

## **CHAPTER 15**

### **FORCE PROJECTION**

#### **References**

JCS Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations  
Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)  
Joint Planning and Execution System (JOPES)  
Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES)  
Army Mobilization Plan  
FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001  
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FM 100-10, Combat Service Support, 3 October 1995  
FM 100-16, Army Operational Support, 31 May 1995  
FM 100-17, Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, 28 October 1992  
FM 100-17-1, Army Pre-positioned Afloat Operations, 27 Jul 1996  
FM 100-17-2, Army Pre-positioned Land, 16 Feb 1999  
FM 100-17-3, Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration, 17 Mar 1999  
1196 FORSCOM Power Projection Handbook, Mar 1999

#### **Objectives**

- Describe the elements of National Power
- Describe the Army's force projection planning system
- Describe the phases of mobilization and deployment
- Understand the levels of mobilization
- Compare the categories of reserve services



## Background

**Students must read (or review) Lesson/Chapter 1 and understand the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) before starting Lesson/Chapter 15.**

## National Power

The nation may apply all or some of its instruments of national power to act in crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. As seen below in Figure 15-1, the elements have advantages and disadvantages. The elements are complementary and the US employs them in varying combinations as components within its overall national security strategy. As their emphasis is intertwined, the distinctions among them often become blurred.

<b>INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER</b>		
<b>Elements</b>	<b>Advantages</b>	<b>Disadvantages</b>
<b>Economic</b>	Only moderately expensive to use	Slow to affect behavior of target Can cost user as much as target
<b>Diplomatic</b>	Very cheap to use Few adverse side effects	Ineffective against determined target
<b>Informational</b>	Very cheap to use Difficult to block/counter	Difficult to determine effectiveness Difficult to control
<b>Military</b>	Usually the most effective and quickest to affect target	High cost (lives) Contingent on national will

Figure 15-1. The Instruments of National Power

## Strategic Concepts

The NMS has **four strategic concepts**, which are the key ideas that govern the use of military force, and forces as the United States executes the strategy of *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now*. These ideas are also important considerations that guide how forces are trained, equipped, and organized. The four strategic concepts are:

- **Strategic Agility**
- **Overseas Presence**

**These are briefly explained in Lesson 1.**

- **Decisive Force**
- **Power Projection**

## Power Projection

Power Projection **is the ability to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain US forces in and from multiple, dispersed locations.** Complementing overseas presence, it strives for unconstrained global reach. Power projection assets are tailored to regional requirements and send a clear signal of US commitment. Being able to project power means being able to act even with no permanent presence or infrastructure in the region. If necessary, it means fighting into a denied theater or creating and protecting forward operating bases. The ability to assemble and move to, through, and between many environments, often reconfiguring to meet specific mission requirements, is essential to offsetting an adversary's advantages in mass or geographic proximity. Global power projection provides our national leaders with the options they need to respond to potential crises.

**Force projection is the military component of power projection. It is the method used to power project the military.** More precisely, **it is the demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, deploy, and operate** forces from CONUS or OCONUS **stations to conduct combat operations or operations other than war anywhere in the world.** Power Projection is a central element of US National Security and National Military Strategy. The Army contributes to this strategy as part of the joint team through **Force Projection**.

## Force Projection

Force projection applies to the entire Army, active and reserve components, based in or OCONUS, and supported by civilians. Combatant commanders often attempt to resolve crises within their area of responsibility (AOR) with forward-presence forces. A quick response may preclude escalation of crises. When such a response is not enough, the projection of forces from CONUS or another theater may be the only recourse.

### Historical Perspective - Operation Just Cause

In 1989 during Operation Just Cause, the armed forces of the United States rapidly assembled, deployed, and conducted an opposed entry operation. The well-tailored force involved in this operation simultaneously seized multiple key targets in Panama, virtually eliminating organized resistance in the space of a few hours. The operation demonstrated the capability of the US military to project forces rapidly against opposition while synchronizing multiple elements of combat power.

Force projection is inherently joint in nature. Key to success is the synchronized employment of land, air, sea, special operations, and space forces and assets that provide the combatant commander with a wide range of operational and tactical options.

Force projection usually begins as a contingency operation--a rapid response to a crisis. Alert may come without notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on soldiers and

systems, accompanied by pressure from the media for information. In any event a rapid, yet measured response, is critical. A combatant commander may be able to resolve the crisis and achieve theater aims faster by committing a smaller forward-presence force than by waiting for a larger but less timely response option.

#### **Historical Perspective - Operation Desert Shield/Storm**

During the 1991 Persian Gulf Conflict, the military was once again called upon to respond to crisis. In the early hours of 2 August 1990, an Iraqi force of more than 100,000 soldiers, spearheaded by three armored divisions, invaded Kuwait. On 7 August, the NCA directed the deployment of US forces in response to Saudi Arabia's request for assistance. USCENTCOM responded rapidly, placing the first US soldier on the ground within 31 hours of the initial alert order.

Operation Desert Shield was a two-phase operation. The first phase involved the initial deployment of forces to deter further Iraqi aggression and to defend Saudi Arabia. The second phase included the subsequent deployment of forces to resource the coalition with a robust counteroffensive capability that could evict the Iraqi Army from Kuwait. Although some units did not begin to deploy until late November, they were in place and combat-ready by early February 1991.

The tailoring of a proper force mix for this operation required the mobilization of 140,000 Army guardsmen and reservists - the largest mobilization since World War II. During this force-projection operation, the Army, supported by the other services, deployed a force equivalent in size to eight divisions and their supporting forces - some 300,000 soldiers and 60 days of supplies - from the United States and Europe, all within a period of six months.

Operation Desert Storm also consisted of two primary phases. CENTCOM initiated a 34-day air operation on 17 January 1991 to gain the initiative by attacking critical Iraqi targets, such as C2 facilities, missile sites, nuclear facilities, and chemical and biological weapons sites, before shifting its focus to the attrition of Iraqi ground units. These operations set the stage for land operations which began in the early morning hours of 24 February 1991. Less than 100 hours later much of the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti theater was destroyed, and the remainder was in flight. Organized resistance ceased, and the allied coalition won a victory of unprecedented dimensions.

