& MANAGEMENT: AN OVERVIEW |
We have discussed the primary causes of fratricide and the consequences of adverse preconditions and contributing factors. Now we will describe the process by which the battalion commander and his staff anticipate these circumstance along with other risks, assess the relative impact of each contributing factor, and employ risk-reducing measures.
Address fratricide contributing factors, preconditions and other elements operational risk early in and throughout the decisionmaking process. You the commander must develop your concept for accomplishing a mission and provide commander's guidance, including your statement of intent, to the staff. Following the initial METT-T analysis, you must state where and to what extent you will accept risk. Commanders will refine guidance throughout war gaming, order development, rehearsals and execution. As part of accomplishing the mission while preserving combat power, you should eventually identify and incorporate all necessary risk-reducing measures.
According to FM 25-101, Battle-Focused Thinking, commanders must consider the following points when integrating risk assessment:
The risk assessment and management methodology we provide in this chapter will allow you to address the following steps outlined in FM 25-101:
--FM25-101 |
RISK ASSESSMENT FOR BATTALION LEADERSHIP |
    METT-T:... the factors that must be considered during the planning or
execution of a tactical operation.
--FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Symbols |
While countless individual factors impact upon risk levels, we offer METT-T as the logical structure to use during the staff planning process. The commander should make necessarily subjective assessments of each factor, its related issues, and its impact. He must consider the most probable enemy course of action and the worst-case alternatives with major branches and sequels. A proposed matrix structure for this METT-T risk analysis accompanies this chapter followed by an example of its application.
MISSION factors include those that elevate the command and control difficulties of executing your mission. Risk depends upon the answers to questions such as:
There is inherent risk in enemy contact and ENEMY factors may generally apply to other areas of METT-T as a perceived enemy strength or advantage. Address these questions only once in your METT-T analysis (for training and Live-Fire Exercises (LFXs), apply factors as appropriate for OPFOR and targetry):
"The commander's decisions are based on his analysis of the
factors of METT-T, staff input, information gained through reconnaissance,
analysis and comparison of feasible courses of action, war gaming, and his
personal judgment."
--FM 71-2 |
The degree of risk to your force from TERRAIN and WEATHER factors stems from your answers to questions such as:
TROOPS is a key area in which leaders assess all aspects of soldier readiness not associated with time available for one mission:
The availability of mission-related EQUIPMENT (not aggregated readiness rates or C-ratings) can dramatically affect your operational risk -- consider these questions:
"Anticipate events on the Battlefield."
--AirLand Battle Imperative, FM 100-5 |
The amount of TIME AVAILABLE to you will decisively impact on any mission. Important associated questions are:
After assessing each METT-T factor, you and the battle staff can consider specific measures to mitigate the risks identified. Incorporate these controls into the plan and rehearsals as appropriate. Remember, the cost-benefit analysis may dictate not using additional controls. In this case, heightened risk awareness is an automatic measure. We recommend a standardized approach with questions tailored to your organization. This will help you to perform operational risk assessment and develop general guidelines for risk-reducing measures. Eventually, many techniques will warrant inclusion in your unit and section SOPs. As with the Troop-Leading Procedures, the final phase of Risk Assessment and Management is to supervise and enforce the provisions of the plan. During execution, as significant components of the estimate change, you the commander will need to reconsider risk levels and reduction measures currently in place. This continuing "in-stride" assessment of risk is an integral component of the Command and Control Battlefield Operating System (BOS).
This discussion reflects the combined efforts of several proponent schools
and organizations within TRADOC. We have also published a combined arms
command approach for company-level fratricide risk assessment that complements
this discussion. We solicit feedback from organizations in the field and
the training base. If you try this or another means of
addressing the risk of fratricide or other operational risks during the
Troop-Leading process, please send us your comments for review and dissemination
in future CALL products.
"Risk Management is Smart Decisionmaking."
