

Training and Evaluation Outline Report

Task Number: 71-9-2421

Task Title: Provide Indications and Warnings for the Joint Operational Area (Division Echelon and Above [Operational])

Supporting Reference(s):

Step Number	Reference ID	Reference Name	Required	Primary
	ADP 3-0	Unified Land Operations	Yes	No
	FM 5-0	THE OPERATIONS PROCESS	Yes	No
	FM 5-0.1	The Operations Process	Yes	No
	FM 6-0	MISSION COMMAND	Yes	No
	JP 2-0	JOINT INTELLIGENCE	Yes	Yes

Condition: The command is conducting or preparing to conduct operations as a Joint Task Force, Joint Force Land Component, Army Forces, or Army Service Component Command headquarters. The command's headquarters may or may not have integrated Joint staff augmentation, liaisons, unit, and individual attachments. The command has received an operations plan, warning, operations, or fragmentary order from higher headquarters and is exercising mission command. The commander has issued guidance on indications and warnings for the joint operations area. The command is prepared to interface with joint, interagency, governmental authorities, nongovernmental organizations, and multinational forces. The command has established communications with subordinate and adjacent units, and higher headquarters. The mission command system is operational and processing information in accordance with standard operating procedures. Some iterations of this task should be performed in MOPP.

Standard: The staff provides indications and warnings for the joint operations area. The staff conducts intelligence activities to detect and report time-sensitive intelligence information on foreign developments that could involve a threat to allied and/or coalition military, political, economic interests, or U.S. citizens abroad. The staff identifies hostile reactions to U.S. reconnaissance activities and indications of impending terrorist attacks. The staff develops indications and warnings that forewarned of threat actions or intentions; the imminence of hostilities; insurgency; nuclear or non-nuclear attack on the U.S., its overseas forces or allied and/or coalition nations; hostile reactions to U.S. reconnaissance activities; terrorists' attacks; and other similar events.
Note: Task steps and performance measures may not apply to every staff, unit or echelon. Prior to evaluation, coordination should be made between evaluator and the evaluated staffs or units' higher headquarters to determine the performance measures that may not be evaluated.

Special Equipment: None

Safety Level: Low

Task Statements

Cue: None

DANGER

Leaders have an inherent responsibility to conduct Composite Risk Management to ensure the safety of all Soldiers and promote mission accomplishment.

WARNING

Composite Risk Management is the Army's primary decision-making process to identify hazards, reduce risk, and prevent both accidental and tactical loss. All soldiers have the responsibility to learn and understand the risks associated with this task.

CAUTION

Identifying hazards and controlling risks across the full spectrum of Army functions, operations, and activities is the responsibility of all Soldiers.

Remarks: While Army doctrine has changed to mission command over command and control (C2 - which is now a component of mission command), and changed from using ISR (Intelligence, Reconnaissance and Surveillance) to information collection (comprised of reconnaissance and surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations), joint doctrine still retains the primacy of C2 over mission command as well as the use of ISR. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as a joint task force, joint force land component command, Army forces, or Army service component command headquarters should refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine for the exercise and use of C2 and ISR.

Notes: Task content last updated: 27 February 2011.

TASK STEPS

1. The staff searches for indications and warnings (I&W) in the joint operational area by:
 - a. Identifying the threat together with his decision-maker's objectives and a desired end state.
 - b. Identifying the threat's capabilities, special strengths and vulnerabilities.
 - c. Employing the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment process to develop the threat's courses of action (COA).
 - d. Prioritizing the COAs and identifying potentially useful indicators of each aspect of each reasonable COA.
 - e. Using the timing of the threat's activities to assist in identifying and analyzing indicators.
 - f. Identifying possible threat deception tactics.
 - g. Employing all practical types of intelligence assets, including human intelligence.
 - h. Focusing on time-sensitive intelligence.
2. The staff evaluates and provides I&W by:
 - a. Matching indicators against all relevant COAs when they become active.
 - b. Matching the active indicator against other indicators to see if other indicators are active and matched with a sequential time frame.
 - c. Reporting the activity and results of the analysis.
 - d. Preparing to check the next expected indicators if active indicators appeared to be valid.
 - e. Preparing to address the Time-Sensitive Target (TST) as a target requiring immediate response when it poses (or would soon pose) danger to friendly forces.
 - f. Confirming communications of TST operations are immediately available to all relevant nodes.
 - g. Disseminating I&W as soon as practical and useful, instead of waiting for all the details.
 - h. Informing the joint headquarters and other component liaison officers when a TST is identified and when executing TST attacks, particularly when a TST might be engaged quicker by another component's assets.
 - i. Employing a common language between all concerned with TST operations, for clarity, precision and speed.
3. The staff prepares for time-sensitive operations by:
 - a. Recognizing successful attacks of TSTs requiring the targeting process to be significantly compressed and individual steps still must be executed.
 - b. Planning and conducting as much of the coordination and decision-making as possible ahead of time.
 - c. Articulating objectives, guidance, priorities, and intent for TSTs before the targets are identified.

d. Providing clear guidance on what constituted a TST.

e. Saving time by conducting detailed prior planning and coordinating between joint forces, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and mission command networks and information systems.

f. Conducting component integration quickly enough to act decisively on the information developed during the attack mission cycle in order to direct forces against a TST.

4. The staff prepares for time-sensitive operations by:

a. Addressing when an indicator becomes active and matching it against all relevant COAs.

b. Matching the active indicator against other indicators, to see if other indicators are active and matched with a sequential time frame.

c. Reporting the activity and results of the analysis.

d. Preparing to check the next expected indicators if active indicators appeared to be valid.

e. Preparing to address the TST as a target requiring immediate response because it poses danger to friendly forces.

f. Confirming communications of TST operations are immediately available to all relevant nodes.

g. Disseminating I&W as soon as practical and useful, instead of waiting for all the details.

h. Informing the joint headquarters and other component liaisons when a TST is identified and when executing TST attacks, particularly when a TST might be engaged quicker by another component's assets.

i. Employing a common language between all concerned with TST operations for clarity, precision, and speed.