The destruction of the Iraqi Army did not end the campaign in the Persian Gulf. Units rapidly began to focus on post conflict activities. Task Force Freedom began operations to restore Kuwait. The task force was charged with assisting in explosive ordnance disposal, public safety, health service support, food and water distribution, sanitation, conversion of currency, reopening of banking and public school systems, and restoration of telephone, radio, and television service.

Task Force Freedom provided invaluable assistance in restoring the Kuwaiti infrastructure and returning a degree of normalcy to the country. Within occupied Iraq, for a period of more than six weeks, US Army forces provided humanitarian assistance, restored

order, opened schools, and resettled almost 20,000 Iraqi refugees into Saudi Arabia.

*Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Storm* dramatically demonstrated the capability of the US to synchronize assets at all levels of war and to respond to crises by rapidly projecting forces. Though these operations differed in terms of the threat faced, forces involved, and duration of deployment, both provided insights for future force-projection operations.

*Operation Provide Comfort*, a joint and combined, post conflict, activity with extensive SOF involvement, focused on providing humanitarian relief and protection to the displaced Kurdish population of Iraq, following an unsuccessful attempt by Kurdish rebels to overthrow the Iraqi government.

Even as this post conflict activity continued, units no longer needed for the campaign began to redeploy to home stations and to reconstitute in preparation for future operations. Reserve component individuals and units no longer needed on active duty demobilized. The Persian Gulf campaign - **a force-projection operation** - thus went full cycle.

The Army participates in force projection in both war and operations other than war (Stability Operations and Support Operations ). US forces may be either **opposed or unopposed**. Opposed operations require a lethal and survivable forcible entry capability with forces prepared to fight immediately upon entry. Unopposed operations may afford an opportunity following arrival in theater to continue to build combat power, to train, and to acclimate. Both demand a versatile mix of light, armored, and special operations forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly. To ensure a rapid response capability, yet retain the flexibility to contend with situations requiring a larger military response, the Army designates units as forward presence, crisis response, initial reinforcement, follow-on reinforcement, and reconstitution. FM 100-17 discusses these units in detail.

## Force Projection Operations

Force-projection operations follow a general sequence, although the stages, as demonstrated in Figure 15-2 below, often overlap in space and time. These operations seldom begin with a clear idea of the entire package or purpose. Often, deployment requirements develop by bits and pieces, with a few false starts and subsequent large adjustments. Enemy actions further change the equation. **Force-projection operations do not end when units arrive in theater. They end when the mission is completed and the last soldier returns.**

Commanders should assume no set arrangement of events. Rather, they should be prepared to deal with many activities. They should conceptualize a logical flow through stages, as long as the force remains physically and mentally prepared to adjust as the situation develops. The stages usually include:

- Stage 1, Mobilization (if necessary)
- Stage 2, Predeployment Activities

- Stage 3, Deployment
- Stage 4, Entry Operations
- Stage 5, Operations
- Stage 6, Postconflict or Postcrisis Operations
- Stage 7, Redeployment and Reconstitution
- Stage 8, Demobilization.




Figure 15-2.

These stages may not be distinct. **Activities of one stage will often blend with another.** Force buildup and preparation for major operations, for example, may blend into deployment and entry operations. Also, combat operations might begin well before the entire force arrives in theater. The following paragraphs discuss potential stages of force-projection operations.<sup>1</sup>

## Stage 1: Mobilization

Mobilization is a process in which the armed forces augment the active component capability in preparation for war or other national emergencies. Mobilization includes activating all or part of the reserve components as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and material and certifying the proficiency of individuals and units.

*“Everyone will now be mobilized and all boys old enough to carry a spear will be sent to Addis Ababa. Married men will take their*

<sup>1</sup> **Author’s note – Aug 2000:** There is significant, ongoing development in the area of force projection. The development is in both the joint and single service environments. This ongoing development will, over time, continue to change the doctrine supporting force projection. FM100-5 is under rewrite and is to be reissued in the near term. Joint Pub 3-35 Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations was issued on September 7, 2000. FM 100-17 and FM 100-17/1/2 & 3 have been recently rewritten or are in final draft. The culmination of these publications may change the number of stages etc but the fundamental considerations you will confront will remain the same.

*wives to carry food and cook. Those without wives will take any woman without a husband. Women with small babies need not go. The blind, those who cannot carry a spear, are exempted. Anyone found at home after receipt of this order will be hanged."*

(1935 Ethiopian Mobilization Order)

Emperor Haile Salassie's 1935 mobilization order is a good example of a simple, and direct order. Its purpose was to initiate the rapid expansion of his country's armed forces in order to defend against an invasion by Italian fascist forces. United States mobilization orders today are not quite so simple, but their purpose is the same.

## Mobilization Management

Mobilization, under the concept of the Graduated Mobilization Response, is a tool provided to the President and Secretary of Defense (previously entitled the National Command Authority or NCA) to respond in varying degrees to crises as they occur. It is the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources. It is also the process by which the Armed Forces, or part of them, are brought to a state of readiness for war or other natural emergency. It can include actions up to ordering Reserve Components (RC) to active duty, extensions of terms of service, and other actions necessary to transition to a wartime posture.

The current force projection military strategy places an enormous premium on the ability of the United States to generate forces. **Mobilization is a phased process designed to be concurrent and continuous, rather than sequential.** It is designed to rapidly expand and enhance the response capability of the Army in support of a military response to a crisis or natural disaster. **The primary objective of the Army mobilization process is to mobilize, deploy, and sustain the theater force.** The major subsystems involved are **theater force units, military manpower, and materiel.** Supporting these subsystems are a number of interrelated CONUS-based functionally oriented subsystems; principally power projection platforms, the training base, the logistics structure, the medical structure, and transportation support. These subsystems are described in more detail below.