--FM 25-101 |
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Nature of Operation | Individual proficiency and experience | |
Complexity of Plan or Intent | Collective proficiency | |
Adequacy of Reconnaissance | Leader competence | |
Direct Fire Control Plan or Measures? | Leader Experience (seasoning) | |
Adjacent Forces Intermingled | Situational Awareness | |
360o Fight? | Rehearsals Adequate | |
Are we the flank unit? | Clearance of Artillery Fires | |
Unit position with respect to main body | Fatigue or Physical Condition or Endurance | |
Weapons systems density | Effective SOPs | |
Converging Forces | Acclimation to region | |
Are stragglers present? | Habitual Attachments | |
Control of Space | Location of Tactical Air Control Party | |
Rules of Engagement | Weapons Errors (Accidents, charge errors, wrong deflections, etc.) | |
Communication or Reporting Failures | Unit manning level | |
Crosstalk Lacking | Soldier's Load | |
Synchronization failure | Anxiety, Confusion, Fear | |
Detached or Reconnaissance Element involved | Combat Identification (ground to ground and air to ground) | |
Dissemination of Plan | Friendly Weapons effects (Penetration, blast, ricochet) | |
LOs or Adequacy of adjacent unit coordination | Communication Redundancy | |
Guidance to Attached or Detached elements | Availability of Protective Equipment(MOPP, Flack Vests, Hazardous material) | |
Disruption of C2 | Availability of Task-Related Equipment | |
Feasibility of Fratricide Risk Reduction | Availability of Navigation and Positioning Equipment | |
| IFF expedient for ground forces | |
Enemy or Friendly Forces Intermingled |
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Enemy has similar equipment | Planning Time | |
Enemy activity | Continuous, operations with minimal sleep | |
| Continuous operations without sleep | |
Day versus Night | Operation Duration and Intensity of Operation | |
NBC environment | Soldier and Leader Rest | |
Land Navigation | ||
Terrain (OCOKA) | ||
Orienting Terrain | ||
Engagement Ranges | ||
Compartmented vs Featureless terrain | ||
Obscuration (Fog, Smoke, Dust) | ||
Precipitation | ||
Battlefield hazards (unrecorded or marked minefields, submunitions, etc.) | ||
ASSESSMENT MATRIX (From CALL Handbook, 92-3) |
REDUCTION MEASURES** |
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Tactically Sound and Simple Scheme of Maneuver | Always Rehearse--Don't accept excuses | |
Complete and Concise Orders | Consider Limited visibility rehearsal | |
Doctrinally correct clearance of fires | Situational Awareness--Units, Enemy,Hazards | |
CPs and TOCs accurately track the battle; render timely reports | Know your weapon and vehicle orientation | |
Maintain graphics two levels down | Anticipate where weapon system density will be highest | |
Use large scale battalion and brigade sector sketches for detail | Recognize Battlefield Stress | |
Coordinate with adjacent units; track adjacent battle | Use validated SOPs to simplify operations | |
Subcompartment sectors and assign responsibility during LIC | Know Rules of Engagement | |
Aviation and maneuver elements must coordinate and communicate | Accurate and timely spot reports | |
Get Air Tasking Order day prior and see what's flying | Positive Target Identification--Don't shoot first, ask questions later | |
FA Bn HHB Cdr clears fires around BSA--he is FSO for the FSB | Sustain good aircraft idenfication training program | |
Only allow the QRF in the BSA perimeter | Train BSA troops in threat ID and survivability skills | |
Anticipate or assess fratricide risk during planning | Know friendly weapons effects | |
Train worst-case MOUT--flimsy structures or high fragmentation | ||
SOCCE is the key to coordination of SOF and conventional unit maneuver |
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Know enemy characteristics and equipment | Maximize Planning Time | |
Know hostile criteria and enemy aircraft flight profiles | Prioritize Tasks or Rehearsals or Reconnaissance | |
Send key leader on objective reconnaissance-(e.g., squad leader from lead platoon) | Multiple WARNORDs and FRAGOs to save time | |
Additional recognition signals or markers | Adjust pace and Tempo | |
Navigate Accurately--Know your Location | ||
