Training and Evaluation Outline Report

Status: Approved 13 Jan 2023 Effective Date: 18 Dec 2024

Task Number: 71-CORP-6717

Task Title: Conduct Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Operations

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Destruction Notice: None

Foreign Disclosure: FD1 - This training product has been reviewed by the training developers in coordination with the Fort Leavenworth, KS, foreign disclosure officer. This training product can be used to instruct international military students from all approved countries without restrictions.

Supporting Reference(s):

Step Number	Reference ID	Reference Name	Required	Primary	Source Information
	(DO NOT USE, CANCELLED) JP 3-15.1	Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations	Yes	No	
	(DO NOT USE, SUPERSEDED) TC 3-90.37	Counter Improvised Explosive Device Training	Yes	No	
	ATP 2-22.7	Geospatial Intelligence	Yes	No	
	ATP 2-33.4	INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS	Yes	No	
	ATP 3-34.20	Countering Explosive Hazards	Yes	Yes	
	ATP 3-92	CORPS OPERATIONS	Yes	No	
	ATP 4-32	Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Operations	Yes	No	
	FM 3-94	ARMIES, CORPS, AND DIVISION OPERATIONS	Yes	No	
	FM 6-0	Commander and Staff Organization and Operations	Yes	No	
	UNIT SOP	Unit / Unit's Standard Operating Procedure SOP	Yes	No	

Conditions: The unit receives an order from higher headquarters or the commander derives a mission that requires it to conduct counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations. The commander issues guidance on conducting C-IED operations. in a dynamic and complex operational environment. Hybrid threat(s) contest the unit's objectives in all five domains (land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace), all three dimensions (human, physical, and information), and the electromagnetic spectrum. Additionally, they maintain the ability to sustain all nine forms of contact (direct; indirect; non-hostile; obstacle; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN); aerial; visual; electromagnetic; and influence) with the unit. All eight operational variables of PMESII-PT are present and dynamic. The order from higher headquarters includes all applicable overlays and or graphics, area of operations (AO) boundaries, control measures, and criteria for subsequent tactical actions. The command has communications with subordinate units , adjacent units, and higher headquarters. The commander has organized the four components of the command and control system to support decision making, facilitate communication, and conduct operations.

Note 1: The conditions statement for this task reflects the training conditions required for the evaluated unit to receive a trained (T) rating. However, a unit can only receive a T rating if the task is executed under these conditions during an external evaluation.

Note 2: Conduct the task using mission partner network (MPN) for foreign-partner information-sharing or conduct the operation as if foreign partners are on the network, realistically portraying an environment where the Army will likely conduct operations in a combined theater. Produce orders and other staff products on the SECRET//RELEASABLE (S//REL) network while retaining non-releasable or not releasable to foreign nationals (NOFORN) information on the secret internet protocol router network (SIPRNET). Deployed units regularly operate mission-specific multinational information networks, and the Army will soon migrate most operations and training to the Releasable-Training Environment (R-TE).

Note 3: The unit may execute some iterations of this task with a multinational component to the force. Exercise planners should coordinate for a multinational partner to participate in the exercise as a component of the multinational task force or should resource training support to role play and replicate a multinational force in simulation. When the unit is executing this task in a scenario without a multinational component, evaluators should rate steps in this task that only apply to multinational operations scenarios as N/A.

Environment: Some iterations of this task should be performed with degraded C2 networks, degraded conditions in the electromagnetic spectrum, and/or with a degraded, denied, and disrupted space operations environment (D3SOE). This task should not be trained in MOPP 4. This task should be trained under IED Threat conditions.

Standards: The unit conducts C-IED operations to enable friendly freedom of action during offense, defense, and stability operations. The unit conducts C-IED operations in accordance with (IAW) ATP 3-34.20, the Army Ethic, MPE information sharing restrictions, established timelines, commander intent, orders from higher headquarters, and standard operating procedures (SOP).

