


# **How the Army Runs**

## *A Senior Leader Reference Handbook*

2001-2002



U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA 17013



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE AND CARLISLE BARRACKS  
CARLISLE, PENNSYLVANIA 17013-4501

May 15, 2001



Office of the Commandant

For over two decades the United States Army War College has produced a text used throughout the Army as well as the entire Department of Defense. How the Army Runs: A Senior Leader Reference Handbook, 2001-2002 helps commanders and staffs better understand and implement the numerous systems that the Army executes each day. In addition, this text is used at the Army War College in the education of the students and in the development and currency of the faculty. This edition continues that tradition.

This text was prepared under the direction of the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management. Its goal is to improve the understanding of the development and sustainment of the landpower component of the national military strategy. This text closely examines the concepts, systems, and processes leaders use to resource the requirements of the national military strategy and provide trained and ready forces to the Combatant Commanders.

The Army War College is proud to provide this text. We look forward to your comments regarding its value to your organization.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Robert R. Ivany".

ROBERT R. IVANY  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commandant

## PREFACE

This is the 23<sup>rd</sup> edition of the U.S. Army War College text designed to explain and synthesize the inseparable relationship of numerous Defense, Joint, and Army systems and processes to improve your understanding of “How the Army Runs.” Although the primary audience of this text is the Army War College students and faculty, the Army War College recognizes the value that commanders and staffs have placed in this text over the years. We remain proud to be able to provide this tool for their use.

This text is one of practice and application. Its focus is on “How” the Army runs. The Army War College is aware that regulations, directives, policies, and systems within DOD, the Joint Staff, and the Army change regularly. This edition of the text reflects changes as of 1 April 2001. Future editions will be modified to reflect future changes.

We encourage input to the next edition of the text. Please send your recommendations for changes and improvements to the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania 17013-5240, ATTN: Editor, Colonel Edward J. Filiberti (email Edward.Filiberti@carlisle.army.mil). Readers can access the text on the worldwide web at <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/dclm/linkedtextchapters.htm>.

This text is not for general distribution, and its contents should not be quoted, extracted for publication, or otherwise copied or distributed without prior coordination with the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management of the U.S. Army War College.

The Army War College extends its appreciation to the staff and faculty of the Army Force Management School and other contributing organizations for their efforts in the publication of this text.



Michael A. Pearson  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
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# HOW THE ARMY RUNS

## A Senior Leader Reference Handbook

### Table of Contents

Commandant's Letter.....	i
Preface.....	ii
Faculty Editors .....	iii
<b>CHAPTER 1</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b><i>FULFILLING THE INTENT OF THE CONGRESS</i> .....</b>	<b><i>1-1</i></b>
1-1. Change as a constant .....	1-1
1-2. Effecting change .....	1-1
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b><i>ARMY TRANSFORMATION</i> .....</b>	<b><i>1-2</i></b>
1-3. Why transform?.....	1-2
1-4. The global environment - evolving geopolitical and military threats.....	1-3
1-5. The Army Vision.....	1-3
1-6. The transformation strategy.....	1-3
1-7. Transformation over three axes.....	1-3
1-8. Army Transformation and the force development process.....	1-5
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b><i>PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS TEXT</i>.....</b>	<b><i>1-5</i></b>
1-9. Purpose .....	1-5
1-10. Scope and objectives .....	1-6
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b><i>TEXT ORGANIZATION AND RELEVANCE</i>.....</b>	<b><i>1-7</i></b>
1-11. Three part text .....	1-7
1-12. The Army as a system.....	1-7
1-13. Army systems and subsystems .....	1-7
1-14. Management and management support systems .....	1-7
1-15. Relevance .....	1-7
<b>CHAPTER 2</b>	
<b>INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE CYCLE .....</b>	<b>2-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b><i>INTRODUCTION</i>.....</b>	<b><i>2-1</i></b>
2-1. Chapter content.....	2-1

2-2. Force management and integration terms .....	2-2
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>FORCE MANAGEMENT—IMPETUS FOR CHANGE .....</b>	<b>2-3</b>
2-3. The decade of modernization.....	2-3
2-4. Force management inspections and studies.....	2-4
2-5. Force management changes at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA). .....	2-5
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>FORCE MANAGEMENT AND INTEGRATION MODELS.....</b>	<b>2-7</b>
2-6. The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM) .....	2-7
2-7. The Army War College Model.....	2-10
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>COORDINATION OF FORCE INTEGRATION ACTIONS.....</b>	<b>2-11</b>
2-8. Information exchange as a key element of force integration.....	2-11
2-9. Objective of force integration.....	2-11
2-10. The organization integration team approach to force integration.....	2-12
2-11. Organization integration function.....	2-12
2-12. The future of organization integration.....	2-16
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>2-17</b>
2-13. Summary .....	2-17
2-14. References .....	2-17
<b>CHAPTER 3</b>	
<b>ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.....</b>	<b>3-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>3-1</b>
3-1. Chapter content.....	3-1
3-2. The Army organizational system.....	3-1
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>THE PRODUCTION SUBSYSTEM.....</b>	<b>3-3</b>
3-3. Statutory requirements .....	3-3
3-4. Production of needed resources.....	3-4
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>THE COMBAT SUBSYSTEM.....</b>	<b>3-6</b>
3-5. Products of the combat subsystem.....	3-6
3-6. The Army in the field .....	3-7
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>THE INTEGRATING SUBSYSTEM.....</b>	<b>3-8</b>
3-7. Tasks of the integrating subsystem.....	3-8
3-8. Differentiation and integration.....	3-8
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>3-11</b>
3-9. Summary .....	3-11
3-10. References .....	3-11

**CHAPTER 4**

**THE RELATIONSHIP OF JOINT AND ARMY FORCE PLANNING ..... 4-1**

**SECTION I**

**INTRODUCTION ..... 4-1**

- 4-1. Chapter content..... 4-1
- 4-2. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)..... 4-1
- 4-3. Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA)..... 4-2
- 4-4. Army participation in Joint planning and resourcing processes..... 4-2
- 4-5. JOPEs ..... 4-3

**SECTION II**

**JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS) ..... 4-3**

- 4-6. JSPS overview..... 4-3
- 4-7. Strategic direction..... 4-3
- 4-8. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan..... 4-4
- 4-9. Planning and programming advice..... 4-5
- 4-10. Strategic assessments ..... 4-6
- 4-11. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process..... 4-8
- 4-12. Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA)..... 4-9

**SECTION III**

**PLANNING AND RESOURCING..... 4-10**

- 4-13. DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)..... 4-10
- 4-14. The Army planning system..... 4-11

**SECTION IV**

**THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS ..... 4-15**

- 4-15. Process overview..... 4-15
- 4-16. National military strategy force..... 4-16
- 4-17. Program Objective Memorandum (POM) force ..... 4-18
- 4-18. Budget force ..... 4-18
- 4-19. Current force..... 4-19

**SECTION V**

**THE JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM**

**(JOPEs)..... 4-19**

- 4-20. JOPEs overview ..... 4-19
- 4-21. Crisis action planning..... 4-20
- 4-22. Combatant commands ..... 4-22
- 4-23. Relationship of the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) to CINCs..... 4-24

**SECTION VI**

**SUMMARY AND REFERENCES..... 4-24**

- 4-24. Summary ..... 4-24
- 4-25. References ..... 4-25

**CHAPTER 5**

**ARMY FORCE DEVELOPMENT..... 5-1**

**SECTION I**

**INTRODUCTION ..... 5-1**

- 5-1. Force development ..... 5-1
- 5-2. Relationship to change ..... 5-1

5-3. Army force development process.....	5-2
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>PHASE I—DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS .....</b>	<b>5-4</b>
5-4. Requirements determination.....	5-4
5-5. Requirements determination process.....	5-5
5-6. The vision.....	5-5
5-7. Army warfighting concepts.....	5-6
5-8. Experimentation, simulation and analysis .....	5-7
5-9. DTLOMS requirements.....	5-9
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>PHASE II—DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS.....</b>	<b>5-10</b>
5-10. Organization design.....	5-10
5-11. The organization design process .....	5-10
5-12. The force design update (FDU).....	5-11
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>PHASE III—DEVELOP ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS.....</b>	<b>5-12</b>
5-13. TOE and BOIP developers .....	5-12
5-14. TOE description.....	5-13
5-15. Incremental TOE system.....	5-14
5-16. TOE review and approval.....	5-15
5-17. Consolidated TOE update .....	5-15
5-18. Basis-of-issue plan (BOIP).....	5-16
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>PHASE IV—DETERMINE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS.....</b>	<b>5-17</b>
5-19. Determining organizational authorizations .....	5-17
5-20. Total Army analysis (TAA) .....	5-18
5-21. The TAA process.....	5-19
5-22. Phase I. Requirements Determination.....	5-20
5-23. Phase II. Resource Determination.....	5-25
5-24. Army structure (ARSTRUC) message .....	5-27
5-25. The product of TAA .....	5-27
<b>SECTION VI</b>	
<b>PHASE V—DOCUMENT ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS.....</b>	<b>5-28</b>
5-26. Documentation components .....	5-28
5-27. Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS).....	5-29
5-28. The Force File .....	5-29
5-29. The Budget File .....	5-31
5-30. Force documentation.....	5-31
5-31. Authorization documents .....	5-34
5-32. The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS).....	5-35
5-33. Structure and Composition System (SACS) .....	5-36
5-34. United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) .....	5-38
5-35. Army Force Management School (AFMS).....	5-38

**SECTION VII**  
**SUMMARY AND REFERENCES..... 5-38**  
5-36. Summary ..... 5-38  
5-37. References ..... 5-39

**CHAPTER 6**  
**PLANNING FOR MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT..... 6-1**  
**SECTION I..... 6-1**  
**INTRODUCTION ..... 6-1**  
6-1. Chapter content..... 6-1  
6-2. Chapter organization..... 6-1  
**SECTION II..... 6-2**  
**PLANNING SYSTEM DESCRIPTION, DELIBERATE PLANNING,**  
**AND CRISIS ACTION PLANNING ..... 6-2**  
6-3. The planning system..... 6-2  
6-4. Deliberate planning ..... 6-9  
6-5. Crisis action (time sensitive) planning (CAP)..... 6-14  
6-6. Relationship to deliberate planning..... 6-15  
6-7. Crisis action planning phases..... 6-15  
**SECTION III**  
**SINGLE-CRISIS AND MULTIPLE CRISIS-PROCEDURES ..... 6-18**  
6-8. Initiation of single-crises procedures ..... 6-18  
6-9. Initiation of multiple-crisis procedures ..... 6-24  
**SECTION IV**  
**ARMY MOBILIZATION..... 6-26**  
6-10. Framework for mobilization planning..... 6-26  
6-11. AMOPES overview..... 6-27  
6-12. Mobilization planning responsibilities ..... 6-28  
**SECTION V**  
**THE ARMY WARTRACE PROGRAM. .... 6-31**  
6-13. WARTRACE program description and composition..... 6-31  
**SECTION VI**  
**INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS ..... 6-41**  
6-14. The need for industrial preparedness..... 6-41  
6-15. DOD industrial base preparedness objectives ..... 6-41  
6-16. DOD-level industrial preparedness management ..... 6-42  
6-17. The Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS) ..... 6-43  
6-18. The National Defense Stockpile..... 6-43  
6-19. DOD key facilities list (KFL)..... 6-43  
6-20. Army Industrial Preparedness Program..... 6-44  
**SECTION VII**  
**SUMMARY AND REFERENCES..... 6-44**  
6-21. Summary ..... 6-44  
6-22. References ..... 6-45

<b>CHAPTER 7</b>	
<b>RESERVE COMPONENTS .....</b>	<b>7-1</b>
<i>SECTION I</i>	
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>7-1</b>
7-1. Chapter content.....	7-1
7-2. Reserve Components.....	7-1
<i>SECTION II</i>	
<b>THE NATIONAL GUARD .....</b>	<b>7-1</b>
7-3. An American tradition.....	7-1
7-4. National Defense Act of 1916.....	7-1
7-5. World War I.....	7-2
7-6. World War II .....	7-2
7-7. Korean War .....	7-2
7-8. Vietnam War .....	7-2
7-9. Desert Shield/Desert Storm.....	7-3
7-10. Current Force.....	7-3
<i>SECTION III</i>	
<b>THE ARMY RESERVE .....</b>	<b>7-3</b>
7-11. Federal control.....	7-3
7-12. The formative years.....	7-3
7-13. World War I.....	7-4
7-14. Korean War .....	7-4
7-15. Changing role .....	7-4
7-16. Operations Just Cause to Joint Endeavor/Guard .....	7-5
7-17. Current force.....	7-5
<i>SECTION IV</i>	
<b>TITLE 10 U.S. CODE .....</b>	<b>7-5</b>
7-18. United States Code (USC).....	7-5
7-19. Title 10 and Title 32 .....	7-5
<i>SECTION V</i>	
<b>RESERVE SERVICE.....</b>	<b>7-6</b>
7-20. The categories.....	7-6
7-21. The Ready Reserve.....	7-6
7-22. Standby Reserve (USAR only).....	7-9
7-23. Retired Reserve (USAR only).....	7-10
<i>SECTION VI</i>	
<b>RESERVE COMPONENT MANAGEMENT .....</b>	<b>7-10</b>
7-24. Structure .....	7-10
7-25. Congress .....	7-10
7-26. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) .....	7-11
7-27. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).....	7-11
7-28. Headquarters, DA.....	7-12
7-29. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) .....	7-13
7-30. Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR).....	7-15
7-31. Major Army commands.....	7-16
7-32. State adjutants general (Army National Guard).....	7-17

**SECTION VII**  
**TRAINING** ..... 7-18  
7-33. Goals..... 7-18  
7-34. Challenges ..... 7-19  
7-35. Unit training assemblies ..... 7-19  
7-36. Collective tasks..... 7-19

**SECTION VIII**  
**EQUIPMENT**..... 7-19  
7-37. Policy..... 7-19  
7-38. National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA)..... 7-20  
7-39. Withdrawal..... 7-20

**SECTION IX**  
**READINESS/MOBILIZATION ASSISTANCE** ..... 7-20  
7-40. Background ..... 7-20  
7-41. Roundout/roundup ..... 7-20

**SECTION X**  
**WARTRACE**..... 7-21  
7-42. Wartime organization..... 7-21  
7-43. Association..... 7-21  
7-44. Management ..... 7-21  
7-45. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)..... 7-21  
7-46. Force support packages (FSP)..... 7-21  
7-47. Joint reserve units (JRU) ..... 7-22  
7-48. Overseas deployment training (ODT) ..... 7-23  
7-49. Drug interdiction and counter drug activities..... 7-23  
7-50. Military support to civil authorities (MSCA)..... 7-24  
7-51. Full time support (FTS)..... 7-25  
7-52. The Total Army School System (TASS)..... 7-26

**SECTION XI**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT PAY, BENEFITS, AND ENTITLEMENTS**..... 7-27  
7-53. Individual status ..... 7-27  
7-54. Benefits..... 7-27  
7-55. Retirement ..... 7-27  
7-56. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) ..... 7-27

**SECTION XII**  
**RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION CAMPAIGN PLAN** ..... 7-28  
7-57. Division XXI design..... 7-28  
7-58. Enhanced separate brigades..... 7-28  
7-59. ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS) ..... 7-28  
7-60. Integrated divisions ..... 7-28  
7-61. Multi-component units..... 7-29

**SECTION XIII**  
**SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**..... 7-29  
7-62. Summary ..... 7-29  
7-63. References ..... 7-29

<b>CHAPTER 8</b>	
<b>FORCE READINESS</b> .....	<b>8-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b> .....	<b>8-1</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>8-1</b>
8-1. Maintaining readiness.....	8-1
8-2. Chapter content.....	8-1
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>MANAGING FORCE READINESS</b> .....	<b>8-2</b>
8-3. Definitions of readiness.....	8-2
8-4. Factors affecting force readiness.....	8-2
8-5. Cost of force readiness.....	8-3
8-6. Resourcing readiness.....	8-4
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>CHAIRMAN'S READINESS SYSTEM</b> .....	<b>8-5</b>
8-7. System overview.....	8-5
8-8. Assessing current joint readiness.....	8-6
8-9. Assessing future readiness.....	8-8
8-10. Key relationships.....	8-8
8-11. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS).....	8-9
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>ARMY READINESS</b> .....	<b>8-9</b>
8-12. Unit status report purpose.....	8-9
8-13. USR relationship to joint readiness.....	8-10
8-14. USR changes.....	8-10
8-15. USR procedures.....	8-11
8-16. Use of USR data at HQDA.....	8-13
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES</b> .....	<b>8-13</b>
8-17. Summary.....	8-13
8-18. References.....	8-13
<b>CHAPTER 9</b>	
<b>ARMY PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION</b>	
<b>SYSTEM</b> .....	<b>9-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>9-1</b>
9-1. Chapter content.....	9-1
9-2. PPBS—a dynamic system.....	9-1
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITIES</b> .....	<b>9-3</b>
9-3. Secretarial oversight.....	9-3
9-4. System management.....	9-4
9-5. Planning phase.....	9-4
9-6. Integrated programming and budgeting phase.....	9-5
9-7. Execution phase.....	9-7

**SECTION III**  
**RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PPBES-RELATED OPERATIONAL TASKS..... 9-8**  
 9-8. HQDA principal officials ..... 9-8  
 9-9. Army commanders ..... 9-12  
 9-10. Staff managers and sponsors for congressional appropriations ..... 9-12

**SECTION IV**  
**DOD PPBS SYSTEM DESCRIPTION..... 9-14**  
 9-11. Purpose ..... 9-14  
 9-12. The Future Years Defense Program..... 9-14  
 9-13. Key participants..... 9-15  
 9-14. Defense Resources Board..... 9-16  
 9-15. Program Review Group ..... 9-17  
 9-16. Intelligence Program Review Group ..... 9-17  
 9-17. Defense Acquisition Board and Joint Requirements Oversight  
 Council ..... 9-17

**SECTION V**  
**ARMY PPBES SYSTEM DESCRIPTION..... 9-18**  
 9-18. Army’s primary resource management system..... 9-18  
 9-19. PPBES concept..... 9-18  
 9-20. PPBES objectives ..... 9-19  
 9-21. Control of planning, programming, and budgeting documents..... 9-20

**SECTION VI**  
**RECORDING RESOURCES..... 9-21**  
 9-22. The MDEP: what it is and how it’s used..... 9-21  
 9-23. Program and budget years covered by the MDEP ..... 9-22  
 9-24. Extent that manpower and dollars can be redistributed in the MDEP ..... 9-23  
 9-25. How flexibility affects the MDEP ..... 9-24  
 9-26. Resource recording structures ..... 9-24  
 9-27. Automated support..... 9-24

**SECTION VII**  
**PPBES DELIBERATIVE FORUMS ..... 9-26**  
 9-28. Army Resources Board ..... 9-26  
 9-29. Senior Review Group ..... 9-26  
 9-30. Planning Program Budget Committee..... 9-27  
 9-31. Council of Colonels ..... 9-27  
 9-32. Program Evaluation Groups ..... 9-28

**SECTION VIII**  
**PROCESS AND STRUCTURE ..... 9-28**  
 9-33. System process ..... 9-28  
 9-34. System structure ..... 9-28

**SECTION IX**  
**PPBS PLANNING PHASE ..... 9-30**  
 9-35. Planning by OSD and the Joint Staff..... 9-30  
 9-36. NSC guidance..... 9-30  
 9-37. Joint strategic planning..... 9-30  
 9-38. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)..... 9-33

9-39. JSPS documents and plans .....	9-34
9-40. OSD planning products .....	9-36
<b>SECTION X</b>	
<b>PPBES PLANNING</b> .....	<b>9-36</b>
9-41. The Army Plan.....	9-36
9-42. Army Strategic Planning Guidance.....	9-37
9-43. Army Planning Guidance .....	9-37
9-44. Army Program Guidance Memorandum.....	9-38
9-45. Army requirements determination process.....	9-38
9-46. Army modernization plan.....	9-38
9-47. Army Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan.....	9-39
9-48. Force development and total Army analysis .....	9-40
9-49. Force management .....	9-40
<b>SECTION XI</b>	
<b>OPERATIONAL PLANNING LINK TO THE PPBS</b> .....	<b>9-42</b>
9-50. Operational planning .....	9-42
9-51. Missions and tasks.....	9-42
9-52. OPLAN development and review .....	9-42
<b>SECTION XII</b>	
<b>INTEGRATED PROGRAMMING-BUDGETING PHASE</b> .....	<b>9-43</b>
9-53. Army programming and budgeting.....	9-43
9-54. Guidance.....	9-44
9-55. Program-budget development process .....	9-44
9-56. OSD program review.....	9-48
9-57. Program Decision Memorandum .....	9-49
9-58. POM updates .....	9-49
9-59. Complementary program and budget perspective .....	9-49
9-60. BES preparation.....	9-50
9-61. BES review and approval.....	9-51
9-62. Justification.....	9-52
<b>SECTION XIII</b>	
<b>BUDGET EXECUTION PHASE</b> .....	<b>9-53</b>
9-63. Management and accounting.....	9-53
9-64. Financial management.....	9-54
9-65. Revised approved program for RDT&E.....	9-56
9-66. Program Budget Accounting System.....	9-56
9-67. Obligation and outlay plans.....	9-57
9-68. Financing unbudgeted requirements .....	9-57
9-69. Oversight of nonappropriated funds.....	9-58
<b>SECTION XIV</b>	
<b>PROGRAM PERFORMANCE AND REVIEW</b> .....	<b>9-58</b>
9-70. Program implementation.....	9-58
9-71. Quarterly Army Performance Review.....	9-58
9-72. Review of selected acquisition systems .....	9-58
9-73. Joint Reconciliation Program.....	9-58

<b>SECTION XV</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>9-64</b>
9-74. Summary.....	9-64
9-75. References.....	9-64
<b>CHAPTER 10</b>	
<b>RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>10-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>10-1</b>
10-1. The need for resource management.....	10-1
10-2. Resource management—a definition.....	10-2
10-3. Resource management terms.....	10-2
10-4. Key players in Army resource management.....	10-3
10-5. A framework to help study resource management.....	10-7
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>ACQUIRE RESOURCES.....</b>	<b>10-7</b>
10-6. Getting the fiscal resources for the Army to use.....	10-7
10-7. Treasury warrants.....	10-9
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>ALLOCATE RESOURCES TO THE FIELD.....</b>	<b>10-9</b>
10-8. Fund distribution and control.....	10-9
10-9. Fund Authorization Document (FAD).....	10-10
10-10. Fund allowance system.....	10-10
10-11. Delegation of funding authority.....	10-10
10-12. Special classified programs.....	10-11
10-13. Secretary of the Army Representation Funds.....	10-11
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>ACCOUNT FOR THE USE OF THE RESOURCES.....</b>	<b>10-12</b>
10-14. Legally using the resources to accomplish the mission.....	10-12
10-15. Availability of appropriations for obligations.....	10-12
10-16. Properly obligating the resources.....	10-13
10-17. The Anti-deficiency Act (ADA).....	10-14
10-18. Accounting for the obligation.....	10-15
10-19. The Army management structure (AMS).....	10-16
10-20. Year end certification of accounts.....	10-17
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>ANALYZE THE USE OF RESOURCES.....</b>	<b>10-18</b>
10-21. 1981 - A change in responsibilities.....	10-18
10-22. Execution reviews.....	10-18
10-23. HQDA Reviews—Quarterly Army Performance Review (QAPR).....	10-18
10-24. Shifting resources.....	10-18
10-25. Analyzing the “accounting books”—Joint Reconciliation Program.....	10-19
<b>SECTION VI</b>	
<b>IMPROVING MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS PRACTICES IN THE</b>	
<b>ARMY.....</b>	<b>10-20</b>
10-26. Efforts to improve Army management.....	10-20
10-27. Federal Manager’s Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982.....	10-20

10-28. Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990.....	10-20
10-29. Government Management Reform Act (GMRA) of 1994.....	10-21
10-30. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993.....	10-21
10-31. Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996.....	10-22
10-32. Management controls .....	10-23
10-33. Improving business practices .....	10-23
<b>SECTION VII</b>	
<b>NON-APPROPRIATED FUNDS.....</b>	<b>10-25</b>
10-34. Non-appropriated funds definitions.....	10-25
10-35. NAFI management .....	10-25
10-36. Fiduciary responsibility for NAF (10 United States Code 2783).....	10-26
10-37. HQDA oversight of non-appropriated funds.....	10-26
<b>SECTION VIII</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>10-26</b>
10-38. Summary.....	10-26
10-39. References .....	10-27
<b>CHAPTER 11</b>	
<b>MATERIEL SYSTEM RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION</b>	
<b>MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>11-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>11-1</b>
11-1. Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Army management system.....	11-1
11-2. System focus.....	11-1
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>DOD ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>11-2</b>
11-3. DOD policy.....	11-2
11-4. DOD acquisition management .....	11-3
11-5. Organizational linkage .....	11-3
11-6. DOD science and technology.....	11-4
11-7. Defense science and technology strategy.....	11-4
11-8. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).....	11-5
11-9. Defense Acquisition University (DAU).....	11-6
11-10. Defense Systems Management College (DSMC).....	11-6
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>ARMY ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>11-6</b>
11-11. Army's RDA goals.....	11-6
11-12. Army Acquisition Executive (AAE).....	11-7
11-13. The program executive officer (PEO).....	11-9
11-14. The program/project/product manager (PM).....	11-12
11-15. PEO resource control.....	11-12
11-16. Acquisition career management .....	11-13
11-17. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA).....	11-14
11-18. Major Army commands (MACOMs).....	11-20
11-19. Other DA agencies .....	11-24

**SECTION IV**

**MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS..... 11-25**

- 11-20. Policy..... 11-25
- 11-21. Army science and technology ..... 11-27
- 11-22. Technology transition strategy..... 11-30
- 11-23. Warfighting experiments..... 11-32

**SECTION V**

**MATERIEL SYSTEMS ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PROCESS ..... 11-33**

- 11-24. Initiation of the materiel acquisition process ..... 11-33
- 11-25. Framework of the materiel acquisition process..... 11-34
- 11-26. Determining and documenting materiel requirements ..... 11-34
- 11-27. Acquisition categories ..... 11-35
- 11-28. Acquisition strategies and program plans ..... 11-35
- 11-29. Environmental considerations ..... 11-35
- 11-30. Risk assessments and management ..... 11-36

**SECTION VI**

**ACQUISITION ACTIVITIES, PHASES AND MILESTONES..... 11-36**

- 11-31. Pre-systems acquisition activity..... 11-36
- 11-32. Concept and technology development phase ..... 11-36
- 11-33. Entrance criteria ..... 11-36
- 11-34. Milestone A..... 11-36
- 11-35. Concept exploration work effort ..... 11-37
- 11-36. Decision review..... 11-37
- 11-37. Program initiations in advance of Milestone B..... 11-37
- 11-38. Component advanced development work effort..... 11-38
- 11-39. Systems acquisition activity..... 11-38
- 11-40. System development and demonstration phase..... 11-38
- 11-41. Entrance criteria ..... 11-39
- 11-42. Milestone B..... 11-40
- 11-43. Entry into system development and demonstration..... 11-40
- 11-44. System integration work effort..... 11-40
- 11-45. Interim progress review..... 11-41
- 11-46. System demonstration work effort..... 11-41
- 11-47. Production and deployment phase..... 11-41
- 11-48. Entrance criteria ..... 11-41
- 11-49. Milestone C ..... 11-42
- 11-50. Low-rate initial production (LRIP) work effort..... 11-42
- 11-51. Full-rate production (FRP) decision review..... 11-43
- 11-52. Full-rate production and deployment work effort ..... 11-43
- 11-53. Sustainment activity/phase ..... 11-43
- 11-54. Sustain systems work effort ..... 11-43
- 11-55. Dispose of systems work effort ..... 11-44
- 11-56. Total package fielding (TPF) process ..... 11-44
- 11-57. Army system of systems (SoS)/unit set fielding (USF)..... 11-45
- 11-58. Additional considerations ..... 11-48

<b>SECTION VII</b>	
<b>ACQUISITION DOCUMENTATION .....</b>	<b>11-48</b>
11-59. Materiel requirements documents (MRDs).....	11-48
11-60. Other service requirements.....	11-50
11-61. Catalog of approved requirements documents (CARDS).....	11-51
11-62. Program review documentation and program plans .....	11-51
11-63. Typical waivers and reports .....	11-54
11-64. Other documentation.....	11-55
<b>SECTION VIII</b>	
<b>ACQUISITION OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW (O&amp;R) PROCESS.....</b>	<b>11-55</b>
11-65. Process control by decision reviews.....	11-55
11-66. Integrated product and process development (IPPD).....	11-56
11-67. The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB).....	11-57
11-68. The Army Systems Acquisitions Review Council (ASARC).....	11-58
11-69. The HQDA Information Technology Overarching Integrated Product Team (ITOIPT).....	11-58
11-70. In-process review (IPR).....	11-59
<b>SECTION IX</b>	
<b>TESTING AND EVALUATION.....</b>	<b>11-59</b>
11-71. T&E strategy .....	11-59
11-72. DT and OT.....	11-60
<b>SECTION X</b>	
<b>INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT (ILS) .....</b>	<b>11-60</b>
11-73. ILS requirements and procedures.....	11-60
11-74. ILS process .....	11-61
<b>SECTION XI</b>	
<b>MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL INTEGRATION (MANPRINT)</b>	
<b>PROGRAM.....</b>	<b>11-62</b>
11-75. Seven MANPRINT domains .....	11-62
11-76. MANPRINT objectives and concept.....	11-64
<b>SECTION XII</b>	
<b>ACQUISITION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>11-64</b>
11-77. Appropriations .....	11-64
11-78. Program and budget process.....	11-65
11-79. RDTE appropriation activities.....	11-65
11-80. Procurement appropriations .....	11-67
11-81. Research, development, and acquisition plan (RDA plan) .....	11-68
11-82. TRADOC warfighting lens analysis (WFLA).....	11-69
11-83. Program stability .....	11-70
<b>SECTION XIII</b>	
<b>ACQUISITION REFORM.....</b>	<b>11-70</b>
11-84. Reform process.....	11-70
11-85. Army XXI reinvention centers .....	11-71
11-86. Army XXI Acquisition Reform Reinvention Laboratory .....	11-71
11-87. Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP).....	11-72
11-88. Horizontal technology integration (HTI).....	11-73

11-89. Simulation and modeling for acquisition, requirements, and training (SMART).....	11-74
<b>SECTION XIV</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>11-76</b>
11-90. Summary.....	11-76
11-91. References .....	11-77
<b>CHAPTER 12</b>	
<b>LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>12-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>12-1</b>
12-1. Chapter content.....	12-1
12-2. Definitions .....	12-1
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>LOGISTICS TASKS AND ROLES.....</b>	<b>12-3</b>
12-3. Logistics tasks .....	12-3
12-4. Logistics roles.....	12-3
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS.....</b>	<b>12-10</b>
12-5. Mission, organization, and functions of the DCSLOG.....	12-10
12-6. Mission and organization of AMC.....	12-20
12-7. Functions of AMC.....	12-25
12-8. Explanation of AMC functions. ....	12-26
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>STANDARD SYSTEMS.....</b>	<b>12-35</b>
12-9. Defense standard systems.....	12-35
12-10. Department of the Army standard systems. ....	12-36
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>FUNDING.....</b>	<b>12-41</b>
12-11. Appropriations.....	12-41
12-12. AWCF .....	12-41
<b>SECTION VI</b>	
<b>SECURITY ASSISTANCE.....</b>	<b>12-42</b>
12-13. Security Assistance (SA).....	12-42
<b>SECTION VII</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>12-44</b>
12-14. Summary.....	12-44
12-15. References .....	12-45
<b>CHAPTER 13</b>	
<b>MILITARY HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>13-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>13-1</b>
13-1. Chapter content.....	13-1
13-2. The transition to military human resource management (HRM).....	13-1
13-3. Military HR life cycle functions.....	13-2
13-4. Military human resources (HR) integrating functions .....	13-3
13-5. Key military human resource (HR) publications .....	13-3

13-6. Military Occupational Classification and Structure system (MOCS).....	13-4
13-7. Human resources (HR) leadership and structure.....	13-4
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>THE STRUCTURE FUNCTION</b> .....	<b>13-5</b>
13-8. Personnel management authorization document (PMAD).....	13-5
13-9. Notional force (NOF) system.....	13-5
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>THE ACQUISITION FUNCTION</b> .....	<b>13-6</b>
13-10. Interrelated documents and systems at the heart of the human resources (HR) acquisition process.....	13-6
13-11. Military manpower management.....	13-8
13-12. Manpower management at HQDA.....	13-9
13-13. Military force alignment.....	13-11
13-14. Enlisted procurement.....	13-11
13-15. Warrant officer (WO) procurement.....	13-13
13-16. Commissioned officer procurement .....	13-14
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>THE COMPENSATION FUNCTION</b> .....	<b>13-15</b>
13-17. Compensation overview .....	13-15
13-18. Manning Program Evaluation Group (PEG).....	13-16
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>THE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION</b> .....	<b>13-17</b>
13-19. Enlisted distribution and assignment.....	13-17
13-20. Officer distribution and assignment .....	13-25
<b>SECTION VI</b>	
<b>THE DEVELOPMENT FUNCTION—ENLISTED</b> .....	<b>13-27</b>
13-21. Enlisted development .....	13-27
13-22. Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS) .....	13-28
13-23. Enlisted Evaluation System (EES).....	13-28
13-24. The NCO Leader Self-Development Career Model.....	13-28
13-25. Enlisted promotions.....	13-29
13-26. Command sergeants major program.....	13-29
13-27. Total Army Retention Program.....	13-30
13-28. Qualitative Management Program (QMP).....	13-30
<b>SECTION VII</b>	
<b>THE DEVELOPMENT FUNCTION—WARRANT OFFICER</b> .....	<b>13-31</b>
13-29. Warrant officer development.....	13-31
13-30. Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) .....	13-31
13-31. Warrant officer promotions .....	13-32
13-32. Warrant officer retention programs.....	13-33
13-33. Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA).....	13-33
<b>SECTION VIII</b>	
<b>THE DEVELOPMENT FUNCTION—OFFICER</b> .....	<b>13-34</b>
13-34. Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) .....	13-34
13-35. Officer Personnel Management System XXI (OPMS XXI).....	13-34
13-36. Fundamental officer management changes .....	13-36

13-37. Career fields .....	13-37
13-38. Career field assignment .....	13-38
13-39. Status of OPMS XXI.....	13-39
13-40. OPMS as a part of human resources management (HRM).....	13-40
13-41. Branch detail program.....	13-40
13-42. Centralized selection for command positions .....	13-41
13-43. Army Acquisition Corps (AAC).....	13-41
13-44. Officer Evaluation System.....	13-42
13-45. Officer Evaluation Reporting System.....	13-43
13-46. Officer promotions .....	13-44
13-47. Officer quality management.....	13-44
13-48. Officer strength management .....	13-45
13-49. Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA).....	13-45
13-50. DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (“Goldwater-Nichols”).....	13-46
<b>SECTION IX</b>	
<b>THE SUSTAINMENT FUNCTION .....</b>	<b>13-47</b>
13-51. Sustainment function overview .....	13-47
13-52. Army Continuing Education System (ACES).....	13-47
13-53. Equal Opportunity Program.....	13-47
13-54. The Army casualty system.....	13-48
<b>SECTION X</b>	
<b>THE TRANSITION FUNCTION.....</b>	<b>13-48</b>
13-55. Transition function overview .....	13-48
13-56. The Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP).....	13-49
13-57. Army Retirement Services Program.....	13-49
13-58. Separation.....	13-50
13-59. Enlisted separation.....	13-50
13-60. Enlisted nondisability retirement system.....	13-51
13-61. Officer nondisability retirement system.....	13-51
13-62. Temporary early retirement authority (TERA) .....	13-51
13-63. Physical disability separation.....	13-51
<b>SECTION XI</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>13-52</b>
13-64. Summary .....	13-52
13-65. References .....	13-53
<b>CHAPTER 14</b>	
<b>CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>14-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>14-1</b>
14-1. Chapter content.....	14-1
14-2. Categories of civilian personnel.....	14-2
14-3. Army workforce mix .....	14-3
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>ARMY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>14-3</b>
14-4. Decentralized management .....	14-3
14-5. Appropriated fund civilians .....	14-4

14-6. Nonappropriated fund civilians .....	14-5
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>ORGANIZATION FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT.....</b>	<b>14-5</b>
14-7. U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) .....	14-5
14-8. Other agencies with Federal government-wide authority. ....	14-6
14-9. Department of Defense.....	14-7
14-10. Department of the Army.....	14-7
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REGIONALIZATION AND</b>	
<b>MODERNIZATION .....</b>	<b>14-9</b>
14-11. Regionalization Initiative .....	14-9
14-12. Regionalization structure.....	14-9
14-13. Modernization.....	14-11
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AT INSTALLATION/ACTIVITY</b>	
<b>LEVEL .....</b>	<b>14-12</b>
14-14. Personnel management responsibility and authority.....	14-12
14-15. Commander responsibilities .....	14-12
14-16. Supervisor responsibilities .....	14-13
14-17. Maintain Accurate Position Descriptions .....	14-13
14-18. Recruit, select, and assign employees.....	14-14
14-19. Evaluate employee performance and administer awards/incentives programs .....	14-15
14-20. Train and develop employees.....	14-16
14-21. Communication, discipline, and labor-management relations.....	14-18
<b>SECTION VI</b>	
<b>EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE FEDERAL</b>	
<b>GOVERNMENT.....</b>	<b>14-20</b>
14-22. Equal employment opportunity statutory requirements and Army implementation.....	14-20
14-23. The discrimination complaint process.....	14-21
<b>SECTION VII</b>	
<b>SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE.....</b>	
14-24. Senior Executive Service structure and composition.....	14-22
14-25. Qualification of SES members .....	14-22
<b>SECTION VIII</b>	
<b>MOBILIZATION PLANNING.....</b>	
14-26. Designation of deployable and non-deployable civilian positions.....	14-24
14-27. Civilian personnel mobilization planning .....	14-24
<b>SECTION IX</b>	
<b>DEFENSE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEM.....</b>	
14-28. Structure and composition of the Defense Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS).....	14-25
14-29. Relationship of DCIPS to the Army Civilian Personnel Program.....	14-25

<b>SECTION X</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>14-26</b>
14-30. Summary.....	14-26
14-31. References.....	14-26
<b>CHAPTER 15</b>	
<b>ARMY TRAINING.....</b>	<b>15-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>15-1</b>
15-1. The training goal.....	15-1
15-2. Chapter organization.....	15-1
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>ARMY TRAINING OVERVIEW.....</b>	<b>15-2</b>
15-3. Army training.....	15-2
15-4. The three major components of the training system.....	15-2
15-5. Combined arms training strategy (CATS).....	15-2
15-6. Future Army training.....	15-4
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>THE POLICY, REQUIREMENTS, AND RESOURCING PROCESS.....</b>	<b>15-5</b>
15-7. General.....	15-5
15-8. Organization.....	15-5
15-9. Requirements and resourcing.....	15-7
15-10. Development of the Army individual training requirements.....	15-7
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC)</b>	
<b>ORGANIZATION.....</b>	<b>15-10</b>
15-11. Training in institutions—general.....	15-10
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>TRAINING DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM.....</b>	<b>15-12</b>
15-12. The Systems Approach to Training (SAT).....	15-12
15-13. Automated Systems Approach to Training (ASAT).....	15-12
<b>SECTION VI</b>	
<b>THE ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM.....</b>	<b>15-13</b>
15-14. The objectives of The Army School System (TASS).....	15-13
15-15. Total Army Training System (TATS).....	15-13
15-16. Enlisted Initial Entry Training (IET).....	15-15
15-17. Noncommissioned officer training.....	15-16
15-18. NCO functional courses.....	15-17
15-19. Warrant officer training.....	15-18
15-20. Lieutenants' training.....	15-20
15-21. Captains' training.....	15-20
15-22. Field grade training.....	15-21
15-23. General officer training.....	15-22
15-24. Self development training.....	15-22
15-25. Mobilization Training Base.....	15-23

<b>SECTION VII</b>	
<b>TRAINING IN UNITS</b> .....	<b>15-24</b>
15-26. General.....	15-24
15-27. Organization for training in units.....	15-24
15-28. Training of soldiers and leaders in units.....	15-25
15-29. Soldier training publications.....	15-26
15-30. Collective training.....	15-26
15-31. Risk management.....	15-27
15-32. Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP).....	15-27
15-33. ARTEPs, mission training plans (MTPs) and drills.....	15-27
15-34. Combat Training Center (CTC) Program.....	15-28
15-35. Unit training management.....	15-30
15-36. Army modernization training (AMT).....	15-32
15-37. The Security Assistance Training Program (SATP).....	15-33
<b>SECTION VIII</b>	
<b>THE TRAINING SUPPORT SYSTEM</b> .....	<b>15-34</b>
15-38. Training support—general.....	15-34
15-39. Organization for training support.....	15-35
15-40. New training technologies.....	15-35
<b>SECTION IX</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES</b> .....	<b>15-37</b>
15-41. Summary.....	15-37
15-42. References.....	15-38
<b>CHAPTER 16</b>	
<b>ARMY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT</b> .....	<b>16-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	<b>16-1</b>
16-1. General background.....	16-1
16-2. The Army in the Information Age.....	16-1
16-3. Army Transformation Strategy.....	16-2
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (CIO)</b> .....	<b>16-2</b>
16-4. CIO authority.....	16-2
16-5. CIO responsibilities and duties contained in the CCA.....	16-3
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>ARMY ENTERPRISE</b> .....	<b>16-4</b>
16-6. Definition.....	16-4
16-7. Army Enterprise Strategy (AES).....	16-4
16-8. Components of the AES.....	16-4
16-9. Major participants in the process.....	16-5
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>CIO INVESTMENT STRATEGY</b> .....	<b>16-5</b>
16-10. General background.....	16-5
16-11. Army CIO strategy and implementation.....	16-5

**SECTION V**  
**ARCHITECTURE..... 16-7**  
 16-12. Army Enterprise Architecture (AEA) ..... 16-7  
 16-13. Tool and products..... 16-7  
 16-14. Army Operational Architecture (AOA)..... 16-7  
 16-15. Army Systems Architecture (ASA)..... 16-7  
 16-16. Joint Technical Architecture—Army ..... 16-8

**SECTION VI**  
**PROCESS ANALYSIS AND REVISION ..... 16-8**  
 16-17. Responsibilities ..... 16-8  
 16-18. Documentation..... 16-8

**SECTION VII**  
**PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT..... 16-9**  
 16-19. Objectives..... 16-9  
 16-20. Measurement types..... 16-9

**SECTION VIII**  
**CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (CIO) ACTIVITIES ..... 16-10**  
 16-21. Digitization of the battlefield ..... 16-10  
 16-22. Digitizing the sustaining base..... 16-10  
 16-23. Information assurance ..... 16-10  
 16-24. Army acquisition and CIO assessment..... 16-11  
 16-25. Electronic commerce (EC)..... 16-11

**SECTION IX**  
**SPACE AND NETWORKS..... 16-13**  
 16-26. Contracting for telecommunications services ..... 16-13  
 16-27. Roles of USANETA, ANSOC, and CECOM..... 16-13  
 16-28. The Global Command and Control System-Army (GCCS-A) ..... 16-13

**SECTION X**  
**C4/IT INFRASTRUCTURE ..... 16-14**  
 16-29. Synchronization tool..... 16-14  
 16-30. CIO responsibilities..... 16-14

**SECTION XI**  
**RESERVES ..... 16-14**  
 16-31. General background ..... 16-14  
 16-32. Reserve overview ..... 16-15

**SECTION XII**  
**ARMY MISSION AND TRANSFORMATION CAMPAIGN**  
**PRIORITIES..... 16-16**  
 16-33. General background ..... 16-16  
 16-34. CIO priorities..... 16-16

**SECTION XIII**  
**SUMMARY AND REFERENCES..... 16-18**  
 16-35. Summary ..... 16-18  
 16-36. References ..... 16-19

<b>CHAPTER 17</b>	
<b>INSTALLATION COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT .....</b>	<b>17-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>17-1</b>
17-1. Chapter content.....	17-1
17-2. The Army's installation environment.....	17-1
17-3. ACSIM mission and functions .....	17-3
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>MAJOR COMMAND (MACOM) INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT</b>	
<b>ORGANIZATION.....</b>	<b>17-3</b>
17-4. General.....	17-3
17-5. Installation organization.....	17-4
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>KEY INSTALLATION POSITIONS.....</b>	<b>17-4</b>
17-6. Installation commander .....	17-4
17-7. Garrison commander and installation support activity commander.....	17-5
17-8. Area support group commander .....	17-5
17-9. Base support battalion commander .....	17-5
17-10. Executive assistant (base operations) .....	17-5
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT .....</b>	<b>17-6</b>
17-11. Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) 6Y (Installation Management).....	17-6
17-12. Garrison Pre-Command Course (GPCC).....	17-6
17-13. General Officer Installation Commander's Course (GOICC).....	17-6
17-14. Garrison Sergeant Major Course (GSGMC).....	17-6
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>INSTALLATION STAFF ORGANIZATION.....</b>	<b>17-7</b>
17-15. Installation special and personal staff.....	17-7
17-16. Garrison/area support group/installation support activity.....	17-7
17-17. Installation management personnel designations .....	17-8
<b>SECTION VI</b>	
<b>INSTALLATION STRATEGY .....</b>	<b>17-8</b>
17-18. Installations: A Strategy for the 21st Century.....	17-8
17-19. Strategic goals. ....	17-8
<b>SECTION VII</b>	
<b>MAJOR INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES AND</b>	
<b>PROGRAMS.....</b>	<b>17-9</b>
17-20. Strategic communications .....	17-9
17-21. Doctrine .....	17-9
17-22. Privatization and outsourcing.....	17-9
17-23. Commercial activities.....	17-11
17-24. Environmental Compliance Program.....	17-12
17-25. Hazardous Substances Management System (HSMS).....	17-12
17-26. Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Reduction Strategy.....	17-13
17-27. Installation pollution prevention plans .....	17-13
17-28. Recycling.....	17-13

17-29. Army Energy Program.....	17-14
17-30. Energy savings performance contracts (ESPC).....	17-14
17-31. Army Installation Restoration Program (IRP).....	17-15
17-32. Army conservation program.....	17-15
17-33. Military Construction Army (MCA) Process.....	17-16
17-34. Army Facility Reduction Program.....	17-16
17-35. Revitalization.....	17-17
17-36. Installation Status Report (ISR).....	17-19
17-37. Army Facility Strategy.....	17-19
17-38. Managing installations to standards.....	17-20
17-39. Improved business practices.....	17-21
17-40. Civilian inmate labor programs.....	17-21
17-41. Army Communities of Excellence (ACOE).....	17-22
<b>SECTION VIII</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>17-23</b>
17-42. Summary.....	17-23
17-43. References.....	17-24
<b>CHAPTER 18</b>	
<b>INTELLIGENCE.....</b>	<b>18-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>18-1</b>
18-1. Chapter content.....	18-1
18-2. Intelligence drivers.....	18-1
18-3. Intelligence products.....	18-3
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM, SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT, AND MANAGEMENT OF COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>18-6</b>
18-4. U. S. intelligence community goal and organization.....	18-6
18-5. Executive and Congressional intelligence resource management.....	18-9
18-6. Intelligence cycle.....	18-12
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>DEFENSE AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND USES OF INTELLIGENCE.....</b>	<b>18-13</b>
18-7. Department of Defense.....	18-13
18-8. Army intelligence system.....	18-17
18-9. General uses of intelligence.....	18-19
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>18-23</b>
18-10. Summary.....	18-23
18-11. References.....	18-23
<b>CHAPTER 19</b>	
<b>THE ARMY HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT SYSTEM.....</b>	<b>19-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>19-1</b>
19-1. The revolution in military medicine.....	19-1

19-2. Scope of the AMEDD .....	19-2
19-3. The health service support system and the Army.....	19-2
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>AMEDD MISSION AND SUPPORT TO COMMANDERS.....</b>	<b>19-2</b>
19-4. Mission of the Army Medical Department.....	19-2
19-5. AMEDD support to commanders.....	19-4
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>THE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT SYSTEM.....</b>	<b>19-4</b>
19-6. Key elements .....	19-4
19-7. Staff relationships and responsibilities.....	19-6
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT .....</b>	<b>19-7</b>
19-8. AMEDD reorganization.....	19-7
19-9. U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM).....	19-8
19-10. U. S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC).....	19-9
19-11. U.S. Army Dental Command .....	19-9
19-12. U.S. Army Veterinary Service .....	19-10
19-13. U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM).....	19-10
19-14. U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School.....	19-10
19-15. USAMEDCOM Acquisition Activity.....	19-11
19-16. Regional medical commands (RMCs).....	19-11
19-17. AMEDD role in combat service support units .....	19-12
19-18. Staff surgeons .....	19-13
19-19. Health service logistics.....	19-13
19-20. Medical Reengineering Initiative (MRI).....	19-14
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>19-14</b>
19-21. Summary.....	19-14
19-22. References .....	19-14
<b>CHAPTER 20</b>	
<b>MANAGEMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS.....</b>	<b>20-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>20-1</b>
20-1. Law and the commander .....	20-1
20-2. Office of the staff judge advocate .....	20-1
20-3. Staff judge advocate .....	20-1
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL LAW.....</b>	<b>20-2</b>
20-4. The Army as an administrative agency.....	20-2
20-5. Corrective administrative personnel actions .....	20-2
20-6. Improper relationships.....	20-3
20-7. Standards of conduct .....	20-5
20-8. Legal basis of command.....	20-5
20-9. Environmental law .....	20-8

20-10. Federal labor relations and the role of the labor counselor .....	20-10
20-11. Legal assistance.....	20-11
20-12. Claims.....	20-13
20-13. Command authority and judicial review of military activities.....	20-13
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>MILITARY JUSTICE .....</b>	<b>20-15</b>
20-14. Background .....	20-15
20-15. Providing military justice legal services .....	20-16
20-16. Active Army jurisdiction.....	20-16
20-17. Jurisdiction over Reservists.....	20-16
20-18. The commander's role .....	20-17
20-19. Options available to the commander .....	20-18
20-20. Unlawful command influence .....	20-21
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>INTERNATIONAL/OPERATIONAL LAW.....</b>	<b>20-22</b>
20-21. International law .....	20-22
20-22. Operational law (OPLAW).....	20-23
20-23. U.S. Forces stationed overseas under a status of forces agreement (SOFA) .....	20-23
20-24. Deployment for conventional combat missions .....	20-25
20-25. Security assistance missions.....	20-29
20-26. Deployment for overseas exercises .....	20-32
20-27. Smaller-scale contingencies (SSC).....	20-34
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>CONTRACT/FISCAL LAW.....</b>	<b>20-36</b>
20-28. Overview .....	20-36
20-29. Contract legal review.....	20-36
20-30. Fiscal law.....	20-37
<b>SECTION VI</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>20-40</b>
20-31. Summary.....	20-40
20-32. References .....	20-40
<b>CHAPTER 21</b>	
<b>CIVIL FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY.....</b>	<b>21-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>21-1</b>
21-1. Civil functions defined.....	21-1
21-2. Funding sources for civil functions .....	21-1
21-3. Relationship to warfighting competencies.....	21-2
21-4. Leadership and organization.....	21-2
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>CIVIL WORKS PROGRAM.....</b>	<b>21-4</b>
21-5. Civil works program activities.....	21-4
21-6. Research and development.....	21-10

<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>SUPPORT TO OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES .....</b>	<b>21-11</b>
21-7. Overview of support to other government agencies.....	21-11
21-8. Value of support activities.....	21-11
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>NATIONAL CEMETERIES.....</b>	<b>21-12</b>
21-9. Overview of national cemeteries.....	21-12
21-10. Funding.....	21-13
21-11. Master plan for Arlington National Cemetery.....	21-13
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>ENGINEER OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES.....</b>	<b>21-13</b>
21-12. Overview of engineer overseas activities.....	21-13
21-13. Foreign military sales.....	21-13
21-14. Partnership for Peace.....	21-14
21-15. Support for U.S. agencies.....	21-14
21-16. Benefits to warfighting capabilities.....	21-14
<b>SECTION VI</b>	
<b>SUPPORT TO COMMANDERS IN CHIEF.....</b>	<b>21-14</b>
21-17. Overview of support to commanders in chief (CINCs).....	21-14
21-18. Examples of support to CINCs.....	21-15
<b>SECTION VII</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>21-15</b>
21-19. Summary.....	21-15
21-20. References.....	21-15
<b>CHAPTER 22</b>	
<b>PUBLIC AFFAIRS .....</b>	<b>22-1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>22-1</b>
22-1. Chapter content.....	22-1
22-2. Specialized and specific terms used in public affairs.....	22-2
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY.....</b>	<b>22-3</b>
22-3. Public affairs strategic goals.....	22-3
22-4. Public Affairs Vision.....	22-4
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>PUBLIC AFFAIRS DOCTRINE .....</b>	<b>22-4</b>
22-5. The Constitution and First Amendment.....	22-4
22-6. Freedom of Information Act.....	22-4
22-7. Privacy Act.....	22-4
22-8. DOD principles of information.....	22-5
22-9. Guidelines for coverage of DOD combat operations.....	22-5
22-10. Operational security.....	22-6
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>PUBLIC AFFAIRS CORE PROCESSES .....</b>	<b>22-7</b>
22-11. Core processes.....	22-7
22-12. Public affairs planning.....	22-7

22-13. Information strategies.....	22-8
22-14. Media operations .....	22-9
22-15. Public affairs training.....	22-9
22-16. Community relations .....	22-10
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS.....</b>	<b>22-10</b>
22-17. The Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Department of the Army.....	22-10
22-18. Installation public affairs.....	22-11
22-19. Unit public affairs.....	22-11
22-20. Theater army PAO .....	22-12
22-21. Corps and theater army area command (TAACOM) PAOs.....	22-12
22-22. Division and corps support command (COSCOM) PAOs.....	22-12
22-23. Reserve Component public affairs.....	22-12
22-24. Public affairs operations center (PAOC).....	22-12
22-25. Mobile public affairs detachment (MPAD).....	22-12
22-26. Broadcast operations detachment (BOD).....	22-13
22-27. Public affairs detachment (PAD).....	22-13
<b>SECTION VI</b>	
<b>JOINT AND COMBINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS.....</b>	<b>22-13</b>
22-28. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA)).....	22-13
22-29. Joint information bureau (JIB).....	22-13
22-30. Combined information bureau (CIB).....	22-14
22-31. Pentagon correspondents.....	22-14
22-32. DOD media pool.....	22-14
22-33. Combat camera.....	22-15
<b>SECTION VII</b>	
<b>INFORMATION MEDIUMS.....</b>	<b>22-15</b>
22-34. News media.....	22-15
22-35. Television.....	22-15
22-36. Radio .....	22-16
22-37. Print .....	22-16
22-38. Television “news magazines”.....	22-16
22-39. Motion picture industry support.....	22-17
<b>SECTION VIII</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>22-17</b>
22-40. Summary.....	22-17
22-41. References .....	22-18
<b>CHAPTER 23</b>	
<b>MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>SECTION I</b>	
<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>23-1</b>
23-1. Constitutional and policy basis for military assistance to civil authorities.....	23-1
23-2. Overview .....	23-2
23-3. Military assistance definitions.....	23-2

23-4. Component of homeland security.....	23-2
23-5. Historic role of domestic military support .....	23-3
<b>SECTION II</b>	
<b>DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES AND RESPONSE.....</b>	<b>23-4</b>
23-6. Domestic emergencies.....	23-4
23-7. Federal crisis management response .....	23-5
23-8. Federal domestic disaster response is a tiered, escalating process.....	23-5
<b>SECTION III</b>	
<b>FEDERAL RESPONSE PROCESS.....</b>	<b>23-9</b>
23-9. Key authorities. ....	23-9
23-10. Federal Response Plan.....	23-10
23-11. Emergency Support Function #3 (Public Works and Engineering) .....	23-15
<b>SECTION IV</b>	
<b>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MACA STRUCTURE .....</b>	<b>23-16</b>
23-12. Civilian control.....	23-16
23-13. Policy principles .....	23-17
23-14. DOD Executive Agent.....	23-17
23-15. Executive Agent missions .....	23-18
23-16. Director of Military Support (DOMS) .....	23-18
23-17. Combatant command CINCs .....	23-19
<b>SECTION V</b>	
<b>MILITARY SUPPORT PROCESS.....</b>	<b>23-20</b>
23-18. Principles of MACA.....	23-20
23-19. Leadership reviews.....	23-20
23-20. Planning parameters .....	23-20
23-21. MSCA request and response process .....	23-21
23-22. Immediate response.....	23-23
23-23. National special security event .....	23-23
<b>SECTION VI</b>	
<b>SPECIAL MACA SITUATIONS.....</b>	<b>23-24</b>
23-24. Consequence management for chemical-biological-radiological- nuclear and high yield explosives (CBRNE) .....	23-24
23-25. Special event sporting competitions .....	23-25
<b>SECTION VII</b>	
<b>MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES (MACDIS).....</b>	<b>23-26</b>
23-26. MACDIS .....	23-26
<b>SECTION VIII</b>	
<b>MACA CONSIDERATIONS.....</b>	<b>23-28</b>
23-27. Role of Reserve Component forces (see chapter 7, paragraph 7- 50). ....	23-28
23-28. Media relations .....	23-28
<b>SECTION IX</b>	
<b>SUMMARY AND REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>23-28</b>
23-29. Summary.....	23-28
23-30. References .....	23-29
<b>Glossary of acronyms and abbreviations .....</b>	<b>Glossary-1</b>

# Figures

<b>CHAPTER 1</b> .....	<b>1-1</b>
<i>Figure 1-1. The Army Transformation</i> .....	<i>1-4</i>
<b>CHAPTER 2</b> .....	<b>2-1</b>
<i>Figure 2-1. Force Development Relationship to Force Integration</i> .....	<i>2-2</i>
<i>Figure 2-2. The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model</i> .....	<i>2-8</i>
<i>Figure 2-3 Army Force Management</i> .....	<i>Insert</i>
<i>Figure 2-4. Organization Integration Team Composition</i> .....	<i>2-13</i>
<b>CHAPTER 3</b> .....	<b>3-1</b>
<i>Figure 3-1. Examples of Field Operating Agencies</i> .....	<i>3-7</i>
<i>Figure 3-2. Secretariat</i> .....	<i>3-9</i>
<i>Figure 3-3. Organization of the Army Staff</i> .....	<i>3-10</i>
<b>CHAPTER 4</b> .....	<b>4-1</b>
<i>Figure 4-1. JSPS Documents</i> .....	<i>4-2</i>
<i>Figure 4-2. JROC Functional Areas</i> .....	<i>4-8</i>
<i>Figure 4-3. JWCA Team Organization</i> .....	<i>4-9</i>
<i>Figure 4-4. PPBS</i> .....	<i>4-10</i>
<i>Figure 4-5. Army Planning and PPBES Cycle</i> .....	<i>4-12</i>
<i>Figure 4-6. Army Force Requirements Planning</i> .....	<i>4-13</i>
<i>Figure 4-7. Force Development Stages</i> .....	<i>4-16</i>
<i>Figure 4-8. NMS Force</i> .....	<i>4-17</i>
<i>Figure 4-9. POM Force</i> .....	<i>4-18</i>
<i>Figure 4-10. Budget Force</i> .....	<i>4-19</i>
<i>Figure 4-11. Current Force</i> .....	<i>4-19</i>
<i>Figure 4-12. JOPES Deliberate Planning</i> .....	<i>4-20</i>
<i>Figure 4-13. Army Force Providers</i> .....	<i>4-21</i>
<i>Figure 4-14. Command and Communication Channels</i> .....	<i>4-22</i>
<b>CHAPTER 5</b> .....	<b>5-1</b>
<i>Figure 5-1. Force Development Process</i> .....	<i>5-2</i>
<i>Figure 5-2. Army Concept Development</i> .....	<i>5-7</i>
<i>Figure 5-3. Requirements Determination Process</i> .....	<i>5-8</i>
<i>Figure 5-4. Battle Labs</i> .....	<i>5-8</i>
<i>Figure 5-5. Force Design Update (FDU)</i> .....	<i>5-12</i>
<i>Figure 5-6. Modernization Over Time (Resource Driven)</i> .....	<i>5-14</i>
<i>Figure 5-7. NMS to MTOE</i> .....	<i>5-18</i>
<i>Figure 5-8. Total Army Analysis Process</i> .....	<i>5-20</i>
<i>Figure 5-9. Sizing and Shaping Methodology</i> .....	<i>5-24</i>
<i>Figure 5-10. Force Structure Components (COMPO)</i> .....	<i>5-28</i>
<i>Figure 5-11. SAMAS</i> .....	<i>5-29</i>
<i>Figure 5-12. Sample Force File Record</i> .....	<i>5-30</i>
<i>Figure 5-13. Extract Report 82 ABN Division DIVARTY</i> .....	<i>5-31</i>
<i>Figure 5-14. The Command Plan Process</i> .....	<i>5-32</i>
<i>Figure 5-15. MTOE Documentation Process</i> .....	<i>5-32</i>

<i>Figure 5-16. The Year-to-Year Flow</i> .....	5-33
<i>Figure 5-17. FB/SACS Process</i> .....	5-37
<b>CHAPTER 6</b> .....	<b>6-1</b>
<i>Figure 6-1. Joint Strategic Planning System</i> .....	6-3
<i>Figure 6-2. Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)</i> .....	6-5
<i>Figure 6-3. Functional Process Major Inputs and Outputs</i> .....	6-7
<i>Figure 6-4. JOPES Relational Functions</i> .....	6-9
<i>Figure 6-5. JOPES Deliberate Planning</i> .....	6-12
<i>Figure 6-6. Deliberate Planning Process</i> .....	6-13
<i>Figure 6-7. JOPES Crisis Action Planning</i> .....	6-15
<i>Figure 6-8. Crisis Action Planning Process</i> .....	6-19
<i>Figure 6-9. Army Mobilization Planning</i> .....	6-27
<i>Figure 6-10. AMOPES Subsystems</i> .....	6-30
<i>Figure 6-11. Reserve Categories and Mobilization</i> .....	6-36
<i>Figure 6-12. Stages of Mobilization</i> .....	6-38
<i>Figure 6-13. Operational and Mobilization Continuum</i> .....	6-38
<i>Figure 6-14. Mobilization and Execution Process</i> .....	6-40
<b>CHAPTER 7</b> .....	<b>7-1</b>
<i>Figure 7-1. FY 00 Total Army Composition</i> .....	7-4
<i>Figure 7-2. Reserve Service Categories</i> .....	7-6
<i>Figure 7-3. ARNG End Strength and Force Structure Allowance</i> .....	7-8
<i>Figure 7-4. USAR End Strength and Force Structure</i> .....	7-8
<i>Figure 7-5. Individual Ready Reserve</i> .....	7-9
<i>Figure 7-6. USAR Command Relationships</i> .....	7-12
<i>Figure 7-7. ARNG Management Structure</i> .....	7-13
<i>Figure 7-8. Army Directorate, NGB</i> .....	7-14
<i>Figure 7-9. Office of the Chief, Army Reserve</i> .....	7-15
<i>Figure 7-10. Force Support Package Units and Tiered Resourcing</i> .....	7-22
<i>Figure 7-11. Joint Reserve Unit</i> .....	7-22
<b>CHAPTER 8</b> .....	<b>8-1</b>
<i>Figure 8-1. Balancing the Imperatives</i> .....	8-1
<i>Figure 8-2. The Components of Military Capability</i> .....	8-2
<i>Figure 8-3. The Cost of Force Readiness</i> .....	8-4
<i>Figure 8-4. Chairman's Readiness System</i> .....	8-6
<i>Figure 8-5. Joint Readiness Functional Areas</i> .....	8-7
<i>Figure 8-6. JMRR/SROC/QRRC Cycle</i> .....	8-9
<i>Figure 8-7. Active Army and Army Reserve Unit Status Reporting Channels</i> .....	8-10
<i>Figure 8-8. Army National Guard Unit Status Reporting Channels</i> .....	8-10
<b>CHAPTER 9</b> .....	<b>9-1</b>
<i>Figure 9-1. Managers for Manpower and Force Structure Issues</i> .....	9-10
<i>Figure 9-2. Program Evaluation Groups</i> .....	9-10
<i>Figure 9-3. Resources in the FYDP Reflecting the FY 02-03 Budget</i> .....	9-11
<i>Figure 9-4. FYDP Major Defense Programs and Subprograms with Army Proponent Agencies</i> .....	9-11

<i>Figure 9-5. Fiscal Year Structure of Resources in an MDEP Reflecting the FY 00-01 Budget</i> .....	9-22
<i>Figure 9-6. Fiscal Year Structure of Resources in an MDEP Reflecting the FY 02-07 POM</i> .....	9-23
<i>Figure 9-7. Fiscal Year Structure of Resources in an MDEP Reflecting the FY 02-03 Budget</i> .....	9-23
<i>Figure 9-8. Events of the Biennial PPBS/PPBES Cycle</i> .....	Insert
<i>Figure 9-9. PPBES Framework</i> .....	9-31
<i>Figure 9-10. Timelines for POM Build FY 02-07</i> .....	9-46
<i>Figure 9-11. Program and Budget Perspectives</i> .....	9-50
<b>CHAPTER 10</b> .....	<b>10-1</b>
<i>Figure 10-1. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)</i> .....	10-5
<i>Figure 10-2. Resource Management’s “4-A’s”</i> .....	10-7
<i>Figure 10-3. Fund Distribution Process</i> .....	10-8
<b>CHAPTER 11</b> .....	<b>11-1</b>
<i>Figure 11-1. Systems Acquisition Management Individual Elements</i> .....	11-2
<i>Figure 11-2. Organizational Linkage for Army Materiel Acquisition</i> .....	11-4
<i>Figure 11-3. Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)</i> .....	11-7
<i>Figure 11-4. Acquisition Categories</i> .....	11-9
<i>Figure 11-5. DOD Acquisition Authority Chain</i> .....	11-10
<i>Figure 11-6. Army Science and Technology Oversight</i> .....	11-30
<i>Figure 11-7. System Acquisition Management Process</i> .....	11-34
<i>Figure 11-8. Total Package Fielding Concept</i> .....	11-45
<i>Figure 11-9. Acquisition Strategy</i> .....	11-52
<i>Figure 11-10. Below Threshold Reprogramming Levels</i> .....	11-66
<i>Figure 11-11. Warfighting Lens Analysis (WFLA)</i> .....	11-69
<b>CHAPTER 12</b> .....	<b>12-1</b>
<i>Figure 12-1. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics</i> .....	12-11
<i>Figure 12-2. U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC)</i> .....	12-22
<i>Figure 12-3. Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL)</i> .....	12-31
<i>Figure 12-4. Projecting Distribution</i> .....	12-31
<i>Figure 12-5. Executing Distribution-Requisition Validation (REQVAL)</i> .....	12-32
<i>Figure 12-6. Executing Distribution-Equipment Release Priority System (ERPS)</i> .....	12-32
<b>CHAPTER 13</b> .....	<b>13-1</b>
<i>Figure 13-1. Strength Relationships</i> .....	13-10
<i>Figure 13-2. Enlisted Procurement</i> .....	13-12
<i>Figure 13-3. Manning Programs</i> .....	13-17
<i>Figure 13-4. Unit Fill Priorities</i> .....	13-19
<i>Figure 13-5. Enlisted Automation Management Systems</i> .....	13-20
<i>Figure 13-6. Officer Distribution</i> .....	13-26
<i>Figure 13-7. TWOS Promotion Goals</i> .....	13-33
<i>Figure 13-8. OPMS XXI—Four Career Fields</i> .....	13-36
<i>Figure 13-9. Human Resource Management Senior Leadership</i> .....	13-40
<i>Figure 13-10. Career Progression Pattern</i> .....	13-44

<b>CHAPTER 14</b> .....	<b>14-1</b>
<i>Figure 14-1. U.S. Army Assigned Strength as of 30 September 2000</i> .....	14-2
<i>Figure 14-2. Differences Between the Military and Civilian Systems</i> .....	14-4
<i>Figure 14-3. Civilian Personnel Policy and Operations Organization</i> .....	14-8
<i>Figure 14-4. Civilian Personnel Management Support Relationships</i> .....	14-10
<i>Figure 14-5. Department of the Army Civilian Career Program Strength         as of October 15, 2000</i> .....	14-17
<i>Figure 14-6. Senior Executive Service Assigned Strength as of 30         September 2000</i> .....	14-23
<b>CHAPTER 15</b> .....	<b>15-1</b>
<i>Figure 15-1. The Army Training System</i> .....	15-3
<i>Figure 15-2. The Policy, Requirements, and Resource Process</i> .....	15-6
<i>Figure 15-3. Developing Training Requirements and Resourcing the         Training Base</i> .....	15-8
<i>Figure 15-4. Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR)</i> .....	15-9
<i>Figure 15-5. Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command</i> .....	15-11
<i>Figure 15-6. Systems Approach to Training (SAT) Model</i> .....	15-12
<i>Figure 15-7. Total Army Training System</i> .....	15-16
<i>Figure 15-8. Enlisted Training Program</i> .....	15-18
<i>Figure 15-9. Warrant Officer Education System</i> .....	15-20
<i>Figure 15-10. Officer Training System</i> .....	15-21
<i>Figure 15-11. Excerpt from TRADOC Reg 350-70</i> .....	15-23
<i>Figure 15-12. The Forces Training System</i> .....	15-25
<i>Figure 15-13. System for Individual Training in Units</i> .....	15-27
<i>Figure 15-14. New Equipment Training: Planning Process</i> .....	15-33
<i>Figure 15-15. The Training Support System</i> .....	15-34
<b>CHAPTER 18</b> .....	<b>18-1</b>
<i>Figure 18-1. Army Intelligence—Changing Methods and Balance</i> .....	18-3
<i>Figure 18-2. Organization of the National Intelligence System</i> .....	18-7
<i>Figure 18-3. Army Intelligence Organization</i> .....	18-17
<b>CHAPTER 19</b> .....	<b>19-1</b>
<i>Figure 19-1. The Army Medical Department</i> .....	19-8
<i>Figure 19-2. Regional Medical Commands and Collocated Dental         Commands</i> .....	19-12
<b>CHAPTER 20</b> .....	<b>20-1</b>
<i>Figure 20-1. Court Martial Maximum Punishments</i> .....	20-19
<b>CHAPTER 21</b> .....	<b>21-1</b>
<i>Figure 21-1. Civil Works Divisions and Districts</i> .....	21-3
<i>Figure 21-2. Military Programs Organization</i> .....	21-4
<i>Figure 21-3. Fiscal Year 2001 Sources of Funding for Civil Works         Program</i> .....	21-5
<i>Figure 21-4. Construction Support for Non-DOD Agencies</i> .....	21-12
<b>CHAPTER 23</b> .....	<b>23-1</b>
<i>Figure 23-1. Crisis and Consequence Management</i> .....	23-4
<i>Figure 23-2. Tiered Disaster/Emergency Response</i> .....	23-7

**Figure 23-3. The Federal Response Plan..... 23-14**  
**Figure 23-4. Sequence for Disaster Support (MSCA)..... 23-21**  
**Figure 23-5. CBRNE (Consequence Management & Technical  
Operations Support)..... 23-24**  
**Figure 23-6. Civil Disturbance Support Command and Control ..... 23-26**

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

*“It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other Armed Forces, of preserving the peace and security... of the United States,... supporting the national objectives,... and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. [The Army] shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land...[and] is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated... mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.”*

Section 3062, title 10, United States Code

### **SECTION I**

#### **FULFILLING THE INTENT OF THE CONGRESS**

##### **1-1. Change as a constant**

Fulfilling the intent of Congress and the requirements of section 3062, title 10, United States Code (USC), is a formidable task. The Army is a dynamic organization that must constantly change to adapt to changing threats to the Nation’s security and to the assignment of new missions that promote our country’s interests at home and abroad. The Army must be capable of accomplishing the full spectrum of missions ranging from domestic disaster relief through peacekeeping and peacemaking to winning major theater wars.

##### **1-2. Effecting change**

**a.** The Army as an organization performs myriad functions within the framework of well-defined systems and processes in order to effect the changes that enhance its ability to accomplish its missions. Functions such as recruiting and accessing military and civilian manpower, providing individual and unit training and education, developing war fighting doctrine and requirements, designing and organizing units and activities, equipping and sustaining fielded units, mobilizing and demobilizing Reserve Component units, stationing units, and deploying and redeploying forces are just a few of the many complex functions that the Army must address when accommodating change.

**b.** The Army’s institutionalized systems and processes address these and many other functions. Systems such as the civilian and military personnel management systems, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, and the Army Health Services System and processes such as combat development, force development, force integration, and materiel acquisition, are some examples of these. The Army’s capability to effect

change in order to discharge its statutory obligations and effectively accomplish the complex missions assigned to its activities and organizations depends upon how well the functions that are performed by any one of these systems or processes are integrated with the functions performed by each of the other systems and processes.

c. Stated another way, the successful integration of new doctrine, organizations, and equipment into the Army and the subsequent sustainment of the force in a trained and ready posture requires the synchronization of many Army systems and processes at many levels of leadership and management to perform the functions that are vital to enabling the Army to comply with the will of the congress and, most importantly, to fulfill our “nonnegotiable contract with the American people - fighting and winning our Nation’s wars” (the *Army Vision*).

d. There is no better nor more recent example of why the Army must change to adapt to changing threats and missions, or of the complexities of effecting change, than the Army transformation effort that began in 1999 and will continue for a number of years to come.

## SECTION II ARMY TRANSFORMATION

### 1-3. Why transform?

a. The former Secretary of the Army (SA), Louis Caldera, cited the experiences of Task Force Hawk in the Kosovo Operation as an example of “...why the Army must transition to a lighter, more agile force.” Secretary Caldera stated that, “I use it to talk to senior leaders about whether the Army was willing and able to get into the fight.” The need for strategically deployable responsive Army brigades capable of generating lethal combat power was further reinforced during the East Timor crisis in September 1999. In the words of David Whelan, a senior Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) official, whose agency is exploring emerging technologies, “East Timor is an example of a situation that, had we had light agile forces, we probably would have used them.”

b. In response to criticism that the Army had failed to adjust to the new post-cold war realities and was poorly postured to respond to the most likely world crises, the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), General Eric K. Shinseki, unveiled a new strategic vision for the Army. On 12 October 1999, at the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) annual meeting, General Shinseki described the *Army Vision* and its plan to transform itself into a force that is strategically responsive and dominant across the entire spectrum of operations. In his article in the 2000-2001 Association of the United States Army Green Book, the Chief of Staff, United States Army, General Eric K Shinseki, wrote—

*“Our Nation is at peace. Our economy is prosperous. We have strategic perspective and technological potential. This window of historic opportunity will grow narrower with each passing day. We can transform today in a time of peace and prosperity. Or we can try to change tomorrow on the eve of the next war, when the window has closed, our perspective has narrowed, and our potential is limited by the press of time and the constraints of resources.”*

c. The mission of the Army remains unchanged: To fight and win the Nation’s wars and to support the national security strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS).

---

While the mission remains unchanged, the world remains a dangerous place with a growing array of potential threats to our national interests.

#### **1-4. The global environment - evolving geopolitical and military threats**

a. The United States, as the world leader in promoting democratic values, free markets, and human rights can expect to face threats from failed and failing states, transnational threats, asymmetric challenges, and potentially the rise of a major military competitor.

b. The strategic environment of the 21st century describes a need for a force that can accomplish a variety of mission. The Army must have a force with characteristics that allows it to initiate combat operations at the place and time of its choosing, that can retain the initiative, that will build momentum rapidly, and will win decisively.

#### **1-5. The Army Vision**

The *Army Vision* calls for a transformation to a force that will provide more strategic flexibility and will become more strategically dominant at every point across the full spectrum of operations. The transformation objective is to develop a force that has the decisive warfighting capabilities found in today's heavy forces. The goal is to transform itself into what is termed the Objective Force. The goal is a force that will be more responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than the current force.

#### **1-6. The transformation strategy**

a. The Army Transformation Strategy has two basic principles:

(1) During transformation, The Army must maintain sufficient capability to overmatch near-term threats while sustaining the current technological superiority of our legacy forces through timely recapitalization.

(2) The Army must not sacrifice dominance for responsiveness. While it is easy to increase responsiveness by developing marginal capabilities, The Army is committed to "no fair fights," and will resolutely ensure the development and commitment of Army forces to decisively defeat any and all opponents.

b. The Army Transformation Strategy is conditions-based, which means that while milestones have been set they are not preordained. At every step along the transformation path, the determination to move forward to the next stage will only be made after all of the necessary preconditions have been met. The primary condition that must be met at every step is to sustain the capabilities to meet the Nation's immediate security requirements. The Army Transformation Strategy involves moving the Army toward the transformation objective along three interdependent, simultaneous axes.

#### **1-7. Transformation over three axes**

Transformation is occurring along three axes as depicted in Figure 1-1. The three axes strategy is critical to shaping and responding today, while preparing for the future. Transforming the Army to the objective force will be a 30-year process. The Objective Force will be dominant at every point on the spectrum of operations. The Legacy Force guarantees our near-term warfighting readiness to support the National Military Strategy. The Interim Force meets an immediate requirement to provide the commanders in chief (CINCs) with

increased warfighting capabilities. By its nature, transformation requires difficult resourcing trade-offs between current force modernization efforts, research and development (R&D) investment to develop necessary future capabilities and sustainment and re-capitalization of an aging legacy force. Many hard decisions have already been made, and many others remain in a politically charged and inter-service competitive environment.




Figure 1-1. The Army Transformation

**a. The Objective Force.**

(1) The objective force is not driven by a single platform, but rather the focus is on achieving capabilities that will operate as a “system of systems.” Transformation to the Objective Force will take thirty years with the key being the development of enabling technology to meet the seven desired characteristics – Responsive, Agile, Deployable, Versatile, Lethal, Survivable, and Sustainable.

(2) The Army has reprogrammed 96 percent of science and technology (S&T) spending through fiscal year (FY) 07 in order to develop the Objective Force platforms and equipment. In FY 03 the Army will select the best technologies and concepts to enter the detailed design and demonstration phase for the future combat system (FCS) in order to meet the engineering and manufacturing development milestone by FY 06.

**b. The Legacy Force.** The current Army forces must be prepared to fight and win the Nation’s wars and be able to supplement the capabilities of the Objective Force until 2032. The Legacy Force's continuous readiness to fight is paramount to enabling the remaining portions of the Army to transform. Unfortunately, this will also be problematic. Since the Army skipped a procurement generation, the current force’s equipment has begun to exceed its expected service life. In order to maintain its warfighting readiness and to reduce operating costs that have risen significantly over the past three years, the Army has begun to recapitalize and modernize its current force until the transition to the Objective Force is complete. It is this Legacy Force that guarantees our near-term warfighting readiness in support of the National Military Strategy.

**c. The Interim Force.** For the past ten years, the Legacy Force has had an operational shortfall — it’s inability to get forces on the ground quickly with the requisite combat power to influence a potential crisis. In order to meet this shortfall, the Army will convert six to

eight combat brigades to interim brigade combat teams (IBCT). The IBCT is a rapidly deployable, combat brigade task force that will be centered on an interim armored vehicle (IAV). This force will be trained and ready to deploy and is not an experimental force. It will provide the CINCs with an increased warfighting capability that they do not now possess. The Army funded six of the eight required interim brigades needed out through FY 07. The Army began the transition of these brigades by forming two initial brigades at Fort Lewis with surrogate vehicles. The Army held its source selection for the IAV and selected the winner in March 2001.

### **1-8. Army Transformation and the force development process**

**a.** The Army has been, and will continue to be, doctrine based during the transformation process. While doctrine specifies the "how" we will accomplish a mission, the concepts will remain well out in front of doctrine in describing the "what" we want to do. Historically, material changes have required up to 15 to 17 years to develop and field. *The Army Vision* has established an accelerated material development and fielding process. This accelerated process establishes the goal of fielding new technologies to the genesis of the objective force beginning in eight to ten years. This is approximately one half of the time that has been the historical norm.

**b.** Equally as dramatic as the material modernization efforts, is the organizational redesign occurring during the transformation process. This redesign effort has been greatly accelerated as well. Organizational redesign historically requires between four to eight years to accomplish. Most notable is the nearly instantaneous (two to four months) force structure modifications made to the initial brigade combat teams (BCTs) at Fort Lewis, Washington that will serve to provide insights and refinements in the organization, training and doctrine for the follow-on interim and objective forces.

**c.** Doctrinal changes have historically required between two to four years to formalize and produce. During the transformation process the BCTs will change the way the Army fights. Their efforts will be captured in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that will serve as the basis for further doctrinal development. Again, like material modernization and organization redesign, the doctrinal development timelines will be reduced on an order of magnitude of 50 percent that will result in the production of doctrinal products in one to two years.

**d.** The rapidity of change inherent in the Army Transformation Strategy will require intense and continuous management by force managers and leaders at all levels of the Army to minimize human and materiel costs and to ensure that the Army maintains its readiness to fight and win the Nation's wars. Moreover, the transformation effort itself should yield valuable insights into how the Army's systems and processes can be streamlined and accelerated to further improve the ways in which the Army manages change.

## **SECTION III**

### **PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS TEXT**

#### **1-9. Purpose**

**a.** The purpose of this text is to provide a primer and ready reference to officers preparing to assume command and management positions at the senior and strategic levels of

leadership. It explains the relationships of the systems and processes that produce both future change and contribute to daily mission accomplishment. It is these systems and processes that will be taxed to their fullest capabilities and capacities during the execution of the Army Transformation Strategy.

**b.** While the principal use of this reference text is to support the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management (DCLM) portion of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) curriculum, there are additional objectives that serve broader purposes. These other objectives include its use—

(1) By nonresident students in meeting objectives of the USAWC Distance Education Program.

(2) As a general reference for branch and service schools in the military education system.

(3) As a primer for all who seek to better understand the Army's organization and functions, and how its systems and processes relate.

**c.** The major focus of the text is on the United States Army; however the text also addresses how the Army interfaces with the other Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commands.

### **1-10. Scope and objectives**

**a.** This reference text supports the DCLM portion of the USAWC curriculum. Elihu Root founded the institution “not to promote war, but to preserve peace by intelligent and adequate preparation to repel aggression.” He charged the faculty with directing “the instruction and intellectual exercise of the Army, to acquire information, devise the plans, and study the subjects indicated, and to advise the Commander-in-Chief of all questions of plans, armament, transportation, and military preparation and movement.” Much of that original emphasis remains in the current USAWC mission that includes preparing leaders to assume high-level leadership responsibilities and in the objectives of the DCLM program of instruction.

**b.** The DCLM presents that portion of the curriculum that promotes a better understanding of the theory and practice of command, leadership, and management in the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army. Methods of instruction include faculty presentations, lectures, and discussions with distinguished academicians and prominent practitioners, seminar group discussions, case studies, independent reading, and practical exercises.

**c.** From 1977 to 1997, the primary reference text published by DCLM was entitled *Army Command, Management, and Leadership: Theory and Practice*. Because of the growing volume of discussion and information in the category of theory as well as the many changes that have occurred in Army organizations and systems since the end of the Cold War, the single theory and practice volume was replaced in 1997 by two texts. *How the Army Runs* is an outgrowth of this. This text addresses the operation and relationships of the systems and processes that enable the Army to fulfill its roles and accomplish its missions.

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**SECTION IV**  
**TEXT ORGANIZATION AND RELEVANCE****1-11. Three part text**

This text is organized into three parts:

- a. A review of the Army as a system.
- b. A detailed examination of planning and structural processes, systems and subsystems; how they operate and how they relate to each other.
- c. A review of management and management support systems.

**1-12. The Army as a system**

Chapter 2 addresses the Army as an organization and provides an overview of the systems and subsystems that affect its operations. Chapter 3 discusses Army structure. Chapters 4 and 5 identify the processes of force planning and design, determining manpower requirements, and developing the manpower management program. Chapter 6 deals with mobilization and deployment. Chapter 7 examines the role, structure, and status of the Reserve Components, and Chapter 8 provides a description of force readiness concepts, the system, and its reporting procedures.