## Theater Force Units

The theater force consists of theater force units, military manpower (individuals), and materiel apportioned for deployment to the theater of operations. The objective of the theater force units subsystem is to ensure the orderly and timely availability of Army units at ports of embarkation (air and sea) for deployment as prescribed in war plans or as directed by the JCS. The approved force consists of Active, National Guard, and Reserve units. It may also include certain new, or unresourced, units that would be activated on order.

**Active Army.** Active Component units do not require mobilization as they are either 'forward-based', 'forward-deployed' or designated to support one or more operation plans by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and Annex A of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). When an emergency

arises, the Joint Chiefs of Staff alert CONUS-based active units through US Joint Forces Command (USJFOM) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) channels or through Pacific Command (PACOM) channels for Hawaii and Alaska-based units. Initially deploying units<sup>2</sup>, which deploy by air to link up with prepositioned equipment, turn in equipment that will remain behind, load equipment to accompany troops, load equipment not authorized prepositioning (NAP) and items that may be short in Army Pre-positioned Stocks (APS), and move to a designated airport of embarkation. APS shortages may be shipped by air and/or sea as required by the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). Non-APS units load their equipment and move either to an air or seaport of embarkation.



**Army National Guard.** During peacetime, the preparation of Army National Guard units for mobilization is the responsibility of the State Governor. Guidance is issued to the Governor by HQDA through the Chief, National Guard Bureau, and by FORSCOM and United States Army Pacific (USARPAC) to the Adjutants General of the respective States. The State Governor commands ARNG units until federalized. Once federalized, ARNG units become Active Component units under the appropriate MACOM.



**Army Reserve.** During peacetime, the preparation of Army Reserve units for mobilization is the responsibility of the CG, FORSCOM through the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC); the Commander, USARPAC; and CDR USAREUR for assigned Army Reserve units. Army Reserve units are usually apportioned to one or more operations plans or designated to support the CONUS sustaining base. Selected later-deploying units may receive interim assignments to augment a particular element in the CONUS base. ARPERCEN is responsible for the management and continued training of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) and the Retired Reserve. These pools provide for the largest resource of pre-trained soldiers. ARPERCEN executes its peacetime mission through direction of the Office of the Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) and on order of DCSPER, orders to active duty selected individuals.

**Unresourced and New Units.** FORSCOM prepares, in coordination with each supported Combatant Commander, a proposed activation schedule for each major planning scenario identified in the JSCP. Changes emanating from the Combatant Commander's response to biennial JSCP guidance (TDFDD shortfall), biennial TAA determinations of which units in the required force structure will be unresourced, and structure changes reflected in POM development will all be considered in the development of the proposed Unit Activation Schedule (UAS). The prioritized activations will include

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<sup>2</sup> Note: What were formerly War Reserves and POMCUS Stocks are currently being combined into the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) program.



additional support units required to sustain the current force. In preparing this activation schedule, close attention is given to recognized equipment availability constraints, particularly major weapon systems.

The composition of the proposed UAS and the recommended priorities will be reviewed and approved by HQDA.

**The Army WARTRACE Program.** The Army WARTRACE Program **organizes the total force into cohesive groupings of Active and Reserve** (ARNG and USAR) **units** based on contingency mission requirements. The primary objective is to train in peacetime in the alignment configuration the unit will go to war. AR 11-30 and FORSCOM Reg 11-30 govern the program. **Headquarters FORSCOM is the coordinating authority for the WARTRACE program.** The minimum guidance given to units will contain the unit's wartime mission, area of employment, and the recommended priorities for planning and training.

## **Military Manpower**

The objective of the military manpower subsystem is to ensure full and timely use of all available sources of individual military manpower to fill the requirements of theater force units for deployment, sustain the deployed force with trained fillers and replacements, and provide mobilization augmentation for the CONUS sustaining base.

## **Materiel**

The objective of the materiel subsystem is to ensure the full and timely availability of adequate military materiel to fill the requirements of theater force units for deployment and to sustain the deployed force in accordance with requirements and priorities. Sources of supplies and equipment include the organic equipment of deploying and non-deploying units, POMCUS Unit Residual (left behind) Equipment (PURE), and that equipment scheduled for delivery through procurement and maintenance channels.

## **Subsystems**

**Power Projection Platforms (PPPs).** The objective of the Power Projection Platforms subsystem (formally called mobilization stations) is to ensure the orderly expansion of Army posts, camps, and stations and their timely ability to receive, house, supply, train, and deploy theater force units. Installations develop mobilization TDAs (MOBTDA)s based on the guidance provided by their parent MACOM to enable Force Projection Platforms to meet surge population and operational requirements. Expansion of mobilization services is accomplished by deleting non-mission-essential services; extending work time; executing option clauses in existing contracts; contracting for personnel and services, and utilizing USAR Garrison Support Units and Deployment Support Brigades (DSB)s. When mobilized units arrive at their designated PPP, command passes to the PPP Commander who is responsible for correcting readiness deficiencies that restrict the deployment readiness of the units. He cross-levels personnel and equipment in accordance with established HQDA policies and priorities and FORSCOM/USARPAC instructions. He is responsible for unit training and deployment validation in accordance with HQDA policy as implemented by FORSCOM/USARPAC. See Figure 15-3 for locations and designations of these installations.

**Training Base.** The objective of the training base subsystem is to ensure the orderly and timely availability of trained manpower to mobilize for CONUS base support and theater force requirements. TRADOC and HQDA are responsible for operating the component organizations that comprise the post-mobilization

training base, induction centers, reception stations, training centers, and Service schools.




Figure 15-3. CONUS Power Projection/Support Platforms <sup>3</sup>

**Logistics Support System.** The objective of the logistics support subsystem is to provide logistical support to meet mobilization and deployment/employment requirements of the Total Army. Supply, maintenance, services, and facilities capabilities must be expanded to deploy and sustain the force

**Medical Support.** As dictated by crisis action, US Army hospitals will initiate conversion to their planned mobilization configuration to accommodate the vastly increased military population and expected theater force casualties. Health care services (inpatient and outpatient) will be limited to active duty military personnel (outpatient occupational health services will continue for civil service employees) and all non-military inpatients will be discharged or transferred to civilian or other federal hospitals as expeditiously as possible.