The Objective Task Evaluation Criteria Matrix (below) is the Army's standard evaluation criteria used by commanders to objectively assess their unit's collective task training conducted during collective training events. Task assessment is determined by the environment, percentages of leaders and Soldiers present at training, task performance, and external task evaluation. For example, in order to receive a fully trained (T) rating, a unit must perform this task incorporating the identified training environment; with 75% of unit leaders and 80% of Soldiers present for training; attaining 80% on performance measures, 100% on critical performance measures, and 85% on leader performance measures; and with an external evaluation. Failure to meet any one of these criteria will result in a lower than (T).

Note: Leader is the commander, deputy commander, chief of staff (COS), command sergeant major (CSM), G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-6, G-9, surgeon , chief of protection, engineer, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officer, staff judge advocate (SJA), command teams of assigned/attached units, and any other leader on the unit's modified table of organization and equipment (MTO&E) that the commander deems essential to conducting C-IED operations.

Live Fire: No

Objective Task Evaluation Criteria Matrix:

Plan	an	d Prepare		Ex	ec	ute			Eval	uate
Operation Environme BDE & Above	al nt	Training Environment (L/V/C)	% Leaders present at training/authorized	% Present at training/authorized	External evaluation	Performance measures	Critical performance measures	Leader performance measures	Evaluator's observed task proficiency rating	Commander's assessment
Dynamic and Complex (All OE Variables and Hybrid Threat)	Night		>=75%	>=80%	Yes	>=80% GO	All	>=85% GO	Т	Т
Dynamic and Complex (All OE Variables and Single Threat)	Da	- Live / Constructive	60-74%	60-79%	Z	65- 79% GO		75- 84% GO	Ρ	Ρ
Dynamic and Complex (<all oe<br="">Variables and Single Threat)</all>	JY		<=59%	<=59%		<65% GO		<=74% GO	U	U

Remarks: For questions, concerns, or comments, please contact usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.list.mission-command-coe-dot-ted@army.mil.

Notes: None

Safety Risk: Low

Task Statements

Cue: The unit receives an order from higher headquarters or the commander derives a mission that requires it to conduct counter improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations.

DANGER

Leaders have an inherent responsibility to conduct risk management to ensure the safety of all Soldiers and promote mission accomplishment.

WARNING

Risk management is the Army's primary decision-making process to identify hazards, reduce risk, and prevent both accidental and tactical loss. All soldiers have the responsibility to learn and understand the risks associated with this task.

CAUTION

Identifying hazards and controlling risks across the full spectrum of Army functions, operations, and activities is the responsibility of all Soldiers.

Performance Steps and Measures

NOTE: Assess task proficiency using the task evaluation criteria matrix.

NOTE: Asterisks (*) indicate leader steps; plus signs (+) indicate critical steps.

STEP/MEASURE

Plan

* 1. The commander fulfills command responsibilities for conducting counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) operations:

- Providing clear and concise planning guidance.
- Creating shared understanding of the operational environment (OE).
- Empowering subordinate leaders to take appropriate action when encountering an IED.
- Ensuring C-IED training is an integral part of the overall corps plan.
- Determining commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).

+ 2. The unit, led by the G-3 or G-5, receives the mission to conduct C-IED operations.

+ 3. The G-3 publishes a WARNORD (at least one after receipt of mission).

* 4. The staff, led by the COS, ensures the C-IED support element is established and manned with required support staff.

+ 5. The engineer, along with the C-IED support element, identifies which of the four conditions that cover every situation in which engineers must counter the categories of explosive hazards.



ATP 3-34.20 Figure 1-1



a. Condition 1: IEDs are stationary, in the AO, and impeding the movement/maneuver of friendly forces.

Note: Condition 1 is the major focus for combat engineers. Combat engineers must be able to counter the effects of having mines, explosive booby traps/IEDs, and unexploded ordinance (UXO) impeding the movement and maneuver of friendly forces. Combat engineers achieve this primarily in support to mobility operations, supporting breaching during maneuver and clearing operations during movement. Countering the explosive hazards under this condition takes in offensive, defensive and stability operations throughout the phases of a typical campaign plan. The majority of engineer effort to counter explosive hazards is applied to countering this condition.

b. Condition 2: IEDs have not yet been emplaced, however, the threat plans to emplace them to impede friendly movement or maneuver.