**1-13. Army systems and subsystems**

The major and supporting systems of the Army are identified, described, and analyzed in the remaining chapters. Chapters 9 and 10 examine the Army's resource management systems at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), major command, and installation levels, and the interface with the Department of Defense systems. Throughout, the interfaces with Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are examined. Chapters 11 and 12 describe the organizations, functions, policies, and procedures associated with research, development, and acquisition, and the logistics systems at HQDA and the U.S. Army Materiel Command.

**1-14. Management and management support systems**

Chapters 13 and 14 address the military and civilian personnel management systems. The remaining chapters through Chapter 23 examine Army training, information management systems, installation management, intelligence management, health services, legal affairs, civil functions, public affairs, and military assistance to civil authorities.

**1-15. Relevance**

a. This text is in consonance with the goals of the Army's senior leadership, addressing the areas of readiness, people, materiel, strategic deployment, future development, and management. The published goals encompass specific objectives for the Army to be a full spectrum force, globally engaged, cost effective and changing to meet the Nation's needs. This text is about the systems and processes that will enable the Army to remain as effective in service to the Nation in the future as it has been from Valley Forge to Desert Shield/Desert Storm and beyond.

## How the Army Runs

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**b.** It is hoped that students and practitioners of the military art who use this text will more fully appreciate the truth in the words of General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, Army, 1964-1968, who said—

*"The Army is like a funnel. At the top you pour in doctrine, resources, concepts, equipment, and facilities. And out at the bottom comes one lone soldier walking point."*

**c.** It is to this ultimate end that this reference text is written.

# CHAPTER 2

## INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE CYCLE

*In his Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War for the period July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941, General George C. Marshall described the stark situation in which he found the Army as the war in Europe erupted and threatened to involve a neutral United States. President Roosevelt's emergency proclamation of September 8, 1939 had given the authority for the Active Army to expand from 210,000 to 227,000 men and to reorganize from the World War I square divisions to the new triangular divisions. However, General Marshall's problems could not be solved by a manpower increase of less than 10% and a division reorganization. He also had major training deficiencies to correct. There was such a shortage in motor transportation that divisional training was impracticable. A lack of corps headquarters and experienced commanders and obsolete doctrine and organizations further degraded capabilities. Over half the undermanned Active Army divisions were horse-mounted and the horse was still the primary means of mounted movement. At the same time Congress had reduced the Army Air Corps request for replacements to World War I aircraft to only 57 planes. It was even worse in the National Guard organizations. General Marshall's solution to these massive problems was to reconstruct the Army systemically, by resourcing, structuring and integrating new equipment, personnel, and organizations while training. Ultimately, he improved the youth and vitality of the Army by discharging elderly and substandard soldiers. The U.S. Army's success in creating, deploying, and sustaining 89 divisions for the European Theater during World War II was largely due to General Marshall's genius for leadership and his skill at what, today, is known as force management and force integration.*

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 2-1. Chapter content

**a.** This chapter is an overview of the systems and processes employed by the Army to manage change on a continuing basis. It reflects the fact, as General George C. Marshall understood all too well, that, in complex organizations, every action or problem impacts upon every function of the organization. These systems and processes comprise the entire life cycle of the Army, from the earliest stages of force development to the final disposition of people, equipment, and facilities.


**b.** This chapter looks holistically at systems and processes where the various products of one become the inputs or constraints of others. This overview of how the Army runs

addresses systems that are necessary to the overall leadership and management of the Army, and that are integral to the force management processes. Subsequent chapters will expand upon the sub-elements presented here.

## 2-2. Force management and integration terms

There are four terms commonly used when describing the force management process:

**a. Force development.** Force development is the process of determining Army doctrinal, training, leader development, organizational, materiel, and soldier (DTLOMS) requirements and translating them into programs and structure, within allocated resources, to accomplish Army missions and functions. Figure 2-1 illustrates the six sub-processes that operate as part of force development leading to the approval and resourcing of Army organizations. Each of these sub-processes influences the ultimate design of Army organizations and force structure (force development is discussed in depth in Chapter 5):



**Figure 2-1. Force Development Relationship to Force Integration**

(1) *Combat development.* The process that determines requirements for doctrine, training, leader development, organizational, materiel, and soldiers and initiates or develops prioritized solutions in one or more of the DTLOMS domains. (The combat development process makes up the first two phases of force development as shown in Figure 5-1.)

(2) *Doctrine development.* The process that develops and documents doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures for military operations in publications such as field manuals.

(3) *Training development.* The process that produces programs, methods, publications, and devices to support individual and unit training.

(4) *Leader development.* The process that produces programs for the training and the professional and personal development of competent and committed leaders for the Army.

(5) *Organizational development.* The process that translates organizational requirements into organizational models and force structure.

(6) *Matériel development.* The process that conceives, develops, and executes solutions to matériel requirements.

(7) *Soldier development.* The process or processes that concern the determination, addition, deletion, or modification of the Army occupational specialties. These range from the development of proposals affecting the force and/or grade structure of existing occupational specialties to the creation of entirely new occupational specialties to accomplish assigned missions.

**b. Force integration.**

(1) Force integration is the synchronized, resource-constrained execution of an approved force development program to achieve systematic management of change, including—

- The introduction, incorporation, and sustainment of doctrine, organizations, and equipment into the Army;
- Coordination and integration of operational and managerial systems collectively designed to improve the effectiveness and capability of the Army, and;
- Knowledge and consideration of the potential implications of decisions and actions taken within the execution process.

(2) The scope of force integration includes the functions of structuring organizations, manning, equipping, training, sustaining, deploying, stationing, and funding the force during the introduction and incorporation of approved organizational or force structure changes. It also includes the function of minimizing adverse impacts on force readiness during the introduction and incorporation of change. Force integration synchronizes these functional activities to produce combat ready organizations. Force integration is an enabling process of force management.

**c. Force modernization.** Force modernization is the process of improving the Army's force effectiveness and operational capabilities through force development and integration.

**d. Force management.** Force management is the capstone process to establish and field mission-ready Army organizations. The process involves organizational development, force integration, decision-making, and execution of the spectrum of activities encompassing requirements definition, force development, force integration, force structuring, combat developments, training developments, and resourcing.

## SECTION II

### FORCE MANAGEMENT—IMPETUS FOR CHANGE

#### 2-3. The decade of modernization

**a.** In the early 1980s, the Army began a series of unprecedented changes designed to significantly improve readiness and effectiveness to execute prompt and sustained combat. A critical aspect of these changes was initiating the fielding of over 400 new equipment items. Some of this equipment replaced less effective items in the inventory. For example, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System (BFVS) replaced the aging M-113 Armored Personnel Carrier. Others, like the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), brought an entirely new dimension to fire support force capabilities.

**b.** To accommodate this pervasive equipment modernization effort and concomitant changes in the Army's warfighting doctrine, extensive personnel and equipment changes were documented to virtually all of the tables of organization and equipment (TOE) and modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) that provide the requirements and authorizations, respectively, for Army units.

**c.** In addition, to fulfill a commitment to improve unit cohesion, the personnel manning system added the Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training (COHORT) system and Regimental philosophy to an individual replacement system that had its genesis in World War I.

**d.** Separately each of these changes would have been a significant challenge. Together they fully tested every facet of the abilities of the Army to raise, sustain, maintain, and resource our forces. World events of 1989 and 1990 saw the end to the Cold War and resulted in resource and force reductions that further tested the Army's ability to apply and adapt to change. In today's era of dynamic political and strategic change, further change is inevitable and, indeed, is now taking place through the Army's Transformation effort that is discussed in chapter 1 and elsewhere throughout this text.

### **2-4. Force management inspections and studies**

**a.** The magnitude and the pace of change during the 1980s revealed a wide range of problems in the integration of the systems and processes used to manage change. As a result, the Army leadership directed the conduct of a number of Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) special inspections of force management systems and processes to examine how the Army managed change. Special inspections in 1980-1983 and 1985-1986 revealed the following:

**(1)** There were extensive documentation and execution problems in the force management system and related sub-systems.

**(2)** There was a lack of knowledge at all levels of leadership and management of the interrelationships of Army systems and processes and how they were used to manage change. This was described by The Inspector General as a general lack of knowledge of "how the Army runs."

**(3)** Changes in the orientation and organization of the activities involved in the force integration process, from threat identification to the fielding and sustainment of equipment, personnel, doctrine, and force structure would result in more effective force management.

**b.** Two other significant studies of force management also examined the interrelationships of the systems and processes used to manage change.

**(1)** In 1983, the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, formed a special Documentation Modernization Task Force to identify problems and recommend improvements to the existing documentation and associated data management structure of the Army. The need for this effort was generated by the fact that, as the Army began the modernization effort, off-line management became the rule rather than the exception in efforts to solve the crisis of the moment.

**(a)** The Task Force recommended, and the Army adopted, a new system for how TOEs and MTOEs would be documented and modernized. This system, which remains

as the Army's current system, documents changes to personnel, equipment, and organizational structure in incremental change packages that are then applied on a unit-by-unit basis as units progress along well-defined modernization paths. (Chapter 5 discusses TOE and MTOE documentation in more detail.) The new TOE system and other recommended interim fixes to processes then in existence greatly enhanced the Army's ability to meet the force management challenges of the 1980s and 1990s.

(b) The Task Force also established a long-term goal of creating a single, unified, and interactive data system for executing force management and force integration functions. This monumental effort is still on going with significant progress continuing to be made. For example, development of the Army Flow Model (AFM) now allows the Army Staff (ARSTAF) to conduct cross-functional analyses of force management data from some 40 databases. Additionally, the Force Management System (FMS) that is now under development by the United States Army Force Management Support Agency will integrate four systems into one for the functions of documenting requirements in TOEs and basis-of-issue plans (BOIP), and documenting authorizations in MTOE and tables of distribution and allowances (TDA). The FMS will also be used interactively to record the Army's programmed force as is now done in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS).

(2) In 1993-1994, the Army conducted another Force Management Study. The purpose of the study was to evaluate the need for further revisions to the force management system and its processes. The study documented the extent of the inadequacies of the Army's system of force management. It also confirmed the finding of earlier investigation and studies that there was a pervasive lack of knowledge in the Army about how force management systems and processes should interact. The study recommended that an Army Force Management School be established to educate military and civilian personnel who were assigned to force management positions from the installation through the Department of the Army levels. That recommendation was approved and the school was subsequently established at Fort Belvoir. The school has the mission to provide command, management, and leadership expertise in the functions of force management and to train command managers at all levels in these functions.

## **2-5. Force management changes at Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA).**

**a. Vice Chief of Staff Army (VCSA) as the Army's force integrator.** As discussed above, previous inspections and studies of force management activities, such as the DAIG special inspections, uncovered weaknesses in the manner in which the Army performed force management. Correction of these weaknesses, combined with staff reorganization and streamlined acquisition initiatives, have led to the VCSA being designated as the force integrator of the Army. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) and the newly established Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (DCSPRO) serve as agents of the VCSA for the management of change.

**b. Establishment of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs.** Effective 1 December 2000, a new staff agency, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (ODCSPRO), was established on the Army Staff. Concurrently, the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army (OAVCSA), was disestablished.

(1) The DCSPRO assumed the materiel program management related responsibilities that were formerly performed by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans for Force Development (ADCSOPS-FD). These responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the implementation of approved, prioritized, and resourced materiel programs through the execution of materiel fielding plans and the unit set fielding process. The DCSPRO is also responsible for providing support to the VCSA in his role as the Army representative on the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Chapter 11 discusses the DCSPRO materiel management responsibilities in more detail.

(2) With some exceptions, the DCSPRO absorbed the staff of the ADCSOPS-FD, including the systems integrators who are key players in the force integration process. A principal exception is that the Directorate for Force Programs (now the Directorate for Force Management) remains in DCSOPS and retains the organization integrators from the former ADCSOPS-FD.

(3) The Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PAED) of the office of the Chief of Staff, Army, has also been assigned to the DCSPRO. Chapter 9 provides a discussion of PAED functions that are now performed by the DCSPRO.

### **c. Chief of Staff, Army approval of Army warfighting requirements.**

(1) In late March 2001, the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), announced that he had assumed the approval authority for all Army warfighting requirements. This is a major change from the policy of recent years that had delegated the approval authority for warfighting requirements to the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). In his memorandum announcing the decision, the CSA states in part that—

*“1. All Army warfighting requirements in the form of Mission Needs Statements (MNS), Capstone Requirements Documents (CRD), and Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) will be submitted to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) for validation and approval. This applies to all requirement documents, regardless of Acquisition Category (ACAT) level. In this context, Army warfighting requirements include Joint and other Service requirements with Army participation and interest.*

*2. Major warfighting concepts designed to guide force modernization, (e.g., Brigade Combat Team or higher Organizational and Operational Concepts) will also be approved by the Chief of Staff, Army. These will be reviewed by the Requirements Review Council (RRC) for synchronization with Army modernization strategy and affordability. The DCSOPS will schedule and execute the RRC.”*

*“4. The foundation of the requirements generation process will not change. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) will continue to be responsible for balanced development of concepts, requirements, and products in doctrine, training, leadership, organizations, materiel, and soldiers. The TRADOC Commander’s evaluation and recommendation will accompany all requirements submitted for HQDA approval.*

*5. The Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) will be established to advise the Chief of Staff on Army warfighting requirements ....”*

(2) The CSA memorandum also notes that the specific responsibilities of the DCSPRO, DCSOPS, TRADOC and the other players in the requirements determination and approval process, as well as the procedures that will be followed in implementing the CSA

decision, will not be finalized until the publication of a revised Army Regulation (AR) 71-9. Discussions of the provisions of the revised AR 71-9 will be incorporated in subsequent editions of this text.

**d. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans responsibilities in the materiel requirements approval process.** As discussed above, the DCSPRO is now responsible for the execution of approved materiel programs; a responsibility formerly assigned to the DCSOPS. The DCSOPS remains the responsible staff element for the validation, prioritization, and documentation, of requirements as discussed in chapters 5 and 11. The principal changes affecting the DCSOPS role are that—


(1) The CSA will now approve materiel requirements on the recommendation of an AROC.

(2) The DCSOPS will be responsible for coordinating AROC meetings, developing and promulgating AROC administrative procedures, promulgating AROC decisions, and supporting the VCSA in executing AROC responsibilities.

### **SECTION III FORCE MANAGEMENT AND INTEGRATION MODELS**

#### **2-6. The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model (AOLCM)**

The AOLCM is shown at Figure 2-2. It reflects the stages that organizations and their personnel and equipment will experience at one time or another (and oftentimes concurrently) during their service in the Army. The functions that are performed in these stages develop and field combat ready MTOE units and their supporting TDA organizations, maintain their viability and effectiveness, and remove them or their resources (personnel and things) from the force as requirements change. Each individual resource (a soldier or civilian or thing) required by a unit or activity will be found at some stage of the model beginning with the establishment of need and entry into the Army (defined and managed during the force management activity) to ultimate separation. The model details the critical stages through which an individual resource will move, at some point, during its life span. Generally, the model depicts the life cycle of Army organizations from their development (force management) and their progression (clockwise around Figure 2-2) to separation. The dynamic of the model, however, is that the Army leadership must resource and manage all of the functions simultaneously, since some resources will be in each functional stage at any one time.



**Figure 2-2. The Army Organizational Life Cycle Model**

**a. Life cycle functions.**

(1) *Force Management.* Force management is the first phase of the organizational life cycle model and is the basis underlying all other functions. The process involves organizational development, force integration, decision-making, and execution of the spectrum of activities encompassing requirements definition, force development, force integration, force structuring, combat developments, training developments, and resourcing. Force management results in the development of a capable combat force within constrained resources.

(2) *Acquisition.* After the Congress authorizes and the Department of Defense (DOD) provides the force structure allowance in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), the Army must then acquire the people and materiel specified in the requirements and authorizations documents necessary to accomplish the mission. From a materiel acquisition perspective, the acquisition function extends beyond the principal item being fielded and must consider other essential requirements such as the availability of associated support items of equipment and personnel (ASIOEP), technical publications, repair parts, trained personnel, and facilities. From a human resource acquisition perspective, the acquisition function must consider recruiting and accession missions in concert with the overall manpower management program and the influences of personnel life cycle functions.

(3) *Training.* The training function encompasses the system for accomplishing the transition from civilian status to military life. In this context, the training function is somewhat different from what most Army officers think of when discussing training. At this point in the life cycle, training is considered only from the aspect of initial entry training or the requirement to provide soldiers with initial familiarization training on new or displaced

equipment. In other words, it is the aspect of the training cycle that imparts new skills to the soldier or converts the civilian into a soldier. It most often results in award of a military occupational specialty (MOS) or additional skill identifier (ASI). The training function also includes the transition of U.S. Military Academy (USMA), Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC), and Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates into officers through the branch basic courses. Traditional collective training and professional educational training is subsumed under the "development" phase of the Organizational Life Cycle Model.

(4) *Distribution.* Having produced or procured the resources necessary to form and sustain units they must be distributed according to established requirements, authorizations, and priorities. The distribution function includes the assignment of people from entry-level training to their initial unit and the delivery of new materiel from the wholesale level to the user. It also includes the redistribution of equipment to less modernized units in the force.

(5) *Deployment.* Once trained or prepared, units, individuals, packages, or things are considered available to support worldwide operations. An individual soldier, civilian, unit, or item of equipment may be subjected to some, if not all, of the mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconfiguration processes of this function. Deployment represents both a planning and operational function involving agencies on the Army Staff, other levels of DOD, and the civilian transportation structure.

(6) *Sustainment.* In peace or war the presence of people and materiel in units establishes a requirement for sustainment. People, skills, capability, and things are maintained to the standard set for mission accomplishment by replacement, rotation, repair, and training operations. From a personnel perspective it covers soldier reassignments throughout a career or obligation period, quality of life and well-being programs, and other aspects of the personnel systems contributing towards retention. Repair parts and maintenance is also a sustainment process for materiel. Training in units covering the process of sustaining common soldier skills that maintain unit or individual proficiency falls under this function as well. The personnel priority group (PPG), officer distribution plans (ODPs), DA Master Priority List (DAMPL), ten classes of supply, the authorized stockage lists (ASLs), and prescribed load lists (PLLs) are examples of systems or techniques used to apply authorization and priority to the sustainment function.

(7) *Development.* While the Army is sustaining itself, it is also constantly developing. Individuals are developed through civilian, enlisted, and officer education programs that include character and leader development modules. Education and training programs range from individual self-development, including graduate-level degree programs to the entire range of branch and skill related institutional training culminating at either the senior service college for officers and civilians or Sergeant Major Academy for enlisted soldiers. Units are developed through collective training processes that include individual training in units, home station training, and deployments for training. Examples are collective training tasks (CTT), leader training, live fire and maneuver training, external evaluations such as those under the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), emergency deployment readiness exercises (EDRE), operational readiness tests (ORT), and training rotations to the combat training centers (CTC).

(8) *Separation.* Finally, there comes a time when people and equipment are separated from military control. People may separate voluntarily by not extending following

completion of an obligated service period or by retiring. Involuntary separation may occur due to reduction in force actions or qualitative reasons. The Army normally separates materiel through the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office (DRMO) process or through foreign military sales (FMS) actions.

**b. External influences affecting the functioning of the model.** There are two categories of external influences that affect the functioning of the model:

(1) The first category is the availability of resources. Resources include tangible objects in the form of funds, materiel, or personnel. Also included are intangible resources such as time, information, and technology.

(2) The second category is the influence of command, management, and leadership in planning, organizing, directing, controlling, and monitoring the multitude of inputs, decisions, and actions to ensure that functions at each stage of the model are executed effectively and at the appropriate time.

### **2-7. The Army War College Model**

To aid in examining specific support systems and their interactions, the U.S. Army War College has adopted the model shown in Figure 2-3 (insert). This widely used model highlights key aspects of force management. Each process displayed in the figure is examined in detail in subsequent chapters of this text. The underlying basis for this model is that force management, in its simplest context, is the management of change.

**a.** The model begins with strategic directives and policy including the national security strategy, and the guidance, plans, and other inputs from OSD, commanders in chief (CINCs), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in determining strategic and operational requirements. When the Army cannot fulfill directed missions and responsibilities with current capabilities the process of force management produces solutions to close the required capability gap. These solutions are initially documented as required capabilities in the requirements determination process. A requirement can be met and a capability acquired by a change in one domain of DTLOMS or some combination of changes in two or more domains.

**b.** The lower cost solutions are those changes to doctrine and training that can be developed within TRADOC, packaged, and provided directly to the unit. Doctrinal changes may, however, drive requirements for new materiel or organizational designs.

**c.** If organizational change is required, the necessary changes must be developed through the design and modeling of new or changed organizations and, subsequently, the determination and documentation of authorizations for the approved organizations and force structure.

**d.** If a change in materiel is required (normally the most expensive solution), it occurs through the materiel acquisition management process. This process must be initiated unless non-developmental (off-the-shelf) items will meet the need. Materiel changes require concurrent changes in organizations that, in turn, require materiel acquisition management to be closely linked to the force development and integration processes.

**e.** As discussed earlier, the force development process culminates in the Department of the Army (DA) approval and documentation of personnel and equipment authorizations in Army organizations and the force structure. This includes an analysis of the entire Army

organizational structure with approved modifications (through the total Army analysis process) to determine a resource constrained, balanced, and affordable force structure. The resource-constrained decisions on the allocation of authorizations are recorded in The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS) and the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS). The marriage of these two systems occurs in the Structure and Composition System (SACS). SACS, in conjunction with the Force Builder System, produces the Army's time-phased demands for personnel and equipment over the Current, Budget and Program Years and is extended for a total of a ten-year period. Additionally, SACS defaults to FY 2050 and builds a fully modernized objective TOE (OTOE) position for all units. In this way, SACS shows current levels of modernization, levels achieved at the end of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) period and a fully modernized Army (for planning purposes). SACS outputs combine information from BOIP, TOE, SAMAS, TAADS and known force structure constraints not included in the previous files. Key outputs are the Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS) and the Logistics Structure and Composition System (LOGSACS). Both PERSACS and LOGSACS are at the unit identification code (UIC), effective date (EDATE), MOS, grade, line item number (LIN), equipment readiness code (ERC) and quantity level of detail for requirements and authorization for MTOE and TDA units. These systems are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

f. SACS provides the data that drives the processes to acquire, train, and distribute personnel and acquire and distribute materiel. Since at that point we are dealing with individuals and things, the linking of the thought process which analyzes the tools the Army uses to manage change with the functional requirements for producing combat-ready units portrayed in the life-cycle model should be apparent.

## **SECTION IV COORDINATION OF FORCE INTEGRATION ACTIONS**

### **2-8. Information exchange as a key element of force integration**

Coordination of all aspects of force integration requires the constant exchange of information. In the Army's battle to achieve effective force integration, there have been and continue to be initiatives that focus on improving the information flow within and between the multiple systems and processes of force integration. Throughout this text, readers will find detailed descriptions of systems and processes that are designed to exchange information and help coordinate force integration actions. Examples of these systems and processes include the functional area assessment process, the Acquisition Management Milestone System, the Force Modernization Master Plan, and the Army Modernization Reference Data System.

### **2-9. Objective of force integration**

Force integration is a method of change management that focuses Army management actions towards organizations to ensure the orderly incorporation and sustainment of structure, equipment, and doctrine in the Army. The objective of the effort is to assess the combined impact of Army functional systems on units and ensure the appropriate mix of resources (structure, people, equipment, dollars, facilities, and information) is available to support a

planned event for a given organization or system. The end result of this process is combat-ready units.

## **2-10. The organization integration team approach to force integration**


a. Execution of the organization integration process was the responsibility of the organization integration (OI) team prior to 1 December 2000. On that date, the organization of the DCSPRO and the reorganization of DCSOPS became effective. While the materiel management responsibilities of the DCSOPS and the DCSPRO are known in general terms to be as described above and in Chapters 9 and 11, the functions and responsibilities of these staff elements and their individual force management action officers with respect to the force integration function have not been finalized as of this writing.

b. HQDA will continue to use the team approach to execute force integration. Force integration staff officer (FISO) positions have been documented in the TDA; and supplement the force integrator (FI), systems integrator (SI), and organization integrator (OI) action officer staffing. At this time, however, it is not completely known which duties and functions of the former positions will migrate to the FISO or other staff officer positions in the new DCSPRO and DCSOPS organizations. (SI duties and functions that are known to have migrated to the DCSPRO are discussed in Chapter 11.)

c. In the following paragraphs, we include a discussion of the former organization integration team composition and the functions and duties of the team members. In the absence of more current information, this discussion is useful in providing a description of the team approach to force integration and the functions that must be performed by some member of the team, regardless of title.

## **2-11. Organization integration function**

The function of organization integration was formally performed by an ad hoc, multi-disciplinary, group of organization managers, functional area representatives, and special interest representatives responsible for management of organizational change. The OI team included representatives who had knowledge of the doctrine, design, structure, personnel, acquisition, equipping, resources, facilities, information management, and training activities that impact a unit. HQDA team members included, but were not limited to, OIs, FIs, SIs, document integrators (DIs), and resource integrators (RIs). As required, representatives from major Army commands (MACOMs) and Reserve Components and other functional area and special interest representatives were included in HQDA teams. The OI team could be compared to the battlestaff of a tactical organization. The team members were not fixed, nor were the specific roles each would play. They “organized for battle” based on the specific challenge or mission. The OI on the team might have played a leading role in one instance and have been a supporting player in another. The personnel system staff officer (PERSSO) might have been an essential member of the team in one instance, but not have been involved at all in others. The same is true of other members of the team. Each action officer on the team was responsible for preparing, handling, and coordinating actions in his or her area of expertise. A representative team is shown at Figure 2-4.



**Figure 2-4. Organization Integration Team Composition**

**a. Functions of the OI team.** The OI team analyzed Army leadership decisions affecting force structure, coordinated implementing action, recommended further action, and monitored the execution of actions. OI teams used and shared information available in existing Army information systems. If disconnects appeared in the information validity or Army plans, the OI team was charged with resolving the conflict.

**b. Roles of team members.**

**(1) Force integrator.** Force integrators (FI) are assigned to DCSOPS and represent organizational interests of functionally dissimilar organizations grouped into brigades, regiments, divisions, and corps. Prior to the establishment of the DCSPRO, the FI—

**(a)** Assessed the ability of functional systems to provide personnel, equipment, facilities, and fiscal resources for major units.

**(b)** Developed, maintained, and defended organizational management decision packages (MDEP) for major organizations.

**(c)** Developed, assessed, and made recommendations for alternative use of resources for establishing and maintaining major organizations to support a warfighting CINC and MACOMs.

**(d)** Acted as the link between resource allocators and OIs.

**(e)** Evaluated and analyzed the total impact of incorporating personnel, facilities, equipment, doctrine, structure, and capability changes into major organizations.

**(f)** Ensured validity of operating system databases.

**(g)** Reviewed requirements and authorization documents.

**(h)** Assessed the impact of new doctrine, structure, manning, equipment, and facilities on major units. This included strategic policy, training, mobilization, deployment, sustainment, redeployment, demobilization, and resource strategies.

**(2) Organization integrator.** Organization integrators (OI) are assigned to the DCSOPS and represent organizational interests of functionally similar organizations and integrated management of all aspects of structuring, equipping, manning, training, sustaining, deploying, stationing, and funding. The OI represents all organizations in a specific branch such as infantry, air defense artillery, and quartermaster or specific type organizations within a branch such as ordnance missile maintenance. The OI was also responsible for the organization and synchronization of OI team activities. Prior to the establishment of the DCSPRO, the OI—

**(a)** Assessed the ability of the functional systems to provide personnel, materiel, and facilities for organizations.

**(b)** Recommended priorities for allocation of personnel, materiel, and facilities to organizations as integrated packages.

**(c)** Assessed the impact on readiness as a result of personnel, training, equipment, facilities, doctrine, or structure changes.

**(d)** Reviewed distribution plans and determines impacts on organizations. Assessed impacts of new capabilities on organization structure, doctrine, or resources.

**(e)** Reviewed, coordinated ARSTAF review, and recommended final ARSTAF position to the Director, Force Programs, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), on all organization requirements documents (TOE, BOIP, and manpower requirements criteria (MARC) studies)

**(f)** Coordinated authorization documents. Maintained the documentation audit trail on all additions, deletions, and other changes to organization authorization documents.

**(g)** Developed, maintained, and defended organizational MDEPs for organizations.

**(h)** Ensured validity of operating system databases, such as SAMAS.

**(3) Command manager (force structure).** Command managers (force structure) (CM (FS)) are assigned to the DCSOPS and represent the organizational interests of a MACOM, manage its TDA, and serve as the MTOE OI and FI for that MACOM. Prior to the establishment of the DCSPRO, the CM (FS)—

**(a)** Acted as point of contact for command plans and concept plans.

**(b)** Maintained the documentation audit trail on all additions, deletions, and other changes to unit MTOEs and TDAs.

**(c)** Produced manpower resource guidance for MACOM program budget guidance (PBG).

**(d)** Managed command force structure allowances.

**(4) Systems integrator.** Systems integrators (SI) are now assigned to the DCSPRO. Prior to the establishment of the DCSPRO, the SI represented user interests in all materiel system management aspects of force integration. The SI was involved in all aspects of equipping, from the front-end requirement determination process through system fielding. The SI—

- 
- (a) Determined requirements for materiel fielding and other user-oriented functions related to materiel acquisition.
  - (b) Developed the command position on materiel requirements documents.
  - (c) Assessed the affordability of the materiel requirements.
  - (d) Developed materiel acquisition or fielding alternatives.
  - (e) Recommended materiel acquisition priorities for research, development, test, evaluation, procurement, and materiel change programs.
  - (f) Recommended priorities for materiel distribution.
  - (g) Participated in system design reviews.
  - (h) Ensured all aspects of rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) are considered.
  - (i) Reviews requirements and authorization documents for materiel user implications.
  - (j) Recommended disposition of displaced equipment.

(5) *Document integrator.* Document integrators (DI), or documentors, are assigned to the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA), a DA DCSOPS field operating agency (FOA). DIs ensure that requirements and authorization documents meet approved Army force programs. DIs include requirements document developers and authorization document developers. The DIs link requirements, planned or programmed force structure actions and the documentation processes. The DIs—

- (a) Develop requirements documents (TOE, BOIP, and MARC).
- (b) Produce authorization documents (MTOE, TDA, joint tables of allowances (JTA), and others) based on HQDA guidance, organization requirements documents, command plans, and input from the MACOMs.
- (c) Review proposed authorization documents to ensure compliance with manpower, personnel, and equipment policies and directives.

(6) *Command manager (program budget guidance).* Command managers (program budget guidance) (CM (PBG)) were assigned to DCSOPS and ensured that the manpower allocation for each MACOM was accurately reflected in the SAMAS system, in conformance with Army leadership decisions, and within the manpower controls as specified by OSD. The CM (PBG) represented the Army's budget interests of functionally dissimilar organizations grouped into the various MACOMs. The CM (PBG)—

- (a) Managed the manpower database of record by MACOM, at UIC, MDEP, and Army management structure code (AMSCO) level of detail, by fiscal year, by category (military and civilian) for each budget cycle.
- (b) Maintained the Army's only detailed audit trail for manpower.
- (c) Interfaced with all ARSTAF agencies and MACOMs during each budget cycle.

(d) Produced the manpower addendum to the PBG at the conclusion of each Planning, Programming, and Budget Execution System (PPBES) event.

(e) Managed and maintained the Army's controlled accounts.

(7) *Army component commands and MACOMs.* Force management staffs at these echelons will continue to manage the planning and execution of the force integration mission through—

(a) Document integration, including authorization document (MTOE and TDA) review, and database management.

(b) Systems integration, including, requirements and authorization document review, the materiel fielding plan (MFP) process, new equipment training plan (NETP) review, and facilities support annex review.

(c) Organization integration, including the organizational assessment process, review of requirements and authorization documents, and doctrine review.

(d) Force structure management, including TDA manpower management and end strength management.

(e) Force planning, including the total Army analysis (TAA) process, command plan process, force reduction planning and monitoring, and concept plan (CONPLAN) development.

(f) Readiness management, including Status of Resource and Training System (SORTS) input and the unit status reporting (USR) process.

(8) *Corps, division, regiment, separate brigade, and installation.* Force management staffs at these levels will continue to manage force integration through—

(a) Force structure management, including authorization document management, USR monitoring, and force structure review and analysis.

(b) Systems integration, including action plan development, distribution plan reviews, and facilities review.

(c) Organization integration, including organizational assessments, force structure review and analysis, and authorization document review process.

## **2-12. The future of organization integration**

**a.** The representative OI team carries a significant manpower bill. This is necessary because of the diverse knowledge required to perform all the OI functions. A robust team is also needed to access the many different databases and models that provide information needed by the OI members. However, steps are underway to apply technology to help reduce the manpower costs of this process.

**b.** The AFM, developed by the Army Strategic and Advanced Computing Center, is a decision support system designed to provide the Army Staff with an integrated, quick turnaround planning tool to assess actual or notional force structures and/or policies across the Army's major functional areas (force structure, personnel, logistics, installations, and budget). AFM supplements the current functional models, which remain "stovepipe" systems and that cannot easily conduct "What If" analyses in a timely manner. The AFM provides the

capability to readily make force structure or policy changes and assess the effects of these changes on unit fill levels and readiness both within and across functional areas.

## **SECTION V**

### **SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

#### **2-13. Summary**

**a.** In modern, complex organizations there is certain to be a cause and effect relationship involving almost every process and system. An appreciation of this interrelationship and knowledge of the individual systems that contribute to force integration will in turn lead to an understanding of how the Army runs.

**b.** Changes within the Army and the processes that brings them about, require a holistic application of cross-functional factors. To be successful, future senior Army leaders and managers must understand the nature of the interrelations of the systems and subsystems, as well as their individual tasks and functions. Only then can force management objectives be effectively and efficiently met. The overviews of the Army Functional Life Cycle Model and the Army War College Model introduced in this chapter provide a basis for subsequent and more detailed examinations of the Army as a system. Additional information can be found at the following web sites:

- (1) [carlisle-www.army.mil](http://carlisle-www.army.mil).
- (2) [www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil](http://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil).

#### **2-14. References**

- a.** Public Law 99-433, *DOD Reorganization Act of 1986*.
- b.** Public Law 103-62, *Government Performance Results Act of 1993*.
- c.** Report of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission), *A Quest for Excellence*, June 1986.
- d.** Memorandum, Chief of Staff, Army, undated, subject: *Approval of Army Warfighting Requirements*.
- e.** Army Regulation 11-40, *Functional Area Assessment*.
- f.** Field Manual 100-11, *Force Integration*.
- g.** Army Modernization Reference Data (CD-ROM).



# CHAPTER 3

## ARMY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

*The resolution of Congress on 2 June 1782 clearly illustrates the concepts of civil control of military forces and the primacy of the Congress in the determination of the Army's structure. That resolution resolved to discharge all remaining Continental Army troops from Federal service except 80 men. It further assigned the remaining men to "guard stores." It established the Army's force structure as:*

- 25 privates at Fort Pitt
- 55 privates to be assigned at West Point and "other magazines"
- A "proportionate number of officers," none above the rank of captain.

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### **3-1. Chapter content**

The United States Army is a strategic instrument of national policy that has served our country well in peace and war for over two centuries. This chapter provides a discussion on how the ultimate organizational design of the Army at a given point in time is the result of systematic approaches and conscious decisions on how the Army is to perform its doctrinal tasks and how it is to deal with its environment. *AR 10-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army* and *AR 10-87, Major Army Commands in the Continental United States*, provide the official description of Army organization, as well as an understanding why the major components are arranged as they are, and why the units and subordinate units are linked together as they are. Such an insight is necessary for an understanding of how the Army operates as a system to carry out its Title 10 functions. What follows is a discussion of the system through which the Army evolves into an organization of headquarters, staffs, commands, and functional units. In a manner of speaking, it provides background and theory to the total Army analysis process.

#### **3-2. The Army organizational system**

##### **a. The Army as an open organizational system.**

(1) In terms of management theory, the Army can be considered an open organizational system with three distinct components: the production, combat, and integrating subsystems. Each of these has tasks to accomplish, each operates in a given environment, and each requires and acquires resources. Because of the size and complexity of the Army and its tasks, the organizational structure needed to accomplish these tasks requires a management approach that gives the Army as much flexibility as possible (given

resources and mission requirements) while also maintaining the command and control relationship that is needed in the military. Although structured along the traditional classical organizational design, with the increased complexity of tasks being given to the Army today, a more fluid design is appropriate.

(2) This design is consistent with the Contingency Design Model which conceptually rests on the idea that to have an effective design for an organization there must be a “goodness of fit” between the structure and the conditions of the external environment of the organization. In essence, this design model recognizes that organizations like the Army exist as “open systems” and thus must be structured in such a way as to allow the system to address those external factors in an appropriate manner, not a one way fits all situations. To accomplish this, the Army organizational system is composed of a number of subsystems that feed into other systems where final decisions are made. In order to design the appropriate subsystem, it becomes necessary to understand the design concepts of differentiation and integration.

**b. Differentiation and integration.** Many organizations are designed along the lines of differentiation and integration. To better understand how this is accomplished in the Army, each of these concepts is discussed below. As a first step to accomplish this design, organizations need to scan their environment, both internally and externally, in order to best determine—

- The tasks to be accomplished.
- The resource constraints placed on the organization.
- The extent of coordination that is needed within the organization in order to make effective and efficient decisions.

(1) *Differentiation.*

(a) Organizations should be tailored in design to meet specific mission requirements. For example, to demonstrate a forward presence in an area of vital interest to U.S. security, such as Europe, and to enhance relations with our allies, the Army has organized U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). Conversely, the U. S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) was established to deal with the soldier acquisition task. To accommodate these different demands, the Army’s systemic organizational response must be different. USAREUR would be as ineffective recruiting in the continental United States (CONUS) as USAREC would be in dealing with the Army’s mission in Europe.

(b) Therefore, task or functional specialization is both a dimension and a requirement of the structure of Army organizations. Such functions as personnel management, resource (funds and manpower) management, operations, intelligence and security, logistics, and research and development are found separately identified in both staffs and commands.

(c) A major result of task specialization is that organizations tend to be designed and structured to fit the requirements of their sub-environments. Depending on the demands of the environment, organizations in one functional specialty tend to be differentiated from organizations in other specialties in the following manner:

- Missions.

- Orientation on time, i.e., a focus on short-term, mid-term, long-term results.
- Degree of formality of structure of organizations, i.e., rules, job descriptions, chain of command, adherence.
- Interpersonal orientation—ways of dealing with people, i.e., very mission-oriented vs. a concern for relationships with others.

(2) *Integration.* The environments within which the Army competes require one principal output: mission-ready forces with a full range of operational capabilities. The Army is successful only to the extent that it produces such forces. These widely diverse environments also require a high degree of differentiation if the Army is to meet its requirements. These two environmental demands—output and high differentiation—must be reconciled and the Army must integrate many elements to produce mission-ready forces. One should expect that the greater the degree of differentiation in an organization, the more difficult it is to get the necessary coordination and interdependence or integration. There are three levels of complexity of integrative rules or processes, ranging from the simple to the highly complex. The use of each depends on the kind of integration desired.

(a) The simplest devices, which can be used to deal with more certain environments, are standard rules and procedures. Integration is achieved through procedures and direct interaction is normally not necessarily required between organizational units.

(b) Somewhat more complex is a plan or order. Interdependence is achieved through an operational plan or order in which the responsibility for and sequence of task accomplishment are specified.

(c) Third, and the most complex, is the process of mutual adjustment in which closely coordinated contact is required within the management hierarchy (or chain of command) and which also implies cross-functional teams or individual integrators. A good example of the last process is the battalion task-force approach to integrating tanks and infantry. A project management organization also exemplifies integration by mutual adjustment.

(d) Each of these devices is operating in any Army organization to some extent. Effective organizations facing more diverse environments will use all of these integrative processes.

## **SECTION II**

### **THE PRODUCTION SUBSYSTEM**

#### **3-3. Statutory requirements**

The Army's fundamental purpose is to fight and win the Nation's wars by establishing conditions for lasting peace through land force dominance. Laws further direct the Army to be organized and trained for prompt and sustained combat. Many other specific requirements are assigned by statute to the Secretary of the Army and the Army Staff (ARSTAF). They include requirements to form organizations of men and women and machines "for the effective prosecution of war.

### **3-4. Production of needed resources**

The production subsystem is the cornerstone of the process. Its job is to secure from its resource environments the “raw materials” for its many production efforts: recruiting untrained people, searching for useable technology, and dealing with producers of outside goods and services. Its task, accomplished through its people and structure, is to convert the “raw materials” into the “intermediate goods” required by the combat system. Training centers and schools transform untrained people into tank crewmen, infantrymen, and mechanics. Schools convert ideas and knowledge into doctrine, tactics, techniques, and training methods for the use of the combat subsystem. Laboratories, arsenals, and procurement and test organizations convert technology and contractor effort into weapons systems and equipment for the combat subsystem. Other parts of the production subsystem provide such sustaining support to the whole organizational system as health care, commissary support, and other services. The production subsystem serves primarily to meet the needs of the combat subsystem.

#### **a. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).**

(1) TRADOC is first of two major components of the production subsystem. TRADOC was created to fully integrate the functions of the former Continental Army Command (CONARC) and Combat Development Command (CDC). With a capability of producing training, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and, at the same time, providing the required user representation in the materiel acquisition process TRADOC filled a shortfall in the Army's production subsystem efficiency.

(2) In terms of differentiation, the task of producing training, doctrine, and the material acquisition interface required a different perception of objectives than did the force readiness tasks. One organization, the former CONARC, could not concentrate on the missions of both a major part of the combat subsystem and a major part of the production subsystem.

(3) The creation of TRADOC has resulted in the establishment of functionally oriented matrix-type organizations to accomplish the assigned mission of preparing the Army for war and being the architect of the Army of the future. This is done through concept and doctrine development, maintenance of the training system, and the conduct of the combat development process.

**b. Army Materiel Command (AMC).** The second major component of the production subsystem is AMC. Taking combat development requirements and converting them into materiel solutions is one, but nonetheless a principal element of AMC. Production of weapons systems and other materiel is not simply a matter of developing, procuring and shipping the system to organizations. Most critical to any system's combat readiness is the ability to repair and maintain the assets which organizations already possess. The provisioning of repair parts, diagnosing causes of failure and the development of correctional procedures or modifications are additional functions. Additionally, AMC is involved in the depot level rebuild of major items, the control of inventories of supplies, and the technical support provided through the logistics assistance program. Continuing support across the spectrum of operations plays a large role in maintaining combat readiness.

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**c. Installation operations.**

(1) The integration of installation organization and operations into the Army's overall organizational structure, in the 1980's both as a home station and training base has proven to have a significant and positive affect on readiness. Installations must be organized for and capable of training, mobilizing, deploying, sustaining, supporting, recovering, and reconstituting assigned and mobilized operating forces. The traditional boundary between tactical and sustaining base activities must disappear as the installation power projection platforms assume an active role in the welfare of deploying operating forces.

(2) This important task has a large influence on structure. The focus is the operations task. An installation is an aggregation of contiguous or near contiguous, common mission-supporting real property holdings under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense controlled by a permanently assigned Army unit or activity. The Army organizes installations for support using tables of organization and equipment, tables of distribution and allowance, and personnel resources documents. Activities on the installation receive installation support in accomplishing their missions. Examples of these are schools, hospitals, reserve component elements, and tactical headquarters and their subordinate units. Although this function is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 17, its organizational impact is pertinent here as well.

(3) Maintaining a position of full-spectrum dominance and overmatch against any threat requires a well-trained and ready force. A trained and ready force needs an installation that has a fully effective capability to train, launch, sustain, and reconstitute the force. The installation requires training and support facilities to deploy and recondition returning forces rapidly and to maintain the edge between contingency missions. It means providing the facilities and services that make the installation a home to the force.

(4) Installations are power projection platforms. They provide a home to the force and be resourced as a productive work and training site. This evolution of the installation's role in the Army structure and its placement in the Army's organization has established it as a critical element of the Army.

**d. Functional commands.**

(1) Not only is the installation operations task common to both the combat and production subsystems, but parts of the installation operations function have become recognizable "specialty" commands — and therefore part of the production subsystem — providing their goods and services usually to both the combat and production subsystems. For example, U. S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) operates most Army medical activities in CONUS; U. S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) directs all criminal investigators.

(2) The principal reason for the establishment and continuation of functional commands is that the required degree of integration for the specialty functions differs from those functions, which have remained the responsibility of the installation commander. Each of the specialty functions is a goods or service provider who can stand apart from the major mission of the installation, whether it is force readiness or training. Mission performance does not require that telephone service, or commissary operations, or medical care delivery is totally integrated with facilities or maintenance so that unit readiness or training objectives

can be met. The same is not true of functions like maintenance or personnel support, which more directly affect installation goal achievement.

(3) Further, the conceptual model would suggest that achieving greater performance from these functions could best be accomplished by improving the degree of differentiation. The 'functional' organizational model appears to do just that. The central control reinforces the commitment by the local agency to: high quality, efficient telephone service, and medical care, good commissary support, meeting recruiting objectives, carrying out engineer construction projects, by emphasizing the uniqueness of the function and demonstrating career paths for civilian employees.

**e. HQDA support specialty commands.** Another secondary category of organizations within the producer subsystem is the group of service producing, special-purpose organizations reporting to HQDA. This category includes, among others, the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM). It has tasks, which do not require field units to produce the service, so it does not fall into the functional command category. PERSCOM's services are used by both the producer and combat subsystems, as well as HQDA. Because of its specialty tasks, such agencies are directly linked to the HQDA staff, yet we do not class them as extensions to the staff because their functions are operational, rather than policy. Most organizations operating in such manner are categorized as field operating agencies (FOAs). Figure 3-1 provides an example of some of the HQDA FOAs.

## SECTION III THE COMBAT SUBSYSTEM

### 3-5. Products of the combat subsystem

The combat subsystem's major task is to convert the Army's intermediate products, obtained from the production subsystem, into mission-ready forces, that is, into units and organizations. Each element of its structure welds together individual soldiers, equipment, and procedures and produces combat readiness. The combat subsystem engages in a process of continued interaction with its resource environment, primarily the production and the integrating subsystems. Its task environment includes the enemy threat(s), the unified combatant commands, allied forces with whom it must deal, and, especially in peacetime, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Congress.

Army Secretariat

- Inspector General Agency
- Army Audit Agency
- EEO Agency
- Cost & Economic Analysis
- CPO Center Mgt Agency
- Information Mgt Support
- EEO Compliance & Complaint
- Cost & Economic Analysis Ctr
- DA Review Boards
- Publishing Agency
- Army Broadcasting Service

Army Staff

- Force Mgt Support Agency
- PERSCOM
- Army Research Institute
- OPTEC
- Safety Center
- Comm & Family Spt Cmd
- Army War College
- Army Claims Service
- Concepts Analysis Agency
- Military Police Support Agency
- Center of Military History

**Figure 3-1. Examples of Field Operating Agencies****3-6. The Army in the field**

a. This category of the Army's organizational structure consists of 16 major Army commands including some commands previously addressed under the production subsystem and installation operations. The Army's designated MACOMs are the following:

- U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).
- Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
- U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR).
- Army Materiel Command (AMC).
- Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).
- Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA).
- U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC).
- U.S. Army South (USARSO).
- U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC).
- Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).
- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).
- U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).
- U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC).
- U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM).
- U.S. Army Military District of Washington (MDW).
- U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC).

b. In some respects each command faces similar environments although they differ from each other in many ways. Several (FORSCOM, USAREUR, USARPAC, EUSA, USASOC,

and USARSO) have the principal task of providing mission-ready land forces—the primary output of the Army. Each has developed an organizational structure reflecting its environment.

## **SECTION IV THE INTEGRATING SUBSYSTEM**

### **3-7. Tasks of the integrating subsystem**


**a.** The integrating subsystem ties all of the subordinate subsystems together for the Army as a whole. Its tasks are to decide what is to be “produced” or accomplished by the whole system and to see to it that the system performs as expected. It also acts as the source of funds for the subsystems, obtaining them from Department of Defense, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Congress.

**b.** In any large organization, the headquarters has the major function to see to it that the major tasks of the organization are accomplished. It is the most prominent integrating device in the organization. The challenge for the integrating subsystem is one of structuring the organization to accomplish the following tasks effectively:

- Determining the nature of demands and requirements (e.g., from OSD, Congress, the public, other Services, the nature of the threat).
- Charting a course for the Army.
- Securing the necessary resources (appropriations authority) for the Army.
- Allocating resources, responsibilities, objectives and performance requirements to the combat and production subsystem.
- Evaluating the performance of the subsystems’ organizations against the requirements.
- Bringing about change in cases where performance does not meet requirements.

### **3-8. Differentiation and integration**

The exercise of these functions calls for both a high degree of differentiation within the headquarters and many integrative devices. Each function must relate to a similar functional group in OSD, to some extent to interested committees in Congress, and to members of the same specialist community in the combat and production subsystems. Figures 3-2 and 3-3 reflect the current Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) structure.



**Figure 3-2. Secretariat**


**a. Achieving differentiation.**

(1) Differentiation is achieved through the assignment of functional responsibilities to the HQDA directorates and the HQDA special and personal staff sections. It is within the directorates that assigned tasks such as recruiting, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) planning, or budgeting can be dealt with; goals can be reasonably clear-cut; appropriate time dimensions exist; and the proper degree of formality of structure is established. The directorates possess knowledge and experience sufficient for most decisions that concern their task environments.

(2) It is important at HQDA that the requirements of particular environments be well understood. This includes both upward relationships—with OSD, OMB, and congressional committee staffers—and downward relationships with the major commands. The senior leadership of the Army has a large influence on goal-setting and performance evaluation for the whole functional or specialty community within the Army and a similar influence on getting the needed resources from OSD, OMB, and Congress.

**b. Differentiation in HQDA.**

(1) Part of the past debate on HQDA reorganization was the belief that the structure of HQDA actually complicates the achievement of the required differentiation and performance. The criticism focused on the functional parts of the Army Secretariat (ARSEC) and the ARSTAF directorates which seemed to be duplicating each other's efforts or have overlapping responsibilities. The *Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986* required the integration of the two staffs into a single HQDA comprised of a Secretariat focused on managing the business of the Army and the Chief of Staff and deputy chiefs of staff responsible for planning, developing, executing, reviewing, and analyzing Army programs. Although it may first appear complicated, it does provide an organizational system, which produces units with required differentiation, capable of being integrated into the roles, missions, and functions of the Army.



**Figure 3-3. Organization of the Army Staff**

(2) The acquisition process provides a good HQDA example of the differentiation sought by Congress. The Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) has now incorporated into the office, by law, the acquisition function assigned by Congress. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition and Logistics) has been appointed by the Secretary of Army to perform this function.

**c. Achieving integration.**

(1) Integration is achieved in a formal series of meetings at the senior staff level within the ARSEC and Army Staff ARSTAF. The heads of the staff agencies, the Deputy Chiefs of Staff themselves, have a principal integrating role—serving more as a corporate management committee, than as simply representatives of their own staff agencies. And there are also many task forces, working groups, and committees with membership from throughout the ARSEC and ARSTAF, which also serve as important knowledge-based integrators.


(2) Integration is also the primary function of the Army's senior leadership: the Secretary, Under Secretary, Chief of Staff, and Vice Chief of Staff. This group decides on management strategies: stability, modernization of equipment, and balance. These strategies, enunciated in the yearly Posture Statement, are unifying, integrating statements of objectives that relate directly to the dominant overall issue—maintaining mission-ready forces.

## SECTION V

### SUMMARY AND REFERENCES

#### 3-9. Summary

a. The United States Army Posture Statement for Fiscal Year 2001, available through the U.S. Army home page ([www.army.mil](http://www.army.mil)), provides a thorough discussion on the strategic role of the Army and the integration necessary to achieve combat ready units. The document acknowledges change is constant in order to respond to challenges of today, tomorrow, and the 21st century and describes, in some detail, the Army Transformation. It also describes the six Army imperatives (shown in Figure 3-4) calling them mandates for success in accomplishing all missions.



**Figure 3-4. The Army Imperatives**

b. We have described the theory of structural change in the Army. The present start point is our current National Security and Joint Military Strategies. Currently, *Joint Vision 2020* provides the direction for change and *The Army Vision* focuses that direction for the Army. The remainder of this text will address the systems that actually plan and execute this continuous process of change and growth.

#### 3-10. References

- a. Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols).
- b. Report of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission), *A Quest for Excellence*, June 1986.
- c. Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
- d. Army Regulation 10-5, *Headquarters, Department of the Army*.
- e. Army Regulation 10-87, *Major Army Commands in the Continental United States*.
- f. Army Regulation 10-88, *Field Operating Agencies, Office of the Chief of Staff*.



# CHAPTER 4

## THE RELATIONSHIP OF JOINT AND ARMY FORCE PLANNING

*Joint matters are defined as "...matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces including matters relating to:*

- National Military Strategy
- strategic planning and contingency planning; and
- command and control of combat operations under unified command."
- Title IV, Public Law 99-433, *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION


#### **4-1. Chapter content**

The *Goldwater-Nichols Act* profoundly changed the relationships among the Services and with the organizations of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This chapter addresses the processes used within the Department of Defense (DOD), the JCS, the combatant commands, and the Army to determine the force levels required to meet the U.S. national security objectives and military strategy and to fulfill unified CINC force requirements. These processes also determine the capabilities that need to be resourced by the Services' programs within the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and provide the basis for the DOD Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

#### **4-2. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)**

The JSPS is the primary formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the commanders-in-chief (CINCs), carries out the responsibilities required by Title 10, USC. The CJCS statutory responsibilities include: assisting the National Command Authorities (NCA) in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces; advising the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) on programming priorities; preparing strategic plans; and advising the SecDef on the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Services and combat support agencies of the DOD. The JSPS is a flexible and interactive process providing supporting military advice to the PPBS and the strategic guidance for use in the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). JSPS provides the venue for the CJCS to review the national security environment and U.S. national security objectives; evaluate the threat; assess current strategy

and existing or proposed programs and budgets; and propose military strategy, programs, and forces necessary to achieve those national security objectives. At the same time JSPS accounts for a resource limited environment consistent with policies and priorities established by the President and the SecDef (Figure 4-1).



**Figure 4-1. JSPS Documents**

### 4-3. Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA)

As the principal military advisor to the NCA and the CINCs' advocate, the CJCS is responsible for the assessment of military needs from a joint warfighting perspective to ensure that the nation effectively leverages joint Service and Defense agency capabilities while minimizing their limitations. Such assessments involve readiness requirements and plans for improving joint military capabilities. The JWCA process, overseen by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), is one of the mechanisms for conducting such assessments. JWCA are continuous assessments conducted by teams of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Services, OSD, defense agencies, and others.

### 4-4. Army participation in Joint planning and resourcing processes

The Army participates fully in the strategic planning and resource processes. The Army Staff (ARSTAF) supports the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), in the role as a member of the JCS, by performing analyses and providing input to the JSPS. The ARSTAF supports the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA), in the role as a member of the JROC, by direct participation in the JWCA process. The ARSTAF supports the Secretary of the Army (SA), as a member of the Defense Resources Board (DRB), by participating in JSPS and JROC/JWCA, and by performing additional analyses as required in support of the development of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

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#### **4-5. JOPES**

**a.** JOPES provides the procedural foundation for an integrated and coordinated approach to developing, approving, and publishing operation plans. This operational planning process concerns the deployment and employment of current forces, and not the identification of future force requirements. The latter is part of the force planning/development process. (See Chapter 6 for detailed discussion of JOPES.)

**b.** The Army supplement to JOPES is the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). AMOPES provides the structure and process for Army participation in JOPES, as well as serving other purposes. (See Chapter 6 for further discussion of Army Mobilization and AMOPES.)

## **SECTION II**

### **JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING SYSTEM (JSPS)**

#### **4-6. JSPS overview**

While the emphasis of this text is on the Army management systems, it is first necessary to understand the relationship of DOD, the JCS, and the combatant commands to the Army force planning process.

**a.** The CJCS is charged by Title 10 USC with preparing strategic plans and providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The JSPS, as prescribed by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3100.01A, provides the framework for strategic planning and strategic direction of the Armed Forces. Joint strategic planning begins the process to create the forces whose capabilities are apportioned for theater operation planning.

**b.** Within the Joint Staff, strategic planning is primarily the responsibility of the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, and the Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate, J-8. They use input from the Joint Staff, OSD, other DOD and Federal agencies, combatant commands, and the Services to assist in formulating policy, developing strategy, and providing force planning guidance. Primary responsibility for the management of JOPES, to include the review and approval of operations plans, resides with the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J-7, and Operations Directorate, J-3.

**c.** The JSPS constitutes a continuing process in which documents or products are produced. Some are developed concurrently. Key components of the JSPS include strategic direction of the Armed Forces, strategic plans, programming advice to the SecDef, and strategic assessments.

#### **4-7. Strategic direction**

**a.** Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services. Drawing from the strategic guidance contained in the President's national security strategy (NSS), the CJCS develops a National Military Strategy (NMS) describing how the military element of power supports national security objectives. The Chairman's vision provides operational commanders with strategic direction for the conduct of future joint operations within the projected strategic environment.

**b.** Through these documents and other guidance issued from time to time, the CJCS and the other members of the JCS establish a common focal point, planning horizons, and critical assumptions necessary for the articulation of a strategic vision, strategies, goals, missions, objectives, plans, policies, requirements, and programmed resources. The three important products which provide this strategic direction are the Chairman's Guidance, the *Joint Vision*, and the NMS and they will now be addressed sequentially.

**(1)** *Chairman's Guidance (CG)*. CG provides a common set of assumptions, priorities, intent, and critical planning factors required in the development of future strategies and plans. CG may not be promulgated as a separate document, but rather as an integral part of the strategy development process. CG may be established pursuant to the conduct of a Joint Strategy Review (JSR), to be described later, the preparation of a Joint vision, the drafting of a new NMS, or provided separately.

**(2)** *The Joint Vision*. The Joint vision document is a long-range vision that provides a common focal point for future planning. The vision recommends concepts for operating within the projected security environment. It provides a conceptual template for follow-on Service and combatant command visions while recognizing the unique aspects of warfighting embodied in each organization's core competencies. The Joint vision provides a means to study the implications of emerging threats, technologies, and global changes and their effects on joint doctrine, future force structures, requirements, and capabilities.

**(3)** *National Military Strategy (NMS)*. The NMS is the principal vehicle by which the CJCS fulfills the obligation of providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces. Deriving overall security policy guidance from the President's NSS, the NMS defines the national military objectives, establishes the strategy to accomplish these objectives, and addresses the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. The NMS describes the strategic landscape and includes a discussion of the potential threats and risks. It also provides strategic direction for the development of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the joint planning document (JPD), both described below.

#### **4-8. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan**

The JSPS fulfills the Chairman's responsibility to prepare strategic plans by means of the JSCP. The purpose of the JSCP is to provide guidance to the CINCs and Service Chiefs to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities. The JSCP serves to integrate the deliberate operation and engagement planning activities of the entire joint planning and execution community within a coherent and focused framework. It provides specific theater planning tasks and objectives, delineates necessary planning assumptions, and apportions resources to CINCs. The resulting plans therefore support and implement the objectives of the NMS.

**a.** The JSCP tasks the CINCs to develop deliberate plans, including operations plans (OPLANs), concept plans (CONPLANs), and functional plans for contingencies and deterrence. It consists of a single instruction that covers planning guidance, objectives, tasks, assumptions, and forces.

**b.** The JSCP provides guidance on the strategic objectives and priorities for theater engagement activities that are intended to shape the theater security environment in peacetime. From this guidance, combatant commanders develop theater engagement plans

(TEP) for peacetime engagement. These plans provide CINC intent, priorities, tasks, and resources required to achieve objectives over the FDYP. The CINC may integrate the elements of TEPs into overall theater strategic plans.

c. The JSCP apportions for planning the major combat forces, strategic lift, and pre-positioned assets expected to be available for both Active Army and Reserve Component (RC) forces. The CINCs may then incorporate these forces in their respective plans. The JSCP also contains an intelligence assessment addressing the global threat environment as well as the probability of selected smaller-scale contingencies in various countries throughout the world. Supplemental instructions are published separately from the JSCP and provide further planning guidance in specified functional areas.

#### **4-9. Planning and programming advice**

##### **a. Role of Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

(1) The JCS has the statutory responsibility to “advise and make recommendations to the SecDef with respect to the requirements of the combatant commands”. Based on the strategic planning priorities and objectives outlined in the Joint vision and the NMS, the CJCS provides this advice during the preparation of the DPG. The DPG represents the culmination of the planning phase of the PPBS and guides the programming efforts of the Services and other subordinate elements of the DOD. In order to satisfy all planning and policy responsibilities, it is important that the strategy, plans, and concepts developed within the JSPS are supported by a programmatic system that identifies, budgets for, and acquires the capabilities required.

(2) Validation of operational concepts is the job of strategists, planners, and tacticians. Programmers develop, produce, and acquire the equipment and systems necessary to achieve capabilities, and execute plans and strategies to validate operational concepts and their associated capabilities. Strategy and programs must be continually reviewed to be sure that the strategies adopted are supportable and that the programs complement the strategy and plans.

##### **b. Role of the Chairman.**

(1) The JPD, Chairman’s Program Recommendation (CPR), and Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA) together make up the Chairman’s planning and programmatic advice to the SecDef. The JPD represents the best possible early authoritative advice to the Secretary as the process of developing the DPG begins. Concurrently, the JPD informs the JWCA and JROC processes of the broad strategic planning and programming direction and priorities of the Chairman and other members of the JCS.

(2) The CPR provides more specificity on programs of greatest concern to the Chairman much later in the DPG process. Finally, building on the information developed in both the JPD and CPR preparation process, the CPA provides the Chairman’s assessment of the adequacy of the Service and Defense agency programs and where applicable, provides recommendations to the SecDef on specific alternative program and budget proposals based upon an assessment of current and future joint warfighting requirements.

**c. Joint planning document (JPD).**

(1) The JPD consists of a cover letter and several chapters and is prepared and submitted six months in advance of the scheduled publication of the DPG. Each Joint Staff Director sponsor of a JWCA prepares the corresponding or related JPD chapter in coordination with the Services, combatant commands, and appropriate Defense agencies.

(2) As a whole, the JPD reflects the Chairman's planning guidance based on the Joint vision and strategic objectives outlined in the NMS and JSCP. It also highlights shortfalls between CINC requirements and resources previously programmed; develops long-term acquisition policy and intelligence projections; highlights selected objectives for priority science and technology investments; and reflects operational vulnerabilities out to a common planning horizon and investment strategies for new operational concepts.

**d. Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR).** The CPR provides the Chairman's personal recommendations to the SecDef for consideration in the DPG, reflecting the Chairman's view of programs important for creating or enhancing joint warfighting capabilities. The CPR development process considers the initial input provided in the JPD and may expand, refine, or modify programming priorities contained in the JPD, focusing on recommendations that will enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and better satisfy joint warfighting requirements.

**e. Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA).** The CPA contains the Chairman's alternative program recommendations and budget proposals for the SecDef's consideration in refining the defense program and budget. The Chairman reviews the program objective memoranda (POMs) of the Services and other agencies of the DOD and the preliminary program decisions made regarding the Defense Program. The CPA, delivered near the end of the program review cycle, provides the Chairman's assessment of the adequacy of the Service and Defense agency POMs, as defined in the most recent programming cycle. The Chairman comments in the CPA on the risk associated with the planned allocation of defense resources. The CPA also includes an evaluation of the extent to which the POMs conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and the CINC's requirements.

**f. Summary.** The SecDef prepares the DPG in order to establish the planning and programming priorities of the DOD. The Chairman uses the JPD and CPR to communicate advice on these priorities and uses the CPA to assist in evaluating compliance and consistency with the guidance.

**4-10. Strategic assessments**

**a. The Chairman and assessments.** The Chairman is responsible for performing ongoing assessments supporting the development of strategic advice and assistance to the President and SecDef. Specifically, the Chairman is responsible for assessing the: ability of the NMS to achieve national security objectives; ability of the strategic and theater plans to accomplish the components of the NMS; capabilities of the Armed Forces to accomplish the tasks and requirements of the strategic plans; and capabilities of the Armed Forces and allied forces as compared to those of potential adversaries. Assessments provided in the JSPS include the JSR and the Joint Net Assessment (JNA) process.

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**b. Joint Strategy Review (JSR).**

(1) The JSR provides the primary means for the CJCS to analyze strategic concepts and issues relevant to strategy formulation. The JSR process continuously gathers information through an examination of current, emerging, and future issues related to threats, strategic assumptions, opportunities, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions.

(2) This analysis provides a basis for changes to the Joint vision and the NMS. The JSR analysis provides a strategic framework for the Chairman's advice on critical defense issues. The JSR validates a common set of planning assumptions and provides a common reference point used by other Joint Staff processes such as the JROC and JWCA.

(3) The JSR is a continuous process used to develop strategic military planning advice and assessments. JSR working groups, composed of representatives from the Joint Staff, Services, combatant commands, and supported by the Defense agencies, study the strategic environment out to a common planning horizon or they may study specific areas of concern identified by the Chairman. The JSR produces periodic JSR issue papers and a JSR annual report.

(4) JSR issue papers are prepared when significant changes or factors in the strategic environment are identified. They are presented to the Chairman, Chiefs, and CINCs and are used to consider changes to the Joint vision, NMS, JPD, or the JSCP.

(5) The JSR annual report provides a framework for the Chairman's strategic military advice. It includes an assessment of the strategic environment, national security objectives, and strategic priorities covering a twenty (20) year review window. It reports changes in the strategic environment that are significant enough to warrant senior leadership review. The report highlights the threat assessment and issues from JSR issue papers, their impact on the NMS, and provides the Chairman with options and a recommendation. The Chairman's endorsement of a course of action constitutes guidance to update, change, or retain the current NMS or Joint vision.

**c. Joint net assessment (JNA) process.**

(1) The Chairman is responsible for assessing current capabilities of U.S. Forces and their allies and comparing them with the capabilities of potential adversaries. The JNA process provides the mechanism to assess force strengths and deficiencies and their effect on U.S. ability to meet national security objectives. In addition, strengths and deficiencies are assessed in terms of their affect on strategic plans. This assessment is conducted with the full participation of the combatant commanders and the Services. The JNA process provides a strategic-level risk assessment and provides the basis for developing risk associated with alternative force structures and strategies.


(2) As a minimum, the JNA process develops a net assessment every four years (quadrennial assessment). This net assessment, based on a risk evaluation force, projects U.S. and allied capabilities against those capabilities that would reasonably be available to potential adversaries. This quadrennial assessment is provided to the SecDef and supports the assessment of current strategy and the development of alternative force structures and strategies.

(3) In the event of significant changes in the national security environment, emerging threats, or at the direction of the NCA, the JNA process assesses the capabilities of the current force structure and compares them to the capabilities of potential adversaries. This assessment supports the ongoing JSR process and provides the necessary evaluation of U.S. forces' capability to achieve current NMS objectives.

**4-11. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process**

a. The CJCS chairs the JROC, and the functions of the JROC chairman may only be delegated to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS). Other members of the JROC are selected by the CJCS after consultation with the SecDef, who are in the grade of General and Admiral that are recommended by their military Departments. Historically, the JROC has consisted of the VCJCS, the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Since April 1994, the CJCS expanded the authority of the JROC to assist in building senior military consensus across a range of issues across four broad functional areas. These functional areas are requirements, assessments, joint integration, and resources (Figure 4-2).

b. The JROC has continued to broaden its agenda to include greater initiative in defining military requirements with an expanded focus on the planning, programming and budgeting process. The JROC oversees the requirements generation process for major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) as specified in CJCSI 3170.01 and DOD 5000.1. Additionally, JROC activity has been increasingly focused on dialogue with CINCs on warfighting requirements. The JROC established JWCA in 1994 as a tool to improve analysis and assessment capabilities to enhance joint operations. These assessment teams have been reorganized several times in the recent past. The current organization covers eight critical warfare areas consisting of the following: Precision Engagement; Dominant Maneuver; Full Dimensional Protection; Focused Logistics; Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Communications and Computer Equipment; Information Superiority; and Strategic Deterrence (Figure 4-3). Finally, the JROC continues to maintain its direct integration in PPBS. Significant effort is involved in the production of two JSPS documents, the CPR and CPA, both discussed earlier in the section on JSPS.



**Figure 4-2. JROC Functional Areas**

c. To assist the integration and coordination effort of the JWCA, the JROC initially created the JROC Review Board (JRB). In 1999, the JRB officially changed its title to Joint Requirements Board but its function remains unchanged. The JRB consists of the Director, J8, and the appropriate Service-designated general officer representatives. The JRB assists the JROC in overseeing the requirements generation process and the JWCA process. The JRB reviews JWCA insights, findings, recommendations, and provides both guidance and direction.

d. To prepare the JRB and the JROC for their roles, a Joint Requirements Panel (JRP) was formed. This panel is comprised of the O-6 level JROC action officers from each of the Services and the Joint Staff, and is chaired by the Deputy Director, J-8. JRP members serve as the primary advisors to their Services' JRB/JROC principals and integrate Service participation in JWCA studies and assessments.

**4-12. Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA)**

JWCA teams, each sponsored by a Joint Staff directorate (Director), examine key relationships and interactions among joint warfighting capabilities and identify opportunities for improving warfighting effectiveness. The teams consist of warfighting and functional area experts from the Joint Staff, CINCs, Services, OSD, DOD agencies, and others as deemed necessary. JWCA issues are presented to the JRB, and then to the JROC for consideration. Through this process the JROC then is instrumental in helping the CJCS forge consensus and examine alternatives.

- ✓ Organized across Service /Agency Lines
- ✓ Focused on Warfighting Issues/Capabilities
- ✓ Helps the Integrate Requirements and Architectures






Figure 4-3. JWCA Team Organization

**SECTION III  
PLANNING AND RESOURCING**

**4-13. DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS)**

a. PPBS is a cyclic process containing three distinct but interrelated phases: planning, programming, and budgeting (Figure 4-4). The process provides for decision-making on future programs and permits prior decisions to be examined and analyzed from the viewpoint of the current environment (threat, political, economic, technological, and resources), and for the time period being addressed.

b. PPBS is the formal resource management system for constructing and maintaining the FYDP. It progresses from the articulation of the military strategy to defining the organizations, training, and forces to support that strategy. During the planning phase, the SecDef provides policy direction, program guidance, and fiscal manpower controls for the remainder of the PPBS cycle.



**Figure 4-4. PPBS**

c. The planning phase of PPBS culminates with the issuance of the DPG. The DPG contains planning and programming guidance to the Services and the Defense agencies for the conduct of force planning and program development. The DPG identifies the major dangers and opportunities bearing on America’s security and prosperity, outlines the force structure and modernization priorities best suited to implement the NMS, and establishes policies in a host of other areas from counter-proliferation initiatives to defense manpower and infrastructure. It establishes overall resource priorities and provides specific programming guidance in the following categories:

(1) *Readiness and sustainability.* This is the ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ without unacceptable delays—normally includes pre-D-day measures), and sustain their peacetime operations/maintenance support. This category includes the “staying power” of forces, units, weapons systems, and equipment, often measured in number of days or in terms of uncommitted units and personnel. It includes those mechanisms, equipment, and facilities necessary to produce and deliver those people and things over prolonged periods (normally associated with post-D-day measures).

(2) *Modernization.* The modernization guidance provides guidance on those tenants and capabilities identified in the Joint vision. This category will be given a high priority in our efforts to ensure qualitative superiority in technology. It provides acquisition approach guidance including the use of reduced cost advanced commercial technologies, products, and practices; research and development hedging strategies; judicious incorporation of advanced technologies into existing or new systems; and research and development cooperation with allies. It also provides guidance on increasing the efficiency of acquisition strategies; research, development, test, and evaluation procedures; the acquisition work force; industrial base policies; and supporting logistics systems.

(3) *Force structure.* This refers to the manpower and materiel resources of units/organizations tasked to perform missions in peace and war. It includes those units/organizations, which will activate, inactivate, or change during the planning/programming period.

(4) *Infrastructure.* In order to add to our efficiency and redirect our shrinking resources while maintaining high quality forces, infrastructure and overhead are examined in all program areas.

**d. Summary.** The DPG is the OSD guidance document for providing general policy and direction for program development. It is the link between planning and programming. The DPG is developed with input from the Services, Defense agencies, CJCS, and combatant commands and is published in the March/April timeframe every year. This document provides guidance for the development of a specific POM period. The guidance covers the entire six year period of the POM and concurrent two budget years. -(See Chapter 9 for a complete discussion of PPBS/PPBES.)

#### **4-14. The Army planning system**


##### **a. System overview.**

(1) The Army planning system is designed to meet the demands of JSPS, JROC/JWCA, JOPES, and PPBS. Through the JSPS and the JROC/JWCA processes, the Army provides its input to the documents, which present the advice of the CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the JCS and the CINCs, to the SecDef and the President.

(2) The Army planning system initiates the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) (Figure 4-5). (The Army has chosen to add an E to the process acronym to emphasize the execution phase.) This planning system addresses the development of defense policies and the military strategy for attainment of national security objectives and policies. It determines force requirements and objectives, and establishes guidance for the allocation of resources for the execution of Army roles and functions in support of national objectives. It provides the forum within which the Army conducts all planning, except operational (contingency) planning which is performed by the CINCs with CJCS guidance and Service assistance. Planning in the PPBES supports the planning phase of the DOD PPBS and the JSPS. It also provides guidance for the subsequent phases of the Army PPBES. Planning is defined as the continuing process by which the Army establishes and revises its goals or requirements and attainable objectives, chooses from among alternative courses of action, and determines and allocates its resources

(manpower and dollars) to achieve the chosen course of action. The value of comprehensive planning comes from providing an integrated decision structure for an organization as a whole.

(3) Adequate planning requires “causative thinking”—a way and means of making events happen to shape the future of an organization instead of adapting to a future that unfolds from “blind forces.” Planning is experimenting with ideas that represent the resources of an organization without risking those resources. It is designed to reduce risk by simplifying and ordering as much information as possible upon which to make a decision. It includes the development of options.




**Figure 4-5. Army Planning and PPBES Cycle**

(4) The Army planning system includes strategic planning and force planning for both requirements and objectives. Strategic planning is the development of national defense policy, national military objectives, and the National Military Strategy. Strategic planning provides direct support to the DOD PPBS and JSPS, while concurrently supporting the Army PPBES. These planning activities serve to guide the subsequent development of programs and budgets. Army planning includes the identification of the integrated and balanced military forces necessary to accomplish that strategy, and provision of a framework for effective management of DOD resources towards successful mission accomplishment consistent with national resource limitations.

(5) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) has primary ARSTAF responsibility for Army planning. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) is responsible for the development of threat estimates. ARSTAF functional proponents are each responsible for supporting this planning within their proponenty. This staff support is essential to ensure the accuracy of macro-level resource projections. Staff participation in Joint actions is also a major and continuous planning activity. The DCSOPS has the additional responsibility of Army Operations Deputy (OPSDEP) for assignment, review, coordination, and staff supervision of all joint actions in the ARSTAF. Each agency head is responsible, within the agency’s staff area of responsibility, for advising the CSA,

through the DCSOPS, on all matters of joint interest and necessary actions resulting from CJCS decisions.

(6) Army planning for the PPBES focuses on the policy and programming guidance determined during DPG development, and force and program recommendations established during NMS, JPD, and CPR development. The Army planning process provides the systematic means to develop guidance for program and budget development. Conceptually, this process is a generalized risk assessment management model that supports the senior leadership of the Army in decisions on resource allocation for the Army. Through this planning process known as total Army analysis (TAA), the Army determines force requirements and required force capabilities. The CSA, major commands, and Army component commanders of the combatant commands to develop their requirements use the resulting documents. A force requirement planning is conducted in order to translate JSPS and CJCS advice and recommendations and DOD guidance and objectives into Army terms (Figure 4-6).



**Figure 4-6. Army Force Requirements Planning**

#### **b. The Army Plan (TAP).**

(1) TAP has recently been revised in format and content. It now combines the planning horizon of the former TAP with that of the former Army long range planning guidance (ALRPG), resulting in a comprehensive single source planning document. TAP focuses primarily on the program years plus ten years. It presents comprehensive and cohesive strategic, mid-term planning, and programming guidance that addresses the Army's enduring core competency over the full sixteen year time period. The Army's core competency is currently defined as: Soldiers and leaders, and those who support them, prepared to conduct prompt and sustained operations throughout the entire spectrum of military operations in any environment that requires land force capabilities.

(2) TAP sets the azimuth and provides a focused and consistent theme for developing the program and budget. TAP starts with the enduring core competency (i.e., ends) and translates it into capabilities (i.e., ways for accomplishing the ends), which ultimately produce the program and budget (i.e., means). This systematic approach provides a coherent context for developing, explaining, and defending the Army's programs and budgets. Explaining the Army's budget effectively is essential to obtaining appropriations and authorizations that provide the means to move along the azimuth to the future.

(3) In order to accomplish the goals described above, TAP does the following:

(a) Outlines and integrates national security strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for the Army.

(b) Introduces mid-range planning objectives and capability requirements from long range plans.

(c) Links programming guidance to mid-range planning objectives and capabilities.

(d) Summarizes the existing view of the current force, the POM force, and the projected force ten years beyond.

(e) States the Army's priorities within expected resource levels.

(f) Provides early direction to programming and budgeting.

(4) In addition, the newly revised TAP possesses the following characteristics which set it apart from previous TAPs:

(a) A continuum from strategic direction, through planning capabilities, to programming guidance.

(b) A planning section that addresses operational capabilities, i.e., what the Army will require to achieve its core competency.

(c) Participation in working sessions at the two-star level in finalizing the strategic guidance, at the action officer level by Secretariat and ARSTAF planners in creating the operational capabilities-based planning guidance, and by the programmers in revising the programming guidance.

(5) The strategic guidance focuses on the long term and where the Army leadership wishes to go. The planning guidance describes the mid-term and the kinds of capabilities needed. The programming guidance addresses the near- to mid-term and how we get there from here. Common themes are shared from strategic guidance, through planning capabilities, to the programming means. TAP systematically links the guidance together through the common themes.

(6) TAP provides the primary guidance for developing the POM and for documenting the program and budget baseline. Equally important, it provides a common foundation for defending the Army program and budget. Finally, TAP provides a common starting point for all other Army strategic functional plans.

(7) TAP is organized into three principal sections. Section I, Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), provides strategic, long-term planning guidance to the rest of TAP, other Army strategic planning documents, and the Army as a whole. It replaces the ALRPG. ASPG provides the senior leadership's vision for the Army, derived from an in-depth assessment of the current and emerging geostrategic environments. The vision is a consensus of the Army operational and institutional capabilities required in the future and provides the overarching goals and objectives that must be attained. Within this vision is a general description of the transformation strategy and the enablers that will assist in achieving strategic goals and objectives.

(8) Section II, Army Planning Guidance, focuses on the ways of accomplishing the core competency. In order to do this, seven mission areas have been identified which reflect

the broad activities the Army will have to perform now and in the future. Mission areas are further organized into a series of operational tasks that identify the key objectives necessary to accomplish the missions. For each operational task, a series of operational capabilities, with performance standards, are identified. These focus on what it will take to accomplish the parent operational task (i.e., what capabilities are essential for accomplishing the objective).

(9) The combination of operational capabilities and performance standards will provide the programmers with information on what is required and how much of it is required from an operational point of view. Planners now have a process and a product for expressing operational requirements to programmers at the DA level.

(10) Section III, Army Programming Guidance Memorandum (APGM), maintains the continuum of guidance from strategic planning to mid-term planning, and finally to programming guidance. It provides the specific direction for building the POM and is described further in Chapter 9.

(11) In summary, TAP identifies capabilities to sustain the Army's core competency over the planning horizon. It relates the capabilities to DOD planning guidance and the Army's strategic planning. TAP provides programmers and budgeters with insights to consider alternative means and to relate their decisions to planning guidance.

**c. Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES).**

Another element of the Army planning system includes AMOPES. AMOPES provides the interface between combatant command plans for utilization and deployment of Army forces and Army plans for providing mobilized forces and resources. It also serves as the Army supplement to the JSCP. AMOPES Volume II provides guidance to Army Staff agencies, Army commands, and Army components of combatant commands for the employment and/or support of Army forces in the near-term period. It reflects specific tasks and capabilities attainable within existing programs and budget limitations. It also documents the Army forces available to execute contingency plans; presents the mobilization schedule and major combat forces together with planned availability for deployment of these forces; sets priorities for apportionment of combat support and combat service support units; presents joint strategic concepts; assigns tasks to commanders of major Army commands; provides personnel, intelligence, and logistics guidance; provides guidance for development of plans with and without mobilization; and provides guidance required to plan for mobilization of units and individuals to meet established force requirements in the event of the need to expand the Active Army. Refer to Chapter 6 for more detail on AMOPES.

## **SECTION IV THE FORCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS**

### **4-15. Process overview**


a. In studying force planning, it is necessary to understand the approach used within the DOD (including the Joint Staff and the Services) in determining the proper size forces the nation should have. This "force sizing" is an integral part of PPBES, which allocates limited resources and adheres to the PPBS schedule and discipline. As in all other aspects of the PPBES, the guidance received from OSD plays an important part. The JCS considers the

previous DPG, Presidential National Security Directives (NSD), and other pertinent policy information issued by the Administration when advice in the form of the NMS, JPD, and CPR is provided for the development of the DPG.

**b.** The force requirements process is not solely an Army process but rather is accomplished by all the Services, usually in concert with one another but sometimes unilaterally. It is a process inextricably linked with the DOD PPBS.

**c.** Force requirements must be based on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved. Consequently, this process begins with the articulation of national interests and objectives by the political leadership and the formulation of a NSD. Guided by the NSD, the CJCS develops a recommended NMS that is provided to the SecDef and to the President. Using the force levels contained in the NMS as a basis and taking into account the threat and, where appropriate, the externally-imposed constraints (dollars, manpower, equipment, industrial capacity, technology, etc.), the force design process is begun.

**d.** The evolution of the force results from a sequence of actions, which progressively refine initial estimates. Beginning with the force requirements contained in the NMS and progressing to the current force, one sees an increasingly detailed definition of force structure components and increasingly definitive resource guidance. As the resource constraints increase, the forces become progressively smaller and the amount of risk inherent in strategy execution increases (Figure 4-7).



**Figure 4-7. Force Development Stages**

**4-16. National military strategy force**

**a.** The force levels contained in the current version of the NMS were derived as a direct result of the Secretary of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in 1997 (Figure 4-8). In the past, force levels contained in the NMS were developed by the CJCS, with CINC and Service input, as a product of the JSR process. These former force levels were referred to as the "CJCS Fiscally Constrained Force".

- Minimum force necessary to carry out NMS at prudent military risk
- Developed through the QDR process
- Fiscally constrained
- Fully supported
- Fully structured
- Benchmark for assessing Program Force risk

#### Figure 4-8. NMS Force

b. The QDR represented the fourth comprehensive review of our military posture since the end of the Cold War, building upon the experience of the 1991 Base Force Review, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.

c. The QDR was required by the *Military Force Structure Review Act*, which was included as part of the *National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1997*. The DOD designed the QDR to be a fundamental and comprehensive examination of the nation's defense needs from 1997 to 2015, encompassing potential threats, strategy, force structure, readiness posture, military modernization programs, defense infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program. The QDR was intended to provide a blueprint for a strategy-based, balanced, and affordable defense program. The review was a collaborative effort between OSD and the Joint Staff, with extensive participation from the Services and the CINCs.

d. The strategy developed during the QDR contained three main elements: first, the ability to shape the international environment by promoting regional stability, preventing or reducing conflicts and threats, and deterring aggression and coercion on a day-to-day basis in key regions of the world; second, the need to respond quickly to the full spectrum of crises, from conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations to fighting and winning two major theater wars; and, third, the mandate to prepare now to meet the security challenges of an uncertain future and discourage prospective rivals from embarking on a military competition with the U.S. This strategy was the conceptual foundation of the review and QDR programmatic decisions.

e. The QDR assumed that defense spending would remain relatively constant for the foreseeable future. Therefore, it recommended some reductions in personnel strength and weapons programs. These reductions, combined with systemic improvements in the infrastructure, were viewed as necessary to meet the near-term requirements of shaping and responding, while at the same time meeting long-term modernization needs. Savings realized through reductions in force structure would be diverted to more robust research, development, and acquisition programs to provide the technology required to dominate future battlefields.

f. While the QDR indicated a need for some restructuring of the force and end strength reductions, it reaffirmed the need to retain ten active Army divisions, two active armored cavalry regiments, fifteen National Guard enhanced separate brigades, and the capability provided by "appropriately restructured" National Guard combat divisions. Major combat force levels were also prescribed for the other Services.

g. In the view of the Chairman and the other members of the JCS, the force levels recommended in the QDR were “the minimum necessary to carry out the [stated] strategy at prudent military risk”.

