

## **PART III -- APPENDIX A**

### **THE CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER (CMOC)**

#### **Background**

For nearly twenty years, the term CMOC has been widely and somewhat indiscriminately used throughout the CA (community affairs) community and the Army. In some instances, the term referred to the unit G5/CMO sections when fully augmented; in others it referred to the tactical operations centers of supporting CA units (command, brigade or battalion). Irrespective of this the roles and functions of a CMOC remained the same: to assist the unit G5/CMO officer in anticipating, coordinating, and orchestrating those civil-military functions pertaining to the civil population, government, and economy of areas in which armed forces are employed.

Although the term 'CMOC' was not promulgated in doctrine, it posed no dilemmas to either general purpose or special operations force commanders and their staffs. But during the period early 1991 to late 1994, the CMOC experience led to a gradual maturing of not only the term but also its usage.

#### **Operation Provide Comfort (northern Iraq, April 1991)**

Encouraged by American radio broadcasts to rise up against their 'dictator', the Kurds of northern Iraq rebelled against a nominally defeated and certainly weakened Saddam Hussein in March of 1991. Although it enjoyed initial success the Republican Guard quickly and ruthlessly crushed the rebellion. By April 2nd over a million Kurds had fled Iraq (approx. 800,000 Kurds in Iran, 300,000 in southeastern Turkey and another 100,000 along the Turkish/Iraq border. With between 500 and 1000 Kurds dying each day in the 8,000 foot mountain passes, on April 5th President Bush ordered the military to assist the Kurds, primarily through airdrops. By April 16th the situation had grown steadily worse and President Bush, in conjunction with European allies, announced the creation of a security zone in northern Iraq. A multi-national military force was quickly raised and given the mission to stabilize the situation and work to return the Kurds to their homelands in northern Iraq and the Turkish mountains. This effort became known as *Operation Provide Comfort*.

Combined Task Force (CTF) *Provide Comfort* was established in Incirlik Air Force Base, Adana, Turkey, to support the initial airdrops in early April. Two subordinate joint task forces (JTFs) were also established to facilitate the mission. JTF 'Alpha' spread throughout the mountains of southeast Turkey, headquartered in Silopi, was responsible for alleviating the dying and suffering while stabilizing the situation. Commanded by BG Richard Potter, USA, JTF Alpha was composed primarily of the 10th Special Forces (SF) Group. The second component, JTF 'Bravo', centered on the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) commanded by MG Jay Garner, USA. Its mission was to prepare the town of Zakho, in northern Iraq, for the incoming Kurds and facilitate their eventual transfer back to their homes. An important part of this mission was the 'seamless' transfer of responsibility over to NGOs.

As Operation *Provide Comfort* matured, many GO, IO, NGO and PVO participating independently in the relief/humanitarian efforts eventually, if somewhat reluctantly, demanded access to the JTF CMOC so they could coordinate their efforts and thus reduce redundancy within their area of responsibility (AOR). Their access to the JTF commander was unobstructed; the CMOC, located across the street from the JTF HQ at Incirlik Air Base, facilitated 24-hour access. The CMOC comprised an augmentation element of USAR CA personnel from the 353rd CA Command which operated under the staff supervision of the JTF Civil-Military Operations officer, BG Don Campbell (commanding general of USEUCOM aligned 353rd CA Command). This JTF CMOC received data from the JTF Joint Operations Center, GO, IO, NGO, and PVO, and developed CMO-related plans in support of the JTF objectives.

### **Operation Restore Hope (Somalia, December 1992 to May 1993)**

In response to an increasing American and international public opinion that demanded reaction to a country stricken by a man-made famine and racked by clan rivalry and random banditry, the United States, with the blessing of the United Nations, took action in late 1992. On December 3rd, U.N. Security Resolution 794 authorized the U.S. led intervention "to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible." Six days later the United States Marines came shore in Mogadishu and quickly established an expeditionary infrastructure to facilitate security and the delivery of food to the starving Somalis.

On December 11th, the Marines established a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and collocated it with the U.N.'s Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC). By doing this, the CMOC quickly became the national focus point for NGO/U.S. military coordination. While the U.S. failed to acknowledge the political dimensions of the situation at the highest political levels (which would lead to tragic results in the second phase, UNOSOM II), Operation Restore Hope was nevertheless a humanitarian success. Both the CMOC/HOC were located within the former U.S. Embassy compound.