**Transportation Support.** The objective of the transportation support subsystem is to move the Total Force (units and materiel) within CONUS, and to and from overseas commands. Overall responsibility for transportation support is vested in USTRANSCOM and its transportation component commands.

<sup>3</sup> **Note:** The former 38 mobilization stations have been redesigned and reduced to 27. Fifteen are Power Projection Platforms and 12 are Power Support Platforms. The former were selected based on their collective capacity to mobilize and deploy designated units of the Major Contingency and Rapid Regional Response Forces, and 100% of the designated FSP units. PPPs will perform TRADOC's training base expansion mission, mobilize individuals, serve as initial mobilization stations for certain ARNG enhanced brigades prior to mobilization training.

Intra-CONUS movements of mobilizing units and materiel are coordinated by the Military Traffic and Management Command (MTMC), which is responsible for CONUS line-haul and common-user terminal operations, in cooperation with installation transportation officers and various state and local agencies. Strategic transportation to and from overseas theaters is the responsibility of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Air Mobility Command (AMC), the other two component commands. USTRANSCOM coordinates and monitors time-sensitive planning and execution of force and resupply movements for deployment of CONUS-based Army and Air Force combat forces. It also coordinates deployment planning with Navy and Marine Corps forces. (These deployments should not be confused with the normal rotation of units, ships, squadrons, etc. in peacetime.)

### **Mobilization Phases**

The five phases of mobilization are **Planning, Alert, Home Station (HS), Mobilization Station, and Port of Embarkation (POE)** and these are shown in Fig 15-4.


**PH 1** **Planning and Preparation**, involves RC units at home stations during peacetime. During this phase, units plan, train, and prepare to accomplish assigned mobilization missions; prepare mobilization plans and files as directed by their higher commands and in accordance with FORMDEPS; attend PPP coordination conferences; provide required planning data to their PPP; and conduct mobilization training as directed. Each unit takes as many administrative and processing actions as possible prior to mobilization. Plans, to include movement planning, must be completed for the following phases.

**PH 2** **Alert**, begins when a unit receives notice of a pending order to active duty and ends when the unit enters active Federal service. The unit takes specific actions, outlined in detail in the Reserve Component Unit Commander's Handbook (RCUCH), to transition from RC to AC status. Simultaneously, the unit begins to implement actions with available personnel and facilities, and takes the necessary emergency actions to complete the administrative and processing actions initiated in Phase I.

**PH 3** **Home Station**, begins with the unit's entry on active Federal status and ends when the unit arrives at its PPP or port of embarkation (POE). During this phase, the unit completes its transition to AC status.

**PH 4** **Mobilization Station**, activities begin when the mobilized unit arrives at its PPP, and ends when the unit is evaluated as operationally ready for deployment. Additional training may vary as evaluations dictate. The unit's goal is to attain operational readiness and meet minimum deployment criteria in the shortest possible time, consistent with its deployment or operational mission.

**PH 5** **Port of Embarkation**, begins with arrival of the unit at its POE, and encompasses all activities while there. These activities include loading of equipment, and manifesting and loading personnel. This phase ends with the departure of personnel and equipment from the POE.

Figure 15-4. The Mobilization Process <sup>4</sup>

## Levels of Mobilization



Although mobilization pertains to both the active and reserve component (AC and RC) structure, the primary emphasis is directed to the Army Reserve structure. To achieve mobilization, the President and Secretary of Defense has the option to exercise, with the concurrence of the US Congress, one or more of the five authorized levels of mobilization. The five levels of mobilization are;

- **Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up,**
- **Partial Mobilization,**
- **Full Mobilization,**
- **Total Mobilization, and**

<sup>4</sup> Source FORSCOM Mobilization/Deployment Handbook Mar 1999

- **Selective Mobilization.**

#### **Mobilization Levels – In Brief**

- **Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up.** By executive order, the President may augment the active duty forces for an operational mission with **up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve of the armed forces for a Maximum of 270 days, with no extension.**<sup>5</sup> **The President must notify Congress whenever he uses this authority to call up the RC.**
- **Partial Mobilization** requires a presidential or congressional declaration of a state of national emergency. **Under a presidential declaration of national emergency, up to one million members of the Ready Reserve may be mobilized/recalled for up to 24 months.** A congressional declaration of national emergency and subsequent reserve mobilization is not limited to a specific number of reservists or length of tour unless specified in a congressional resolution.
- **Full Mobilization** authorizes the call-up of all forces in the current force structure to active duty, fully equipped, manned, and sustained. **All RC units and individuals of the IRR, Standby, and Retired Reserve may be ordered to active duty. The length of service is for the duration of the war or emergency and for six months thereafter.**
- **Total Mobilization** expands the active armed forces by organizing and activating additional units beyond the existing approved troop structure when responding to requirements exceeding the current troop structure. All resources needed, including production facilities, may be mobilized to support and sustain the armed forces.
- **Selective Mobilization is an expansion of active duty forces in response to a peacetime domestic crisis.** The President, or Congress, upon special action, may order expansion of the active duty forces by **mobilizing units and individuals of the Selected Reserve to protect life, federal property, and functions or to prevent disruption of federal activities.** A selective mobilization would not be associated with a requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security

#### **Reserve Components**



The reserve force of the Army consists of two components: the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR). These forces, together with the Active Component (AC) and the Civilian Component (Department of the Army Civilians) make up America's Army. While the National Guard evolved from the tradition of the decentralized colonial or state controlled militia ("minutemen") who fought both the French and the British, the Army Reserve evolved from the reality that a significant portion of the nation's

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<sup>5</sup> This was signed as legislation on 5 Oct 94 by the POTUSA, which changed the current legislation from 90 days with an extension of up to 90 additional days as stated in FM 100-17.

military reserve must be centrally controlled in times of peace and war, like the Active Army, by the Federal Government.