Fire control measures on identifiable terrain |
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Redundant navigation aids or checks | ||
Control the MSR--Know what should be on it and what shouldn't | ||
Fratricide by Mission: | Frat/MP | %Frat | Kills/MP | %Frat Kills |
Defend Battle Psn | 45/639 | 7.0% | 18/639 | 2.8% |
Defense in Sector | 123/2190 | 5.6% | 67/2190 | 3.1% |
Hasty Attack | 14/154 | 9.1% | 5/154 | 3.2% |
Mvt to Contact | 92/644 | 14.3% | 45/644 | 7.0% |
Reconnaissance | 49/333 | 14.7% | 24/333 | 7.2% |
Counterattack | 38/240 | 15.8% | 22/240 | 9.2% |
Deliberate Atk | 183/720 | 25.4% | 104/720 | 14.4% |
AVERAGE | 544/4920 | 11.0% | 285/4920 | 5.8% |
The NTC instrumentation can 'match' the firer with the target
and highlight fratricidal matched pairs (MP) for many engagements
25-40% of the time). This study shows the relative risk of fratricide
by mission type. It also shows the relationship between fratricidal
engagements that are MILES kills and all engagements to include near
misses (52%*). These fratricide percentages may not apply to all
engagements, but even the 544 total recorded friend-on-friend engagements
in two years is too high
*285/544=Kills/Total/Frat=52% |
REDUCTION LESSON PLAN |
Installation Distribution Centers | ROTC Headquarters |
Corps, Division, and Brigade CSMs | Combat Training Centers |
Separate Brigades | ARCOM Headquarters |
Special Forces Groups and Battalions | Readiness Groups |
Ranger Battalions | State Adjutant Generals |
TRADOC DOES | Training Divisions |
TRADOC LOs |
TELEPHONE (FOR PUBLICATIONS): | DSN 552-2255; COMMERCIAL (913)684-2255TELEPHONE (FOR INFORMATION): | DSN 552-2132; COMMERCIAL (913)684-2132 | FAX: | COMMERCIAL (913) 651-8470 | MESSAGE: | CDRUSACAC FT LEAVENWORTH KS //ATZL-CTL// | MAIL: | COMMANDER | | USACAC | | ATTN: ATZL-CTL | | Ft LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027-7000
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Apr 92 | 92-4 Fratricide: Reducing Self-Inflicted Losses |
Apr 92 | 92-3 Fratricide Risk Assessment for Company Leadership |
Feb 92 | 92-2 Mobilization of the Reserve Components (RC) for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM |
Jan 92 | 92-1 Joint Tactical Communications |
Dec 91 | 91-5 Battlefield Logistics |
Nov 91 | 91-4 Counterdrug (CD) Operations |
Oct 91 | 91-3 The Ultimate High Ground!(Space Support to the Army) |
Jun 91 | 91-2 The Yellow Ribbon (Army Lessons from the Home Front) |
Apr 91 | 91-1 Rehearsals |
Dec 90 | 90-11 Getting to the Desert (Deployment and Selective Callup Lessons) |
Nov 90 | 90-10 Inactivation |
Oct 90 | 90-9 Operation JUST CAUSE (Vols I, II, III) |
Sep 90 | 90-8 Winning in the Desert II (Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Maneuver Commanders) |
Aug 90 | 90-7 Winning in the Desert |
Jun 90 | 90-6 The Musicians of Mars (Synchronization for the Company/Team Commander) |
May 90 | 90-5 Fire Support |
May 90 | 904 Introduction to Low Intensity Conflict |
May 90 | 90-3 "The Stone Forest" (A Heavy/Light Combat Narrative) |
Mar 90 | 90-2 Reserve Component Deployments |
Feb 90 | 90-1 Fire Support for the Maneuver Commander |
Nov 89 | 89-5 Commander's Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) System |
Nov 89 | 894 Corps/Division Lessons Learned |
Oct 89 | 89-3 NCO Lessons Learned |
Aug 89 | 89-2 Heavy-Light Lessons Learned |
Spring 89 | 89-1 Non-Mechanized Forces |
Apr 89 | 1-89 RC Brigade Rotation to the NTC |
Fall 88 | 88-3 Heavy Forces |
Jul 88 | 3-88 Deception |
Jun 88 | 2-88 Light Infantry in Action - Part II |
May 88 | 88-2 Minefield Breaching |
Apr 88 | 1-88 Light Infantry in Action |
Jan 88 | 88-1 Command Continuity on the AirLand Battlefield |
Jul 87 | No. 5 Leadership |
May 87 | Commander's Comments - The CS Team |
Apr 87 | 1-87 Lessons Learned (General) |
Feb 87 | No. 4 Command and Control System |
Nov 86 | Fort Hood Leadership Study (Condensed) |
Nov 86 | 2-86 Rear Operations |
Sep 86 | No. 3 Combat Support Systems |
Sep 86 | Lessons Learned by/for Division Commanders |
Jul 86 | 1-86 Initial Bulletin (General) |
Jun 86 | Multiple Integrated Laser System (MILES) Checklist |
May 86 | No. 2 Intelligence |
Jan 86 | No. 1 Seven Operating Systems |
Nov 85 | Commander's Memorandum - CG, NTC |