#### **4-17. Program Objective Memorandum (POM) force**

a. The POM force is based on the NMS force, and must be responsive to the OSD sizing and structuring scenario (Figure 4-9). In the case of the Army, using major combat forces established in the NMS force, extensive analysis is conducted to determine the achievable manning, equipment, and modernization levels for the major combat units. For the Army, once the NMS force has been determined (mission forces), the combat support and combat service support units (supporting forces) required to support the force in combat are determined using the TAA process. The TAA takes the major divisional and nondivisional combat forces of the NMS force and identifies (or develops) the necessary supporting forces required to support deployed major combat units. This provides a basis for examining trade-offs between types of units and assessing risk when shortfalls occur in the program. Considerable data are amassed on the contribution various units make towards the combat effectiveness of the Army, and these data are used in assessing trade-offs as the structure of the POM force is determined. (TAA is discussed in Chapter 5). Similarly, extensive analysis is conducted to determine the amount and location of stockpiles and other logistical functions that can be programmed to support the POM force. This information is also incorporated in the trade-off analysis.

- **Based on the NMS Force**
- **Responsive to OSD Sizing and Structuring Scenario**
- **Resource Constrained Based on OSD Projections**
- **Analysis Two to Six Years Into the Future**
- **Careful Balance Between Resource Availability and Force Capability**

**Figure 4-9. POM Force**

b. As a consequence of the numerous analyses mentioned, a POM force is determined which is a delicate balance between resource availability and force capability. A Service’s POM presents its programs for achieving objectives in the areas of forces, manpower, equipment, materiel acquisition, and logistic support within constraints specified by the SecDef.

#### **4-18. Budget force**

The budget force is that force and its associated capabilities which would be achieved if the budget requests were fully appropriated (Figure 4-10). The capabilities of the budget force are slightly less than the POM force, and it has an accordingly higher associated risk. The budget force is drawn from the first two years of the POM.

- Force and Its Associated Capabilities That Would Be Achieved If the Budget Were Fully Executed
- Drawn From the First Two Years of the Six Year Defense Program
- Less Capable Than the Program Force
- Accordingly Higher Risk Than the Program Force

**Figure 4-10. Budget Force**

#### **4-19. Current force**

The current force is that force and its associated capabilities that is in being today (Figure 4-11). It is the force that reflects real-time readiness conditions. The current force also represents the latest adjustments to the budget force based on congressional resource appropriations and command priorities and decisions. When more constraints are applied to it than the budget force, it manifests a different level of risk.

- Force and Its Associated Capabilities That Is In Being Today
- Reflects Real-Time Readiness Conditions
- Represents Latest Adjustments to the Budget Force Based On:
  - Congressional Resource Constraints
  - Command Priorities and Decisions
- May Be Less Capable Than the Budget Force
- Possible Higher Risk

**Figure 4-11. Current Force**

## **SECTION V**

### **THE JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES)**


#### **4-20. JOPES overview**

**a.** The objective of JOPES is the timely development of effective operation plans throughout the combatant commands. Through the use of uniform planning procedures and formats, JOPES facilitates CJCS review of operation plans, incorporates automatic data-processing techniques and interchange of data, standardizes operation plans, and provides for reporting any force shortfalls and limiting factors identified during the planning process.

**b.** JOPES establishes a comprehensive set of procedures to be used in both deliberate and crisis action planning of joint military operations and, to the extent possible, in combined operations. Planning in JOPES begins with the assignment of missions and publication of

other data to combatant commanders in the JSCP. The phases of deliberate planning under JOPES are (Figure 4-12)—

(1) *I.* Initiation Phase, in which planning tasks are assigned, forces and resources available for planning are identified, and initial planning assumptions are stated.



**Figure 4-12. JOPES Deliberate Planning**

(2) *II.* Concept Development Phase, in which all factors which can have a significant effect on mission accomplishment are collected and analyzed, the best course of action is determined, and the concept of operations is developed. The CINC’s strategic concept is submitted to the CJCS for approval. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), or a designated representative, reviews selected concepts.

(3) *III.* Plan Development Phase, in which force requirements are identified, the force list is structured, resupply and transportation requirements are determined, time-phased force deployment information are developed (not required for CONPLANS) and concept summaries), and all elements of the plan are documented in JOPES format and submitted for CJCS approval.

(4) *IV.* Plan Review Phase, in which all elements of the plan are assessed, validated, and approved by the CJCS for adequacy, acceptability, and joint doctrine. Again, the USD (P), or a designated representative, may review selected plans.

(5) *V.* Supporting Plans Phase, in which all required supporting plans are completed, documented, and validated.


#### **4-21. Crisis action planning**

a. When required during crisis action, execution planning is conducted as the traditional planning necessary to convert an OPLAN or CONPLAN into an operations order (OPORD) for the purpose of achieving timely military response for a specific situation. It is normally initiated by a CJCS alert order. A no-plan situation is one in which an OPLAN, CONPLAN, or concept summary does not exist. In this case, JOPES provides standardized procedures for crisis action planning.

**b.** Clearly, all aspects of an OPLAN are of interest to the participating Service(s). Some are singled out here since they impact so heavily on the Army’s force-structuring process and ultimate assignment of priorities for unit deployment and levels of readiness (Figure 4-13). It is during the plan development phase that the warfighting CINC’s time-phased force lists are provided by component/subordinate commanders to sequence the arrival of forces in accordance with the visualized concept of operations. Planning for deployment is the product of mission analysis and intelligence assessment and is keyed to the supported commander’s concept of operations. It is based on Joint and Service doctrine, guidance, review, and the availability of forces. While this planning is ultimately integrated by the supported joint commander or the CINC, the component commanders develop detailed lists of combat and support forces to be employed in accomplishing the assigned tasks, including the required closure time of forces (as specified in the supported commander’s concept of deployment) to be deployed to the area of operations. This phase concludes with the production of the supported commander’s time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). The TPFDD includes assigned forces, augmentation forces, resupply, replacements, and supporting forces, which are to be deployed to the area of operations and forces stationed within the area of operations.

**c.** The TPFDD is built by each warfighting CINC and refined in detail by various participants to ensure the feasibility and acceptability of the data. The TPFDD is then made accessible to planners throughout the joint military community on the Global Command and Control System (GCCS).

**d.** Closely related to planning for the major forces is determining the overall transportation and sustainment requirements with the proper sequencing to support the combat forces. This entails computation of support requirements based upon Service planning guidance and the time phasing of this support in accordance with the supported commander’s overall concept. Most critical to the process is the proper assignment of air or sea mode to time-phased requirements to ensure optimum use of mobility/transportation assets.



**Figure 4-13. Army Force Providers**


**e.** Another significant consideration of the whole process is the identification of shortfalls and associated risks. Coordination with and between all commands and agencies

concerned is essential to make the detailed adjustments necessary to resolve shortfalls or limiting factors. When a plan has been approved, subordinate and supporting commands and Services must update/modify force and resupply requirements and identify units in light of real-world asset availability/readiness. They must also consistently address the basic execution planning tasks: identification of forces required, designation of units, determination of movement requirements to include actual resupply, and planning the movements of forces and supplies. (See Chapter 6 for detailed discussion of JOPES.)

**4-22. Combatant commands**

a. Combatant commands provide for the integrated effectiveness of U.S. military forces in combat operations and for the projection of U.S. military power in support of U.S. national policies. They are established by the President through the SecDef with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. The chain of command extends from the President to the SecDef to the commanders of the combatant commands. Forces are assigned under the authority of the SecDef. This prevents any Service from unilaterally removing its forces, thereby undercutting the authority of these commanders. A combatant command is a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services. Combatant commanders have full combatant command (COCOM) of those forces assigned. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is the document that establishes the combatant commands.

b. The combatant commands and the command and communication relationships are indicated in Figure 4-14:



**Figure 4-14. Command and Communication Channels**

(1) U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is responsible for the defense of the eastern approaches to the United States and the lines of communication in the Atlantic area. USCINCFJCOM is also Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), a major NATO commander. Additionally, USJFCOM is responsible for joint force integration, providing most CONUS-based forces, and conducting joint force experiments to help operationalize the Joint vision.

(2) U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) is responsible for Southwest Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of Africa. CENTCOM will also be responsible for some of the countries of the former Soviet Union which border its current region.

(3) U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is responsible for the U.S. contribution to NATO and for commanding U.S. forces assigned to Europe. Its area of responsibility also includes six countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union, portions of the Middle East, most of the African states bordering on the Mediterranean, and Africa south of the Sahara. USCINCEUR is also Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), a major NATO commander, and as such is responsible for the defense of Allied Command Europe.

(4) U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) is responsible for defense of the United States from attacks through the Pacific Ocean, and for U.S. defense interests in the Pacific, Far East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean.

(5) U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) was established 23 September 1985. It is responsible for space operations in support of U.S. forces across all levels of conflict. USCINCSPACE supplies warning of ballistic missile attack, communications, navigation, positioning, and environmental support to U.S. military and selected government users. USCINCSPACE also controls military space launch and satellite on-orbit control operations. Additionally, USSPACECOM ensures the safety of U.S. satellites against attacks and initiates actions against foreign satellites to safeguard U.S. forces from attacks in space. USCINCSPACE, when designated as Commander-in Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command (CINCNORAD), is responsible for bi-national aerospace surveillance and warning, and atmospheric defense of North America.

(6) U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was established 16 April 1987. It exercises combatant command (COCOM) of all CONUS-based special operations forces (SOF). The missions of USSOCOM are to: prepare assigned forces to carry out special operations (SO), psychological operations (PSYOP), and civil affairs (CA) missions as required; plan for and conduct SO in support of United States national security objectives; provide SOF to other combatant commands when directed; and recommend to CJCS strategy and doctrine for joint employment of SOF. Major units include: Army special forces, rangers, special operations aviation, PSYOP, and CA units; Navy sea-air-land teams (SEALs) and special boat units; and Air Force special operations squadrons. USSOCOM is unique in that USCINCSOC is responsible for planning, programming, and budgeting for Major Force Program 11, Special Operations Forces.

(7) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) is responsible for the defense of the Panama Canal and fulfills our military responsibilities throughout the Latin American area, less Mexico. Its area of responsibility also includes the Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and islands located there.

(8) U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) established in 1987, is responsible for providing global air, land, and sea transportation to deploy, employ, and sustain military forces to meet national security objectives in peace and war. Its component commands are the Air Mobility Command (AMC), the Military Sealift Command (MSC), and the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

(9) U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) designated as a combatant command in May 1992, is responsible for worldwide strategic nuclear operations. U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy strategic nuclear assets are assigned to USSTRATCOM. The USCINCPACSTRAT billet rotates between the U.S. Air Force and Navy.

#### **4-23. Relationship of the Chairman of the JCS (CJCS) to CINCs**

The *Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986* specifies that the SecDef may assign to the CJCS responsibility for overseeing the activities of the combatant commands. The UCP directs that communications between the combatant commanders and the NCA shall be transmitted through the CJCS, unless otherwise directed by the President or SecDef. These two directives place the CJCS in a unique and pivotal position. However, such directives do not confer command authority on the CJCS and do not alter the responsibilities of the combatant commanders. Subject to the direction of the President, a combatant commander—

- a. Performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of the NCA.
- b. Responds directly to the NCA for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

## **SECTION VI SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

#### **4-24. Summary**

a. Joint planning is conducted under the supervision of the CJCS, in coordination with the Services and CINCs. The JSPS is oriented toward identifying and evaluating the threats facing the nation, looking at various times into the future. It provides the basis for formulating the nation's military strategy and resource needs in terms of forces and material. The PPBS is primarily concerned with resource allocation, which means it is primarily dollar and manpower oriented. The PPBS is primarily concerned with the acquisition of those resources necessary to meet the threat and to execute the strategy identified by the DPG. Cost is balanced against risk, with an objective assessment being provided by the CJCS in the CPA. The JSPS and JROC/JWCA process impact the PPBS starting with the planning and programming advice contained in the NMS, JPD, and CPR and through the assessment of the resulting POMs contained in the CPA.

b. JOPEP focuses on deliberate operation planning and crisis action planning, deployment, and execution. The JSCP translates the National Military Strategy into taskings and requires that plans be completed to accomplish tasked missions within available resources. The JSCP may be viewed as a capabilities planning document, which represents the last phase of resource management. The combatant commands are the main players in this activity. JOPEP is oriented on the most effective use of the nation's current military

capability against the near-term threat. The JSCP is the JSPS document that starts the deliberate planning process. The JSCP is the formal tie between JSPS and JOPES.

c. The details of planning change constantly. However, the overall procedure of identifying the threat, developing a military strategy, structuring forces to support the strategy, providing resources for priority requirements, and planning for the deployment of those forces to meet contingencies remains essentially the same from year to year.

d. Force planning is not a precise activity, even though the resulting force levels are stated precisely in terms of divisions, airwings, carriers, and the like. There are many uncertainties involved in force planning, and the procedures used in determining force levels, as well as the risks inherent with a particular force level, are judgmental in nature.

e. Force planning is complex and is characterized by an interrelated series of analyses to determine an affordable force. It begins by establishing the force requirements and accepts resource and time constraints to develop the Program, Budget, and Current Forces. Throughout this process, the key consideration is how to successfully execute the National Military Strategy and to keep risk at an acceptable level. Much analysis and time is spent in developing a force within resource constraints to execute that strategy. The JSPS, JROC/JWCA, JOPES, and PPBS are processes in place to guide force and operational planning into the 21st century.

#### 4-25. References

- a. National Military Strategy of the United States of America, *Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997.
- b. Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.
- c. Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.
- d. CJCS Instruction 3100.01A, *Joint Strategic Planning System*.
- e. CJCS Instruction 3137.01A, *The Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Process*.
- f. CJCS Instruction 5123.01, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council*.
- g. Army Regulation 1-1, *Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System*.
- h. Army Regulation 71-11, *Total Army Analysis*.
- i. Army Regulation 500-5, *Army Mobilization*.
- j. Field Manual 100-11, *Force Integration*.
- k. Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Pub 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997*.



# CHAPTER 5

## ARMY FORCE DEVELOPMENT

*"Most militaries do change, but in most cases, it is when wartime pressures, wartime setbacks force them into it... Today, we seek to change in a time of relative peace, in a time when our country enjoys economic prosperity, and a time when we have both a strategic perspective as a leading nation of the world, and also at a time when we the technological potential to do something about it... We do have a window of opportunity, and the Army is embarking on its most significant change in about a century."*

General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, Army

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 5-1. Force development

Force development takes the desired operational capability of the National Military Strategy (NMS) determines Army doctrinal, leader development, training, organizational, materiel and soldier development requirements, translates them into programs and structure, within allocated resources, to accomplish Army missions and functions. Force development brings together people and equipment, forms them into operational organizations to provide units with the desired capabilities for the combatant commander. Force development uses a phased process to translate organizational concepts based on technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources into combat capability. The force development process interfaces and interacts with the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

#### 5-2. Relationship to change

**a.** In the context of force development as part of the Army Organizational Life-Cycle Model, we need to understand change as a dynamic process. The elements for change are themselves changing and this fundamentally alters force development. Realizing the *Army Vision* Objective Force mandates that we manage the process of change. The pace of technological advances challenges our ability to envision objective force capabilities and the time required to change the primary long lead elements of the institution: doctrine, materiel, and organization.

**b.** The U.S. Army is a concept-based army that performs its mission within a framework of doctrine. Concepts generate questions and hypothesis about the future, while doctrine provides answers about today. Materiel changes require up to 15 years developing and fielding, organizational change requires 2-8 years, doctrine requires 2-4 years, and leader development and training follow changes in the other “drivers” by several years. For the

future Army to benefit from the synergism of the integrated doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldier systems (DTLOMS), we must work to shorten development and fielding times, and increase our ability to envision and conceive future warfighting capabilities.

c. This chapter explains the Army force development process (Figure 5-1). Force development is the initiating process of the organizational life cycle of the Army, and is the underlying basis for all other functions. It is a process that consists of defining military capabilities, designing force structures to provide these capabilities, and translating organizational concepts based on doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources into a trained and ready Army. The five-phased process includes:

- (1) Determine requirements.
- (2) Design organizations.
- (3) Develop organizational models.
- (4) Determine organizational authorizations.
- (5) Document organizational authorizations.




Figure 5-1. Force Development Process

### 5-3. Army force development process

The schematic framework of the force development process as part of the capstone force management process is displayed in the Army force management chart; Figure 2-3 in Chapter 2. This model reflects a system of systems, each of which provides an essential force integration function and, more importantly, how these functions relate to each other. In this network, the processes for determining warfighting requirements, conducting research and development (R&D), and providing resources all provide input to the force development

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process. The resulting products of force development, in turn, provide the basis for acquiring and distributing materiel and acquiring, training, and distributing personnel in the Army. It is useful to use the Army force management chart to visualize how each system relates to others and contributes to the accomplishment of each task.

**a. Determine requirements.** The force development process has its roots in the requirements generation process. The requirements generation process identifies the desired operational capability in terms of personnel, equipment, and unit structure. This process begins with national-level guidance (NMS, Joint vision, Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)), guidance from the Army's senior leadership (Army vision, The Army Plan (TAP)), joint warfighting concepts (such as rapid decisive operations, peace enforcement operations), and/or new materiel capabilities evolving from the research, development, and acquisition (RDA) process. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) assesses the future warfighting concepts through a series of analysis, testing, experimentation and studies to gain insights across DTLOMS domains. Using the integrated concept team (ICT) management technique, TRADOC pursues timely involvement of appropriate agencies/expertise to aggressively identify and work issues. TRADOC establishes objective force capabilities (OFCs) as the foundation upon which to base the assessment process. These critical, force-level, measurable statements of operational capability frame how the Army will realize advanced full spectrum operations as stated in the approved capstone concept. The OFCs focus the Army's Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP) and warfighting experimentation. As the transformation process unfolds, these force-level objective concepts will give rise to supporting proponent/branch future operational capabilities (FOC) included within subordinate concepts. This assessment process leads to a recommendation by the Commanding General (CG), TRADOC to Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) on how to best fulfill the warfighting requirement. If the capability requires a change in doctrine, training, or leader development TRADOC begins action to meet the requirement upon approval of HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS). If the analysis results in a need for change in soldier occupational specialty structure, then the recommendation goes forward to HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) for action. If the required capability needs a materiel solution, TRADOC prepares a materiel requirements document (MRD) and forwards it to HQDA DCSOPS for consideration by the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC). Warfighting concepts requiring organizational solutions move to the next phase of force development.

**b. Design organizations.** As the organizational conceptual requirements begin to clarify, the force development process begins to design organizations. The combat development community develops the proposed organization, and its mission and functions, to meet the required operational capabilities. Organizational solutions to OFCs are captured in a unit reference sheet (URS) in sufficient detail to support Army force design initiatives, and related studies and analyses. After the design has been developed, laid out and analyzed by TRADOC, it moves forward to HQDA in the force design update (FDU). Once approved, this design will be further refined into an organizational model known as a table of organization and equipment (TOE).

**c. Develop organizational models.** The Requirements Documentation Directorate (RDD), U. S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) applies rules, standards, and guidance to the doctrinally correct design to produce the organizational model,

a requirements document, and the definition of a fully mission-capable organization (i.e. an unresourced TOE).

**d. Determine organizational authorizations.** After HQDA approves the TOE, the desired unit enters into the resourcing phase of force development where the organizational model competes for resources in the total Army analysis (TAA) process. The TAA takes into account force guidance and resource availability to produce a balanced and affordable force structure. It determines and/or verifies the affordability, supportability, and executability of the organizational model.

**e. Document organizational authorizations.** After approval of the resourced force structure by Army leadership, USAFMSA manages the process of documentation of the decision. This process results in organizational authorizations documented as modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) or tables of distribution and allowance (TDA).

## **SECTION II**

### **PHASE I—DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS**

#### **5-4. Requirements determination**

Requirements determination begins the Army force development process. Traditionally, that process has fostered competition among DTLOMS domains to develop feasible solutions or to improve the operational shortcomings in the force.

**a.** In recent history, due to leap-ahead technology advances, materiel system solutions captured more attention than changes to doctrine, training/leader development, or organizations thereby creating a potential imbalance or inefficiency in correcting warfighting capability deficiencies. It was felt that the Army should first seek alternative solutions, mainly because of the associated cost and timesaving advantages over materiel development programs.

**b.** TRADOC has the mission to chart the course for the Army to follow to achieve the objective force. Significant aspects of how TRADOC approaches this challenge are:

**(1)** A holistic approach to determine requirements based on desired Joint and Army warfighting capabilities versus known deficiencies. This approach must consider the full spectrum of Army operations and functions. This is a substantial change from the previous emphasis on Army deficiencies against a single, well-defined threat.

**(2)** Focus on requirements as a change to any DTLOMS domain, with materiel being the least desirable domain to change because of acquisition costs and schedules.

**(3)** Requirement of a multidisciplinary team effort. The establishment of ICT will provide that disciplined team effort.

**(4)** Cost as an independent variable (CAIV) was introduced to insure the preferred solution includes an affordable life cycle cost. The Army cannot expect performance at any cost or have everything it wants. CAIV will not, however, preclude consideration of a new, high potential, leap-ahead technology (often referred to as a “potential silver bullet”).

### 5-5. Requirements determination process

The Army continually upgrades and changes the way it fights so it can maintain battlefield superiority over all adversaries and can achieve complementary capabilities with other services and other nations. Requirements are determined holistically and are driven by warfighting concepts focused on the future and on experimentation in our battle labs that will provide us insights to discern viable requirements.

### 5-6. The vision

**a. Joint Vision.** The requirements determination process begins when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) issues a Joint vision that provides a conceptual overview of the armed forces for the future. The Joint vision establishes the initial conceptual template for how the forces will channel the vitality of their people and leverage their technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.

**b. Joint concept.** The concept for future joint operations (CFJO) serves as the joint concept document. The CFJO is a rudimentary, abstract description of a desired goal as the CJCS looks at the future battlefield. The CFJO expands the Joint vision's new concepts to provide a more detailed foundation for follow-on capabilities assessments. The CFJO also helps concept developers identify joint desired operational capabilities (JDOCs) and joint future operational capabilities (JFOCs). America's armed forces must be able to shape the strategic environment to prevent war, respond when deterrence fails, and begin now to prepare for an uncertain and challenging future. Toward those ends, the CFJO considers future joint operations in the context of the broad range of challenges anticipated.

**c. U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) concepts.** The Secretary of Defense (SecDef), in the Joint Warfighting Experimentation Charter, directed the Commander, JFCOM to develop concepts that will provide Joint Staff (JS) guidance to the military. The JFCOM staff has initiated the development of concepts that provide a more detailed view of the CFJO. JFCOM is working through the creation of two categories of subordinate concepts: integrating and supporting.

**d. Transformation to the objective force.** Today, *The Army Vision* provides the broad direction for the transformation of the Army to meet the exceptional challenges of our changing national security environment. *The Army Vision* states the way ahead for transforming our Army as an abstract description of a desired goal and it integrates the Joint vision and Army requirements to accomplish the Army role in that vision. It is influenced by national security and military strategies, with science and technology (S&T) providing a frame of reference. It is a conceptualization that integrates and leverages information technology, redesigns the tactical forces, and re-engineers institutional forces while retaining legacy warfighting capability, by divesting in the near term, while organizing and equipping to operate in the far term. At the same time, *The Army Vision* seeks to develop future capabilities to achieve an end state of an Army that operates across the full spectrum of military operations. The three major thrusts of its focus are depicted in Figure 1-1. The Transformation Campaign Plan captures the details of how we will implement *The Army Vision* across the force.


## 5-7. Army warfighting concepts

**a. Capstone concept.** TRADOC translates the vision into a capstone concept. This still abstract, but much more detailed description of future operations is published in TRADOC Pam 525-5, *Advanced Full-Spectrum Operations*. HQ TRADOC forms an ICT to develop the capstone concept. The ICT comprises members from TRADOC, U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC), other Army commands, HQDA, other military Services, academia, industry, and others—taking advantage of the synergy of the group to translate the commander’s vision into the next level of detail. The capstone concept reflects direct linkage to the NMS, DPG, the Joint vision, TAP, and other documents. In this context, the capstone concept becomes the primary guide for all other Army concept development.

**b. Objective force capabilities (OFCs).** TRADOC establishes OFCs, as measurable force-level statements of operational capability upon which to base the assessment process. OFCs will form the basis for conducting analyses to define and refine requirements across the full spectrum of operations throughout the transformation period. The OFCs focus the ASTMP and warfighting experimentation. They are identified and consolidated in TRADOC Pam 525-66, *Objective Force Capability*, that serves as the control mechanism for requirements determination activities and will provide a cross-reference for all capabilities concepts. All warfighting requirements must have linkage through an OFC to an approved subordinate concept supporting the capstone concept and *The Army Vision*.

**c. Army subordinate concepts.** Because the capstone concept provides a macro-level description of the future Army, it must be enabled by more detailed subordinate concepts, called integrating and supporting concepts. Integrating concepts address requirements in multiple operational environments, whereas supporting concepts amplify a specific function or describe how to employ a system or conduct a task. These concepts further refine the basis for studies, experimentation, analyses, simulations, and testing leading to the determination of DTLOMS solutions to achieve desired capabilities. Army school commandants and center commanders use the ICT approach to develop the integrating and supporting concepts for FOCs.

**d. Future operational capabilities (FOCs).** FOCs are proponent/branch level structured statements of operational capability required by the Army to achieve its goals as stated in approved capstone and subordinate concepts. Currently, they translate the desired capabilities described in *Joint Vision 2020* and *The Army Vision* into the Army’s operational concept for full spectrum operations. FOCs bridge near term force capabilities with the Army’s Objective Force development process. FOCs focus research, provide a clear hypothesis for test and experimentation, and lead to the balanced development of solution sets in DTLOMS. FOCs must be stated in sufficient detail to allow measurement of success and to prioritize resources, thus encouraging materiel and combat developers to pursue only relevant technology applications to DTLOMS domains. Figure 5-2 depicts this process.




**Figure 5-2. Army Concept Development**


### 5-8. Experimentation, simulation and analysis

Warfighting experiments, simulations and analysis are key to the requirements determination process. When properly planned and executed, warfighting experiments, simulations and analysis give the Army an unsurpassed means to understand future warfighting capabilities requirements. Progressive and interactive mixes of constructive, virtual, and live experiments combined with operational experience and appropriate analysis yield insights to better define not only warfighting concepts but also requirements across the spectrum of DTLOMS. Modern simulations allow the Army to look at current and future force capabilities and compare the contributions of alternative solutions. The Army S&T program determines the warfighting value of individual efforts of material developers relative to OFCs (Figure 5-3). For more detail on Army S&T see Chapter 11.

**a. Battle labs.** Battle labs were formed to help refocus the force, experiment with new methods for determining new requirements and to develop capabilities for future warfighting concepts. The principal role of the battle labs of the future will be to plan for and conduct warfighting experiments in support of the requirements determination process (Figure 5-4).



**Figure 5-3. Requirements Determination Process**



**Figure 5-4. Battle Labs**

(1) There are four main categories of warfighting experiments; concept experiments, limited objective experiments (LOEs), advanced warfighting experiments (AWEs), and joint warfighting experiments (JWEs). The overwhelming majority are warfighting concept experiments pertaining to individual operations and branches.

(2) Battle labs create an institutional link between emerging technologies and warfighting ideas (concepts) to foster the intellectual leap from the technologically plausible

to the development of warfighting requirements and attainment of warfighting capabilities. Battle lab information supports HQ TRADOC's input to develop and revise the Army modernization plan (AMP), and the ASTMP.

**b. Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP).** The ASTMP is a strategic plan for the technology base, which synthesizes national, Department of Defense (DOD), and Army top-down guidance to the S&T community. The ASTMP provides an underpinning concept and a vision of future constraints by applying realistic funding limits. ASTMP is a vital link between DOD technology objectives, planning, and force modernization efforts. It provides a road map of how Army R&D funds support the AMP. It lists Army S&T objectives and advanced technology demonstrations.

**c. Army modernization plan (AMP).** The AMP, produced by HQDA Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (ODCSPRO), is the link to the resourcing process out of the materiel requirements determination process. This key document articulates the Army's modernization vision for the future force. It translates vision into a strategy for near-to-mid-modernization of the Army. The AMP sets the foundation for programs and modifications further defined in the research, development, and acquisition plan (RDAP) to compete for resourcing in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).

## 5-9. DTLOMS requirements

Requirements assessment and determination occurs in the sequence: doctrine, training, leader development, organization, soldiers and materiel. (D-T-L-O-S-M) based on expense and timeliness to field a capability. TRADOC Pam 71-9 outlines the process.

**a. Link to the doctrine development process.** Doctrine evolves as a body of thought that consolidates the Army's collective wisdom regarding past, present, and future. Doctrinal publications capture how the Army fights and conducts operations. Doctrine reflects an application of required and attainable capabilities for fighting on today's battlefield. TRADOC Regulation 25-32, The Doctrine and Literature Master Plan (DLMP), includes tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that provide branch chiefs and proponents, the "how" of doctrine focus. Branch chiefs and proponents, provide to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine, HQ TRADOC, a detailed, prioritized description of near-term to far-term required doctrine capabilities. The development of both concept and doctrine is restricted by the executable and the imaginable. Technology can provide capabilities that then drive concept and doctrine.

**b. Link to the training/leader development process.** Training/leader development capabilities identified will be evaluated at every stage of the process, ensuring that the combined arms training strategy (CATS) interfaces with the requirements determination process. System training device requirements are incorporated into the specific system management decision packages (MDEP) and applicable AMP annexes. Training and leader development requirements identified by branch chiefs and proponent assessments are provided to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training, HQ TRADOC. For more detail see Chapter 15, Army Training.

**c. Link to the organizational development process.** Organizational capabilities required are identified through branch chiefs' and proponents' continuous assessments on how to meet combatant commander requirements. The FDU process ensures the integration

of force planning with all other force development issues that are then prioritized in the TAA process to meet overall Army force program requirements. This chapter explores this process in detail in later sections.

**d. Link to the soldier and human resource management process.** Changes in organizations and structure change the requirements placed upon the systems that recruit, retain, and manage military personnel. Manpower managers deal with human resource requirements from the perspective of the organizational structure in which they will be most efficiently and economically used. For more detail see Chapters 13 and 14.

**e. Link to the materiel development process.** A materiel solution begins only when the operational capability cannot be achieved through the other domains of DTLOMS. The experimentation, simulation, and analysis process refines the materiel solution. These analyses continue into the Concept and Technology Development Phase of the materiel acquisition life cycle and have residual effect out to the Milestone C – Low Rate Initial Production decision. The documented results of these analyses support the mission need statement (MNS), the analysis of alternatives (AoA), the development of the operational requirements document (ORD) and structuring the acquisition program baseline (APB). The AoA determines operational effectiveness and costs for all alternatives by looking at the relative contribution each alternative makes to force effectiveness. The AoA also identifies trade-offs among cost, performance and schedule. Materiel solutions are examined in an organizational context and can drive changes to organizations, soldier skills, leader skills, and training requirements as well as sustainment and logistics support requirements. Requirements for new materiel emerging from the requirements determination process follow the DOD, CJCS and army guidance for development of materiel operational requirements documents. For more detail see Chapter 11.

### **SECTION III PHASE II—DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS**

#### **5-10. Organization design**

Organizational requirements are derived from the continuous assessments conducted by the branches and functional proponents to identify whether a new or modified organization is required on tomorrow's battlefield. Once identified, organizational requirements then are documented through a series of connected and related development processes: URS development; FDU process; TOE development; basis-of-issue plan (BOIP) development, and TAA. Every process may not always be required before organizational changes are made to the force structure.

#### **5-11. The organization design process**

**a.** Organizations have their beginnings in warfighting concepts that are connected to the overarching concept. They provide the basis for the proposed organization and address a unit's mission, functions, and required capabilities. The combat developers at TRADOC proponent schools, the Army Medical Department Center and School (AMEDDC&S), and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) develop new designs or correct deficiencies in existing organizations by developing branch or functional concepts. The TRADOC Commander is responsible for the integration and approval of the concepts

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developed by the respective proponent school. Branch/ functional concepts normally address:

- Missions, functions, capabilities, and limitations.
- Command and control linkages.
- Individual, collective, and leader training requirements.
- Sustainment; both in field and garrison.
- Doctrinal impacts.
- Impacts on materiel programs.

**b.** Organizational solutions to meet desired capabilities require the development of a URS. The URS ultimately leads to a TOE. The URS can be likened to a rendering or architectural drawing of the new or changed organization. It does not show every “nut and bolt” but it must contain sufficient data about a unit’s personnel and equipment to be used to support Army force design initiatives and related studies and analyses. Personnel and equipment should be developed as accurately as possible and refined throughout the process. The URS must contain the proposed personnel requirements by job title, grade and quantity. It must include major equipment requirements to include nomenclature and quantity, and a breakout of the organization elements with related personnel and equipment requirements. Also included is a summary that captures other relevant data such as unit title, design description, mission, assignment, tasks, assumptions, limitations, mobility requirements, and concept of operations.

#### **5-12. The force design update (FDU)**

**a.** The organization proponent (the service school commandant) forwards the design to the Force Design Directorate (FDD) of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments (DCSCD) at HQ TRADOC for entry into the FDU process.

**b.** The FDU is a semi-annual process used to develop consensus within the Army on new organizations and changes to existing organizations and to obtain approval and implementation decisions (Figure 5-5). FDU issues are organizational solutions to desired capabilities and other improvements to existing designs in which other doctrine, training, leader development, or soldier solutions were insufficient. The FDU process is not a resourcing tool, however it may have impacts in other DTLOMS domains. The FDU serves as the link between the development of the URS and the development of the TOE. During the FDU process the URS is staffed throughout the Army to include the Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) and other major Army commands (MACOMs). HQDA makes force structure implementation (resourcing/prioritization) decisions. Force design issues that do not have an offset within current force structure will go through a HQDA level force feasibility review (FFR). FFR is an event driven forum that reviews force structure issues and the impacts of force structure decisions. The ARSTAF analyzes the force, to assure it is affordable, supportable and sustainable. At the macro level, within the limits of personnel and budgetary constraints, the FFR determines if the force can be manned, trained, equipped, sustained, and stationed. The FFR may provide alternatives based on prior initiatives, unalterable decisions from the Army leadership or program budget decisions (PBDs). The FFR can result in one of three decisions. HQDA can decide to implement the change and find resources, return it to TRADOC for further analysis, or prioritize the issue for resourcing in the next TAA.

Depending on the sensitivity, visibility, or resource impacts of an organization design/FDU issue the implementation decision may go to the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) or Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) for approval.




Figure 5-5. Force Design Update (FDU)

**SECTION IV  
PHASE III—DEVELOP ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS**

**5-13. TOE and BOIP developers**

a. Organizations designed in the preceding phase become the start point for the next phase. Following approval of the URS during the FDU process, the design is handed-off to the USAFMSA for documentation as a TOE. The USAFMSA, RDD develops TOEs and BOIPs codifying the input from the URS basic design.

b. TOEs and BOIPs are developed using an Army-wide development system and database called the Requirements Documentation System (RDS). A successor system to RDS called the Force Management System – Requirements (FMS-R) is currently undergoing development. The prototype is scheduled to be operational during calendar year 2001. FMS-R will feature a relational database and many rule-based automated assists to capitalize on available technology to improve and standardize the development processes. FMS-R is the first part of an overarching automation system development project that will ultimately replace the existing systems for developing, documenting, accounting, and managing requirements and authorizations. This new Force Management System (FMS) will become the Army’s single database for requirements and authorizations information.

c. Although the organization design phase and organization model development phase are depicted as separate processes, they are closely related and often conducted very nearly concurrently. The proponent organization designers and the USAFMSA TOE developers work closely to ensure that the designs reflect requirements consistent with doctrine and policy and include all the elements necessary to provide an organization fully capable of accomplishing its doctrinal mission. The approved organization design should capture personnel and equipment requirements as accurately and completely as possible.

#### **5-14. TOE description**

a. A TOE prescribes the doctrinal mission, required structure, and mission essential wartime manpower and equipment requirements for several levels of organizational options for a particular type unit. These organizational options provide models for fielding a unit at full or reduced manpower authorizations if resource constraints so mandate. A TOE also specifies the capabilities (and limitations or dependencies) the unit has to accomplish its mission.

b. TOEs are the basis for developing authorization documents and are a vital input for determining Army resource requirements for use by force managers. In addition, these unit models establish increments of capability for the Army to develop an effective, efficient, and combat-ready force structure.

c. The TOE is a collection of related records in the RDS database. There are a variety of records to include narrative information, personnel requirements, equipment requirements, paragraph numbers and titles, and changes in the form of BOIP records to name a few. A TOE consists of base TOE (BTOE) records, related BOIP records, and an incremental change package (ICP) header.

d. A TOE is normally developed in three levels of organization based on the manpower requirements necessary to achieve the following percentage levels: 100 percent (level 1) (minimum essential wartime requirement), 90 percent (level 2), and 80 percent (level 3). Equipment quantities for levels 2 and 3 are equal to level 1 except for individual equipment such as protective masks, bayonets, individual weapons, and tool kits issued to mechanics and repairers. Quantities of these individual equipment items are adjusted to correspond to personnel strength levels. As TOE level 1 is the wartime requirement, it is what is reflected in the "required" column of the authorization document (MTOE). TOE levels 2 and 3 are provided as models of a balanced organization available for use during the processes of determining and documenting authorizations. TOEs provide a standard method for documenting the organizational structure of the Army.


e. FDU decisions, branch proponent input, and MACOM issues, along with force design guidance, developed during capabilities analyses, provide TOE developers with recommended TOE additions/modifications. The missions and probable areas of use of a unit are provided by policy and doctrine. Policy includes guidance, procedures, and standards, in the form of regulations, on how to develop TOEs. Policy published in the DA PAM 611-21 also contains standards of grade (SG), duty titles, and guidance for occupational identifiers (area of concentration (AOC), military occupational specialty (MOS), skill identifier (SI), special qualification identifier (SQI), and additional skill identifier (ASI)) used in the development of requirements documents. Doctrine describes

how each type of unit will perform its functions and details the mission and required capabilities.

f. TOE developers consider the unit mission and required capabilities when applying equipment utilization policies, manpower requirements criteria (MARC), standards of grade (SG), and BOIPs, to develop the proper mix of equipment and personnel for an efficient organizational structure. Resource constraint guidance is considered during the development of draft TOEs to ensure that a unit organized using a BTOE can perform its mission using resources available in the inventory.

**5-15. Incremental TOE system**

The Army uses an incremental TOE system that reflects personnel and equipment modernization over time that reflects how the Army actually conducts its organizational and force modernization business. The incremental TOE system illustrates enhancements to the capabilities or increases to the productivity of an organizational model through the by application of related doctrinally sound personnel and equipment changes (BOIPs) packaged in separately identifiable ICPs. This process is illustrated in Figure 5-6. The incremental TOE begins with a doctrinally sound BTOE and, through the application of ICPs, can provide a series of intermediate TOEs (ITOE) up through a fully modernized objective TOE (OTOE). The TOE is the basis for force programming and becomes an authorization document (MTOE) when resources, specific unit designations, and effective dates for the activation or reorganization are approved at HQDA. The incremental TOE system consists of the following components:



**Figure 5-6. Modernization Over Time (Resource Driven)**

**a. Base TOE (BTOE).** The BTOE is an organizational model design based on doctrine and equipment currently available. It is the least modernized version of a type of organization and identifies mission-essential wartime requirements (MEWR) for personnel and equipment.

**b. Incremental change package (ICP).** An ICP is a doctrinally sound grouping of related personnel and equipment change documents (BOIPs) that is applied to a BTOE or ITOE to provide an enhanced capability, increased productivity, or modernization that results in a new ITOE or an OTOE.

**c. ICP header.** The ICP header is a listing of all ICPs for a specific type of organization in the sequence of intended application. It depicts a unit's doctrinal modernization path (MODPATH). The MODPATH is standardized by unit type.

**d. Intermediate TOE (ITOE).** The ITOE is a transition TOE that results from applying one or more ICPs to a BTOE (or to an ITOE) to produce an enhanced capability. ITOEs form the bridge between BTOE and OTOE and provide the primary tool for programming, executing, standardizing, and documenting the force structure during phased modernization.

**e. Objective TOE (OTOE).** The OTOE is a fully modernized, doctrinally sound organizational model design achieved by applying all DA-approved ICPs. The OTOE sets the goal for planning and programming of the Army's force structure and supporting acquisition systems.

#### **5-16. TOE review and approval**

**a.** The TOE development and revision process is controlled by the annual Army TOE development plan (ATDP). A draft plan is prepared by USAFMSA and submitted to HQDA (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS)) for review and approval. The HQDA approved plan identifies specific TOEs to be developed or updated during a six-month period.

**b.** A TOE in the revision, development, or staffing process and not yet DA approved is called a draft TOE (DTOE). DTOEs are reviewed by USAFMSA and coordinated with appropriate commands, agencies, and activities during an area-of-interest (AOI) review. After AOI review USAFMSA makes final changes prior to the responsible ODCSOPS organization integrator (OI) presenting the DTOE to Director, Force Management for approval. Following approval, the DTOE status is changed to "DA approved" in the RDS database. It will subsequently be included in the consolidated TOE update (CTU) file.

**c.** TOEs are scheduled for revision in the ATDP to accommodate changes in doctrine, introduction of new or improved equipment, or to incorporate more effective organizational designs. Development of new TOEs is scheduled to accommodate requirements for new organizations. If a TOE is not scheduled for revision or replacement by a new TOE, it will normally be scheduled for cyclic review every three years.

#### **5-17. Consolidated TOE update**

BOIPs and TOEs, or changes thereto, are published once a year in the CTU file distributed by USAFMSA-RDD. Information from this file is used by USAFMSA Authorizations

Documentation Directorate (ADD) to update the requirements information contained in authorization documents for tactical units (MTOE), and to refine planning and program data for the future fielding of new equipment.

**5-18. Basis-of-issue plan (BOIP)**

**a.** A BOIP is a requirements document that states the planned placement of new or improved items of equipment and personnel in TOEs at 100 percent of wartime requirements. It reflects quantities of new equipment and associated support items of equipment and personnel (ASIOEP), as well as equipment and personnel requirements that are being replaced or reduced. In addition to its use for TOE development/revision, it is used by HQDA for logistics support and distribution planning for new and improved items entering the Army supply system. Materiel developers (MATDEVs) (program executive officers (PEOs)/program managers (PMs), AMC, and USASOC communities) use it as input for concept studies, life cycle cost estimates, and trade-off analyses during the system development and demonstration phase of the R&D process.

**b.** A BOIP provides personnel and equipment changes required to introduce a new or modified item into Army organizations. The development of a BOIP can play an integral part in TOE development. A BOIP is developed to place a new or substantially changed materiel item into organizations along with associated equipment and personnel to maintain and operate it as specified in the ORD and the basis-of-issue feeder data (BOIPFD).

**c.** BOIPFD, prepared by the MATDEV, contains a compilation of organizational, doctrinal, training, duty position, and personnel information that is incorporated into the BOIP. The information is used to determine the need to develop or revise military occupational specialties and to prepare plans for the personnel and training needed to operate and maintain the new or improved item. The BOIPFD also forms the basis for the operator and maintainer (O/M) decision. The O/M decision is the responsibility of PERSCOM. The BOIP process begins when the MATDEV receives an approved and resourced ORD. The project manager and/or MATDEV develops BOIPFD, then obtains a developmental line item number (ZLIN) and standard study number (SSN) from AMC.

**d.** The BOIPFD is submitted via the Total Asset Visibility (TAV) system to USAFMSA where the information is reviewed for accuracy, continuity, and completeness prior to the formal development of the BOIP. During staffing, the training impacts associated with the BOIP equipment and the associated personnel requirements are developed. If the O/M decision includes an occupational identifier (AOC, SI, MOS, SQI, or ASI), the personnel proponent must prepare a proposal per AR 611-1 for submission to PERSCOM to revise the military occupational classification and structure. USAFMSA requests TDA requirements for new or modified items from the MACOM and TDA requirements are entered into the BOIP at UIC level. It should be noted that BOIPs are not developed for TDA-only equipment. When the BOIP is complete, it is submitted to DA for approval. The systems integrator (SI) is responsible for HQDA staffing and for presenting the BOIP to the Director, Force Management in the Office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans -- Force Management (OADCSOPS-FM) for approval. USAFMSA publishes approved BOIPs in the CTU released in April of each year.

e. There may be several iterations of the BOIP: an initial BOIP, developed during system development and demonstration, and amended BOIPs, which are based on updated information provided by the MATDEV as required. A BOIP may be amended at any time during system development and fielding when new or changed information becomes available.

## **SECTION V**

### **PHASE IV—DETERMINE ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS**

#### **5-19. Determining organizational authorizations**

a. The fourth force development phase, determining organizational authorizations, provides the mix of organizations, resulting in a balanced, and affordable force structure. Force structuring is an integral part of the OSD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the JSPS. It is the resource-sensitive process portrayed in the Provide Resources section of the Army Force Management Chart at Figure 2-3. It develops force structure in support of joint, strategic, and operational planning and Army planning, programming, and budgeting. The development of a force is based on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved, threats, and externally imposed constraints (e.g., dollars, end strength, roles, and missions).

b. The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process, not all of which is exclusively within the purview of the Army. The NMS describes the strategic environment, develops national military objectives, and describes the military capabilities required to execute the strategy. The NMS also addresses the force structure requirements for the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Special Operations Command, and Reserve Components (RC). The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report addresses the total force required to implement the President's national security strategy and the supporting NMS at prudent military risk.


c. The SecDef provides policy, articulates strategic objectives and the National Military Strategy, and provides force and resource guidance to the Services, other DOD agencies, and to the combatant commanders through the DPG. Based on the DPG, the Services prepare their POM. For the Army, the DPG directs the number and type of major units such as corps and divisions, and an end-strength constraint. With additional information provided on separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments and Special Forces groups, this guidance identifies the "operating forces." The DPG further defines the major theater wars (MTWs) and small scale contingencies (SSC) the Army must address, identified in the illustrative planning scenarios (IPS).

d. The NMS, DPG and QDR constitute some of the JCS/DOD directives and constraints imposed upon Army force structure. TAP, the principal Army guidance for development of the Army program objective memorandum (POM) submission, articulates the CSA and SA translation of the JCS/DOD guidance to all Services into specific direction to the ARSTAF and MACOMs for the development of the Army POM, and the TAA process. The TAP, a HQDA ODCSOPS document, defines the types and quantities of units within the "operating forces." The TAA process validates the Army's combat requirements (MTOE), generates the Army's support requirements (MTOE), and captures the Army's generating force

requirements (TDA), and resources the force (MTOE & TDA, all components). TAA develops the echelons above division/echelons above corps (EAD/EAC) combat (CBT), combat support (CS), combat service support (CSS) and TDA force structure, referred to as “generating” forces, required to support the “operating” force structure. TAA then resources the requirements based on Army leadership directives, written guidance, risk analysis, and input from the CINCs day-to-day requirements. The resulting force structure is the POM force, forwarded to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) with a recommendation for approval. When Congress approves the budget, all approved units are programmed in the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and documented in The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS) (Figure 5-7).

**5-20. Total Army analysis (TAA)**

a. TAA is the acknowledged and proven mechanism for explaining and defending Army force structure. It takes us from the Army of yesterday to the Army of the future. It requires a doctrinal basis and analysis; flowing from strategic guidance; and joint force requirements. TAA is a biennial process initiated during even-numbered years. The purpose of TAA is to define the required “generating” forces, necessary to support and sustain the DPG “operating” forces. The determination of the size and content of the Army force structure is an iterative, risk-benefit, trade-off analysis process. The POM force, the force recommended and supported by resource requests in the Army POM, as part of the future years defense program (FYDP), is developed during the TAA process. TAA determines the force for each program year. It has Army wide participation, including CSA decision and SA approval.



**Figure 5-7. NMS to MTOE**

b. The TAA principal products are:

- The Army's total warfighting requirements.
- The defined, required support forces (EAD/EAC).
- The force resourced against requirements and budgetary constraints.
- Army structure (ARSTRUC).message

- The initial POM force.
- c. TAA objectives are to:
  - Develop, analyze, determine and justify a POM force, aligned with the DPG and TAP. The POM is that force projected to be raised, provisioned, sustained, and maintained within resources available during the FYDP.
  - Provide analytical underpinnings for the POM force for use in dialogue among Congress, OSD, JS, CINCs and the Army.
  - Assess the impacts of plans and potential alternatives for materiel acquisition, the production base, and equipment distribution programs on the projected force structure.
  - Assure continuity of force structure requirements within the PPBS and PPBES.
  - Provide program basis for structuring organizational, materiel, and personnel requirements and projected authorizations.

### **5-21. The TAA process**

TAA supports the fourth force design phase that determines the mix of organizations that comprise a balanced and affordable force structure.

**a.** TAA is the resource sensitive process that executes the decisions of the OSD, the DOD PPBS, directives and initiatives of the JS, and the Army PPBES. TAA serves as the bridge between OSD/JS guidance and the Army's planning and program building processes, balancing the Army's force structure requirements (manpower and equipment) against available and planned resources. The Army's strategic roles must support the NMS. These roles have a major impact on the shaping of the Army. Therefore, TAA develops a force that meets the NMS, defeats the threat, within the defined scenarios, under the established dollar constraints, and fulfills all the roles and missions listed, within the parameters of congressional oversight and guidance.


**b.** Additionally, the TAA process is the means to transition from the planning phase to the programming phase within the Army's PPBES, assisting in determining, verifying and justifying Army requirements, while assessing force capabilities. The TAA process is flexible and responsive to dynamic changes. The process flows from internal Army actions, decisions and guidance (for example: allocations rules, resource assumptions, warfighting capabilities, and infrastructure priorities), and from external inputs from the National Command Authorities (NCA), CJCS, JS, OSD, and CINC priorities (for example: anticipated threats, scenarios, and assumptions). The Army develops the POM force to achieve an affordable and competent force capable of best supporting national objectives and CINC warfighting needs. This force supports the joint strategic planning conducted by the JS, CINC and the Services at the transition between planning and programming. The mix of unit models that make up a balanced and affordable force structure must support Joint and Army planning, programming, and budgeting at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

**c.** TAA is a multi-phased force structuring process. It consists of both qualitative and quantitative analysis designed to develop the MTOE and TDA "generating" forces necessary to sustain and support the divisional and non-divisional combat forces delineated in the DPG, the IPSs, and the TAP.

d. Figure 5-8 depicts the sequence of activities in the TAA process. TAA is a two-phased analytical and subjective process consisting of Requirement Determination (force guidance and quantitative analysis) and Resource Determination (qualitative analysis and leadership review).

**5-22. Phase I. Requirements Determination**

Requirements determination is made up of two separate actions: force guidance and quantitative analysis. Phase I is the more critical of the two phases. Accurate planning, consumption and workload factors, threat data, and allocation rules ensure accurate computer developed requirements.



**Figure 5-8. Total Army Analysis Process**

a. **Force guidance.** Force guidance consists of data inputs and guidance from various sources. The DPG and TAP provide the NMS objectives, threat data, and resource assumptions and priorities. The DPG also directs the Army to maintain a specific number of combat organizations. The April 2000 DPG, for example, directs the Army to maintain a specific number of Active divisions (both heavy and light), and a specific number of Army National Guard (ARNG) divisions and enhanced separate brigades. The IPS provides DOD directed scenarios called MTWs and SSCs. DPG/IPS also specify the quantity and type of combat forces (corps, divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments, ranger battalions, and special forces groups) for employment in each scenario. These specific combat forces are referred to as “operating” forces. They constitute the start point for force structuring activities. ODCSOPS-SSW (War Plans) and ODCSOPS-FMF (Force Structure)

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determine the specific identification, size, and composition of the “operating” forces in accordance with TAP force structure guidance.

**(1) Data and guidance inputs.**

**(a)** Mission task organized force (MTOF). A ready structured force possessing balanced capabilities that are adaptable for missions against one or more multi-faceted threat(s). MTOFs are linked to the NMS. The NMS assigns future missions, which in turn generates future requirements. These MTOF requirements are developed using a “strategy-to-task” process. The tasks in this process are for the most part based on the universal joint task list (UJTL). Other MTOFs are generated from specific CINC requirements, working groups and workshops and other relevant documents. ODCSOPS-SSW has staff responsibility for MTOFs.

**(b)** Parameters, planning and consumption factors and assumptions.

**1** Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG), TRADOC, U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), the theater MACOMs and other elements of the HQDA staff (ODCSPER, ODCSOPS and ODCSPRO) provide specific guidance, accurate and detailed consumption factors, planning factors, doctrinal requirements, unit allocation rules, weapons and munitions data and deployment assumptions. The parameters, factors and assumptions are needed to conduct the series of modeling and simulations iterations to develop and define the total logistical support requirements necessary to sustain the combat force(s) in each MTW or SSC.

**2** The parameters, factors and assumptions contain theater-specific information concerning logistics and personnel planning, consumption and workload factors, host-nation support offsets and other planning factors crucial to theater force development. A critical step the Force Guidance development is the update and revision of the planning and consumption factors and assumptions.

**(c)** Allocation rules. Another critical step during the force guidance development is the review and updating of support force unit allocation rules used by the U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis (CAA) during the modeling process (quantitative analysis).

**1** These allocation rules, developed by TRADOC and the functional area proponents, represent a quantitative statement of each type of CBT/CS/CSS unit’s capability, mission, and doctrinal employment. Allocation rules are machine-readable; normally an arithmetic statement that incorporates the appropriate planning factors. They are adjusted as necessary to incorporate theater-specific planning factors. There are three basic types of rules:

- Direct input (manual) that are stand-alone requirements for a unit in a theater.
- Existence rules that tie a requirement for one unit to another.
- Workload rules that tie unit requirements to a measurable logistical workload.

**2** The allocation rules need modification whenever unit TOEs, scenario assumptions, logistical support plans, or doctrinal employment concepts change.

**3** Study advisory groups (SAGs), attended by Army Staff (ARSTAF), support agencies, MACOM and proponent representatives, ensure all allocation rules are appropriate and approved for use in the current DPG scenarios.

(2) *SAGs*. SAGs are decision forums where all the parameters, constraints, data inputs and guidance are identified and approved for inclusion in the current TAA cycle and CAA models.

(a) There are two types of SAGs: council of colonels (COC) and general officer (GOSAG). ARSTAF, MACOMs, TRADOC schools and field operating agencies (FOAs) participate in the COC forums. The very senior leadership of the Army participates in the GOSAG. The SAG COC ensures all data input and guidance is appropriate and approved for use in the current DPG scenario(s). The GOSAG addresses those issues that were unresolved at the SAG COC and approves all assumptions, planning factors, allocation rules and guidance as inputs for the second part of Phase I, the CAA modeling.

(b) SAGs are computer event driven. SAG forums are scheduled to approve data inputs to the CAA computer modeling and review the modeling outputs. SAGs are convened to approve the specific inputs to the CAA models. The final SAG is scheduled to review the warfighting force structure requirements developed through the CAA computer modeling. The format and content of the SAGs is subject to change. However, the forums should approve the related items in these general categories:

**1** Deployment models. Inputs include the general parameters, modeling for all U.S., allied, and threat forces, and deployment assumptions; all weapons, characteristics, rates of fire, munitions available, and lethality. This category focuses on how we model and how we constrain the force.

**2** Combat modeling. Inputs include the combat modeling, approving the priority of flow, requirements versus capabilities, and the campaign plan (warfight and support concept). This category focuses on how we deploy and how we fight the force.

**3** Force Analysis Simulation of Theater Administrative and Logistics Support (FASTALS). Inputs considered for approvals are fuel, ammunition, host nation support (HNS), coalition support, stockage levels, the casualty rates, evacuation policy and the allocation rules. This category focuses on how we support and sustain the force. This forum terminates the guidance determination when all assumptions, planning factors and guidance inputs are approved for the current TAA cycle.

**4** Modeling outputs. Review and approval is gained through the final SAG. This SAG reviews the warfighting force structure requirements developed through CAA modeling. It focuses on reviewing and approving the “required force” file prior to the VCSA reviewing and approving the “required” force.

(3) *Setting the stage for quantitative analysis*. During the early stages of Phase I, CAA makes several model runs of Global Deployment Analysis System (GDAS) and Concepts Evaluation Model (CEM) to set the stage for the second part of Phase I, Quantitative Analysis.

**b. Quantitative analysis**. CAA takes the operating forces identified in the NMS for employment in the DPG scenarios and determines the generating force structure. Through

computer modeling, CAA develops the EAD/EAC, CBT/CS/CSS forces required to support the deployed division and non-division force, given the assumptions and guidance approved by the SAGs. CAA also develops the TDA force structure required to support the operating and generating force structure. CAA accomplishes the modeling of TAA through a series of analytical efforts and associated computer simulations.

**(1) CAA modeling.**

**(a) GDAS.** A strategic deployment analysis, GDAS, is accomplished for each scenario. The CAA models have as their major inputs the available strategic mobility (lift) forces, the joint force(s) requiring movement, the required mobilization and training times for RC forces, and the DPG's specified desired delivery schedule for the operating force. The major output is the achievable mobilization station - to -port of embarkation-to-port of debarkation to tactical assembly area arrival schedule for all units (CBT/CS/CSS). This becomes one input into the theater combat operations analysis, CEM.

**(b) CEM.** A theater combat operations analysis is accomplished at both tactical and operational levels for each scenario, using the additional major inputs of friendly and enemy weapons' quantities and effectiveness data, friendly and enemy tactical and operational doctrines, projected resupply capabilities, and available joint and combined forces. Major outputs which become inputs to the theater logistical analyses, FASTALS, include forward line of own troops (FLOT) movement over time, personnel and equipment casualties to the operating force, ammunition expenditures, and brigade/division combat intensities.


**(c) FASTALS.** A theater logistical analysis for each scenario utilizes the outputs of CEM as inputs, along with such logistical data as in-place stocks, existing infrastructure and transportation network, available host-nation support, projected consumption rates, unit direct support (DS) and general support (GS) maintenance requirement factors, and supply, medical, and construction policies to determine time-phased personnel, replacement, medical, material, maintenance, construction, and transportation workloads. In combination with the allocation rules approved by the SAGs, these workloads generate the CS/CSS support force requirements and a time-phased required troop deployment list for that scenario.

**(2) Total requirements.** The total force requirements include the force requirements identified to successfully conduct the MTW(s) (MTOE – CBT/CS/CSS), SSCs, all forces developed for the Base Engagement Force (BEF) (MTOE and TDA) and Base Generating Force (BGF) (MTOE and TDA), and designated Strategic Reserve/Homeland Defense/Domestic Support (MTOE), as well as CINC day-to-day force requirements (Figure 5-9).

**(a)** The total MTOE requirements file include units required/generated in the MTW(s) warfight(s), units required in the multiple SSC MTOFs, the BGF, Strategic Reserve, and BEF.

**(b)** The MTW(s) produce a "time-phased" force that includes the "operating" forces and the "doctrinal" non-divisional support force requirements (fully structured and totally optimized) that sustain the combat forces based on the DPG/IPS, doctrine, allocation rules and the conduct of the warfight. Unit requirements for SSCs, BEF, BGF, Homeland

Defense, Consequence Management and Domestic Support Operations are additive to the MTW(s) force requirements.



**Figure 5-9. Sizing and Shaping Methodology**

(c) TDA requirements include force structure needed to support the MTW(s), support multiple SSCs, organizations found in the BGF, organizations supporting the warfight, organizations supporting the BEF, and organizations supporting a variety of domestic support missions.

**c. Review and approval.** Phase I (Requirements Determination) is complete after the SAG COC and GOSAG review the CAA computer generated output (total warfighting MTOE and TDA requirements).

(1) The total warfighting requirements, portrayed by FASTALS as a fully structured and resourced force at authorized level of organization (ALO) 1, are reviewed and approved by the COC and GOSAG.

(2) Additionally, the SAG COC and GOSAG review and approve the force structure requirements supporting the BEF, BFG, Homeland Security, Consequence Management, and Domestic Support Operations. The GOSAG recommends approval of the force to the VCSA.

(3) The VCSA reviews and approves the "total force requirements" generated through the computer models and recognized within the BEF, and BGF accounts. The VCSA review and approval is the transition to Phase II of TAA (Resource Determination).

(4) After the VCSA reviews and approves the total force requirements, a comparison of data files (MATCH report) is made between the VCSA approved total force requirements (CAA developed) and the current program force (Master force (MFORCE)).

(a) The MATCH (not an acronym) report provides the delta between the new requirements and the programmed force. The MATCH is accomplished through a computer comparison program. CAA produces the required MTOE/TDA force file by combining the troop lists of required forces for the various scenarios (stacked simultaneity), in accordance with guidance provided from ODCSOPS, produces the “required MTOE/TDA force” file. The “required MTOE/TDA force” file has five major components:

- CBT, CS, and CSS units directed, generated and verified to successfully win the MTW(s).
- Operating and generating forces developed to support the “worse case” simultaneous stacking of SSCs (based on the likelihood and impact on the U.S.).
- Units (CBT/CS/CSS) required for the BEF.
- Units (CBT/CS/CSS) required for the BGF.
- Strategic Reserve. Includes the strategic reserve forces, Domestic Operations Support forces, Consequence Management (Homeland Security) forces and OCONUS CINC requirements.

(b) A computer program compares the VCSA approved, doctrinally required, force file provided from CAA with a current list of on-hand and programmed units (MFORCE from SAMAS) to determine the “delta” (component (COMPO) 5) for future programming discussions and issue formulation. The MATCH report and required force files are provided to ODCSOPS for dissemination to the MACOMs for review and issue formulation in preparation for the Resource Determination phase.

### **5-23. Phase II. Resource Determination**

Resource determination consists of two separate activities: qualitative analysis and leadership review. The qualitative analysis is the most emotional facet of the TAA process because the results impact every aspect of the Army. Therefore, this phase requires extensive preparation by participants to ensure the best warfighting force structure is developed.

**a. Qualitative analysis.** Qualitative analysis is conducted to develop the initial POM force, within end strength guidance, for use in the development of the POM. A series of resourcing forums, analyses, panel reviews, and conferences consider and validate the FASTALS model generated requirements and the analysis of those requirements. The qualitative analysis is conducted during the resourcing conference. The resourcing conference is held in two separate sessions: COC and GOSC.

#### **(1) Resourcing conference COC.**

(a) The resourcing conference COC provides the initial qualitative analysis and review of the CAA developed force. The resourcing conference COC provides the opportunity for the ARSTAF, MACOMs, proponent representatives and staff support agencies to provide input, propose changes, and surface issues. The issues focus on COMPO and ALO, and center on defending claimant versus billpayer resourcing issues, while voicing

concerns about priorities versus risks. It allows CINC representatives (Army component commanders) to verify that theater specific requirements are satisfied by Army force structure assigned/apportioned to their commands to meet current CINC operation plan (OPLAN)/concept plan (CONPLAN) warfighting requirements and CINC day-to-day requirements.

(b) The resourcing conference is conducted over a 3-5 day period for the MTOE force structure and 3-5 day period for the TDA force structure. The focus is to identify and develop potential solutions for the myriad of issues brought to TAA. The OIs and force integrators (FIs) are key individuals in this forum. The OIs and FIs have the responsibility to pull together the sometimes diverse guidance and opinions developed during the conference, add insight from a branch perspective, and establish whether the changes in the building blocks for the design case were in fact the best course of action. The OIs pull all the relevant information together for presentation to the COC over a 2-day period. During these presentations, the OI reviews each standard requirements code (SRC) that falls under his/her area of responsibility, and presents recommendations on how to solve the various issues.

(c) HQDA action officers and their counterparts enter an intense round of preparations for the upcoming resourcing conference. Since the quantitative analysis only determined requirements for doctrinally correct, fully resourced (ALO 1) CBT/CS/CSS units deployed into the theater(s) of operations, the determination of a need for additional nondeploying units, the acceptance of risk through the reduction in ALO of units, and the allocation of resourced units to components (Active Army, U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), ARNG) must all be accomplished during the resourcing conferences. HQDA bases force structuring options on an understanding of the objectives to be achieved, the threat and the constraints. The primary differences among various options are the extent to which risk, constraints and time are forecast.

(d) The resourcing conference COC integrates TDA issues and requirements, and reviews and resolves issues based upon sound military judgment and experience. COC submits their product to the FFR process for review by the ARSTAF. The COC forwards their recommendations and unresolved issues, after the FFR process is completed, to the resourcing conference GOSC.

(2) *FFR*. The ARSTAF conducts a FFR during the resource determination phase. The ARSTAF further analyzes the force, initially approved by the COC, via the FFR. The FFR process uses the results of the TAA resourcing conference as input, conducting a review and adjusting the POM force to assure it is affordable and supportable. At the macro level, within the limits of personnel and budgetary constraints, the FFR determines if the POM force can be manned, trained, equipped, sustained and stationed. The FFR process identifies problems with the POM force and provides alternatives, based on prior TAA initiatives, unalterable decisions from the Army leadership, or PBDs, to the GOSC for determining the most capable force within constraints.

(3) *Resourcing conference GOSC*. The qualitative phase culminates with the resourcing conference GOSC. The GOSC reviews/approves the decisions of the resourcing conference COC, reviews the output from the FFR process and addresses remaining unresolved issues. The resourcing conference GOSC approves the force that is ultimately forwarded for CSA decision and Secretary of the Army approval.

**b. Leadership review.** After the resourcing conference GOSC meets to resolve any contentious or outstanding issues, the leadership review is initiated through the force program review (FPR) process. The VCSA chairs the FPR resolving any issues forwarded from the resourcing conference forums. The VCSA scrutinizes, reviews and approves the force ultimately presented to the CSA for decision and briefed to the Secretary of the Army.


#### **5-24. Army structure (ARSTRUC) message**

The ARSTRUC message provides a historical record of decisions made during the TAA process. The ARSTRUC message, produced by ODCSOPS, is directive in nature providing the MACOMs results at the SRC level of detail. The ARSTRUC message directs the MACOMs to make appropriate adjustments to their force structure at the unit identification code (UIC) level of detail during the next command plan. Command plan changes are recorded in the SAMAS, the official database of record for the Army. SAMAS, along with the BOIP and TOE, provides the basis for Army authorization documentations (MTOE and TDA).

#### **5-25. The product of TAA**

**a.** The resourced TAA force represents the force structure for POM development, capturing all components (Active, Reserve, host nation) and TDA requirements through the end of the POM years (MFORCE). The POM force meets the projected mission requirements within anticipated end strength and equipment level. The final output should result in an executable POM Force. The Army forwards the POM force to OSD with a recommendation for approval.

**b.** The product of the TAA and POM processes is the approved force structure for the Army, which has been divided for resource management purposes into components: the Active Army (COMPO 1), the ARNG (COMPO 2), the USAR (COMPO 3), and unresourced units (COMPO 4). COMPO 4 units, mostly CSS units, are part of the Army's required force structure, but are deliberately unresourced so that available resources can be applied to higher priority peacetime force structure initiatives and other Army programs. Three other components — direct host-nation support (COMPO 7), indirect host-nation support (COMPO 8), and logistics civil augmentation (COMPO 9) — comprise force structure offsets. COMPO 7 and 8 are guaranteed by host-nation support agreements. COMPO 9 is an augmentation, not an offset and represents the contracts for additional support and services to be provided by domestic and foreign firms augmenting existing force structure (Figure 5-10).



**Figure 5-10. Force Structure Components (COMPO)**

## **SECTION VI**

### **PHASE V—DOCUMENT ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS**

#### **5-26. Documentation components**

**a.** The fifth and final phase of force development, the documenting of unit authorizations, can be viewed conceptually as the integration of developing organizational models and determining organizational authorizations. Developing organizational models is driven by battlefield requirements for specific military capabilities that will defeat a postulated threat. The results of this process are TOEs for organizations staffed and equipped to provide increments of the required capabilities. TOEs specify Army requirements. Determining organizational authorizations, on the other hand, is a force structure process that documents resources (people, equipment, dollars and facilities) for each unit in the Army.

**b.** Because the Army is a complex array of people, each with one of a multitude of different skills, and many millions of items of equipment, there must be an organized system for documenting what is required and how much is authorized. More importantly, as the Army moves forward with its equipment modernization program, and new doctrines and organizations evolve, the Army must have a way of keeping track of changes that are made so that they may be managed efficiently and with a minimum of turbulence. The Army’s authorization documentation system meets these needs.

**c.** Each unit in the Army has its mission, structure, personnel and equipment requirements, and authorizations established in an authorization document. These documents are essential at each level of command for the Army to function. A unit uses its authorization document as authority to requisition personnel and equipment and as a basis for readiness evaluation. Authorization documents are used to manage personnel and materiel procurement, force planning, programming, budgeting, training, and distributing. Additionally, authorization documents are used at various levels of command for inspections, surveys, special projects, and studies.


**5-27. Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS)**

a. The SAMAS is the force development automated data processing (ADP) system that records, maintains and distributes force structure information for all 8500+ units in the Total Army. SAMAS is the Army’s “database of record” for all force structure actions. It maintains information for all Active Army (COMPO 1), ARNG (COMPO 2), USAR (COMPO 3), required (but unresourced) units (COMPO 4), Army prepositioned stocks equipment sets (APSES) (COMPO 6) and direct host nation support (COMPO 7) units.

b. The primary inputs to SAMAS are the “operating” forces (divisions, separate brigades, armored cavalry regiments and special forces groups) directed by the DPG and “generating” forces at EAD/EAC (CBT/CS/CSS and TDA) derived from the TAA process.

c. SAMAS has two primary files. One is a Force Structure (FS) File (commonly referred to as the “Force File”), that reflects the approved (documented and programmed) force structure position for each unit in the Army. The Force File produces the Army’s MFORCE. The second file is the Program and Budget Guidance (PBG) File (commonly referred to as the “Budget File”). The Budget File produces both the civilian annex to the MFORCE as well as the Manpower Addendum to the PBG.

d. Figure 5-11 depicts SAMAS data elements, controls, distribution and use of information contained within the database.



**Figure 5-11. SAMAS**

**5-28. The Force File**

a. The Force File is updated and maintained by the FIs, command managers and OIs at HQDA ODCSOPS-FM. The Budget File is updated and maintained by the resource integrators/PBG command managers of USAFMSA. The Force File displays the force structure position for every unit in the Army at UIC, SRC, effective date (EDATE), Army management structure code (AMSCO), MDEP, resource operating command (ROC), required and authorized strength levels (personnel spaces), MTOE and TDA number level of detail. Additional data items include troop program sequence number (TPSN), unit number

## How the Army Runs

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and regimental designation, unit description, command assignment code, location code, station name, phase and action codes, required and authorized strength levels, mobilization data, Army force package code (FPC) and Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) number. A sample force file record is displayed in Figure 5-12. There are approximately 40 total data items for each unit, displayed over-time (previous, current and future programmed and approved actions). SAMAS does not contain MOS and grade level of detail, but drives the development of authorization documents in TAADS, which contains the MTOEs and TDAs at paragraph, line, MOS and grade, line item number (LIN), equipment readiness code (ERC) and quantity level of detail.

UIC	COMPO	TPSN	ES	UNMBR	CARS	BR	ULC	UNTDS	EDATE			
WAGRAA	1	00001	16	0008	02	AR	BN	TANK(M1A2)	011016			
ACTCO	PHASE	SRC	NTREF	STNNM	LOC	ASGMT	PRUIC					
X	D	17375F000100	**	FT HOOD	5TX	FC	*****					
STRUCTURED STRENGTH					CCNUM	ADCCO	AMSCO	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH				
OFF	WO	ENL	AGG	CIV				OFF	WO	ENL	AGG	CIV
35	0	312	347	0	FC0102	*****	11101100000	33	0	312	345	0
ROC	DC	ROBCO	UNPID	DAMPL	MDEP	AUTHORITY						
761	DC	****	*****	*****	W51C	TAA05						

**Figure 5-12. Sample Force File Record**

**b.** A sample SAMAS extract report for the 82d Airborne Division Artillery (DIVARTY) is displayed in Figure 5-13. It shows the four units of the DIVARTY (headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) and three direct support field artillery (DSFA) battalions) and the approved force structure in the June 00 MFORCE. Data elements include UICs, SRCs (TOE and ALO), authorization document numbers, EDATES and required and authorized strength levels. In approximately two dozen lines, the “force programming” of the 82d Airborne DIVARTY is depicted.

TPSN	UIC	CR	UNMB	BR	ULC	UNTD5	SRC	DOCNO	CCNUM	EDATE	P	A	STOF	STWC	STEN	LAUOF	AUWCA	UENL
01082	WABDAA	70	0082	FA	HHB	DIVARTY ABN	06202L00010006202LFC82	FC1099	19981016	D	X	23	4	84	23	4	84	
01082	WABDAA	70	0082	FA	HHB	DIVARTY ABN	06202L00010006202LFC82	FC1000	19991016	D	U	23	4	84	23	4	84	
01082	WABDAA	70	0082	FA	HHB	DIVARTY ABN	06202L00010006202LFC82	FC0101	20001016	D	R	23	4	85	23	4	85	
01082	WABDAA	70	0082	FA	HHB	DIVARTY ABN	06202L00010006202LFC82	FC0102	20011016	D	R	23	4	86	23	4	86	
01082	WABDAA	70	0082	FA	HHB	DIVARTY ABN	06202L000100		20050921	A	X	23	4	85	23	4	85	
01082	WABDAA	70	0082	FA	HHB	DIVARTY ABN	06202L000100		20070921	A	X	23	4	85	23	4	85	
01082	WABJAA	01	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC1099	19981016	D	R	37	3	401	37	3	401	
01082	WABJAA	01	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC2099	19981017	D	X	37	3	401	37	3	401	
01082	WABJAA	01	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC1000	19991016	D	U	37	3	401	37	3	401	
01082	WABJAA	01	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC0101	20001016	D	R	37	3	398	37	3	398	
01082	WABJAA	01	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC0102	20011016	D	R	37	3	398	37	3	398	
01082	WABJAA	01	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L000100		20050921	A	X	37	3	398	37	3	398	
01082	WABJAA	01	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L000100		20070921	A	X	37	3	398	37	3	398	
01082	WABKAA	02	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC1099	19981016	D	R	37	3	401	37	3	401	
01082	WABKAA	02	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC2099	19981017	D	X	37	3	401	37	3	401	
01082	WABKAA	02	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC1000	19991016	D	U	37	3	401	37	3	401	
01082	WABKAA	02	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC0101	20001016	D	R	37	3	398	37	3	398	
01082	WABKAA	02	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC0102	20011016	D	R	37	3	398	37	3	398	
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01082	WABKAA	02	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L000100		20070921	A	X	37	3	398	37	3	398	
01082	WABLAA	03	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC1099	19981016	D	R	37	3	401	37	3	401	
01082	WABLAA	03	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC2099	19981017	D	X	37	3	401	37	3	401	
01082	WABLAA	03	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC1000	19991016	D	U	37	3	401	37	3	401	
01082	WABLAA	03	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC0101	20001016	D	R	37	3	398	37	3	398	
01082	WABLAA	03	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L00010006205LFC82	FC0102	20011016	D	R	37	3	398	37	3	398	
01082	WABLAA	03	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L000100		20050921	A	X	37	3	398	37	3	398	
01082	WABLAA	03	0319	FA	BN	105T ABN	06205L000100		20070921	A	X	37	3	398	37	3	398	

Figure 5-13. Extract Report 82 ABN Division DIVARTY

**5-29. The Budget File**


The Budget File contains Active Army military and civilian manpower data. The Budget File represents manpower for which budget authority is available. The Budget File is the feeder system to the HQDA Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E) Program Optimization and Budget Evaluation (PROBE) database, which captures the Army’s POM and Budget submissions. The Budget File also feeds civilian data to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA(FM&C)) Civilian Manpower Integrated Costing System (CMICS) where civilian costing is performed for all PPBES events. Primary inputs to the Budget File are: MACOM command plans, PBDs and POM decisions. Primary outputs of the Budget File are the manpower addendum to the PBG and the civilian annex to the MFORCE. The addendum is normally published three times a year.

**5-30. Force documentation**

- a. TAADS applies to entire Army—Active Army, ARNG, USAR, and civilian work force. The Army uses the system to record changes in requirements and authorizations that result from changes in unit missions, organizational structure, and equipment.
- b. TAADS documents requirements and authorizations for MTOE units at various levels of the organization using data from SAMAS, the TOE, BOIPs, and ICPs. Requirements and authorizations for TDA units and are derived from SAMAS, concept plans, manpower surveys/studies, and manpower standards applications.


## How the Army Runs

c. Detailed integration and documentation of the force centers on the “command plan process,” a yearlong process running from the approved June MFORCE until the next June’s approved MFORCE. The Army uses this process to update and create MTOE and TDA documents. These documents officially record decisions on missions, organizational structure, and requirements and authorizations for personnel and equipment (Figure 5-14).



**Figure 5-14. The Command Plan Process**


d. The force structure authorization documentation process (Figure 5-15) begins with documentation guidance released by HQDA ODCSOPS-FM at the start of the documentation window. The HQDA guidance establishes the focus (“target”) of the documentation window and directs documentation of specific units and actions. Under centralized documentation (CENDOC), USAFMSA-ADD builds draft MTOEs based on the documentation guidance and forwards them to HQDA and the MACOMs for subject matter expert (SME), usually the OI for that type of unit, and unit review. Draft TDA documents are also built by USAFMSA-ADD.



**Figure 5-15. MTOE Documentation Process**

e. The command plan is used to make adjustments between SAMAS programmed spaces and the proposed draft authorization documents. In some cases, two to four years

separate the TAA force programming for a unit and the documentation of the unit (Figure 5-16). Changes in structure over time necessitate that “bills” and “billpayers” for authorized spaces be identified and adjustments made to balance the Force and Budget Files in SAMAS with TAADS. Those issues without resolution are deferred pending identification of other solutions (directed military overstrength (DMO), overstructure/undermanning (OS/UM), re-order documentation priorities, as examples).



**Figure 5-16. The Year-to-Year Flow**

**f.** Command plan is also used by the MACOMs to comply with TAA directed force structure actions and to submit selected MACOM initiatives. HQ, U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) submits a command plan for all USAR units in the continental United States (CONUS) (less USAR Special Operations Forces) through HQ, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). Force structure issues for USAR units outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) are submitted through the respective MACOM. The National Guard Bureau (NGB), in coordination with the State NG HQ, develops the Army National Guard Troop Structure Program (ARNG-TSP). After acceptance by the States, the ARNG-TSP is submitted to HQDA as the ARNG command plan.

**g.** Following command plan, SAMAS is adjusted to the “corrected” strength levels and the draft MTOEs, with changes applied, are again forwarded to the SMEs and the MACOMs for review to insure the agreed upon positions have been documented.

**h.** At the close of each documentation window, the Automatic Update Transaction System (AUTS) is run. AUTS compares SAMAS programming against TAADS documents submitted for approval. Those TAADS documents that match SAMAS programming at UIC, SRC, EDATE, strength level, and officer (OFF)/warrant officer (WO)/enlisted (ENL)/civilian (CIV) level of detail are approved and make up the new MFORCE. Approved documents are forwarded to the MACOMs for distribution to the appropriate units. “Disconnected” SAMAS/ TAADS actions are not approved or included in the updated

MFORCE. Approved post-AUTS TAADS documents provide the basis for updating the ODCSPER/ U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) Personnel Management Authorization Document (PMAD) and are a primary input to the Structure and Composition System (SACS). Additionally, the MFORCE is sent to, and provides the baseline for, HQDA ODCSOPS-Training (DAMO-TR) in the Battalion Level Training Model (BLTM) and the Training Resource Model (TRM) for developing operating tempo (OPTEMPO) funding, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA(FM&C)) Army Budget Office (ABO) for civilian costing through the CMICS model and budget estimate submission (BES) preparation, and HQDA PA&E for POM preparation. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA(M&RA)) provides input “controls” for total strength, by category, to be allocated in SAMAS.

**i.** Concept plans are used to address force structure actions not approved or programmed in the current MFORCE. Concept plans complement the command plan process by providing an avenue to address exceptional near-term force structure actions. These actions could include unprogrammed activations, inactivations, changes in strength or ALO, deviation from MTOE standardization, and changes in Army Management Headquarters Activities (AMHA) accounts, as examples. The concept plan must be submitted to HQDA in accordance with AR 71-32 and will state, among other things, the purpose, objectives, advantages, and disadvantages of the proposed action and will include the resource requirements (force structure and budget “bills” and “billpayers”) and draft authorization documentation.

**j.** The SACS, in conjunction with the Force Builder, produces the Army’s time-phased demands for personnel and equipment over the current, budget and program years and is extended for a total of a ten-year period. Additionally, SACS defaults to FY 2050 and builds a fully modernized OTOE position for all units. In this way, SACS shows current levels of modernization, levels achieved at the end of the POM, and a fully modernized Army (for planning purposes). SACS outputs combine information from BOIP, TOE, SAMAS, TAADS and known force structure constraints not included in the previous files. Key outputs are the Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS) and the Logistics Structure and Composition System (LOGSACS). Both PERSACS and LOGSACS are at the UIC/ EDATE and MOS/grade (GRD)/LIN/ERC/quantity (QTY) level of detail for requirements and authorization for MTOE and TDA units.

**k.** Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP), for example, uses equipment requirements and authorizations from LOGSACS to plan equipment distribution. The PMAD, used by ODCSPER and PERSCOM for personnel requirements and authorizations, is updated in part by TAADS, not PERSACS. It is hoped that with further improvements in SACS, greater utility will be found for PERSACS, allowing it to eventually replace PMAD.

### **5-31. Authorization documents**

There are four basic authorization documents in the Army: MTOE, TDA, mobilization TDA (MOBTDA), and augmentation TDA (AUGTDA).

**a. MTOE.** The MTOE is a modified version of a TOE that prescribes the unit organization, personnel, and equipment necessary to perform a mission in a specific geographical or operational environment. It reflects the organizational option selected from

the TOE. Thus, the MTOE of a unit organized at the ALO 3 has been based on the Level 3 organizational structure found in the TOE. At unit level, the MTOE is the base document for:

- Requesting personnel and equipment.
- Distributing personnel and equipment resources.
- Unit status reporting.
- Reporting supply and maintenance status.

**b. TDA.** The TDA prescribes the organizational structure for a unit having a support mission for which a TOE does not exist and which may include civilian positions. TDAs are unique in that they are developed based on the type and level of workloads associated with the unit's mission. Units with similar missions, like U.S. Army garrisons, may be organized similarly but may have a substantially different mix and number of personnel and equipment authorizations due to differences in the population and composition of the post they support. At unit level, a TDA is used for the same purposes as an MTOE except for unit status reporting, which is generally not required of TDA units. At MACOM and HQDA level, the MTOE and TDA are used to provide equipment and personnel MOS and grade details for planning, programming, budgeting, and force structuring activities.

**c. MOBTDA.** The MOBTDA records the mission, organizational structure, and personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations for an Army unit to perform its assigned mission upon mobilization. It reflects the unit's mobilization plan by identifying functions to be increased, decreased, established, and discontinued.

**d. AUGTDA.** The AUGTDA records the mission, organizational structure, and personnel and equipment requirements and authorizations to augment an MTOE unit to perform added non-TOE peacetime missions. AUGTDA can include civilian personnel and/or commercial equipment allowances required and authorized to an MTOE unit. An example is the augmentation of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA, with equipment authorizations for their "visually modified" (VISMOD) opposing forces (OPFOR) equipment.

### **5-32. The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS)**

**a.** Every Army unit (Active Army, ARNG, and USAR) and Army components of other agencies must have an authorization document to reflect a supportable organizational structure. Authorization documents state a unit's approved structure and resources and serve as a basis and authority for requisitioning.