*Title 10, US Code*, contains the general and permanent laws governing the Armed Forces. Various sections of *Title 10* establish and govern the RC. The role of the RC, as stated in Section 10101, *Title 10*, 'is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in time for war, national emergency, or when national security requires'. Specific provisions of the Code pertaining to the Army and the Air National Guard are contained in *Title 32*. *Title 32* further states that ARNG units shall be ordered to federal active duty and retained as long as necessary whenever Congress determines that they are needed. The role of the RC has clearly been expanded from the traditional 'war time augmentation' force to now being an integral part of the total force. Today's Army can meet no major contingency without the RC.



### Categories of Reserve Service

There are **three major categories of reserve service**:

- The **Ready Reserve**,
- The **Standby Reserve**; and
- The **Retired Reserve**,

**The Ready Reserve.** Within the Ready Reserve, there are three sub-categories:



**The Selected Reserve.** The Selected Reserve consists of ARNG and USAR unit members, Active Guard Reserve (AGR), and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (USAR only). Included in the Selected Reserve are Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) (USAR only) who are preassigned to active component positions which must be filled on or shortly after mobilization. **IMAs are available for call-up as part of the PSRC or any other level of mobilization.** IMAs may volunteer for active duty at any time.



**Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).** The IRR (USAR only) is composed of trained non-unit reserve personnel who are liable for involuntary active duty in time of war or national emergency declared by the Congress or by the President. In peacetime, the ARPERCEN commander commands the IRR. **Upon declaration of partial mobilization or full mobilization, IRR members are ordered to active duty as individual fillers or replacements in accordance with priorities set by DA.** IRRs may volunteer for active duty at any time.



**Inactive Army National Guard (ING).** The ING provides the means for individuals who are unable to participate actively to continue in a military status in the ARNG. While in the ING, individuals retain their federal recognition and Reserve of the Army status as members of the ARNG units. They are subject to immediate involuntary mobilization with units to which they assigned in time of Federal or State emergency. Personnel transferred to the ING normally will be attached to their former ARNG

units. They are encouraged to participate in annual training with their parent unit.



**The Standby Reserve (USAR only)** Individuals in the Standby Reserve are those who have completed all active duty and reserve training requirements and have either requested reassignment to the Standby Reserve to maintain an affiliation with the military, or have been screened from RC unit or IRR roles for one of several cogent reasons i.e. members of Congress or the Federal Judiciary whose positions cannot be vacated during mobilization without seriously impairing their agency's capability to function effectively, are examples of Standby Reservists. Members of the Standby Reserve cannot be involuntarily ordered to active duty under less than a full mobilization. In recent years, the Standby Reserve has consisted of less than 500 individuals.



- **Retired Reserve (USAR only)** Individuals in the Retired Reserve include those entitled to retiree pay from the Armed Forces because of prior military service or who have completed 20 or more qualifying years of reserve (ARNG or USAR) and/or active service for which retirement benefits are not payable until age 60. In addition, ARNG/USAR officers and warrant officers who are drawing retired pay after completing 20 or more years of active federal service are, by statute, members of the Retired Reserve, Regular Army enlisted men, retired after 20 (but less than 30) years of active service, are automatically transferred to the Retired Reserve until completing 30 years.

## Summary

The utility of the Army to the nation depends to a large extent on whether its forces can be rapidly and effectively mobilized, deployed, employed, and sustained. The process of planning for contingencies is a continuous, all-encompassing process. Mobilization requires detailed planning, crossing numerous functional areas and departments. Non-DoD agencies, as well as DoD organizations, must fully participate in the creation and execution of mobilization plans. Advance preparation addressing the total spectrum of possible military operations will ensure effective and efficient mobilization of units, individuals, and logistics. Central to the task of reinforcing existing active forces is the ability to mobilize Reserve Component assets and to deploy them with the least possible delay to the theater where they will be needed.





## The Planning System

The Army's force structure must be designed to generate forces for maximum early combat power and support units to sustain that power. Both the Active and Reserve Components must provide these capabilities without the lengthy preparation periods that have been characteristic of the past. The need for deploying a substantial number of Reserve Component units overseas in the initial stages of a conflict underscores the importance placed on the Total Army force structure. Figure 15-5 portrays the Army's current Force Projection Force Requirements.




Figure 15-5. Army Force Projection Force Requirements

The deterrent value of mobilization resides not only in the Active and Reserve Components, but also in the preparedness to convert civilian manpower and industrial production rapidly into military power, individual replacements, and supplies. The capability of the United States to expand the active force rapidly and efficiently through mobilization is essential in deterring potential enemies. Such a capability assures our allies and coalition partners of US resolve. Fundamental to achieving such a capability is the coordination of mobilization planning with the planned deployments for war, which require mobilization.

Joint military planning is conducted within the framework of the **Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)** and the **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)**. These systems are related to each other and to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). **Army operations planning, to implement joint planning tasks, is conducted within the framework of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES).** Other Service systems, similar to Army's AMOPES, include the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP) and the Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN), the Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP), the Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP), and the Coast Guard Logistic Support and Capabilities Plan (CG LSCP).

**Deliberate Planning is the cornerstone of the peacetime joint planning process**, which begins with the publication of the principal task assignment document, the biennial Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and ends in the last year of the JSCP. This process includes several critical activities:

- The five phases in the deliberate planning process are described below. The planning process begins when a commander is assigned a task, and ends when supporting plans have been approved by the supported commander. Of course, from the supported commander's perspective, the deliberate planning process is never completed, for at that level, planning, training and preparation are ongoing activities.

[illegible]

In its basic form, Deliberate Planning has **five formal phases**, which produce a family of plans (the Supported Commander's Plan, Supporting plans, and plans for concurrent execution).