Operation Restore Hope also demonstrates some of the problems that can be experienced as a result of incomplete or ineffective political analysis. Because the operation was purely 'humanitarian' with no long-term aims, the CMOC lacked enough Army Civil Affairs personnel. Given their stellar performance during Operation *Provide Comfort* this at first glance appears strange. While Charlie Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, was sent to Somalia, none of the reserve component (despite receiving call-up orders) were ever activated. Two reasons appear in the literature; activation of such units generally implies a long-term commitment and the Marines (the short-term expeditionary unit first sent to Somalia) thought they did not need them - both reasons fitted in well with the political climate of Washington D.C. in late 1992.

By early 1993, sector 'coordination centers' (mini CMOCs) had been established in eight areas throughout Somalia. They served as focal points for civil-military priorities within that region and provided an ideal way to further the all-important NGO/military dialogue process. While there was a lack of political resolve from many of the major players, the CMOC provided the liaison capability for many of the players at the 'coal face' that enabled Operation *Support Hope* to be the humanitarian success that it was.

## **Operation Support Hope (Rwanda, 1994)**

Rwanda, and its neighbor Burundi to the south, share a common history of enflamed ethnic conflict. In this region, the Tutsi minority has traditionally subjugated the Hutu majority, an ethnic division which had been reinforced under both German and Belgian colonial rule. With Rwandan independence from Belgium in 1962, the Hutus officially threw off the Tutsi yoke, and in the process killed thousands of Tutsis and forced thousands more into Zaire and Uganda. In 1973, the Tutsi-dominated Burundi army killed thousands of Burundi Hutus, which set the scene for further massacres of Rwandan Hutus by Rwandan Tutsis. This history of deep ethnic hatred set the stage for the Rwandan genocide of April 1994 when a plane carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Ntaryamira of neighboring Burundi (both moderate Hutus) was shot down as it approached Kigali airport.

By July 13th with the Rwandan capital, Kigali, and many of the northern routes held by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), much of the Hutu population felt trapped. Fearful of genocide equal to or greater than that of the one-half million deaths that they had recently visited upon the Tutsis, they began to flee west to Zaire and to the French safe-zone in the southwest. Within two days the refugee camps in Goma numbered nearly a million people and the numbers in the southwest had increased from 83,000 to over 200,000. With no relief structure both areas quickly became a nightmare.

On 22nd July, President Clinton called the situation the “world’s worst humanitarian crisis in a generation...” By July 24th, American military personnel had been deployed to Goma (Zaire), Kigali (Rwanda), and Entebbe (Uganda), setting up the necessary infrastructure to complement and support the humanitarian response community. By the end of July, a CMOC had been established in Goma and Entebbe and by the end of the first week in August, a CMOC also been established in Kigali. Working hand-in-hand with the U.N., and other NGOs, the American military quickly established an atmosphere of collaboration and coordination as the major humanitarian problems were quickly addressed.

In Entebbe, the CMOC was collocated with the JTF headquarters at the airport. Located on the fourth floor, it was directly across from the J-3 (Operations) which proved ideal. The goal of this CMOC was to provide ‘wholesale’ transportation to the retailer, the NGO, who alone dealt directly with the customer, the refugee. The CMOC was constantly aware, and encouraged the necessity, of the need for U.N. control during Operation Support Hope. This quickly established U.N. leadership and responsibility in an environment where it was the primary player. With the U.N. in charge of the operation, the U.S. forces could also hand off to the NGOs and depart more quickly.

Between 30 July and 5th August CMOCs were also established at Goma and Kigali. Both **facilitated** the U.N. requests for support by concentrating on support efforts for water purification, delivery, and storage (as well as some minor engineering assistance). There was little interface with other NGO’s or other civilian agencies. In both locations the U.N. ran the day-to-day humanitarian relief effort while the CMOC quickly became a passive instrument of the U.N. demonstrating ‘value added’ based purely on logistic capability. This also allowed for a quicker transition to NGO than would otherwise have been the case under a more aggressive U.S. approach.


## CMOC

**General.** As a result of these three missions, hundreds of GO, IO, NGO, and PVO operating world-wide now understand that their interface with a military unit participating in an operation is through the CMOC. The term itself now implies civilians and military working together; it sends a clear message to these organizations that this is the main focal point for requesting and coordinating military support.