**b.** The development and documentation of authorization documents is supported by TAADS. TAADS is a HQDA automated system that contains all unit authorization documents; maintains quantitative and qualitative personnel and equipment data for individual units and the entire Army force structure; standardizes authorization documents for similar parent units; and interfaces with other DA automated systems, such as SAMAS.

**c.** The authorization document data maintained in TAADS are organizational structure, personnel, and equipment requirements and authorizations. The basic procedures for documentation are the same for MTOE and TDA units; that is, all unit personnel and

equipment requirements and authorizations are written in the same detail. However, the basis for developing the two documents differs.

**d.** MTOEs are derived by adjusting/ modifying TOEs, when required, to meet specific operational requirements. A unit will be organized under the proper level of its TOE to the greatest extent consistent with the mission and the availability of manpower spaces as directed by the DPG for “operating” forces (ALO 1 for divisions, separate brigades, ACRs and special forces groups) and TAA allocations to “generating” forces (EAD/EAC CBT, CS, CSS and TDA). Equipment modernization is fielded in accordance with HQDA systems distribution plans and the TAEDP.

**e.** TDAs are uniquely developed for units with specific support missions. The organizational structure of TDA units will be developed to attain only essential manning, the most efficient use of personnel, and the most effective operational capability within the manpower spaces prescribed in the command force structure. Manpower standard applications, manpower surveys, and manpower requirements change requests, and personnel requirements from BOIPs will be used to structure TDA manpower. When manpower authorizations are insufficient to satisfy valid requirements, garrison/post and/or unit commanders will distribute resources on a mission-priority basis. Unsupported requirements are sometimes filled by a variety of means, e.g. borrowed military manpower, overhires, or the restructuring/redefining of work responsibilities. Equipment utilization and BOIP data will be used to develop TDA materiel requirements.


**f.** HQDA reviews and approves all authorization documents (MTOEs and TDAs) using the AUTS process to ensure compatibility among the unit’s mission, capabilities, organization, ALO, and the allocation of resources. Approved MTOEs and TDAs are documented in TAADS and the SAMAS MFORCE.

### **5-33. Structure and Composition System (SACS)**

**a.** The SACS process is supported by the Force Builder Decision Support System (FBDSS). Operated and maintained by USAFMSA, FBDSS combines data from a multitude of management information systems and databases addressing force structure, personnel, manpower, and dollar resource constraints.

**b.** FBDSS produces the SACS output that provides time-phased personnel and equipment requirements and authorization needed for a specified force structure for a 10-year period (current, budget and POM years, extended).

**c.** USAFMSA produces SACS output three to four times per year. These outputs are used to analyze force structure decision impacts on out-year programming in terms of Army forces (COMPOs, unit types, and quantities) and unit composition (personnel and force modernization levels). Figure 5-17 shows SACS.



**Figure 5-17. FB/SACS Process**

**d.** Each SACS cycle begins with the analysis and synchronization of key force management information inputs—BOIP files, TOE files, SAMAS, and TAADS. These inputs provide insights into today’s and tomorrow’s structure, and the resources available for feasible modernization. Both the PERSACS and LOGSACS are based on these force structure decisions and resource constraints.

**(1)** PERSACS combines data from the HQDA SAMAS, TAADS, and TOE systems to state military personnel requirements and authorizations by grade, branch, and MOS/AOC) for each unit in the force for the 10 years of the SACS. This data supports planning for personnel recruiting, training, promoting, validating requisitions, and distribution.

**(2)** LOGSACS combines data from the HQDA SAMAS, TAADS, TOE, and BOIP to state equipment requirements and authorizations by LIN and ERC for each unit in the force for the current, budget, and POM years extended for a total of ten years. Authorized/required quantities of currently documented equipment are determined for each unit from its authorization document in TAADS for the first two years of the SACS run. Data for the POM period and beyond is derived from the unit TOE model and data on unit equipment for new developmental items that are undocumented, but planned for inclusion at a later date, are applied through application of the applicable BOIP/ICP file(s).

**e.** A summary of all unit requirements for a particular LIN, as computed by LOGSACS, is the initial issue quantity (IIQ) of that LIN. FBDSS takes the IIQ input and adds requirements for Army war reserves, operational projects, war reserve stocks for allies and operational readiness float (ORF)/ repair cycle float (RCF) to produce the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO).

**f.** SACS output products (PERSACS and LOGSACS) are published after the AUTS process at the end of the command plan cycle. The MFORCE reconciled at the end of AUTS is the key force structure input to initiate the SACS cycle.

### **5-34. United States Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA)**

**a.** USAFMSA (formerly the United States Army Force Integration Support Agency – USAFISA) is a FOA under HQDA ODCSOPS-FM. USAFMSA consists of ADD, RDD, and the USAFMSA’s Chief of Staff’s office.

**b.** USAFMSA’s organization and “customer” focus provides accurate and timely requirement and authorization databases for both personnel and equipment. The Chief of Staff’s office concentrates on force accounting, force planning, and programming. RDD (Forts Leavenworth and Lee) and ADD (Fort Belvoir) support all MACOMs with a full range of documents.

### **5-35. Army Force Management School (AFMS)**

AFMS is part of the ODCSOPS and operates under the supervision of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans--Force Management. AFMS supports the force management and education processes through the conducting the following courses:

- Force Management Course.
- General Officer/Senior Executive Service (GO/SES) Force Integration Course.
- Action Officer Force Integration Course.
- Action Officer Logistics Course.
- Army Materiel Command (AMC) Action Officer Course.
- Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) Course.
- Army/Joint Staff Officer Orientation Course.
- Other courses tailored to the needs of specific target audiences are developed and conducted as required. AFMS also conducts specialized academic studies in the force management field.

## **SECTION VII SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

### **5-36. Summary**

**a.** Army force development is accomplished through the integration of numerous processes. Requirements drive what the Army needs to give it the capability to deter or conduct operations across the spectrum in support of national security objectives. Resources determine the capabilities the Army can afford.

**b.** Force development begins with requirements for doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldier systems derived from a concept of how-to-fight/operate (required capabilities). These requirements initiate the five force development phases: determining requirements, designing organizations, developing organizational models, determining organizational authorizations, and documenting those authorizations. The BOIP and TOE systems provide the organizational models that are the building blocks of force structure. The resource-driven force-structuring process determines the mix of units for a balanced force and how many units the Army can afford in our resource-constrained environment.

c. Finally, the authorization documentation process documents the decisions of the organizational unit modeling and force structuring activities and provides the detailed forecast of authorizations that forms the basis for acquiring, distributing, and sustaining personnel, materiel, and facilities in the Army.

d. The past several years have seen significant changes to the force development process, but the process of change and how to manage it remains dynamic. This chapter has been a snapshot of a process that needs to remain as dynamic as the environment it supports as we transform the Army.

### **5-37. References**

- a. CJCS Instruction 3170.01A, *Requirements Generation Process*.
- b. Army Regulation 1-1, *Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System*.
- c. Army Regulation 71-9, *Materiel Requirements*.
- d. Army Regulation 71-11, *Total Army Analysis*.
- e. Army Regulation 71-32, *Force Development and Documentation - Consolidated Policies*.
- f. Message, HQDA, DAMO-ZA, 221230Z September 1995, Subject: *Revised MTOE Documentation Policy*.
- g. Field Manual 100-11, *Force Integration*.
- h. TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9: *Requirements Determination*.
- i. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, *Advanced Full Spectrum Operations (DRAFT)*.
- j. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66, *Objective Force Capabilities (DRAFT)*.



# CHAPTER 6

## PLANNING FOR MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT

*“We will develop the capability to put combat force anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff—in brigade combat teams for both stability and support operations and for warfighting. We will build that capability into a momentum that generates a warfighting division on the ground in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.”*

The Army Vision

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### **6-1. Chapter content**

The *Army Vision* statement forcefully expresses today’s Army deployability requirements. Our Army is evaluating its ability to rapidly deploy decisive force throughout the world. In view of today’s complex global environment, the Army must remain prepared, trained and ready to deploy operationally, and to expand rapidly and if necessary, mobilize to meet its regional and territorial responsibilities. The Army force structure must be designed to allow force projection with maximum combat power and support units to sustain that power. The Active Army and Reserve Components must provide both capabilities without the lengthy preparation periods that have been characteristic of the past. The need for deploying a substantial number of Reserve Component units overseas in the initial stages of a conflict underscores the importance placed on the Army force structure. The deterrent value of mobilization resides not only in the Active Army and Reserve Components, but also in the preparedness to convert civilian manpower and industrial production rapidly into military power, individual replacements, and supplies. The capability of the United States to expand the active force rapidly and efficiently through mobilization is essential in deterring potential enemies. Such a capability assures our allies of U.S. resolve. Fundamental to achieving such a capability is the coordination of mobilization planning with the planned deployments for war that require mobilization.

#### **6-2. Chapter organization**

This chapter covers mobilization and deployment planning systems. Although the focus is on joint planning systems, the participation of the Army in these systems is explained in some detail. Also discussed are the Department of Defense (DOD) objectives for improving industrial preparedness in the U.S. and the Army industrial preparedness program. The discussion of mobilization and deployment is presented in 7 sections:

- The planning system.
- Deliberate (peace time) planning process.
- Crisis action (time sensitive) planning.
- Army mobilization.
- Mobilization management.
- Industrial preparedness.
- Summary.


## **SECTION II**

### **PLANNING SYSTEM DESCRIPTION, DELIBERATE PLANNING, AND CRISIS ACTION PLANNING**

#### **6-3. The planning system**

Joint operational planning encompasses planning for the full range of activities required for conducting joint operations and includes mobilization, deployment, and employment planning. Joint operational planning is conducted within the framework of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) (discussed in chapter 4) and the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). These systems are related to each other and to the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (discussed in chapter 9). Army operational planning to implement joint operational planning tasks is conducted within the framework of the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). Other service systems, similar to AMOPES, include the Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP), the Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP) and Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN), the Air Force War and Mobilization Plan (WMP), and the Coast Guard Capabilities Plan (CG CAP) and Coast Guard Logistic Support and Capabilities Plan (CG LSCP).

**a. JSPS.** The JSPS is a flexible and interactive process, and is the primary formal means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and combatant commanders, carries out statutory responsibilities and discharges strategic planning responsibilities. The JSPS is the mechanism for translating national security policy, resource planning guidance (as reflected in the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)), and CINC requirements into strategic guidance, force structuring objectives, and operations planning guidance (Figure 6-1). The link with JOPES is through the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which provides short-term operational planning guidance to the military Services and Commanders in Chief (CINC).



**Figure 6-1. Joint Strategic Planning System**

**b. JSCP.** The JSCP, as the link to JOPES, provides guidance to the combatant commanders and the chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions utilizing the current capabilities. It also apportions resources to combatant commanders, based on military capabilities resulting from completed program and budget actions. Additionally, the JSCP provides a solid framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the National Command Authorities (NCA).

**c. JOPES.** JOPES provides a single, interoperable planning and execution process, using similar policies and procedures needed during war and in smaller scale contingencies (SSC). It also provides for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision-making supported by modern communications and computer systems. Thus, it is the joint command and control system for operation planning and execution covering the full spectrum of potential threats identified through the national security planning process. JOPES provides the means to respond to emerging crisis situations or transition to war through rapid, coordinated planning and execution. It also addresses mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment mission areas. The design is to support commanders and planners at national, theater, and supporting levels. The goals of JOPES are to—

- (1) Support the development of operation plans (OPLANs), concept plans (CONPLANs), functional plans, campaign plans, and the development of operation orders (OPORD) within time-constrained crisis situations.
- (2) Permit theater commanders to start, stop, or redirect military operations effectively and rapidly.
- (3) Support peacetime, crisis, and wartime planning and execution.
- (4) Integrate mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities.
- (5) Standardize policies and procedures which will be similar, in peacetime (including exercises) and crisis situations.

(6) Support the rapid evaluation of military options and development of courses of action (COA) in single or multi-theater scenarios (for example two major theater wars (MTW)).

(7) Exploit information technology (IT) and communications technology advances. Specifically, utilization of the capabilities of the Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and communications assets as the Defense Data Network (DDN).

(8) Expedite the development of military estimates of situations.

(9) Ensure the dissemination and presentation of timely, accurate, and properly aggregated information.

(10) Allow planners to identify resource shortfalls (personnel, transportation, materiel, forces, medical, and civil engineering services).

(11) Secure from unauthorized access, data manipulation, and data retrieval. System hardware must be tempest (an unclassified term referring to technical investigations for compromising emanations from electrically operated information processing equipment) qualified and must be security certifiable for top secret sensitive compartmented information (SCI).

**d. Systems relationship.** JOPES is the principal system for translating and implementing policy decisions of the National Security Council (NSC) System (NSCS) and the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) into plans and orders for operations in support of national security policy. It also provides a means of identifying risks in executing currently assigned missions employing currently available resources. AMOPES is the Army's mobilization interface with JOPES. It is applicable to Army components of unified commands, the major Army commands (MACOMs), and other supporting commands and agencies.

**e. JOPES overview.** JOPES is the integrated joint conventional command and control system used to support all military operation monitoring, planning, and execution (including theater-level nuclear and chemical plans) activities. JOPES incorporates policies, procedures, personnel, and facilities by interfacing with IT systems, reporting systems, and the underlying GCCS. JOPES provides IT support to senior-level decisionmakers and their staffs with enhanced capabilities to plan and conduct joint military operations. JOPES procedures and IT systems are the mechanisms for submitting movement requirements to the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

**f. Joint Planning And Execution Community (JPEC).** JOPES provides support to and is used by decision makers and their staffs at all levels of the national structure for joint planning and execution. This structure is defined as the National Command Authority (NCA) and the JPEC. Membership includes, but is not limited to the following:


- (1) National level.
  - CJCS.
  - Service Chiefs.
  - Joint Staff.
  - Services.

(2) Theater level. Supported commands (including Service component commands, sub-unified commands, and joint task forces).

(3) Supporting organizational level.

- Supporting commands (including Service component commands and supporting combatant commands).
- Defense agencies.
- Non-DOD departments and agencies.
- Allied commands and agencies.

**g. JOPES planning and execution methodology.** JOPES supports the joint planning and execution process used during peacetime operations, exercises, hostilities other-than-war, and war. JOPES procedures provide for various levels of decision-making in deliberate and crisis action planning environments. The five operational functions of JOPES (Figure 6-2) govern both deliberate and crisis action planning processes. Together with the two JOPES supporting functions (simulation and analysis and monitoring), they form the JOPES methodology.



**Figure 6-2. Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)**

**h. JOPES procedural principles.**

(1) Single set of information technology (IT) procedures. JOPES embodies a single set of IT procedures that, combined with administrative policies and procedures, govern all aspects of conventional military operation planning and execution (including theater-level nuclear and chemical plans). This single networked system ensures that all participants in all aspects of joint military planning and execution use the same vocabulary, procedures, and joint IT support, thus facilitating the transition from training to planning, then to effective military operations.

(2) Use of existing or programmed capabilities and resources. JOPES planning is capabilities based. Military planners use the forces and resources specified for regional or global planning in the JSCP and CJCS orders, Service capabilities documents, and approved operation plans or orders. Using the forces and resources apportioned for planning, the Commander in Chiefs CINCs select those forces they intend to employ within their plans to complete the assigned tasks.

(3) Shortfall identification and risk analysis. JOPES contains specific procedures for the supported command to identify shortfalls between the planned requirement and the identified capability at various points in the planning process. The supported command then attempts to resolve shortfalls, conducts risk analysis if the shortfalls are not resolved, and redefines the CINC's Strategic Concept if the resultant risk is too great.

(4) Plans maintenance. Completed and approved plans will be maintained and updated as changes occur. A new plan is required only when the threat, taskings, forces assigned, resources available, or concept of operations change to the extent the supported CINC and the CJCS deem it necessary to develop a new plan. Otherwise, commanders and their staffs concentrate on keeping existing plans and orders up to date and executable.

**i. JOPES policies, procedures, and guidance.** Procedures, guidance, and descriptions of IT system support and reporting structure necessary to conduct joint operation planning and execution are contained in four Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandums (CJCSM):


(1) CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation and Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), provides policy, guidance, and procedures for the development, coordination, dissemination, review, approval, and implementation of joint OPLANs and OPORDs.

(2) CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II (Planning Formats and Guidance), prescribes standard formats and minimum content for operation plans, concept summaries, annexes, appendixes, tabs, and exhibits. It is functionally oriented and provides directional, procedural, and planning guidance keyed to certain plan annexes.

(3) CJCSM 3500.02A, Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution), prescribes standard formats and minimum content for crisis action planning (CAP) procedures, orders, letters, reports, and the CAP checklists.

(4) CJCSM 3150.16A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Reporting Structure (JOPEsRE), prescribes reporting procedures, reporting channels and timelines necessary to conduct joint operation planning.

**j. JOPES functions.** JOPES consists of seven interrelated functions that provide a framework for joint military planning and execution. Figure 6-2 depicts the five operational functions and two supporting functions. The five operational functions are sequentially related, proceeding in a logical order from identification of a threat, to determination of strategy that counters the threat, to course of action (COA) development, to detailed planning, and finally, to actual implementation of military operations. The supporting functions, on the other hand, relate to all of the operational functions and have an impact on each JOPES operational function. Figure 6-3 displays the operational functions and identifies the major inputs and outputs of each operational function.



**Figure 6-3. Functional Process Major Inputs and Outputs**

(1) *Threat identification and assessment.* This function addresses procedures for continuous monitoring of the international political and military environment so threats to national security can be detected and analyzed, alerting decisionmakers, and determining and defining threat capabilities and intentions. Through detailed planning and the development of courses of action at the operational level and monitoring and adjusting operations during execution, this function provides information for strategic planning and resource allocation at the national level. All organizational levels are supported by this function during crisis action planning and execution.

(2) *Strategy determination.* Using this function, the NCA, CJCS, and Joint Staff formulate suitable and feasible military direction to counter the threats and to develop courses of action. It involves formulating politico-military assessments, developing and evaluating military strategy and clearly defining political and military objectives or end state, apportioning forces and other resources, formulating concepts and military options, and developing planning guidance leading to the preparation of COAs, OPLANs, and OPORDs. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategy guidance in light of the intelligence estimate and ends with issuance of either the JSCP in peacetime or a CJCS warning or planning order during crisis action planning situations.

(3) *Course of action development.* In COA development during peacetime, the supported command develops the CINC's Strategic Concept based on Joint Staff and Service planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in the JSCP and Service documents. In crisis situations, the supported command develops COAs based on CJCS planning guidance and resource allocation from approved OPLANs and CJCS warning or alert orders.

Using this JOPES function coupled with the JOPES support function, simulation and analysis, force sustainment and transportation feasibility are analyzed. The Services, through Service component commands, and supporting commands provide supportability estimates of the CINC's Strategic Concept or COAs to the supported command. Products from COA development include CINC's Strategic Concept; CJCS-approved Concept of Operations (CONOPS); the Commander's Estimate, including COAs; supportability estimates; and, time permitting, an integrated time-phased databases of notional combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) force requirements, with an estimate of required sustainment.

(4) *Detailed planning.* This function is used in developing a CONPLAN, OPLAN, or OPORD with supporting annexes and in determining preliminary movement feasibility. This function provides detailed force lists and required sustainment. This includes a fully integrated schedule of deployment, employment and mobilization activities, determination of support requirements, including medical, civil engineering, air refueling, host nation support and transportation needs, all based on the CJCS-approved CONOPS or COA. Detailed planning begins with CJCS guidance in the form of an approval for further planning in a peacetime environment or a CJCS Alert or Planning Order in a crisis action planning situation and ends with a CJCS-approved OPLAN or NCA-approved OPORD.


(5) *Implementation.* This function provides decision makers the tools to monitor, analyze, and control events during the conduct of military operations. It encompasses the execution of military operations and provides procedures to issue OPORDs; conduct mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities; and adjust operations where required. The ability to monitor and compare actual events with scheduled events is crucial to assessing mission accomplishment; controlling, directing, replanning, redirecting, or terminating operations; and conducting redeployment. Planning is a cyclic process that continues throughout implementation. Implementation begins with the CJCS execute order and usually ends with some type of replanning effort such as redeployment or redirection of operations.

(6) *Supporting functions.* Two supporting functions identified in Figure 6-2, monitoring and simulation and analysis, complement the operational functions to complete the conceptual framework of JOPES.

(a) *Monitoring.* This supporting function supports each of the other JOPES functions by obtaining current, accurate information concerning the status of friendly, enemy, and neutral forces and resources in accomplishing mission tasks. Examples of information processed are objective accomplishment; consumption data; and the status of deployment, procurement, mobilization, forces, and facilities.

(b) *Simulation and analysis.* This supporting function offers various automated techniques that enhance each of the other JOPES functions. Examples of simulation and analysis applications, when feasible, are force-on-force assessments (suitability); generation of force requirements; comparison of requirements to capabilities, such as consumption data; closure profiles (feasibility); and generation of mobilization and sustainment requirements based on need.

**k. JOPES planning process.** Joint operation planning and execution is a continuous, iterative process. It begins in response to perceived and identified threats to U.S. security interests; continues through military option and COA selection, operation plan, and operation order development and implementation; and ends when the requirement for the plan is canceled, the operation is terminated, or the crisis is satisfactorily resolved. Figure 6-4 shows the JOPES operational functions aligned with the deliberate and crisis action planning process.



**Figure 6-4. JOPES Relational Functions**

#### 6-4. Deliberate planning

**a. Applicability of JOPES.** This section describes the applicability of JOPES to deliberate planning, describes the deliberate planning process for operation plans, outlines responsibilities and recommended time requirements for the planning cycle, and provides guidance for resolving conflicts. JOPES applies to all operation plans except for the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) that is prepared with inputs from the CINCs in response to CJCS requirements. Operation plans are prepared in complete format or in concept plan format. Theater engagement plans and campaign planning are also a vital portion of the deliberate planning process. All are described below:

(1) *Operation plans (OPLANs).* An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan for the conduct of joint military operations. Prepared by the combatant commander, it includes a full description of the concept of operations and all annexes applicable to the plan. It identifies the specific forces, functional support and resources required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their movement into the theater. An OPLAN can be quickly developed into an OPORD. OPLANs are normally prepared when the contingency is critical

to national security and requires detailed prior planning or when detailed planning will contribute to deterrence by demonstrating readiness through planning. In some cases detailed planning is required to support alliance or combined planning. OPLANs also facilitate the transition to war and, through the development of supporting plans, establish the feasibility of the plan's concept of operations.

(2) *Concept plans (CONPLANs)*. A CONPLAN is an operation plan with or without time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the CINC's strategic concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the CINC to complete planning. CONPLANs with TPFDD require more detailed planning for the phased deployment of forces. Supporting plans are prepared as tasked by the supported combatant commander in support of their deliberate plans. As a rule, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared.

(3) *Functional plans*. The combatant commanders develop plans involving the conduct of military operations in a peacetime or non-hostile environment. Examples include plans for disaster relief, peace keeping, nation assistance, logistics, communications, surveillance, protection of U.S. citizens, nuclear weapon recovery and evacuation, and continuity of operations. Requirements for these plans should be satisfied by command publications. An example is the United States Army Europe (USAREUR) Reconstitution Plan. Unless specifically directed, no requirement exists to submit these plans to the Joint Staff for review and CJCS approval, but information copies will be submitted to the Joint Staff, J-7, for internal Joint Staff distribution. Although the planning procedures and formats prescribed in JOPEs, Volume II, are not mandatory for such plans, they may be useful.

**b. Campaign planning.** Campaign planning is the process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint task force commanders translate national and theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin prior to or during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance and resources become evident, but is not completed until the NCA select the COA during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is normally conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation.

**c. Deliberate planning process for OPLANs.**

(1) Conducted primarily during peacetime, deliberate planning is designed as a cyclic process which involves the entire JPEC in a coordinated effort to develop and refine plans to be used in wartime. In its basic form, deliberate planning has five formal phases (Figure 6-4). These phases produce a family of plans (the supported commander's plan, supporting plans, and plans designed for concurrent execution).

(2) Forces and sustainment requirements are developed by the supported commander and resourced by the Services, supporting commanders, and Defense agencies. The resourced forces and sustainment requirements requiring common-user lift are time-phased by the supported CINC and scheduled for movement by USTRANSCOM. The supported commander prepares the various annexes that provide detailed guidance to supported command components and subordinate commanders. The supported commander is authorized to task supporting commands and DOD agencies to participate in the planning process to include submitting supporting plans, as required. The supported command may

also request Joint Staff assistance in gaining planning support from agencies outside the Department of Defense. Supporting commands and agencies should be informed of support requirements as early as possible in the planning process. OPLANs must be thoroughly coordinated. The format and content for an OPLAN are prescribed in CJCSM 3122.03A, JOPES, Volume II.

**d. Deliberate planning process for CONPLANs.** The planning process for CONPLANs is the same as for OPLANs, except that the CONPLAN process normally omits the resource detail developed in the Plan Development Phase. The format and content for a CONPLAN are prescribed in CJCSM 3122.03A, JOPES, Volume II.

**e. Planning cycle responsibilities and time requirements.** JOPES uses a planning cycle that begins when the Joint Staff, in the name of the CJCS, publishes the JSCP and planning schedules and terminates at the end of the period to which the JSCP applies. The Joint Staff also reviews OPLANs, CONPLANs, Strategic concepts and functional plans are prepared by the CINCs in accordance with provisions of Enclosure D, CJCSM 3122.03. The JSCP provides guidance, assigns tasks, apportions major combat forces, and specifies items of materiel and lift assets available for planning. Following publication of the JSCP, the Joint Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, will produce an initial planning schedule for the development of the operation plans and concept summaries tasked in the JSCP. The initial planning schedule will be disseminated by message and will set forth established OPLAN submission and if required, plan refinement conference dates. All CINCs plans will be forwarded to the joint staff for approval. Upon receipt and after analysis of JSCP taskings and planning guidance, supported commanders develop new OPLANs, request permission to cancel approved plans no longer meeting JSCP requirements, or revise existing plans to conform to current JSCP and CJCS taskings. Canceled plans must be retained on file for a two-year period. Upon expiration of the two-year period, the record copy of the OPLAN (less TPFDD file) or CONPLAN specified as the permanent record will be retired to the applicable Federal records center. Records so retired will be marked with appropriate instructions to ensure their protection against improper release in accordance with CJCSI 5714.01, *Release Procedures for Joint Staff and Joint Papers and Information*. If the requirement for an existing operation plan is not changed by the JSCP tasking, the supported commander should review the plan to determine whether it is still sufficient and can still pass the tests of acceptability, feasibility, adequacy, and consistency with joint doctrine. If the plan still sufficiently passes these tests, the tasking may be satisfied by a message to the CJCS stating that the plan has been reviewed, analyzed, and can still meet the JSCP tasking. If the CJCS review results in concurrence, a CJCS message or memorandum will approve the plan for the appropriate JSCP period.

**f. Conflicting guidance.** CINCs who are also commanders of combined commands or who conduct coordinated planning on a bilateral or combined basis will report to the CJCS any conflicts between the guidance contained in JOPES and directives received from international authorities or provisions of any plan established by international agreement. The Chairman, U.S. Section, Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee, will report to the CJCS any conflicts between plans developed by the committee and the guidance in JOPES. In all cases, the provisions in JOPES will have precedence pending resolution of the conflict.


**g. Deliberate planning procedures.** Procedures for deliberate planning are designed to assist the planning community in the timely, efficient development of OPLANs and to provide a consistent framework for the planning process. The deliberate planning process phases and procedures are as shown in Figure 6-5 and 6-6. A detailed discussion of the requirements of each phase follows:

(1) *Phase I—Initiation.* Initiation is the phase in which planning tasks are assigned, resources available for planning are identified, and the groundwork is laid for planning.

(a) **Task assignment.** In the JSCP, the CJCS tasks the CINCs to develop operation plans and concept summaries. When such taskings are issued by message or other directive, they will normally be incorporated into the next edition of the JSCP. The extent of CINCs' planning is not limited by JSCP taskings. Each CINC has broad responsibilities assigned in the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action armed forces (UNAAF) and may prepare whatever plans are necessary to discharge those responsibilities. The CINC may decide to prepare an operation plan not required by the JSCP that would task forces not apportioned to the affected theater. However, the CINC will submit the requirements for the plan to the CJCS for approval before preparing the plan.

(b) **Resources.** The Joint Staff and the Services identify resources and provide guidance to the supported commander. The JSCP, other JSPS documents, joint doctrine, and Service planning documents provide the following:

- Strategic intelligence and guidance.
- Service doctrine and guidance.
- Resources available for planning.
- Priorities for accomplishing tasks.



**Figure 6-5. JOPES Deliberate Planning**

<b>Deliberate Planning</b>	
<b>PHASE I</b>	<b>INITIATION</b> - CINC Receives Planning Task From CJCS - Major Forces Available For Planning
<b>PHASE II</b>	<b>CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT</b> - Mission Statement is Deduced - Subordinate Tasks Are Derived - CINC's Strategic Concepts Are Developed The Product: A Concept of Operations
<b>PHASE III</b>	<b>PLAN DEVELOPMENT</b> - Forces Selected and Time Phased - Support Requirements Computed - Strategic Deployments Simulated / Analyzed - Shortfalls Identified and Resolved - Operation Plan Completed The Product: A Complete Plan
<b>PHASE IV</b>	<b>PLAN REVIEW</b> - OPLAN / CONPLAN Reviewed & Approved By CJCS - CINC Revises Plan / Based on Review Comments The Product: An Approved Plan
<b>PHASE V</b>	<b>SUPPORTING PLANS</b> - Supporting Plans Prepared

**Figure 6-6. Deliberate Planning Process**

(c) Review of previous operations. The Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL), as well as the Joint Utilization Lessons Learned System (JULLS) database, should be queried early in the planning process and periodically thereafter to obtain specific practical lessons in all areas of planning and execution based on actual operation and exercise occurrences. A regular review of this information during plan development can alert planners to known pitfalls and to highlight successful and innovative ideas.

(2) *Phase II—Concept development.* Concept development is the phase in which all factors that can significantly affect mission accomplishment are collected and analyzed, the mission statement is deduced, subordinate tasks are derived, COAs are developed and analyzed, the best COA determined, and the CINC's Strategic Concept developed and documented.

(3) *Phase III—Plan development.*

(a) Plan development is the phase in which the basic OPLAN, CONPLAN and supporting annexes are prepared. Upon receipt of the approved concept of operations, the supported commander prepares the OPLAN or CONPLAN in the format prescribed in JOPEs, Volume II, and submits it to the CJCS for formal review and approval.

(b) During this phase, the supported commander publishes guidance in a memorandum of instruction (MOI); the force list is structured; the nonunit-related materiel, nonunit-related personnel, noncombatant evacuation order (NEO) and medical evacuees, enemy prisoners of war (EPW), retrograde cargo, and transportation requirements are determined; the nuclear, civil engineering, and medical support planning is conducted; the TPFDD file is developed; shortfalls are identified; transportation feasibility is determined; and all the elements of the plan are documented for TPFDD refinement and preparation of the plan for submission to the CJCS for review and approval.

(c) At the beginning of the Plan Development Phase, the supported commander publishes a letter of instruction (LOI). The purpose of the LOI is to provide specific guidance to the CINC's service component commanders and supporting commands and agencies on how to develop the plan. The LOI should be coordinated with affected organizations (as an example, USTRANSCOM, or Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)) prior to publication to ensure that the planning guidance is current. The LOI should contain the supported commander's classification and Operational Security (OPSEC) planning guidance.


(4) *Phase IV—Plan review.* In this phase, all elements of the OPLAN, CONPLAN, and Concept Summary are assessed and validated. The Joint Staff, in coordination with the Services and appropriate Defense agencies, reviews OPLANs, CONPLANs, and Concept Summaries in accordance with the procedures in CJCSM 3122.01.

(5) *Phase V—Supporting plans.* In this final phase, all required supporting plans are completed, documented, and validated. Supporting plans, when required by the supported commander, will be submitted by the supporting command or agency to the supported commander within 60 days after CJCS approval. Information in the supported plan need not be repeated in the supporting plan unless it is so directed by the supported commander. In the absence of Joint Staff instructions to the contrary, the supported commander will review and approve supporting plans.

#### **6-5. Crisis action (time sensitive) planning (CAP)**

a. This paragraph and paragraphs 6-6 and 6-7 describe how the basic planning process is adapted and employed to plan and execute joint operations in crisis situations. Crisis is defined within the context of joint operation planning and execution as an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives.

b. An adequate and feasible military response to crisis demands a flexible adaptation of the basic planning process that emphasizes the time available, rapid and effective communications, and the use of previously accomplished contingency planning whenever possible. In time-sensitive **situations**, the JPEC follows formally established CAP procedures to adjust and implement previously prepared contingency plans or to develop and execute OPODs where no useful contingency plan exists for the evolving crisis. CAP procedures provide for the rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, the timely preparation of military COAs for consideration by the NCA, and the prompt transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders (Figure 6-7).



**Figure 6-7. JOPES Crisis Action Planning**

### 6-6. Relationship to deliberate planning

CAP procedures provide for the transition from peacetime operations to hostilities other than war or war. Deliberate planning supports crisis action planning by anticipating potential crises and operations and developing contingency plans that facilitate the rapid development and selection of a COA and execution planning during crises. Deliberate planning prepares for a hypothetical crisis based on the best available intelligence and using forces and resources projected to be available for the period during which the plan will be effective. It relies heavily on assumptions regarding the political and military circumstances that will exist when the plan is implemented. These ambiguities make it improbable that any contingency plan will be usable without modification as a given crisis unfolds, and every crisis situation cannot be anticipated. However, the detailed analysis and coordination accomplished during the time available for deliberate planning can expedite effective decision-making and execution planning as the crisis unfolds and assumptions and projections are replaced with facts and actual conditions. CAP procedures provide the means to respond to any crisis within a constrained time frame. CAP routinely includes the consideration and exploitation of deliberate contingency planning whenever possible.

### 6-7. Crisis action planning phases

**a. Planning sequence.** Because crises are fluid and involve dynamic events, planning procedures must be flexible. The activities of the JPEC are keyed to the time available and the significance of the crisis. Planning procedures describe a logical sequence of events beginning with the recognition of a crisis and progressing through the employment of U.S. military forces. Several points are identified in this sequence where key activities (or decisions) are required:

(1) *Phase I—Situation development.* An event when possible national security implications occur, are recognized, and reported.

(2) *Phase II—Crisis assessment.* The diplomatic, military, economic, and political implications of the crisis are weighed. A decision is made on possible requirement for a military force. Current strategy and applicable operations plans are reviewed.

(3) *Phase III—Course of action development.* CINCs are tasked, or a CINC is tasked to develop and recommend COAs, or the NCA may develop its own COA.

(4) *Phase IV—Course of action selection.* The NCA selects the COA.

(5) *Phase V—Execution planning.* A detailed operation order is prepared to support the selected COA. The level of detail is proportional to the time available for planning.

(6) *Phase VI—Execution.* The decision of the NCA to deploy or employ U.S. Forces is implemented. CAP phases are further defined in the remaining paragraphs of this section. Through the inherent flexibility of CAP, the time spent in each phase depends on the nature of the crisis.

**b. Post-execution activities.** Post-execution requirements (including preparing detailed after-action reports, assessing results, developing lessons learned, declassifying material, releasing information, and preparing follow-on plan reviews) will be as directed by the CJCS.

**c. Operation plans.** In a crisis, existing OPLANs or CONPLANs are reviewed for applicability to the situation at hand. Using CAP procedures, applicable existing plans are expanded or modified to fit the situation. If no existing plan applies, CAP procedures are followed to build an OPORD.

**d. Joint planning and execution community responsibilities.** Many organizations are involved in planning for a crisis. The composition of the JPEC and roles of members are described below.

**e. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).** The CJCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The CJCS manages the planning process; provides advice, options, and recommendations to the NCA; and conveys NCA decisions to the CINCs. More specifically, the CJCS receives and analyzes reports, tasks commanders to prepare estimates and COAs, reviews those estimates and COAs, resolves conflicts and shortfalls or seeks resolution from the NCA, and monitors the deployment and employment of forces. The NCA has the final responsibility and authority in a crisis. The NCA approves a COA and authorizes the major actions to be taken, including the deployment, employment, or redeployment of forces. Authority to conduct military operations against a potential enemy, as delineated in the JSCP, rests solely with the NCA, except as authorized under the applicable rules of engagement (ROE).

**f. Joint Chiefs of Staff.** The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the NSC, and the SecDef. A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the NSC, or the SecDef. Additionally, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers provide advice to the President, the NSC, or the SecDef on a particular matter when requested.

**g. Supported commander and service component commanders.** The supported commander, designated by the CJCS, has the primary responsibility for responding to a crisis. The supported commander is usually the commander of the unified command of the geographic area in which the crisis occurs. As soon as the supported commander becomes

aware that a military response may be needed, COA development begins and the supported commander provides an estimate of the situation to the CJCS. In developing COAs, the supported commander will consult with and task the commanders of subordinate components, subunified commands, or JTFs. If time permits, the Service component commands will develop the Service aspects of the concept, determine force and resource requirements, and build TPFDD files to implement appropriate concepts. The Service component commands will also work within Service channels to identify CS and CSS forces, critical materiel, sustaining supplies, filler and replacement personnel, and Reserve Component (RC) asset availability. Throughout the crisis, the supported commander will ensure that continuous communications are maintained with the supporting commanders concerning present requirements and anticipated future actions that might affect or necessitate additional support.

**h. Supporting commanders.** Supporting commanders are designated by the CJCS. Relationships between the supported and supporting commander will be in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2 (USAAF). Supporting commanders determine their ability to support each of the proposed military COAs and identify the actual units and associated movement data. Additionally, when supporting commanders provide lift assets in support of a COA, they will provide deployment estimates and schedules for non-USTRANSCOM assets.

**i. Services.** The Services are responsible for mobilizing and calling up RC forces when authorized; providing units, individual filler, and replacement personnel; and sustaining deployed forces.

**j. USCINCTRANS and components.** As a supporting commander, USCINCTRANS is responsible for the transportation aspects of worldwide strategic mobility planning (deliberate and crisis) and centralized wartime traffic management, including—

- Developing and operating the deployment elements of the crisis action planning and execution system.
- Receiving, evaluating, and coordinating global strategic mobility requirements in support of the other unified and specified commands.
- Optimizing the use of transportation capability.

**k. Other supporting agencies.** Combat support agencies such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), Central Imagery Office (CIO), and National Security Agency (NSA); and other U.S. Government agencies, such as Department of State (DOS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Transportation (DOT), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), play important roles as part of the planning community in developing, evaluating, selecting, and executing military COAs. These agencies provide information vital to NCA decision-making and should be considered early in the planning process; other agencies supply materiel, personnel, or other resources to support the military forces.


### SECTION III SINGLE-CRISIS AND MULTIPLE CRISIS-PROCEDURES

#### 6-8. Initiation of single-crises procedures

As previously discussed, a response to a crisis is normally carried out in six sequential phases. The time spent in each phase depends on the nature of the crisis. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the time spent in each phase can be compressed so that all decisions are reached in conference and orders are combined or are initially issued orally. A crisis could be so time-critical, or a single COA so obvious, that the first written directive might be a deployment or execute order. The time sensitivity of some situations may require so rapid a response that the normal CAP sequence cannot be followed. Accordingly, the commander's assessment may also serve to indicate recommended COA, normally developed in Phase III. In this situation, no formal warning order is issued, and the next communication received by the supported commander from the CJCS is the planning order or alert order containing the COA to be used for execution planning. A commander's assessment and proposals should be submitted at the earliest possible time to preclude an execution decision that may not consider the commander's position. Meanwhile other members of the JPEC are gathering information and developing an accurate picture of the crisis event. The following subparagraphs describe key activities during each phase of a crisis, and Figure 6-8 presents a general flow of the CAP procedures:

**a. Phase I—Situation development.** Phase I begins with an event having possible national security implications and ends when the CINC submits an assessment of the situation to the NCA and the CJCS. When a significant event is recognized, an initial report is submitted to higher headquarters. If the National Military Command Center (NMCC) receives the report from a source other than the commander of the unified command in whose area the event occurred, the NMCC will make every effort to establish communication with the CINC and request a report. In an assessment report, the CINC provides as much information as possible about the nature of the crisis, the forces readily available, major constraints to possible force employment, and actions being taken, if any, within existing ROE. As appropriate, the CINC's report also contains a succinct discussion of various COAs under consideration or recommended by the commander. A report that initiates CAP may be received by message or voice. Two formal reports that could initiate action are—

- (1) Critical Intelligence Communication (CRITIC).
- (2) Operational Report (OPREP)-3 PINNACLE Command Assessment (OPREP-3PCA). This is an event or incident report of possible national interest.



**Figure 6-8. Crisis Action Planning Process**

**b. Phase II—Crisis assessment.** Phase II begins with a report from the supported commander and ends with a decision by the NCA to return to the precrisis situation, or to have military options developed for possible consideration and possible use.

(1) Phase II is characterized by increased awareness and reporting and intense information-gathering activity. The CJCS, in coordination with the other members of the JCS, provides the NCA with an assessment of the situation from the military point of view and provides advice on possible military action. The CJCS reviews current strategy and existing OPLAN data in the JOPES and evaluates reports from the CINC and other sources. The CJCS establishes, or directs the establishment of a crisis teleconference if the supported commander has not already done so. The required assets are provided by the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE).

(2) The CINC continues to issue status reports as required and to report the significant actions taken within the existing ROE. The CINC continues to evaluate the crisis event and the disposition of assigned and available forces. The CINC will assess the employment status and availability of theater transportation assets and the transportation infrastructure.

(3) The Services participate in the CINC's review of available military forces, when time permits. The Services review will include, as appropriate, actions within Service purview to improve force readiness and sustainability and to identify potential RC requirements.

(4) USCINTRANS reviews the status of strategic lift assets and takes action as authorized and appropriate to improve the disposition and readiness of strategic lift assets and common-user port facilities.

**c. Phase III—Course of action development.**

(1) Phase III begins with a decision to develop possible military COAs, normally transmitted by a CJCS warning order, and ends when COAs are presented to the NCA.

(2) The warning order is a planning guidance message to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC and establishes command relationships (designating supported and supporting commanders) and states the mission, objectives, and known constraints. The warning order usually allocates forces and strategic lift or requests the supported commander to develop force and strategic lift requirements using JOPES. A tentative C-day and L-hour are provided in the warning order, or the supported commander is requested to propose a C-day and L-hour.

(3) Finally, the warning order directs the supported commander to develop COAs. If time permits, the supported command should use JOPES IT and begin entering preliminary force movement requirements. If a specific COA is already being considered, the warning order transmits the COA and requests the supported commanders' assessment. It also establishes a deadline for USTRANSCOM's preliminary force deployment estimate and force closure profile, and for the supported commander's response which is the commander's estimate. Time permitting, the CJCS may direct USTRANSCOM to develop a Deployment Estimate for analytical purposes. During the preparation of the warning order, the CJCS will use the GCCS to interact with the supported commander to ensure that mission support requirements are adequately detailed.

(4) In extremely time-sensitive situations, the warning order may be issued orally or even omitted. When it is omitted, a planning order or alert order may be issued in lieu of it and will contain the force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information. In response to the warning order, the supported commander works with supported command components, subunified commands, and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) and develops possible COAs using JOPES.

(5) The amount of time available for planning governs the level of activity. The supported commander manages the use of JOPES to construct COAs and tasks Service component commanders and supporting commanders to evaluate the proposed COAs by releasing an evaluation request message. The supported commander directs a review of existing OPLANs for applicability. Even if not applicable in full, deployment data extracted from existing plans may be useful.

(6) Finally, the supported commander prepares and submits a commander's estimate to the CJCS. It contains one or more possible COAs and the supported commander's recommendation. If time permits, COAs will include deployment estimates. In extremely time-sensitive cases, the commander's estimate may be provided orally.

(7) The supporting commanders and Service components take action as directed by the supported commander's evaluation request message. Activities will normally include the creation of combat, CS, and CSS lists and generation of a movement requirement estimate. Normally, they are directed to provide the required information in an evaluation response message or in JOPES (by developing a deployment databases).

(8) Sustainment planning (non-unit related cargo and non-unit related personnel data) will be coordinated with the Services as directed by the supported commander. USCINTRANS reviews the supported commander's proposed COAs and prepares and forwards deployment estimates to the supported commander, normally 24 to 36 hours prior to the commander's estimate, for each proposed COA. As time permits (as directed by the supported commander), the JOPES data will be used to develop a preliminary force deployment estimate and a force closure profile.

(9) The Services monitor COA development using JOPES and begin preliminary plans for providing support forces and sustainment. In addition, the Services continue to monitor force readiness and requirements for the RC, taking action or making recommendations to the CJCS, as appropriate.

**d. Phase IV—Course of action selection.**

(1) This Phase begins when COAs are presented to the NCA and ends when a COA is selected. The primary activity in this phase of crisis planning rests with the CJCS and NCA. All other members of the JPEC continue their activities as described in Phases II and III.

(2) The CJCS, in consultation with the other members of the JCS, reviews and evaluates the commander's estimate. Based on the supported commander's assessment, the CJCS prepares to advise the NCA. The CJCS may concur in the supported commander's recommended COA in whole or in part, direct the supported commander's development of an additional COA, or may develop and recommend a different COA.

(3) The CJCS presents possible military COAs to the NCA and, following the NCA decision, normally issues the alert order. The planning order is a message from the CJCS to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC.

(4) The primary purpose of the planning order is to direct that execution-planning activities begin before formal selection of a COA by the NCA. Used in this manner, the planning order saves time by allowing the planning activities described in Phase V to begin pending a decision by the NCA. The planning order is designed to allow the CJCS additional flexibility in directing military activities taken in response to a crisis.

(5) In extremely time-sensitive situations, the planning order may be used in lieu of a warning order. When used in this manner, the planning order will describe a specific COA; direct execution planning activities; and provide the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in a warning order. The planning order will not normally be used to direct the deployment of forces or to increase force readiness. If force deployment is directed, the planning order will require approval of the SecDef.

(6) The alert order is approved by the SecDef and transmitted to the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to announce the COA selected by the NCA. The

alert order will describe the selections in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander and other members of the JPEC to begin the detailed planning required to deploy forces. The alert order will also contain guidance, as needed, to change or amplify the guidance provided in the warning order.

(7) In extremely time-sensitive cases, the alert order may be omitted or issued in lieu of the warning order. When issued in lieu of a warning order, the alert order will contain the combat force, strategic lift, and C-day and L-hour information normally provided in the warning order.

**e. Phase V—Execution planning.**

(1) Phase V begins when a planning or alert order is received and ends when an executable OPORD is developed and approved for execution on order. Execution planning activities begin with the CJCS-issued planning or alert order. If (in the case of a planning order) an NCA decision on a COA is still pending, then the CJCS will notify the supported commander by message, GCCS, or orally (in extremely time-sensitive situations) when the NCA decision is made.

(2) The CJCS monitors the execution planning activities using JOPES and reviews the supported commander's OPORD for adequacy and feasibility. Time permitting, the CJCS may direct USCINTRANS to develop a deployment estimate for analytical purposes. In those instances where the crisis response does not progress into execution, the CJCS will evaluate the situation and provide the CINC guidance on either continuing under CAP or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures.

(3) During the execution-planning phase, the supported commander publishes a TPFDD LOI that provides procedures for the deployment, replacement, and redeployment of the operation's forces. The LOI provides instructions and direction to the CINC's components, supporting CINCs, and other members of the JPEC.

(4) Also, the supported commander converts an approved COA into an OPORD. The purpose of the supported commander's OPORD is to provide the components, supporting commands, and agencies a detailed operation plan and to task those involved to prepare for the operation. The supported commander also submits the OPORD to the CJCS for review. The amount of time available will govern the level of activity.

(5) A primary deployment concern of the supported commander during execution planning is to ensure that early deploying force requirements are adjusted as required in response to the alert or planning order and to the current situation. When firm force requirements and priorities are established, the supported commander notifies the JPEC that the force requirements are ready for sourcing.

(6) This signals force-providing organizations and supporting commands and agencies to provide or update specific unit movement data in JOPES for the first increment of movement (normally, the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of sea movement). It also prompts the Service logistics and personnel offices to adjust sustainment requirements based on the most accurate assessments available.

(7) When the above actions have been completed, the supported commander will review the TPFDD and notify USTRANSCOM that the movement requirements are ready for lift scheduling. The supported commander also requests that the Joint Staff and supporting commands and agencies assist in resolving any critical resource shortfalls or limitations.

(8) Supporting commanders providing forces will identify and task specific units and provide unit movement requirements in JOPES to allow lift scheduling for the first increment of deployment. Supporting commanders will develop OPORDs to support the approved COA effectively.

(9) The Service component commanders work with the Services and their major commands to identify and update estimated sustainment requirements in JOPES. Service components and supporting commands also schedule movements for self-deploying forces (organic moves).

(10) USCINCTRANS takes action to provide effective air, land, and sea transportation to support the approved COA or OPORD. USTRANSCOM will apply available transportation assets against the transportation requirement identified by the supported commander and will develop feasible airlift and sealift transportation schedules. USTRANSCOM also establishes air and sea channels for movement of non-unit sustainment and personnel.

(11) The level of detail will be commensurate with the availability of detailed movement requirements and the time available for planning. In extremely time-sensitive situations, USTRANSCOM will focus its planning effort on the first increment of the movement requirement.

(12) During Phase V, the Services determine mobilization requirements and take action to request the authority to mobilize. The Services also provide nonunit sustainment and recommend the necessary actions to improve manpower and industrial readiness. The Services work with the supported commander's components in establishing or updating sustainment requirements. The Service subordinate commands that provide augmentation forces as supporting commands also schedule organic (self-deploying) movements in JOPES.

**f. Phase VI—Execution.**

(1) Phase VI begins with the decision to execute an OPORD, transmitted by a CJCS Executive order, and continues until the crisis is resolved satisfactorily. The CJCS, reflecting the decision of the NCA, publishes the execute order, issued by authority and direction of the SecDef, orders the supported commander to execute the OPORD.

(2) The execute order is normally a simple, straightforward message directing the deployment and employment of forces. However, in extremely time-sensitive situations, the execute order may be the only message provided. In such situations, the CJCS ensures that the execute order contains the information normally provided in the warning and alert orders.

(3) Throughout the operation, the CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces and takes actions needed to effect a quick and successful termination of the crisis. In those instances where the crisis response does not progress into execution, the CJCS will evaluate the situation and provide the CINC guidance on either continuing under CAP

procedures or developing a plan to expand, reduce, or continue planning using the deliberate planning procedures.

(4) Should the NCA desire to increase the deployability posture, position forces, or take other preparatory action that might signal a U.S. intent to respond militarily to a situation, a deployment preparation or deployment order will be published by the CJCS. These orders are issued by authority and direction of the SecDef and may be issued at any time throughout the crisis.

(5) Deployments or preparations for deployment may also be included as part of the warning, planning, or alert orders and will always require NCA approval. The supported commander executes the OPORD and uses JOPEs to monitor the force deployments.

(6) Incremental force sourcing and lift scheduling continue, with USCINCTRANS managing the deployment process in accordance with the supported commander's force and sustainment priorities.

(7) The supported commander reports force or resource shortfalls to the CJCS for resolution. The supported commander employs assigned forces to accomplish the assigned mission.

(8) The Service component commanders work with the Services and their subordinate commands to continue to provide forces and to report movement requirements within JOPEs. Supporting commanders execute their supporting OPORDs.

(9) Management of common-user transportation assets needed for movement of forces and sustainment is a function of USCINCTRANS, who will report the progress of the deployment to the CJCS and the supported commander. USCINCTRANS will support the Joint Staff in developing lift allocations and report shortfalls to the Chairman and the supported commander. USCINCTRANS will support the Joint Transportation Board (JTB), as required, during resource deliberations. The Services continue to provide for the sustainment of forces.

### **6-9. Initiation of multiple-crisis procedures**

**a. When to use multi-crisis procedures.** Multiple-crisis procedures are used by the JPEC to respond to situations in which more than one crisis is occurring simultaneously. The following procedures define only those procedures unique to multiple-crisis situations. These procedures supplement, but do not replace, those found in the preceding section. Multiple-crisis procedures apply when all of the following conditions are met:

- CAP procedures are in progress for two or more crises.
- Competing demands for combat forces or resources exceed availability.
- The supported commanders are unable to resolve the conflict over combat forces or resources.

**b. Multiple-crisis events may occur in a single theater.** The supported commander facing two or more crises may apply multiple-crisis procedures when the available forces or resources are insufficient to carry out assigned missions simultaneously. The procedures unique to multiple crises are provided in the following subparagraphs. The procedures are

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organized by phases as are single-crisis procedures. Within each phase, activities are described for applicable members of the JPEC.

(1) *Phase I—Situation development.* No procedures unique to multiple crises are established in this phase.

(2) *Phase II—Crisis assessment.* The key activity in this phase is the exchange of information. When crises occur in two or more theaters, initial reports and subsequent status reports will be provided to all the supported commanders involved.

(3) *Phase III—Course of action development.* When publishing warning orders for multiple crises, the CJCS will allocate forces and resources as necessary. Combat forces will be allocated to supported commanders within each warning order. If forces or resources are insufficient, the CJCS will establish planning priorities. The Joint Transportation Board (JTB) or the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) may be convened, if needed, to allocate the available resources and strategic lift or recommend allocations to the CJCS.

(a) Activities of the supported commanders. The supported commanders will develop COAs using those forces and resources allocated for planning. The effect on mission accomplishment of force, materiel, strategic lift, or other resource shortfalls will be defined briefly in the commander's estimate.

(b) Activities of the supporting commanders and service components. The supporting commanders and Service components allocate CS and CSS forces to the tasked supported commanders. This allocation will be in rough proportion to the CJCS-allocated combat force. If CS and CSS forces are insufficient to meet all tasks, the supporting commanders and Service components will allocate such forces in accordance with priorities established by the CJCS.

(c) Activities of USCINTRANS. The command coordinates the preparation of movement requirements and deployment estimates with the supported commanders to resolve potential conflicts in the use of transportation assets, to remain within port workload constraints, to identify firm movement requirements. Issues that cannot be resolved will be referred to the CJCS.

(d) Activities of the Services. The Services will take action to identify and alleviate anticipated shortages in supplies and forces. The Services will identify and take action to activate needed Reserve units and personnel.

(4) *Phase IV—Course of action selection.* The primary activity in this phase rests with the CJCS and NCA. In recommending COAs to the NCA, the CJCS, in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), will consider, and brief to the NCA, the impact of each COA on other COAs approved or contemplated. The briefing will include the impact of multiple deployments on strategic lift and other resources. If resources are insufficient to meet the needs of all supported commanders, the CJCS will brief plans in priority order and recommend that the available resources be based upon these priorities.

(5) *Phase V—Execution planning.* The primary activity of the CJCS during this phase is the adjudication of conflicting demands for forces, resources, and strategic lift. The

CJCS may convene the Joint Materiel Priorities Analysis Board (JMPAB) or the JTB to resolve resource or strategic lift shortfalls.

(a) Activities of the supported commanders. The supported commanders monitor the process as forces and resources are identified (“sourced”) in all the OPLANs being considered. The supported commanders react to conflicts, dual-tasking of units, and resource shortfalls by modifying the concept of operations or by seeking resolution by the CJCS.

(b) Activities of the supporting commanders and service components. The supporting commanders and Service components seek to allocate forces and resources without conflict (e.g., dual-tasking units) or shortfalls (e.g., unfilled force or resource requirement). The supported commander will be advised of all known unresolved conflicts or shortfalls.

(c) Activities of USCINTRANS. USCINTRANS will examine port workloads and other factors that may be affected by the execution of multiple plans. USCINTRANS will develop and integrate movement schedules.

(d) Activities of the Services. The Services will attempt to resolve dual-tasked units and shortfalls by advising the supported commander and Service component commanders of untasked or substitute units. The Services will participate in the JMPAB, assisting the CJCS in resolving resource shortfalls.

(6) *Phase VI—Execution.* If a force deployment is in progress and a second, more threatening, crisis erupts, the NCA, through the CJCS, may halt existing deployments or order the redeployment of forces. The procedures in Phases I through V of this section apply.

## **SECTION IV**

### **ARMY MOBILIZATION**


#### **6-10. Framework for mobilization planning**

a. The DOD Master Mobilization Plan (MMP) provides the framework for mobilization planning within the DOD. The MMP provides a conceptual overview of the DOD mobilization planning process and its relationship to the development of military operations plans. It also provides a basis for making mobilization decisions within the DOD and managing the mobilization process to support military operations.

b. Army participation in joint operations planning and Army planning for mobilization must be integrated processes. Joint Pub 4-05, Mobilization, facilitates integration of these processes by identifying the responsibilities of the JCS, Services, CINCs, transportation component commands, and other agencies engaged in mobilization planning.

c. AR 500-5, *Army Mobilization*, incorporates DOD and CJCS mobilization planning guidance in a single Army publication. It recognizes the close relationship between operations planning and mobilization planning. It provides the means, within the Army, to accomplish both in a coordinated manner.

d. The mobilization plans of Army MACOMs and agencies, together with those of Headquarters, Department of the Army, constitute the Army Mobilization Plan (Figure 6-9). AMOPES is the vehicle by which all components of the Army plan and execute actions to provide and expand Army forces and resources to meet the requirements of unified commands. AMOPES serves as the Army supplement to the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System. It provides the interface between the Army's plans to provide forces and resources and the unified commander's plans to deploy and use them. It also provides a standard set of guidelines for developing these plans and an integrated structure for the planning products.



**Figure 6-9. Army Mobilization Planning**

### 6-11. AMOPES overview

a. **AMOPES.** AMOPES ensures that the Army plans and executes actions necessary to provide the forces and resources to meet requirements of the combatant commanders. It covers a wide range of general functions covering the full course of a military action, conflict, or war. These functions include training, exercises, mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, expansion of forces beyond the approved force structure, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstruction of Army forces. The goal of AMOPES is to ensure that the Army can adequately support all future combat operations of the combatant commanders, as opposed to concentrating only on getting our forces into the theater of operations. AMOPES is also adaptable for planning operations other than war. The system is not just a planning system but also an execution system. The use of OPLAN format, with functional annexes and appendices, emphasizes the operational nature of the system.

b. **Required mobilization plans.** Each of the following commands/activities will prepare mobilization plans, to include deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstitution actions when appropriate. Mobilization plans of MACOMs, Army components of unified commands and other army elements as indicated by DCSOPS HQDA are forwarded for review prior to publication. Plans will be prepared in accordance with guidance contained in the AMOPES basic plan and annexes:

- MACOMs
- Army components of unified commands
- Mobilization stations (power projection platforms/power support platforms) (PPP/PSP)
- Support installations (AR 5-9)

- Staff support agencies and field operating agencies

**c. Mobilization files.** Mobilization files in place of plans will be maintained as directed by commander Forces Command (FORSCOM) or the commanders of the Eight United States Army (EUSA), USAREUR, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), or United States Army Pacific (USARPAC). The latter will use FORSCOM guidance to develop mobilization files.

**d. The Army mobilization plan (AMP).** The AMP is a collection of individually published mobilization plans of the MACOMs, Army components of unified commands, and other designated Army elements. The AMP currently consists of Volume I through Volume XIX. AR 500-5 further amplifies responsibility for each volume.

## **6-12. Mobilization planning responsibilities**

**a. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.** Army Staff responsibility for developing Army mobilization and operations policy and guidance; developing priorities for mobilization of RC units; directing the call-up of RC units and preparing them for deployment; and establishing, publishing, and maintaining AMOPES. The AMOPES responsibilities include coordinating the structure and content of AMOPES with ARSTAF, MACOM, and other Army activities; tasking agencies and commands to prepare appropriate portions of AMOPES; reviewing agency and command mobilization plans; and ensuring AMOPES guidance, policies, and products satisfy applicable OSD and CJCS guidance and are updated biennially, as a minimum, but not later than 45 days after publication of the JSCP.

**b. Principal DA officials and Army Staff agencies.** Each agency is responsible for assisting the ODCSOPS, HQDA, in developing and maintaining those portions of AMOPES pertaining to their respective areas of interest and for mobilization and operational planning activities within their respective functional areas. They disseminate additional guidance to staff support agencies (SSA) and field operating agencies (FOA) on related matters. In development of mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization and reconstitution plans and other matters, they review and approve mobilization plans of respective SSAs and FOAs.

**c. MACOMs.** Each MACOM is responsible for assisting the ODCSOPS, HQDA, in developing and maintaining those portions of the AMOPES pertaining to their respective mission areas. MACOMs are also responsible for mobilization and operations planning within their respective mission areas and for publishing a command mobilization plan as a volume of the Army Mobilization Plan. Such plans will be submitted to HQDA for review and approval prior to publication. MACOMs are also responsible for compliance with the guidance and procedures published in the AMOPES.

### **d. Specific responsibilities.**

(1) FORSCOM is the DA executive agent for CONUS unit mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstitution planning and execution. FORSCOM also develops the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS) which will standardize CONUS wide policies and procedures for all Army mobilization efforts for CONUS based Army forces in support of approved military operations.


(2) USASOC is responsible for the alert notification of all Reserve Component special operations forces (RCSOF) units to include mobilization, validation, deployment, and demobilization for wartime or other assigned missions. USASOC coordinates with FORSCOM during the mobilization process to ensure sustainment, training, equipping, and deployment of CONUS based RCSOF is accomplished in a timely manner. USASOC provides follow-on personnel and equipment to sustain RCSOF units and individual replacements provided to the CINCs.

(3) TRADOC acts as HQDA executive agent for the CONUS replacement center (CRC) operations. TRADOC will establish and operate CRC which will receive and prepare individuals and filler personnel for onward movement. TRADOC will establish procedures and ensure that the training base infrastructure can be rapidly expanded to support contingency operations and insure that individual ready reserve (IRR) are properly assessed, trained and processed for onward movement in time of crisis. As part of the AMOPES, develop and maintain the TRADOC Mobilization Operation Planning and Execution System (TMOPES).

(4) MACOMS and Army components of unified commands support HQDA in developing and maintaining AMOPES, and assist FORSCOM units to ensure plans to mobilize, deploy, redeploy, demobilize, and reconstitute are sound and workable. Memorandums of Understanding will be initiated with FORSCOM, where appropriate, for execution of the Army Mobilization functions.

**e. Mobilization planning.** Mobilization, under the concept of graduated mobilization response, is a tool provided to the NCA to respond in varying degrees to crises as they occur. It is the act of preparing for war or other emergencies through assembling and organizing national resources. It is also the process by which the armed forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. It can include actions up to ordering RC to active duty, extension of terms of service, and other actions necessary to transition to a wartime posture. This section provides an overview of the mobilization process within the framework of the AMOPES, the types of mobilization, the mobilization process, and the interface with non-DOD agencies.

(1) *AMOPES functional subsystems.* The primary objective of the Army mobilization process is to mobilize, deploy, and sustain the theater force. The major subsystems involved are theater force units, military manpower, and materiel. Supporting these subsystems are a number of interrelated CONUS-based functionally-oriented subsystems; principally PPP/PSP, the training base, the logistics structure, the medical structure, and transportation support. These subsystems are interrelated as shown in Figure 6-10 and described in more detail below.



**Figure 6-10. AMOPES Subsystems**

(2) *Theater force units.* The theater force consists of theater force units, military manpower (individuals), and materiel apportioned for deployment to the theater of operations. The objective of the theater force units subsystem is to ensure the orderly and timely availability of Army units at ports of embarkation (air and sea) for deployment as prescribed in war plans or as directed by the JCS. The approved force consists of Active, National Guard, and Reserve units. It also may include certain new, or unresourced, units that would be activated on order.

(3) *Active Army.* Active Army units do not require mobilization; they are either forward-deployed or designated to support one or more operation plans by the JSCP and Annex A of the AMOPES. When an emergency arises, the JCS alert CONUS-based active units through FORSCOM channels (through Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) channels for Hawaii and Alaska-based units). Pre-position (PREPO) units, which deploy by air to link up with prepositioned equipment, turn in equipment that will remain behind, load equipment to accompany troops, load equipment not authorized prepositioning (NAP) and items that may be short in PREPO, and move to a designated airport of embarkation. PREPO shortages may be shipped by air and/or sea as required by the TPFDD. Units with organic equipment load their equipment and move either to an air or seaport of embarkation.

(4) *Army National Guard.* During peacetime, the preparation of Army National Guard units for mobilization is the responsibility of the State Governor. Guidance is issued to the Governor by HQDA through the Chief, National Guard Bureau, and by FORSCOM and USARPAC to the adjutants general of the respective States. ARNG units are commanded by the State Governor until federalized. Once federalized, ARNG units become Active Army units under the appropriate MACOM.

(5) *Army Reserve.* During peacetime, the preparation of Army Reserve units for mobilization is the responsibility of the CG, FORSCOM through the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC); the Commander, USARPAC; and Commander, USAREUR for assigned Army Reserve units. Army Reserve units are usually apportioned to one or more operations plans or designated to support the CONUS sustaining base. Selected later-deploying units may receive interim assignments to augment a particular element in the CONUS base. Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM) is responsible for the management and continued training of the IRR and Retired Reserve. These pools provide for the largest resource of pretrained soldiers. AR-PERSCOM executes its peacetime mission

through direction of Office of the Chief Army Reserve (OCAR) and, on order of Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel (DCSPER), orders to active duty selected numbers of individuals.

(6) *Unresourced and new units.* FORSCOM prepares, in coordination with each supported CINC, a proposed activation schedule for each major planning scenario identified in the JSCP. Changes emanating from the CINC's response to biennial JSCP guidance (TPFDD shortfall), total Army analysis (TAA) determinations of which units in the required force structure will be unresourced, and structure changes reflected in Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development will all be considered in the development of the proposed unit activation schedule (UAS). The prioritized activations will include additional support units required to sustain the current force. In preparing this activation schedule, close attention will be given to recognized equipment availability constraints, particularly major weapon systems. The composition of the proposed UAS and the recommended priorities will be reviewed and approved by HQDA.

## SECTION V THE ARMY WARTRACE PROGRAM.

### 6-13. WARTRACE program description and composition

a. **WARTRACE program subsystems.** The Army WARTRACE (not an acronym) program organizes the total force into cohesive groupings of Active and Reserve (ARNG and USAR) units based on contingency mission requirements. The primary objective is to train in peacetime in the alignment configuration the unit will go to war. The program is governed by AR 11-30 and FORSCOM Regulation 11-30. Headquarters FORSCOM is the coordinating authority for the WARTRACE program. The peacetime commander has primary responsibility for execution of the WARTRACE program. This is accomplished through notification of alignment, ensuring training and resourcing remain focused on wartime mission's, and monitoring subordinate units' receipt of mission guidance. The wartime gaining command is responsible for providing mission guidance to all units within their WARTRACE program. This guidance, as a minimum, will contain the unit's wartime mission, area of employment, and the recommended priorities for planning and training.

(1) *Military manpower.* The objective of the military manpower subsystem is to ensure full and timely use of all available sources of individual military manpower to fill the requirements of theater force units for deployment, sustain the deployed force with trained fillers and replacements, and provide mobilization augmentation for the CONUS sustaining base.

(a) Prior service personnel are grouped generally by their training status. Pretrained individual manpower (PIM) is a generic term consisting of the following manpower categories: Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Inactive National Guard (ING), Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA), Standby Reserve (SBR), and the Retired Reserve. Qualified individuals in these categories are the primary source of manpower to reinforce Active Army and Reserve Component units during the early phases of mobilization. Unskilled individuals, principally IRR members whose skills have eroded, or who were transferred to the IRR in lieu of discharge prior to the completion of initial entry

training, will be ordered to an appropriate training center to complete training. Each of these PIM categories is explained further in Chapter 7.

(b) Non-prior service personnel include Selective Service inductees, delayed entry enlistees, and volunteer enlistees who, by law, require a minimum of 12 weeks training prior to deployment.

(c) Selective Service inductees constitute the largest single source of post-mobilization manpower. Delayed entry personnel are active and reserve enlistees who are high school graduates or students awaiting graduation, and reserve unit members who have completed basic training and are awaiting advanced training.

(d) Replacement centers to process and equip nonunit-related individual replacements will be established by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) at sites normally collocated with Army Training Centers. These CONUS Replacement Centers (CRC) are close to the Air Force Air Mobility Command designated airfields with strategic lift capability. In addition to final preparation of replacements for oversea movement, Preparation for Overseas Replacement, (POR), CRCs will issue individual clothing, equipment, and weapons.

(2) *Matériel*. The objective of the matériel subsystem is to ensure the full and timely availability of adequate military matériel to fill the requirements of theater force units for deployment and to sustain the deployed force in accordance with requirements and priorities.

(a) Sources of supplies and equipment include the organic equipment of deploying and nondeploying units, PREPO Unit Residual (left behind) Equipment (PURE), and that equipment scheduled for delivery through procurement and maintenance channels.

(b) War reserve matériel stocks (WRMS) consist of military matériel acquired in peacetime to meet military requirements at the outbreak of war until the sustaining production base can be established. WRMS are acquired to meet the war reserve matériel requirement (WRMR) established in the Army guidance.

(3) *Mobilization stations (power projection/power support platforms (PP/PSP))*. The objective of the mobilization stations subsystem, now called (PPP/PSP), is to ensure the orderly expansion of Army posts, camps, and stations and their timely ability to receive, house, supply, train, and deploy theater force units.

(a) There are 15 designated PPP, and 12 PSP. Mobilization stations develop mobilization TDAs (MOBTDA) based on guidance provided by their parent MACOM to enable mobilization stations to meet surge population and operational requirements. Expansion of mobilization services is accomplished by deleting nonmission-essential services; extending the workweek; executing option clauses in existing contracts; and contracting for personnel and services.

(b) When mobilized units arrive at their designated mobilization stations and command passes to the mobilization station commander. The commander is then responsible for correcting readiness deficiencies that restrict the deployment readiness of the units. The commander cross-levels personnel and equipment in accordance with established HQDA policies and priorities and FORSCOM/USARPAC instructions. The commander is

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responsible for unit training and deployment validation in accordance with HQDA policy as implemented by FORSCOM/USARPAC.

(4) *Training base.* The objective of the training base subsystem is to ensure the orderly and timely availability of trained manpower to mobilize for CONUS base support and theater force requirements.

(a) TRADOC and HQDA are responsible for operating the component organizations that comprise the post-mobilization training base, induction centers, reception stations, training centers, and Service schools. Headquarters, Department of the Army (ODCSPER) is the agent for DOD and all matters pertaining to the operation of the Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) and the military entrance processing stations (MEPS), also known as induction centers. MEPCOM, through the MEPS, is responsible for providing facilities for conducting physical and mental examinations, and inducting qualified registrants into the armed forces.

(b) The Army's capability for receiving and processing enlistees, inductees, and other accessions will be increased in the event of mobilization. The existing reception stations (all collocated with existing TRADOC training centers) will be expanded. USAR training divisions/brigades will be mobilized to increase the capacity of TRADOC training centers and establish new training centers at selected FORSCOM installations. This is important, especially during any MTW, however it seldom happens or is very limited during SSC.

(c) The capacity and capability of the Army Service Schools will also be expanded. The existing TRADOC Service School structure will be expanded and selected United States Army Reserve Forces (USARF) schools will be mobilized to expand the capability of designated TRADOC Service Schools and to augment the U.S. Army Training Centers.

(d) AMC provides extensive refresher and skill sustainment training for both ARNG and USAR units and individuals during peacetime and specialized post-mobilization training in accordance with existing agreements.

(5) *Logistics support system.* The objective of the logistics support system is to provide logistical support to meet mobilization and deployment/employment requirements of the Army.

(a) Supply, maintenance, services, and facilities capabilities must be expanded to deploy and sustain the force. The Army will expand its supply storage, handling, procurement, and production capabilities. Storage policies will be relaxed to permit open storage on improved and unimproved sites, public warehouses, and contractor facilities. The waiving of formal advertising and competitive bidding will expedite the ability to procure goods and services. Suppliers will accelerate deliveries by going to multishift production operations. A major objective of the supply system will be to expedite the availability of needed materiel for entry into the transportation subsystem and responsive delivery to the recipient. The Army will call on the existing (wartime) authority to utilize the national industrial base for preplanned production and buy, lease, or contract for goods and services from any available commercial source.

(b) Upon mobilization, the Army maintenance structure has several immediate goals. It absorbs Reserve Component combat service support units, executes emergency civilian hiring procedures in accordance with mobilization TDAs, and implements already negotiated maintenance contracts and interservice and Federal agency support agreements. Mission-essential items receive the highest priority of maintenance effort. First priority will go to equipment items for deployed and/or deploying theater force units. Equipment in excess of mobilization needs left behind by deploying units would be second priority and third would be specific items identified and managed by HQDA.

(c) It will be necessary to expand troop service support (food services, laundry, dry cleaning, bath, and mortuary) to accommodate the expanded mobilization station population. Service facilities at newly activated mobilization stations will be renovated utilizing available materiel, funds, and manpower. As required, support units will be tasked to provide mobilization stations with unit facilities and equipment until general support force units can assume these functions.

(d) The Army production base is comprised of Army-controlled industrial activities and contractor facilities. The Army will also coordinate expanded production requirements with the defense logistics Agency on common use items. Included in these industrial activities are active and inactive ammunition plants, arsenals and proving grounds, missile plants, and other miscellaneous plants. These facilities are to be activated or expanded to provide maximum wartime levels of production of materiel.

(e) Expansion of the CONUS training and sustaining base facilities will be required under full mobilization. Initially, expansion of capacity will be achieved from immediate cessation of nonessential activities; relaxation of space, environmental, and other constraining criteria; and the rehabilitation of facilities using available labor and the self-help effort of using units. New facilities construction will feature modern prefabrication technology to provide increased living, storage, and work space needed early in the post-mobilization buildup period.

(6) *Medical support.* As dictated by crisis action, U.S. Army hospitals may initiate conversion to their planned mobilization configuration to accommodate the vastly increased military population and expected theater force casualties.

(a) Health care services (inpatient and outpatient) may be limited to active duty military personnel, with the exception that outpatient occupational health services will continue for civil service employees. If so, all nonmilitary inpatients will be discharged or transferred to civilian or other Federal hospitals as expeditiously as possible. TRICARE service centers and the local military medical treatment facility will assist eligible beneficiaries in completing administrative requirements for procuring health care from civilian sources.

(b) With the approval of the Commander, Medical Command (MEDCOM), and the Office of the Surgeon General, HQDA, inpatient services may be continued beyond M-Day to D-Day for family members and retirees (if M-Day and D-Day do not coincide). Medical center/medical department activity commanders may continue outpatient services for family members and retirees as resources permit.

(7) *Transportation support.* The objective of the transportation support subsystem is to move the entire force (units, individual replacements, and materiel) within CONUS, and to and from overseas commands. Overall responsibility for transportation support is vested in USTRANSCOM and its transportation component commands.


(a) Intra-CONUS movements of mobilizing units and materiel are coordinated by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) in cooperation with installation transportation officers and various state and local agencies. Strategic transportation to and from overseas theaters is the responsibility of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and the Air Force Air Mobility Command (AFAMC), the other two component commands.

(b) Management of the surface lines of communication is split among MTMC, MSC, and the theater commanders. MTMC is responsible for CONUS line-haul and common-user terminal operations. MSC is charged with ship contracting and scheduling. The theater commander manages intratheater surface movements. The schedule for cargo movement and port operations must interface with the schedule for ships. Port throughput capacity, both in CONUS and in a theater of operations, is a major consideration and is often a limiting factor. Finally, surface transportation planning procedures must be flexible enough to allow planners to adjust to exigencies such as ship or port losses.

(c) AFAMC is responsible for airlift operations. To meet response times postulated by the JSCP, planners must be able to develop and maintain flow plans that can be executed rapidly. This capability requires detailed planning among the users of common-user airlift assets. In addition, AFAMC requires 3-4 days to achieve a full-surge airlift capability. This time is required to marshal Active Air Force elements and to mobilize and position essential Air National Guard and Air Reserve units. Therefore, to develop realistic flow plans, planners must carefully balance airlift requirements with capabilities until a full surge capability can be achieved and maintained. A limiting factor to U.S. airlift capability is the availability of Strategic Air Command (SAC) tanker resources, which are periodically tasked to support other national-level operations. Planners must consider the potential availability of tanker resources when developing flow plans and must closely coordinate with other claimants for refueling aircraft.

(d) USTRANSCOM coordinates and monitors time-sensitive planning and execution of force and resupply movements for deployment of CONUS-based Army and Air Force combat forces. It also coordinates deployment planning with Navy and Marine Corps forces. (These deployments should not be confused with the normal rotation of units, ships, squadrons, etc. in peacetime.) USTRANSCOM assists the CJCS in resolving transportation shortfalls with supported and supporting commanders, military transportation agencies, and the Services.

**b. Types of mobilization.** Generally, the magnitude of the emergency governs the type of mobilization. As authorized by law or congressional resolution and when directed by the President, DOD mobilizes all or part of the armed forces as shown in Figure 6-11. Concurrently, the DOD and other Federal agencies marshal national resources in order to sustain the mobilized force.



**Figure 6-11. Reserve Categories and Mobilization**

(1) *Selective mobilization.* For a domestic emergency, the President (or Congress, upon special action) may order expansion of the active armed forces by activation of RC units and/or individual Reservists to deal with a situation where the armed forces may be required to protect life, Federal property, and functions, or to prevent disruption of Federal activities. A selective mobilization would not be associated with a requirement for contingency plans involving external threats to the national security.

(2) *Presidential reserve call-up (PRC).* The President may augment the active forces by a call-up (involuntary) of units and individuals of the Selected Reserve, up to 200,000 persons, from all Services, for up to 270 days, to meet an operational requirement. The President must notify Congress whenever the authority to call up the RC is exercised.

(3) *Partial mobilization.* For a contingency operation or war plan or upon declaration of a national emergency, Congress or the President may order augmentation of the active armed forces (short of full mobilization) by mobilization (involuntary) of up to one million persons of the Ready Reserve (units or individuals) for up to 24 months. Actually, only the President is limited by the one-million-person ceiling and 24-month limit. Congress may specify other limits in a partial mobilization implemented with a congressional declaration of national emergency.

(4) *Full mobilization.* Full mobilization requires passage by Congress of a public law or joint resolution declaring war or a national emergency. It involves the mobilization of all RC units in the approved force structure, all individual Reservists, and the materiel resources needed for this expanded force structure. Terms of service may be extended to the duration of the war plus six months under this authority. For both planning and operations, Mobilization Day (M-Day) is the day full mobilization occurs.

(5) *Total mobilization.* Total mobilization involves expansion of the active armed forces beyond the approved force structure by organizing and/or activating additional units to respond to requirements of the emergency. The national resources—to include production facilities—to sustain additional forces will also be mobilized. Congressional authorization is required for these actions.

**c. Mobilization Authority.**

(1) The authority to order mobilization resides with the President and the Congress as outlined in the stages of mobilization shown in Figure 6-12. An example of the USAR

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participation on the mobilization continuum is shown in Figure 6-13. A national emergency may be declared by the President, by Congress, or both.

(2) The *National Emergencies Act* passed in 1976 provides that when the President declares a national emergency, the declaration or subsequent Executive order must specify the specific authorities being invoked. The President's powers are limited to those invoked until the subsequent announcement of the invoking of additional specific authorities. Once the President declares a national emergency for a specific purpose, the national emergency will remain in effect for one year, unless sooner rescinded or extended. Under the *Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946*, all Executive orders must be published in the Federal Register.

(3) The SecDef, with the advice and recommendation of the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), recommends to the President and the Congress the mobilization authority required to support a given contingency, OPLAN, or national emergency. The SecDef directs mobilization of Reserve Component units and manpower through the military departments.

**d. Peacetime planning.** The Army plans and prepares for mobilization in peacetime. It participates in war planning to establish Army forces and the requirements for their augmentation. It programs and budgets resources and acts to man, equip, and train the Total Army and to prepare for its employment during a war or other national emergency. Planning is accomplished in accordance with the provisions of the JOPEs and AMOPEs. This peacetime planning essentially consists of war planning, intended to develop the OPLANs for the conduct of operations (addressed earlier in the chapter and in Chapter 4) and mobilization planning.

**e. DOD mobilization planning process.** Mobilization planning, primarily a Service responsibility, is based on guidance from OSD and JCS. OSD guidance is included in the biennial Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) (see Chapter 4). JCS guidance is contained in the JSCP (see Chapter 10). In addition, Joint Pub 4-05, Mobilization, assigns general responsibilities and procedures for mobilization. The JCS coordinates the mobilization plans of the Services and ensures the interface of these plans with deployment.

**f. Mobilization planning in other Federal departments and agencies.** In addition to DOD, approximately 50 Federal departments and agencies have emergency planning responsibilities. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the Federal Government coordinator of these emergency management activities in both peace and war.

AUTHORITY LIMITS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EXPAND BEYOND THE APPROVED PEACETIME RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE STRUCTURE</li> <li>DURATION PLUS 6 MONTHS</li> <li>DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY</li> </ul>				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ALL EXISTING RESERVE COMPONENT FORCE STRUCTURE</li> <li>DURATION PLUS 6 MONTHS</li> <li>DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY</li> </ul>				
SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 MILLION ALL SERVICES</li> <li>24 MONTHS</li> <li>DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY</li> </ul>		PARTIAL MOBILIZATION	FULL MOBILIZATION	TOTAL MOBILIZATION
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>200K ALL SERVICES</li> <li>270 DAYS W/ NO EXTENSION</li> <li>PRESIDENTIAL ORDER</li> </ul>				
AUTHORITY TYPE	SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION	* PRESIDENTIAL RESERVE CALL-UP			
CRISIS LEVEL	DOMESTIC EMERGENCY	SSC	1 OR 2 MTW	2 PLUS MTW	GLOBAL WAR

\* PERSONNEL AND DURATION BASED UPON SITUATION

Figure 6-12. Stages of Mobilization




Figure 6-13. Operational and Mobilization Continuum

(1) FEMA’s responsibilities include policy guidance and planning to ensure that government at all levels is able to cope with and recover from emergencies. FEMA assesses national civil mobilization capabilities and develops concepts, plans, and systems for management of national resources. It identifies actual and potential shortages in natural, industrial, economic, and other resources; develops plans to mitigate their national security impacts; and fosters programs to reduce our national vulnerability to such resource shortages.

(2) FEMA is the principal respondent to military requirements for civilian sector resources during mobilization. It coordinates the response of the civil agencies to defense needs, always cognizant that without the might of the Nation’s industrial production, transportation networks, work force, financial institutions, energy, and natural resources, there could be no national security. Likewise, without food, clothing, housing, health care, and education, there would be no civilian population to support the defense of our way of life

and our constitutional government. FEMA must, therefore, see to it that national resources are used to meet both the military and the essential civilian needs of the nation.

**g. Army mobilization planning.** Army mobilization planning provides the resources required to support various OPLANs. This includes mobilizing the units, manpower, and materiel required for immediate implementation of an OPLAN as well as the resources required to sustain the operation. AMOPES incorporates the guidance of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), JSCP, and Joint Pub 4-05, and specifies the planning process used to develop HQDA and MACOM mobilization plans. The FORSCOM Mobilization Plan, with its associated FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), details the time-phased flow of mobilizing RC units from home stations to their mobilization stations. The TRADOC Mobilization Operational Planning and Execution System (TMOPES) provides installations and training base augmentation units in the USAR with guidance on training base expansion activities.

**h. Relationships of war planning and mobilization planning.** AMOPES provides the linkage between war planning under JOPES and mobilization planning as directed by DOD and the JCS. AMOPES establishes the who, what, where, why and how of mobilization. It further prescribes the Army Crisis Action System for managing the execution of mobilization and operation plans. The principal products of AMOPES are prepared executable plans, supporting information, and data-bases prepared and maintained for use during national crises. Mobilization plans incorporate the specific actions and responsibilities that must be accomplished both in peacetime and upon the order to mobilize. The HQDA and MACOM mobilization plans which constitute the Army Mobilization Plan (AMP) are based on guidance contained in AMOPES and other documents. Most mobilization plans are oriented toward full mobilization. (Figure 6-14). For selected contingencies, however, the Army has developed partial mobilization plans.