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The five formal phases are:

- **Phase I. INITIATION.** Planning tasks are assigned, major combat forces and strategic transportation assets are apportioned for planning, and the groundwork is laid for additional planning.
- **Phase II. CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT.** The combatant commander derives his mission from the assigned task and issues guidance to his staff. Information about the enemy is collected and analyzed. The staff then analyzes and proposes tentative courses of action, the commander selects the best course of action, and the staff develops and documents a concept of operations. The Joint Staff reviews the concept, and it is approved by the JCS.
- **Phase III. PLAN DEVELOPMENT.** The combatant commander's staff and the staff of the Service components develop a detailed, feasible transportation flow of resources into the theater to support the concept. Forces are selected, time-phased support requirements are determined, and the strategic transportation flow is computer simulated. The information that is required for the plan, that is, the combat and support units along with the equipment and supply support, is collected in the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) file. This phase ends when the fully documented OPLAN, including TPFDD, is forwarded to JCS for review and approval.
- **Phase IV. PLAN REVIEW.** This phase is a formal element of the deliberate planning process. Even before this phase begins, the OPLAN has received a concept review and an intermediate review. It is during this phase that all elements of the plan are reviewed by JCS for adequacy and feasibility.
- **Phase V. SUPPORTING PLAN.** In this last phase, each subordinate and supporting commander who is assigned a task in the Combatant Commander's plan prepares a supporting plan. The supporting commander submits these OPLANS to the supported combatant commander for review and approval. The planning process is not complete until the employment plans and the supporting deployment plans are complete; only then is the Combatant Commander's plan ready for implementation.

From the deliberate planning process two plans can be created. The first is called the concept plan or CONPLAN. **The important element of the CONPLAN is the concept of the operation, which is developed during the concept development phase.** Once that phase is complete the planning process ends for the CONPLAN.

The other plan that is created and most often associated with deliberate planning is the operation plan or OPLAN. The OPLAN includes the concept of the operation. **The OPLAN covers all five phases and most importantly includes detailed support requirements and TPFDD files.** This information is excluded from a CONPLAN.

**OPLANS are initiated for contingencies that have the potential for grave consequences to the security of the United States. CONPLANS are developed**

**when the contingency is not sufficiently critical to national security to warrant detailed planning.**

In the event that time does not permit deliberate planning joint planners use crisis action planning for rapid response. It too is composed of phases and may require the dusting off of OPLANS and CONPLANS. The big difference is the amount of time and resources available to produce a timely operations order.

***The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).*** JOPES is the integrated joint conventional command and control system used to support military operation monitoring, planning, and execution (including theater-level nuclear and chemical plans) activities. JOPES incorporates policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities by interfacing with ADP systems, reporting systems, and the underlying Global Command and Control System (GCCS), which replaced the Worldwide Military Command and Control System in September 1995, which supplies ADP support to provide senior-level decision makers and their staffs with enhanced capability to plan and conduct joint military operations. It also addresses mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment mission areas. These JOPES procedures, and the supporting ADP systems, are the mechanisms for submitting movement requirements to USTRANSCOM.

***The Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES).*** AMOPES is, in essence, the Army's interface with the JSCP; it provides guidance to Army commands and agencies for strategic employment of Army forces, identifies AC and RC combat forces available to execute operational plans for regional contingencies, and establishes priorities for the apportionment of CS and CSS units in conjunction with existing operational plans. Additionally, AMOPES provides mobilization, deployment, and demobilization guidance for planning and execution, along with a detailed description of the Army's Crisis Action System. (AMOPES, due to its broad focus and lack of specificity, is normally not distributed below CONUSA level.) A thorough revision of AMOPES was published in late 1997.

AMOPES provides a standard set of guidelines for developing these plans and is the vehicle by which all components of the Army plan are brought together to meet the requirements of unified commands.

***The Army Mobilization Plan (AMP).*** The Army Mobilization Plan is the collected mobilization plans of HQDA and the MACOMs. AR 500-5 directs the preparation of mobilization plans or files at every level from MACOM to unit, and prescribes the minimum plans to be included in the AMP. At present, there are ten mobilization plans for Army commands and agencies included in the AMP.

## Stage 2: Predeployment Activity

Successful force-projection capabilities rely on a foundation of fully trained, well-led, properly equipped and sustained units and soldiers. All units in the Army, whether active or reserve components, within CONUS or OCONUS, are an integral part of the force-projection strategy. Thus, unit METLs must reflect appropriate mobilization and deployment tasks. Also, unit training must emphasize and integrate critical aspects of force projection.



When required to deploy forces in response to a crisis, the Army tailors them based upon the mission assigned by the combatant commander and available resources. The theater campaign plan will specify the command, intelligence, and logistics relationships among the services. It should also specify any combined operations relationships, if known. Intelligence preparation must begin as early as possible to allow commanders to develop adequate plans. The deploying force achieves this through split-based operations, which integrate CONUS-based national systems with forward-deploying tactical systems. Anticipatory logistics planning during this stage is key to successful execution of later stages. While always important, OPSEC is critical during this stage to deny the enemy intelligence that he may use against friendly forces during deployment and entry operations.

Army commanders must prioritize lift requirements consistent with METT-TC. The combatant commander or JFC can then establish the sequence in which Army units should deploy relative to the movement of forces of the other services. Early decisions on sequencing will solidify the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), determine the time required to deploy the force, and initialize the theater distribution plan.

### Stage 3: Deployment Operations

The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) provides the umbrella structure for the deployment of Army units. Deployment planning tools must allow commanders to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances. Sealift and airlift assets are limited yet critical to the successful projection of the force. The Army therefore makes every effort to integrate the capabilities of the deploying force with host nation support and forward-presence capabilities to maximize the available airlift and sealift. US Army forces are trained, structured, and postured for rapid deployment. Light forces are based close to major airports. Armored forces are located near major rail nets, assisting rapid displacement to seaports.

#### Phases of Deployment

The five deployment phases, shown in Figure 15-7, include predeployment activities, movement to the POE, strategic lift, theater reception, and theater onward movement. Concurrent with, and resulting from, the deployment of the forces and logistics, the combatant commander conducts lodgement, stabilization, and restoration of conditions amicable to US interests.

- **PHASE I, Predeployment Activities**, during normal peacetime operations, include preparation for crisis response and force-projection missions. Based on the operational requirements of the supported Combatant Commander, Army organizations are designated, equipped, trained, and led with force projection capabilities in mind. Units conduct routine collective deployment training to ensure the Army forces, manpower, and material are deployed to meet the combatant commander's mission requirements.
- **PHASE II, Movement to the Port of Embarkation**, only begins when the mobilization process and/or Phase I, Predeployment Activities is complete, and when the unit has completed Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) and has been validated as operationally ready.