Note: In stability operations, this condition can require engineers to install barriers and obstacles to deny the enemy the ability to move mines and explosive booby traps/IEDs into or around the area of operations. During the offense and defense, combat engineers work within the targeting process to ensure mine-laying vehicles and other enemy assets, or units are targeted to prevent them from ever emplacing explosive obstacles that will impede the combined arms team.

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NO-GO

N/A

GO

c. Condition 3: Occurs when IEDs are employed against stationary friendly forces or facilities. Note: Combat engineers counter these IEDs (such as vehicle- or personnel-borne) by executing survivability operations and general engineering to build protective positions and harden structures to mitigate the blast effects. Additionally, engineers install barriers such as tetrahedrons at checkpoints or serpentine concrete barriers at entry control points to slow or stop the movement of mobile IEDs. d. Condition 4: Captured enemy ammunition (CEA) or explosives in the AO are under friendly control, but in need of engineer support. Note: CEA and bulk explosives are under the control of friendly forces and normally do not pose an immediate danger to friendly forces. However, these explosive hazards often require military effort to protect, move, or destroy them. Engineer support to condition 4 is normally limited to providing general engineering support to construct berms or fencing around CEA sites to secure these explosives from falling into threat hands. Combat engineers may also be tasked to assist EOD in destroying CEA or bulk explosives. +* 6. The staff, led by the chief of staff (COS), plans to incorporate C-IED operations during the military decision-making process (MDMP). a. The staff, led by the G-2, gathers information on IED threats and updates running estimates. + b. The staff, led by the G-3, includes C-IED considerations into planning during mission analysis. + c. The staff, led by the G-2, conducts intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), focusing on the IED threat. d. The staff, led by the G-2 and G-3, develop a detailed information collection plan that incorporates modern intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, (ISR) techniques and systems to include: Air and ground sensors. Forward-looking airborne radar. Unmanned aerial systems support. Geospatial images. + e. The staff, led by the G-3, with the C-IED support element, conducts COA analysis and wargaming: Confirming refinement of the C-IED capability risk assessment.
Identifying potential decision points for C-IED activities, shifts required in the C-IED synchronization effort, or engagement to support a specific line of operation (LOO). Providing input for potential branches and sequels as the adversary adapts to C-IED activities.
Providing input to COA refinement to better support C-IED objectives and activities. Revising the C-IED capability component in the force protection staff estimate (as required). + f. The staff, led by the G-3, conducts COA comparison, determining which COA best: Protects US, multinational (if applicable) and host nation (HN) forces, and the local populace against the physical effects of IEDs. Enables mobility in operational areas. Exposes and neutralizes IED networks. Neutralizes IED impacts. · Stabilizes economic activity in the affected locations. · Focuses on the friendly and adversary center of gravity (COG). 7. The staff, led by the G-4, plans for C-IED logistic considerations. 8. The staff, led by the G-6, develops a communications architecture connecting all C-IED participants sustainable through all phases of operations. 9. The staff, led by the G-3, develops an assessment framework: • Developing measures of effectiveness (MOE) to assess improvements regarding C-IEDs (example: what are the number of IEDs encountered and has that number increased or decreased?). • Developing measures of performance (MOP) to assess the unit's ability to counter the IED threat (example: are subordinate units receiving IED threat training and executing their part of the process?). Assigning responsibilities for conducting analysis and generating recommendations. Identifying feedback mechanisms. + 10. The G-3 publishes the OPORD. Prepare 11. The G-3, supported by the C-IED support element, prepares the unit for C-IED operations: Coordinating product development with the G-2 to support higher headquarters and unified

action partners.
Conducting rehearsals and refining the plan with consideration of the most current situational updates and deficiencies.

+ 12. The G-2 initiates ISR and information collection actions to answer C-IED information requirements (IRs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).

• Maintaining digital and analog maps that reflects the most current intelligence information, to include updated obstacle intelligence.

Integrating C-IED intelligence-enabling organizations that support the technical and forensic exploitation of recovered devices.

• Establishing liaison with HN governmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and special operations forces.