**i. Peacetime preparation.** Preparation for mobilization proceeds concurrently with planning. The Army programs, budgets, and funds resources to overcome the shortfalls and limiting factors identified from a continuing analysis of the various operations plans. Concurrently, the Army trains units and individuals. Within its capabilities, it identifies and preassigns augmenting manpower and prepositions materiel to support those plans.

**j. Alert, mobilization, and deployment.**

(1) On receiving the order to mobilize, the Army begins a Presidential Reserve Call-up (PRC), a partial or full mobilization, as directed by the SecDef, of RC units, pretrained manpower, and materiel. A portion or all of the mobilizing force may augment an established theater force such as Europe, or may augment a force deployed in a contingency operation. Under the general supervision of HQDA, FORSCOM, USAREUR, and USARPAC bring Active Army and Reserve Component units to combat-ready status and then deploy them by air and sea to the area(s) of operation according to the deployment plans.

(2) An initial pool of reserve materiel resources exists in war reserve stocks in the continental United States and prepositioned stocks in overseas areas. The initial resources sustain the deployed force until reinforcement and resupply pipelines can be established or the emergency is resolved. Active Army units in place in the theater of operations are referred to as “forward-presence” units. Other Active Army units, most of them CONUS-

## How the Army Runs

based, are earmarked by FORSCOM war plans to support one or more requirements of the JSCP and AMOPES.

(3) When an emergency arises, units are alerted through FORSCOM, USAREUR, or USARPAC channels to deploy to the theater of operations in accordance with applicable OPLANs. Reserve Component units (ARNG and USAR) are ordered to active duty by mobilization orders transmitted by HQDA through FORSCOM/ USARPAC command channels. Units may be apportioned to support one or more OPLANs or they may be apportioned to become part of the CONUS base.

MOBILIZATION PHASE	PHASE 1 PRE-MOB	PHASE 2 ALERT	PHASE 3 HOME STATION	PHASE 4 Mobilization Station	PHASE 5 PORT OF EMBARKATION
PRIMARY ACTIVITY LOCATION	HOME STATION (ARMORY OR USAR CENTER)	HOME STATION (ARMORY OR USAR CENTER)	HOME STATION (ARMORY OR USAR CENTER)	Mobilization Station	AIR OR SEA PORT
ACTIVITY DURATION (DAYS)	AS TIME PERMITS	3 to 7 DAYS	3 DAYS	10 to 180 DAYS	1 to 2 DAYS
PRIMARY ACTIVITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MOB PLANNING</li> <li>• TRAINING</li> <li>• SOLDIER READINESS PROCESSING</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNIT RECALL</li> <li>• MOB ORDER PREP</li> <li>• PERSONNEL SCREENING</li> <li>• EQUIP. RECORDS CHECK</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CONTINUE SRP</li> <li>• INVENTORY EQUIP.</li> <li>• CROSS LEVEL PER./EQUIPMENT</li> <li>• LOAD FOR MVMT.</li> <li>• ADV. PARTY TO MS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MOVE TO PPP</li> <li>• COMPLETE SRP</li> <li>• CONDUCT TNG</li> <li>• COMPLETE CROSS LEVEL</li> <li>• COMPLETE VALID.</li> <li>• LOAD FOR MVMT.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MOVE TO POE</li> <li>• LOAD TRANSPORT.</li> <li>• DEPLOY</li> </ul>
OUTCOME	PLANNING	NOTIFICATION	PREPARATION	VALIDATION	DEPLOYMENT

**Figure 6-14. Mobilization and Execution Process**

### k. FORSCOM mobilization planning.

(1) FORSCOM publishes the FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), FORSCOM Regulation 500-3, based on HQDA guidance contained in AMOPES. FORMDEPS contains planning directives and guidance to MACOM commanders, CONUSA, major troop units, FORSCOM installation commanders, other MACOM installation commanders, State adjutants general (in consonance with NGB), and the major U.S. Army Reserve commands (MUSARC). FORMDEPS also contains annexes on the various functional aspects of mobilization and updates the GCCS-A Mobilization Planning Line based on OPLAN TPFDD.

(2) FORSCOM coordinates with USASOC, TRADOC, MEDCOM, TRANSCOM, Military Transportation Movement Center (MTMC), Army Materiel Command (AMC), and NGB in preparing data. The GCCS-A Mobilization Planning Line includes scenario dependent data RC deploying and redeploying MTOE and TDA units in the Army Status of Resources and Training System (ASORTS). The Mobilization Planning Line includes the following data (as applicable) for these units:

- Unit description, component, and home station.

- Power projection platform data.
- Unit mobilization data (notional).
- Ready-to-load dates.
- Deployment data for the applicable TPFDD(s).

**l. Mobilization flow.** Mobilization execution is decentralized to MACOMs. FORSCOM, USARPAC, and USAREUR are the principal MACOMs that command mobilizing Reserve Component units. Other MACOMs (USASOC, TRADOC, MEDCOM, AMC, and MTMC) assume command of designated nondeploying units. Upon receiving the order to mobilize, most Reserve Component units move to one of 15 PPPs and 12 PSPs within the two CONUS Army areas and the USARPAC area to train before deploying or augmenting the CONUS base. Cross-leveling of equipment and personnel assets, required to make units mission-capable, takes place primarily at PPPs. AMC provides wholesale management for materiel. PERSCOM serves in a similar management role for personnel. Medical Command expands medical support services and facilities. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers expands troop housing, training, industrial, and other facilities.

## **SECTION VI INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS**

### **6-14. The need for industrial preparedness**

In the post-Cold War era when global conflicts are unlikely, we must maintain a viable industrial base that can replenish expenditures of critical war material following regional conflicts or operations other than war in a timely manner. Most future conflicts will be short-lived, “come as you are” actions. Although the industrial base may be called upon to sustain the deployed forces, more likely it would be needed to expeditiously replace losses in order to be prepared for another contingency.

### **6-15. DOD industrial base preparedness objectives**

**a.** OSD’s objectives for improving the preparedness of our nation’s industrial base to meet contingency requirements have changed radically in recent years. There are six objectives set forth in the Defense Planning Guidance:

**(1)** Promote a strong, technologically -advanced industrial base able to develop, produce, and support advanced military systems in a cost-effective manner.

**(2)** Foster integration of the civilian and military industrial and technology base by: encouraging and using commercial technologies in military equipment to the maximum extent feasible; eliminating defense-unique specifications and standards wherever possible; and demonstrating a clear preference for commercial and other nondevelopmental items, as well as commercial buying and manufacturing practices, to the extent permitted by law.

**(3)** Preserve only those unique defense-related skills, facilities, processes and technologies essential to execute the program, or that are highly likely to be essential beyond the program, and not likely to be economically reconstitutable, or available from other nondomestic sources. This includes cost-effective investments in layaway/shutdown procedures for those assets deemed essential to support requirements; e.g., storage of

blueprints, videotapes, data files, or other documentation of the production processes/skills and, where necessary, storage of production equipment and tooling, etc.

(4) Maintain real growth in industrial preparedness planning funding levels. Use the funding to support planning and to accomplish the first three objectives.

(5) Program industrial preparedness measures to permit accelerated production of only those munitions, critical support items, and spares where this is a cost-effective alternative to full war reserve inventories.

(6) Reduce weapon system support costs without sacrificing readiness or wartime mission capability. Near-term actions are desired that will result in outyear support cost reductions.

b. The DOD strategy that can be inferred from these objectives is relatively straightforward. To begin with, the focus is on producing advanced military systems cost-effectively. The next objective deals with utilizing commercial and dual-use technology by eliminating defense peculiar specifications and standards whenever possible. The next two deal with retention and enhancement of the industrial base. Retention will only be undertaken for those essential unique defense-related processes and technologies that cannot be economically replaced or substituted. Enhancement of the industrial base (Industrial Preparedness Measures) will only be employed to accelerate production of critical items where economically advantageous to retention of assets.

### **6-16. DOD-level industrial preparedness management**

a. It is DOD policy to maintain a State of industrial preparedness by working with private industry to produce, maintain, and repair materiel that meets mobilization requirements. Where it is determined that required mobilization items cannot be provided by the private sector, then government-owned facilities and equipment are acquired and maintained to produce them.

b. Overall responsibility for managing the DOD Industrial Preparedness Program is vested in the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Economic Security (ASD(ES)). The Office of the ASD(ES) develops policy to ensure the rapid and coordinated production of materiel to meet mission requirements; providing a basis for planning, programming, and budgeting relating to improving industrial base responsiveness; and it directs the industrial preparedness programs of the Services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). It develops procedures to guide the allocation of available industrial production capacity for contingencies to avoid conflicts or overcommitment.

c. The ASD(ES) is responsible for advising the SecDef on the relative urgency of acquisition programs. The recommendations are presented as the DOD Master Urgency List (MUL) and provide the priority basis for assigning production resources. The DOD MUL includes only those programs which are designated as "DX". Essential support items are assigned to the same urgency category as their end items. Since the production of every item needed by the Services is prohibitively expensive, the key to a successful industrial preparedness program is the careful selection of critical materiel on which to apply scarce resources. The following paragraphs exemplify this management philosophy.

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**6-17. The Defense Priorities and Allocations System (DPAS)**

**a.** This regulatory system (15 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 700), administered by the Department of Commerce (DOC), is used to ensure the timely availability of industrial resources to meet approved national defense and emergency preparedness program requirements, and to provide an operating system to support rapid industrial response in a national emergency.

**b.** The authority for this is found in Title I of the *Defense Production Act* (50 USC app. 2061, et seq.), which authorizes the President to require—

(1) The priority performance of defense contracts and orders over all other contracts and orders.

(2) The allocation of materials, services, and facilities necessary and appropriate to promote the national defense.

**c.** The DPAS establishes two levels of contract priority- “DX” and “DO”. DX priority rated contracts and orders take precedence over DO priority rated contracts and orders; and DX rated contracts and orders take precedence over un-rated / commercial contracts and orders. The DPAS requires that—

(1) All priority rated contracts and orders be accepted by contractors and suppliers capable of their performance.

(2) That precedence be given to priority rated contracts and orders as necessary to achieve timely delivery.

(3) That contractors extend the priority rating on contracts and orders placed with vendors and suppliers.

**d.** Although the DPAS is self-executing, in the event of a problem involving acceptance, scheduling, production, or any situation that would interfere with timely delivery against a priority rated contract or order, Special Priorities Assistance may be requested. DOC may take “official action” under the DPAS to resolve the problem.

**6-18. The National Defense Stockpile**

The Federal Government has maintained a supply of strategic and critical materials designed to decrease our nations vulnerability to interruptions in the foreign supply of these materials in time of national emergency. Recently it was decided to dispose of the stockpile materials, retaining only a few of the most critical and essential, to cover U.S. defense requirements for not less than three years of national emergency. The stockpile is managed by the Department of Defense through the Defense National Stockpile Center, a Defense Logistics Agency organization.

**6-19. DOD key facilities list (KFL)**

A list of facilities of such importance that loss through sabotage, subversion, terrorism, or other hostile acts would seriously impair the national defense posture of the United States. FORSCOM uses these documents in fulfilling its responsibility for CONUS land defense planning.

## **6-20. Army Industrial Preparedness Program**

The DOD-level management philosophy applies to the Army's Industrial Preparedness Program as well. The Army depends on private industry as the foundation for production of military materiel. Therefore, when Army production facilities or depot-level maintenance do not exist, first consideration will be given to developing private industrial facilities which produce critically-needed items. Management tools available include the following:

**a. Industrial preparedness planning (IPP).** Conducted to ensure that an adequate industrial base is established, maintained, and retained to be responsive to military materiel requirements in the event of an emergency. It involves the assessment of the capability of the industrial base to support peacetime and emergency operations, and planning with industry to ensure adequate procurement, production, and maintenance capabilities to meet support requirements.

**b. DA critical items lists (DACILs).** Prepared by HQDA (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans), they provide biennially a priority list of items required to sustain warfighting for either an indefinite or surge contingency. It also provides stable mobilization requirements to support planning with industry. The DACIL is the basic document from which industrial preparedness planning is conducted.

**c. Industrial preparedness planning list (IPPL).** Prepared by Army Materiel Command (AMC) from the DACIL, the IPPL consists of critical items having long lead-time components. Many of these components require special manufacturing skills, or other production challenges requiring detailed planning.

**d. Production base analysis (PBA).** This describes the status of the Army's industrial readiness. It shows the base required for production and depot-level maintenance of IPPL items. Contingency production requirements are matched against the capacity of the industrial base, and actions needed to improve base readiness are identified.

**e. Industrial preparedness measures (IPMs).** These actions aid industry to overcome production deficiencies in the Army's industrial base. IPMs are designed to shorten production lead-time, increase production or repair capacity, and reduce inspection time. IPMs for accelerated production will only be used where this is a cost-effective alternative to stockpiling.

## **SECTION VII SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

### **6-21. Summary**

The utility of the Army to the Nation depends to a large extent on whether its forces can be rapidly and effectively mobilized, deployed, employed, and sustained. The process of planning for contingencies or for eventualities that Army forces are needed somewhere to accomplish specified tasks, is a continuous, all-encompassing process. It includes all aspects of Army management, be it manpower procurement, training, materiel development, or fiscal assets and constraints.

Central to the task of reinforcing existing active forces is the ability to mobilize Reserve Component assets and to deploy them with the least possible delay to the theater where they

will be needed. Although the U.S. Industrial Base may be called upon to accelerate production to directly support the deployed forces, it will normally be utilized to repair and replace the damaged/destroyed equipment and munitions and other consumable expenditures following the conflict.

## **6-22. References**

- a. DOD Directive 4400.1, *Defense Production Act Programs*.
- b. Joint Publication 4-05, *Mobilization Planning*.
- c. Joint Publication 6-02, *Joint Doctrine for Employment of Operational / Tactical Command, Control and Communication Systems*.
- d. CJCS Memorandum 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*, Volume I, (*Planning Policies and Procedures*).
- e. CJCS Memorandum 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)*, Volume II, (*Planning Formats and Guidance*).
- f. CJCS Memorandum 3122.02A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES)* Volume III, (*Crisis Action Time Phased force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution*).
- g. CJCS Manual, 3500.03, *Joint Training*, change 4.
- h. Army Regulation 11-30, *The Army WARTRACE Program*.
- i. Army Regulation 500-5, *Army Mobilization*.
- j. Army Regulation 700-90, *Army Industrial Base Program*.
- k. Field Manual 100-17, *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment and Demobilization*.
- l. FORSCOM Regulation 11-30, *The Army CAPSTONE Program*.
- m. FORSCOM Regulation 55-1, *Unit Movement Planning*.
- n. FORSCOM Regulation 500-3, *FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMSDEP)*, Vols. 1-10 (U).
- o. U.S. National Defense University, *Armed Forces Staff College Publication 1*.
- p. U.S. Department of Commerce, *Defense Priorities and Allocation System (DPAS) Regulation (15 CFR 700) (Revised Edition)*, August 1998.



# CHAPTER 7

## RESERVE COMPONENTS

*“We are The Army—totally integrated into a oneness of purpose—no longer the Total Army, no longer the One Army. We are The Army, and we will march into the 21st Century as The Army. We acknowledge the components and their varying organizational strengths. We will work to structure The Army accordingly.”*

General Eric K. Shinseki, CSA, Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army, 23 June 1999

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 7-1. Chapter content

Traditionally, demands upon the Army to accomplish its missions have been accomplished using either Active Army (AA) or Reserve Component (RC) forces. The power-projection force of today is different; we can only accomplish those missions using a mix of AA and RC forces. The RC are vital to mission accomplishment.

#### 7-2. Reserve Components

The reserve forces of the Army consist of two components: the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United States Army Reserve (USAR).

### SECTION II THE NATIONAL GUARD

#### 7-3. An American tradition

The National Guard is an important link in a unique American tradition tracing its origin back to the militia in 1636. Many ARNG units in the eastern U.S. can trace their lineage back to the local militia organizations that fought on the side of the British during the French and Indian War and later against the British in the Battle for Independence. The term “National Guard” was first used to honor the Marquis de Lafayette. On his visit to New York in 1824, the American honor guard was renamed the “Battalion of National Guards” in tribute to Lafayette’s command of the Garde Nationale of the French Army in Paris during 1789.

#### 7-4. National Defense Act of 1916

With the *National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA-1916)*, the term “National Guard” became the official name. The NDA-1916 also expanded the role of the National Guard in national defense. Though the Guard remained a State force, a direct result of the act was increased

Federal oversight and assistance. NDA-1916 increased the number of times a National Guard unit was brought together for training called drills. These four-hour drill periods increased from twenty-four to forty-eight periods. Additionally, it authorized National Guard units to perform fifteen consecutive days of paid annual training (AT), paid for the drill periods, and increased overall Federal funding. NDA-1916 also required National Guard units to be organized like AA units, established Federal standards for commissioning officers in the Guard, and gave the President authority to mobilize the National Guard in case of war or national emergency.

### **7-5. World War I**

Following World War I, questions arose over the National Guard's status and existence that were ultimately resolved in the *National Defense Act of 1933*. The 1933 Act created a new Army component, the National Guard of the United States, identical in personnel and units to the States' National Guard. This new component was part of the Army, and could be ordered into Federal service by the President when Congress declared a national emergency. The National Guard by statute is the primary reserve force for the AA. At the same time, the Guard provided the State Governors a force for disaster relief, maintaining public peace, and when in a State Status, a force for utilization during State and local emergencies. The National Guard has made significant contributions to the Army's combat power throughout this century. The National Guard provided 17 of the 43 divisions in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in World War I. The 30th Division, from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee, received the highest number of Medals of Honor in the AEF.

### **7-6. World War II**

In World War II, total mobilization was ordered. New Mexico's 200th Coast Artillery and two newly created tank battalions helped in the defense of the Philippines. They soldiered on with their Regular Army counterparts as prisoners of war after U.S. forces surrendered on the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor. Eighteen National Guard divisions fought in World War II, equally divided between the European and Pacific theaters. The first division to deploy overseas, the 34th Division, was a National Guard division. National Guard divisions were an instrumental part of General MacArthur's island hopping campaign in the Pacific theater. In the European theater, National Guard divisions participated in all campaigns from North Africa, to Sicily and Italy, to the Normandy Invasion and subsequent breakout, the race across France, the Battle of the Bulge, and the final campaign to conquer Germany. Following World War II, the Air National Guard was formed and remains part of the National Guard.

### **7-7. Korean War**

The Korean War caused a partial mobilization of the National Guard. A total of 138,600 soldiers were mobilized, including eight infantry divisions and three regimental combat teams. Two of these divisions served in Korea, two went to Europe, and four remained in the U.S. to help reconstitute the strategic reserve.

### **7-8. Vietnam War**

During the Vietnam War the National Guard played a much smaller role than in the past. This was primarily a political decision not to mobilize the country's RC. After the Tet

Offensive of January 1968, a small number of RC units mobilized, including 34 Guard units. Most were support units.

### **7-9. Desert Shield/Desert Storm**

During Operation Desert Shield/ Desert Storm, RC units were on active duty within days after the invasion of Kuwait. The majority of the Army's combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units were in the RC. The first Guard units mobilized were transportation, quartermaster, and military police. Later two ARNG field artillery brigades deployed to Southwest Asia providing essential fire support capabilities. In total, 62,411 ARNG personnel were ordered to active Federal service of which 37,848 deployed to Southwest Asia.

### **7-10. Current Force**

Today the ARNG contains over half of the combat force structure. The ARNG is currently structured with eight combat divisions and fifteen separate combat brigades. These fifteen brigades, referred to as enhanced separate brigades (eSB), are apportioned to warfighting in support of the AA. The ARNG has the only two RC Special Forces Groups, which are part of Special Operations Command (SOCOM). The ARNG is also structured with CS and CSS units. Many of these units are considered high priority and apportioned to support active forces. Today's ARNG provides 56 percent of the combat, 40 percent of the CS, and 34 percent of CSS units (Figure 7-1).

## **SECTION III THE ARMY RESERVE**


### **7-11. Federal control**

Whereas the National Guard evolved from the tradition of the decentralized colonial or State controlled militia system, the USAR evolved from the reality that a significant portion of the nation's military reserve must be centrally controlled in times of peace and war, like the AA, by the Federal Government.

### **7-12. The formative years**

The concept for an American Federal reserve force was first proposed by General George Washington, Generals Frederick von Stueben, Henry Knox, and Alexander Hamilton during the formative years of the United States military establishment (1783-92). Due to the lack of a visible threat to national security, combined with the young republic's regional focus, only a paramilitary structure for Army reserve officer training materialized during the nineteenth century. Today, the private military academy, Norwich University, founded in 1819 by Captain Alden Partridge for training citizen-soldiers as officers, is considered the origin of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC). Following this precedent and model, many other State and private military schools were founded, and the provisions of the *Morrill Act* (1862) for military instruction at State universities further supplemented this movement. Thousands of Army officers who served in the Civil War (1861-65), on both sides, and World War I (1917-18) received their military education in the reserve officer training programs of these institutions. Problems faced in mobilizing the Army for the Spanish-American War (1898-99) and the emergence of the United States as a world power at the

beginning of the 20th century, with international commitments, pressured American political and military leaders to finally establish the Federal reserve force proposed by Washington and Hamilton. Initially, in 1908, Congress established the Medical Reserve Corps. Then, using its constitutional authority “to raise and support armies,” Congress passed legislation in 1916 and 1920 creating the Organized Reserve Corps, which included the Officers Reserve Corps and the ROTC.



**Figure 7-1. FY 00 Total Army Composition**

**7-13. World War I**

More than 160,000 reservists served on active duty in World War I. During the interwar period, the Army planned for thirty-three divisions at cadre status, and from 1933 to 1939, approximately 30,000 reserve officers served active duty assignments as commanders and staff members of the Civilian Conservation Corps camps. Twenty-six reserve divisions mobilized for World War II (1941-45), and roughly a quarter of all Army officers who served were reservists, of which over 100,000 were ROTC graduates.

**7-14. Korean War**

About 200,000 reservists mobilized for the Korean War (1950-53), comprising 64 percent of the total reserve component mobilization and involving 971 reserve units. In the 1950s, under the patronage of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, the Organized Reserve Corps was reformed into the present USAR structure and revitalized in order to play a more prominent role in supporting the AA.

**7-15. Changing role**

As a result, in the decades that followed the USAR force structure evolved away from a combat role to CS and CSS roles. By the end of 1996, the USAR troop unit composition was 68 percent CSS, 31 percent CS, 22 percent mobility base expansion, and only 1 percent

combat. This change in mission necessitated a command and control reorganization in order to regulate the thousands of company and detachment-sized CS and CSS units.

Reorganization led to the establishment of: (1) regional support commands (RSC) and direct reporting commands (DRC) (2) U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) to command and control continental U.S. (CONUS) based USAR units (less U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC)), (3) Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM) to administer the nonaligned force, and (4) the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR) to advise the Army Chief of Staff on USAR matters.

#### **7-16. Operations Just Cause to Joint Endeavor/Guard**

The USAR participated in Operation Just Cause (1989) and 85,276 reservists served in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (1990-91), using 647 reserve units to accomplish both CONUS and overseas missions. More than 70 percent of all reserve forces mobilized for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti came from the USAR; and as of December 1997, more than 73 percent of all reserve forces mobilized for Operation Joint Endeavor/Guard in Bosnia are Army Reserve.

#### **7-17. Current force**

Today's restructured USAR provides 33 percent of the Army CSS units, 23 percent of the CS, 100 percent of the railway units and enemy prisoner of war brigades, 100 percent of the training and exercise divisions, and 98 percent of its civil affairs units (Figure 7-1).

### **SECTION IV**

#### **TITLE 10 U.S.CODE**

#### **7-18. United States Code (USC)**

Title 10, U.S. Code, contains the general and permanent laws governing the Armed Forces. Various sections of Title 10 establish and govern the RC. Specific provisions of the Code pertaining to the Army and Air National Guard are contained in Title 32, U.S. Code.

#### **7-19. Title 10 and Title 32**

The role of the RC as stated in section 10101, title 10, USC is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in time of war, national emergency, or when national security requires. Title 32 further states that ARNG units shall be ordered to Federal active duty and retained as long as necessary whenever Congress determines they are needed. Policy statements further define these basic roles. The RC role clearly has expanded from one of wartime augmentation to being an integral part of the force. The Army can meet no major contingency without the RC. The totally integrated Army is no longer just a concept; it is a guiding principle (Figure 7-1).

## **SECTION V RESERVE SERVICE**

### **7-20. The categories**

There are three major categories of reserve service: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve (Figure 7-2).

- Ready Reserve (ARNG/USAR)
  - Selected Reserve
    - Troop Program Units
    - Active Guard Reserve (AGR)
    - Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA)
  - Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) (USAR Only)
  - Inactive National Guard (ING) (ARNG Only)
- Standby Reserve (USAR)
- Retired Reserve (USAR)

**Figure 7-2. Reserve Service Categories**

### **7-21. The Ready Reserve**

The Ready Reserve has three subcategories:

#### **a. The Selected Reserve.**

(1) The Selected Reserve consists of ARNG and USAR unit members, Active Guard Reserve (AGR) members, and Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) (USAR only). Normally, members of ARNG and USAR units attend forty-eight paid unit training assemblies (UTA), each of which is a minimum of four hours duration, and perform two weeks of AT each year (USAR: 14 days, ARNG: 15 days). Officers, noncommissioned officers, and members of high-priority units have increased AT and inactive duty training (IDT) requirements. The prevalent system in most units is to conduct multiple unit training assemblies (MUTAs) consisting of four consecutive assemblies (MUTA-4), the equivalent of one weekend per month. Individuals are also eligible for active duty for special work (ADSW), or active duty for training (ADT) to accomplish military training and schooling. The minimum peacetime training objective is that each unit attains proficiency at platoon level in combat arms units and company level in CS/CSS units.

(2) USAR soldiers are acquired primarily through USAR AGR recruiters working for the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC), and with RC career counselors who move soldiers from the AA to RC at transition points. ARNG soldiers are acquired primarily by ARNG AGR recruiters working for State ARNG recruiting organizations and, like USAR soldiers, with the assistance of RC career counselors at transition points. Both ARNG and USAR units have military technicians who serve as Federal civil service employees during the week and as members of the unit during training assemblies or periods of active duty. RC

personnel serving on active duty in an AGR status and members of the AA attached directly to the units, provide full-time support.


(3) The AR-PERSCOM makes officers' assignments from the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) in coordination with the RSC and gaining troop program units (TPU). The vast majority of officers are assigned to USAR TPUs based on voluntary assignments.

(4) The charts at Figures 7-3 and 7-4 show the historical and projected decline in the strength of the Selected Reserve. Current plans reduce the ARNG from 405,000 force structure allowance (FSA) spaces to 388,000 FSA spaces in Fiscal Year (FY) 2000 with a 350,000 programmed end strength (ES). For the USAR, FSA traditionally equaled the programmed end strength with the Fiscal Year 1998 allowance of 208,000 spaces, decreased to 205,000 in Fiscal Year 2000. However, during Total Army Analysis 2007, HQDA granted the USAR the same FSA to ES ratio as the ARNG. Additionally, the 1997 RC Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reduction of 25,000 spaces was deferred pending the outcome of QDR 2001.

(5) Included in the Selected Reserve are IMAs (USAR only). IMAs are assigned to AA wartime-required positions not authorized in peacetime. They are also assigned to Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Selective Service positions. As members of the Selected Reserve, IMA are subject to the Presidential 200,000 call-up. The IMA program provides for a mandatory 12 days of AT.

**b. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) (USAR only).**


(1) AR-PERSCOM exercises command and control over IRR, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. For strength accountability purposes, the IRR consists of pre-trained individual soldiers assigned to various control groups for control and administration available for mobilization in time of war or national emergency declared by Congress. The control group "Annual Training" consists of nonunit Ready Reserve members with a training obligation, who may be mandatorily assigned to a unit by the Commander, AR-PERSCOM. The control group "Reinforcement" consists of obligated members who do not have a mandatory training requirement and those nonobligated members interested in nonunit programs which provide retirement point credit. This includes USAR, ARNG, and discharged AA soldiers that have met their training requirement but have not completed their eight year service obligation. The *Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act* (ROPMA) replaced the Officer Personnel Management System USAR (OPMS-USAR) and defines the training requirements and opportunities for IRR and unit officers. The Enlisted Personnel Management System—USAR (EPMS-USAR) focuses on training and management of IRR enlisted members.



	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
ES	368	367	362	357	350	350	350	350
FSA	420	405	405	405	388	388	388	388

As of: JUL 00

**Figure 7-3. ARNG End Strength and Force Structure Allowance**




	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
ESO	230	215	208	208	205	205	205	205
FSA	230	215	208	208	205	225	225	225

As of: JUL 00

**Figure 7-4. USAR End Strength and Force Structure**

(2) The IRR constitutes the largest of the pretrained individual manpower categories. These personnel provide the majority of fillers required to bring both the AA and Selected Reserve units to the wartime required personnel strength in the event of mobilization, and initial casualty replacement/fillers in fighting theaters. Figure 7-5 shows the projected IRR strength of 160,000 by the end of FY 2003.



As of: JUL 00

**Figure 7-5. Individual Ready Reserve**

**c. Inactive Army National Guard (ING).**

(1) The ING provides a means for individuals unable to participate actively to continue in a military status in the ARNG. While in the ING, individuals retain their Federal recognition and Reserve of the Army status as members of ARNG units. Subject to immediate involuntary mobilization with their assigned units in time of Federal or State emergency, personnel transferred to the ING normally are attached to their former ARNG units and encouraged to participate in AT with their parent unit.

(2) Individuals assigned to the ING are accounted for in the Ready Reserve strength of the Army. ARNG units schedule an annual muster day assembly for their ING personnel each fiscal year. The muster serves to:

- Screen soldiers for mobilization.
- Inform soldiers of unit training plans and objectives.
- Conduct lay-down inspections of clothing and/or equipment.
- Update personnel records.
- Determine requirements for immunization and physical examination.
- Discuss transfer back to active status (especially with those individuals who possess a critical skill).

**7-22. Standby Reserve (USAR only)**

a. Individuals in the Standby Reserve are those soldiers who have completed all active duty and reserve training requirements and have either requested reassignment to the Standby Reserve to maintain an affiliation with the military, or who have been screened from RC unit or IRR roles for one of several cogent reasons. Key employees of the Federal Government (for example, members of Congress or the Federal judiciary), whose positions cannot be

vacated during a mobilization without seriously impairing their agency's capability to function effectively, are examples of Standby Reservists. Other reasons for a Standby Reserve assignment include graduate study, temporary (one year or less) medical disqualification, or temporary extreme hardship.

**b.** Standby Reservists may not be ordered to active duty except during a declared national emergency. Those assigned in an active status are authorized to participate in Ready Reserve training at no expense to the Government. Such participation includes training to earn retirement points or to qualify for promotion. Those assigned in an inactive status are normally not authorized to participate in reserve duty training. In recent years, the Standby Reserve has consisted of less than 500 individuals.

### **7-23. Retired Reserve (USAR only)**

**a.** Individuals who are eligible for and have requested transfer to the Retired Reserve are in this third category. Included are those individuals who are entitled to retiree pay from the Armed Forces because of prior military service or who have completed twenty or more qualifying years of reserve (ARNG or USAR) and/or active service for which retirement benefits are not payable until age sixty. In addition, ARNG/USAR officers and warrant officers who are drawing retired pay after completing twenty or more years of active Federal service are, by statute, members of the Retired Reserve. Regular Army enlisted personnel, retired after twenty, but less than thirty years of active service, are transferred to the Retired Reserve until they have completed thirty years of service.

**b.** Members of the Retired Reserve and those with less than twenty years of active service are not provided any form of training and are not available for military service except in time of war or a Congressionally declared national emergency. However, Secretaries of the military services may recall retired personnel with twenty or more years of active service to active duty at any time in the interests of national defense. Additionally, anyone over thirty-seven years of age with a minimum of eight years of service is eligible for transfer to the Retired Reserve.

## **SECTION VI RESERVE COMPONENT MANAGEMENT**

### **7-24. Structure**

As with the AA, the ARNG and the USAR are governed by Congress, and affected by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the Department of the Army (DA).

### **7-25. Congress**

The Senate and House Armed Services Committees propose strength authorizations and other matters concerning the ARNG and USAR. Certain areas such as pay and allowances and officer promotions are closely controlled. The most significant congressional action may be establishing and approving the annual paid end strength authorizations. Each year minimum paid end strength floors are authorized to support appropriations for reserve pay and allowances. Although floors are established, Congress has been known to appropriate less money than needed to fund the authorized strength. The Committees of both Houses propose strength authorizations and other matters concerning the ARNG and USAR. The

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Defense Subcommittees of both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees prepare the appropriation acts that allow funding.

**a. Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).** This congressional action is significant in the protection of RC soldiers' rights for employment and reemployment after military service or training. This act does not replace the *Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act*, but further codifies and clarifies 50 years of case law and court decisions.

**b. Civilian employment.** The USERRA entitles Reserve soldiers to return to their civilian employment with the seniority, status, and pay they would have attained had they been continuously employed. Among other protections, it expands health care and employee benefit pension plan coverage.

#### **7-26. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)**

**a. Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD(RA)).** Overall responsibility for all RC at OSD level is vested in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ASD(RA)).

**b. Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB).** Also at OSD level, the RFPB, acting through the ASD(RA), is by statute the principal policy adviser to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) on matters relating to the RC. The RFPB includes a civilian chairman, Guard and Reserve general officers, the Assistant Secretaries (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) of each Service, and one active duty general or flag officer from each Military Department. A RC general officer is also designated as the executive officer. The SecDef is formally associated with the RC community through the RFPB. The RFPB is required by statute to prepare and submit an annual report to the President and Congress on the status of the RC. That report normally reviews the progress made by the DOD and the Services in improving readiness and areas where, in the Board's judgment, further improvements are required to make the Reserve Forces more effective.


**c. National Committee for Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve.** This OSD-level committee, in operation since 1972, improves relations between civilian employers and local ARNG and USAR units. The committee has successfully resolved many employer/employee misunderstandings arising from RC service. It operates on an informal basis with the goal of ensuring that individuals have the freedom to participate in training without job impediment or loss of earned vacations. In FY 1979, State chairmen were appointed to work with the national chairman. The use of State committees provides more widespread support for the program.

#### **7-27. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)**

The 1998 DOD Authorization Bill created two new two-star positions at the JCS, the Assistant to the CJCS for National Guard Matters, and the Assistant to the CJCS for Reserve Matters. They assist the CJCS in assuring that NG and Reserve Forces are fully integrated in the Joint arena and reach full potential in executing the National Military Strategy.

**7-28. Headquarters, DA**

The management structure for the USAR is shown in Figure 7-6. Almost all USAR TPUs are commanded by the USARC which is subordinate to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM); except for designated special operations force (SOF) units that are commanded by the SOCOM and OCONUS units commanded by U.S Army Europe (USAREUR) and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC). State Governors command their respective ARNG units until the units are federalized by Presidential Executive order.



NOTE: CAR is also CG, USARC, and Deputy CG for Reserve Affairs, FORSCOM

**Figure 7-6. USAR Command Relationships**

**a. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) (ASA(M&RA)).** Within DA, overall responsibility for RC is vested in the Office of the ASA(M&RA).

**b. Reserve Component Coordination Council (RCCC).** The RCCC, established in 1976, reviews progress on RC matters related to readiness improvement, examines problem areas and issues, coordinates the tasking of issues to the Army Staff (ARSTAFF), and reviews staff efforts. The Council, chaired by the VCSA, includes selected general officers from the ARSTAFF, Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Army Reserve, Director of the Army National Guard, the FORSCOM Chief of Staff, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).


**c. Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC).** The ARFPC reviews and comments to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (CSA) on major policy matters directly affecting the RC and the mobilization preparedness of the Army. Membership of the committee consists of five AA general officers on duty with the ARSTAFF, five ARNG general officers, and five USAR general officers. There are also five alternate members appointed from the ARNG and the USAR. ASA(M&RA), ARNG, OCAR, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and FORSCOM provide liaison representatives. The Director of the ARSTAFF serves as adviser to the committee. The committee chairman is selected from among the RC members, and serves a two-year term. The committee normally meets in March, June, September, and December. The Secretary of the Army appoints committee members. RC principal members are appointed for a three-year term and RC alternate members are appointed for a one-year term, and AA members are appointed for the duration of their assignment to the ARSTAFF. The

*Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* did affect the operation of the ARFPC. The act reassigned the committee from the Office of the CSA to the Office of the Secretary of the Army. The Chairman of the ARFPC now reports directly to the Secretary of the Army. The act also modified the nomination procedures.

### 7-29. The National Guard Bureau (NGB)

a. The NGB is the legally designated peacetime channel of communication between the Departments of the Army and Air Force and the National Guard as established by section 10501, title 10, USC. It is both a staff and an operating agency. The Chief, NGB (CNGB) reports to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force through the respective Chiefs of Staff and is their principal staff adviser on National Guard affairs.

b. As an operating agency, the NGB is the channel of communication between the States and the Departments of the Army and Air Force. This means that the CNGB must work directly with the State Governors and the adjutants generals (TAGs) (Figure 7-7). Although the CNGB has no command authority in these dealings, cooperation is facilitated through control of funds, end strength, equipment, force structure programs, and by authority to develop and publish regulations pertaining to the ARNG when not federally mobilized.



**Figure 7-7. ARNG Management Structure**

c. The CNGB is appointed for a four-year term by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate from a list of National Guard officers recommended by the State Governors. The CNGB may succeed himself. The grade authorized for this position is lieutenant general.

d. The function of the NGB is to formulate and administer a program for the development and maintenance of the National Guard units in accordance with Army and Air Force policies. The NGB is a joint bureau of the Departments of the Army and Air Force.

e. The CNGB is the director of six appropriations: three ARNG and three Air National Guard (pay and allowance, operations and maintenance, and construction). The CNGB delegates administration through the Vice Chief, NGB (a major general of the opposite Service of the CNGB) to the Directors of the Air National Guard and ARNG.


f. The Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG) is a federally recognized major general who directs resources to provide combat-ready units. In support of the Federal mission, the DARNG formulates the ARNG long-range plan, program, and budget for input

to the ARSTAFF. The DARNG administers the resources for force structure, personnel, facilities, training, and equipment. The Army Directorate assists the DARNG in these efforts.

(1) The Army Directorate, National Guard Bureau serves as the Chief, National Guard Bureau’s primary channel of communications between DA and the States and the Territories. (Figure 7-8.) The Army Directorate functions as part of the ARSTAFF and as a major Army command (MACOM). Its mission is to acquire, manage and distribute resources to meet the ARNG priorities and influence the development of policies in order to support the commanders in chief (CINCs), Services, and States. The Director, Army National Guard serves as the head of the Army Directorate. The Army Directorate is the program manager for the following functional areas:

- Personnel.
- Operations, training, and readiness.
- Force management.
- Installations, logistics, and environment.
- Aviation and safety.
- Comptroller.
- Information systems.
- Operational support airlift.


(2) Figure 7-8 shows the organization of the Army Directorate, NGB. As part of the ARSTAF, the Army Directorate assists HQDA in identifying resource requirements and determining the allocation to ARNG units (including: funding, personnel, force structure, equipment, and supplies) To accomplish this, the Army Directorate coordinates with HQDA to ensure proposed policies are conducive and responsive to ARNG unique requirements. While functioning as a MACOM, the Army Directorate assists the Chief, NGB and Director, ARNG in the execution and implementation of ARNG policies and programs, prepares detailed instructions for the execution of approved plans, and supervises execution of plans and instructions. Also, the Army Directorate serves as the Chief, NGB’s executive agent for policy, procedures, and execution of the military support to civil authorities (MSCA) program.



**Figure 7-8. Army Directorate, NGB**

### 7-30. Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR)

a. The OCAR provides direction for USAR planning to accomplish the mission of providing trained units and individuals to support Army mobilization plans. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and holds office for four years. The CAR may succeed himself one time, and holds the rank of Major General, Army of the United States, for the duration of the appointment. The CAR performs additional duties as Commanding General, USARC and Deputy Commanding General for Reserve Affairs, FORSCOM. Figure 7-9 shows the organization of the OCAR.



**Figure 7-9. Office of the Chief, Army Reserve**

b. The duties of the CAR are—

- (1) Adviser to the CSA on USAR matters.
- (2) Directly responsible to the CSA for matters pertaining to the development, readiness, and maintenance of the USAR.
- (3) Responsible for implementation and execution of approved Army plans and programs.
- (4) USAR representative in relations with governmental agencies and the public.
- (5) Adviser to ARSTAFF agencies in formulating and developing DA policies affecting the USAR.
- (6) Assists in development of policy and plans for mobilization of the USAR.
- (7) In coordination with other appropriate ARSTAFF agencies, develops, recommends, establishes, and promulgates DA policy for training the USAR.
- (8) Director for three USAR appropriations (pay and allowances, operations and maintenance, and construction).
- (9) Member of DA and OSD committees as required.

c. The Army Reserve Personnel Center was reorganized and redesignated. AR-PERSCOM In 1997 and was established as a field operating agency of the OCAR with the mission of providing personnel life cycle management to all members of the active, inactive, and retired reserve. This redesignation was more than a name change and represents a significant step towards the establishment of a truly integrated personnel system for the AA and RC

(1) The current structure and mission of AR-PERSCOM is very similar to that of the Total Army Personnel Command that provides like services to the AA. Critical responsibilities for AR-PERSCOM include—

- Maintenance of the Official Military Personnel File using the Personnel Electronics Records Systems (PERMS).
- Conduct of officer and enlisted selection boards required by law and policy.
- Management of the officer and enlisted forces, including full-time support personnel (AGR Force)
- Management of the life cycle personnel systems to optimize utilization of human resource assets
- Synchronizing personnel activities across USAR for peacetime, mobilization, and wartime
- Administering the branch and functional area proponency and training requirements

(2) AR-PERSCOM provides services necessary for maintaining high individual morale and esprit de corps by administering to those individuals who are veterans or retirees. In this capacity, AR-PERSCOM provides information to various government agencies to be used as a basis for obtaining entitlements or benefits. AR-PERSCOM corrects records, replaces essential documents, verifies status and service, and accomplishes many other functions involving the individual military personnel record. In addition, AR-PERSCOM provides administrative support for many DOD programs involving records in its custody, as well as records of discharged personnel in the custody of the National Archives and Records Administration.

### **7-31. Major Army commands**

#### **a. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).**

(1) The missions of the Commanding General, FORSCOM, include command of all assigned USAR TPUs in CONUS (less USAR SOF), and evaluation and support of training of the ARNG. The commanding general is responsible for organizing, equipping, stationing, training, and maintaining the combat readiness of assigned units. The CG, FORSCOM also manages the RC advisory structure and exercises command of the USAR units through the CG, USARC.

(2) The USARC, established as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM on 18 October 1991, became fully operational on 1 October 1992. The USARC commands and controls all USAR TPUs assigned to FORSCOM. The CAR fills three roles: CAR; CG, USARC; and Deputy CG FORSCOM for Reserve Affairs.

(3) The USARC commands and controls assigned units through RSCs, DRCs, and echelon above division /echelon above corps (EAD/EAC) commands. The twelve USAR RSCs provide support to all units located within their area of responsibility. Their responsibilities include operations, mobilization and deployment activities, training assistance, and support of the RC within their geographical area of responsibility. The RSCs are based in California (63d RSC), Puerto Rico (65th RSC), New York (77th RSC), Alabama (81st RSC), Minnesota (88th RSC), Kansas (89th RSC), Arkansas (90th RSC), Massachusetts (94th RSC), Utah (96th RSC), Pennsylvania (99th RSC), Hawaii (9th RSC), and Washington State (70th RSC). Command and control of USAR units may flow through the RSC or through other DRCs. Examples of DRCs are Divisions (Institutional Training) and Divisions (Exercise) that provide regional training support to Army individuals and units. The RSCs also assume operational control of volunteer units serving as MSCA for natural or manmade disasters where a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up has not been declared, and assume command and control of mobilized USAR units. Three regional support groups (RSG) support those RSCs with large unit populations. One Army Reserve command (ARCOM) is located outside CONUS in Germany (7th ARCOM).

(4) The USARC also established garrison support units (GSU) and reorganized port/terminal units, medical augmentation hospitals, movement control units, and replacement battalions/companies to provide the Army with a robust power-projection capability. These units, ready on the first day of any contingency, are essential to the successful deployment of AA heavy divisions. The GSUs backfill AA base operations activities vacated by deploying AA units. In addition, the GSUs provide peacetime support to their respective AA counterparts.

(5) Among USAR units are such diverse organizations as CS, and CSS units; training divisions with a mission to provide tri-component individual and collective unit lanes and simulation training; Army garrisons with a mobilization mission of staffing a post; special courses, and Command and General Staff Officer's Course (CGSOC) courses for AA, ARNG, and USAR soldiers. The USAR, in addition to maintaining units, has individuals in nonunit control groups as described in the section on the IRR. In addition to the major USAR organizations, there are almost 2,000 company/detachment-sized units.

**b. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).** TRADOC is responsible for initial entry training for RC members. All nonprior service enlistees under the Reserve Enlistment Program of 1963 (REP-63) perform initial active duty for training (IADT). This includes basic training (BT) and advanced individual training (AIT) or one station unit training (OSUT) under AA auspices. An alternative method of conducting this training is the "split-option training" concept whereby an RC member may do BT during one year and AIT the following year.

### **7-32. State adjutants general (Army National Guard)**

**a.** Army National Guard units are located in each of the fifty States, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The ARNG resources more than 4,464 units that are located in over 2,600 communities. Command of the ARNG when not in active Federal service is vested with the Governors of the States. The Governors exercise command through TAG. The TAG is a State official whose authority is recognized by Federal law. The

TAG is normally appointed by the Governor but in certain instances is elected or appointed by the President. The grade authorized is normally major general.

**b.** TAGs of the several States manage Federal resources to build combat-ready units. Their management staffs include both State and Federal employees. ARNG commanders under the TAG lead their combat-ready units in training during peacetime. A State area command (STARC) is organized within each state. Upon full mobilization the STARC assumes command and control of ARNG units during pre-mobilization, is charged with initial post-mobilization, and command and control of mobilized ARNG units until the units arrive at their mobilization station. The STARC also provides installation support, family support, and mobilization support to other RC within the State upon declaration of a national emergency.

**c.** The U.S Property and Fiscal Officer (USPFO) is an officer (Colonel) of the National Guard of the United States (Army or Air) ordered to active duty under the provisions of Title 10, USC and is normally collocated with the STARC. The USPFO receives and accounts for all Federal funds and property and provides financial and logistical resources for the maintenance of Federal property provided to the state. The USPFO manages the Federal logistics support systems (Army and Air Force) for the State and, upon mobilization of a supported unit, provides that support necessary for the transition of the mobilized entity to active duty status. Additionally, the USPFO functions as a Federal contracting officer responsible for Federal procurement activities within the state. The USPFO is also the payroll certifying officer responsible for certifying the accuracy of Federal payrolls.

**d.** Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 18203, provides for Federal support of construction of ARNG facilities. This law permits construction of facilities on sites furnished by States at no cost to the Federal Government, or on Federal property licensed to the State specifically for ARNG purposes. Funding for approved armory construction is normally 75 percent Federal funds and 25 percent state funds, with 100 percent Federal support for other construction such as administrative, logistics support, and training facilities in direct support to sole Federal functions. Operations and maintenance costs for these facilities are funded via cooperative agreements between the Federal Government and the State military departments. The Federal Government provides all funding for construction and maintenance of facilities for the USAR.

## **SECTION VII TRAINING**

### **7-33. Goals**

The training goals of the ARNG and the USAR are the same as the AA. Plans to achieve objectives are accomplished during IDT, commonly referred to as UTAs, MUTAs, drills, or assembly periods; and during a fifteen-day period known as AT. The same training standards apply to ARNG/USAR units as that of their AA counterparts.

### **7-34. Challenges**

A key factor to understanding reserve training challenges is to comprehend the distinct differences between RC and AA training. Unlike AA units, which have MOS qualified

soldiers assigned to them by PERSCOM, RC units usually recruit soldiers from the local market area. Whether initial entry or prior service, these soldiers are assigned to the unit and then must attend qualification training. Qualification training, sustainment training, training for additional duties, and professional development education are often conducted in lieu of scheduled UTAs and AT, and in some cases require more than a year to complete. Even though these soldiers are counted against the unit's assigned strength they are generally not available to participate in collective training. Another impact on training is that RC soldiers and units must meet the same standards for training as AA units in a fraction of the time. Non-mission essential task list (METL) training and other events, such as Army physical fitness tests (APFT), weapons qualification, mandatory training, inventories, physicals, etc., have a greater impact because they take the same time as AA units from fewer available days.

### **7-35. Unit training assemblies**

ARNG and USAR units, as elements of the Selected Reserve, are normally authorized forty-eight drills and a two-week (14-17 days) AT period during the training year, which starts on 1 October and terminates on 30 September of the following year. The general trend is to consolidate these unit training assemblies (UTAs) during the year so that four UTAs (sixteen hours minimum) are accomplished during a single weekend. This MUTA-4 configuration provides continuity for individual and crew training, qualification firing, field training, and refresher training.

### **7-36. Collective tasks**

AT is primarily directed to collective pre-mobilization tasks. Individual training and weapons qualification are typically performed during IDT. Soldiers and units train to established pre-mobilization levels of proficiency. Combat maneuver units generally train to an individual/crew/platoon levels of proficiency. CS/CSS units are generally required to train to company level proficiency.

## **SECTION VIII EQUIPMENT**

### **7-37. Policy**

DA policy distributes equipment to units in first-to-fight/ first-to-support sequence. The component to which a unit belongs (active or reserve), with the exception of specified programs (for example, National Guard Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) formerly known as Dedicated Procurement Program (DPP), is not a factor in equipment distribution. This policy ensures the adequate equipping of units employed first in time of crisis. Under this policy, the RC have received substantial amounts of modern equipment in recent years. Army procurement distributes new equipment. Excess AA equipment is redistributed in priority sequence known as "cascading". Later deploying units are provided the minimum-essential equipment required for training and to achieve minimum acceptable readiness levels.

### **7-38. National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA)**

The NGREA is a special appropriation designated for the acquisition of equipment by the RC to improve readiness. Congress may further fence these funds for the purchase of specific items of equipment. NGREA funds complement the Service appropriations, which primarily fund force modernization, thereby improving training and readiness in the RC.

### **7-39. Withdrawal**

Procedures are in place to ensure that new and/or serviceable equipment is not withdrawn from the RC without justification. Requests for withdrawal of NGREA appropriated equipment must be coordinated with the SecDef. Waiver of this provision during a crisis allows the Secretary of Defense to delegate that authority to the Assistant Secretary of the Army.

## **SECTION IX READINESS/MOBILIZATION ASSISTANCE**

### **7-40. Background**

In 1973, the Army leadership recognized the potential of many types of RC units for early deployment. Accordingly, the affiliation program was conceived to improve the mobilization and deployment readiness of selected RC units and provide added combat power earlier in the execution of contingency plans. As part of this program, RC combat battalions and brigades were selected to “round out” AA divisions that were understructured.

### **7-41. Roundout/roundup**

**a.** Additionally, some RC combat battalions and brigades were selected to “round up” AA divisions, as additional force structure to existing AA structure. Roundout units were accorded the same resourcing priority as the parent unit, were scheduled to deploy with the parent unit, or as soon as possible thereafter, and entered into close planning and training associations with the parent unit to improve readiness. Other categories of the original affiliation program were given resources to foster close training associations between like AA and RC units to help upgrade the readiness and capabilities of certain other RC units.

**b.** As more structure and missions were added to the RC in the mid-to-late 1970s, the Army instituted several other programs to facilitate achievement of higher training readiness levels for the RC. These included the AA/RC partnership program which aligned selected major combat and special forces units, the counterpart program which aligned ARNG attack helicopter units with AA counterparts, and the Corps and Division Training Coordination Program (CORTRAIN) which associated AA/RC combat units with a CONUS corps for command post exercises. Together these programs provided resources and opportunities for RC unit leaders and soldiers to work closely with and learn from their AA colleagues who shared with them a common goal of improving unit capability for wartime mission accomplishment.

**SECTION X  
WARTRACE****7-42. Wartime organization**

In 1979, HQDA approved a FORSCOM initiative called CAPSTONE (not an acronym), subsequently changed to WARTRACE (not an acronym) in 1994. This program established an organizational structure for managing the Force by placing all AA and RC units into a wartime organization designed to meet the enemy threat in a European, Southwest Asian, or Pacific contingency. A later update of the structure also included the units assigned to operate the CONUS sustaining base.

**7-43. Association**

WARTRACE provides the basis for establishing planning and training associations to enable units to focus planning on specific wartime missions and, where feasible, to train in peacetime with the organization they will operate with in wartime. Under WARTRACE, RC units concentrate their limited training time on tasks bearing directly on their wartime mission. Units slated for more than one theater are assigned a priority theater and directed to focus training on that contingency.

**7-44. Management**

Army Regulation 11-30, published first in 1983, expanded the CAPSTONE Program to provide a better framework for managing the existing affiliation, partnership, counterpart, and CORTRAIN programs. CAPSTONE also provided a more rational basis for participating in the Mutual Support Program (which allows AA and RC units to conduct mutually beneficial activities on their own volition), overseas deployment training, and joint exercises. WARTRACE planning alignments and missions provide a basis on which to establish a METL, develop effective training programs, and for participating in various collective training activities.

**7-45. Defense Planning Guidance (DPG)**


While WARTRACE is useful in establishing reliable training and planning associations based upon validated CINC operation plan (OPLAN) requirements, it is not fully integrated with the current DPG. The DPG directs the Army to organize, train, and equip to defeat two aggressors in two nearly-simultaneous major theater wars (MTW). Based on this combat structure, FORSCOM designed a support force structure capable of providing support to a total of 5 1/3 divisions.

**7-46. Force support packages (FSP)**

The USAR support forces, shown at Figure 7-10, are designated as FSP units, consisting of AA/RC early deploying CS and CSS type units. These FSP 1-2 units support the MTW-1 initial forces. These early deploying units organize and train based more upon their MTW/FSP relationships than upon WARTRACE alignments. Later required units, non-FSP, and the ARNG divisions use WARTRACE to develop unit training programs with National Guard eSBs apportioned to the warfight. Although the goal is to align units with a MTW, units may find themselves mobilized with a different WARTRACE based upon the needs of the warfighting CINCs.

### 7-47. Joint reserve units (JRU)

The 1995 Zero Base Review (ZBR) conducted by the JCS J-1 resulted in new requirements for IMA support to the warfighting CINCs. CINC augmentation units called JRUs have been established as shown at Figure 7-11 for Joint Forces Command and U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). This concept incorporates soldiers into a joint unit with RC manpower administration in one place. The component billets are then assigned to staff directorates where soldiers work in functional areas of personnel, intelligence, operations, training, and logistics.



#### Mission Statement

To provide trained Reserve Component (RC) personnel to augment and fully integrate into CINC's staff, leveraging military experience, civilian skills, and availability to meet peacetime, crisis and wartime requirements on a timely basis.

Figure 7-10. Force Support Package Units and Tiered Resourcing

	Tier I	Tier II	Tier III	Tier IV	TIER V	
Note: Tiered Resource depictions include all USAR active and programmed units	Force Support Packages (ESP) <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 397 Units (MTOE) 115% Manning	MTW Follow-On Forces <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 336 Units (MTOE) 100% Manning	Non-MTW Very Early, Early, and Intermediate Deployers <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 10 Units (MTOE) 100% Manning	HQ USARC and RSCs <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 33 Units (TDA) 100% Manning	Inactivating Units - FY 99, 00 & 01 <i>C-3</i> 105 Units (MTOE/TDA) Minimal Manning	Note: FY99 End Strength Equals 208K [difference between 208K and 221K (below) is due to programmed activations and FY99/00 inactivations]
	SOCOM Support Packages (SSP) <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 69 Units (MTOE) 115% Manning	Divisions (Institutional Training, Installation Support, and Divisions (Exercise)/ Training Support Divisions <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 474 Units (TDA) 100% Manning	Non-MTW Follow-On Forces <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 5 Units (MTOE) 100% Manning	Remaining Division (IT) Units and Other Units <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 11 Units (TDA) 100% Manning	Considered Separately	
	CONUS Support Packages (CSP) <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 59 Units (TDA) 115% Manning	AMSAs, ECSs & ASFs <i>Readiness: N/A</i> 173 Units (Derivative TDA) Civilians & Mil Techs only	Planned Units <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 78 Units (MTOE) 100% Manning			
	Very Early Deployers (VED) <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 112 Units (MTOE) 115% Manning	Non-MTW A Follow-on Forces <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 217 Units (MTOE) 100% Manning				
	Early & Intermediate Deployers <i>C-3 OR BETTER</i> 357 Units/MTOE 100% Manning					
	OCAR/ARPERCEN - 710 Auth'd USAREC - 1780 Auth'd 7th & 9th RSC - 110 Auth'd IMA - 6150 Auth'd TOTAL - 8750 Auth'd					
Units:	994	1,027	188	122	105	2,436
Soldiers Auth'd:	97,149	103,712	689	10,048	9,376	220,974
% of USAR (soldiers):	44%	47%	1%	4%	4%	100%

Figure 7-11. Joint Reserve Unit

**7-48. Overseas deployment training (ODT)**

The ODT program provides RC units the opportunity to train their skills in a realistic environment with the added benefit of reducing operating tempo (OPTEMPO). Selected units normally train up to twenty-two days in JCS exercises and in non-exercise mission training enhancing their awareness of mobilization/ deployment processing. The ODT program also deploys larger units providing an increasing number of companies/battalions the opportunity for this training. ODT programs allow the RC to conduct realistic mobilization mission training in peacetime, in many cases with the organization with which they will be associated when mobilized. This training increases awareness of mobilization mission requirements, allows training to be conducted in an overseas environment that reinforces a sense of belonging, and increases units' abilities to mobilize and deploy.

**7-49. Drug interdiction and counter drug activities**

**a.** The *Posse Comitatus Act of 1878*, and subsequent legislation, directly affects the extent to which military forces (including RC) can participate in law enforcement activities. The *Posse Comitatus Act* prohibits the use of Federal military forces to perform internal police functions. The Act does not pertain to the ARNG when in State status.

**b.** Public Law 97-86, passed in 1982, amended the *Posse Comitatus Act*. The law, as amended, now authorizes indirect military involvement such as equipment loan, personnel support, training, and sharing information. Indirect support must be incidental to the military mission, or provide substantially equivalent military training. Further, it cannot degrade combat readiness or the capacity of the DOD to fulfill its defense mission. The law does not limit the National Guard in State status (on State active duty or under Title 32, USC) from performing law enforcement functions authorized by the States concerned.

(1) While the National Guard has supported law enforcement agencies counterdrug and drug interdiction activities since 1978, Federal funding for that participation did not begin until the 1989 National Defense Authorization and Appropriations Acts. The SecDef distributed funds to the Governors of States who submitted plans specifying how they proposed to use the National Guard. Such operations were required to be duty served in addition to normally scheduled (weekend drill (IDT) and (AT)) training requirements.

(2) In 1988, National Guard military policy was used in a pilot/test program to assist U.S. Customs agents in searching commercial cargo entering various land and sea border-entry points. This very successful program was expanded in 1989 to nearly every major seaport and many major airports throughout the United States, increasing the U.S. Customs Service capability to inspect cargo. Other examples of missions for State interdiction and eradication efforts are: helicopter transport of law enforcement personnel and confiscated illegal drugs; special operations forces identification of ground and air traffic; loan of equipment and training of law enforcement agencies; aircraft photo reconnaissance; and monitoring air traffic with organic radar.

(3) The ARNG and USAR counterdrug programs are applicable to all drug supply reduction operations in CONUS and OCONUS. They include all resources (personnel, logistics, funding, and facilities) and activities employed in the planning, resourcing, development, dissemination, distribution, and management of information related to

counterdrug support operations. Both RC counterdrug programs respond to DOD and CINC taskings for operational and non-operational support.

(4) Operational support includes personnel units in support of drug law enforcement agencies (DLEA), law enforcement agencies (LEA), and host countries. Non-operational support is a broad category that can include facilities, formal military school training opportunities, intelligence, equipment loans, counterdrug funding, and personnel support to non-DOD agencies.

(5) Federal, state, and local LEAs originate requests for DOD counterdrug operational support in CONUS and submit them to either Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) or the CONUS Army (CONUSA) with geographical responsibility. The approval process for the use of USAR forces is retained at the highest level. Current authority for the employment of USAR soldiers and assets in counterdrug related support activities rests with the Commander, FORSCOM, or a CINC. For CONUS based operations, FORSCOM further delegated this authority to the Commander, JTF-6. Either FORSCOM or the appropriate geographical CINC approves all OCONUS operations.

(6) USAR units and individuals have supported the Army's counterdrug effort since 1989. The USAR support to CINCs, DLEAs, and LEAs includes, but is not limited to, the following:

- Ground reconnaissance.
- Detection monitoring and communication about land trafficking.
- Aerial reconnaissance.
- Counterdrug related training of DLEA and LEA personnel.
- Nonherbicidal cannabis eradication.
- Linguist support.
- Transportation, both aerial and ground.
- Intelligence analysis.
- Tunnel detection.
- Diver support for subsurface hull inspections.
- Engineering support (vertical and horizontal construction and crack house demolition) and training.
- Use of military vessels for bases of operations for DLEAs.
- Maintenance support.

### **7-50. Military support to civil authorities (MSCA)**

a. MSCA is the employment of military resources (personnel and equipment) in support of civil authorities during periods of emergency. In most cases this includes Army and Air National Guard units. Civil authorities have primary responsibility for emergency planning, response, and recovery during emergency situations. Emergencies that potentially requiring military support are as follows:

(1) *Civil*. Any man-caused emergency or threat that causes or may cause substantial property damage or loss.

(2) *Natural*. Any hurricane, tornado, storm, flood, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mud-slide, snowstorm, drought, fire, or other catastrophic event.

(3) *Other*. An emergency in any part of the United States which requires assistance to supplement local or State efforts to save lives and protect property, public health and safety, or to avert or lessen the threat of a disaster.

b. MSCA missions are authorized by executive order of the Governor of a State, using his or her National Guard in a State active duty status. In this status, the Governor utilizes State funds for pay and allowances. The State also reimburses payment for utilization of Federal equipment and facilities in State status to the Federal Government. MSCA missions are of a temporary nature and will be terminated as soon as possible after civil authorities are capable of handling the emergency. Employment of National Guard assets by the Governor will be in accordance with State laws and constitutions. In addition, deployment of National Guard forces and equipment between State is expected, in accordance with Federal guidelines and legal agreements between the State.

c. If the scope of a civil emergency exceeds the capabilities of the civilian response agencies, military assistance may be requested. The National Guard in State status is the primary responder during most U.S. natural or man-made disasters and other emergencies. When catastrophic events escalate to such a magnitude to warrant a declaration of national emergency, then a Federal response is usually required.

d. The FEMA is the proponent for the Federal response plan and is charged with the responsibility of coordinating disaster assistance provided by all agencies of the Federal Government in the continental United States and its territories. FEMA coordinates public assistance to State and local governments and works with volunteer agencies providing aid for disaster victims. FEMA is the validating authority for all support and assistance in a declared national emergency. The USAR has invested in military support to civilian authorities with over 100 State emergency preparedness liaison officers and 80 regional emergency preparedness liaison officers in addition to full time planning cells at each CONUSA. The mission is to liaise with FEMA and coordinate response to a domestic crisis.

#### **7-51. Full time support (FTS)**

a. The FTS program was directed by Congress to increase the readiness of ARNG and USAR units by providing full-time support personnel. The FTS program exists for the purpose of organizing, administering, recruiting, instructing, or training the ARNG and USAR. The majority of FTS personnel work in ARNG and USAR TPUs. The FTS staff performs all the day-to-day support functions for the unit to function, including personnel, administration, training, operations, maintenance, and supply. The FTS staff enables the unit's drilling reservists to use their limited training time (generally 39 days annually) to concentrate on their wartime tasks instead of sustainment functions.

b. The FTS program consists AGR soldiers, military technicians, DA civilians, and AA soldiers. AGR soldiers are reservists who are on active duty. Military technicians and DA civilians are both full-time civilian employees; Military technicians have the distinction of also being reservists, who must maintain their reserve status as a condition of employment.

The AA assigns soldiers to support ARNG and USAR units; these soldiers are considered part of the FTS program.

(1) ARNG and USAR technicians provide full-time, day-to-day assistance and support and act as the representative for their commanders during nondrill periods. Technicians ensure continuity in administration, supply, maintenance, and training, and their services are critical to mobilization preparedness.

(2) Both ARNG and USAR technicians are Federal Civil Service employees. The USAR technicians are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service System. ARNG technicians are governed by the same provisions except as modified by Public Law 90-486 (*National Guard Technician Act of 1968*) as well as Title 32, USC, Section 709, and regulations prescribed by the NGB. As a provision of employment in the military technician program (civil service), technicians must also be members of the ARNG or USAR. Many technicians are employed in the same unit they are assigned to.

(3) AGR soldiers serve on full-time military duty in support of the RC. Title 10, United States Code personnel are available for worldwide assignment, whereas Title 32, United States Code personnel (unique to the National Guard) receive assignments within the state.

### **7-52. The Total Army School System (TASS)**

a. The TASS initiative is a TRADOC program designed to leverage existing school resources. Organized into seven regions that unites TRADOC schools, USAR school brigades and battalions, and ARNG academies; courseware and standards are the same throughout the system, and students are chosen from all three components depending on the situation. During mobilization, the TASS school battalions have the mission to assist TRADOC in recertifying or reclassifying IRR and recalled retiree filler personnel.

b. The USAR has an institutional training division (DIV(IT)) to provide instruction in each of the seven TASS regions. The DIV(IT) mission is to teach reclassification training for CS, CSS, health services education, and the officer education system (OES) (Combined Arms and Services Staff School and the General Staff Officers Course). Each DIV(IT) has four brigades with each responsible for one of these subject areas. Additionally, three TASS regions have USAR non-commissioned officer academies (NCOAs) and USAR non-commissioned officer education system (NCOES) battalions structured in two of these TASS regions.

c. The ARNG has faculty and support personnel executing the ARNG TASS mission in fifty-four State and territories. The ARNG mission is to conduct leadership, combat arms, and selected CS/CSS training in each region. There are seven Guard Leadership Training Brigades that each have an officer candidate school (OCS) and NCOA. The Combat Arms Training Brigades conduct training in the career management fields (CMF) of armor, field artillery, infantry, air defense artillery, and aviation. Additionally, in four of seven regions, the ARNG is responsible for the ordnance training battalion, and provides assistance to the USAR in the remaining three regions.

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## **SECTION XI**

### **RESERVE COMPONENT PAY, BENEFITS, AND ENTITLEMENTS**

#### **7-53. Individual status**

In general, RC pay and allowances are determined on the basis of the individual reservist's status. During IDT periods, members of the Selected Reserve receive one day of basic pay (based upon years of service and grade) for each attended UTA. During ADT periods, members receive the same compensation (basic pay, quarters, and subsistence allowances) as their AA counterparts. Depending upon assignment, some reservists may be eligible for additional special pay for aviation duty, medical or dental service or hazardous duty pay, all on a pro rata basis.

#### **7-54. Benefits**

Eligibility for other service-associated benefits also depend upon the status of the service member. For example, members of the Army's RC are entitled to full use of the exchange system. Unaccompanied spouses with proper identification are authorized to use the post exchange (PX) at all times. Qualified Reserve soldiers and their families may shop in the commissaries, on days of their choosing, up to twelve days a year. This entitlement is based on the number of days served during the previous calendar year. In addition, during IDT, Reservists may use military clothing stores, official library services, and some clubs. Ready Reservists assigned or attached to units that schedule at least twelve drills yearly and ADT also are entitled to receive full-time Servicemen's Group Life Insurance and dental insurance. While on ADSW or ADT, Reservists receive the same benefits and privileges as AA members. However, they do not receive TRICARE coverage or dental care unless the training period exceeds thirty days. Members of the Retired Reserve under age sixty, known as "Gray Area Retirees," are entitled to use the PX, military clothing stores, official library services, and receive a burial flag. (Note: Although retired AA enlisted soldiers with less than thirty years service are part of the Retired Reserve, their benefits differ.) Upon reaching age sixty, members of the Retired Reserve receive basically the same benefits as retired active counterparts except for military burial assistance and a military death gratuity.

#### **7-55. Retirement**

Members of the RC who accumulate twenty years of creditable service and reach age sixty are entitled to retired pay computed on the basis of accumulated retirement points. In general, a creditable year is one during which a Reservist accumulates fifty or more retirement points. Points are awarded on the basis of one point for each four-hour assembly, each day of active duty, and each three credits of completed correspondence courses. Additionally, fifteen points are awarded for membership. However, no more than seventy-five points per year may be awarded for IDT activities. Retirement pay is computed by totaling all retirement points accumulated and dividing by 360. The quotient is then multiplied by 2.5 percent. The resulting percentage is then applied to active duty basic pay of an individual with the same grade and number of years of service.

#### **7-56. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)**

The UCMJ was extended to RC members as of 14 November 1986, when President Reagan signed into law the "*Military Justice Amendment of 1986*" as part of the *National Defense*

*Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987.* Under these changes, USAR soldiers are subject to the UCMJ while in an IDT (that is, drill) status. The military can now recall a soldier to active duty for trial for crimes committed while performing ADT or IDT. The decision to activate a soldier for trial must be approved through the Reserve chain of command to the Secretary of the Army if confinement is contemplated. In other cases, the AA general court-martial convening authority (GCMCA) is the final decision authority.

## **SECTION XII**

### **RESERVE COMPONENT TRANSFORMATION CAMPAIGN PLAN**

#### **7-57. Division XXI design**

For the first time, RC spaces are embedded in the new heavy division design. This fully digitized and modernized division represents the spearhead of America's land combat power and the prototype for the heavy legacy force. By fully integrating reserve component soldiers into an AA division, this will serve as proof of principle for other "one team, one fight, one future" initiatives.

#### **7-58. Enhanced separate brigades**

The fifteen eSBs of the ARNG are the principal RC ground combat maneuver force of the Army. The eSBs achieve enhanced readiness levels of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training. During transformation selected eSBs are in a ready pool status for a 2-year period filling the CINC's MTW force requirement shortfall created by AA brigades transforming.

#### **7-59. ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS)**

In response to a long-standing shortfall in CS and CSS assets, the Army conducted the ADRS to determine how best to use ARNG divisions to alleviate these shortfalls. The ADRS recommended converting a portion of the ARNG's combat structure to a CS and CSS structure. The ARNG will convert two mechanized infantry brigades, three armor brigades, and one light infantry brigade to resource approximately 20K of CS/CSS between FY00-07. The majority of the structure to be resourced are transportation and quartermaster units. The ARNG will convert additional 28K spaces by FY09. One division will convert between FY06-07 and another division will convert between FY08-09. The division and brigade headquarters will form composite command and control headquarters for the CS/CSS structure. All conversions will be validated in subsequent TAAs.

#### **7-60. Integrated divisions**

In October 1999, the Army established two new divisions whose design feature an AA division headquarters company and three eSBs from the ARNG. The 24th Infantry Division (ID) is located at Ft. Riley, KS, with a forward element at Ft. Jackson, SC. The 7th ID is located at Ft. Carson, CO. AA major generals command these divisions. The heavy division is located at Ft. Riley with a forward element at Ft. Jackson commanded by a brigadier general. The light division is located at Ft. Carson. The eSBs selected for the 24th ID at Ft Riley are the 30th Infantry Brigade (Mech) (NC), the 218th Infantry Brigade (Mech)(SC), and the 48th Infantry Brigade (Mech)(GA). The associated eSBs for the 7th ID at Ft Carson are the 45th Infantry Brigade (Lt)(OK), the 39th Infantry Brigade (Lt)(AR), and the 41st Infantry Brigade (Lt)(OR).

**7-61. Multi-component units**

Multiple component units combine personnel and/or equipment from more than one component on a single authorization document. The objectives of this initiative are: maximize the integration of AA and RC resources, improve readiness and resource posture, optimize unique capabilities of each component, and improve documentation. Phase One of the initiative established 36 “initial” multi-compo units with activation dates FY99--01. The goal for phase two is to make multiple component a routine part of the Army culture. In phase two, MACOMs may propose the component mix for units identified for activation beyond FY 01. The documents for these units will be developed in applicable documentation windows. MACOMs may nominate units not selected by the TAA process through their command plan. This phase extends indefinitely. Multi-compo is a resourcing initiative: it does not change a unit’s doctrinal requirements for personnel and equipment. All Army MTOE units are technically eligible for multi-compo resourcing. However, the decision to do so must consider readiness implications, mission requirements, efficiencies to be gained, unique component capabilities and limitations, and willingness of each component to contribute the necessary resources. Training and operation of multi-compo units are facilitated when AA/RC elements are located within the same geographical area.

**SECTION XIII****SUMMARY AND REFERENCES****7-62. Summary**

Over half of the Army’s total deployable forces are in the ARNG and the USAR. The management of these forces is of paramount importance as the Army transforms. The structure for RC management includes Congress, DOD, HQDA, MACOMs, State, and units. Two key managers at HQDA are the NGB and the OCAR. At the MACOM level, FORSCOM and its subordinate CONUS armies and USARC have a leading role in preparing RC forces for mobilization and deployment.

**7-63. References**

- a. Title 10 United States Code, Vol. 2.
- b. Title 32 United States Code Vol. 8.
- c. Public Law 90-486, *The National Guard Technician Act of 1968*.
- d. Public Law 90-168, *The Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act*, 1968.
- e. Office of the Secretary of the Army, *Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee Annual Report 1989*, 31 December 1989.
- f. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), *The Army Budget, 1996/1997 President’s Budget*, April 1995.
- g. Army Regulation 11-30, *Army WARTRACE Program*.
- h. Army Regulation 140-1, *Army Reserve: Mission, Organization, and Training*.
- i. Army Regulation 140-10, *Army Reserve: Assignments, Attachments, Details, and Transfer*.
- j. Army Regulation 140-145, *Individual Mobilization Augmentation Program*.



# CHAPTER 8

## FORCE READINESS

*“Again and again the readiness was tested and not found wanting, not on the night when we launched an invasion to Haiti, then called it back, and then in hours reformulated and reorganized the entire operation. Nor was it found wanting when, even while we were engaged in Haiti, our forces rapidly responded to the unexpected movement of Saddam’s divisions towards Kuwait’s border. Hollow forces don’t have this kind of edge.”*

General John Shalikashvili, Chairman, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 8-1. Maintaining readiness

General Shalikashvili’s statement stands as a marker against which future readiness will subjectively be measured. As the Army begins the 21st century, it confronts the major challenge of maintaining readiness. Maintaining readiness requires difficult decisions by the Army leadership, for they must strike the proper balance between maintaining current readiness and building towards future readiness requirements. The Army guides its decisions by balancing the fundamental imperatives that have shaped the development of today’s Army: quality people, doctrine, force mix, training, modern equipment, and leader development (Figure 8-1).



**Figure 8-1. Balancing the Imperatives**

#### 8-2. Chapter content


In order to make the decisions necessary to achieve and maintain a combat ready force, the Department of Defense (DOD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Department of

Army (DA) have developed systems to assist the leadership at all levels in managing force readiness. This chapter discusses the concepts on measuring force readiness and the systems and procedures used to prompt decisions to respond to readiness issues. This chapter will discuss how the Army uses the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) and authorized level of organization (ALO) systems to manage both readiness and resourcing. It provides insights regarding the difficulty of defining readiness both qualitatively and quantitatively. Specifically the following processes are discussed: the Chairman’s Readiness System to measure current and future readiness; the role of the Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR), the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA); and the role of the DOD Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC). Finally, the Army’s readiness system is discussed to include the Chief of Staff’s monthly reviews and the unit status report criteria.

## SECTION II MANAGING FORCE READINESS

### 8-3. Definitions of readiness

The Army defines unit readiness as the ability of a unit to deliver the output for which it was designed. However, the Army also uses the term “force readiness” which can be equated to the DOD term “military capability.” Force readiness is defined as the readiness of the Army within its established force structure, as measured by its ability to station, control, man, equip, replenish, modernize, and train its forces in peacetime, while concurrently planning to call up, mobilize, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain them in war to accomplish assigned missions. DOD defines military capability in relation to force readiness, sustainability, force structure, modernization, and infrastructure (Figure 8-2). This definition is directly linked to how the total force is planned, programmed, and budgeted. These combinations of force readiness functions can best be seen as a set of interrelated, sequential, responsive, reciprocal, and comprehensive functions for the preparation and conduct of war. The functions are responsive to the time-phasing requirements of war plans.



**Figure 8-2. The Components of Military Capability**

### 8-4. Factors affecting force readiness

a. Force readiness is affected by many quantitative and qualitative factors. For example, it is fairly easy to measure the status of personnel, equipment, or war reserves.

It is not so easy to assign a value to morale or cohesion. Force readiness is dynamic, encompasses many functions, and is influenced by many factors. Because of this, the Army has not yet developed a single measurement system to measure force readiness in its totality. To illustrate its complexity, consider the following partial listing of factors that impact on the force readiness of the Army:


- Unit status.
- Design of weapons systems.
- Construction of facilities.
- Availability of supplies.
- Relationship with allies.
- Strategic intelligence capability.
- Application of unit manning principles of Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training.
- Civilian personnel force planning—availability and experience; strategic force sustainment.
- Quality of soldier/family services in support of deployments.
- Civilian and military airlift.
- Civilian and military sealift.
- Civilian and military land transportation assets.
- Lines of communications.
- Availability of pre-stocked equipment.
- Mobilization capability.
- Recruitment of manpower for military and industry.
- Capability to receive, process, and transport forces in theaters.
- Senior leadership—quality of strategic planning and decision-making.
- Capability of the enemy.
- Quality and morale of personnel.

**b.** Estimating force readiness is difficult and highly situational. The American people and their elected representatives need to know how much security is required and what it costs. Short of the military's performance in war or deterring war, a defined measure of return on the dollar that the Services can show is the level of force readiness to execute the National Military Strategy (NMS), as deduced from analytical tools and other indicators.

### **8-5. Cost of force readiness**

**a.** Force readiness is expensive and must be balanced against other program needs (Figure 8-3). Within a finite amount of resources, the purchase of a balanced program that satisfies future investment needs such as research and development and procurement can impact current readiness needs such as spare parts, depot maintenance, and war reserves. The Army's move to a smaller force and need for immediate response to a wide

variety of requirements put great demands on it to maintain forces at a high state of readiness.



**Figure 8-3. The Cost of Force Readiness**

**b.** Readiness costs increase sharply as higher levels of readiness are approached. At the unit level, maximum readiness is highly perishable. A unit can attain a very high level of readiness and a short time later, without continued intensive resource allocation, have the trained expertise and peak maintenance levels ebb away. The availability of repair parts and supplies, length of time between training events, and personnel turbulence all have a tremendous influence on unit readiness.

**c.** The readiness costs compound one of the most perplexing problems facing the Army, that of tying resources to readiness. The resource-to-readiness relationship is complex but essential to the proper management of total force capability; the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES); and justification of Army programs to Congress.

### **8-6. Resourcing readiness**

**a. Tiered resourcing.** Because of readiness costs and the response times of war plans, the Army maintains some units at a higher level of readiness than others. This stratification of readiness is brought about through a “tiered resourcing” policy. Tiered resourcing means providing the highest level of warfighting resources to units in accordance with DOD’s long-standing “first to fight, first resourced” policy.

**b. Force packages.** The first step in tiered resourcing is to prioritize units into force packages. Force package categorizations are contained in The Army Plan(TAP) and are rank-ordered for resource planning guidance. Force packages are based upon approved war plans and unit commitment dates. A major factor for units not based within the theater of operations is their strategic deployment date, which is driven by the availability of strategic lift and the order of priority assigned by operational or contingency plans.

**c. ALO and DAMPL.** The next step in tiered resourcing is the management of the distribution of resources using the Army’s resourcing priority tools, ALO and DAMPL. A unit’s ALO determines the allocation of manpower spaces and distribution of personnel. The Army assigns ALOs to units commensurate with their primary mission and required availability dates from war plans. The Army is the only service that uses an ALO system, which has a direct effect on unit status levels. ALO is expressed in numerically designated levels representing percentages of full TOE/MTOE manpower


spaces. For example, ALO 1 is 100 percent, ALO 2 approximately 90 percent, ALO 3 approximately 80 percent, and ALO 4 approximately 70 percent. A unit's ALO is listed in Section I of its MTOE. The DAMPL rank orders units based on their strategic priority or their projected deployment/employment sequence. This standing order of precedence list, approved by the senior Army leadership, is used to guide the peacetime distribution of personnel and equipment resources used or controlled by Department of the Army. Distributing scarce resources in DAMPL sequence allows the Army to optimize the readiness value of its assets where the risk or probability of conflict is greatest or where the least flexibility and time exist to correct shortages.

### **SECTION III CHAIRMAN'S READINESS SYSTEM**

#### **8-7. System overview**

**a. System purpose.** The Chairman's Readiness System was implemented in the fall of 1994. It was designed to provide the CJCS the information necessary to fulfill the Title 10, USC responsibilities. The system applies to the Joint Staff, Services, unified commands, and the Department of Defense combat support agencies (CSAs). The system is designed to assess both unit and joint readiness. Unit readiness focuses on people, training, and equipment. Joint readiness assesses key functional areas that enable the CINCs to integrate and synchronize forces. The Chairman's Readiness System is designed to provide a current, macro-level assessment of the military's readiness to execute the NMS. Long-term readiness and modernization issues are addressed by the JWCA process or by the JROC. Until recently, readiness was defined as the capability of a unit to accomplish the mission for which it was designed. Readiness was service-oriented, with no consideration given to requirements to operate as an integral part of a joint or combined multinational force.

**b. Responsibilities.** The CJCS is responsible for assessing the strategic level of readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the demands of the full range of the NMS. Readiness at this level is defined as the synthesis of readiness at the operational and tactical levels. It also focuses on broad functional areas such as intelligence and mobility to meet worldwide demands. The operational level of readiness is the responsibility of the CINCs and considers the joint perspective. Joint readiness is defined as the CINC's ability to integrate and synchronize ready combat and support forces in order to execute assigned missions. Readiness at the tactical level remains the primary responsibility of the Services. Unit readiness is defined as the ability to provide the capabilities required by CINCs to execute their assigned missions. These definitions are considered key because they delineate the responsibilities of the CJCS, Service Chiefs, and CINCs in maintaining and assessing readiness (Figure 8-4).



**Figure 8-4. Chairman’s Readiness System**

**8-8. Assessing current joint readiness**

**a. Joint Monthly Readiness Review (JMRR).**

(1) *JMRR types.* The JMRR provides the CJCS a current and broad assessment of the military readiness to fight across all three levels of war. There are three components of the JMRR: a Full JMRR, By-exception JMRR and Feedback JMRR, conducted on a 3-month cycle. The Full JMRR is conducted quarterly (usually during the first month of the quarter) or as requested by the CJCS. The Services present an assessment of unit readiness. The CINCs and CSAs submit an assessment of joint readiness in response to a specific scenario defined in the CJCS JMRR guidance message. The J3, Joint Staff compiles the information and presents a combined readiness assessment of the CINCs and the CSAs. The By-Exception JMRR is used to identify significant changes reported since the last Full JMRR, with the focus, both positive and negative, on current and projected assessments. A briefing is scheduled only if the changes have a major warfighting impact. A By-exception JMRR could be scheduled for the second month of the quarter. The Feedback JMRR is normally conducted during the third month of the quarter. It provides a forum to review the status of actions to address specific current readiness deficiencies raised in previous Full JMRR or By-exception JMRR assessments.