- **PHASE III, Strategic Lift**, begins with the unit's departure from the POE and ends with its arrival in the operational theater.




Figure 15-7. Force Projection Phases

- **PHASE IV, Theater Base Reception**, begins with the arrival of forces and sustainment at the port of debarkation (POD) in the theater, and ends with the departure of the forces from the POD.<sup>6</sup>
- **PHASE V, Theater Onward Movement**, includes the personnel and equipment linkup, the reconfiguration of forces, sustainment, and receipt of pre-positioned war reserve stock at designated marshaling areas. This phase concludes with arrival at the gaining command's staging areas where combat preparation occurs.

## Stage 4: Entry Operations

The requirements of entry operations following deployment will vary. Entry may be in direct support of a host nation or forward-presence forces. In some instances conditions may dictate that operations be conducted in the absence of either. Further, entry may be either opposed or unopposed and these factors will heavily influence force and deployment asset selection. Commanders will sequence combat units and supporting structures into the contingency area in a manner that enables them to gain and sustain the initiative and protect the force. More detail on the Reception in a Theater Phase is given in Chapter 14.

<sup>6</sup> **Author's note – Aug 2000:** Joint Pub 3-35 Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, released 7 Sep 1999, sets Four Phases of Deployment: 1. Predeployment Activities, 2. Movement To and Activities at Port of Embarkation, 3. Movement to Port of Debarkation, 4. Reception Staging, Onward Movement & Integration. In essence this combines the existing Phases IV & V into one phase. Army will change its doctrine to match this in due course.

**Unopposed Entry.** Whenever possible, US forces seek unopposed entry, entering the theater peacefully with the assistance of the host nation. Early deploying units may flow through airports or seaports into a lodgment area. From this area, they will prepare to assist forward-presence or host nation forces, protect the force, reconfigure, build combat capability, train, and acclimate to the environment. Entry during operations other than war will normally be unopposed. However, even in an apparently benign entry operation, protection of the force remains a critical command consideration.

**Opposed Entry.** An opposed entry requires combat operations to land deploying forces in the theater. If the circumstances are right, the entry and combat operations stages could combine in a coup de main, achieving the strategic objectives in a single major operation. Operation Just Cause, conducted in Panama in 1989, is such an example. When this type of operation is not possible, Army forces will typically gain, secure, and expand a lodgment as part of the joint team before conducting combat operations. The operation is at greatest risk during opposed entry operations in which units move directly to combat operations. Often this will be the first contact between US forces and the enemy. Commanders make maximum use of joint capabilities to ensure early lethality and security of the force by engaging the enemy in depth. Early entry forces may have to move immediately to combat operations to take advantage of an opportunity, protect the force, or even conduct retrograde operations to gain time for additional force buildup. Situations are likely to arise with little or no advance warning. Opposed entry operations will require the full synchronization of joint capabilities in order to place large ground forces in the theater.

### Early Entry Decisions

The initial decisions in force-projection operations will often be the most critical. These decisions normally fall into an early deployment time window. Once decisions are made and the operation begins, adjustments, while necessary, become more difficult. Thus, it is vital that commanders and staffs focus immediately on deployment, early entry, and force placement in the theater decisions. The essential trade-off is between projecting force rapidly and projecting the right mix of combat power and resources to accomplish the mission. The selection of the earliest arriving units will have far-reaching implications.

If the right units deploy early, they may help the force maintain a balanced posture, ready to respond to unforeseen events. In areas with substantial infrastructure, the commander may more heavily weight his force with combat units. **When entry is made into an area requiring infrastructure enhancement, CS and CSS units will be needed early in the flow.** This will reduce combat units arriving early in theater.

These decisions are most difficult when combat has not begun, yet the enemy is capable of sudden, effective opposition. In such cases, the commander must seek a balance that provides protection of his force, efficient deployment, and a range of feasible response options should the enemy attack. Joint force cooperation is particularly critical in this phase. Air and naval forces may have to compensate for an initial lack of ground combat power that can reach deep.



Forces are most vulnerable, and the success of the contingency operation is at greatest risk, during initial entry. This vulnerability is acute when the enemy possesses weapons of mass destruction. Defensive and offensive operations to counter these weapons will affect both Army and joint planning. Protecting the force will be critical to the success of this phase of the operation because of extreme vulnerability.

Even as the commander begins entry operations, the main focus shifts to building up capabilities in preparation for operations. **Projection of the force and rapid buildup may include establishing forward operating and logistics bases**, closing the remainder of the force, expanding the lodgment, linking up with other forces, and preparing for future operations.

Placement of the force on the ground must not only achieve initial mission success but also have forces arrayed on the ground to maximize future employment options. The commander works to acclimate and train arriving soldiers. Whether or not units are in combat, the emphasis is on seizing the initiative early and controlling events from this point in time forward. To do so, commanders at all levels generate as many options as possible by skillfully positioning maneuver and support assets, protecting the force, refining intelligence assessments, and using fires appropriately. Sustaining the tempo of operations is especially important. The success of operations may hinge on swift response in peacetime or on the rapid generation of combat power in conflict to prevent losing the initiative.

## Stage 5: Operations

In operations involving combat, the JFC will at some point decide to move against the enemy. This point in time may be predetermined and stated in the campaign plan, or it may be tied to specific enemy actions. In either case, the commander bases his decision on sufficient information and a clear picture of the enemy. Occasionally, commitment might be required before such a picture is available. At this point, the ground commander might reposition forces to facilitate the imminent start of combat.

The arrangement of forces on the ground in relation to one another, the terrain, and the enemy should allow the maximum number of employment options. Sometimes such positioning will be at a significant offset from the actual operational area, thus continuing the reliance tactical commanders must place on theater and national intelligence assets. In order to paralyze the enemy and rapidly gain the initiative for friendly forces, commanders normally seek to engage enemy forces simultaneously throughout the depth and space of the operational arena.