• Providing intelligence updates on explosive hazard (EH) areas to subordinate, higher, and adjacent commanders.

• Focusing employment of intelligence collection assets against the threat network IED infrastructure.

+ 13. The staff, led by the G-4, prepares for C-IED operations:

Establishing a priority of support.

• Tasking organizing elements of sustainment units with their supported maneuver formations as required by the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, and informational considerations (METT-TC(I)).

Determining future logistics/supplies requirements for likely contingencies.

14. The staff, led by the OPSEC officer, implements risk and operations security controls.

15. The staff, led by the corps engineer, coordinates training with specialized units on known and/or anticipated devices.

Execute

 + 16. The staff, led by the COS, conducts C-IED operations:
• Employing joint, multinational, and civil airspace control capabilities for the planning and integration of airspace user requirements.

• Facilitating shared understanding by providing the timely flow of information according to the Sustaining the continual gathering, tracking, and analyzing of relevant information to support running estimates by the staff and decision-making by subordinate commanders.

+ 17. The staff, led the G-2, provides C-IED threat intelligence:

Providing intelligence updates to subordinate, higher, and adjacent commanders.

· Maintaining an incident map with graphic overlays that include historical IED strike times and locations to facilitate pattern analysis.

 Maintaining a threat network modal or link analysis (such as how threat groups have disrupted lines of communications).

Conducting predictive trend analysis on enemy IED employment and device design to enhance friendly force protection programs and C-IED operational level planning.
Identifying and producing target intelligence on the critical nodes in the threat network IED

infrastructure.

+ 18. The staff, led by the corps engineer, continues to "train the force" on new or modified devices and/or enemy TTPs.

+ 19. The C-IED intelligence fusion cell:
• Reviews the latest IED threat intelligence and relevant IED trend analysis.

• Tracks developments in the employment of IEDs and TTPs by the various threat networks. • Receives coordinated augmentation from operational level C-IED assets and enabling

organizations

Provides analytical products to the commander (when required).

Assess

+* 20. The commander and staff assess operations to determine progress and make adjustments to operations by executing assessment activities.

Note: There is no single way to conduct an assessment. Every mission and operational environment (OE) has its own challenges, and every commander assimilates information differently, making every assessment plan unique. The following steps can help develop an assessment plan.

* a. Monitor indicators to observe conditions relevant to the current operation.

* b. Evaluate indicators to judge progress toward desired conditions.

* c. Staff and subordinate commanders identify variances and recommend corrective actions specific to assigned tasks.

* 21. The commander and staff adapt the 6-step assessment process to the current operation to answer six general questions:

- How has the OE changed?
- Where are we?
- Why do we think the change happened?
- Is the current plan still suitable to achieve the objectives?
- Do changes in the OE impose additional risk or provide additional opportunities?
- What do we need to do?

a. Step 1: Develop the assessment approach during planning by identifying specific information needed to monitor and analyze conditions associated with attaining the operation's end state, achieving objectives, and accomplishing tasks.

b. Step 2: Develop the assessment plan to monitor and collect necessary information and intelligence to inform decision making.

c. Step 3: Collect relevant information through routine procedures and reporting, such as maintaining running estimates, through directed information collection, and through recognition of exceptional information.

d. Step 4: Analyze information and intelligence to identify positive or negative movement toward achieving objectives or attaining end state conditions, identify the causes for the changes, and to generate recommendations.

e. Step 5: Communicate feedback and recommendations to the commander.

f. Step 6: The commander directs changes to operations according to visualization and recommendations to improve operations or take advantage of opportunities.

22. The staff, led by the COS, implements changes directed by the commander by issuing orders and coordinating with all unified action partners (UAPs).

Note: When time permits following the operation, the commander leads an after-action review (AAR) to learn from the experience and improve future operations. Unit SOPs should be updated as applicable.