(2) *JMRR responsibilities.* The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) chairs the JMRR. The Director of Operations (J3) organizes the process and presents the joint readiness briefing. All Directors of the Joint Staff attend the JMRR briefing. The Service Vice Chiefs are the senior service representatives to the JMRR meeting. The Service Operations Deputies present the unit readiness briefing for their respective Services. During a Full JMRR, the Services report on current real-world force commitments and force assignments to a notional warfighting scenario. Data include current unit location, current and projected unit readiness, support force capability and readiness, and major Service readiness trends in the areas of personnel, equipment, training and enabler. In support force capability the following six major areas are

assessed: theater mobility support; engineers; health services; sustainability; security; and field services. Services will also provide an executive level summary of current tempo and its associated impact on readiness. The CINCs submit a readiness assessment in the eight functional areas that enable them to integrate and synchronize forces to execute their assigned missions (Figure 8-5). The U.S. Special Operations Command representative briefs unit readiness in generally the same format as the Services. The CSAs submit assessments in the same eight functional areas as the CINCs. Agency directors provide a narrative assessment of the agency's ability to support the CINCs. The CINCs and CSAs submit a current assessment and a 12-month projection of how ready they are to support their current worldwide and theater requirements. They also respond to how ready they are to meet the specific scenario identified in the CJCS JMRR guidance message. They use a C-1 to C-4 scale which is similar to the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) criteria covered later in this chapter.

- Joint personnel
- Intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance
- Special operations
- Mobility
- Logistics/sustainment
- Infrastructure
- Command/control/communications/  
computers
- Joint war planning and training

**Figure 8-5. Joint Readiness Functional Areas**

(3) *JMRR outputs.* With the consolidated responses of the Services, CINCs, and CSAs, the JMRR provides a current readiness assessment at the strategic level. It produces an assessment of the Armed Forces readiness to fight and meet the demands of the NMS. In addition, the JMRR produces a list of CINC and Service current readiness deficiencies which are further categorized as strategic concerns. Based on these concerns an overall risk assessment at the strategic level is reported to the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.

**b. Senior Readiness Oversight Council (SROC).** The SROC brings together the senior civilian (Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under Secretaries of Defense and of the Military Departments) and military leadership (VCJCS, Service Chiefs, and others) in a monthly meeting to review significant readiness topics. At each meeting the Service Chiefs provide a current and projected assessment of their unit status, similar in scope and form to the assessment provided in the JMRR. The VCJCS provides a joint readiness assessment and overall assessment of the readiness of the Armed Forces to fight and meet the demands of the NMS. Specific readiness issues can also be discussed at this meeting.

**c. Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC).** The *DOD Authorization Act of 1996* requires within 30 days following the end of each calendar quarter a report sent to Congress based on readiness assessments provided to a DOD forum (SROC) with

responsibility for readiness oversight. The Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress (QRRC) is approved by the Secretary of Defense prior to forwarding to Congress.

**d. Fixing Current Readiness.** The results of joint and Service actions to address readiness deficiencies are presented to the VCJCS and the Service Vice Chiefs at Feedback JMRR meetings. Deficiencies can either be resolved by accepting the risk they pose or by taking direct action to correct the shortfall. The Joint Staff directorates lead the deficiency analysis effort for their respective functional areas. Close coordination is required among the Joint Staff, Service Staffs, CINCs, and DOD agency staffs. Appropriate CINC mission impacts are analyzed; solutions and “workarounds” are proposed; and courses of action are approved. In addition to the quarterly Feedback JMRR meetings, a semiannual JMRR Deficiency Review is conducted by the Director, J-3, in collaboration with the CINCs, Services, and CSAs, to update the status and validate the categorization of all deficiencies in the JMRR database.

### **8-9. Assessing future readiness**

Broad responsibility for assessing future joint requirements falls under the purview of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC, with membership of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Vice Chiefs of each Service, performs mission needs review, validates requirements, and makes recommendations on the placement of scarce dollars and resources to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JROC provides a senior military perspective on the major weapons systems and other military capabilities required. (See Chapter 4 for discussion of JROC). The JROC uses the analytical process known as Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments (JWCA) to maintain continuity between current readiness and future capability. Because deficiencies identified in the JMRR may require long-term programmatic fixes, the deficiency may be passed to the appropriate JWCA assessment team for action. The JWCA ensures that the CINCs, Services, and CSAs are included in the assessment processes (See Chapter 4 for discussion of JWCA). The JROC uses the analytical assessments from the JWCA process to assist them in making informed decisions in preserving current capabilities while building future joint military capabilities through investments in people, force enhancements, modernization, and infrastructure.

### **8-10. Key relationships**

The relationships between JMRR assessments, Full JMRR, Feedback JMRR, JROC/JWCA SROC, and QRRC are illustrated graphically at Figure 8-6.




Figure 8-6. JMRR/SROC/QRRC Cycle

**8-11. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)**

GSORTS is an internal management tool for use by the CJCS, Services, and combatant commands. GSORTS is the single, automated reporting system within the Department of Defense that functions as the central registry of all operational units of the Armed Forces. GSORTS provides a current snapshot on a select slice of resource areas: personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training. GSORTS measures the level of selected resources and training status required to undertake the missions for which the unit was designed and organized. GSORTS is designed to support, in priority order, information requirements related to crisis response planning; deliberate or peacetime planning; and management responsibilities to organize, train, and equip forces for use by the CINCs. GSORTS provides the CJCS with the necessary unit information to achieve adequate and feasible military response to crisis situations and participate in the joint planning and execution process associated with deliberate planning. GSORTS also provides data used by other automated systems (JOPES, GCCS) in support of the joint planning process.


**SECTION IV  
ARMY READINESS**

**8-12. Unit status report purpose**


The unit status report (USR) is the Army’s input to GSORTS. The primary purpose of the USR is to provide the National Command Authorities, JCS, HQDA, and all levels of the Army’s chain of command with the current status of U.S. Army units and necessary information for making operational decisions. The USR is designed to measure the status of resources and training level of a unit at a given point in time. The reports should not be used in isolation to assess overall unit readiness or the broader aspects of Army force readiness. The USR provides a timely single source document for assessing key elements of unit status. It does not provide all the information necessary to manage resources.

**8-13. USR relationship to joint readiness**

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.02B requires all reporting units to report their status in the areas of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment serviceability, and training. The Army Unit Status Reporting System is required by Army Regulation 220-1 and provides the data required in CJCSI 3401.02B. The Army requires additional data that increases the value of the USR as a resource management and operations tool. The supplemental data required by the Army was selected by HQDA in coordination with the MACOMs. This information passes through but is not retained by the Joint Staff. The higher level of detail allows units to better express their status and all levels of command to use the report to analyze key status indicators (Figures 8-7 and 8-8).



**Figure 8-7. Active Army and Army Reserve Unit Status Reporting Channels**



**Figure 8-8. Army National Guard Unit Status Reporting Channels**

**8-14. USR changes**

The current version of AR 220-1 was published in September 1997. The current version is reorganized along functional areas; gives commanders flexibility in determining personnel and equipment availability; requires reporting overall level for Army war

reserve prepositioned sets; rescinds MACOM authority to exempt units from USR reporting while deployed or during training; and requires major combat unit commanders to derive two ratings for personnel and equipment on hand if units or elements of units are deployed.

### 8-15. USR procedures

**a. Overall category level.** USR data are transmitted through command and control communications channels. For this reason the report cannot be all-inclusive. Problems are highlighted for commanders and operators. Detailed reviews of problems are conducted using other data systems. Details of Army unit status reporting procedures are explicit in AR 220-1. Since procedures for measuring and reporting unit status have changed considerably with each revision, each commander, manager, or staff officer concerned with readiness should carefully study the detailed guidance and requirements of the latest edition. A summary of the key aspects of the procedure is included here to provide a basic understanding of the system. Chapter 2, AR 220-1 clearly identifies which units must report readiness. Reporting units are required to submit a USR covering their resource and training status levels. The overall category level (C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5) indicates the degree to which a unit has achieved prescribed levels of personnel and equipment, the training of those personnel, and the maintenance of the equipment. These levels reflect the status of the unit's resources and training measured against the resources and training required to undertake the wartime mission for which the unit is organized or designed. Category levels do not project a unit's combat ability once committed to action. The overall unit category level will be based only upon organic resources and training under the operational control of the reporting unit or its parent unit. The categories of overall unit levels are:

**C-1.** Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.

**C-2.** Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake most of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.

**C-3.** Unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake many, but not all, portions of the wartime mission(s) for which it is organized or designed.

**C-4.** Unit requires additional resources or training to undertake its wartime mission(s), but it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission(s) with resources on hand.

**C-5.** Unit is undergoing a service-directed resource change and is not prepared at this time to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed. C-5 units are restricted to the following:

- Units undergoing activation, inactivation, or conversion.
- Units manned or equipped below ALO-3 level.
- Units that are not manned or equipped but are required in the wartime structure.
- Units placed in cadre status by HQDA.

**b. Personnel data.** The USR provides the indicators of a unit's personnel status by comparing available strength, available MOS qualified strength, and available senior

grade strength against wartime requirements. In addition, assigned strength and personnel turnover data are also provided.

**c. Equipment on hand (EOH) data.** The USR provides indicators of a reporting unit EOH status level by comparing the fill of selected equipment to wartime requirements. A level is determined for all of an MTOE unit's primary items of equipment to include: Principal Weapons Systems and Equipment (ERC A/P), each individual pacing item (ERC P), and support items of equipment (ERC B/C).

**d. Equipment serviceability (ES).** The USR provides an ES status level indicating how well a unit is maintaining its on-hand equipment. A status level is calculated for the on-hand reportable equipment, referred to as pacing items (ERC P). A separate status level is calculated for each on-hand pacing item. The status level is calculated by comparing the aggregate Fully Mission Capable (FMC) rate for "all on-hand reportable equipment" regardless of ERC (including pacing items) and a separate calculation for each individual pacing item (ERC P). The units overall ES status is equal to the lower of these calculated levels.

**e. Training data.** The USR provides a training status for the reporting unit. The primary purpose of the unit training level indicates the current ability of the unit to perform assigned wartime missions. A secondary purpose of the unit training level shows resource shortfalls that prevent attainment of a training tempo necessary to achieve or maintain proficiency. A commander assesses his or her unit's ability to execute mission essential tasks (METL). The estimated number of training days needed to reach full proficiency determines a unit's training status level. This method of calculating training status is currently under revision by HQDA. The proposed change entails the addition of a second metric, a METL training percentage, in which the commander calculates a second training level based on the number of METL tasks trained, practiced, or untrained. The lower of the two metrics, training days needed to reach full METL proficiency and METL training percentage, will then determine the overall training level.

**f. Mission accomplishment estimate (MAE).** The MAE is the commander's subjective assessment of the unit's ability to execute that portion of its wartime mission it would be expected to perform if alerted/committed within 72 hours of the date of the report. The estimate is expressed in terms of the percent of wartime mission that can be accomplished if the unit were alerted/committed. An MAE is required from all reporting units. The MAE is also used for deployed units to report the effectiveness of the unit in executing its deployed mission(s).

**g. Determining overall unit status level.** To determine the overall unit status level, the commander reviews the status levels attained in the measured resource and training areas. The overall unit category level will normally be identical to the lowest level recorded in any of the unit's individually measured resource areas of personnel, equipment and hand, equipment serviceability, and training, but the overall category may be upgraded or downgraded by the unit commander. Modification of a unit's overall level by its commander does not permit modification of the computed status of each individually measured area, which must be reported without adjustment.

**8-16. Use of USR data at HQDA**

a. At HQDA, the USR is part of a larger readiness picture compiled from many functional reports and sources. It provides a quick channel whereby the chain of command is alerted to the status of units and, thus, can exercise the appropriate management actions and provide the required assistance. DA uses the USR in conjunction with other personnel and logistics reports to improve resource management of people, equipment, and the programming of facilities and training areas/exercises to increase the combat effectiveness of subordinate elements.

b. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS) receives the reports from the major commands through the JCS. Upon receipt, ODCSOPS prepares USR summaries for AA and RC units. Copies of these summaries, in the form of computer printouts, are provided to elements of the DA Staff, as well as other logistics and personnel agencies, and Service schools. Data may be assembled by type unit, OPLAN, major command, unit category, or in other formats to meet specific needs.

c. The Chief of Staff receives a monthly written readiness summary and briefing from the ODCSOPS, with significant input and analysis from the DCSPER, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG), and other ARSTAF elements. The status of major units by strategic force package (SFP) is provided as well as a two-year projection of each resource area. Special interest items, such as division reorganization, equipment conversion, or critical personnel issues are covered. This briefing provides the latest readiness information to the Army leadership.

d. Each principal DA Staff element uses the information provided by ODCSOPS to effect resource allocation in consonance with the DAMPL and ALO. Aggregate data from the USR also serves as a yardstick to judge how well the functional systems of personnel, logistics, and training are performing.

**SECTION V****SUMMARY AND REFERENCES****8-17. Summary**

Readiness is a primary mission of military forces in peacetime. Recognizing that readiness is highly situational and subjective, it is, nevertheless, a yardstick for programming and budgeting. The Army's readiness strategy entails maximizing readiness within available resources to meet the demands of war plans. The more accurately the Army captures and quantifies readiness, the better the Army can articulate resource needs to the DOD and the Congress.

**8-18. References**

- a. CJCS Instruction 3401.01B, *Chairman's Readiness System*.
- b. CJCS Instruction 3401.02, *Global Status of Resources and Training System*.
- c. CJCS Guide 3401A, *CJCS Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System*.
- d. CJCS Manual 3150.02, *Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)*.
- e. Army Regulation 220-1, *Unit Status Reporting*.
- f. Field Manual 100-11, *Force Integration*.



# CHAPTER 9

## ARMY PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, BUDGETING, AND EXECUTION SYSTEM

*Before the era of Secretary of Defense McNamara, each Service essentially established its own single-year budget and submitted it to Congress annually. Secretary McNamara, however, applied a different approach founded on a study by the RAND Corporation. He required the Services to prepare a single document, the then Five Year Defense Program, or FYDP, which detailed their resource requirements on a multi-year basis. He established himself as the sole authority for approving changes to the FYDP, and Services that desired change to the approved FYDP had to obtain his approval. That formed the rudimentary beginning of the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, or PPBS, which has changed substantially over the intervening years.*

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### **9-1. Chapter content**

This chapter describes how, at the beginning of 2001, the PPBS and its Army counterpart, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES), help acquire, allocate, and manage resources for military functions. Prescribed by Army Regulation 1-1, the PPBES makes up the Army component of the Department of Defense (DOD) Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) governed by DOD Directive 7045.14 and DOD Instruction 7045.7. This account describes the PPBES in relation to its parent PPBS. It lays out the responsibilities of Army officials—for overseeing the PPBES, for managing the several phases of its process, and for performing PPBES-related operational tasks. Next, the chapter highlights principal forums and other key characteristics of the DOD PPBS and then the Army PPBES. After displaying a graphic representation of the system's recurring events and organizational structure, the chapter concludes with a phase-by-phase discussion of the system's biennial process.

#### **9-2. PPBS—a dynamic system**

First, however, consider the history of the PPBS now beginning its 40th year. Significant events recorded by presidential administration show how the system has evolved, revealing a dynamic system.

**a. 1962—Kennedy/McNamara.**

(1) The DOD PPBS began in 1962 as a management innovation of President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense (SecDef), Robert McNamara. Before McNamara, each Military Department had prepared its budget following individual Service interests with very little guidance. Previous SecDef involvement was for the most part limited to dividing the budget ceiling of DOD between the Services. If the Services exceeded their "share of the pie," the SecDef would reduce their budget, usually by a percentage cut across all appropriations. Introducing the PPBS changed all this.

(2) Based on a concept developed at the RAND Corporation in the 1950s, the PPBS inaugurated a multi-year programmatic focus. Annual ceiling reductions gave way to analysis centered on 10 major force and support programs over a 5-year program period.

**b. 1969—Nixon/Laird.** The first major change in the PPBS occurred under President Nixon's SecDef, Melvin Laird. The Laird management style stressed participatory management. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) no longer initiated detailed program proposals; it reviewed those put forward by the Services using specific budgetary ceilings.

**c. 1977—Carter/Brown.** President Carter introduced zero-based budgeting to the Federal Budget. It achieved only limited success. The goal of zero-based budgeting was to identify marginal programs more clearly. "Decision packages" arrayed resources at three different levels, giving OSD greater opportunity to alter Service program proposals. Each Service developed procedures to array the decision packages. As an aid in building and displaying its program, the Army installed a program development increment package (PDIP). Used internally and not reflected in programs and budgets forwarded by the Army, the PDIP has since evolved into a management decision package (MDEP). In 1979, as a result of a RAND Corporation study (the Rice Study), Secretary of Defense Brown formed the Defense Resources Board (DRB). Designed to manage the PPBS more effectively, the DRB consisted of various OSD officials and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).

**d. 1981—Reagan/Weinberger.** The Reagan Administration pledged to revitalize American military strength in the most effective and economical manner. This objective led to significant changes in the PPBS known as the Carlucci initiatives (Frank Carlucci was the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) and Chairman of the DRB). Initiatives included a greater emphasis on long-range planning, a greater decentralization of authority to the Services, closer attention to cost savings and efficiencies, a refocus of DRB Program Review on major issues only, and a general streamlining of the entire PPBS process. In addition, a restructured DRB added Service Secretaries as full members. The DRB would now review and approve policy and strategy in the planning phase, which produced defense guidance (DG). Moreover, one initiative invited commanders in chief (CINCs) of the combatant commands to participate in crucial DRB deliberations during the development of the DG and the DRB Program Review.

**e. 1984—Enhancement of the role of the CINC in the PPBS.** DepSecDef Taft introduced procedures to allow the CINCs a greater voice in the process for developing Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) and the DRB Program Review. The

procedures included: CINC submission of prioritized requirements (via integrated priority lists (IPLs)); tracking CINC concerns during POM development and execution; visibility of CINC requirements in the POMs; enhanced CINC participation in DRB program review; and enhanced role for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in the review and coordination of CINC concerns.

**f. 1986—Conversion from annual to biennial PPBS cycle.** In response to his Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission) and the *DOD Authorization Act of 1986* (Public Law 99-145), President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 219, directing that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and DOD produce a 2-year budget beginning with the FY 1988 and FY 1989 budget years. In response to this direction, OSD and the Military Departments implemented a biennial PPBS process. In practice, however, Congress still requires an annual budget submission, compelling an off cycle update of the POM and budget for the second budget year.

**g. 1987—CINC capabilities to participate effectively in the PPBS budget phase.** Earlier decisions of the DRB gave the CINCs a role in the planning and programming phases of the PPBS. In October 1987, the DRB expanded the role of the CINCs to include the budget review and execution phase.

**h. 1989—Bush/Cheney.** During the early stages of DOD downsizing, President Bush instituted a series of defense management review decisions. In another initiative, SecDef Cheney modified the framework for PPBS decision-making, including in the structure a core group of DOD officials he used to help manage the Department.

**i. 1993—Clinton/Aspin, Perry, Cohen.** DOD downsizing continued under the Clinton Administration guided initially by SecDef Les Aspin's Bottom Up Review and later by the results of the Defense Performance Review, Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, and 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. The Clinton administration continued the PPBS framework of the Bush Administration, using a core group of DOD managers and several review forums including a program review group (PRG) expanded by the Administration.--

## SECTION II SYSTEM RESPONSIBILITIES

### 9-3. Secretarial oversight

**a. PPBES oversight and Armywide policy development.** The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA(FM&C)) oversees the PPBES and the development and promulgation of Armywide PPBES policy. The ASA(FM&C) also oversees all Army appropriations and serves as the sponsor for all appropriations except Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) appropriations.

**b. Functional oversight.** Principal officials of the Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA) oversee operation of the PPBES process within assigned functional areas and provide related policy and direction.

#### **9-4. System management**

The ASA(FM&C), with the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE), manages the PPBES. As provided below, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) joins the ASA(FM&C) and DPAE to manage various aspects of the several PPBES phases, each establishing and supervising policies and procedures necessary to carry out phase functions.

#### **9-5. Planning phase**

**a. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.** Responsible for strategy, planning, and requirements determination, DCSOPS—

- (1) Administers the Army Planning System to meet and complement the demands of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) and the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES).
- (2) Prepares The Army Plan(TAP).
- (3) Exercises staff supervision of joint matters and assigns, coordinates, and reviews Joint Staff actions.
- (4) Integrates the views of principal officials of Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) on Army missions and capabilities consonant with national security objectives and DOD guidance.
- (5) Develops the program force.
- (6) Makes sure that CINC-required warfighting capabilities are integrated into the Army requirements determination process.
- (7) Determines force-related requirements of the Active Army, ARNG, and USAR that includes:
  - (a) Developing near-, mid-, and long-term force requirements.
  - (b) Developing requirements for organization, force structure, personnel, materiel, command and control, mobilization, facilities, and training devices.
- (8) Recommends priorities for Army requirements, programs, and resources to the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) for approval by the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY).
- (9) Provides the operational link between HQDA, the Joint Staff, and, through commanders of Army service component commands (ASCCs), the CINCs.
- (10) With the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (DCSPRO), helps DPAE prepare—
  - (a) Army input to OSD's Defense Program Projection and Army comments on the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).
  - (b) Briefings on the resource status of CINC issues.
- (11) With DCSPRO, helps ASA(FM&C) coordinate CINC major budget issues.

(12) With DCSPRO and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA(ALT)), prepares the Army modernization plan (AMP) and research, development, and acquisition plan (RDAP).

(13) Serves as Army manager for force structure issues (Figure 9-1 below), and performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Tables 9-5 and 9-6. (Tables 9-5 and 9-6 appear at the end of the chapter.)

**b. DCSPRO.** Responsible for the execution of approved materiel requirements, DCSPRO—

(1) With DCSOPS and ASA(ALT), helps prepare the following:

(a) The AMP

(b) The RDAP that is represented by the database for the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) augmented for the extended planning period (EPP).

(2) With DCSOPS, helps DPAAE prepare—

(a) Army input to OSD's Defense Program Projection and Army comments on the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

(b) Briefings on the resource status of CINC issues.

(3) With DCSOPS, helps ASA(FM&C) coordinate CINC major budget issues.

#### **9-6. Integrated programming and budgeting phase**

ASA(FM&C) and DPAAE jointly manage the integrated programming and budgeting phase.

##### **a. Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation.**

Taking the lead on program matters, DPAAE—

(1) Provides the SECARMY and CSA with independent assessments of program alternatives and priorities.

(2) With ASA(FM&C) and DCSOPS, guides and integrates the work of the program evaluation groups (PEGs) throughout the PPBES process.

(3) Serves as the authoritative source of the FYDP resource position for the Army as a whole and, specifically, for CINC issues resourced by HQDA.

(4) Exercises HQDA staff jurisdiction over the POM development process and FYDP to include interaction with OSD and the Joint Staff on resource issues.

(5) With input from PEGs and program integrators (Figure 9-2), develops the Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM) (section III, TAP).

(6) With DCSOPS and functional proponents—

(a) Responds to DPG and other OSD programming guidance.

(b) Prepares Army input to OSD's Defense Program Projection and the DPG.

(7) With functional proponents—

(a) Develops and defends the Army program, manages its codification in the POM.

(b) Reviews CINC integrated priority lists (IPLs).

(c) Reviews commander's narratives and command-requested changes submitted by commanders of the major Army commands (MACOM), program executive officers (PEOs), program managers (PMs), and heads of other operating agencies.

(8) Directs the review and analysis of Army programming actions, performs selected studies, and develops alternatives for resource planning and programming.

(9) Manages the MDEP architecture.

(10) Makes sure the force structure and manpower information included in FYDP submissions to OSD match the positions in the military force structure and accounting databases for the Active Army, ARNG, USAR, and civilian work force. (Data in the FYDP and in the force structure and manpower databases must match before the FYDP can be provided to OSD.)

(11) With DCSOPS and ASCCs, briefs each CINC on the resource status of the CINC's issues after submission of each POM.

(12) With ASA(FM&C)—

(a) Maintains the data architecture of the Army management structure (AMS) to meet management needs for each phase of the PPBES and to support FYDP submissions (including annexes).

(b) Maintains a resource management architecture to support the integration of PPBES processes and systems.

(c) Maintains the database architecture for the PPBES Data Management System (Probe), paragraph 9-27a, below.

(d) Maintains Probe as the official database of record for Army program and budget data, managing data entry into Probe and making sure that Probe data elements remain consistent both internally and with AMS and FYDP reporting requirements (including annexes).

(e) Produces the resource position for submitting the Army portion of the FYDP and for periodic issue of Program and Budget Guidance, Volume II. Generates and submits electronic data in support of Army budget estimates.

(13) With appropriate HQDA principal officials develops automated management systems, decision support systems, and predictive models to support program development.

(14) Provides analytical and administrative support to the Planning Program Budget Committee (PPBC), Senior Review Group (SRG), and Army Resources Board (ARB).

**b. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller).** During the integrated programming and budgeting phase, ASA(FM&C) takes the lead on

budget matters. In particular, ASA(FM&C) through the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Budget) (DASA(B))—

- (1) Supervises and directs preparation of Army budget estimates.
- (2) With functional proponents and PEGs, prepares the Army Budget from the approved Army program.
- (3) Reviews and consolidates the ARNG and USAR budgets with the Active Army budget for submission to OSD and Congress.
- (4) Guides and integrates the work of PEGs on budget matters.
- (5) With DCSOPS, coordinates with each CINC on major budget issues affecting the CINC's resource requirements.
- (6) Develops and approves the independent cost estimate to check the reasonableness of the baseline cost estimate for selected major weapon and information systems and sets the Army cost position that certifies or modifies the baseline cost estimate as appropriate.
- (7) Validates economic analyses supporting new programs.
- (8) With DPAAE, performs system and data management functions as described above.
- (9) Issues resource controls for authorized or projected total obligation authority (TOA), manpower, and force structure before each update of the Probe database.
- (10) Performs budget and appropriation sponsor assignments listed in Tables 9-5 and 9-6 at chapter end.

### **9-7. Execution phase**

ASA(FM&C) manages the PPBES execution phase and applies funds appropriated by Congress to carry out authorized programs. In the process, ASA(FM&C)—

- a. Supervises and directs financial execution of the congressionally approved budget.
- b. Reports on budget execution.
- c. Oversees policy and guidance to account for and report on Army managed funds.
- d. Oversees accounting for and reporting on use of Army-managed funds to OSD and Congress by appropriation. As applicable to each appropriation, includes FYDP program, program element (PE), project number, budget line item number (BLIN), budget activity (BA), budget activity group (BAG), budget subactivity (BSA), element of resource (EOR), and financing data. Also as applicable to an appropriation, accounts for and reports on the use of manpower-by-manpower category.
- e. With the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), oversees the development and maintenance of Army systems in support of financial analysis; and oversees implementation of the same standard Army systems in support of distribution, accounting, and reporting of funds.

f. Reviews program performance, specifically overseeing the Quarterly Army Performance Review (QAPR).

### **SECTION III RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PPBES-RELATED OPERATIONAL TASKS**

#### **9-8. HQDA principal officials**

**a. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology).**  
ASA(ALT)—

(1) Performs Army acquisition management activities as the designated Army Acquisition Executive (AAE).

(2) Represents the Army on the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the Nuclear Weapons Council Standing Committee, and the Conventional Systems Committee.

(3) Advises the SECARMY on matters of acquisition management.

(4) With the Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA), co-chairs the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC).

(5) Integrates the development and acquisition of materiel into all phases of the PPBES process.

(6) With DCSPRO, exercises responsibility for the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE) and procurement programs.

(7) Performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Tables 9-5 and 9-6 at chapter end.

**b. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).**  
ASA(M&RA)—

(1) Approves policy for, and oversees, manpower, force structure, and personnel activities conducted throughout the Army.

(2) Oversees development and promulgation of Reserve Component policy.

(3) Performs PPBES functions and responsibilities outlined in AR 10-5 and related functions affecting manpower, including review of proposed manpower levels before approval by the SECARMY and CSA.

(4) Serves as Army manager for Army Management Headquarters Activities (AMHA) (Figure 9-1) and performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Tables 9-5 and 9-6 at chapter end.

(5) Approves allocation of military end strength, civilian end strength, and civilian work years to MACOMs, PEOs, PMs, and other operating agencies.

**c. Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers.** DISC4 serves as Program Integrator for Information Technology as provided in paragraph 9-32, below.

**d. Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, International Affairs.** DUSA(IA)—

(1) Co-chairs selected mission areas in the development of The Army Plan(TAP).

(2) Oversees and justifies those portions of the Army budget relative to Army international activities, Title 10 foreign military sales, the International Military Education and Training Transfer Appropriation, OSD directed executive agencies, and CINC engagement programs.

(3) Performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Tables 9-5 and 9-6 at chapter end.

**e. Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. DCSINT—**

(1) Prepares, justifies, and submits the program and budget for the Army portion of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) per the policy, resource, and administrative, guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence and DOD NFIP program managers.

(2) Performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Tables 9-5 and 9-6 at chapter end.

**f. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. DCSLOG—**

(1) Reviews the program and budget for its capability to sustain the force.

(2) Performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Tables 9-5 and 9-6 at chapter end.

**g. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. DCSPER—**

(1) Manages the individuals account for Active Army military manpower not included in Army operating strength as listed in Figure 9-1, below.

(2) Allocates Active Army military strength to MACOMs, PEOs, PMs, and other operating agencies.

(3) Collects for reimbursable manpower allocated to revolving funds and non-Army agencies.

(4) Performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Tables 9-5 and 9-6 at chapter end.

**h. Chief, National Guard Bureau. The Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) through the Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG)—**

(1) Prepares and justifies the budget for ARNG appropriations and performs operational tasks set forth below for commanders of MACOMs and other operating agencies.

(2) Serves as Army manager for ARNG manpower issues as listed in Figure 9-1, below, and performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Table 9-2, below, and Tables 9-5 and 9-6 at chapter end.

**i. Chief, Army Reserve. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR)—**

(1) Prepares and justifies the budget for USAR appropriations.

(2) Serves as Army manager for USAR manpower issues as listed in Figure 9-1, below, and performs programming and budgeting assignments listed in Table 9-2, below, and Tables 9-5 and 9-6 at chapter end.


**j. Other principal officials.** Other HQDA principal officials, as assigned, serve as Army managers for manpower issues listed in Figure 9-1, and perform programming and budgeting assignments listed in Tables 9-5 and 9-6 at chapter end.

<b>Managers for Manpower and Force Structure Issues</b>	
<i>Issue</i>	<i>Manager</i>
Force structure/Unit Identification Code (UIC)	DCSOPS
Military (Active)	ASA (M&RA)
Army National Guard Manpower	DARNG
U.S. Army Reserve Manpower	CAR
Civilian (end strength)	ASA (M&RA)
Individuals account	DCSPER
Army Management Headquarters Activities (AMHA)	ASA (M&RA)
Joint and Defense Accounts	ASA (M&RA)

**Figure 9-1. Managers for Manpower and Force Structure Issues**

<b>Program Evaluation Groups</b>		
<i>Title</i>	<i>Co-chairs</i>	
Manning	ASA (M&RA)	DCSPER
Training	ASA (M&RA)	DCSOPS
Organizing	ASA (M&RA)	DCSOPS
Equipping	ASA (ALT)	DCSPRO
Sustaining	ASA (ALT)	DCSLOG
Installations	ASA (I&E)	ACSIM
<b>Program Integrators</b>		
Army National Guard	DARNG	
U.S. Army Reserve	CAR	
Information Technology	DISC 4	

**Figure 9-2. Program Evaluation Groups**



**Figure 9-3. Resources in the FYDP Reflecting the FY 02-03 Budget**

<b>FYDP Major Defense Programs and Subprograms with Army Proponent Agencies</b>		
Nr	Major Defense program	Proponent <sup>1</sup>
1.	Strategic Forces	DCSOPS
2.	General Purpose Forces	DCSOPS
3.	Communications, Intelligence, and Space	
	Communications	DISC4
	Intelligence	DCSINT/DCSOPS <sup>2</sup>
	Space	SMDC <sup>3</sup>
4.	Mobility	DCSOPS
5.	Guard and Reserve Forces	
	Army National Guard	CNGB
	Army Reserve	CAR
6.	Research and Development	ASA (ALT)
7.	Central Supply and Maintenance	ASA (FM&C)
8.	Training, Health and Other Personnel Activities	
	Training	DCSOPS
	Health	MEDCOM <sup>4</sup>
9.	Administration	DCSPER
10.	Support of Other Nations	DUSA (IA)
11.	Special Operations Forces	DCSOPS

**Notes.**—<sup>1</sup> Within each applicable program, ACSIM serves as proponent for base operations and real property services and ASA (M&RA) serves as proponent for management headquarters and manpower functions.

<sup>2</sup> DCSINT is the resource proponent for operational and strategic intelligence. DCSOPS is the resource proponent for tactical intelligence.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command

<sup>4</sup> The U.S. Army Medical Command performs functions of The Surgeon General (TSG).

**Figure 9-4. FYDP Major Defense Programs and Subprograms with Army Proponent Agencies**

### **9-9. Army commanders**

**a. Commanders of MACOMs, PEOs, PMs and heads of other operating agencies.** MACOM commanders, PEOs, PMs, and heads of other operating agencies:

- (1) Plan, program, and budget for assigned missions, responsibilities, and functions.
- (2) Document manpower in their subordinate organizations per allocated manpower levels.
- (3) Execute the approved MACOM or agency program within allocated resources, applying the inherent flexibility allowed by law and regulation.
- (4) Assess MACOM or agency program performance and budget execution and:
  - (a) Account for and report on use of allocated funds by appropriation and MDEP. As applicable to each appropriation, include FYDP program, AMSCO, PE, project number, BLIN, BA, BAG, BSA, and EOR. Also, account for and report on use of allocated manpower by unit identification code (UIC).
  - (b) Use manpower data (especially the Civilian Employment Level Plan (CELP)) and financial data from budget execution in developing future requirements.

**b. Commanders of MACOMs serving as Army service component commanders.** MACOM commanders serving as Army service component command (ASCC) commanders identify and integrate their other missions and operational requirements with the requirements of the CINC.

### **9-10. Staff managers and sponsors for congressional appropriations**

The task of getting Army resources entails working with separate resource allocation structures for congressional appropriations and the FYDP. Figure 9-1, above, lists staff managers for manpower and force structure issues. Figure 9-4, above, lists proponents of FYDP programs and subprograms. Tables 9-5 and 9-6 at chapter end list staff managers and sponsors for Army appropriations and funds and 0-1 level budget activities of the operation and maintenance appropriations. Responsibilities of designated staff managers and sponsors are as follows.

**a. Manager for manpower and manager for force structure issues.** The manager for manpower issues and the manager for force structure issues work together to maintain a continuous exchange of information and collaboration. As appropriate, they—

- (1) Coordinate instructions to the field, and the processing of requests from the field, for manpower or force changes.
- (2) Align and balance manpower and unit information among the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS), The Army Authorization Documents System (TAADS), Probe, and the FYDP.
- (3) Provide lead support on manpower issues to the chairs of PEGs.

**b. Manager for functional requirements.** The manager for functional requirements—

- (1) Determines the scope, quantity, and qualitative nature of functional requirements for planning, programming, and budgeting.
- (2) Checks how commands and agencies apply allocated manpower and dollars to make sure their use fulfills program requirements.
- (3) Reviews unresourced programs submitted by MACOMs, PEOs, PMs, and other operating agencies.
- (4) Resolves conflicts involving unresourced requirements or decrements on which MACOMs, PEOs, PMs and other operating agencies fail to reach agreement in developing the program or budget.
- (5) Recommends to the Planning Program Budget Committee (PPBC) (see section on PPBES deliberative forums) the allocation of projected resources, unresourced programs, and offsetting decrements.
- (6) During program and budget reviews, and throughout the process, coordinates resource changes with agencies having pronency for MDEPs.

**c. Manager for program and performance.** The manager for program and performance—

- (1) Represents the functional program and monitors its performance.
- (2) As required, acts with the appropriation sponsor or helps him or her perform the duties listed for the appropriation sponsor, paragraph 9-10d(1) – d(5), below.
- (3) Translates budget decisions and approved manpower and funding into program changes and makes sure that data transactions update affected MDEPs.
- (4) Checks budget execution from the functional perspective.
- (5) For investment appropriations:
  - (a) Operates and maintains databases in support of Probe.
  - (b) During budget formulation, determines how changes in fiscal guidance affect budget estimates and reviews and approves the documentation of budget justification.
  - (c) During review of the budget by OSD and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and by Congress, serves as appropriation advocate, helps prepare the Army response to OSD Program Budget Decisions (PBDs), and prepares congressional appeals.
  - (d) During execution determines fund recipients, monitors execution, perform decrement reviews, plans reprogramming, and controls below threshold reprogramming. On RDA matters and otherwise as required, testifies before OSD and Congress.

**d. Appropriation sponsor.** The appropriation sponsor—

- (1) Controls the assigned appropriation or fund.
- (2) Serves as Army spokesperson for appropriation resources.

- (3) Helps resource claimants solve manpower and funding deficiencies.
- (4) Issues budget policy, instructions, and fiscal guidance.
- (5) During budget formulation—
  - (a) Bears responsibility for Probe updates.
  - (b) Prepares and justifies budget estimates.
- (6) Testifies before Congress during budget justification.
- (7) Manages financial execution of the appropriation and reprograms allocated funds to meet unforeseen contingencies during budget execution.

## **SECTION IV**

### **DOD PPBS SYSTEM DESCRIPTION**

#### **9-11. Purpose**

The DOD PPBS serves as the primary resource management system for the department's military functions. Its purpose is to produce a plan, a program, and finally the Defense budget. The system documents the program and budget as the FYDP.

#### **9-12. The Future Years Defense Program**

**a.** The FYDP officially summarizes forces and resources for programs developed within the DOD PPBS and approved by the SecDef. The FYDP specifies force levels and lists corresponding total obligation authority (TOA) and manpower. For example, in addition to historical data, the FYDP for the FY 2002-2003 Budget would, as shown in Figure 9-3:

- (1) Record totals for each resource group by—
  - (a) Prior fiscal year (PY), in this case FY 2000.
  - (b) Current fiscal year (CY), in this case FY 2001.
  - (c) Budget fiscal years (BY), in this case FY 2002-2003.
- (2) Extend TOA and manpower totals 4 years beyond the FY 2002-2003 Budget to FY 2007.
- (3) Extend force totals 7 years beyond the FY 2002-2003 Budget to FY 2010.

**b.** The FYDP comprises 11 major Defense programs. Figure 9-4 lists the programs together with Army subprograms and Army proponent agencies. Each program consists of an aggregation of PEs that reflect a DOD force or support mission. PEs identify specific activities, projects, or functions and contain the fiscal and manpower resources needed to achieve an objective or plan. PEs permit cross-Service analysis by OSD and congressional staff members.

**c.** HQDA submits the Army portion of the FYDP database to OSD 3 times a year. During odd years, it records the POM update.

(1) The first submission, generally forwarded in mid-May, records the position of the Army POM.

(2) The second submission, generally forwarded in mid-September, records the Army budget estimate submission (BES).

(3) The third submission, forwarded in mid-January, records the position of the President's Budget

d. For each FYDP position, OSD publishes a Summary and Program Element Detail volume on a CD ROM.

e. As prescribed by section 221, title 10, United States Code, (10 USC 221), OSD provides the President's Budget version to Congress.

f. OSD's Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation manages the program element data structure and serves as the approval authority for any changes to that structure. Beginning with the FY 2002-2007 POM, OSD is gradually replacing the nearly 40-year old FYDP database format with a new Defense Programming Database (DPD). Transition to the DPD over the next several PPBES cycles will seek to standardize budget and program data while consolidating many of the FYDP's currently required supplemental reports and annexes.

### 9-13. Key participants

DOD officials, assisting the Secretary of Defense as key participants in the PPBS, include the following:

a. **The Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef).** The DepSecDef assists the SecDef in overall leadership of the department. The DepSecDef exercises authority delegated by the SecDef and conducts the day-to-day operation of DOD. The DepSecDef manages the PPBS.

b. **The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).** The CJCS assists the President and SecDef in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces. The CJCS serves as the principal military adviser to the President and SecDef. Shouldering responsibilities for planning, advising, and policy formulation, the CJCS participates in DOD's senior councils, by speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the CINCs.

c. **The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS).** During absences of the Chairman, the VCJCS, who is the second-ranking member of the Armed Forces, acts for the Chairman.

d. **The Service Secretaries.** The Service Secretaries convey the Service perspective on Defense matters to the SecDef and DepSecDef and, as key advisers, provide them with candid personal views.

e. **The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)).** The USD (AT&L) exercises responsibility for all matters relating to Defense acquisition, technology, and logistics and serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE).

**f. The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD(Policy)).** The USD (Policy) represents DOD on foreign relations and arms control matters and serves as the principal adviser to the DepSecDef for the PPBS planning phase.

**g. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer) (USD(C)).** The USD(C) exercises responsibility for all budgetary and fiscal matters including DOD program analysis and evaluation and budget formulation and execution.

**h. The Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD(P&R)).** The USD (P&R) exercises responsibility for all matters relating to total force management as it concerns readiness; National Guard and Army Reserve affairs; health affairs; training; and personnel requirements and management.

#### **9-14. Defense Resources Board**

**a.** The Defense Resources Board (DRB) assists the SecDef and DepSecDef in making major program decisions. The DepSecDef chairs the DRB with the CJCS serving as vice chairman. The DepSecDef designates other OSD principals to participate in deliberations as necessary. DRB members are as follows:

(1) From OSD: the Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Policy, Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer, and Personnel and Readiness.

(2) From the Joint Staff and Services: the VCJCS and Secretaries of the Military Departments, who normally are accompanied by Chiefs of Services.

**b.** Considering broad policy and developing guidance on high-priority objectives, the DRB helps promote long-range planning and stability in the Defense program.

**c.** Among other functions, the DRB—

(1) Reviews guidance for planning and programming.

(2) Evaluates high-priority programs.

(3) Considers the effect of resource decisions on baseline cost, schedule, and performance of major acquisition programs and aligns the programs with the PPBS.

(4) Helps tie the allocation of resources for specific programs and forces to national policies.

(5) Reviews the program and budget.

(6) Reviews execution of selected programs.

(7) Advises the SecDef on policy, PPBS issues, and proposed decisions.

**d.** When the DRB meets to deliberate major issues on DOD-funded intelligence programs, it expands to include representatives from appropriate intelligence agencies. The DepSecDef and Director of Central Intelligence co-chair this Expanded DRB (EDRB).

**e.** The OSD Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation acts as Executive Secretary for both the DRB and EDRB. In this capacity, the Director manages the program review process and, with the chairs of the EDRB, the intelligence program

review. The Director also manages the preparation of Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) and the intelligence PDM (IPDM) that reflect the SecDef's program decisions.

### **9-15. Program Review Group**

**a.** The OSD Program Review Group (PRG) analyzes major issues identified by the DepSecDef and develops decision options during program review. It forwards issues sufficiently significant to warrant action by the Defense Resources Board (DRB) to that body for consideration. Supporting the endeavor, OSD principal staff assistants conduct a series of front end assessments (FEAs). As directed by the DRB, assessments address topics or decisions that will influence the next POM and subsequent program review. Prepared in coordination with representatives of the CJCS, Service chiefs, and other OSD principal assistants, the assessments are briefed to the PRG. As appropriate they are also briefed to the DepSecDef or DRB.

**b.** The Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation chairs the PRG. Adding other OSD principals to participate in sessions as appropriate, the PRG includes the following members:

**(1)** From OSD: the Principal Deputy Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and for Comptroller and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I), Force Management Policy, Health Affairs, and Reserve Affairs.

**(2)** From the Joint Staff: the Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J8).

**(3)** From the Services: the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments), the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff (Programs and Resources), and the Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs.

### **9-16. Intelligence Program Review Group**

**a.** The Intelligence Program Review Group (IPRG) identifies opportunities to advance the U.S. Government's Intelligence Strategy. It evaluates potential program changes from a mission perspective, considers tradeoffs, and forwards issue analyses to the EDRB for consideration.

**b.** The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Programs and Evaluation) and the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs co-chair the IPRG. Members include representatives of all executive branch organizations that manage or oversee intelligence capabilities.

### **9-17. Defense Acquisition Board and Joint Requirements Oversight Council**

**a.** The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) oversees Defense system acquisition, providing discipline through review of major programs. At each milestone in the system's life cycle, the Board assures that programs have met established performance requirements, including program-specific exit criteria. As chairman and vice chairman, respectively, the USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) and VCJCS direct the efforts of the DAB.

**b.** The USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), with the DAB and Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) (below), helps link the acquisition process to planning, programming, and budgeting. Serving as a key adviser to the SecDef and DepSecDef, the USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) participates in all resource decisions affecting the baselines of major acquisition programs, including costs, schedules, and performance.

**c.** The VCJCS chairs the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). Through the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process and Joint Requirements Board (JRB), the JROC explores new alternatives by assessing joint military warfighting capabilities and requirements posed by the CINCs, Services, Joint Staff, and supported Defense agencies. The forum helps forge consensus underlying the Chairman's statutory advice to the SecDef on program and budget proposals. The JROC also helps the DAB and USD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) articulate military needs and validate performance goals and program baselines at successive milestones of each DAB program.

## **SECTION V**

### **ARMY PPBES SYSTEM DESCRIPTION**

#### **9-18. Army's primary resource management system**

The PPBES serves as the Army's primary resource management system. A major decision-making process, the PPBES interfaces with joint strategic planning and with planning conducted by OSD. Linking directly to OSD programming and budgeting, the PPBES develops and maintains the Army portion of the Defense program and budget. The PPBES supports Army planning, program development, and budget preparation at all levels of command. Similarly supporting program and budget execution, it provides feedback to the planning, programming, and budgeting processes.

#### **9-19. PPBES concept**

**a.** The PPBES ties strategy, program, and budget all together. It helps build a comprehensive plan in which budgets flow from programs, programs from requirements, requirements from missions, and missions from national security objectives. The patterned flow from end purpose to resource cost defines requirements in progressively greater detail.

**b.** Long-range planning creates a vision of the Army 20 years into the future. In the 2- to 10-year midterm, long-range macro estimates give way to a specified size, composition, and quality of divisional and support forces. Derived from joint strategic planning and intermediate objectives to achieve long-range goals, this divisional and support force provides the planning foundation for program requirements.

**c.** In the midterm, guided by force requirements, the integrated program–budget process distributes projected resources. It seeks to support priorities and policies of the senior Army leadership while achieving balance among Army organizations, systems, and functions. For the 0- to 2-year near-term, the integrated process converts program requirements into budget requests for manpower and dollars. When enacted into

appropriations and manpower authorizations, these resources become available to carry out approved programs.

**d.** By formally adding execution to the traditional emphasis on planning, programming, and budgeting the Army emphasizes concern for how well program performance and financial execution apply allocated resources to meet the Army's requirements.

**e.** Documents produced within the PPBES support Defense decision-making, and the review and discussion that attend their development help shape the outcome. For example:

**(1)** The Army helps prepare the DPG and planning documents produced by the JSPS. Army participation influences policy, strategy, and force objectives considered by the SecDef and the CJCS, including policies for development, acquisition, and other resource-allocation issues.

**(2)** MACOM commanders, PEOs, PMs, and heads of other operating agencies similarly influence positions and decisions taken by the SECARMY and CSA. Commanders and heads of agencies develop and submit force-structure, procurement, and construction requirements; assessments; and data to support program and budget development. Through periodic commanders' conferences held by the CSA, they also make their views known on the proposed plan, program, and budget.

**(3)** The CINCs influence Army positions and decisions through MACOM commanders serving as Army service component command (ASCC) commanders, who integrate CINC operational requirements into their program and budget submissions. CINCs also highlight pressing requirements in an IPL that receives close review during program development.

## **9-20. PPBES objectives**

The main objective of the PPBES is to establish, justify, and acquire the fiscal and manpower resources needed to accomplish the Army's assigned missions in executing the National Military Strategy. Phase by phase objectives follow:

**a.** Through planning, to size, structure, man, equip, train, and sustain the Army force to support the National Military Strategy.

**b.** Through integrated programming and budgeting, to—

**(1)** Distribute projected manpower, dollars, and materiel among competing requirements according to Army resource allocation policy and priorities, making sure that requirements get resourced at defensible, executable levels.

**(2)** Convert resource allocation decisions into requests for congressional authorization and appropriations.

**c.** Through program execution, to apply resources to achieve approved program objectives, and adjust resource requirements based on execution feedback.

**d.** Through budget execution, to manage and account for funds to carry out approved programs.

### **9-21. Control of planning, programming, and budgeting documents**

**a.** Papers and associated data sponsored by the DOD PPBS give details of proposed programs and plans. The proposals often state candidate positions and competing options that remain undecided until final approval.

**b.** Access to such tentative material by other than those directly involved in planning and allocating resources would frustrate the candor and privacy of leadership deliberations. Moreover, access by private firms seeking DOD contracts would imperil competition and pose serious ethical, even criminal, problems for those involved. For these reasons, DOD closely controls documents produced through the DOD PPBS and its supporting databases. Thus, OSD restricts access to DOD and other governmental agencies directly involved in planning, programming, and budgeting Defense resources, primarily OMB.

**c.** Exceptions to the limitations described require SecDef approval. After coordination with the General Counsel, Army proponents may request an exception, but only for compelling need. Statutes and other procedures govern disclosure of information to Congress and the General Accounting Office (GAO).

**d.** The list that follows cites some of the major PPBS and related PPBES documents and material requiring restricted access.

**(1)** Planning phase: DPG.

**(2)** Programming phase:

**(a)** Fiscal Guidance.

**(b)** POM.

**(c)** FYDP documentation including FYDP annexes.

**(d)** Issue papers (for example, major issue papers, cover briefs).

**(e)** Proposed military department program reductions (or program offsets).

**(f)** Tentative issue-decision memoranda.

**(g)** Program decision memorandum (PDM).

**(3)** Budgeting phase:

**(a)** FYDP documents for the September BES and President's Budget, including procurement, research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), and construction annexes.

**(b)** Program Budget Decisions (PBDs).

**(c)** Automated Program and Financing Statements generated by Probe.

**(d)** Reports generated by the automated Budget Review System (BRS).

**(e)** DD Form 1414 Base for Reprogramming.

**(f)** DD Form 1416 Report of Programs.

**(g)** Congressional data sheets.

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**SECTION VI**  
**RECORDING RESOURCES****9-22. The MDEP: what it is and how it's used**

**a.** The MDEP gives the Army a key resource management tool. Collectively, MDEPs account for all Army resources. They describe the capabilities programmed over a 9-year period for the Active Army, Guard, Reserve, and civilian work force.

**b.** Recording the resources needed to get an intended output, an individual MDEP describes a particular organization, program, or function and applies uniquely to one of the following six areas for resource management:

- (1) Missions of MTOE (modified tables of organization and equipment) units.
- (2) Missions of TDA (tables of distribution and allowances) units and Armywide standard functions.
- (3) Missions of standard installation organizations (SIOs).
- (4) Acquisition, fielding, and sustainment of weapon and information systems (with linkage to organizations).

(5) Special visibility programs (SVPs).

(6) Short term projects (STPs).

**c.** In short, the MDEP—

(1) Specifies the military and civilian manpower and dollars associated with a program undertaking.

(2) Displays needed resources across relevant Army commands and relevant appropriations.

(3) Justifies the resource expenditure.

**d.** HQDA uses the MDEP to help—

(1) Determine military requirements.

(2) Develop programs to support the requirements.

(3) Carry out approved programs.

(4) Check program results.

**e.** HQDA uses the MDEP to link decisions by the SECARMY and CSA and their priorities to—

(1) FYDP accounts that record Service positions in OSD.

(2) AMS accounts that record funding transactions in Army activities and installations.

**f.** HQDA uses the MDEP also to link the Probe database with other key systems, such as—

(1) SAMAS and TAADS.

(2) The Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) whose product, the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT), shows valid training requirements and associated training programs.

(3) Depot maintenance programs.


g. For investment accounts, managers for construction, RDT&E, and procurement first allocate program and budget resources by Army management structure code (AMSCO), PE, project number, BLIN. They then distribute the resources to MDEPs within the six resource management areas, listed above.

**9-23. Program and budget years covered by the MDEP**

a. The MDEP records manpower and total obligation authority over the 9 fiscal years needed to display the program and budget. Which program year or which budget year each fiscal year addresses, depends on whether interest in the MDEP centers on the program or budget. Figure 9-5 shows the fiscal year structure of an MDEP applying to the President’s FY 00-01 budget.

b. The MDEP shifts 2 years forward in the even (or biennial POM submission) year. At the start of the cycle for the next biennial POM, Probe (paragraph 9-27a, below) drops the 2 earliest years from the database and adds 2 new years. Thus, for the FY 2002-2007 POM, the MDEP would then display the 6 years of the new program period and the 3 preceding years (Figure 9-6). The first of the preceding years is the prior fiscal year (PY). It records resources spent in executing the budget the year before the current fiscal year (CY). The CY shows resources in the budget being executed. The last preceding year is called the budget year (BY). It lists resources requested in the President’s Budget being reviewed by Congress.

c. Another shift occurs the next odd year (the year in which the President submits the next 2-year Defense budget). The shift leaves each year’s resources intact but changes their relative position in the program or budget process as shown in Figure 9-7. For the FY 2002-2003 budget, budget years 99 and 00 both become prior years; budget year 01 becomes the current year; and the first 2 program years become budget years 02 and 03. The last 4 years (years 04 through 07) remain program years.



**Figure 9-5. Fiscal Year Structure of Resources in an MDEP Reflecting the FY 00-01 Budget**

budget years			program years					
PY	CY	BY	1	2	3	4	5	6
FY 99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07
\$TOA			\$TOA					
Manpower			Manpower					

**Figure 9-6. Fiscal Year Structure of Resources in an MDEP**

budget years					program years			
PY	PY	CY	BY	BY	3	4	5	6
FY 99	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07
\$TOA					\$TOA			
Manpower					Manpower			

**Reflecting the FY 02-07 POM**

**Figure 9-7. Fiscal Year Structure of Resources in an MDEP Reflecting the FY 02-03 Budget**

**9-24. Extent that manpower and dollars can be redistributed in the MDEP**

a. The MDEP, as just described, has both a budget and program increment. The two parts differ primarily by the flexibility the Army has with manpower and funds.

b. In the program or POM years, HQDA restricts military manpower by total end strength and civilian manpower by work years rather than by appropriation. Similarly, HQDA restricts program dollars only by total obligation authority (TOA), not by individual appropriation. The distinctions allow redistributing previously programmed manpower and dollars to meet changing requirements. In later POM or budget submissions, for example, HQDA can, as needed, move program year resources between MDEPs, appropriations, and program elements (PEs).

c. Once HQDA sends the BES to OSD, OSD must approve any changes to manpower and dollars. Even tighter controls govern the redesignation of manpower and funding in the budget years after the President’s Budget has gone to Congress.

(1) HQDA can redistribute previously budgeted manpower and dollars between MDEPs or commands and agencies but must leave budget manpower and dollars unchanged until current year appropriations become law.

(2) Some flexibility during execution permits financing unbudgeted requirements to meet unforeseen needs or changes in operating conditions. Even so, congressional rules and specified dollar thresholds severely restrict spending for purposes other than those originally justified and approved. In addition, during execution, HQDA can transfer military and civilian manpower within appropriations without a corresponding transfer of funds, but not between MACOMs.

### 9-25. How flexibility affects the MDEP

**a. Frequent change in MDEP resources.** Competition at each stage of program development and budget formulation can produce frequent change in an MDEP's resource levels. Decisions resulting from OSD review of the POM and BES will further change amounts initially approved. Sometimes decisions may even affect requests in the President's Budget already before Congress. Authorization and appropriation decisions by Congress often change amounts requested in the President's Budget. Budget execution sometimes results in different rates and quantities of expenditure from those planned, and, at times, it results in different purposes.

**b. Keeping MDEP resources current.** Functional proponents continually update MDEPs through their respective feeder systems to reflect the position of the last program or budget event. The kinds of changes described require that resource managers continually weigh how the stream of program and budget actions affect the MDEP and how a change in the program year or budget year portion of the package may affect the out years. Managers continually ask, "In what ways do the changes—

- (1) Alter MDEP resource levels?
- (2) Shift resources between years?
- (3) Affect resources in related MDEPs?"

### 9-26. Resource recording structures

**a. Future Years Defense Program.** As mentioned, the FYDP accounts for the total of all resources programmed by the DOD. Using OSD program elements, DOD apportions decisions on dollars and manpower among the FYDP's 11 major force programs.

**b. Army management structure.** AMS serves as a second major resource recording structure. Based on congressional appropriations, the AMS relates program dollars and manpower to a standard classification of activities and functions per Defense Finance and Accounting Service-Indiana (DFAS-IN) Manual 37-100-\*\* (where \*\* stands for the current fiscal year, e.g., 01 or FY 2001). AMSCOs help record the data in the detail needed for budgeting, execution, and accounting.

**c. Other structures.** Other fiscal management structures include the 0-1 level budget activity structure for operation and maintenance appropriations shown in Table 9-6 at chapter end. Other structures also include standard study numbers (SSN) and BLIN for weapon systems, and project numbers for military construction.

### 9-27. Automated support

Various automated data systems support the PPBES. First among these is the PPBES Data Management System (Probe). Others include the Resource Formulation System (RFS), the Army RDA Budget Update Computer System (ARBUCS), and SAMAS.

#### **a. Probe.**

(1) HQDA uses the MDEP to record data in Probe. Probe gathers, organizes, and records the 9 years of programming and budgeting resource data used in the PPBES

process. Probe data make up the official database of record for Army resources. Hence, the term Probe has become synonymous with the Army's program and budget data- base.

(2) Originating mainly in HQDA and MACOM information systems, resource data enter Probe using MDEP-AMSCO keys. The MDEP records manpower and dollars by appropriation, AMSCO, and other identifiers and lists the data by command or resource organization. For investment accounts, the MDEP also records the data by OSD PE, project number, BLIN. HQDA uses Probe to—

- (a) Build and record the Army program and budget.
- (b) Prepare the Army portion of the FYDP to reflect the biennial POM, BES, and the President's Budget.
- (c) Prepare after each FYDP update the FYDP resource position distributed electronically over the internet to Army commands as Program and Budget Guidance (PBG).

**b. Army PPBES Strategic Automation Plan.**

(1) Already under way, the HQDA PPBES Strategic Automation Plan will replace the Probe database over years 2001 and 2002 with a system of greater utility to Probe users and the senior Army leadership. Among its improvements, the follow-on system will consolidate appropriation data from RFS (managed by ASA(FM&C)), procurement quantity information from ARBUCS (managed by ASA(ALT)) and manpower information from SAMAS (managed by DCSOPS). The follow-on system will also provide—

- (a) An advanced Program Analysis and Evaluation (PAE) Web Site for managing the most dynamic of system data elements for use by all PPBES databases.
- (b) A web-enabled official database that consolidates proponent-prepared program and budget data exhibits for approval and direct submission to OSD.

(2) One early step occurred in 2000, when the Army installed the SSN-LIN Automated Management and Integrating System (SLAMIS). Adding significantly to PPBES automation, SLAMIS automatically coordinates changes to acquisition data elements from the PAE Web Site. Then, reaching beyond the HQDA Staff to Item Materiel Managers, SLAMIS and related systems will, over time, link dollar and manpower decisions to the fielding of new equipment in units. Further development and integration of formerly separate automation systems will improve the accuracy of programming and budgeting of major weapon systems by—

- (a) Identifying candidate requirements for weapon systems recapitalization.
- (b) Tracking funding and modifications by serial number.
- (c) Collecting mileage and cost data.

## **SECTION VII**

### **PPBES DELIBERATIVE FORUMS**

#### **9-28. Army Resources Board**

**a.** The Army Resources Board (ARB) is chaired by the SECARMY with the CSA as the vice chair. The board serves as a senior Army leadership forum, through which the SECARMY and CSA review Army policy and resource allocation issues, particularly those emanating from the PPBES. It sets policy and approves guidance and priorities. The ARB approves the prioritization of Army programs and selects resource allocation alternatives. In addition, on their completion, it approves TAP, POM, and budget submissions to OSD and Congress. ARB membership includes:

(1) *From the Secretariat.* The Under Secretary of the Army (USA) and Assistant Secretaries for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; Financial Management and Comptroller; Installations and Environment; Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and General Counsel.

(2) *From the Army Staff.* The VCSA, DCSOPS, and DCSPRO.

**b.** The Assistant DCSOPS (ADCSOPS), DPAE, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Budget) (DASA(B)) attend ARB meetings as advisors. Also attending are the ARB Executive Secretary designated by ASA(FM&C) and other participants as needed.

#### **9-29. Senior Review Group**

**a.** Co-chaired by the Under Secretary of the Army (USA) and Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) the Senior Review Group (SRG) serves as a senior level forum to resolve resource allocation and other issues but generally does not revisit decisions made at lower levels.

**b.** The SRG monitors staff implementation of decisions of the ARB and makes recommendations to the ARB on:

(1) The prioritization of programs.

(2) Resource alternatives.

(3) Final TAP, program, and budget.

(4) Other issues as determined by the USA and VCSA.

**c.** SRG membership includes:

(1) *From the Secretariat.* The Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Civil Works; Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; Financial Management and Comptroller; Installations and Environment; Manpower and Reserve Affairs; the General Counsel; and the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4).

(2) *From the Army Staff.* The DCSINT, DCSLOG, DCSOPS, DCSPER, DCSPRO, Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), CAR, and DARNG.

d. The ADCSOPS, DPAE, and DASA(B) attend SRG meetings as advisors. Also attending are the SRG Executive Secretary designated by ASA(FM&C) and other participants as needed.

### **9-30. Planning Program Budget Committee**

a. The Planning Program Budget Committee (PPBC) is co-chaired by the ADCSOPS, DPAE, and DASA(B), each presiding depending on the subject.

b. The PPBC serves the PPBES in both a coordinating and executive-advisory role. It provides a continuing forum in which planning, program, and budget managers review, adjust, and recommend courses of action on relevant issues. The PPBC helps make sure that Army policy remains internally consistent and that program adjustments remain consistent with Army policy and priorities.

c. The PPBC may return the results of committee deliberations to the Army Staff or Secretariat for action. It may pass them, in turn, to the SRG and ARB for review or approval.

d. The PPBC may set up standing committees or working groups to resolve issues that arise in managing the program or budget. An example of a standing committee is the Project Review Board (PRB), which addresses construction requirements.

e. Helping to maintain an open dialogue between the Secretariat and Army Staff, PPBC members consist of a balanced group of officials responsible for planning, programming and budgeting:

(1) *From the Secretariat.* Representatives of the Assistant Secretaries for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; Civil Works; Financial Management and Comptroller; Installations and Environment; and Manpower and Reserve Affairs as well as the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army (AASA) and DISC4.

(2) *From the Army Staff.* Representatives from the DCSINT, DCSLOG, DCSOPS, DCSPER, ACSIM, Surgeon General, CAR, and DARNG.

f. Representatives attending without vote include a representative from the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs) (DUSA(IA)), the Director of Investment and Director of Operations and Support from ASA(FM&C), the Director of Force Development from DCSPRO, and the Director of Training from DCSOPS.

### **9-31. Council of Colonels**

A group of colonels or civilian equivalents, who represent PPBC members, meet throughout the PPBES process in a forum known as the Council of Colonels. The Council is co-chaired by the Chief, Resource Analysis and Integration Office, DCSOPS; Chief, Program Development Division, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate; and Deputy Director of Management and Control, ASA(FM&C). The group packages proposals, frames issues, and otherwise coordinates matters that come before the PPBC when it convenes.

### **9-32. Program Evaluation Groups**

HQDA uses six PEGs to support planning, programming, and budgeting (Table 9-1). Each is co-chaired by a representative of the Secretariat and a representative of the Army Staff, who also provides the PEG with executive and administrative support. Permanent members include representatives of ASA(FM&C), DCSOPS, and DPAE.

**a.** PEGs program and monitor resources to perform Army functions assigned by Title 10, United States Code and support OSD-assigned executive agencies and the CINCs. Each administers a set of MDEP within one of the following functional groupings: Manning, Training, Organizing, Equipping, Sustaining, and Installations.

**b.** Each PEG sets the scope, quantity, priority, and qualitative nature of resource requirements that define its program. It monitors PEG resource transactions and, as required, makes both administrative and substantive changes to assigned MDEPs. MDEP proponents, subject matter experts, and, as appropriate, representatives of commands and agencies participate in PEG deliberations.

**c.** The DARNG, CAR, and DISC4 serve as program integrators to the PEGs (Table 9-2). Program Integrators provide technical assistance and monitor actions to integrate priorities and statutory, Defense, and Army requirements for the ARNG, USAR and information technology programs into the Army's overall program.

**d.** PEGs, assisted by the program integrators, help HQDA functional proponents:

(1) Build TAP and the Army program and help convert the program into budget-level detail.

(2) Maintain program consistency, first during planning and later when preparing, analyzing, and defending the integrated program-budget.

(3) Track program and budget performance during execution.

(4) Keep abreast of policy changes during each phase of the PPBES process.

## **SECTION VIII PROCESS AND STRUCTURE**

### **9-33. System process**

Beginning with the planning phase for PPBS, the following sections present a phase-by-phase description of the PPBS/PPBES. This description is represented graphically in Figures 9-8 and 9-9. Figure 9-8 (folded insert) shows the general sequence and interrelationship of events of the biennial cycle of the PPBS/PPBES. Note that the PPBES differs from the PPBS in two ways. First, unlike the PPBS, the Army system merges the programming and budgeting phases into a single, integrated programming-budgeting phase. Next, the PPBES adds execution as a distinct system phase.

### **9-34. System structure**

Figure 9-9 displays the structure within which the PPBES operates. Table 9-3 explains the acronyms in the figure.

**Table 9-1. Title 10 Program Evaluation Groups**

<p><b>Manning (MM)</b>  <b>Co-chaired by ASA (M&amp;RA) and DCSPER</b>                  Provides the Active Army, ARNG, and USAR with authorized personnel by grade and skill. Integrates these activities for the ARNG and USAR.</p> <p><b>Training (TT)</b>  <b>Co-chaired by ASA (M&amp;RA) and DCSOPS</b>                  Provides resources for Active Army, ARNG, and USAR unit readiness (to include medical units) and unit and collective training (Ground OPTEMPO and the Army Flying Hour Program), fixed wing aircraft operation and maintenance, combat training centers (CTCs), mobilization, engagement activities, and military contingency operations.                  Provides for collective training, institutional training (initial entry training, leader development, professional development, functional training), and officer acquisition (USMA, ROTC, OCS). Supports multinational force compatibility through integrated training, military exercises, and command and control exchanges with allies and coalition partners.                  Deals with programs, systems, and activities to satisfy intelligence requirements of the National Command Authorities (NCA) and senior Army leadership—requirements funded in the Army portions of the NFIP under Program 3I and Army intelligence support to national agencies under Program 9. (The Equipping PEG addresses most requirements for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) managed by DCSPRO–FD under Programs 2, and 4 through 10 and acquisitions to meet other intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW requirements).)</p> <p><b>Organizing (OO)—</b>  <b>Co-chaired by ASA (M&amp;RA) and DCSOPS</b>                  Provides resource objectives to establish Operating Force Structure and Generating Direct Support Force Structure.                  Establishes Operating Forces and Generating Direct Support Forces to meet wartime requirements of the NMS per DPG illustrative planning scenarios.                  Provides minimum essential Generating Forces for peacetime sustainment and training and wartime mobilization and power projection capabilities for Army Operating Forces.                  Supports special programs that meet needs of The Army.                  Resources the majority of the civilian workforce that carries out the Army’s portion of the NMS.</p>	<p><b>Equipping (EE)</b>  <b>Co-chaired by ASA (ALT) and DCSPRO</b>                  Provides resources for the integration of new doctrine, training, organization, and equipment to develop and field warfighting capabilities for the Active Army, ARNG, and USAR. Focuses mainly on materiel acquisition, which comprises RDTE and procurement of weapons and equipment.                  Considers operating and support costs to field weapons and equipment as well as the cost of combat development.</p> <p><b>Sustaining (SS)</b>  <b>Co-chaired by ASA (ALT) and DCSLOG</b>                  Provides resources to sustain operations of the Active Army, ARNG, and USAR, stressing worldwide readiness. Scope embraces strategic mobility, Army reserve stocks, industrial preparedness, and central supply, and also internal operations of Army depots and arsenals, procurement of secondary item Army reserves, and transportation. Includes depot materiel maintenance.                  Includes measures to assure the quality and timeliness of sustainment resources and to develop and maintain strategic logistics systems, manage weapon systems, provide security assistance, conduct logistics long-range planning, and reshape Army logistics.                  Addresses measures to streamline Army business operations, improve information management structure, and develop concepts of operations and procedures to further the integration, sharing, standardization, and interoperability of information systems.</p> <p><b>Installations (II)</b>  <b>Co-chaired by ASA (I&amp;E) and ACSIM</b>                  Provides resources to maintain services and infrastructure to support installations as power projection platforms. Plans and programs for installations services that minimize migration of resources into Base Support. Provides housing for military personnel and their families.                  Scope embraces Real Property Maintenance (RPM) funding to maintain facilities and covers measures to comply with environmental laws and the exercise of good stewardship of natural and cultural resources. Scope includes installation quality of life programs to ensure soldier morale, retention, readiness, and family support.                  Supports measures to establish and maintain information systems, communications, and audio-visual infrastructure to support power projection platforms and logistical sustainment base operations.                  Makes sure within assigned responsibilities that programs to maintain a trained and ready force receive appropriate civilian support staffing per statutory guidance.</p>
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**Table 9-2. Program Integrators**

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**Army National Guard (NG)—DARNG**

Provides technical assistance to Title 10 PEGs and monitors actions to integrate into The Army program the statutory, Defense, and Army requirements of the Army National Guard.

Tracks ARNG program performance during budget execution.

**U.S. Army Reserve (AR)—CAR**

Provides technical assistance to Title 10 PEGs and monitors actions to integrate into The Army program the statutory, Defense, and Army requirements of U.S. Army Reserve.

Tracks USAR program performance during budget execution.

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**Information Technology (IT)—DISC4**

Provides technical assistance to Title 10 PEGs and monitors actions to integrate information technology requirements into the Total Army program.

Makes sure that information technology requirements comply with the Army Enterprise Architecture (AEA).

Tracks program performance for information technology issues during budget execution.

**SECTION IX  
PPBS PLANNING PHASE**

**9-35. Planning by OSD and the Joint Staff**

Drawing on guidance from the National Security Council (NSC), OSD policy and resource planning and Joint Staff strategic planning make up PPBS planning. PPBS planning examines the military posture of the United States in comparison with national security objectives and resource limitations. It develops the National Military Strategy, and it identifies force levels to achieve the strategy. In addition, PPBS planning provides a framework of requirements, priorities, and risk. OSD uses the framework to give each CINC the best mix of forces, equipment, and support attainable within defined fiscal constraints.

**9-36. NSC guidance**

The National Security Strategy (NSS) set by the National Security Council (NSC) bears importantly on the PPBS process. Also bearing on the process are two sets of NSC documents. Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) promulgate presidential decisions implementing national security policy and objectives in all areas involving national security. Presidential Review Directives (PRDs) direct studies involving national security policy and directives.

**9-37. Joint strategic planning**

**a.** Led by the Joint Staff, joint strategic planning examines the global security situation. It develops National Military Strategy to achieve national security objectives and sets related force requirements. It also prepares strategic and contingency plans, prepares supporting joint logistics and mobility plans, and conducts capability assessments.



**Table 9-3. Legend for Figure 9-9.**

**Note.** Bold structure lines in the diagram link decision makers and deliberative forums with key events and contributing commands and other operating agencies.

<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Definition</i>	<i>Acronym</i>	<i>Definition</i>
<b>AAE</b>	Army Acquisition Executive	<b>FYDP</b>	Future Years Defense Program
<b>AASA</b>	Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army	<b>GAO</b>	General Accounting Office
<b>ACSIM</b>	Assistant Chief of Staff Installation Management	<b>Gen</b>	General
<b>AMC</b>	Army Materiel Command	<b>HAC</b>	House Appropriations Committee
<b>ARB</b>	Army Resources Board	<b>HASC</b>	House Armed Services Committee
<b>ASA</b>	Assistant Secretary of the Army	<b>HBC</b>	House Budget Committee
<b>ASA (ALT)</b>	ASA (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)	<b>Info</b>	Information
<b>ASA (CW)</b>	ASA (Civil Works)	<b>IPRG</b>	Intelligence Program Review Group
<b>ASA (FM&amp;C)</b>	ASA (Financial Management & Comptroller)	<b>JCS</b>	Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>ASA (I&amp;E)</b>	ASA (Installations & Environment)	<b>JROC</b>	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
<b>ASA (M&amp;RA)</b>	ASA (Manpower & Reserve Affairs)	<b>MACOM</b>	Major Army command
<b>ASCC</b>	Army Service Component Command	<b>MDEP</b>	Management Decision Package
<b>AVCSA</b>	Assistant VCSA	<b>MILDEP</b>	Military deputy
<b>BES</b>	Budget Estimate Submission	<b>OSA</b>	Office of the Secretary of the Army
<b>CAR</b>	Chief, Army Reserve	<b>OSD</b>	Office of the Secretary of Defense
<b>CBO</b>	Congressional Budget Office	<b>PEO</b>	Program Executive Office(r)
<b>CC</b>	Chief of Chaplains	<b>PM</b>	Project or Program Manager
<b>CINC</b>	Commander in Chief, Combatant Command	<b>POM</b>	Program Objective Memorandum
<b>CJCS</b>	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	<b>PPBC</b>	Planning Program Budget Committee
<b>CLL</b>	Chief, Legislative Liaison	<b>PPBES</b>	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System
<b>COE</b>	Chief of Engineers	<b>Pri</b>	Priority
<b>CPA</b>	Chief of Public Affairs	<b>PRG</b>	Program Review Group
<b>CSA</b>	Chief of Staff, Army	<b>RDAP</b>	Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan
<b>DAB</b>	Defense Acquisition Board	<b>RDP</b>	Army Requirements Determination Process
<b>DARNG</b>	Director Army National Guard	<b>RDTE</b>	Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
<b>DAS</b>	Director of the Army Staff	<b>SA</b>	Secretary of the Army
<b>DASA (B)</b>	Deputy Assistant Secretary for Army Budget	<b>SAC</b>	Senate Appropriation Committee
<b>DCS</b>	Deputy chief of staff	<b>SASC</b>	Senate Armed Services Committee
<b>DCSINT</b>	DCS for Intelligence	<b>SBC</b>	Senate Budget Committee
<b>DCSLOG</b>	DCS for Logistics	<b>SECDEF</b>	Secretary of Defense
<b>DCSOPS</b>	DCS for Operations and Plans	<b>SRG</b>	Senior Review Group
<b>DCSPER</b>	DCS for Personnel	<b>Struct</b>	Structure
<b>DCSPRO</b>	DCS for Programs	<b>Sys</b>	System
<b>DEPSECDEF</b>	Deputy SECDEF	<b>TAP</b>	The Army Plan
<b>DISC4</b>	Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers	<b>TIG</b>	The Inspector General
<b>DPAE</b>	Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation	<b>TJAG</b>	The Judge Advocate General
<b>DUSA (IA)</b>	Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs)	<b>TRADOC</b>	US Army Training and Doctrine Command
<b>DUSA (OR)</b>	Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research)	<b>TSG</b>	The Surgeon General
<b>DRB</b>	Defense Resources Board	<b>USA</b>	Under Secretary of the Army
<b>EDRB</b>	Expanded Defense Resources Board	<b>USD</b>	Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)
		<b>(AT&amp;L)</b>	
		<b>VCJCS</b>	Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
		<b>VCSA</b>	Vice Chief of Staff, Army

**b.** Joint strategic planning helps the CJCS discharge the functions prescribed by 10 USC 153(a) and 10 USC 163(b)(2). Specifically, joint strategic planning underlies the military advice the Chairman gives to help the President and SecDef:

- (1) Provide strategic direction to the armed forces.
- (2) Form Defense policy, programs, and budgets.

**c.** Joint strategic planning involves each of the Joint Staff directorates and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Moreover, joint strategic planning entails close consultation with the Services, combatant commands, and supported Defense agencies. It evaluates risks and threats. It assesses the current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets.

### **9-38. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)**

Joint strategic planning takes place within the context of the JSPS. JSPS continuously reviews the national military environment and capability to meet national security objectives through a Joint Strategy Review (JSR) and Joint Net Assessment (JNA) process.

**a. Joint Strategy Review.** The JSR lies at the core of the JSPS. The review helps the Joint Staff integrate strategy, operational planning and program assessments.

(1) The JSR provides the primary means for the Chairman, in consultation with the CINCs, Services, and Defense agencies, to analyze strategic concepts and issues relevant to strategy formulation. The JSR process continuously gathers information through the examination of current, emerging, and future issues related to threats, strategic assumptions, opportunities, technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structures, and military missions.

(2) A continuous process, the JSR assesses the global strategic setting for issues affecting the National Military Strategy, producing JSR issue papers and, at the start of the calendar year, the JSR annual report. In this process, the Joint Staff, with the Services, combatant commands, and supported Defense agencies, develops issue papers highlighting how changed conditions affect current strategy. Key judgments, if not earlier acted on, appear in the next JSR annual report. Provided to the CJCS, Chiefs of Services, and CINCs, the report, when approved by the Chairman, becomes guidance for maintaining or revising the *Joint Vision 2020*, the National Military Strategy (NMS), and other JSPS products.

#### **b. Joint Net Assessment (JNA).**

(1) The JNA provides the means to assess force strengths and deficiencies and how they affect U.S. ability to meet national security objectives. Closely involving the CINCs and other members of the JCS, the JNA compares Defense capabilities and programs of the United States and its Allies with those of potential adversaries.

(2) The JNA process develops a net assessment every 4 years, which the CJCS provides to the SecDef. Using a risk evaluation force, it projects U.S. and allied capabilities at the end of the FYDP period against capabilities reasonably available to potential adversaries. The results help evaluate current strategy and the development of

alternative force structures and strategies. Supporting the JSR between quadrennial assessments, the JNA reviews significant changes in emerging threats and the national security environment to evaluate the capability of U.S. forces to achieve current NMS objectives.

### **9-39. JSPS documents and plans**

The JSPS yields a number of principal products. The products help the joint community relate strategic planning to both the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and PPBS. Shown in Figure 9-8 (folded insert), they are described below.

**a. Chairman's Guidance.** The Chairman's Guidance (CG) provides a common set of assumptions, priorities, intent, and critical planning factors for developing strategies and plans. Often accompanying the conduct of the JSR, preparation of the Joint vision, and drafting of a new NMS, the CG usually forms an integral part of strategy development. When necessary, it may appear as a separate document.

**b. Joint vision.** Prepared as required, *Joint Vision 20xx* presents a long-range conception of emerging threats, technologies, and global changes and how they will affect military operations. Implementing the vision transforms its concepts into requirements and capabilities of the future force. Their achievement leads to corresponding changes in doctrine, force structure, materiel, personnel programs, and training.

#### **c. National Military Strategy.**

(1) The CJCS approves and issues the NMS. The strategy advises the SecDef, and after SecDef review, the President and NSC on the strategic direction of the armed forces. A standing document changed when needed, the NMS applies to program years, 2-8 years in the future. Drawing from the strategic guidance contained in the President's NSS, the NMS—

(a) Summarizes the global strategic setting from the JSR.

(b) Discusses potential threats and risks.

(c) Recommends military foundations and strategic principles to support national security objectives.

(d) Provides a strategy and force levels that conform with fiscal guidance of the National Command Authorities (NCA).

(2) Strategic direction from the NMS underlies the Joint Planning Document (JPD) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

#### **d. Joint Planning Document (JPD).**

(1) The JPD derives from the NMS. Prepared by the Joint Staff with the Service Chiefs and the CINCs, the document reflects the Chairman's planning guidance based on the Joint vision and strategic objectives outlined in the NMS and JSCP. The JPD helps the SecDef prepare the DPG, which it precedes by about 6 months. It also informs the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and supporting Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment (JWCA) process of the programmatic direction and priorities of

the Chairman and helps the Chairman develop further programming advice for the SecDef.

(2) The JPD consists of a cover letter and individual chapters corresponding to the related JWCA prepared by the Joint Staff. Each chapter advises on requirements and programming priorities in a specific functional area.

**e. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.** The JSCP underlies the capabilities-based military advice the CJCS gives the President and SecDef. Another standing document, the JSCP, undergoes revision as needed, receiving formal review early each even year. Covering the 2-year, near-term planning period, the JSCP—

(1) Gives strategic guidance to the CINCs, JCS members, and heads of Defense agencies.

(2) Apportions major combat forces, strategic lift, and pre-positioned assets to the CINCs for their incorporation in deliberate planning.

(3) Tasks the CINCs to develop major and lesser regional plans to employ the force resulting from completed program and budget actions.

**f. CINC theater engagement plan.**

(1) The CINC theater engagement plan (TEP) links planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives. It details the type and scope of activities to support the strategy of a geographic CINC or executive agent for the assigned theater or designated country.

(2) Covering the year of execution and the next 7 seven years, plan development proceeds in four phases. The first phase conveys planning guidance via the JSCP. The second phase produces the following April a strategic concept for regional engagement. The third phase synchronizes supporting and coordinating plans. This phase produces a TEP approved by the CINC or Executive Agent and results in activity annexes published annually in October detailing the type and scope of engagement activities. The fourth phase subjects the approved TEP to a national level review and subsequent integration into the Global Family of Theater Engagement Plans.

**g. Chairman's Program Recommendation.** Presented before publication of the DPG, the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) compares planning guidance and objectives with current and projected resource profiles from the most recent President's Budget and related FYDP. The CPR focuses on recommendations that will enhance joint readiness, promote joint doctrine and training, and better satisfy joint warfighting requirements. As needed, it expands, refines, or modifies initial recommendations provided in the JPD.

**h. Chairman's Program Assessment.** The Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA) checks the balance and capabilities of composite force and support levels recommended by Service Program Objective Memorandums (POMs). It compares recommended capabilities and levels with priorities established by the SecDef. The document helps the SecDef make decisions reflected in PDMs and, later, during budget review.

#### **9-40. OSD planning products**

Two SecDef documents influence products of the JSPS. One is DPG; the other is Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG).

##### **a. Defense Planning Guidance.**

(1) The SecDef places responsibility and authority for program execution with the Services and other DOD components but maintains central direction. The principal product of the OSD planning phase, DPG serves this central purpose. The document presents the Defense strategy that underlies DOD plans and programs and identifies key planning and programming priorities to carry it out. OSD issues the DPG in the even year before POM preparation and normally provides an update for off-cycle program development.

(2) The *Government Performance and Results Act of 1993* (GPRA) requires that DOD and most other Federal agencies submit to the Office of Management and Budget and to the Congress a strategic plan for agency program activities. DOD meets the need using the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The DPG incorporates DOD corporate goals reflecting the QDR.

**b. Contingency Planning Guidance.** CPG provides the CJCS written policy guidance for preparing and reviewing contingency plans. Focusing NMS and DPG guidance on contingency planning, the CPG bears directly on the JSCP. The SecDef prepares the document annually in coordination with the Joint Staff. Then, on approval by the President, the SecDef provides guidance to the Chairman.

### **SECTION X PPBES PLANNING**

#### **9-41. The Army Plan**

**a.** Army planning responds to and complements OSD planning and joint strategic planning. In particular, Army planning:

(1) Helps the senior Army leadership determine force requirements and objectives and set priorities.

(2) Provides the basis for positions and comments supporting Army participation in OSD and joint processes.

(3) Lays the planning basis for the Army program.

**b.** The foundation of Army planning lies in the TAP, which is developed in three stand-alone, yet interrelated, sections:

(1) The Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG), which forms section I of the TAP—

(a) Relates Army planning to National, OSD, and Joint strategic guidance.

(b) Gives rationale for transforming the Army per The Army vision then in force.

(c) Provides leader guidance.

(2) Army Planning Guidance (APG), which is section II of the TAP, links requirements to strategy and guides development of resource priorities for operational tasks.

(3) The APGM, which exists as section III of the TAP, relates operational tasks to resource tasks, thereby helping link operational tasks and their associated resources to Army Title 10 functions.

#### **9-42. Army Strategic Planning Guidance**

**a.** The DCSOPS Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate prepares the ASPG (TAP section I). The senior Army leadership creates a vision for the Army from an in-depth assessment of the current and emerging geostrategic environments. The vision presents a consensus of the Army operational and institutional capabilities required in the distant future and provides overarching goals and objectives. It identifies long-term institutional goals and objectives with enablers for attaining those goals and objectives.