(Asterisks indicates a leader performance step.)

PERFORMANCE MEASURES	GO	NO-GO	N/A
1. The staff searched for indications and warnings (I&W) in the joint operational area:			
a. Identified the threat together with the decision-maker's objectives and a desired end state.			
b. Identified the threat's capabilities, special strengths and vulnerabilities.			
c. Employed the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment process to develop the threat's courses of action (COA).			
d. Prioritized the COAs and identified potentially useful indicators of each aspect of each reasonable COA.			
e. Used the timing of the threat's activities to assist in identifying and analyzing indicators.			
f. Identified possible threat deception tactics.			
g. Employed all practical types of intelligence assets, including human intelligence.			
h. Focused on time-sensitive intelligence.			
2. The staff evaluated and provided I&W:			
a. Matched indicators against all relevant COAs when they became active.			
b. Matched the active indicator against other indicators to see if other indicators were active and matched with a sequential time frame.			
c. Reported the activity and results of the analysis.			
d. Prepared to check the next expected indicators if active indicators appeared to be valid.			
e. Prepared to address the Time-Sensitive Target (TST) as a target requiring immediate response when it posed (or would soon pose) danger to friendly forces.			
f. Confirmed communications of TST operations were immediately available to all relevant nodes.			
g. Disseminated I&W as soon as practical and useful, instead of waiting for all the details.			
h. Informed the joint headquarters and other component liaison officers when a TST was identified and when executing TST attacks, particularly when a TST might be engaged quicker by another component's assets.			
i. Employed a common language between all concerned with TST operations, for clarity, precision and speed.			
3. The staff prepared for a time-sensitive operation:			
a. Recognized successful attacks of TSTs required the targeting process to be significantly compressed and individual steps still must be executed.			
b. Planned and conducted as much of the coordination and decision-making as possible ahead of time.			
c. Articulated objectives, guidance, priorities, and intent for TSTs before the targets were identified.			
d. Provided clear guidance on what constituted a TST.			
e. Saved time by conducting detailed prior planning and coordinated between joint forces, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and mission command networks and information systems.			
f. Conducted component integration quickly enough to act decisively on the information developed during the attack mission cycle in order to direct forces against a TST.			
4. The staff prepared for time-sensitive operations:			
a. Addressed when an indicator became active and matched it against all relevant COAs.			
b. Matched the active indicator against other indicators, to see if other indicators were active and matched with a sequential time frame.			
c. Reported the activity and results of the analysis.			

Step Number	Task Number	Title	Proponent	Status
	71-9-2100	Direct Operational Intelligence Activities (Division Echelon and Above [Operational])	71 - Combined Arms (Collective)	Approved
	71-9-2110	Determine Operational Priority Information Requirements (Division Echelon and Above [Operational])	71 - Combined Arms (Collective)	Approved
	71-9-2200	Collect Relevant Information (Division Echelon and Above [Operational])	71 - Combined Arms (Collective)	Approved
	71-9-2424	Provide Target Information for the Joint Operational Area (Division Echelon and Above [Operational])	71 - Combined Arms (Collective)	Approved
	71-9-2500	Disseminate Operational Intelligence (Division Echelon and Above [Operational])	71 - Combined Arms (Collective)	Approved
	71-9-4710	Provide Security Assistance in the Joint Operations Area (Division Echelon and Above [Operational])	71 - Combined Arms (Collective)	Approved
	71-9-5450	Coordinate with Components, Theater, and other Support (Division Echelon and Above [Operational])	71 - Combined Arms (Collective)	Approved
	71-9-6160	Conduct Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment in the Joint Operations Area (Division Echelon and Above [Operational])	71 - Combined Arms (Collective)	Approved

Supporting Individual Task(s):

Step Number	Task Number	Title	Proponent	Status
	150-718-5111	Participate in the Military Decision Making Process	150 - Combined Arms (Individual)	Approved
	150-718-5113	Recommend the Commanders Critical Information Requirements	150 - Combined Arms (Individual)	Approved
	150-718-5114	Participate in Course of Action Development	150 - Combined Arms (Individual)	Approved
	150-718-5144	Prepare a Running Estimate	150 - Combined Arms (Individual)	Approved

Supporting Drill Task(s): None

TADSS

Step ID	TADSS ID	Title	Product Type	Quantity
No TADSS specified				

Equipment (LIN)

Step ID	LIN	Nomenclature	Qty
No equipment specified			

Material Items (NSN)

Step ID	NSN	LIN	Title	Qty
No equipment specified				

Environment: Environmental protection is not just the law but the right thing to do. It is a continual process and starts with deliberate planning. Always be alert to ways to protect our environment during training and missions. In doing so, you will contribute to the sustainment of our training resources while protecting people and the environment from harmful effects. Refer to FM 3-34.5 Environmental Considerations and GTA 05-08-002 ENVIRONMENTAL-RELATED RISK ASSESSMENT.

Safety: In a training environment, leaders must perform a risk assessment in accordance with FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management. Leaders will complete a DA Form 7566 COMPOSITE RISK MANAGEMENT WORKSHEET during the planning and completion of each task and sub-task by assessing mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations, (METT-TC). Note: During MOPP training, leaders must ensure personnel are monitored for potential heat injury. Local policies and procedures must be followed during times of increased heat category in order to avoid heat related injury. Consider the MOPP work/rest cycles and water replacement guidelines IAW FM 3-11.4, NBC Protection, FM 3-11.5, CBRN Decontamination. .