**Definition.** The CMOC is defined as a coordination center established and tailored to assist the unit CMO officer in anticipating, facilitating, coordinating, and orchestrating those civil-military functions and activities pertaining to the civil population, government, and economy of areas in which armed forces, GO, IO, and NGO are employed. The CMOC is neither a unit nor an organization; it is simply a capability provided to facilitate access to civilian agencies and non-military organizations participating in or having peripheral interest in a particular operation. The G5/CMO Section, when sufficiently augmented, can perform the day-to-day detailed civil-military interface, plan and monitor all unit operations that may impact on civilians.

**CMOC Composition.** The following CMOC structure is based on the doctrinal G5/CMO structure and illustrates how a CMOC may be structured for humanitarian support operations. The CMOC may include at least two sub-sections that assist in the planning, coordinating, and executing of civil-military operations. These sub-sections are:

- Operations Section.
- Administration/Logistics Section.



\* Participating or interested representatives from both military, e.g. PSYOP and non-military organizations, e.g., GO, IO, NGO, and PVO.

**Operations Section.** The Operations Section provides operations-related support to the CMOC. It may comprise at least three sub-sections:

- Current Operations.
- Plans.
- Technical Support.

**Current Operations Section.** Monitors the current civil-military and operational situation. Develops reports, and receives, analyzes, coordinates, disseminates and monitors information from military and non-military sources. Coordinates staff

coordination for executing support to GO, IO, and NGO generated 'requests for assistance'. Disseminates data and planned activities of the various GO, IO, NGO, and PVO operating within the AOR.

**Plans Section.** Works closely with the Current Operations Section analyzing data and commander's intent, forecasting requirements, and integrating all CMOC activities into JTF plans. This section also closely monitors progress towards the DoD-defined, CMOC-related, desired *End State*.

**Technical Support Section.** Provides, as required, the CA functional experts required to provide the CMOC commander with current and detailed advice regarding various areas of expertise. It may also include contracted civilians whose level of expertise is beyond the scope of the military forces but well within the requirements of the current situation.

**Admin/Log Section.** Provides both general and specific admin/log support to the CMOC commander, elements and cells. General support includes office administration, linguistic (interpreter/translator) support, and monitoring and maintaining section equipment. Specific support includes collating and maintaining detailed CMOC-related data obtained from assessments and CMOC activities; capturing CMOC-related data for historical (lessons learnt) purposes, and providing clerical support for briefings, charts, and other CMOC-related documents as required.

### **Requirement and Responsibility**

The number of CMOCs supporting a given operation may vary based on mission analysis (METT-TC) and distance from the headquarters serving a particular geographical area or AOR. In operations where the joint force commander's headquarters and majority of subordinate units are located in proximity to the civilian/host nation diplomatic center and GO, IO, NGO, PVO representatives, a CMOC may be established to facilitate access by those organizations. Somalia (Operation Restore Hope) and the initial stages of Rwanda (Operation Support Hope) are good examples of this approach.

Conversely, in operations where the joint force headquarters is located in one locale and subordinate units are spread throughout the country (as demonstrated during Operation Support Hope from late July onwards), CMOCs may be established at critical points to provide the necessary civil-military facilitation. In addition to these sector CMOCs, it is conceivable that CMOCs may be established at every level of command from unified command down to brigade level - again depending on the geographic area and the control measures required by the commander.

Commanders will normally establish a CMOC after an initial situation assessment indicates the need for closer/improved coordination with the various agencies involved. It may also be established purely on operational security requirements alone, which prohibit 'unrestricted' access to the main headquarters. When established, CMOCs will remain flexible in size and composition depending on mission requirements

### **Major Functions**

The major functions of the CMOC include:

- Providing GO, IO, NGO, and PVO and other relief agencies with a 'focal' point for activities and matters that are civilian-populace based.
- Coordinating relief efforts with U.S./Allied commands.
- Coordinating with GO, IO, NGO, and PVO.
- Providing interface with the U.S. Information Service, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the American Embassy (if applicable).
- Assist in the transfer of authority/hand-off of humanitarian assistance operations from military forces to host nation, GO, IO, NGO, PVO, U.N. Agencies, or other agency control.