**b.** The ASPG—the cornerstone document of the Army Strategic Planning Process (ASPP)—articulates the vision. Developed through an iterative process, the ASPG encompasses all key agencies of the Army, including the Army Secretariat, Army Staff, MACOMs, ASCCs, ARNG, and USAR. In general, the ASPG:

(1) Provides an integrated assessment of the NSS, NMS, DPG, and other strategic planning inputs.

(2) Provides the leadership’s approved view of the emerging strategic landscape. It also establishes the demand for new operational concepts while articulating institutional goals and objectives.

(3) Facilitates planning throughout the Army by providing senior Army leadership goals and vision for the Army’s transformation.

(4) Provides direction for the family of Army functional plans such as the AMP and the Strategic Logistics Plan.

(5) Drives the total Army analysis (TAA) process and influences the design of future forces, equipment, and doctrine.

(6) Provides a long-term perspective to focus near- and mid-term planning while integrating and coordinating the activities of near-, mid-, and long-term planners and programmers.

(7) Provides common understanding for efforts to “tell the Army story.”

(8) Provides the senior Army leadership’s broad priorities that guide other processes.

(9) Influences periodic external processes and products such as the NMS and the QDR /National Defense Panel while also informing joint planning and programming efforts in the JSPS.

#### **9-43. Army Planning Guidance**

**a.** The DCSOPS Resource Analysis and Integration Office prepares the APG (TAP section II). The APG covers the mid-term period of the next 6-year POM plus 10

additional years. Guiding the preparation of capabilities-based mission and functional plans, the APG defines seven mission areas.

- (1) Promote regional stability.
- (2) Reduce potential conflicts and threats.
- (3) Deter aggression and coercion.
- (4) Conduct small scale contingency operations.
- (5) Deploy, fight, and win, major theater wars (MTW).
- (6) Secure the homeland.
- (7) Provide domestic support to civil authorities.

**b.** Centering on sets of operational activities essential to maintain the Army's core competency, the mission areas help define requirements based on needed capabilities. They also help set priorities to guide the allocation of resources during programming.

#### **9-44. Army Program Guidance Memorandum**

The DPAE prepares the APGM (TAP section III). The APGM applies requirements derived from operational capabilities to program development thus completing the succession of guidance from strategic planning to mid-term planning to programming. Guided by planning priorities, the APGM translates mission area operational tasks to PEG resource tasks. Then, through MDEPs, it further relates operational tasks and their associated resources to Army Title 10 functions grouped under the PEG structure as Manning, Training, Organizing, Equipping, Sustaining, and Installations. A forwarding memorandum from the SECARMY and CSA provides additional guidance.

#### **9-45. Army requirements determination process**

HQDA manages the Army's requirements determination process. Applying warfighting concepts for the future and experimentation in TRADOC battle labs, the process compares desired joint and Army capabilities in relation to the anticipated threat and known deficiencies. From this comparison the process derives mutually dependent requirements stressing overall needs of the future Army across the spectrum of doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldiers (DTLOMS). HQDA approves materiel requirements through the Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC). The AROC reviews requirements documents and evaluates requirements in terms of military need and risk, their synchronization with the Army Modernization Plan and Transformation Campaign Plan, as well as their affordability and interoperability. The VCSA chairs the AROC.

#### **9-46. Army modernization plan**

**a.** DCSOPS, with DCSPRO and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA(ALT)), prepares the AMP. The AMP outlines the vision for modernizing the future force and a strategy for near- to mid-term force development and long-term evolution. The AMP provides a start point for developing the RDAP. Its modernization objectives guide program prioritization at HQDA.

**b.** The AMP codifies required capabilities programmed through the PPBES and assesses the impact of required capabilities remaining to be programmed. It describes the relationship between desired future capabilities and materiel system development.

**c.** The AMP, the Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP), and the Weapons System Handbook, present the total picture of the Army's RDT&E investment. Additionally, the AMP supports review of the approved POM by congressional authorization and appropriation committees and their staffs.

#### **9-47. Army Research, Development, and Acquisition Plan**

**a.** DCSOPS, with DCSPRO and the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA(ALT)), prepares the Army RDAP. The RDAP lists battlefield requirements and ranks them in priority. It then matches them to materiel solutions, that is, to RDTE and procurement programs. Developed through analysis by TRADOC and Army Materiel Command (AMC) and guided by the NMS and DPG, the materiel solutions present an integrated HQDA position. What follows describes the plan in greater detail.

**b.** The RDAP takes the form of a priority list of program increments and funding streams for RDTE and procurement over the 15-year planning period. It presents a plan for developing and producing technologies and materiel to support Army modernization. At the same time, it converts materiel requirements from an unconstrained planning environment to a balanced but truncated RDA program that is both technically and fiscally achievable. Conforming to force structure guidelines, the plan seeks to maximize warfighting capabilities and supporting infrastructure within resources expected to be available.

**c.** In December each year, TRADOC provides recommendations to HQDA on material requirements for the RDAP and POM. To arrive at the recommendations, TRADOC applies a process known as warfighting lens analysis (WFLA). The process takes into account such guidance as the NMS, OSD DPG, CINC IPLs, the AMP, and TAP. It compares future required capabilities of the total force against the fiscally constrained budgeted force. In doing so it determines force modernization needs, which TRADOC prioritizes according to their contribution to mission accomplishment.

**d.** AMC performs an analogous function in determining requirements for RDA science and infrastructure (S&I). Supporting warfighting, modernization, and other HQDA high visibility programs, S&I requirements are defined, ordered in priority, and managed by materiel developers' laboratories, RDE (research, development, and evaluation) centers, and support activities.

**e.** From October through February, AMC reviews the requirements jointly with other materiel developers. These include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC), U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), and Army Research Institute (ARI).

**f.** The review integrates and sets priorities for requirements and reconciles funding allocations. AMC records the results of the review in the Science and Infrastructure RDAP (SIRDAP). AMC forwards the SIRDAP and briefs it to HQDA in February.

**g.** HQDA divides TRADOC and AMC programs, as approved by the senior Army leadership, into increments (entire programs often form a single increment). It consolidates approved program increments into a single list ranking them in 1–n priority. The ranked increments and their funding streams form the Army RDAP. The first 6 years of the plan form the start point of the RDA portion of the POM. Its final 9 years cover the EPP. In another use, the RDA plan informs the TAA process of RDA programs planned for Army modernization.

**h.** The plan receives update each February on receipt of the TRADOC and AMC products. It may receive further updates in the spring after completing the biennial POM (or POM update) and in September after preparing the BES.

#### **9-48. Force development and total Army analysis**

**a.** PPBES planning develops an achievable force structure for America's Army that supports the NMS. The approach centers on TAA, a computer-aided force developmental process that gets under way about January of even years.

**b.** Drawing on guidance in DPG and other sources, TAA begins by modeling illustrative planning scenarios to determine warfighting force structure requirements. Once HQDA approves those warfighting requirements, TAA compares or matches the programmed force to those requirements to identify mismatches and shortfalls. To overcome shortfalls and mitigate warfighting risk, a Resourcing Council of Colonels proposes various adjustments to the programmed force. Made within the force structure allowance of the Active Army, ARNG, and USAR, such adjustments could include converting units from one component to another or from one branch to another. For example, combat support units in the Active Army may convert to combat service support units. Similarly, ARNG or USAR units with a low warfighting priority may be converted to provide combat support capability no longer residing in the Active Army.

**c.** A force feasibility review (FFR) follows the deliberations of the resourcing council of colonels. Issues are then forwarded to a general officer steering committee (GOSC). The GOSC approves or modifies the proposals and, from its knowledge of available resources and other issues, deletes adjustments deemed too costly or difficult to implement. The FFR identifies potential friction points and the manning, equipping, and training costs to implement the proposed force adjustments. The GOSC then sends the resulting fiscally constrained TAA force to the senior Army leadership. When approved, it becomes the base force for POM development.

**d.** Alternatively, the GOSC can recommend that the senior Army leadership approve the proposed TAA force without applying fiscal constraints. That unconstrained TAA force would then compete for near- to mid-term resources during the development of the POM. These proposed TAA force adjustments also could be slated for the latter years of the POM period, deferring their review for resourcing until the next POM.

#### **9-49. Force management**

**a.** Detailed integration and documentation of the force centers on the command plan process. During this process, the Army updates and creates modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) and tables of distribution and allowances (TDA).

These authorization documents officially record decisions on missions, organizational structure, and requirements and authorizations for personnel and equipment.

**b.** The process begins with DCSOPS releasing a command plan guidance message. Command plan guidance sets the focus for a forthcoming documentation cycle, lists documentation priorities and actions, and provides force structure allowances (FSA). Draft MTOEs are prepared by the U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency and reviewed by HQDA and the owning MACOMs. Proposed command plans incorporate the strength levels of the draft MTOEs and reflect force decisions in HQDA guidance, including the program force approved in TAP and Army structure (ARSTRUC) guidance. Command plans reflect the current and projected force structure of each command. Command plans normally contain only military manpower. After HQDA review, DCSOPS publishes an adjusted Master force (MFORCE) and an associated civilian annex reflecting the approved plan. The adjusted MFORCE provides the basis for resourcing personnel and equipment in draft MTOEs and TDAs.

**c.** TAADS applies to the Active Army, ARNG, USAR, and civilian work force. The Army uses the system to record changes in requirements and authorizations that result from changes in unit missions, organizational structure, and equipment.

**d.** TAADS defines requirements and authorizations for MTOE units at various levels of organization using data from the table of organization and equipment (TOE) system, incremental change packages (ICPs), and basis-of-issue plans (BOIPs). Data from the BOIP identify quantitative and qualitative requirements for new items of equipment, including personnel requirements to accommodate them. Requirements for TDA units derive from concept plans, manpower surveys and studies, and manpower standards application.

**e.** The SAMAS serves as the force development database that records the authorized level of manpower and force structure for the Army program and budget. SAMAS has two primary files.

**(1)** One is the force structure file (commonly referred to as the “force file”), which reflects the approved and documented force structure position. The force file produces the MFORCE.

**(2)** The second file is the program budget guidance (PBG) file (commonly referred to as the “budget file”). The budget file reflects the approved command plan force structure plus additional budgeting assumptions, and it produces both the civilian annex to the MFORCE and the manpower addendum to the PBG.

**f.** The Automatic Update Transaction System (AUTS) runs at the close of the documentation cycle. AUTS compares the command plan, MFORCE (FS/PBG) against the TAADS documents. When discrepancies are discovered, the TAADS documents are corrected or the MFORCE (FS/PBG) adjusted to match the latest leadership decisions. The AUTS comparison occurs at the close of the documentation cycle and approves those MTOEs/TDAs whose TAADS position matches their MFORCE position. HQDA publishes a new MFORCE showing which units have approved TAADS documents. This post-AUTS MFORCE provides the basis for updating the database for DCSOPER’s Personnel Management Authorization Document (PMAD) and other databases.

**g.** The Structure and Composition System (SACS), in conjunction with Force Builder (a management database integration system), produces the Army's time-phased demands for personnel and equipment over the current budget and program years. SACS information combines information from BOIP, TOE, SAMAS, and TAADS data. Two key outputs are:

(1) The Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS). PERSACS summarizes time-phased requirements and authorization for personnel, specifying grade and branch as well as functional area specialties and military occupational specialty (MOS).

(2) The Logistics Structure and Composition System (LOGSACS). LOGSACS summarizes time-phased requirements and authorizations for equipment by line item number (LIN).

**h.** PERSACS and LOGSACS form the requirements and authorizations base used by other personnel and logistics systems. The Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP), for example, uses equipment requirements and authorizations from LOGSACS to plan equipment distribution throughout the program years.

## **SECTION XI OPERATIONAL PLANNING LINK TO THE PPBS**

### **9-50. Operational planning**

Operational planning addresses the 0-2 year short-range planning period. It takes place under the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the counterpart Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES). Through JOPES, the CINCs and their Service component commands develop concept plans (CONPLANs) and operation plans (OPLANs). Based on capabilities reflected in the President's Budget, the plans employ the current (budgeted) force to carry out military tasks assigned in the JSCP. Plan preparation and review return information about shortfalls and limiting factors for consideration in current planning, programming, and budgeting.

### **9-51. Missions and tasks**

The JSCP carries out the NMS through combatant command OPLANs. Its accompanying intelligence estimate assesses potential threats and their impact on available U.S. Forces. Based on the assessment, the document assigns missions and planning tasks to the CINCs. It also apportions the combat forces expected to be available. Annexes amplify guidance, capabilities, and tasks in specified functional areas.

### **9-52. OPLAN development and review**

**a.** HQDA provides ASCCs, supporting MACOMs, ARNG, and USAR additional guidance through the AMOPES. AMOPES provides planning assumptions, policy, and procedures. It applies both to mobilization and to military operations before the involuntary call up of ARNG and USAR forces. AMOPES Annex A describes the availability of Army combat, combat support, and combat service support units for

developing time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). AMOPES Annex S guides planning to survive a nuclear attack on the United States and to recover and reconstitute essential HQDA missions and functions.

**b.** ASCC TPFDDs specify arrival priorities for force augmentation, resupply, and troop replacement. TPFDD review and later logistics and transportation assessments help refine the priorities to accord with CINC OPLANs. Issues remaining after negotiation become the subject of a force conference in December of the even year and logistics and transportation conferences the following August. ASCCs, supporting MACOMs, and HQDA agencies participate in these deliberations. The participants bring information about current shortfalls and limitations to bear on future requirements through the force feasibility review (FFR) and program development processes.

**c.** In July (odd year), the CINCs submit their OPLANs for final JCS review and approval. The OPLANs provide a basis for CINC IPLs, which influence program development. Their earlier drafts have influenced the TRADOC Black Book Requirements Determination process and command program and budget input.

## **SECTION XII**

### **INTEGRATED PROGRAMMING-BUDGETING PHASE**

#### **9-53. Army programming and budgeting**

**a.** A single decision process, integrated programming-budgeting, produces the POM, the BES, and the President's Budget. During this phase HQDA staff officials responsible for programming and budgeting work together to help the senior Army leadership distribute resources to support Army roles and missions.

**b.** Beginning in this phase, programmers translate planning decisions, OSD programming guidance, and congressional guidance into a comprehensive allocation of forces, manpower, and funds. In doing this they integrate and balance centrally managed programs for manpower; operations; research, development, and acquisition; and stationing and construction. Concurrently, they incorporate requirements stated by MACOMs, PEOs, and PMs for manpower, operation and maintenance, housing, and construction.

**c.** Working with programmers, budgeters make sure that programmatic decisions are properly costed and that Army resource decisions can be defended during budget reviews conducted by OSD, OMB, and Congress. Programmers and budgeters working closely together during program-budget development help the senior Army leadership consider all relevant information before the leaders make resource allocation decisions. The approach precludes the need, later in the integrated process, to revisit most issues. Moreover, it presents a near seamless transition from program to budget.

**d.** The integrated programming-budgeting phase first produces the POM, which presents the Army's proposal for a balanced allocation of its resources within specified OSD fiscal and manpower constraints. As approved by OSD, this program provides the basis for preparing the BES, the second product of the programming-budgeting phase.

#### 9-54. Guidance

**a. Defense Planning Guidance.** The primary product of the OSD planning phase, the DPG identifies key planning and programming priorities to carry out the NMS. OSD issues the DPG in the even year before POM preparation and normally provides an update for off-cycle program development.

**b. Army Program Guidance Memorandum.** The APGM provides direction to PEGs to prepare them for POM build. It outlines strategic guidance. It issues programming guidelines. In addition, it defines resource tasks for PEG goals, relating each task to one or more MDEPs.

**c. Technical guidance memorandum.** Later, DPAE complements the APGM, with a technical guidance memorandum (TGM). The TGM gives coordinating instructions to guide actions of the PEGs during POM build. Then, via PEG-by-PEG guidance, the TGM lays out programming priorities for specific programs set by the SECARMY and CSA.

**d. Fiscal guidance.** Before POM build, OSD issues fiscal guidance establishing the Army's TOA over the POM years. DPAE then apportions the TOA to the PEGs for building their portion of the program. The guidance includes inflation factors and other administrative instructions.

**e. Program and budget guidance.** PBG provides resource guidance to MACOMs, PEOs, PMs, and other operating agencies. Volume I of the document appears in narrative form. It guides commands and agencies, in addressing resource requirements, such as those related to flying hours, ground operating tempo (OPTEMPO), and rates for fuel, inflation, and foreign currency. Volume II reflects the status of command or agency resources. Issued three times each year, one issue of the PBG corresponds to the POM, a second to the BES, and a third to the President's Budget.

**f. Integrated program-budget data call.** HQDA publishes a multivolume resource formulation guide (RFG) for the overall PPBES undertaking. Issued in the fall, RFG volume 3 (Integrated Program-Budget Data Call) describes the data MACOMs, PEOs, PMs, and other operating agencies must submit to HQDA to prepare the POM and BES. Commands and agencies may propose changes to their resources over the program years. Volume 3, however, requires that changes remain zero-sum within the command or agency.

**g. POM preparation instructions.** Issued annually by HQDA and augmenting OSD POM preparation instructions (PPI), RFG volume 4 guides HQDA agencies in preparing the POM.

#### 9-55. Program-budget development process

**a. Initial programmatic review.** The biennial program-budget process typically starts in October in the odd years after the BES goes to OSD. Then, through December, HQDA—

- (1) Reviews the existing program to determine program deficiencies.
- (2) Sorts existing MDEPs by PEG.

- (3) Develops DA-directed and compliance MDEPs.
- (4) Establishes force structure and civilian manpower requirements.
- (5) Responds to decisions that result from the PBD process.

**b. Preparing the database.**

(1) Also, in the odd year, starting in October after the BES goes to OSD, HQDA begins building the program and budget that are due the following spring and summer.

(2) Once the President's Budget is submitted, DPAE establishes a data file in the Probe database. Afterwards, in a series of zero-sum adjustments that leave resource levels in the President's Budget unchanged for the budget years, HQDA revises the database. The adjustments—


(a) Update earlier estimates with new information and revise them for inflation.

(b) Move resources between and among current AMSCOs and MDEP structures (for various reasons).

(c) Consolidate or otherwise restructure individual programs through rolls and splits to make the overall Army program more manageable.

(d) Re-price existing programs as needed and, when required by modified resource levels, identify offsetting deductions as bill payers.

(3) Figure 9-10 shows timelines for Probe updates and other significant events for POM build FY 02-07.



**Figure 9-10. Timelines for POM Build FY 02-07**

**c. Command participation.** MACOMs participate in the PPBES process as do PEOs and PMs, which report through the Army Acquisition Executive Support Agency (AAESA). They and other operating agencies make mission and operating requirements known through commander’s narratives, command-requested changes, and additional data submissions prescribed by RFG volume 3. MACOM commanders serving as ASCC commanders integrate CINC operational requirements into their program and budget input. The CINCs, in addition, highlight their pressing requirements in an IPL that receives close review during program development by HQDA, the Joint Staff, and OSD.

**d. Use of program evaluation groups.**

(1) As mentioned, HQDA packages program requirements into MDEPs, each deriving from one of six resource management areas. HQDA then assigns each MDEP to a PEG to help build and track the Army POM that forms the Army portion of the DOD FYDP.

(2) PEG POM-building activity begins in the fall and peaks in February through April of the following year. Table 9-1, above, lists PEG organization and functions.

(3) PEGs administer assigned MDEPs. They set the scope, quantity, priority, and qualitative nature of resource requirements that define each PEG program. They

monitor PEG resource transactions, making both administrative and substantive changes to their MDEPs as required. In the process, PEGs review assigned MDEPs in terms of TOA guidance. They also review command and agency POMs together with CINC IPLs and ASCC-developed requirements supporting them. PEGs relate these command operating requirements to HQDA guidance as well as to existing MDEPs and new initiatives.

(4) Meanwhile, serving as program integrators, the DARNG, CAR, and DISC4 provide technical assistance to the PEGs and monitor actions to integrate their priorities and the statutory, Defense, and Army requirements for the ARNG, USAR, and information technology programs.

(5) Based on their requirements review, each PEG builds an executable program for its assigned function, making sure its program is reasonable and has continuity and balance. In the process, the PEG—

(a) Validates requested changes submitted by MACOMs, PEOs, PMs, and other operating agencies.

(b) Reconciles conflicts involving unresourced requirements or decrements on which commands fail to reach agreement.

(c) Recommends the allocation of available resources and offsetting decrements to support approved unresourced programs.

(d) Rank orders within its PEG validated but unresourced programs, using a POM 1-n list.

(e) Evaluates HQDA, command, and other agency zero-sum realignments that reallocate programmed resources to meet existing shortfalls and changed requirements.

(f) Coordinates resource changes with appropriate Service, DOD, and non-DOD agencies when required.

(g) Makes sure that proposed reallocations conform to legal restraints and Army policy and priorities, avoid imprudently high risk, and maintain the executability of mandatory programs and subprograms.

(h) Prices programmatic decisions that the Army can defend during review by OSD, OMB, and the Congress.

**e. Internal program review.** The Planning Program Budget Committee (PPBC) meets periodically throughout POM build to review and adjust the developing program, devising courses of action and recommendations on relevant issues as appropriate. Bearing on the PPBC review is the Army Commanders' Conference scheduled in February, which gives field commanders the chance to express their views on the prospective program. The Senior Review Group (SRG), in turn, convenes early in the process to approve guidance and at key stages to ratify PPBC decisions. The ARB convenes in one or more sessions in early to mid-May to review and approve the completed program.

**f. Program Objective Memorandum.** The biennial POM prepared in the spring each even year documents the program decision of the SECARMY and CSA. Submitted to OSD, the POM, as mentioned, presents the Army’s proposal for a balanced allocation of its resources within specified constraints. POM subject matter remains relatively constant from cycle to cycle but varies as required to address special issues. Topics of the FY 02-07 POM, appear in Table 9-4.

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**Table 9-4. POM 02-07 Topics**

<b>TAB</b>	<b>TOPIC</b>	<b>TAB</b>	<b>TOPIC</b>
A	Force Structure	H	Investment Hedges Against Emerging Threats
B	Force Development and Positioning	I	Unified Commands
C	Modernization and Investment	J	Special Operations Forces
D	Force Readiness and Sustainability	K	Counterdrug Program
E	Installation Support and Environment	L	International Agreements
F	Manpower	M	Defense Medical Program
G	Information Technology (IT)/Defense Information Infrastructure (DII)	N	Infrastructure
		O	Antiterrorism/Force Protection
		P	Reserve Component Data

**9-56. OSD program review**

**a.** OSD program review begins soon after POM submission and continues normally until mid to late summer.

**b.** The review features program review proposals that recommend alternatives to POM programs submitted by the Services and Defense agencies. Two- or three-page issue papers prepared by OSD programmers describe the proposed alternative and give evidence for its adoption.

**c.** Issues arise early in the process. They develop from review by members of the Defense Resources Board (DRB) and nonmember Assistant Secretaries of Defense who manage specific programs. Each reviewer prepares a set of proposals whose recommended program additions and reductions sum to zero. Submitted to the DepSecDef, the balanced sets add nothing to the cost of the Defense program. CINCs also may submit proposals but need not balance theirs.

**d.** DPAE serves as Army executive agent for the OSD review, interacting with the OSD staff, functional agencies, and the Joint Staff. As issues arise, representatives of HQDA principal officials meet with their OSD counterparts. The Army representatives present the Army position and try to clarify the issue. If possible, they resolve the issue. Unresolved issues go to the PRG, and if not resolved there, to the DRB.

**e.** An issue resolved outside the DRB is known as an out-of-court settlement. Such settlements require the signature of responsible Army and OSD officials.

**9-57. Program Decision Memorandum**

In mid summer and early fall, after the DRB has debated all outstanding issues, the DepSecDef signs one or more PDMs approving the submitted program with directed changes. Such PDMs provide the program basis for the BES and President's Budget.

**9-58. POM updates**

**a.** Congress requires the President to submit annual budgets under the biennial cycle, and so OSD also prepares a POM update in the off-cycle year. The off-cycle update re-looks at the previous biennial POM, now minus 1 year. It revises the program to—

- (1) Keep its five remaining years consistent with original decisions and strategy.
- (2) Adjust to program decisions reflected in PDMs and budget decisions reflected in PBDs.

**b.** An important aspect of the POM update centers on program resource allocations for the upcoming (or second) budget year. The aim is to make the allocations as correct as possible in terms of program balance and executability. By re-examining the POM, the task of making program resource changes shifts from budget analysts to program analysts.


**c.** The process remains essentially the same as for the biennial POM. For the update, DPAE, DCSOPS, DCSPRO, and ASA(FM&C) together—

- (1) Re-assess the strategy and determine what changed during the last program review and the last budget review.
- (2) Assess how conditions have changed and what is needed next.
- (3) Capture current positions and guidance of the senior Army leadership to detect changes since the spring before, when preparing the original program.
- (4) Adjust for the latest fiscal guidance.
- (5) Review issues raised by PEG chairmen.

**9-59. Complementary program and budget perspective**

**a.** The POM defines what the Army intends to do over the 6-year program period. It uses the MDEP to package required resources by mission, function, and other program objectives. Throughout program development, however, the ASA(FM&C) member helps the PEG maintain a complementary budget perspective that translates mission outputs to congressional appropriation requests.

**b.** Figure 9-11 shows this complementary way that programmers and budgeters view resource requirements. The display shows from left to right the manpower and dollars needed to carry out missions and functions. From top to bottom, it shows how these requirements distribute to form appropriation requests to Congress.



*Note.*—The budgeting goal centers on producing a Budget Estimate Submission (BES) that, except for technical fixes, is the same as the Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

**Figure 9-11. Program and Budget Perspectives**

**9-60. BES preparation**

HQDA forwards the BES to OSD in September each year. The BES covers the first 2 years of the program approved by the PDM. Ideally, little or no data would change between submitting the POM and the BES. Then, preparing the BES would simply mean preparing budget exhibits required by OSD. In fact, however, several events cause HQDA to re-address certain POM decisions.

**a. Program Decision Memorandums.** If OSD publishes the PDM beforehand, the BES will reflect the resource changes incorporating PDM decisions and guidance.

**b. Budget guidance.** Two OSD budget guidance documents affect BES content. Volume 2 of the DOD Financial Management Regulation prescribes various exhibits and displays to be used in presenting the budget. The annual budget call memorandum provides supplemental information such as current rate and pricing guidance. Complementing these documents, ASA(FM&C) also issues administrative instructions for preparing the Army's BES.

**c. Congressional action on the current budget.** Concurrent with Army program-budget development, Congress reviews the budget for the upcoming fiscal year. In the summer of 2000, for example, when the Army began preparing its FY 2002-2003 BES, Congress deliberated on the FY 2001 budget. The Army tracked resultant congressional actions and made appropriate adjustments in the FY 2002-2003 BES.

**d. Rate and pricing change.** Changes occur in rates and prices available before submitting the POM. Rate and pricing information provided later by OSD, for example, will likely alter Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) rates, fuel rates, inflation guidance, and pay raise guidance.

**e. Inter- and intra-Service transfers.** When missions transfer between MACOMs or Services, the calculation and approval of data regarding the accompanying resources

usually lags until summertime. Unavailable when submitting the POM, such resource changes must later be incorporated into the BES.

**f. Execution performance.** At each PPBES decision point, the Army considers how current activity may affect future programs and budgets. It uses the information to adjust future resource allocations. Typical changes in allocations, for example, might reflect the results of acquisition program reviews, unanticipated but unavoidable cost growth, and initiation of contingency missions likely to extend into the program and budget years.

### **9-61. BES review and approval**

**a. Internal review.** Appropriation sponsors brief the results of their analyses to the PPBC when presenting their budgets for approval. It is important to note that PEGs continue to participate in the resource allocation decision-making process that in this phase produces the BES. They do this by providing a programmatic assessment of resource allocation changes that are proposed by budget analysts. The DASA(B) chairs the PPBC while it discusses the issues and alternatives to appropriation sponsor proposals.

(1) The PPBC reviews the “scrub” of appropriation budget estimates to make sure they reflect SECARMY and CSA guidance. It then presents summary budget estimates through the SRG to the ARB for review and final decision.

(2) Once the proposed estimates receive approval, appropriation sponsors, aided by managers for program and performance, prepare detailed justification books and furnish DPAE update data for incorporation into the FYDP reflecting the approved BES. DASA(B) prepares the executive summary of the budget and a transmittal letter from SECARMY to the SecDef. Separately, DASA(B) submits each appropriation’s justification books to OSD, and DPAE submits an updated Army database for the FYDP. The combined events constitute the Army’s BES to OSD.

#### **b. OSD-OMB budget review.**

(1) Members of OSD and OMB jointly review the BES. The joint review focuses on proper pricing, reasonableness, and executability. Appropriation and program sponsors provide appropriation and program overviews at OSD-OMB hearings and respond to questions on the budget submission. Based on the hearings and discussions with Army budget analysts, OSD analysts draft Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) for review and coordination.

(2) PBDs usually present at least one alternative to the BES position in the budget area addressed. An alternative poses dollar and manpower increases or decreases. PBDs may be issued based on errors or on the strength of the justification. Sometimes they are motivated by cost savings or the need to reflect changes in policy. Sometimes they result from analytical disagreement. Whatever the reason, the Army analyzes each PBD and responds to OSD, either agreeing or disagreeing with the OSD position.

(3) Throughout the PBD cycle, the ASA(FM&C) meets with the USD(C) at periodic Service financial manager meetings. At these meetings, toward the end of the PBD cycle, ASA(FM&C) presents financial management (FM) direct appeals. In these

appeals, the ASA(FM&C) tries to reverse OSD positions that are adverse to the Army program and budget.

(4) After the DepSecDef or USD(C) has signed most PBDs, each Service selects as major budget issues (MBIs) certain, still pending, adverse resource decisions. Army MBIs center on decrements to specific initiatives or broad issues that would significantly impair its ability to achieve its program intentions. An MBI addresses the adverse impact that would occur if the decrement were to prevail. At the end of the PBD process, the SECARMY and CSA meet with the SecDef and DepSecDef on MBIs. After the meeting, the SecDef decides each issue, if necessary meeting with OMB or the President to request additional funds or recommend other action.

(5) In December, at the end of the PBD cycle, OSD normally issues a final PBD or OSD memorandum incorporating any changes from MBI deliberations, thus completing the PBD process. OSD then issues each Service its final TOA and manpower controls. DASA(B) incorporates the final changes in the developing President's Budget while DPAE uses the information to adjust or revalidate the Army's program. DASA(B) supervises the PBD and MBI processes, and throughout the review—

(a) Maintains coordination between the USD(C) and HQDA.

(b) Makes sure that adjustments to fiscal controls are correct on all records for each PBD. (However, verifying corresponding manpower controls is an ASA(M&RA) responsibility.)

(c) Gives special attention to any PBD under appeal since the DepSecDef may revise the pending adjustments on review.

**c. President's Budget.**

(1) After implementing the final resource distribution at the budget activity and object class level, Army sends the information to OSD. OSD and OMB forward the information as the Army's portion of the Defense budget, which OMB incorporates into the President's Budget. The President's Budget covers prior year obligations and updated resource estimates for the current year. During the biennial POM cycle, it covers TOA estimates for the budget year and budget year plus 1. The following year, reflecting the offcycle update of the POM, the Presidents' Budget presents a revised second budget year.

(2) Budget analysts translate decisions into program changes, posting PEs, MDEPs, and command distributions, as required. Managers for program and performance update their internal systems. DASA(B) forwards database updates to DPAE, and DPAE updates Probe to produce the President's Budget FYDP, which is also submitted to Congress as required by law.

**9-62. Justification**

**a. Budget hearing.**

(1) During budget justification, the Army presents and defends its portion of the President's Budget before Congress. The process proceeds formally and informally under the staff supervision of the Chief of Legislative Liaison and ASA(FM&C).

(2) After the President formally submits the budget, the Army provides detailed budget justification to the authorizing and appropriations committees. First, however, appropriation sponsors will have prepared material in Army justification books to conform to decisions of the President and SecDef and congressional requirements for formats and supporting information. Justification books undergo internal Army review by ASA(FM&C) and are then sent to OSD for final review.

(3) The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and House Armed Services Committee (HASC) conduct authorization hearings for the various programs and appropriations. Concurrently, the Army's budget request goes before the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. In these hearings, the SECARMY and CSA normally testify first. Then, helped by ASA(FM&C) and the Chief of Legislative Liaison, appropriation sponsors and functional proponents present and defend the details of the budget.

**b. Legislative approval and enactment.**

(1) When congressional sub-committees complete their review, the Senate and House vote on the committee bills. Differences between the Senate and House versions get resolved via a joint conference.

(2) Budget justification ends when the President signs the authorization and appropriation bills for the coming fiscal year. Enacted into law, Army appropriations provide the legal authority to incur obligations and make payments.

**c. Continuing Resolution Authority.** When Congress fails to pass an appropriation by the end of September, it may pass a continuing resolution. Continuing resolution authority (CRA) derives from emergency legislation that authorizes the funding of Government operations in the absence of appropriations. A temporary measure, the CRA usually restricts funding to the prior year level and prohibits new initiatives. HQDA separately publishes specific policy on how the Army will operate under the CRA. Failure to pass either an appropriation or CRA (as happened in the Fall of 1995 when Congress failed to pass FY 96 legislation on time and the President refused to sign continuing resolution authorities) could result in a temporary close down of government operations. Normally, however, until an appropriation or CRA is enacted, DOD would continue minimum essential operations based on the requirements of national defense.

## **SECTION XIII**

### **BUDGET EXECUTION PHASE**

#### **9-63. Management and accounting**

During execution, the Army manages and accounts for funds and manpower to carry out approved programs. It checks how well HQDA, MACOMs, PEOs, PMs, and other operating agencies use allocated resources to carry out program objectives. Through the Army Joint Reconciliation Program, it strengthens financial accounting and management to make sure financial reports accurately reflect the results of budget execution. The Army, and of even greater importance, OSD and Congress apply execution feedback to adjust resource requirements during their deliberation on the Army's budget.

## **9-64. Financial management**

Budget execution applies the funds appropriated by Congress to carry out authorized programs. The procedure entails apportioning, allocating, and allotting funds; obligating and disbursing them; and associated reporting and review. The procedure also entails performing in-progress evaluations and making necessary course corrections to reallocate resources to meet the changing requirements that develop during execution. Budget execution includes financing unbudgeted requirements that result from changed conditions unforeseen when submitting the budget and having higher priority than the requirements from which funds are diverted (reprogramming).

### **a. Funds control.**

(1) Several events must occur before the Army can execute its programs for a new fiscal year under a new appropriations act:

(a) OMB must apportion the appropriations, which provides obligation/budget authority. An apportionment distributes funds by making specific amounts available for obligation.

(b) The Department of the Treasury must issue a Treasury Warrant providing cash.

(c) The USD(C) must release program authority

(2) Before the Army can execute its programs for the new fiscal year, all these authorities must be loaded into the Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS). Additionally, PBAS must be loaded with execution restrictions in accordance with congressional language, and undistributed decrements must be spread to the appropriate program by appropriation sponsors.

### **b. Apportionment.**

(1) The apportionment requests (DD Form 1105) are prepared by DASA(B) within 5 days of the availability of an appropriations act and in response to approved reprogramming requests, supplementals, or rescissions. The apportionment requests are approved or revised by OSD and submitted to OMB for approval. OMB approves, changes, or disapproves the requests and returns apportionments through OSD to the Army for entry into PBAS. OMB apportionments—

(a) Operating accounts (Operation & Maintenance (O&M), Military Personnel (MILPERS), and Army Family Housing (Operations) (AFHO)) on a fiscal quarterly basis.

(b) Investment accounts (RDT&E, Procurement, Military Construction (MILCON), and Army Family Housing (Construction) (AFHC)) initially for the entire amount of the appropriation.

(2) The apportionment determines the budget authority (BA) available in PBAS. For the operating accounts—even after releasing the entire program to the command—it is the cumulative amount of BA issued to commands and agencies by quarter that determines the execution level for the appropriation.

**c. Program release.**

(1) For the investment accounts, the Army releases program and budget authority in equal amounts. Actual expenditure, however, depends on OSD program controls wherein the USD(C) gives the Army specific program releases that further control expenditures.

(a) For the procurement appropriations (Aircraft, Missiles, Weapons & Tracked Combat Vehicles, Ammunition, and Other Procurement), the program is released at the budget line item number (BLIN) level.

(b) For the RDTE appropriation, the program is released at the PE level. These are the same levels as those authorized and appropriated by Congress and reported in the DD 1414 and DD 1416 Reports (which are provided to Congress to show execution changes to appropriated amounts).

(c) Both the MILCON and the AFHC appropriations are released at the project level as contained in the conference report accompanying the *Military Construction Appropriations Act*.

(2) Program releases for the operating accounts, O&M and Mil Pers, are contained in the obligation authority (OA) letter issued by the USD(C). A separate OA letter is issued for AFHO.

**d. Allocation, obligation, and reconciliations.** Guided by HQDA appropriation sponsors and using the PBAS, ASA(FM&C) allocates apportioned funds to commands and agencies. Then—

(1) MACOMs and other operating agencies, in turn, make funds available to subordinate commands and installations by an allotment. Allotments authorize users to place orders and award contracts for products and services to carry out approved programs.

(2) Installations obligate funds as orders are placed and contracts awarded. They make payments as materiel is delivered or as services are performed.

(3) Finally installations, commands, and appropriation sponsors conduct joint reconciliations. Reconciliations make sure financial statements and reports accurately represent the results of the apportionment, allocation, and allotment program. Reconciliations also make sure payments align properly with supporting obligations.

**e. Changes from the President's Budget.**

(1) After appropriations are enacted, appropriation sponsors and the Army Budget Office review the legislation to determine changes, which include congressional adds, denial of programs, or changes to the funding level as submitted in the budget. Changes also include identification of congressional special interest items, undistributed reductions, and any language relating to execution of the programs. These changes are applied to amounts loaded into the PBAS.

(2) Appropriation sponsors must determine how to spread any undistributed reductions. In addition, they may also have to spread some unapplied reductions in the appropriations act, which are distributed to the Services (and appropriations) during the

PBD cycle. For those reasons, the actual funding level for a particular project, BLIN, PE, or budget activity may not be finally set until several months into the new fiscal year. This is so even if the appropriations act is passed before October 1, and the ultimate funding level for individual programs will almost certainly be less than shown in the joint conference reports.

**f. Funding letters for O&M and AFHO.** HQDA issues funding letters to commands and agencies for both the Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) and AFHO appropriations. (ARNG and USAR issue their own funding letters for their O&M appropriations.) The letters indicate funded programs and give guidance on how they should be executed. They also provide an audit trail from the resource position in the President's Budget to the revised, appropriated position. The OMA funding letter outlines the funding posture and goals set by the senior Army leadership for command execution. Preparing and issuing the funding letter takes about 30 days after the appropriations act is passed.

#### **9-65. Revised approved program for RDT&E**

HQDA issues a revised approved program (RAP) for the RDT&E appropriation. The RAP shows the congressional changes at both the PE and project level. In addition, the RAP spreads general reductions at the project level. It includes the amounts set aside for the Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR) and the Small Business Technology Transfer Pilot Program (STTR). The RAP also includes amounts withheld by the USD(C) and HQDA and provides language on congressional restrictions as well as congressional special interest items. Because of the level of detail and the extensive information included, the RAP is not available until several months after the appropriations act is enacted.

#### **9-66. Program Budget Accounting System**

**a.** The PBAS is used to issue both the program and BA to commands and agencies for all appropriations. After appropriation sponsors determine the revised appropriated level for each appropriation, the amounts are adjusted in PBAS. The program and BA are released in equal amounts for all appropriations except Military Personnel, O&M, and AFHO. These accounts receive the total program for the fiscal year but receive BA quarterly throughout the year. BA controls the total amount of obligations a command or agency can execute through any given quarter but allows flexibility in its application against the program received.

**b.** The ASA(FM&C) controls PBAS at the HQDA level. The appropriation sponsor may request release of the program and budget authority (BA), or below threshold reprogramming actions. The HQDA Funds Control Officer in the Office of the Deputy ASA for Budget (SAFM-BUC-E) reviews requests for compliance with congressional language and guidance of the USD(C) before entering the action in PBAS. PBAS produces documents that display both BA and the program. The documents include a section for remarks for executing the program and footnotes that provide statutory restrictions according to the revisions of 31 USC 1517.

**c.** PBAS agrees with the program detail contained in DFAS-IN Manual 37-100\*\* (the Army Management Structure (AMS)). Changes to PBAS can only be made at the

DA level and must be approved as a change to DFAS-IN Manual 37-100\*\*. This pamphlet initially agrees with the detail obtained in the President's Budget request and is changed to incorporate congressional adds. Any additional changes may be controlled by congressional language and vary from one appropriation to another.

**d.** PBAS uses special reprogramming keys either to allow commands and agencies to move the program below threshold or to restrict the ability to reprogram below threshold to the DA level. The use of the keys in PBAS varies from one appropriation to another. Special keys may also be used in PBAS to identify congressional special interest items or programs that have been denied by Congress.

### **9-67. Obligation and outlay plans**

During December and January, the ASA(FM&C), in coordination with field activities and appropriation sponsors, develops obligation and outlay plans for each of the appropriations. The obligation plans address unexpired funds for all Army appropriations. The outlay plans address unexpired and expired funds. The ASA(FM&C) sends completed obligation and outlay plans to the USD(C). Based on command estimates of annual obligations, the plans tie to obligation and outlay controls in the President's Budget. The importance of the outlay plan is that it is directly tied to the projected amounts the Treasury must borrow to maintain proper balances to meet expected disbursements (outlays).

### **9-68. Financing unbudgeted requirements**

**a.** Congress recognizes the need for flexibility during budget execution to meet unforeseen requirements or changes in operating conditions, including those to address minor, fact-of-life financial changes. Congress accepts that rigid adherence to program purposes and amounts originally budgeted and approved would jeopardize businesslike performance. Thus, within stated restrictions and specified dollar thresholds, Congress allows Federal agencies to reprogram existing funds to finance unfunded requirements. Typically, reprogramming diverts funds from undertakings whose requirements have lower priority than the new requirements being financed.

**b.** Congressional language on reprogramming, which varies by appropriation, controls the Army's ability to move the program within appropriations (below threshold reprogramming). Moving the program in excess of specified limits requires congressional approval via a formal reprogramming (DD Form 1415) request. Moving amounts between appropriations always requires a formal reprogramming request.

**c.** Provided reprogramming authority is not required, another way to finance unfunded requirements is to apply obligation authority harvested from joint reconciliations. This means using unexpired funds originally obligated against a contract or order but identified as excess to the need and subsequently deobligated. Reutilizing funds in this way gives allotment holders greater leverage in executing the budget and increases the buying power of the Army's financial resources.

**d.** FY 91 marked the first year of Omnibus Reprogramming procedure, which, except for construction accounts, consolidated all DOD reprogramming actions into one very large reprogramming action. It identified all DOD reprogramming requirements at

one time. This allowed the Congress and DOD to set priorities for limited funding and make smarter decisions.

#### **9-69. Oversight of nonappropriated funds**

Applying various methods, the ASA(FM&C) also oversees nonappropriated funds. One method is by participating on the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Board of Directors. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations) is a voting member of the MWR Executive Committee. In addition, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (FM&C) chairs the Audit Committee, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Resource Analysis and Business Practices) serves on the Investment Subcommittee. Through these positions the ASA(FM&C) influences virtually all aspects of MWR financial policy. As part of the responsibility of overseeing nonappropriated funds, the ASA(FM&C) presents nonappropriated funds issues to the SECARMY and CSA for decision.

### **SECTION XIV PROGRAM PERFORMANCE AND REVIEW**

#### **9-70. Program implementation**

MACOMs, PEOs, PMs, and other operating agencies carry out the approved program within manpower and funds provided. They review budget execution and account for and report on the use of allocated funds by appropriation and MDEP. As applicable to each appropriation, they include FYDP program and subprogram, AMSCO, PE, project number, BLIN, budget activity, BAG, and EOR. They also account for use of allocated manpower by UIC. The manpower and financial data obtained help commands and agencies develop future requirements.

#### **9-71. Quarterly Army Performance Review**

ASA(FM&C) oversees a management review of Army programs via the QAPR. The QAPR compares program performance with objectives set at the beginning of the fiscal year by HQDA staff principals. These officials personally present the review to the SECARMY and CSA on a quarterly basis.

#### **9-72. Review of selected acquisition systems**

The means for checking system program performance include milestone reviews of designated acquisition programs by the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) conducted by ASA(ALT) and the VCSA.

#### **9-73. Joint Reconciliation Program**

This program applies the skills of those responsible for various aspects of financial management. The skills include those of accountants, budget and program analysts, contracting professionals, logisticians, and internal review auditors. The program applies the combined skills to verify the validity of unliquidated obligations, contractor work in process, billing status, and the continued need for goods and services not yet delivered. The program achieves dollar savings by identifying and canceling obligations for goods and services no longer needed or duplicative. The program also reconciles current

appropriations to verify the correctness of amounts obligated. In addition, the program assures the liquidation of appropriations to be canceled by the end of the fiscal year.

**Table 9-5. Army Appropriation and Fund Managers**

<i>Resource identification code</i>	<i>Appropriation (fund) <sup>1</sup></i>	<i>Manager for functional requirements</i>	<i>Manager for program and performance</i>
<i>Investment</i>			
<b>RDTE</b>	Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army	DCSPRO	ASA (ALT)
<b>CHEM</b>	Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction, Army	DCSPRO	ASA (ALT)
<b>ACFT (APA)</b>	Aircraft Procurement, Army	DCSPRO	ASA (ALT)
<b>MSLS (MIPA)</b>	Missile Procurement, Army	DCSPRO	ASA (ALT)
<b>WTCV</b>	Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army	DCSPRO	ASA (ALT)
<b>AMMO (PAA)</b>	Procurement of Ammunition, Army	DCSPRO	ASA (ALT)
<b>OPA</b>	Other Procurement, Army	DCSPRO	ASA (ALT)
	OPA 1	DCSPRO	ASA (ALT)
	OPA 2	DCSPRO	ASA (ALT), DISC4
	OPA 3	DCSPRO	ASA (ALT)
<b>MCA</b>	Military Construction, Army	ACSIM	ACSIM
<b>MCNG</b>	Military Construction, Army National Guard	DARNG, ACSIM	DARNG
<b>MCAR</b>	Military Construction, Army Reserve	CAR, ACSIM	CAR
<b>AFHC</b>	Family Housing, Army (Construction)	ACSIM	ACSIM
<b>BRAC</b>	Base Realignment and Closure	ACSIM	ACSIM
<i>Operations</i>			
<b>OMA</b>	Operation and Maintenance, Army	See Table 9-6.	
<b>OMNG</b>	Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard <sup>2</sup>	DARNG, ACSIM	DARNG
<b>OMAR</b>	Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve <sup>2</sup>	CAR, ACSIM	CAR
<b>ERA</b>	Environmental Restoration, Army and Formerly Used Test Sites	ACSIM	ACSIM
<b>AFHO</b>	Family Housing, Army (Operations)	ACSIM	ACSIM
<b>MPA</b>	Military Personnel, Army	DCSPER	DCSPER
<b>NGPA</b>	National Guard Personnel, Army	DARNG	DARNG
<b>RPA</b>	Reserve Personnel, Army	CAR	CAR
<i>Miscellaneous accounts</i>			
<b>AWCF</b>	Army Working Capital Fund		
	Supply management	DCSLOG	ASA (ALT)
	Depot maintenance	DCSLOG	ASA (ALT)
	Ordnance	DCSLOG	ASA (ALT)
	Information services	DISC4	DISC4
<b>CAWCF</b>	Army Conventional Ammunition Working Capital Fund	ASA (ALT)	ASA (ALT)
<b>IMET</b>	International Military Education and Training Transfer Appropriation	DUSA (IA)	DUSA (IA)
<b>FMFE</b>	Foreign Military Financing Executive	DUSA (IA)	DUSA (IA)
<b>FMS</b>	Foreign Military Sales Program	DCSLOG	DCSLOG
<b>HOA</b>	Homeowners Assistance Fund, Defense	COE	COE
<b>ATF</b>	Department of the Army Trust Funds	ASA (FM&C)	ASA (FM&C)

**Notes.**—<sup>1</sup> ASA (FM&C) serves as appropriation sponsor for all appropriations (funds) except ARNG and USAR appropriations, whose sponsors are the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Chief, Army Reserve, respectively.

<sup>2</sup> See Table 9-6.

**Table 9-6. Budget Activity Management Structure for Operation and Maintenance Appropriations**

<b>Operation and Maintenance, Army</b>					
<i>Army manpower and total obligation authority</i>					
<i>Records resources for Army management structure code (AMSCO) nnnxxx, where nnn shows budget subactivity. (See chaps AO-2020a-d, h, and j, DFAS-IN Manual 37-100-** for further information.)</i>					
n	Budget activity (BA)	nn	Activity group (01 level)	nnn	Budget subactivity
<b>Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>
	<b>BA 1: Operating forces</b>	<b>DCSOPS</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>Recruiting, and other training and education</b>	
<b>11</b>	<b>Land forces</b>	<b>DCSOPS</b>			
111	Division		331	Recruiting and advertising	DCSPER
112	Corps combat forces		332	Personnel processing	DCSPER
113	Corps support forces		333	Continuing education and assistance	DCSPER
114	Echelon above corps support forces		334	Civilian training	DCSPER
115	Land forces operations support		335	Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps	DCSPER
<b>12</b>	<b>Land forces readiness</b>		336	Base support–recruiting and examining	ACSIM
121	Force readiness operations support	DCSOPS		<b>BA 4: Administration and service-wide support</b>	
122	Land forces system readiness	DISC4, ACSIM, DCSOPS	<b>41</b>	<b>Security Programs</b>	<b>DCSINT</b>
123	Land forces depot maintenance	DCSLOG	411	Security programs	
<b>13</b>	<b>Land forces readiness support</b>		<b>42</b>	<b>Logistics operations</b>	<b>DCSLOG</b>
131	Base operations support	ACSIM	421	Service-wide transportation	
132	Real property maintenance (land forces readiness support)	ACSIM	422	Central supply activities	
135	Additional activities	DCSOPS	423	Logistic support activities	
	<b>BA 2: Mobilization</b>	<b>DCSOPS</b>	424	Conventional ammunition management	
<b>21</b>	<b>Mobility operations</b>		<b>43</b>	<b>Service-wide support</b>	
211	Strategic mobility	DCSOPS <sup>2</sup>	431	Administration	ASA (M&RA)
212	War reserves	DCSOPS	432	Service-wide communications	DISC4, ACSIM
213	Industrial preparedness	DCSLOG	433	Manpower management	ASA (M&RA)
214	Real property maintenance	ACSIM <sup>3</sup>	434	Other personnel support	ASA (M&RA)
	<b>BA 3: Training and recruiting</b>	<b>DCSOPS</b>	435	Other Service support	Various
<b>31</b>	<b>Accession training</b>		436	Army claims and administrative support activities	TJAG
311	Officer acquisition	DCSOPS	437	Construction and real estate management	ACSIM
312	Recruit training	DCSOPS	438	Base support	ACSIM
313	One station unit training	DCSOPS	439	Real property maintenance	ACSIM
314	Senior Reserve Officers' Training Corps	DCSOPS		<b>44</b>	<b>Support of other nations</b>
315	Service Academy base support	ACSIM			<b>DUSA (IA)</b>
continued on next page			continued on next page		

**Table 9-6. Budget Activity Management Structure for Operation and Maintenance Appropriations**

<i>Army manpower and total obligation authority (continued)</i>					
316	Real property maintenance			441	International military headquarters
		<b>ACSIM</b>			
<b>32</b>	<b>Basic skill and advanced training</b>			442	Miscellaneous support of other nations
321	Specialized skill training	DCSOPS		451	Closed account
322	Flight training	DCSOPS		493	Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA)
323	Professional development education	DCSOPS			None
324	Training support	DCSOPS			None
325	Base support–TRADOC	ACSIM			
326	Real property maintenance	ACSIM			
<b>continued in right column, previous page</b>					

**Notes.** —<sup>1</sup> Manager for functional requirements and program and performance throughout entire table (except as noted.). <sup>2</sup> Manager for functional requirements. DCSLOG serves as manager for program and performance. <sup>3</sup> Follows support recording structure used for Operation and Maintenance, Army.

**Manpower-only activity structure**

Probe generates categories 8 and 9 below to meet manpower reporting requirements. Category 8 records resources for AMSCO 84nxxx where n=1, 6, 7, or 9 shows the budget subactivity. Category 9 records resources for AMSCO 9nxxxx, where n=1, 2, 3, or 4 shows the 0-1 level structure.

<b>Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>
	<b>Category 8: Medical activities, manpower only—reimbursable labor</b>			<b>Category 9: Other—manpower only</b>	
<b>84</b>	<b>Medical manpower—reimbursable</b>	<b>TSG</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>Defense agency manpower (military only)</b>	<b>DCSOPS</b>
841	Examining activities—health care		<b>92</b>	<b>Special operations forces manpower—reimbursable</b>	<b>DCSPER</b>
846	Service support to USUHS		<b>93</b>	<b>Outside Department of Defense</b>	<b>DCSPER</b>
847	Defense medical centers, hospitals, and medical clinics—CONUS		<b>94</b>	<b>Transients, holdees, and operating strength deviation</b>	<b>DCSPER</b>

**Base support**

Base Support, which divides into Base Operations Support (BOS) and Real Property Maintenance (RPM) provides resources to operate and maintain installations.

Base Support records resources for Army management structure code (AMSCO) where *nnnxxx* shows budget subactivity and *xxxxnn* designates specified subdivisions. As recorded in the **Code** column below, some AMSCOs have an additional set of codes (sometimes referred to as letter accounts) that appear after the 6<sup>th</sup> character. (See chap A9-BSSPT, DFAS–IN Manual 37-100-\*\* for further information.).

Base Operations Support (BOS)

Base Operations Support (BOS) applies to subactivity groups 131, 135, 325, 336, and 348

<b>Code</b>	<b>Account</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Account</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>
	<b>AMSCO xxxx19, xxxx20</b>		<b>.D</b>	Transportation services	DCSLOG
	Child development services, family centers	ACSIM	<b>.E</b>	Laundry and dry-cleaning services	DCSLOG
			<b>.F</b>	Food services	DCSLOG
<b>continued on next page</b>			<b>continued on next page</b>		

**Table 9-6. Budget Activity Management Structure for Operation and Maintenance Appropriations**

<b>AMSCO xxxx53, xxxx54, xxxx56</b>			<b>.K</b> Civilian personnel management	ASA(M&RA)
Environmental conservation, pollution prevention, environmental compliance	ACSIM		<b>.L</b> Morale, welfare, and recreation	ACSIM
<b>AMSCO xxxx75</b>			<b>.M</b> Military personnel support	ASA(M&RA)
Force protection	ACSIM		<b>.Q</b> Reserve Component support	ACSIM
<b>AMSCO xxxx79 (Real Property Services)</b>			<b>.U</b> Financial management	ASA(FM& C)
<b>.J</b> Operation of utilities	ACSIM		<b>.V</b> Management analysis	ASA(FM&C)
<b>.M</b> Municipal services	ACSIM		<b>.W</b> Contracting operations	ASA(ALT)
<b>.N</b> Facilities engineering services	ACSIM		<b>.X</b> Information technology, management and planning	DISC4, ACSIM
<b>.P</b> Fire and emergency response services	ACSIM		<b>.Y</b> Administrative services	DISC4, ACSIM
<b>AMSCO xxxx90</b>			<b>.1</b> Provost Marshal	DCSOPS
Audio visual and visual information production, acquisition, and support)	DISC4, ACSIM		<b>.2</b> Staff Judge Advocate	ACSIM
<b>AMSCO xxxx95</b>			<b>.3</b> Chaplain	ACSIM
Base communications	DISC4, ACSIM		<b>.4</b> Public Affairs	ACSIM
<b>AMSCO xxxx96 (Base Operations Support)(BASOPS(-))</b>			<b>.5</b> Inspector General	ACSIM
<b>.A</b> Real estate leases	ACSIM		<b>.6</b> Installation management	ACSIM
<b>.B</b> Supply operations and management	DCSLOG		<b>.7</b> Operations	DCSOPS
<b>.C</b> Materiel maintenance	DCSLOG		<b>.9</b> Unaccompanied personnel housing management	ACSIM
<b>continued in right column, previous page</b>				

**Note.**—<sup>1</sup> Manager for functional requirements and program and performance.

Real Property Maintenance

Real Property Maintenance (RPM) applies to subactivity groups 214, 316, 326, and 439.

<b>Code</b>	<b>Account</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Account</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>
<b>AMSCO xxxx76</b>			<b>.E</b> Administrative facilities (including information technology facilities)		ACSIM
<b>.L</b>	Minor construction	ACSIM	<b>.F</b> Unaccompanied personnel housing facilities, enlisted barracks		ACSIM
<b>AMSCO xxxx78 (Maintenance and Repair)</b>			<b>.G</b> Other unaccompanied personnel housing facilities		ACSIM
<b>.1</b>	Surfaced areas (including bridges and other appurtenances)	ACSIM	<b>.H</b> Dining facilities		ACSIM
<b>.2</b>	Airfields, paved and unpaved (including bridges and other appurtenances)	ACSIM	<b>.Q</b> Other facilities without facility category groups (FCGs))		ACSIM
<b>.4</b>	Railroads (including bridges and other appurtenances)	ACSIM	<b>.R</b> Airfield facilities		ACSIM
<b>.5</b>	Utility systems	ACSIM	<b>.S</b> Training/instruction support facilities		ACSIM
<b>.A</b>	Maintenance and production facilities	ACSIM	<b>.T</b> Ports		ACSIM
<b>.B</b>	Training and operations facilities	ACSIM	<b>.U</b> Medical and hospital facilities		ACSIM
<b>.C</b>	RDT&E facilities	ACSIM	<b>.V</b> Grounds		ACSIM
			<b>.W</b> Community support		ACSIM
			<b>.X</b> Family housing		ACSIM
<b>continued on next page</b>			<b>continued on next page</b>		

**Table 9-6. Budget Activity Management Structure for Operation and Maintenance Appropriations**

.D	Supply and storage facilities <i>continued in right column, previous page</i>	ACSIM	<b>AMSCO xxxx93</b>		
			Demolition of real property	ACSIM	
<b>Operation and Maintenance—Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve</b>					
Records resources for Army management structure code (AMSCO) nnnNxx, where nnn shows budget subactivity and N is constant for Army National Guard. (See chap AO-2065.106, DFAS-IN Manual 37-100-** for further information.) For the Army Reserve, a constant R replaces the N in the code. (See chap AO-2080.106, DFAS-IN Manual 37-100-** for further information.)			n	Budget activity (BA)	
			nn	Activity group (01 level)	
			nnn	Budget subactivity	
<b>Army National Guard</b>					
<b>Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>
	<b>BA 1: Operating forces</b>	<b>DARNG</b>	132	Real property maintenance	
<b>11</b>	<b>Land forces</b>		133	Management and operational headquarters	
111	Divisions		135	Weapons of mass destruction	
112	Corps combat forces			<b>BA 4: Administration and service-wide activities</b>	<b>DARNG</b>
113	Corps engineers		<b>43</b>	<b>Servicewide support</b>	
114	Echelon above corps–forces		431	Staff management	
115	Land forces operations support		432	Information management	
<b>12</b>	<b>Land forces readiness</b>		433	Readiness and personnel administration	
122	Land forces system readiness		434	Recruiting and advertising	
123	Land forces depot maintenance				
<b>13</b>	<b>Land forces readiness support</b>				
131	Base operations support (land forces readiness support)				
<b>U.S. Army Reserve</b>					
<b>Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Code</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Manager<sup>1</sup></b>
	<b>BA 1: Operating forces</b>	<b>CAR</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>Land forces readiness support</b>	
<b>11</b>	<b>Land forces</b>		131	Base operations support	
111	Divisions		132	Real property maintenance	
112	Corps combat forces		135	Additional activities	
113	Corps engineers			<b>BA 4: Administration and service-wide activities</b>	<b>CAR</b>
114	Echelon above corps–forces		<b>43</b>	<b>Servicewide support</b>	
115	Land forces operations support		431	Administration	
<b>12</b>	<b>Land forces readiness</b>		432	Servicewide communications	
121	Forces readiness operations support		433	Personnel and financial administration	
122	Land forces system readiness		434	Recruiting and advertising	
123	Depot maintenance				
<b>Note.</b> — <sup>1</sup> Manager for functional requirements and program and performance.					

## **SECTION XV**

### **SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

#### **9-74. Summary**

**a.** This account describes how, at the beginning of 2001, the PPBS and its Army PPBES counterpart produce a departmental plan, program, and budget. From its inception in 1962, the PPBS has evolved continuously in terms of system responsibilities, framework, and products, leading over time to greater participation by the Joint Staff, Services, and CINCs. Figure 9-8 lists the events occurring in a typical PPBS/PPBES cycle. Figure 9-9 shows the organizational framework within which the process operates.

**b.** The Army's PPBES serves as its primary resource management system. It differs from the DOD counterpart in two ways. First, the PPBES merges programming and budgeting into a single, integrated programming-budgeting phase. Next, the PPBES adds execution as a distinct system phase.

**c.** The PPBS/PPBES ties strategy, program, and budget all together. It helps build a comprehensive plan in which budgets flow from programs, programs from requirements, requirements from missions, and missions from national security objectives. The patterned flow—from end purpose to resource cost—defines requirements in progressively greater detail.

#### **9-75. References**

- a.** DOD Instruction 7045.7, *Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System*.
- b.** CJCS Instruction 3100.01, *Joint Strategic Planning System*.
- c.** Army Regulation 1-1, *Planning Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System*.

# CHAPTER 10

## RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

*“Mr. Chairman,*

*I want to thank the members of this committee for your support of our soldiers and of our vision for the future, especially The Army’s Transformation initiative, which will be so critical to our readiness in the decades to come. With your support, that effort is well underway.*

*...Achieving...force readiness has taken significant effort... We have fully funded training and taken risk elsewhere... The price for achieving that kind of readiness in our early deploying units has been to accept risk elsewhere in the force. First, we have diverted soldiers from other organizations to fill our high priority war fighting formations. Second, we have for years mortgaged our future readiness -- our modernization programs -- in order to assure that our soldiers had, in the near-term, what it takes to fight and win decisively...*

*For a number of years now, we have focused resources into these high priority units at the expense of non-divisional and reserve component units and the institutional Army. We also deferred revitalization of our facilities. The DOD benchmark calls for complete renewal of facilities every fifty-seven years. With current funding, it will take The Army 157 years to fully revitalize our infrastructure... In addition, our current real property maintenance backlog exceeds \$15 billion today. That is the result of migrating funds to pay for near-term readiness, and that problem compounds with each passing year.*

*Likewise, most of our legacy force equipment -- our major combat systems -- is aging. Over 75% of them exceed the half-life of their expected service. As a result, operations and maintenance costs have grown 30% over the past four years...”*

Testimony of the Chief of Staff, Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, before the House Armed Services Committee on 27 September 2000

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 10-1. The need for resource management

**a.** General Shinseki’s testimony to the House Armed Services Committee illustrates the need for effective resource management throughout the Army. He mentions past strategic resource management decisions that have had a profound effect on the Army in the field. Because the Army has a large and complex set of missions to execute and a limited set of resources with which to accomplish its missions and supporting tasks, the necessity to maximize the spending power of every dollar the Congress appropriates to

the Army becomes paramount. Further, because the Army is vested with the public's trust and confidence for defending our Nation, all Army leaders have an incumbent responsibility to exercise effective and responsible stewardship for all the resources that have been entrusted to them. As such, responsible, effective and efficient resource management is an integral part of all Army leaders' duties and functions and is essential for maintaining the Army's readiness to accomplish its assigned missions.

**b.** Resource management at the strategic level must address the issues of affordability, required force capabilities, and the entire supporting structure. Resource managers at this level must also deal with the larger questions of whether particular programs are needed, how they serve the specific missions assigned to the Army, and whether the strategies designed to accomplish the mission are correct and necessary. Programmatic and financial resource perspectives examine the efficiency with which funds are allocated and spent, and with how effectively particular programs are managed and integrated. At the program level this process encompasses the ways in which the soldiers, civilians, facilities, equipment, information, time, and funds are integrated into the Army.

**c.** Implicit in this programmatic resource management perspective is the recognition that all of us participate in a resource decision stream that requires some of these decisions, once made, to remain unalterable. For example, placing a new facility at an installation requires a minimum of four years. Training instructors and then troops on a new piece of equipment requires three years. Ordering the secondary spares for new end items requires at least two years. Integrating all three of these resourcing decisions requires that we consider them to be "irreversible," otherwise we will find new facilities being completed at one installation, while we have resourced new equipment and soldiers trained on that equipment to be serving on another installation.

**d.** More importantly, this "unalterable decision base" will have created "a receivables stream" such as aircraft, training packages, equipment shops, displaced equipment, and so forth of substantial proportion. Reconfiguring these "receivables" into one's own conception without considering the previous decision rationale may well create resource management disconnects which tend to surface in OSD resource review forums and Congressional hearings.

### **10-2. Resource management—a definition**

Resource management is the direction, guidance, and control of financial and other resources. It involves the application of programming, budgeting, accounting, reporting, analysis, and evaluation.

### **10-3. Resource management terms**

Throughout this chapter, there are a number of unique terms associated with resource (specifically financial or fiscal) management that if understood will enable you to more readily understand and use this chapter.

**a. Obligation.** Any act that legally binds the United States Government to make a payment is an obligation. The concept of the "obligation" is central to resource management in the Government. From the central concept of "obligating the U.S. Government to make a payment" springs forth the foundation of our fiscal law and the

legal parameters under which the Army must operate as a part of the U.S. Government. The obligation may be for a service rendered by a contractor, the acquisition of material items (for example, a tank), the construction or repair of a facility, salary for a soldier or civilian, and so forth

**b. Congressional authorization.** A law passed by the Congress and signed by the President that establishes or continues a Federal program or agency, and sets forth guidelines to which it must adhere. Generally for every fiscal year, the Congress passes a DOD authorization act (for example, Public Law 106-554, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001*), which directs by law what can be purchased, what manpower resource levels each Service can have, and how many weapon and other materiel systems can be bought. It also provides additions and changes to Title 10 of the United States Codes that, among other laws, guide the management of the Army and the other activities of the Department of Defense. An authorization act however does not provide the budget authority to draw funds from the U.S. Treasury to pay an obligation.

**c. Congressional appropriation.** A law passed by the Congress and signed by the President that provides budget authority for the specific purpose(s) stated in the law. In the case of the annual DOD appropriations acts (for example, Public Law 106-259, *Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2001*; and Public Law 106-246, *Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001*), budget authority is provided for a number of appropriations (for example, Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA); Military Personnel, Army (MPA); Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army (RDT&E,A); Military Construction, Army (MCA), and so forth) for a specified period of time for the Army to incur legal obligations as it executes the programs authorized by Congress and other laws that guide Army operations.

**d. Budget authority.** Budget authority is the authority to incur a legal obligation to pay a sum of money from the U.S. Treasury. Budget authority is not “money.” The U.S. Treasury actually disburses cash only after an agency (for example, Army, Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) accounting office activity, and so forth) issues a U.S. Treasury Check withdrawing money from the Treasury and thus disburses the money to pay a previously incurred obligation.

**e. Disbursement.** Payment of an obligation of the U.S. Government.

**f. Fiscal year (FY).** The fiscal year is the Government’s accounting period. For the Federal Government it begins on 1 October and ends on 30 September. The fiscal year is designated by the calendar year in which it ends. For example, Fiscal Year 2001 begins on 1 October 2000 and ends on 30 September 2001.

**g. Outlays.** Outlays are the amount of money the Government actually disburses in a given fiscal year.

#### **10-4. Key players in Army resource management**

There are a number of different actors who play in the Army’s resource management arena:

**a. Congress.** Central to the function of obligating the Government to make a payment is the power invested by the U.S. Constitution to the Congress for the following:

Congress has the power to raise revenue and borrow money (U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause 1-2); Congress has the power to raise and support armies and a navy (U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 8, Clause 12-13); and no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law (U.S. Constitution Article I, Section 9, Clause 7). For Congress to meet these requirements they pass authorization and appropriation acts as described above.

**b. Office of Management and Budget (OMB).** OMB assists the President of the United States in overseeing the preparation of the Federal budget and in supervising its administration in Federal agencies. It evaluates, formulates, and coordinates management procedures and program objectives within and among Federal departments and agencies. It also controls the administration of the Federal budget, while routinely providing the President with recommendations regarding budget proposals and relevant legislative proposals. Additionally it plans, conducts, and promotes evaluation efforts that assist the President in assessing Federal program objectives, performance, and efficiency. Finally, OMB also oversees and coordinates the Administration's procurement, financial management, information, and regulatory policies. Further details on the OMB organization and its functions can be viewed on-line at: "<http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/>".

**c. Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C)).** Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) there is appointed an Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). The USD(C) advises and assists the SecDef in exercising the SecDef's budgetary and fiscal powers. As such the USD(C) supervises and directs the preparation of DOD budget estimates, establishes and supervises the execution of policies and procedures to be followed in connection with organizational and administrative matters relating to: preparation of budgets; fiscal, cost, operating, and capital property accounting; and progress and statistical reporting. Finally the USD(C) establishes and supervises the execution of policies and procedures relating to the expenditure and collection of funds administered by DOD, and establishes uniform fiscal terminology, classifications and procedures used in the DOD's fiscal management. The USD(C) is the DOD Chief Financial Officer. Further details on the Office of the USD(C) organization and its functions can be viewed on-line at: "<http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/>".

**d. Secretary of the Army (SECARMY).** Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and subject to the provisions of chapter 6 of Title 10, United States Code, the SECARMY is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following functions:


- (1) Recruiting.
- (2) Organizing.
- (3) Supplying.
- (4) Equipping (including research and development).
- (5) Training.
- (6) Servicing.

- (7) Mobilizing.
- (8) Demobilizing.
- (9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
- (10) Maintaining.
- (11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment.

(12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified.

(13) Further, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef, the SECARMY is also responsible to the SecDef for: the functioning and efficiency of the Department of the Army; the effective and timely implementation of policy, program, and budget decisions and instructions of the President or the SecDef relating to functions of the Department of the Army; and the performance of the functions of the Department of the Army so as to fulfill (to the maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands. As such the SECARMY can be considered the Army’s top resource manager because of the position’s inherent decision-making authority over the affairs of the Department of the Army.

**e. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management & Comptroller) (ASA(FM&C)).** Within the Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA) there is appointed an Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller). The ASA(FM&C) exercises the comptroller functions of the Department of the Army and advises the SECARMY on financial management as directed by the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986* (Public Law 99-433). To execute this mission, the Office of the ASA(FM&C) is organized as follows:



**Figure 10-1. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)**

(1) *Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Budget) (DASA(B))*. The DASA(B) is responsible for the Army’s budget formulation, the presentation and defense of the

budget through the congressional appropriation process, budget execution and analysis, reprogramming actions, and appropriation/fund control and distribution. The DASA(B) is a co-chairman of the HQDA Planning Programming and Budgeting Committee (PPBC). To accomplish its missions and functions, the Office of the DASA(B) is organized into four directorates (Operations and Support; Investment; Business Resources; and Management and Control). Additionally, the Army's Congressional Budget Liaison Office is under control of the DASA(B).

(2) *Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations) (DASA(FO))*. The DASA(FO) is responsible for: policies, procedures, programs and systems pertaining to finance and accounting activities and operations; Army financial management systems and data integration activities; Army programs for management control, internal review and audit compliance, the Government Travel Charge Card, and fraud, waste and abuse; and other management evaluation activities. To accomplish its missions and functions, the Office of the DASA(FO) is organized into three directorates (Management Services and Internal Review; Financial Reporting; and Finance and Accounting Oversight). Additionally, the U.S. Army Finance Command, a HQDA field operating agency, is under the control of the DASA(FO).

(3) *Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Resource Analysis & Business Practices) (DASA(RB))*. The DASA(RB) is responsible for providing: discrete independent resource analysis for the purpose of recommending changes to policy, procedures and systems; policy and oversight of management improvement and productivity functions within the Army; HQDA level assessments of mission accomplishment through the Quarterly Army Performance Review (QAPR); development and review of alternative financing initiatives including lease finance, privatization, public-private ventures, and asset exchange; and financial management oversight of non-appropriated funds (NAF). To accomplish its missions and functions, the Office of the DASA(RB) is organized into a Resource Analysis Team and a Business Practices Team.

(4) *Deputy for Cost Analysis*. The Deputy is responsible for implementing the Army Cost and Economic Analysis Program through the development and promulgation of cost and economic analysis policy, cost estimating models, and cost databases for Army wide use. The Deputy is dual-hatted as the Director of the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center (CEAC), a HQDA field operating activity. CEAC conducts component cost analysis for weapons and automated information systems and manages the Army Cost Review Board and Army Cost Position Process. CEAC is responsible for conducting force structure, operations and support, personnel, and installation cost analyses. Other functions include implementation of the Army Activity Based Costing/Management Strategic Plan and management of the Army Cost Research Program.

(5) *Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (OASA(FM&C)) web site*. Further details on the OASA(FM&C) organization and its functions can be viewed on-line at: “[www.asafm.army.mil/](http://www.asafm.army.mil/)”.

**f. Commanders of major Army commands (MACOM) & heads of other operating agencies.** Commanders of major commands and commanders and heads of operating agencies (for example, program executive officers (PEO), program managers

(PM), President, National Defense University) are responsible for developing, justifying, presenting and defending programs supporting their assigned missions and responsibilities. Further, they are accountable for ensuring approved program budgets are properly executed and certified. This responsibility includes ensuring accounting and fund status reporting for appropriated and non-appropriated funds is accomplished in accordance with fiscal law and governing regulations and policies.

### 10-5. A framework to help study resource management

a. For our study of the internal workings of the Army's Resource Management System and how it functions, it helps to use a model called the "Four A's":

- **Acquire** resources.
- **Allocate** those resources according to the priorities generally considered in terms of dollars and manpower.
- **Account** for those resources with a system that provides a decision support and tracking capability for the program and budget functions, and a system that performs accounting for fiscal compliance required by statutes.
- **Analyze** the execution of those resources and implement course corrections as required.

b. As illustrated in Figure 10-2, these functions are performed in a closed-loop process. Though it is recognized that there are other models that describe the elements of resource management, for our discussion the "4-A's" model meets our needs.




Figure 10-2. Resource Management's "4-A's"


## SECTION II ACQUIRE RESOURCES

### 10-6. Getting the fiscal resources for the Army to use

Extensively described in detail in Chapter 9, the Army's PPBES provides the means by which the Army justifies and acquires its resources from Congress. After passage and signing into law of the authorization and appropriation acts, several interrelated functions

are performed by OMB, the U.S. Treasury, OUSD(C) and OASA(FM&C) to acquire the Army’s financial resources and distribute them to the field for execution. Figure 10-3 graphically portrays this process of getting resources to the Army.

**a. Apportionment requests.** Apportionment is a process for the administrative control of appropriations and funds. It is also a distribution of a specified “amount of obligation authority” in an appropriation/fund that is available for specified time periods (for example, fiscal quarter), activities, projects or a combination thereof as approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The amounts so apportioned limit the obligations that may be incurred by the Army. After Congress passes an appropriation act and the President signs it into law, the OASA(FM&C) submits an apportionment of funds request through OUSD(C) to OMB. OMB reviews the request, adjusts the amounts as may be necessary based on their analysis of prior Army spending patterns, approves the request, and transmits the approved request back down through OUSD(C) to the OASA(FM&C). Within OASA(FM&C), the HQDA Funds Control Officer loads the approved apportioned amounts into the Program-Budget Accounting System (PBAS). PBAS is the official funds control management system of the Department of Defense and is used throughout the Army financial management community to control the fund distribution process.



**Figure 10-3. Fund Distribution Process**

**b. Program documents.** In addition to the approved apportionment mentioned above, OUSD(C) may issue further restrictions on using the obligation authority provided in the apportionment document by withholding amounts for specific programs. These restrictions come to HQDA via an Obligation Authority (OA) letter (for O&M, MILPERS, and AFHO appropriations), a DD Form 440 (for Procurement and RDTE appropriations), or a DD Form 460 (for the military construction appropriations).

### 10-7. Treasury warrants

After the President signs the appropriations act(s), the U.S. Treasury issues appropriations warrants to establish “bank accounts” on the books of the U.S. Treasury for each appropriation. The Treasury Warrant is a financial controlling mechanism and gives the Army the authority to disburse funds (“cut a check to pay for an obligation”) from those accounts. Without this authority, the Army cannot make any payments citing the non-warranted appropriation.

## SECTION III

### ALLOCATE RESOURCES TO THE FIELD

#### 10-8. Fund distribution and control

“Pass funds through command channels and make the commander responsible for their control.” This is the basic tenet by which the Army’s funding distribution system operates. In this case the use of the term “funds” implies that the authority to create obligations, for which the U.S. Government has to pay, has been granted. Distribution of funds is any documented action that makes funds available for obligation. This distribution is made in a stated amount for specific purposes and to a specific organization for a specific time period. The commander’s authority to incur obligations is received on a funding document, which specifies the appropriation and budget program for which the funds may be used, and identifies applicable statutory limitations. This process is used to facilitate control over funds and the reporting of violations of laws (see below about *Anti-deficiency Act* violations) and directives.

**a. The distribution procedure.** After obtaining obligation authority from OMB and OUSD(C), HQDA directs major commands and other subordinate operating agencies to execute their approved budgeted programs (see Figure 10-3). Using the Program-Budget Accounting System (PBAS), the HQDA Funds Control Officer in the OASA(FM&C) allocates program and obligation authority to MACOMs and operating agencies. Major commands and operating agencies in turn sub-allocate or allot to the appropriate subordinate organization (for example, installation, major unit, program manager, and so forth) where the program will be actually executed by obligating for such things as payroll, travel orders, contracts, purchase orders, and so forth. Although this funds distribution system is a means of controlling obligations and fixing responsibility, the policy is to minimize the formal distribution and to fund an operation at the highest practical level. As an example, the Military Personnel, Army (MPA) appropriation is held and controlled centrally at HQDA, whereas the Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation is decentralized through the Major Commands to the installations.

**b. Funding Guidance.** Along with program and budget authority moved out to Army activities through the PBAS, HQDA normally issues additional specific spending guidance at the beginning of the fiscal year. The appropriation sponsors for Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) and the Army Family Housing (Operations) (AFHO), issue annual funding letters to MACOMs with required or specialized fiscal guidance that is to be used in the execution of the budget for the fiscal year. MACOMs and Operating agencies may also issue specific funding guidance to their subordinate commanders and

activities for the execution of their programs and budgets. The Chief of the Army Reserve issues a funding guidance letter to subordinate Army Reserve activities, for executing the Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR) appropriation and the Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA) appropriation. Likewise, the Director of the Army National Guard issues a funding guidance letter to subordinate Army Guard activities, principally the State adjutants general, for executing both the Operations and Maintenance, Army National Guard (OMARNG) appropriation and the National Guard Personnel, Army (NGPA) appropriation.

### **10-9. Fund Authorization Document (FAD)**

Using the Program Budget Accounting System (PBAS), the HQDA Funds Control Officer issues Funding Authorization Documents (FADs) to allocate obligation authority and program authority to MACOMs and operating agencies. The MACOMs and operating agencies in turn use PBAS to issue FADs to their subordinate activities (for example, installations) to allot obligation authority and program authority. For the procurement and RDTE appropriations, an approved program document accompanies the FAD to provide further administrative limitations on the use of those funds.

### **10-10. Fund allowance system**

Some MACOMs and operating agencies have implemented a fund allowance system whereby the lowest formal distribution of funds is at the MACOM/Operating Agency level with funding allowances being issued to subordinate installation commanders or activity heads. The advantages of this system are that it allows more flexibility in fund control and lessens the possibilities of reportable statutory violations. Commanders are still responsible for assuring the execution of their mission remains within the provided fund allowance and violations of that guidance may warrant administrative disciplinary action. Exceeding this funding allowance does not constitute a statutory violation but could cause an over-obligation or over-expenditure of the MACOM allotment provided on the Funding Authorization Document. Nevertheless, individuals responsible for exceeding their allowances will be named responsible for any resultant *Anti-deficiency Act* violations (see paragraph 10-17).

### **10-11. Delegation of funding authority**

Commanders to whom funds are made available may delegate authority to establish and maintain such administrative controls as may be necessary to comply with the provisions of Federal fiscal law and Department financial management regulations. This may be done keeping these key points in mind—

- Delegation of authority must be in writing. (Verbal or telephonic authorizations will not be recognized except in emergency circumstances— those jeopardizing health and/or safety of the command—and must be confirmed in writing as soon as possible.).
- Authority may be delegated to a named individual or a position so long as the authority is vested in a readily identifiable person at all times.
- Delegation of authority does not relieve commanders of their fiscal responsibilities under the law.

**10-12. Special classified programs**

Classified programs, which are sensitive "need to know," may be compartmentalized for security reasons. Specific funding distribution procedures have been created to accommodate the unique security requirements of such programs. Generally, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army must approve the use of the procedures.

**10-13. Secretary of the Army Representation Funds**

Congress gives the SECARMY a specific level of authority to be utilized for emergency and extraordinary expenses from within the Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation. These authorities are identified under limitations entitled with the limit codes .0012, .0014, .0015, .0017, and .0019. They are described in AR 37-47, *Representation Funds of the Secretary of the Army*. The utilization of these authorities are very closely monitored and fall under audit responsibilities of the Army Audit Agency to ensure that funds used under these authorities are solely for the purposes intended and approved by the SECARMY. The rules for using the authorities are very specific and exceptions to deviate should be obtained from higher headquarters. A brief description of these authorities is provided below.

**a. Limitation .0012 (Miscellaneous Expenses, Category A).** For official representation expenses, as authorized by the SECARMY, in connection with official functions at times of national holidays; dedication of facilities; visits of distinguished guests; purchase of floral wreaths, decorations, and awards upon occasions of national holidays and similar observances in foreign countries; and gifts and mementos by the authorized host, costing not more than \$200 each, used in connection with official ceremonies or functions. Commanders of MACOMs, their subordinate commanders, and installation commanders are authorized to present gifts or mementos in circumstances that they personally document as being a necessary part of the event or occasion being observed.

**b. Limitation .0014 (Miscellaneous Expenses, Category B).** For miscellaneous expenses, other than for official representation, which are not provided for in other appropriations. Examples of these expenses are awards for emergency rescues, witness fees for the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, and settlement of meritorious claims.

**c. Limitation .0015 (Criminal Investigation Activities, AR 195-4).** For emergency and extraordinary expenses in support of the worldwide expenses of the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command's activities.

**d. Limitation .0017 (Intelligence Contingency Funds, AR 381-141).** For expenses related to worldwide intelligence activities.

**e. Limitation .0019 (Compartmented Special Operations, SECARMY Letter of Instruction (proponent ODCSOPS)).** For emergency and extraordinary expenses related to worldwide-compartmented operations.

## **SECTION IV**

### **ACCOUNT FOR THE USE OF THE RESOURCES**

#### **10-14. Legally using the resources to accomplish the mission**

This section gives a brief overview of the controlling principles used in accounting for the use of fiscal resources. Title 31, United States Code, Section 1301(a) states that “Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made except as otherwise provided by law.” Congress initially enacted this statutory control in March, 1809. The act, generally referred to as the “Purpose Statute,” was passed as a part of a reorganization of the War, Navy and Treasury Departments to limit the discretion of the executive branch in spending appropriations. Thus it becomes abundantly evident that the Congress, for close to two hundred years, has taken a keen interest in how the Army spends the funds that have been appropriated to it. To preclude the misappropriation/mispending of funds, a body of laws, regulations, court decisions and rules have evolved over many years to direct how fiscal resources will be used to accomplish the Army’s missions and tasks. Because Congress provides funds in specific amounts for specific purposes through the enactment of public law, the expenditure of those funds must be within the boundaries established by the law. The term “administrative control of funds,” as required by law is used to identify those actions, events or systems that are required to ensure essentially three things:

- Funds are used only for the purposes for which they were intended.
- Amounts of funds in excess of that available are neither obligated, disbursed nor further distributed.
- The agency head is capable of fixing responsibility in the event of violations of either of the first two.