Task Performance Summary Block									
Training Unit			ITERATION						
			1		2	;	3		4
Date of Training	per Iteration:								
Day or Nigh	t Training:	Day	/ Night	Day	/ Night	Day /	Night	Day /	Night
		#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Total Leaders Authorized	% Leaders Present								
Total Soldiers Authorized	% Soldiers Present								
Total Number of Performance Measures	% Performance Measures 'GO'								
Total Number of Critical Performance Measures	% Critical Performance Measures 'GO'								
Live Fire, Total Number of Critical Performance Measures	% Critical Performance Measures 'GO'								
Total Number of Leader Performance Measures	% Leader Performance Measures 'GO'								
MOPP L	EVEL								
Evaluated Ratin T, P	g per Iteration , U								

Mission(s) supported: None

MOPP 4: Never

MOPP 4 Statement: None

NVG: Never

NVG Statement: None

Prerequisite Collective Task(s): None

Supporting Collective Task(s):

Step Number	Task Number	Title	Proponent	Status
1.	71-CORP-5103	Control Operations	71 - Mission Command (Collective)	Approved
3.	71-CORP-5100	Conduct the Operations Process for Command and Control (C2)	71 - Mission Command (Collective)	Approved
6.	71-CORP-5111	Conduct the Military Decision-Making Process	71 - Mission Command (Collective)	Approved
6.	71-CORP-5112	Conduct Mission Analysis	71 - Mission Command (Collective)	Approved
6.	71-CORP-2210	Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment	71 - Mission Command (Collective)	Approved
20.	71-CORP-6700	Assess Protection Measures	71 - Mission Command (Collective)	Approved
20.	71-CORP-5300	Assess the Operational Situation	71 - Mission Command (Collective)	Approved

OPFOR Task(s): None

Supporting Individual Task(s):

Step Number	Task Number	Title	Proponent	Status
	052-192-4539	Plan for an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat	052 - Engineer (Individual)	Approved
	052-COM-1270	React to a Possible Improvised Explosive Device (IED)	052 - Engineer (Individual)	Approved
	052-COM-1271	Identify Visual Indicators of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED)	052 - Engineer (Individual)	Approved
	052-COM-3261	React to an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Attack (UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (U//FOUO)	052 - Engineer (Individual)	Approved
	052-COM-3262	Prepare for an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Threat Prior to Movement (UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY) (U//FOUO)	052 - Engineer (Individual)	Approved
	052-COM-3401	Identify Potential Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Locations (CRM) (UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICAL USE ONLY) (U//FOUO)	052 - Engineer (Individual)	Approved

Supporting Drill(s): None

Supported AUTL/UJTL Task(s):

Task ID	Title
OP 6.2.2.1	Integrate Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) Framework

TADSS

TADSS ID	Title	Product Type	Quantity
71-20	Common Hardware Platform (CHP)	DVC	1
20-101	Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability - Multi-Resolution Federation - Standard Configuration	DVC	1
71-ALOTT	Army Low Overhead Training Toolkit	SIM	1

Equipment (LIN)

LIN	Nomenclature	Qty
No equipment specified		

Materiel Items (NSN)

NSN	LIN	Title	Qty
7010-01-443-2309		Computer System, Digital: AN/TYQ-45A	1

Environment: Environmental protection is not just the law but the right thing to do. It is a continual process and starts with deliberate planning. Always be alert to ways to protect our environment during training and missions. In doing so, you will contribute to the sustainment of our training resources while protecting people and the environment from harmful effects. Refer to the current Environmental Considerations manual and the current GTA Environmental-related Risk Assessment card. Refer to GTA 05-08-002 ENVIRONMENTAL-RELATED RISK ASSESSMENT.

Safety: In a training environment, leaders must perform a risk assessment in accordance with current Risk Management Doctrine. Leaders will complete the current Deliberate Risk Assessment Worksheet in accordance with the TRADOC Safety Officer during the planning and completion of each task and sub-task by assessing mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available and civil considerations, (METT-TC). Note: During MOPP training, leaders must ensure personnel are monitored for potential heat injury. Local policies and procedures must be followed during times of increased heat category in order to avoid heat related injury. Consider the MOPP work/rest cycles and water replacement guidelines IAW current CBRN doctrine. Refer to GTA 05-08-012 INDIVIDUAL SAFETY CARD.