As he begins operations, the ground commander assembles sufficient, sustained combat power to win the decisive battles. He allocates enough combat power to supporting efforts to ensure overall victory. Force agility, initiative, and synchronized operations in depth characterize the rapid generation of combat power for ground operations. The ground commander may have initially dispersed his maneuver forces out of range of most enemy direct-fire and indirect-fire systems. In order to conduct decisive action, he maneuvers them to gain the best positional advantage over the enemy. This maneuver eventually results in close combat with enemy forces.

Reconnaissance and force protection remain crucial to the joint and ground commanders' plans as they engage the enemy in combat operations. Actions to counter

the enemy's reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition efforts help maintain the conditions created earlier for decisive operations. Deception operations continue to mislead the enemy commander as to the timing, intent, and location of friendly forces, as well as to the objectives of the operation. **Commanders conduct their operations against the backdrop of a sound logistics concept integrated with their concept of combat operations.** Conduct of combat operations within the theater is described in detail in later chapters. Commanders also seek decisive results in operations other than war, although the approach may be quite different than for obtaining successful results in war.

## Stage 6: Postconflict and Postcrisis Operations

Successful combat operations are designed to bring an end to the war. **When a cessation of hostilities or a truce is called, deployed forces transition to a period of postconflict operations. This transition can occur even if residual combat operations are still underway in parts of the theater of operations.** Anticipation and appropriate planning during earlier stages will smooth the transition during this critical period immediately after the fighting stops.

The postconflict operations stage focuses on restoring order and minimizing confusion following the operation, reestablishing the host nation infrastructure, preparing forces for redeployment, and continuing presence to allow other elements of national power to achieve the overall strategic aims. Postconflict operations make demands at every level of command. Company- and even squad-sized units may be called upon to conduct emergency humanitarian assistance and population control, especially in remote areas. At higher echelons, commanders must engage in joint planning with the State Department, relief agencies, and host nation officials to prepare for a smooth and rapid transition to host country rule.

Army forces are extremely well-suited for postconflict operations. The Army has the skills and staying power to control prisoners, handle refugees, mark mine fields and destroy unexploded ordnance, provide emergency health service support, provide humanitarian assistance and support the social needs of the civilian population, provide emergency restoration of utilities and other civil affairs, and perform other required humanitarian assistance activities. During the postconflict stage, commanders emphasize those activities that reduce postconflict or postcrisis turmoil and help stabilize the situation until other US, international, interagency, or host nation agencies assume control.

The postconflict stage may be interrupted by the resumption of hostilities. Thus, **units must rapidly consolidate, reconstitute, train, and otherwise prepare to remain in theater should fighting resume.** During this time, force protection is vital in order to prevent isolated enemy individuals or forces from engaging in destructive operations.

## Stage 7: Redeployment and Reconstitution

The objective in this stage is to redeploy assets no longer needed. Postconflict requirements have a direct impact on the redeployment flow. The extent of this impact is dependent upon the amount of disruption caused by the crisis and the measures and

forces required to resolve it. Commanders contend with the same challenge as in deployment, balancing the factors of METT-T against available lift assets. Forces and materiel not required for subsequent operations will redeploy to CONUS or their home theater and prepare for future missions. Redeploying forces must also prepare for deployment to areas other than home stations on short notice. Protection of the force during redeployment is as critical as during deployment or any other stage of the operation. **Planners must also consider the significant resources required for packaging and preparation. Successful redeployment may require contractor and host nation support.**

Reconstitution activities can begin in the theater prior to redeployment. These include rebuilding unit integrity and accounting for soldiers and equipment. These activities continue after arrival in CONUS or home theater, with focus on the reconstitution of units to pre-mobilization levels of readiness, the regeneration of logistics stockpiles, and the accountability of mobilized equipment and supplies. Reconstitution will be discussed in more detail in Lesson/Chapter 14.

## Stage 8: Demobilization

Demobilization is the process by which units, individuals, and materiel transfer from active to a pre-mobilization posture or to some other approved posture. **Although the overall focus of demobilization is generally on units and individuals, the demobilization of logistics also requires significant resources such as supplies, materiel, and support activities.**



## Chapter 15: Force Projection Homework Assignment

Manuals Required to Complete Homework: FM 100-17

1. Name and describe the five (5) mobilization levels.

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-1/2/3 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

2. A Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up requires a declaration of national emergency.

\_\_\_\_\_ True  
\_\_\_\_\_ False

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-1 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

3. A Partial Mobilization may occur without a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up.

\_\_\_\_\_ True  
\_\_\_\_\_ False

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-3 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

4. List the five (5) mobilization phases and briefly describe them.

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-5 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

5. Mobilization Phase II for RC units begins \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ and ends  
\_\_\_\_\_.

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-8 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

6. Mobilization Phase III for RC units begins \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ and ends  
\_\_\_\_\_.

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-8 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

7. Mobilization Phase IV for RC units begins \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ and ends  
\_\_\_\_\_.

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-10 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

8. Mobilization Phase V for RC units begins \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ and ends  
\_\_\_\_\_.

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-12 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

9. Who are Individual Mobilization Augmentees?

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-13 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

10. What is the Individual Ready Reserve?

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-14 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

11. What is the Retired Reserve?

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-14 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

12. What is the Standby Reserve?

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-14 (Extract in TLOG Handbook Chap 15)

13. Explain the role of mobilization TDAs in providing sustaining base manpower.

**SUSTAINING BASE MANPOWER**

Planners identify sustaining base manpower requirements in the deliberate planning process by constructing comprehensive mobilization tables of distribution and allowances (MOBTDA). AR 310-49 provides detailed guidance for preparing a MOBTDA. Requirements for IMA positions and military and civilian augmenters are all reflected on the MOBTDA. Military positions are considered suitable for fill by retirees unless coded to the contrary. Properly prepared MOBTDA support both the assignment of IMAs, sustaining manpower requirements, and pre-assignment of retirees.

Ref: FM 100-17, p3-15

## **NOTES**