#### **10-15. Availability of appropriations for obligations**

Congress determines how long an appropriation or fund may be used, that is, new obligations may be made against the specified appropriation or fund. Most appropriations used by the Army have a limited time period for which new obligations can be made against them. (Note: In recent years Congress has made exceptions to the normal periods of availability of appropriations such as making two year or “X” year O&M appropriations, three year RDTE appropriations, and so forth, as well as continuing with the “normal” periods of availability.)

**a. Annual appropriations.** These appropriations, generally having a one-year period of availability, include:

- Operation and maintenance appropriations like Operation and Maintenance, Army (OMA); Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard (OMARNG); Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR); and Army Family Housing, Operation and Maintenance (AFHO).
- Military personnel appropriations like Military Personnel, Army (MPA), National Guard Personnel, Army (NGPA) and Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA).

**b. Multi-year appropriations.** These appropriations having a multi-year period of availability include—

- The Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Army (RDTE) appropriation is available for two years.
  - Procurement appropriations (Aircraft Procurement, Army; Missile Procurement, Army; Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles (WTCV), Army; Procurement of Ammunition, Army; and Other Procurement, Army (OPA)) are available for three years.
  - Military construction appropriations (Military Construction, Army (MCA); Military Construction, Army National Guard (MCARNG); Military Construction, Army Reserve (MCAR); and Army Family Housing Construction (AFHC) are available for five years.
- c. “No-year” appropriations.** These appropriations and funds have an unlimited period of availability. Examples include the appropriation for Base Realignment and Closure, and the Army Working Capital Fund.
- d. Expired appropriations.** Once an appropriation’s period of availability is over for incurring new obligations, it is considered “expired.” For five years after the period an appropriation expires for incurring new obligations, both obligated and un-obligated balances of that appropriation shall be available for adjusting and liquidating (that is, disbursing against a previously incurred obligation) obligations properly charged to the account. As an example, the FY 01 Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation has a period of availability of 1 October 2000 through 30 September 2001. The appropriation has a five year expiration period of 1 October 2001 through 30 September 2006.
- e. Canceled appropriations.** After the fifth year of expiration an appropriation is canceled on the books of the U.S. Treasury. The appropriation is no longer available for any purpose, for example, accounting adjustments. Obligated and un-obligated balances are canceled. Using the FY 01 OMA example above, it would cancel on 30 September 2006. (Special note: If an obligation adjustment, such as a final settlement to a disputed contract, has to be made from what is now a canceled appropriation, then the payment is made out of the activity’s current year appropriation.)

#### **10-16. Properly obligating the resources**

An obligation is the action taken to establish a liability against the U.S. Government that will ultimately result in a disbursement from the U.S. Treasury. There are several principles that must be followed in executing and accounting for obligations. The foundations for these principles are contained in Title 31 of the United States Code. While only the most important “obligating” principles are outlined here, the entire listing is provided in the Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R or in DFAS-IN Regulation 37-1 (Finance and Accounting Policy Implementation).

**a. Bona fide need of the current fiscal year.** A determination must be made that supplies or services required pursuant to contracts entered into or orders placed obligating an annual appropriation are intended to fill a bona fide need of the current fiscal year. There are provisions when lead-time is an important factor to obligate funds in the current year for a subsequent year delivery.

**b. Intent of performance.** Contracts entered into or placed for supplies or services are executed only if there is a bona fide intent on the part of the contractor (or other performing activity) to commence work promptly or to perform the contract in accordance with its terms and conditions (to include beginning date).

**c. Assure availability.** The responsible official must ensure that proper funds are available before binding the U.S. Government in an agreement with a second party, which will result in an obligation for which the Government is required to pay.

**d. Documentary evidence.** Each obligation recorded in the official record must be supported by proper documentary evidence. These may be originals, duplicates, or copies of appropriate documents so long as signatures are visible. A memorandum of telephone conversation or an electronically received written message may be used temporarily until the actual document is received.

**e. Charge immediately.** Obligations, when incurred, must be charged immediately to the applicable account. The recording of obligations incurred cannot be deferred until additional funds are received. The obligation must be recorded even if there are insufficient funds to cover it, thereby incurring a statutory violation, which must then be reported through command channels. Failure to record an obligation will not obviate a suspected violation of the *Anti-deficiency Act* statute.

**f. Prompt adjustment.** Any adjustment to previously recorded obligations, either as an increase or decrease, must be entered in the accounts as soon as the necessity for an adjustment is evident and the amount can be determined.

### **10-17. The Anti-deficiency Act (ADA)**

Chapters 13 and 15 of United States Code Title 31 contain prohibitions with respect to the legal use of funds and establish punitive provisions in the event there are violations. When the *Anti-deficiency Act* was codified into the United States Code, its provisions were incorporated into a number of sections of Title 31. The sections that are most frequently cited are sections 1341, 1342, and 1517.

**a. How Anti-deficiency Act violations occur.** Generally, ADA violations may occur when:

- Funding authority is issued in excess of the amount available and the excess amount is obligated or expended.
- There are violations of the special and recurring statutory limitations or restrictions on the amounts for which an appropriation or fund may be used.
- There are violations of statutory or regulatory limitations on the purposes for which an appropriation or fund may be used.
- Obligations are authorized or incurred in advance of funds being available.
- Obligations or expenditures of funds do not provide for a bona fide need of the period of availability of the fund or account and corrective funding is not available.

**b. Administrative and criminal penalties for ADA violations.** The person who caused the violation may be subject to discipline, to include suspension without pay or

removal from office (31 USC 1349 and 1518). The Army's implementation procedures of these statutes are contained in DFAS-IN Regulation 37-1 (Finance and Accounting Policy Implementation). If an action is taken knowingly and willfully and results in a conviction for violating the ADA, the person may be fined up to \$5000, imprisoned for not more than two years, or both (31 USC 1350 and 1519).

### **10-18. Accounting for the obligation**

**a. Legal mandate to account for funds.** By law the DOD is required to maintain accounting systems that provide:

- Complete disclosure of the financial results of the Department's activities.
- Adequate financial information the Department needs for management purposes.
- Effective control over, and accountability for, assets for which the Department is responsible.
- Reliable accounting results that will be the basis for—
- Preparing and supporting the Department's budget requests.
- Controlling the Department's budget execution.
- Providing financial information the President requires.
- Suitable integration of the Department's accounting with the central accounting and reporting responsibilities of the Secretary of the Treasury.

**b. Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).** As can be surmised, if the Department of Defense is required to account for the ways it spends its funds, so too does the Army have to account in the same way for how it uses its funds. Most of the financial management accounting required by the Army is performed by DFAS. This organization was established in January 1991 to reduce the cost and improve the overall quality of Department of Defense financial management through consolidation, standardization and integration of finance and accounting operations, procedures and systems. DFAS took over responsibility for five finance and accounting centers and 338 installation finance and accounting offices that belonged to the military services and Defense agencies. Through its mandated consolidation efforts, DFAS now consists of a headquarters located in Washington, five centralized sites located in Indianapolis (formerly the U.S. Army Finance and Accounting Center), Cleveland, Columbus, Denver, Kansas City, and 20 field sites or operating locations (OPLOCs). Personnel staffing levels were reduced from 31,000 in 1992 to the current level of 18,000. Since 1991 DFAS has consolidated and standardized 324 finance and accounting systems down to 109 systems in 1998. By 2003 DFAS expects to reduce down to 32 systems.

**c. Accounting systems used by the Army.** The Army and its subordinate activities use a number of the remaining Army accounting systems operated by DFAS. The principal system used is the Standard Finance System (STANFINS). This system performs the accounting for the majority of Army installations. It records funding authorization, accumulates and reports on obligations and disbursements against fund authorizations for control purposes, and provides standardized accounting reports for the installation, MACOM, and HQDA financial managers. STANFINS serves as the Army's primary formal record of account at the installation level for installation-level

appropriation accounting. Other accounting systems are used by the Research, Development and Acquisition activities, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Army National Guard.

**10-19. The Army management structure (AMS)**

The AMS provides a resource management language and coding structure that is based on congressional appropriations. It relates program dollars and manpower to a standard classification of activities and functions required and used by Congress as they deliberate on Army programs and budget requests. AMS codes (AMSCO) help record data in the detail needed for budgeting, execution and accounting. Army activities use the AMS to record obligations and disbursements in the requisite accounting system. The details for constructing the accounting and classification codes for all funds received by the Army are contained in DFAS-IN Manual 37-100-xx, the Army Management Structure (AMS), where the “xx” indicates the last two digits of the fiscal year. For instance the AMS for FY 2002 would be outlined in DFAS-IN Manual 37-100-02. Using the AMS coding structure assists Army activities to fulfill Federal accounting requirements. A simple illustration translating an accounting classification code (as one could see on a purchase request, a set of TDY orders, and so forth) would be the following accounting fund cite on a supply purchase transaction at Fort Sill: 21 2 2020 57-3106 325796.BD 26FB QSUP CA200 GRE12344019003 AB22 WORNA S34031.

<b>Table 10-1. Translating an accounting code.</b>		
<b><i>Code</i></b>	<b><i>Data Element</i></b>	<b><i>Translation</i></b>
	Treasury Symbol:	
21	Department Code	Department of the Army
2	Period Availability	FY 2002
2020	Basic Symbol	OMA Appropriation
57	Operating Agency	TRADOC
3106	Allotment Serial Number	(a locally assigned code)
325796.BD	AMS Code (AMSCO) or Project Account	Base Operations (-), Director of Logistics
26FB	Element of Resource	Supplies – Army Managed / DWCF item
QSUP	Management Decision Package (MDEP)	Installation Supply Operations
CA200	Functional Cost Account	Commercial Activities – contract furnished supplies

<b>Table 10-1. Translating an accounting code.</b>		
<b>Code</b>	<b>Data Element</b>	<b>Translation</b>
GRE1234019003	Standard Document Number	(a locally assigned code)
AB22	Account Processing Code	(a locally assigned code)
WORNAA	Unit Identification Code (UIC)	Fort Sill Garrison
S34030	Fiscal Station Number	DFAS OPLOC, Lawton, OK

### **10-20. Year end certification of accounts**

Since DFAS was established, the subordinate Defense Accounting Office (DAO) has had the responsibility for preparing and monitoring “accounting reports” at the installation. Commanders who receive FADs authorizing them to incur obligations not in excess of certain amounts and for specific purposes have a legal requirement to “certify the status” of those funds as of 30 September, that is, the end of fiscal year. Commanders may delegate the authority to certify fiscal year-end reports to the Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, Garrison Commander, or Director of Resource Management.

**a.** The DAO will make the certification on the “accounting reports” substantially as follows:

*“I hereby certify that the attached reports and associated schedules include all transactions received which have been properly recorded and are supported by subsidiary accounting records.”*

**b.** The DAO will forward the certification to the Commander or a designated representative, who, in turn, will make the following certification:

*“I hereby certify that the attached reports and schedules include all known transactions. Those meeting the criteria of 31 USC 1501(A) have been obligated and are so reported. All reports and schedules for all transactions for the fiscal year ended September 30, \_\_\_\_, are correct and are supported by subsidiary accounting records. All individual upward obligation and open allotment disbursement adjustments in excess of \$100,000 of expired appropriations have been properly approved and are on file for audit purposes.”*

**c.** Certifications are required for all appropriations and for any reimbursable activity performed by the command or agency. The ASA(FM&C) certifies all Army appropriations to the U.S. Treasury.

## **SECTION V**

### **ANALYZE THE USE OF RESOURCES**

#### **10-21. 1981 - A change in responsibilities**

The Army Chief of Staff renamed the Army's Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1981, adding "Execution" to the process title—PPBES. This constituted a marked change from the prior decentralized concept in which PPBS execution responsibility was transferred to the field commanders. The CSA charged Army leaders with the responsibility to evaluate or analyze and report on the effectiveness of program and budget accomplishment. These evaluations and reports relate funds and personnel inputs in output terms to the Army's Title 10 responsibilities.

#### **10-22. Execution reviews**

Using the information presented by the accounting systems and other data feeder systems, functional, programmatic and fiscal managers along with commanders track the course of program and budget execution in their organization or functional area. Inherent in this analysis is the need to judge program performance and effectiveness, to consider the need for more resources to accomplish the specified program, and finally to consider reallocation of resources to high priority missions and programs. This process takes place at all of the resourcing echelons of the Army.

#### **10-23. HQDA Reviews—Quarterly Army Performance Review (QAPR)**

The QAPR is a tool that Army senior leaders use to monitor program performance in accomplishing Army major goals and objectives. The QAPR cycle begins with identification of the core performance measures that relate to explicit goals and objectives by the Secretariat and Army Staff principals. Each quarter these performance measures are monitored to determine the progress made towards accomplishing these goals. In addition, other critical issues that may be of immediate interest and impact for the Army can be presented. This review, managed by the ASA(FM&C), is presented directly to the SECARMY and CSA personally by the Secretariat and Army Staff principals.

#### **10-24. Shifting resources**

During the course of analyzing the execution of resources, there often arises the need to shift resources outside the boundaries of programs for which Congress authorized and appropriated funds. Examples of such real life events may be an emerging contingency operation, storm damage to installation, increasing cost of installation utilities, accelerating the procurement of an item to achieve an economic savings, new bills resulting from a newly assigned mission, and so forth. The congressional committees concerned with DOD's operations have generally accepted the view that rigid adherence to the amounts justified for budget activities, appropriations, or for subsidiary items or purposes may unduly jeopardize the effective accomplishment of planned programs in a businesslike and economical manner.

**a.** Transfer procedures have been worked out with the congressional committees (House and Senate Appropriations and Authorization Committees (and for intelligence related items, the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees)) to accommodate different degrees of interest in the transfer of funds; that is, certain transfers require prior

approval by the appropriate committees of Congress, while others require advance notification, and still others are provided after the fact. Reprogramming reapplies funds from one project to another or transfers funds from one appropriation to another to resolve financial shortfalls or to adjust programs to meet unforeseen requirements. The process is subject to designated dollar thresholds and congressional requirements for advance approval or notification. No shifts between appropriations are allowed without prior consent of Congress and must be requested in writing, by the submission of the Congressional Reprogramming Request (DD 1415).

**b.** Other flexibility is obtained through additional laws, committee reports, administrative actions such as reprogramming, or by requesting supplemental appropriations. The OASA(FM&C) manages the reprogramming process for Army appropriations.

### **10-25. Analyzing the “accounting books”—Joint Reconciliation Program**

The Joint Reconciliation Program is an effort combining the skills and expertise of accountants, budget and program analysts, contracting professionals, logisticians, internal review auditors, and DFAS personnel for the purpose of verifying the validity of un-liquidated obligations, contractor work in progress, billing status, and validating the continued need for goods and services that have not yet been delivered. The reconciliation must be performed by all commands and, when performed properly, will result in real dollar savings through the identification and cancellation of nonessential goods and services, reconciliation of current appropriations to ensure the correctness of amounts obligated, and liquidation of appropriations expiring at the end of the fiscal year.

**a.** The primary objectives of the Joint Reconciliation Program are to “harvest” obligation authority by—

- De-obligating funds supporting invalid obligations
- Eliminating the use of current funds to pay liabilities arising from appropriations that expired.
- Reconciling and liquidating delinquent travel advances.
- Eliminating and avoiding unmatched disbursements (UMD)
- Eliminating and avoiding negative un-liquidated obligations (NULO)

**b.** As a result of performing effective joint reconciliation, commands increase their purchasing power, which directly enhances mission accomplishment. Purchasing power is increased in that:

- Canceled account liabilities are reduced
- Current obligation authority is harvested for reutilization.
- Erroneous payments and over payments are identified and eliminated.
- Visibility over contractor work in process (WIP) and contract in process (CIP) is increased.
- Delinquent travel advances are eliminated.

**c.** Additionally, joint reconciliation increases the Army’s stewardship credibility with Congress. The integrity and accuracy of financial records has improved and the

cycle time for processing financial transactions has been reduced. History has proven that using a thorough and intense joint reconciliation program is an excellent investment of time and resources and adds value to financial management, logistics, and procurement activities.

## **SECTION VI IMPROVING MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS PRACTICES IN THE ARMY**

### **10-26. Efforts to improve Army management**

Over the last ten years, major legislative and Army management initiatives have introduced an unprecedented focus on performance and results. These initiatives all point to the transition to more outcome-oriented program management and performance budgeting.

### **10-27. Federal Manager’s Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982**

**a.** This act requires all Federal agencies to establish and maintain effective accounting and administrative controls to provide “reasonable assurance” that—

- Obligations and costs are in compliance with applicable laws.
- Funds, property, and other assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use or misappropriation.
- Revenues and expenditures are properly recorded and accounted for.

**b.** The Act also requires agency heads to submit an annual statement to the President and the Congress indicating whether agency management controls are reasonable and, where they are not, material weaknesses are identified and corrective actions are taken.

### **10-28. Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990**

**a.** The *CFO Act* was enacted to implement more effective financial management practices in the Federal Government. Its key purpose is to provide more accurate, timely, and reliable financial information for decision-makers through improved accounting systems, integrated functional and financial management, and strengthened internal controls. The law also establishes initial requirements for the “systematic measurement of performance” by shifting the management focus from resource acquisition to resource execution—not in terms of obligation and outlay rates, but in how well taxpayer dollars are spent.

**b.** A major provision of the Act mandated the preparation of audited annual financial statements for revolving funds, trust funds, and substantially commercial activities. The law designated ten Federal agencies— including the Department of the Army—as pilots for comprehensive, agency-wide financial statements covering all operations and activities. As the first DOD pilot under the *CFO Act*, the Army broke new ground in a number of important areas—for example, physical inventory policy, valuation of assets, interface between military pay and personnel systems, the incorporation of outcome-oriented program performance measures in financial reports, and the restructuring of the management control process. The GAO and Congressional committees have acknowledged Army efforts and improvements. However, the Army cannot by itself

achieve full compliance with the standards of the *CFO Act*. The resolution of long-term problems with financial systems is a DOD-wide effort, and there must be government-wide accounting principles and standards to support both management decision-making and public accountability.

#### **10-29. Government Management Reform Act (GMRA) of 1994**

**a.** GMRA implements the requirements for audited annual financial statements “covering all accounts and associated activities of each office, bureau, and activity of the agency” for all Federal agencies. Beginning in 1998, and annually thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury, in coordination with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, is required to submit to the President and Congress government-wide audited financial statements that cover all accounts and associated activities of the executive branch of the Federal Government. With the end of the *CFO Act* pilot project and full implementation of reporting under the *Act*, the Army continues working to implement the letter and the spirit of the legislation and to improve all aspects of Army financial management and stewardship.

**b.** The most recent financial report for the U.S. Government can be viewed online at “[www.gao.gov/index.htm](http://www.gao.gov/index.htm)”.

**c.** The most recent financial report for the Army can be viewed online at “[www.asafm.army.mil/](http://www.asafm.army.mil/)” in the publications section.

#### **10-30. Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993**

**a.** GPRA is major management reform legislation and a critical step in the inevitable transition to more outcome-oriented program management and performance budgeting. As noted above, the *CFO Act* intended to integrate financial and functional systems to provide better information for decision makers and shift management focus to how well taxpayer dollars are spent. Although implementation of the *CFO Act* and audited financial statements have led to significant improvements in financial reporting, the law itself provided only limited guidance with regard to its provisions for “the systematic measurement of performance.”

**b.** The GPRA builds on the *CFO Act* and establishes the framework for full integration of financial and functional data in all phases of the resourcing cycle. GPRA was implemented to improve government-wide programs by linking resource expenditures to results achieved. OSD has implemented GPRA by establishing corporate and annual performance goals, and linking specific performance measures to each goal. The most recently completed Quadrennial Defense Review serves as DOD’s strategic plan in accordance with the GPRA requirements.

**c.** The purpose of the GPRA is to increase public confidence in the Federal Government, and improve program effectiveness and public accountability, by systematically holding agencies accountable for achieving program results. The law also is intended to improve congressional decision-making by providing more objective information on the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and spending.

d. OSD has decided that DOD GPRA requirements will be processed at the DOD corporate level. DOD used the results of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to meet the GPRA strategic plan requirement. The QDR was a comprehensive examination of defense strategy from 1997 to 2015. It included force structure, modernization plans, infrastructure, readiness posture, and other elements of defense programs and policies. For GPRA, DOD corporate goals are—

- Shape and Respond — Shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises by providing appropriately sized, positioned, and mobile forces.
- Prepare — Prepare now for an uncertain future by pursuing a focused modernization effort that maintains U.S. qualitative superiority in key war-fighting capabilities. Transform the force by exploiting the Revolution in Military Affairs and reengineer the Department and achieve a 21st century infrastructure.

e. Through its PPBES the Army reviews and monitors its strategic plans and mission objectives. The PPBES process supports the Army's implementation of GPRA by using the—

- Army Strategic Planning Guidance that amplifies The Army vision then in force and helps promulgate Army goals and strategies, and the objectives to achieve them.
- Army Planning Guidance that leads to the preparation of capabilities-based action plans and, where needed, the allocation of resources to carry them out.
- Army Programming Guidance that links operational tasks and their associated resources to the Department of the Army's Title X functions.

f. The annual Army Program Objective Memorandum that results from the PPBES programming phase allows the Army to balance program resources based upon more definitive resource objectives. Management decision packages used to build the Army program are linked to objectives, sub-objectives, and tasks and prioritized. Program resources that govern levels of accomplishment are adjusted according to affordability.

g. Appropriations approved by Congress in the budget phase are applied in the execution phase. Execution of programs is constantly monitored to insure Congressional and other legally mandated requirements are met.

h. The DOD GPRA report is contained in Appendix I of the Secretary of Defense's annual Defense report (ADR) to the President and Congress. The ADR can be viewed online at: "[www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr\\_intro.html](http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr_intro.html)".

### **10-31. Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996**

This law builds upon and compliments the acts discussed above. It requires auditors to report as part of their report on agencies' annual financial statements whether the agencies' financial management systems comply substantially with three requirements: (1) Federal financial management systems requirements; (2) applicable Federal accounting standards; and (3) the U.S. Government Standard General Ledger at the transaction level. These requirements are critical for ensuring that agency financial

management activities are consistently and accurately recorded, and timely and uniformly reported throughout the Federal Government.

### **10-32. Management controls**

**a.** Management controls are the procedures we establish to ensure that we accomplish our objectives and guard Army resources against fraud, waste, and abuse. Numerous audit and inspection reports, however, continue to find serious management control deficiencies in DOD and the Army. This damages our reputation as stewards of public resources and hinders our ability to compete effectively in Congress for additional resources. Congress has made clear that their emphasis on management controls will continue.

**b.** Army Regulation 11-2, *Management Control*, establishes policies and guidelines for implementing the provisions of the *Federal Financial Management Improvement Act*. It describes the Army's current management control process which was restructured effective in FY 95 to reduce the administrative burden, to provide commanders and managers with greater flexibility in scheduling and conducting their evaluations, and to make them directly accountable for the effectiveness of their management controls. The restructured process requires management control evaluations only for the most critical controls (the "key management controls") and encourages commanders and managers to use existing review and oversight processes wherever possible to accomplish evaluations.

### **10-33. Improving business practices**

**a.** An essential element of Resource Management is the process of reviewing, revising and reengineering the business practices of the Army to increase efficiency and reduce costs. Several tools have been developed to assist in furthering business practices improvements:

- The Waiver Program facilitates preparation, coordination, and submission of waiver requests to gain exceptions to certain policies or regulations on a case-by-case basis to improve processes.
- The Legislative Program expedites processing of viable, high payoff reengineering legislative proposals through OSD, OMB, and Congress.
- The Non-appropriated Fund (NAF) Financial Oversight prepares policy guidance and conducts reviews of NAF finances and encourages NAF activities to operate more like a business.
- The Business Practices Initiatives focus on Army operations to avoid or reduce costs, generate and collect revenues, streamline and consolidate functions, form partnerships, and use the latest technology to help the Army better utilize diminishing resources.

**b.** The Army is implementing new and improved business practices to bridge the gap between Army resources and Army requirements. Many private sector business practices "make sense" for the DOD and can potentially be applied to optimize the use of Army resources. The overall objective is to stretch available resources by generating revenues, reducing costs, and improving the delivery of service.

**c.** A major example of the successful use of business practices to bridge the gap between Army resources and requirements is in the area of real property assets (land and facilities). Historically, the Army relied primarily upon appropriated funds (Military Construction Funds) to build, modify, and upgrade Army facilities. The Army also relied upon appropriated funds (Operating Funds) to maintain and repair the real property assets. The lack of sufficient funds allows construction of only the most critical facilities and causes a backlog of maintenance and repair that ultimately reduces the useful life of Army assets. As the size of the Army was reduced over the last decade, the Army began to dispose of real property assets that were underutilized and no longer needed. There is a significant cost associated with maintaining assets, even when the assets are maintained at a minimal level. This effort is continuing. The problem arose when facilities are needed, but there are insufficient appropriated funds to construct, modify, or maintain them.

**d.** To address this problem, the Army began using a new private sector tool - public private partnerships (PPP's). PPP's may take many forms - the Residential Housing Initiative (RHI Program); Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Program (ARMS); leasing initiatives that use Title 10, Section 2267 authority; Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Program initiatives; utilities privatization; and energy saving projects. What is unique about PPP's is (1) they involve a significant contribution of private capital and expertise to meeting Army resource needs; and (2) the private sector requirements for successful business ventures must also be met. With the PPP approach, the Army is not buying a specified product in the traditional sense. The Army is selecting a partner to work jointly on a solution, which will line up both with Army requirements and those for commercial success.

**e.** The past several years have witnessed a quantum leap forward in the planned use of PPP's as a tool to bridge the gap between Army resources and requirements for real property assets. The Congress has repeatedly shown its general support for using this tool by passing very significant enabling legislation in areas such as housing privatization, utilities privatization, energy savings, and enhanced lease authority. These PPP efforts will have a prominent role in the way the Army manages its real property assets in the future. We will succeed if we (1) use PPP's as part of a sound strategic plan; (2) adequately weigh the long-term implications of our actions; and (3) realize that PPP's make new and different demands on program and financial managers.

**f.** The Army also is wrestling with similar resource management issues for activities supported by non-appropriated funds (NAF). Base closures, troop realignments, and declining appropriated fund support create a challenging environment for NAF. Policy decisions for NAF must take into account a resource management strategy that considers the interrelationship between appropriated funds and NAF. Coordination between the NAF and appropriated fund communities is essential to ensure appropriate execution of both the appropriated and NAF programs. For example, a facility built as a NAF major construction project may be authorized appropriated funds for maintenance and repair support. In such instances, a one-time NAF expenditure could result in a significant and continuing appropriated fund operating expense. Conversely, reduction of appropriated fund support for NAF activities can force dramatic changes in the level of quality-of-life programs available to soldiers and their families.

**g.** Improving business and operating practices is complimentary to financial reform and is in the spirit of reinventing government. Enabling and encouraging improved operating efficiency, better use of information, implementation of private sector practices, and enhanced utilization of Army resources is essential to maximizing the use of the Army's increasingly scarce resources to carry out its mission in a volatile world.

## **SECTION VII NON-APPROPRIATED FUNDS**

### **10-34. Non-appropriated funds definitions**

**a. Non-appropriated funds (NAF).** Non-appropriated funds are monies that are not appropriated by Congress. NAFs are used for the collective benefit of authorized patrons who generate them. These funds come primarily from the sale of goods and services to authorized patrons - DOD military and civilian personnel and their family members, and are used to support Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs. NAFs are government funds, though they are separate and apart from appropriated funds that are recorded on the books of the U.S. Treasury.

**b. Non-appropriated fund instrumentality (NAFI).** A U.S. Government and fiscal entity that performs essential government functions. It acts in its own name to provide, or assist other DOD organizations in providing, MWR and other programs for military personnel, their families, and authorized civilians.

### **10-35. NAFI management**

**a.** Every NAFI is legally constituted as an "instrumentality of the United States." Funds in NAFI accounts are U.S. Government funds and NAF property including buildings and real estate is U.S. Government property. NAFs are not commingled with appropriated funds and are managed separately, even when supporting a common program or activity. This means that:

- Each NAFI operates under the authority of the U.S. Government in accordance with applicable Federal laws and departmental regulations.
- Because NAFIs operate under the authority of the Federal Government, they are entitled to the same sovereign privileges and immunities as the U.S. Government accorded by Federal law.
- Applicable DOD directives and implementing Army regulations have the force and effect of law.

**b.** A NAFI is administered and managed by military or civilian personnel acting in an official capacity. The NAFI is generally immune from Federal taxes and exempt from most direct State, local, and host country taxes. It must account for and report financial operations through command and department channels. NAFI operations are subject to review by Congress. AR 215-1, *Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Activities and Non-appropriated Fund Instrumentalities*, provides more information on management of Army NAFIs.

### **10-36. Fiduciary responsibility for NAF (10 United States Code 2783)**

NAFs are U.S. Government funds entitled to the same protection as funds appropriated by the Congress.

**a. Individual responsibility.** There is an individual fiduciary responsibility to use NAFs properly and prevent waste, loss, mismanagement, or unauthorized use. This responsibility extends to all DOD personnel, to include members of the Armed Forces and appropriated funded and non-appropriated funded civilian employees.

**b. Violations.** Commanders are responsible for the prompt detection and proper investigation of possible violations, and instituting appropriate corrective action. Individuals reporting NAF violations are protected from reprisal. Commanders will take appropriate administrative action against violators. Where evidence indicates criminal conduct, commanders will refer the matter to the appropriate criminal investigative organization. Penalties for violations of waste, loss, mismanagement, or unauthorized use of NAFs apply to military, appropriated funded civilian personnel and NAF civilian personnel. They include the full range of statutory and regulatory sanctions, both criminal and administrative, and are the same as those under provisions of Federal law that govern the misuse of appropriations. Reporting of suspected violations at the lowest organizational level possible is encouraged. However, reports may be made to senior management, organizational inspectors general, or to the Defense Hotline.

### **10-37. HQDA oversight of non-appropriated funds**

Applying various methods, the ASA(FM&C) provides HQDA level financial management oversight of Army controlled non-appropriated funds. One method is by participating on the Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Board of Directors. A representative from the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Resource Analysis and Business Practices) participates in all MWR working group meetings where major MWR financial policy issues are addressed. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Budget) is the Chairman of the MWR Finance Committee and a voting member of the MWR Executive Committee. In addition, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations) co-chairs the Audit Committee and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Resource Analysis and Business Practices) serves on the Investment Subcommittee. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Budget) is also a voting member of the Army and Air Force Exchange System Finance Committee. The Army and Air Force Exchange System is a major revenue contributor to Army MWR. Through these positions, the ASA(FM&C) influences all aspects of MWR financial policy. As part of the responsibility of overseeing non-appropriated funds, the ASA(FM&C) participates in addressing non-appropriated fund issues to the SECARMY and CSA for decision.

## **SECTION VIII SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

### **10-38. Summary**

**a.** Resource management in our Army continues to evolve. New legislation, new requirements, new management initiatives, new missions and the proviso to get the “biggest bang for the buck” out of Army resources continually forces resource managers

to develop new approaches to resource management. On top of this, the application of information technology has literally revolutionized the resource management community. The power of the computer and its sophisticated software has provided decision makers at all levels with powerful tools to maximize the allocation and application of resources.

**b.** The real innovation lies, however, in the thrust of the entrepreneurial approaches being advocated in the resource management community. Recognition that Army budget levels in the 1990s were declining forced us to reexamine business practices, to integrate in a far more comprehensive manner programming and budgeting, and to look seriously at ways of enhancing the productivity of the people that constitute the Army team. The management decision package (MDEP) concept was a forerunner of this integration effort.

**c.** Third-party financing, value engineering, charge-back/direct-customer payment, self-sufficiency, organizational efficiency reviews, and output focus based on unit cost are some of the concepts that allow us to examine the way we manage our Army in a more productive way to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the resources that Congress and the American taxpayer provide to us to forge combat capabilities.

**d.** This chapter summarized the more pertinent features of resource management systems using a minimum of the complex terms associated with the process. We have identified the major players, the major steps they must take, and the various controls, which guide their actions in the resource management process particularly during the execution stage.

### **10-39. References**

- a.** United States Code, titles as follows:
  - (1) Title 5 USC, *Government Organization and Employees*.
  - (2) Title 10 USC, *Armed Forces*.
  - (3) Title 31 USC, *Money and Finance*.
  - (4) Title 32 USC, *National Guard*.
  - (5) Title 41 USC, *Public Contracts*.
- b.** DOD Regulation 7000-14.R, *Financial Management Regulation (FMR)*, consisting of fifteen volumes.
- c.** Army Regulation 5-1, *Army Management Philosophy*.
- d.** Army Regulation 11-2, *Management Control*.
- e.** Army Regulation 37- 14, *Representation Funds of the Secretary of the Army*.
- f.** Army Regulation 215-1, *Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Activities and Non-appropriated Fund Instrumentalities*.
- g.** DFAS-IN Regulation 37-1, *Finance and Accounting Policy Implementation*.
- h.** DFAS-IN Pamphlet 37-100-\*\*, *Army Management Structure (AMS) Fiscal Year 20\*\**.



# CHAPTER 11

## MATERIEL SYSTEM RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

*"Modernizing the U.S. Army is more than just enhancing and developing new weapons platforms. It is the examination of the future of warfare and new operations concepts made possible by advanced technology. We are focusing on the soldier as both a subsystem of our aircraft and ground vehicles, and as a system himself. We have empowered our Army acquisition professionals to continuously find smarter ways to doing business, and we are seeing good results."*

Paul J. Hoepfer, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### **11-1. Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Army management system**

This chapter describes the DOD and U.S. Army management system used for the research, development, and acquisition (RDA) of materiel systems, both major defense acquisition (MDAP) systems and major systems. As a result of the *Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act* (FASA) of 1994 and the DOD process action team (PAT) efforts to re-engineer the acquisition oversight and review process, the current materiel systems acquisition structure within DOD and the Army is in a state of change. Major system acquisition policy changes resulting from these activities are currently being integrated into the DOD and Army materiel acquisition systems. That system can be viewed simply as a combination of structure, process, and culture.

- Structure is the sum of the guidance provided by law, policy, regulation or objective, and the organization provided to accomplish the RDA function.
- Process is the interaction of the structure in producing the output.
- Culture is the cumulative sum of past practices and their impact on interpretation of guidance and attitude toward institutional changes to the system.

#### **11-2. System focus**

For the Army, the focus of materiel acquisition management output is producing military units that are adequately trained, equipped, and maintained to execute National Military

Strategy (NMS) effectively. The focus of the RDA management system is the development and acquisition of systems that are affordable and support the enforcement of our NMS. The RDA management system is a fully coordinated effort concerned with the total fielding of a system consisting of hardware, software, logistic support, manuals, organizations, doctrine, facilities, personnel, training, and spares. Figure 11-1 shows the elements of systems acquisition management. To facilitate an understanding of the process, this chapter will begin by highlighting some of the critical aspects of structure.

<u>System</u>	<u>Acquisition</u>	<u>Management</u>
• Hardware	• Determine Need	• Plan
• Software	• Design	• Organize
• Logistic Support	• Develop	• Staff
• Manuals	• Test	• Control
• Organizations	• Produce	• Lead
• Doctrine	• Field	
• Facilities	• Support	
• Personnel	• Improve	
• Training	• Replace	
• Spares	• Dispose	

**Figure 11-1. Systems Acquisition Management Individual Elements**

## **SECTION II**

### **DOD ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT**

#### **11-3. DOD policy**

a. The basic policy is to ensure that acquisition of defense systems is conducted efficiently and effectively in order to achieve operational objectives of the U.S. Armed Forces in their support of national policies and objectives within the guidelines of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11, part 3, Major System Acquisitions. DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, and DOD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, are the documents that provide the DOD guidance for system acquisition policy and procedure. These documents establish an integrated management framework for a single, standardized DOD-wide acquisition system that applies to all programs including highly sensitive, classified programs. Within the DOD system there are four acquisition program-size categories with decision authority placed at the lowest practical level. The system is characterized by three activities, four phases, eight work efforts, and four milestones (discussed later in the chapter) which track a DOD program's progress throughout its development and program life. "Tailoring" is encouraged in the process to reflect specific program needs. In accordance with DODD 5000.1 "One size does not fit all." The essential features of the DOD materiel acquisition system are:

- A clear acquisition strategy (AS).
- A thorough program plan.

- Risk management techniques.
- Systematic program tracking against the plan.

**b.** An acquisition program is defined as a directed, funded effort designed to provide a new, improved or continuing weapon system or automated information system (AIS) capability in response to a validated operational need. Acquisition programs are divided into different categories, which are established to facilitate decentralized decision-making, and execution and compliance with statutory requirements. Acquisition phases provide a logical means of progressively translating broadly stated mission needs into well-defined system-specific requirements and ultimately into operationally effective, suitable, and survivable systems. All the tasks and activities needed to bring the program to the next milestone occur during acquisition phases. A milestone (MS) is the major decision point that initiates the next phase of an acquisition program. MDAP milestones may include, for example, the decisions to begin concept and technology development, or to begin low-rate initial production.

#### **11-4. DOD acquisition management**


**a.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) is the senior procurement executive and the principal staff assistant and adviser to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) and takes precedence in DOD for all matters relating to the materiel acquisition system: research and development, production, logistics; command, control, and communications, and intelligence activities related to acquisition; military construction; and procurement.

**b.** The USD(AT&L) serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) with responsibility for supervising the performance of the entire DOD acquisition system in accordance with the laws, Congressional guidance and direction, and OMB Circular No. A-11, part3. The DAE establishes policy for all elements of DOD for acquisition. The basic policies of the DAE are established and implemented by Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5000.1 and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.2. The DAE also serves as the chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), assisted by overarching integrated product teams (OIPs) that relate to the acquisition process. As DAB chairman, the DAE recommends to the SecDef acquisition resource matters and other acquisition management matters required to implement acquisition milestone decisions. A clear distinction exists between responsibility for weapon systems acquisition and budgetary authority. While the DAE, as DAB Chairman, makes recommendations on whether to proceed with plans to acquire major materiel systems, the Defense Resources Board (DRB), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef), makes budgetary recommendations on the same programs. Acquisition programs must operate within the parameters established by the DRB and the SecDef through the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting (PPBS) process.

#### **11-5. Organizational linkage**

The managerial process of transforming a materiel requirement into a fielded and supported system consisting of hardware, software, and personnel is conducted by various organizational structures in DOD and the Services responsible for RDA. Figure 11-2 shows the primary elements involved for the Army, including the linkage between the defense

community, industry, and academia. The arrows in the Figure depict the flow of business in the process of this transformation.



**Figure 11-2. Organizational Linkage for Army Materiel Acquisition**

### 11-6. DOD science and technology

Since World War II, owning the technology advantage has been a cornerstone of our National Military Strategy (NMS). Technologies like radar, jet engines, nuclear weapons, night vision, global positioning, smart weapons, and stealth have changed warfare dramatically. Maintaining this technological edge has become even more important as U.S. force size decreases and high technology weapons become readily available on the world market. In this new environment, it is imperative that U.S. forces possess technological superiority to ensure success and minimize casualties across the broad spectrum of engagements. The technological advantage enjoyed by the United States in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, and still enjoyed today, is the legacy of decades of wise investments in science and technology (S&T). Similarly, our warfighting capabilities 10 to 15 years from now will be substantially determined by today's investment in S&T.

### 11-7. Defense science and technology strategy

The Defense Science and Technology Strategy is supported by the DOD Basic Research Plan (BRP), DOD Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP), Defense Technology Area Plan (DTAP), and Defense Technology Objectives (DTOs) of the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan and Defense Technology Area Plan. It provides DOD's S&T vision, strategy, plan, and a statement of objectives for the planners, programmers, and performers. Revised annually, these documents and the supporting individual S&T master plans of the Services and defense agencies guide the annual preparation of the DOD S&T budget and program objective memoranda (POMs).

- a. The Basic Research Plan (BRP) presents the DOD objectives and investment strategy for DOD-sponsored Basic Research (6.1) performed by universities, industry, and Service laboratories. In addition to presenting the planned investment in 12 technical discussion

areas, this year's plan highlights six strategic research objectives (SROs) holding great promise for enabling breakthrough technologies for 21st century military capabilities.

**b.** The Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP) objective is to ensure that the S&T program supports priority future joint warfighting capabilities. The JWSTP looks horizontally across the Services and agencies and together with the DTAP ensures that the near-, mid-, and far-term needs of the joint warfighter are properly balanced and supported in the S&T planning, programming, budgeting, and assessment activities of DOD. The JWSTP is focused around 12 Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives (JWCOS). These objectives support the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) process, and the four leveraged concepts emphasized in the Joint vision: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimension protection, and focused logistics. The JWSTP is issued annually as defense guidance. Advanced concepts and technologies identified as enhancing high priority joint warfighting capabilities, along with prerequisite research, receive funding priority in the President's Budget and accompanying Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).

**c.** The DOD Technology Area Plan (DTAP) presents the DOD objectives and the Applied Research (6.2) and Advanced Technology Development (6.3) investment strategy for 12 technology areas critical to DOD acquisition. It takes a horizontal perspective across Service and agency efforts, thereby charting the total DOD-wide investment for each technology area. The DTAP documents the focus, content, and principal objectives of the overall DOD science and technology efforts. The 2000 DTAP, includes an assessment of the potential technology capabilities of other countries vis-a-vis the United States.

**d.** The focus of the S&T investment is enhanced and guided through Defense technology objectives (DTOs). Each DTO identifies a specific technology advancement that will be developed or demonstrated, the anticipated date of technology availability, and the specific benefits resulting from the technology advance. These benefits not only include increased military operational capabilities but also address other important areas, including affordability and dual-use applications that have received special emphasis in the Defense Science and Technology Strategy. Each of the 326 DTOs identifies funding required to achieve the new capability. Over seventy percent of the DTOs are identified and described in the DTAP, which cites the anticipated return on the S&T investment through 12 broad technology areas. The remaining DTOs support the 12 JWCOS of the DOD JWSTP. JWSTP DTOs are limited to advanced technology demonstrations (ATD) and advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTD) discussed later in this chapter.

### **11-8. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)**

DARPA is a unique management tool of the SecDef. It consists of a mix of military and civilian scientists and engineers, and has a broad charter to conduct advanced research which fills research and development (R&D) gaps between Service lines of responsibility or handles high priority problems that cross Service lines. DARPA is charged with the maintenance of leadership in forefront areas of technology so DOD can be aware as soon as possible of developments of potential military significance. DARPA's purpose is to review ongoing research and development, determine whether or not the concept is feasible, determine its usefulness, and transfer it to the appropriate Service. DARPA does not have its own in-house research facilities and relies on the Services and other government agencies for

technical and administrative support. Once a decision to support a research proposal is made, responsibility for contracting is generally assigned to one of the Services.

#### **11-9. Defense Acquisition University (DAU)**

The DAU is a corporate university that includes the Defense Systems Management College (DSMC). Its operation and structure is designed to be similar to a State university with many campuses each specializing in certain acquisition disciplines. The *Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)* required the formation of the DAU with operation commencing in 1992. Also, the law required the establishment of a senior course for personnel serving in critical acquisition positions (CAPs) that are equivalent to existing senior professional military education programs. The USD(AT&L) has oversight authority for the acquisition curriculum of the course, located at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) of the National Defense University.

#### **11-10. Defense Systems Management College (DSMC)**

The DSMC is the USD(AT&L) institution for ensuring the up-to-date training of military and civilian professionals in the management of materiel acquisition programs in DOD. One such course is the Advanced Program Management Course (APMC), a required 14-week course for individuals seeking Level III certification in the Program Management Acquisition Career Field (ACF). The DSMC, founded 1971, is a joint military professional institution, operating under the direction of the DAU Executive Board, to support acquisition management as described in DOD Directive 5000.1, and to assist in fulfilling education and training requirements set out in appropriate DOD directives and public laws. The mission of the DSMC is to—

- a. Conduct advanced courses of study in defense acquisition management as the primary function of the college.
- b. Conduct research and special studies in defense acquisition management.
- c. Assemble and disseminate information concerning new policies, methods, and practices in defense acquisition management.
- d. Provide consulting services in defense acquisition management.

### **SECTION III**

#### **ARMY ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT**

#### **11-11. Army's RDA goals**

a. The Secretary of the Army (SA) is responsible for functions necessary for the research, development, logistical support and maintenance, preparedness, operation, and effectiveness of the Army. Also required is supervision of all matters relating to Army procurement. The SA executes acquisition management responsibilities through the Army Acquisition Executive (AAE).

b. Special emphasis is placed on medium and long-range materiel planning, product modification, and life extension programs. Major state-of-the-art advancements are sought only in carefully selected areas. Stability of materiel acquisition programs is a matter of utmost interest, especially after the system passes the System Development and


Demonstration milestone decision. Reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) goals; manpower and personnel integration (MANPRINT); integrated logistics support (ILS); survivability; effectiveness; safety; and product quality are incorporated into system performance objectives. Contractual incentives for the improvement of RAM and ILS are encouraged.

**11-12. Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)**

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA(ALT)) is the AAE. The AAE is designated by the SA as the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) and the senior procurement executive within Department of the Army (DA). The AAE is the principal DA-staff official for the execution of the AAE responsibilities. When serving as the AAE, the ASA(ALT) is assisted by a military deputy (MILDEP) and the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4).

a. The MILDEP is assigned to the Office of the ASA(ALT) and provides staff support to the AAE in managing the research development, developmental test, and the acquisition of materiel for all Army major weapon and support systems. The MILDEP, delegated down from the AAE, is the Army’s Director, Acquisition Career Management (DACM). The DACM is responsible for directing the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC) as well as implementation of the acquisition career management requirements set forth in the DAWIA legislation.

b. The DISC4 provides staff support to the AAE in managing the research, development, and acquisition of automated information systems (AIS) (includes automation, telecommunications, and command and control) and information technologies (IT). The DISC4 also serves as the Army Chief Information Officer (CIO) as directed in the *Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA) of 1996*. The CIO primary responsibility, under ITMRA, is the management of resources for all Army information programs. The day-to-day management of Army acquisition programs is shown in Figure 11-3.



**Figure 11-3. Army Acquisition Executive (AAE)**

**c.** Similar to the DAE, the AAE develops Army acquisition policies and procedures and manages the Army's production base support and industrial mobilization programs. The AAE, acts with the full authority of the SA is responsible for administering acquisition programs according to DOD policies and guidelines, and exercises the powers and discharges the responsibilities as set forth in DODD 5000.1 for component acquisition executives. In addition, the AAE will:

**(1)** Appoint, supervise and evaluate program executive officers (PEOs) and direct-reporting program, project, or product managers (PMs).

**(2)** Coordinate with Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (ODCSOPS), establish policy and guidance for analysis of alternatives (AoAs); for army category (ACAT) I and II programs, designate the organization responsible for performing system engineering trade-off analyses for the AoA; and provide issues and alternatives to ODCSOPS for inclusion in the AoA tasking document. ACATs are described in Figure 11-4.

**(3)** Carry out all powers, functions, and duties of the SA with respect to the acquisition work force within the Army, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SA.

**(4)** Develop guidance, in coordination with the ODCSOPS, and serve as co-proponent for the RDA plan.

**(5)** Formulate Army-wide S&T base strategy, policy, guidance, and planning.

**(6)** Establish and validate Army technology base priorities throughout the planning, programming, budget, execution system (PPBES).

**(7)** Approve and resource Army advanced technology demonstrations (ATDs) and the Advanced Concepts and Technology II (ACT II) Program.

**(8)** Act as the final authority of all matters affecting the Army's acquisition system, except as limited by statute or higher-level regulation.

**(9)** Develop and promulgate acquisition, procurement, and contracting policies and procedures.

**(10)** Co-chair all Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) meetings with the Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (VCSA).

**(11)** Establish and implement Army horizontal technology integration (HTI) policy.

**(12)** Appoint the source selection authority (SSA) for specified programs. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is the primary contracting regulation. It is the first regulatory source to which DA acquisition personnel refer. The ASA(ALT) issues the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS) to implement and supplement the FAR and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) and to establish uniform policies and procedures for use in the Army.

<u>Program Category</u>	<u>Program Management</u>	<u>Primary Criteria</u>	<u>Milestone Review Forum</u>	<u>Milestone Decision Authority</u>
<b>ACAT I</b>				
ACAT ID	PEO/PM	RDTE > \$365M PROC > \$2.19B	DAB	DAE
ACAT IC	PEO/PM	RDTE > \$365M PROC > \$2.19B	ASARC	AAE
<b>ACAT IA</b>				
ACAT IAM	PEO/PM	Single Year > \$32M or Total Program > \$126M or Total Life-Cycle Costs > \$378M	DOD IT OIPT	DAE/CIO
ACAT IAC	PEO/PM	Single Year > \$32M or Total Program > \$126M or Total Life-Cycle Costs > \$378M	Army ITOIPT	AAE/CIO
<b>ACAT II</b>				
ACAT II	PEO/MAT CMD DSA /PM	RDTE > \$140M PROC > \$660M	ASARC	AAE
<b>ACAT III</b>				
ACAT III	PEO/MAT CMD DSA /PM	High Visibility; Special Interest	IPR	PEO/MAT CMD DSA
<b>ACAT IV</b>				
ACAT IV	System Manager, or Equivalent	All Other Acquisition Programs (includes AIS)	IPR	MAT CMD CDR

**Figure 11-4. Acquisition Categories**

(13) Review and approve, for ACAT ID programs, the Army position at each decision milestone before the DAB review. This includes the review and approval of acquisition program baselines (APBs). The AAE also serves as the milestone decision authority (MDA) for ACATs IC, II, and assigns the MDA for ACAT III and IV programs. The MDA is the individual designated to approve entry into the next phase; this decision is made for each milestone used in a program.

(14) Approve the establishment and termination of all program management offices (PMO) and PEOs. The AAE has authority to designate a system for intensive, centralized management and prescribe the appropriate level of management at any point in the program management process.

d. The DA system coordinator (DASC) is the primary acquisition staff officer at DA. The DASC is responsible for the day-to-day support of his or her assigned program and serves as the PM’s representative and primary point of contact (POC) within the Pentagon. Depending on whether the system or program falls within the purview of the DISC4 or ASA(ALT), the responsible DASC may report to either the Vice Director, Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (VDISC4) or the ASA(ALT), Deputy for Systems Management and Horizontal Technology Integration (HTI). The DASC is responsible for keeping the acquisition chain of command (ASA(ALT)) or DISC4) informed of the status of the assigned acquisition program. In addition, the DASC assists the PM in issue resolution at DA and Office Secretary of Defense (OSD) levels. The DASC is the “eyes and ears” of the PM at the Pentagon and ensures that the PM is advised of any actions or circumstances that might negatively impact their program.

**11-13. The program executive officer (PEO)**


a. The PEO system structure was implemented by the Army in 1987 in response to requirements established by the *Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986*, and the recommendation of the Packard Commission which the President approved and then ordered

## How the Army Runs

by NSDD 219 (Figure 11-5). The PEO and direct-reporting PMs serve as materiel developers (MATDEVs).

**b.** The PEO, administering a defined number of AAE assigned major and/or non-major programs, is responsible for making programmatic (materiel acquisition cost, schedule, and total system performance) and for the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution necessary to guide assigned programs through each milestone. In addition, the PEO provides program information to the AAE, HQDA, DOD, and Congress; defends assigned programs to Congress through the Army legislative and budget liaison offices; and participates in the development of data to support AAE programmatic decisions in the PPBES. Other PEO and direct-reporting PM responsibilities include assisting the combat developer (CBTDEV) and training developer (TNGDEV) in developing operational requirements documents (ORDs) by providing technical, availability, performance, anticipated materiel acquisition cost, and schedule type information as needed.

**c.** The AAE currently has eight PEOs—Air and Missile Defense; Aviation; Command, Control, and Communications Systems; Intelligence and Electronic Warfare; Ground Combat and Support Systems (GCSS); Standard Army Management Information Systems; Reserve Component Automation Systems (reports to Chief, National Guard Bureau); and Tactical Missiles—responsible for the intensive management of RDA weapon and information systems.



**Figure 11-5. DOD Acquisition Authority Chain**

**d.** To support the expanded acquisition mission within Army Materiel Command (AMC), the SA approved the establishment of three new brigadier general positions titled, “Deputy for Systems Acquisition (DSA).” The positions are located at the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), Fort Monmouth, NJ; the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), Warren, MI, and the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM), Redstone Arsenal, AL. The DSAs develop command policy and plans, and manage the integration, coordination, and execution of

systems acquisition and project management missions. The DSA positions have full line authority of the AAE and the appropriate AMC major subordinate command (MSC) CG in carrying out systems acquisition and project management activities.

**e.** The CBTDEV, referred to above, is the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). TRADOC formulates and documents operational concepts, doctrine, organizations, and/or materiel requirements for assigned mission areas and functions. Materiel requirement documents are mission need statements (MNSs), capstone requirements documents (CRDs), and ORDs. The CBTDEV serves as the user representative during acquisitions for their approved materiel requirements as well as doctrine and organization developments.

**f.** A MATDEV is the RDA command, agency, or office assigned responsibility for the system under development or being acquired. The term may be used generically to refer to the RDA community in the materiel acquisition process (counterpart to the generic use of CBTDEV). A TNGDEV is a command or agency that formulates, develops, and documents or produces training concepts, strategies, requirements (materiel and other), and programs for assigned mission areas and functions. TNGDEV serves as user (trainer and trainee) representative during acquisitions of their approved training materiel requirements (MNS, CRDs, and ORDs) and training program developments. They perform the following functions solely in support of training systems:

(1) Fund and conduct concept formulations for all system training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) in support of assigned system.

(2) Embed system-training capabilities into assigned materiel systems in accordance with the approved system ORD and in coordination with the CBTDEV/TNGDEV.

(3) Develop, acquire, and field the subsystem training package with the materiel system.

(4) Plan and program resources for the execution of new equipment training (NET) using distance learning (DL) technology and/or contract NET as the desired training strategy in support of TRADOC developed/approved system training plan (STRAP).

(5) Program and budget resources for TADSS as specified in the training support requirements (TSR) annex of the ORD.

(6) Program and budget resources to support and ensure attention to and integration of MANPRINT in the research, development, test, and evaluation (RDTE) and acquisition processes.

(7) Provide TNGDEV perspective through input to the RDA plan and the Army modernization plan (AMP).

(8) Lead the cost-performance integrated product team (CPIPT) to institute the cost as independent variable (CAIV) process beginning with the approval of the MNS.

(9) Conduct a crosswalk, with the CBTDEV (TNGDEV for TADSS), of the ORD to the request for proposal (RFP) to verify that the RFP, to include system specification or purchase description and the statement of work (SOW), accurately reflects the operational requirements stated in the ORD for all programs. The MATDEV and CBTDEV (MATDEV

and TNGDEV for TADSS) will formally certify that the RFP has been crosswalked with the ORD and is in agreement prior to the ASARC or program review.

#### **11-14. The program/project/product manager (PM)**

**a.** The program management approach to materiel acquisition management is a distinct departure from the Services' traditional practice of establishing functionally oriented organizations to carry out well-defined, repetitive, and continuous long-term tasks. Organization for program management is a tailored, task-oriented process. This approach requires the program manager to establish management arrangements among the PMO, other military organizations, and various contractors to coordinate their efforts and to accomplish program objectives effectively, efficiently, and economically. A variety of PMO organizations have been established. They operate on the matrix management principle and must draw all functional support from a host command or installation. In addition to the formal PM organization, the PM directs the informal MATDEV/CBTDEV team to execute the assigned materiel acquisition program. MATDEV/CBTDEV team is the terminology used to describe the informal, but essential close working relationship among the MATDEV, CBTDEV, and other players in the RDA management process (Figure 11-2).

**b.** The PM has authority and responsibility for all programmatic cost, schedule, and performance decisions to execute the assigned program within the approved APB and subject to functional standards established by regulation, Secretarial direction, or law. Generically, all PMs are program managers, but they are chartered as a program manager, a project manager, or product manager based on the value and importance of the program they manage. The criteria established for designation of a program manager are generally the same as those which cause a system acquisition to be designated as a major program—high defense priority, high dollar value, or high Congressional or OSD interest. Most program managers report to a PEO and to the AAE. Project and product managers report to a program manager or a PEO. The Army also has many PMs who report to AMC and U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC). Their programs are usually more mature systems or programs that have been through production and fielding. As a general rule, a program manager is a general officer or Senior Executive Service (SES); a project manager is a colonel or GS 15; a product manager is a lieutenant colonel or GS 14. This distinction between PMs is unique to the Army and does not apply to the other Services or within industry.

#### **11-15. PEO resource control**

The Army has revised its resource support system structure for the PEOs to improve their control over the funding and manpower resources they need to carry out their responsibilities. PEOs and subordinate PMs receive dollars and personnel authorization resources directly from HQDA rather than through the materiel commands. The materiel commands continue to provide a variety of support services without duplicating any of the PEOs or PMs management functions. This enhanced resource control system ensures PEO and PM-managed programs operate as centers of excellence, managed with modern efficient techniques, without administrative burdens or materiel command layers being inserted into the chain of command.

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**11-16. Acquisition career management**

a. The MILDEP to the ASA(ALT) serves as the Army DACM. The DACM is assisted by the Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management (DDACM) and the Acquisition Career Management Office in OASA(ALT). The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civilian Personnel Policy) and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel work closely with the DACM in implementing the requirements and intent of DAWIA for the Army.

b. The AAC was established for both military and civilian personnel and is a subset of the entire Army acquisition workforce (AAW). The AAW consists of those personnel who work directly with acquisition in the various acquisition career fields at the CPT/GS-5 and above levels. The AAC consists of military and civilian personnel at the rank/grade of MAJ/GS-13 and above who have met the statutory requirements for experience, education and training. Current Army policy focuses on accessing individuals at the GS-14 and above level into the AAC. All AAW positions at rank/grade of LTC/GS-14 and above are designated critical acquisition positions (CAPs) and must be occupied by AAC members. For program management and contracting positions, statute or regulation further dictates education, training, and experience requirements which must be met prior to placement of an individual in these positions.

(1) *AAC vision.* The strategic vision for the AAC forms the foundation for all policies and initiatives impacting the AAW. This vision is to develop "a small premier professional corps of acquisition leaders willing to serve where needed and committed to developing, integrating, acquiring and fielding systems critical to decisive victory...for the 21st century." The vision focuses on "a small premier professional corps of acquisition leaders...It is these leaders the Army must develop early in their careers to ensure they possess the requisite experience and skills to successfully manage the acquisition challenges of the 21st century." The key to developing the best possible leaders for the Army lies in educating the workforce, particularly at the lower levels, as to the DAWIA requirements and the policies, procedures, and tools available to meet those requirements.

(2) *Career development as a mission.* The leader development career pattern for an AAC officer is clearly defined and highly rewarding. Military acquisition career development is covered under DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization. An officer should normally serve eight years in branch qualifying assignments prior to entering the AAC. Upon AAC selection, the officer will attend functional area (FA) specific military training courses, and selected officers will have the opportunity to attend advanced civil schooling (ACS). Attendance at ACS is contingent on the officer's manner of performance, potential for academic success, and support of his or her career time line. Graduate level education opportunities are an important part of career development within the AAC. However, job experience and strong performance across a variety of acquisition positions remains the key indicator for success. Recent initiatives seek to increase developmental acquisition experience opportunities while providing improved support for alternative advanced degree schooling. AAC officers compete for product/project management or acquisition command positions in the same manner as field commands. AAC LTCs and COLs are ineligible for selection to non-acquisition command positions. For career development of civilians, the Army has developed a civilian acquisition career model as well as a matrix of quality achievement factors as a "roadmap for success." The focus of the career model is to begin to develop acquisition leaders and managers early in their careers, giving

them a broad-based knowledge of the various acquisition functions supported by leadership and management experience. The quality achievement factors are the combination of training, education, and experience at the higher grade.

### **11-17. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA)**

**a. Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA).** The CSA is responsible by law to the SA for the efficiency of the Army and its preparedness for military operations. The CSA acts as the agent of the SA in carrying out the plans or recommendations submitted by the ARSTAF and approved by the SA. The VCSA supports the CSA by managing the day-to-day operations of the Army, and specifically in the area of RDA, co-chairs the ASARC with the AAE.

**b. Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (Operations Research)(DUSA(OR)).** The DUSA (OR), designated Army Test and Evaluation (T&E) Director, establishes, reviews, supervises and enforces Army T&E policy and procedures; oversees all Army T&E associated with RDA, as well as combat development programs; provides staff management (policy formulation, program direction, and resource oversight) of all T&E programs of interest to OSA; approves all test and evaluation master plans (TEMPs) requiring HQDA approval; and is responsible for all software development for modeling and simulations and software T&E policy.

**c. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASA(FM&C)).** The ASA(FM&C) has secretariat responsibility for all financial management activities and operations for appropriated funds. While the budget is in preparation, the ASA(FM&C) receives and consolidates procurement and RDTE budget forms from major Army commands (MACOMs) and PEOs. The ASA(FM&C) also:

- (1) Represents the AAE on all cost and economic analysis matters related to the acquisition process.
- (2) Carries out all financial management responsibilities assigned under Title 10.
- (3) Tasks the appropriate CBTDEV or MATDEV to conduct program office estimates (POE) and/or economic analyses (EA) to milestone decision review (MDR) and PPBES requirements.
- (4) Manages all budgeting activities in support of the Army materiel requirements processes and RDA modernization program, with the framework of PPBS/PPBES.
- (5) Provides oversight, review and approval for all costing and economic analysis efforts, as carried out by the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center (CEAC) within the Cost and Economic Analysis Program to include preparation of the component cost analysis (CCA).
- (6) For ACAT I and special interest programs the ASA(FM&C) establishes an Army cost review board (CRB) of senior leadership to review the life-cycle cost estimates and recommend the Army cost position (ACP). The ASA(FM&C) Deputy for Cost Analysis ensures that the ACP reflects the costs and risks associated with the program in concurrence with the (CAIV) process.

**d. Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM).** The ACSIM is responsible for developing criteria for the mitigation of environmental impacts, and reviewing emerging Army RDA systems for environmental effects.

**e. Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4).** The DISC4 is the Army CIO and has ARSTAF responsibility and serves as the MILDEP to the AAE for Army AIS and IT activities. These include establishing and approving policies, procedures, and standards for the planning, programming, life-cycle management, use of Army IT resources, and responding to and validating all warfighting requirements. The DISC4—

(1) Validates all IT related to MNS, ORD, and operational need statement (ONS) by ensuring that they meet three criteria.

(2) They conform to the Joint Technical Architecture-Army (JTA-A) and address integration into Army Enterprise Architectures.

(3) The requirement has gone through business process reengineering (BPR).

(4) They are in concert with emerging command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) technologies.

(5) They are consistent with joint interoperability requirements.

(6) Oversees the activities of PEOs or PMs managing command, control, communications, and computer and IT acquisition programs.

(7) Has overall responsibility for Army software policy for both AIS and weapon systems.

(8) Provides technical oversight for both AIS and weapon systems on software and IT matters during the acquisition approval process.

(9) Directs and approves standards for data and interoperability of products, to include joint and combined programs.

(10) Provides software R&D advice and management oversight for all systems during the ASARC and the Information Technology Overarching Integrated Product Team (ITOIPT).

(11) Reviews materiel system programs and warfighting rapid acquisition program (WRAP) candidate systems for compliance with HQDA policy for software reuse, technical and systems architectures, data element standardization, post production software support, interoperability, spectrum management, and software initiatives.

(12) Ensures proper implementation of the ILS and MANPRINT programs in IT.

**f. Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (DCSPRO).**

(1) In November 2000, Congress approved the creation of the DCSPRO. The creation of the new office was the result of the HQDA Headquarters Redesign, Phase I efforts based on the CSA guidance to base reorganization on process and AR 10-5 ARSTAF functions, not current organization structure. Effective 1 December 2000 the DCSPRO:

(a) Received Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE),

(b) Received Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans – Force Development (ADCSOPS-FD) minus Force Programs Directorate, (renamed Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs – Force Development (ADCSPRO-FD)),

(c) Established a clearinghouse for all internal and external Army studies,

(d) Established an infrastructure for external review teams (i.e. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)),

(e) Works JROC/JWCA issues,

(f) Works approved/validated materiel requirements from DCSOPS.

(g) Integrates unit-set fielding.

(2) As of this update, the HQDA Headquarters Redesign, Phase I Implementation Plan and AR 10-5 are being developed. The updated AR 10-5, when approved, will impact the roles and responsibilities discussed in this chapter, especially within ODCSOPS and ODCSPRO.

(3) Within ODCSPRO, the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (DPAE) is responsible for reviewing and analyzing requirements and programs in force structure development, providing analytical support to the Army Resources Board (ARB) and subordinate committees, developing resource guidance, developing and compiling the program objective memorandum (POM), maintaining the Army portion of the DOD FYDP, and presenting an affordability analysis to the ASARC and OIPT. Other responsibilities include conducting and presenting affordability assessments to support DOD and HQDA ACAT I programs and managing the programming phase of the PPBES.

(4) Within ODCSPRO, the systems integrator (SI) is the focal point for ODCSOPS approved materiel requirements and the CBTDEV's primary representative and POC in the Pentagon. The SI provides the continuous coordination necessary to ensure the integration of new warfighting materiel systems into Army organizations. SIs are appointed by the ADCSPRO-FD.

(a) The SI integrates operational, training, doctrinal, organizational, personnel, logistical, and test and evaluation aspects to ensure the fielding of a complete, coordinated, and supportable system. The SI ensures that systems are doctrinally based and that they are properly reflected in approved tables of organization and equipment (TOEs). SI duties include developing a DA position on proposed materiel requirement documents and basis-of-issue plans (BOIPs) and identifying, in coordination with U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), the required operational and force development tests.

(b) The SI monitors the progress of an assigned system throughout its developmental process to ensure that approved materiel requirements are staffed and satisfied. In addition, the SI ensures necessary logistical support, manpower spaces, and training packages are available when and where the system enters the inventory. The overall objective is to meet the first unit equipped (FUE) / initial operational capability (IOC) dates with an operationally suitable, reliable, maintainable, and economically obtainable system. The first unit equipped date (FUED) is the date when the system and associated equipment is fielded (in operational quantities complete with logistical support, and training support) to the IOC unit and new equipment training (NET) is accomplished. The IOCD is the first

attainment of warfighting capability of modification TOE (MTOE) and supporting elements to operate and support a fielded RDA system.

(c) The SI is also responsible for the management of requirements which result from the introduction of a system. Budget constraints and manpower ceilings make effective management of those requirements imperative. Identifying, monitoring, recording, and coordinating the data connected with force structure requirements is a complex task which requires a thorough understanding of the procedures, techniques, methods, and various management systems used in the requirements process. The SI works in close cooperation and coordination with his or her counterparts at TRADOC and the HQDA Staff.

**g. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS).**

(1) Until Phase I Implementation Plan and AR 10-5, previously discussed, are developed, the DCSOPS has primary ARSTAF responsibility for the prioritization and validation of both materiel quantitative and performance requirements. DCSOPS develops broad force requirements and issues guidance for the combat developments programs to include establishing materiel objectives and requirements, overall force structure design, fielding schedules, and BOIPs. DCSOPS provides guidance and reviews results of AoAs, establishes priorities for materiel development for designating major Army programs, and is a regular member of the ASARC. Under Phase I, effective 1 December 2000, DCSOPS:

- (a) Retains Force Programs Directorate (renamed Force Management Directorate),
- (b) Retains requirements validation/approval within DCSOPS,
- (c) Remains the prioritizer for the Army,
- (d) Retains the Army Modeling and Simulation Office (AMSO) and Joint Doctrine.

(2) Other DCSOPS responsibilities include:

- (a) Developing Army policy and guidance for materiel requirements and combat development programs. This includes the requirements determination process, prioritization, resourcing, and integration of materiel warfighting requirements.
- (b) Establishing and validating Army priorities throughout PPBES to include RDA programs.
- (c) Assigning catalog of approved requirements documents (CARDS) reference number, and maintaining and publishing CARDS.
- (d) Providing ARSTAF oversight of the development of the operational architecture (OA) and requirements.

**h. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG).** The DCSLOG assesses the logistical supportability of materiel systems during the system acquisition process through management of the ILS program. DCSLOG participates in all phases of the RDA management process to ensure equipment is logistically reliable, supportable, and maintainable. DCSLOG is also responsible for secondary item requirements including secondary item war reserve requirements. The DCSLOG is a regular member of the ASARC.

(1) The DA logistics support officer (DALSO) is the HQDA representative of the logistics community, providing logistics coordination. The DALSO monitors the progress of the assigned system and ensures that all elements of ILS, as outlined in AR 700-127, are satisfactorily completed. Because of the interrelationships of assigned responsibilities in materiel acquisition, close and continuous coordination and cooperation is essential between the DALSO and his or her counterparts at TRADOC, AMC, and the HQDA Staff. In addition to new items of equipment, DALSOs also have responsibility for existing weapons and materiel systems in the Army force structure. This responsibility covers all phases of logistics support to include readiness, redistribution, and disposal.

(2) The DALSO's primary mission is to provide HQDA general staff supervision over the ILS management of assigned commodity materiel/weapons systems from concept to disposal. Other responsibilities include:

(a) Taking ARSTAF responsibility for logistical acceptability and supportability of materiel systems, interoperability, ILS, materiel release, and logistics R&D programs for the Army.

(b) Establishing the HQDA logistic position concerning acceptability, deployability, and supportability for all acquisition programs.

(c) Serving as the logistician in the materiel acquisition process for other than medical equipment, and conduct surveillance over logistics aspects of materiel acquisition and modification programs to ensure supportable systems.

(d) Providing policy guidance for logistics for medical and engineer materiel acquisition.

### **i. Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER).**

(1) The DCSPER has ARSTAF responsibility for personnel management. DCSPER monitors planning for the manpower and personnel aspects of new systems. Also, the DCSPER is the proponent and has primary ARSTAF responsibility for the DOD Human Systems Integration (HSI) program (called MANPRINT program in the Army). The emphasis of the MANPRINT program is to enhance total system performance (soldier in the loop) and to conserve Army manpower, personnel and training (MPT) resources. The DCSPER is a regular member of the ASARC.

(2) The DA personnel staff officer (PERSSO) is the ARSTAF representative of the personnel community. The PERSSO provides for the continuous coordination necessary to ensure the smooth integration of new equipment, materiel systems, and new organizations. The PERSSO responsibilities include, but are not limited to: preparing and justifying force structure requests in conjunction with the organization integrator (OI) and SI; reviewing and coordinating the development of force structure changes; personnel supportability architecture, officer and enlisted issues related to new organizational concepts and doctrine; and ensuring programming and budgeting of manpower spaces. The PERSSO participates in all HQDA actions to develop the staff position on CBTDEV proposals for potential MDAPs (mission need determination), the designation of a proposed system, the recommendations on the elements of system fielding including the proposed BOIP, the initial issue quantity (IIQ), and the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO). The PERSSO represents the DCSPER at force modernization-related, HQDA-sponsored conferences, forums, and meetings on issues of

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supportability concerning the introduction of new and/or reorganized existing TOE/TDA units.

**j. Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT).**

(1) The DCSINT provides scientific and technical intelligence and threat projections in support of all aspects of the Army RDA programs.

(2) In addition, a threat integration staff officer (TISO) is designated by the DCSINT to function as the HQDA threat integration coordinator for designated mission areas, programs, and systems. The TISO represents the DCSINT on all aspects of threat support throughout the system life-cycle or study process. The TISO system complements the ODCSOPS SI and is designed to foster closer coordination among the intelligence community, MACOMs, and ARSTAF agencies to ensure the timely integration of the threat into the materiel acquisition process. The TISO system supplements existing management procedures but does not relieve ARSTAF agencies and MACOMs of established responsibilities. The DCSINT is the approving authority for either establishing or ending TISO monitorship of systems. Generally, all programs designated as Army major or non-major systems will be assigned to a TISO for monitorship on an as-required basis with approval of the DCSINT.

**k. The Surgeon General (TSG).** TSG has ARSTAF responsibility for medical research, development, test and evaluation, and is the Army medical MATDEV. The TSG is also responsible for the medical aspects of all other development and acquisition programs ensuring mission area interface with CBTDEVs. The TSG serves as a member of the ASARC and ITOIPT for medical issues, including health hazard assessment, personnel safety, and hazards remediation. Other responsibilities include:

(1) Developing policy, responsibilities, and procedures to ensure implementation of systems acquisition policy as it applies to combat medical systems, medical readiness and health care programs, and other assigned Army and joint service requirements.

(2) Assigning support responsibilities for medical materiel development and acquisition to agencies and activities under TSG command and control.

(3) Recommending to TRADOC materiel requirements and associated priorities for medical readiness and health care programs.

(4) Establishing mission area interface with TRADOC for all medical programs, ensuring that requirements and interests of each participating service are provided full consideration in medical programs for which the Army has lead agency or executive agency responsibility.

**l. Chief of Engineers (COE).** The COE monitors requirements and research and development necessary to provide construction design criteria, construction techniques, and construction material for the Army, Air Force, and other government agencies. The COE provides fixed-facility concealment, camouflage, and deception; real estate management techniques; and engineering support for maintenance of installation and facilities. It is the COE's mission to preserve and improve environmental quality associated with construction and facilities and Army environmental quality and R&D activities covering atmospheric, terrestrial, and topographical sciences. The COE is also responsible, under the general direction of the AAE, for the RDTE of fixed and floating power systems, and high voltage

generation applications (to include nuclear applications). The COE reviews all emerging Army systems for digital terrain data requirements and environmental effects such as climate, terrain, or weather. The review also includes minimization of toxic and hazardous wastes and those hazardous wastes associated with normal system test, operation, use, and maintenance.

**m. The General Counsel (GC).** The GC advises the AAE and the ASARC on any legal issue, which arises during the acquisition of a weapon or materiel system. The GC reviews all Army acquisition policy and supervises all attorneys providing legal advice relating to programs within the Army RDA management system. The GC is also responsible for all legal advice in the negotiation, oversight, and review of international cooperative RDA programs.

#### **11-18. Major Army commands (MACOMs)**

**a. Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).** MTMC provides transportability engineering advice and analyses to the MATDEV, CBTDEV and TNGDEV; provides item, unit, and system transportability assessments for MDR; provides transportability approval or identify corrective actions required to obtain approval for all transportability problem items; and reviews all materiel requirements documents to assess adequacy of transportability.

**b. U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM).** MEDCOM is the medical CBTDEV, TNGDEV, trainer, and user representative. MEDCOM conducts medical combat and training development activities as assigned by CG, TRADOC and TSG; reviews and evaluates materiel and TADSS requirements documents to identify and assure that adequate consideration is given to the prevention of health hazards from operating or maintaining materiel systems, and conduct the health hazard assessment (HHA) program, as required; conducts and supports assigned operational tests; and forwards all medical warfighting concepts and requirements documents to TRADOC for review and approval.

**c. U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).** INSCOM is the CBTDEV for strategic signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems and INSCOM sole-user intelligence, electronic warfare (EW) systems used for formulating doctrine, concepts, organization, materiel requirements, and objectives. INSCOM responsibilities include:

(1) Preparing requirements documents and serving as the Army CBTDEV during development and fielding of new SIGINT and information security (INFOSEC) systems under the purview of the National Security Agency (NSA) and having sole application to U.S. SIGINT and INFOSEC systems. INSCOM forwards warfighting concepts and requirements documents to TRADOC for review and approval.

(2) Coordinating with the PEO or MATDEV on matters pertaining to acquisition of INSCOM sole-user SIGINT and intelligence, security and electronic warfare (ISEW) systems.

(3) Coordinating with the CG, TRADOC, on requirements determination for other INSCOM sole user intelligence, security, and electronic warfare (ISEW) systems and conduct combat and training developments for these Army systems when directed by HQDA, and/or Director, Central Intelligence (DCI), or at the request of CG, TRADOC.

(4) Ensuring documentation of requirements for training support products, system TADSS, and/or embedded training for INSCOM systems.

(5) Providing threat documentation to TRADOC as validated and approved by HQDA DCSINT.

(6) Recommending to CG, TRADOC materiel requirements and associated priorities for strategic intelligence and security readiness.

**d. U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC).** AMC performs assigned materiel and related functions for research and development, acquisition and logistics support of materiel systems, and other materiel acquisition management functions required by DA. AMC is a principal MATDEV in the Army. The CG, AMC is a regular member of the ASARC. The AMC mission, in support of RDA, is to:

(1) Equip and sustain a trained, ready Army.

(2) Provide development and acquisition support to MATDEVs (PEOs, DSAs, and PMs).

(3) Provide equipment and services to other nations through the Security Assistance Program.

(4) Develop and acquire non-major systems and equipment.

(5) Define, develop, and acquire superior technologies.

(6) Maintain the mobilization capabilities necessary to support the Army in emergencies.

(7) Verify system safety; support developmental operational tests; and participate in the continuous evaluation process.

(8) Exercise delegated authority, under ASA(ALT) oversight, in the following areas: metrication; design to cost; production readiness reviews; manufacturing technology, standardization; acquisition streamlining; reliability, availability, and maintainability; quality; risk management; value engineering; parts control; and industrial modernization improvement.

(9) Provide survivability, vulnerability, or lethality assessments and survivability enhancement expertise for all Army materiel programs.

(10) Evaluate and recommend improvements to the industrial base.

(11) Responsible for the RDA and logistics support of assigned materiel in response to approved materiel requirements.

(12) Plan, coordinate, and provide functional support to PEOs, DSAs, and PMs. Support includes, but is not limited to, procurement and contracting, legal, managerial accounting, cost estimating, systems engineering, conducting system TADSS and embedded training concept formulation, developmental test, logistics support analyses, MANPRINT, environmental, intelligence and threat support, configuration management, and conducting various independent assessments and analyses.

(13) Provide overall management of the Army's technology base (less Class VIII), including identification of maturing technologies necessary to support acquisition of warfighting materiel systems.

(14) Provide RDA science and infrastructure information to HQDA for the Army RDA plan.

(15) Conduct a crosswalk, with the CBTDEV (TNGDEV for TADSS), of the ORD to the RFP to verify that the RFP, to include system specification or purchase description and the SOW, accurately reflects the operational requirements stated in the ORD for all programs. The MATDEV and CBTDEV (MATDEV and TNGDEV for TADSS) will formally certify that the RFP has been crosswalked with the ORD and is in agreement prior to the ASARC or program review.

(16) Provide initial and updated cost and system performance estimates for battlefield and peacetime operations as inputs to supporting analysis and program decisions.

**e. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).** TRADOC is the Army's primary "user representative" in the materiel acquisition process. TRADOC performs assigned materiel and related functions for operations research and analysis, evaluation of products of the requirements determination process, operational and organizational planning, logistics support planning, and quantitative and performance requirement specifications for materiel systems, and other combat development functions required by DA. As the Army's principal CBTDEV, TRADOC guides, coordinates, and integrates the total combat development effort of the Army. Combat developments are a major component of force development and encompass the formulation of concepts, doctrine, organization, materiel objectives, requirements, and operational tests (OT) of products of the requirements determination process.

(1) The CG, TRADOC is a regular member of the ASARC. As the Army's primary CBTDEV/TNGDEV, TRADOC is the Army's architect for the future and is charged to chart the course for the Army. In doing this, CG, TRADOC:

- (a) Guides and disciplines the requirements determination process by:
- Providing requirements determination and documentation procedures and process guidance.
  - Establishing and implementing horizontal requirements integration (HRI) policy.
  - Generating all Army warfighting requirements prior to their submission to HQDA.
  - Approving integrated concept team (ICT) minutes or reports containing proposing solution sets for force level objective force capabilities (OFCs) and proponent/branch level future operational capabilities (FOCs).
  - Coordinating MNSs and ORDs produced by the Army community and forward to DCSOPS for approval, prioritization and resourcing.
- (b) Assists DA to prioritize and justify warfighting requirements by:
- Determining applicability of ONS to future Army-wide requirements and assign to a proponent for requirement documentation.

- Providing insights and descriptive information for materiel programs.
- Supporting ODCSOPS by presenting documents and information to the JROC and Joint Warfighting Capabilities assessment (JWCA) and assisting in issue resolution.
- (c) Coordinates and integrates the total combat/training developments efforts of the Army by:
  - Providing, with appropriate support from other MACOMs, the capstone warfighting concept and OFCs/FOCs, the start point for requirements determination process.
  - Developing and maintaining the C4I operational architecture (OA).
  - Being the primary source for determining need for and preparing requirements and requirements documents for TADSS and embedded training.
  - Determining need for and obtaining CSA approval for conduct of advanced warfighting experiments (AWEs).
- (d) Conducts AoA for ACAT I, IA, and most II, programs when required by HQDA. When required by the MDA, conduct AoA for all other ACAT programs.
- (e) Serves as member of the Army S&T Advisory Group (ASTAG).
- (f) Provides representative to Army S&T reviews and management teams.

(2) TRADOC is organized into integrating centers and mission area schools and centers. The principal integrating centers in the materiel acquisition process are the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, and the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), Fort Lee. The mission area schools and centers are the branch schools and centers for Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Air Defense Artillery, Aviation, etc. The directorates of combat developments (DCDs) at the TRADOC mission area school and centers work very closely with the PEO community and the AMC “commodity” MSCs in the RDA management process.

(3) The TRADOC counterpart to the PM, the TRADOC system manager (TSM), is a central Figure in the RDA process and a key member of the MATDEV/CBTDEV team. The TSM is chartered by the CG, TRADOC to function as focal point for coordination of the CBTDEV/TNGDEV efforts in the development and acquisition of the system. The TSM is responsible to synchronize all doctrine, training, leader development, organization and soldier (DTLOS) domains that are impacted by the fielding of a materiel system. TSMs are appointed for selected acquisition programs. In some cases, a TRADOC program integration office (TPIO) may be appointed for a family of systems such as Army Battle Command System (ABCS), Combat ID, etc. A TSM/TPIO is appointed early in the development cycle, normally at the same time as the PM. The TSM is usually located at the proponent school and center. For systems without an assigned TSM/TPIO, the DCD at the proponent school and center serves as the focal point.

**f. U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).** In support of materiel systems RDA management, USASOC establishes mission area interface with TRADOC for all programs, ensuring that requirements and interests of each participating agency are provided full consideration in programs for which the Army has lead agency or executive

responsibility, and serves as the special operations trainer and user representative. In addition, USASOC will:

- (1) Forward all non-SOC unique warfighting capability requirements and documents to CG, TRADOC for appropriate action.
- (2) Forward SOC unique requirements documents to CG, TRADOC for review.
- (3) Monitor TRADOC projects and identify needs that affect the USASOC mission and responsibility.
- (4) Support TRADOC field activities, conduct and support testing, and monitor RDA projects to include potential force standardization and interoperability.
- (5) Participate in warfighting experiments, as appropriate.

**g. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC).** USASMDC is the principal assistant and advisor to the SA and the CSA for all matters pertaining to space and strategic defense. The USASMDC is responsible for technology development programs related to strategic and tactical missile defense, space defense, and satellite technology. The command conducts missile defense technology base research and development activities in support of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), assures transfer of technology between BMDO and Army systems, and provides matrix support to PEO Missile Defense. USASMDC is also chartered by CSA to be the operational advocate and focal point for theater missile defense (TMD) at Army level. The CG, USASMDC, assists in the development of Army TMD positions, reflective of work being done in TRADOC, and represents those positions at HQDA, OSD, BMDO, Joint Staff, Congressional, and other high-level forums.

### **11-19. Other DA agencies**

**a. U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC).** ATEC is a field operating agency (FOA) under the CSA. The CG, ATEC is responsible for management of the Army's operational testing, developmental testing, and system evaluation. Their evaluations of materiel systems operational effectiveness, suitability and survivability are independent of the CBTDEV/MATDEV and are reported directly to the MDR body. CG, ATEC is a member of the ASARC and Chairman of the Test Schedule and Review Committee (TSARC). The TSARC is the HQDA centralized management forum for user (operational) testing resources. ATEC provides advice and assistance to the CSA, the VCSA, other members of the ARSTAF, and other elements of DA in regard to Army operational test and evaluation. Other responsibilities are to:

- (1) Review all draft materiel requirements documents for T&E implications.
- (2) Assist TRADOC (CBTDEV/TNGDEV) in developing evaluatable, operationally relevant, and totally system focused critical operational issues and criteria (COICs). Provide advice concerning methods and measures to evaluate the system against the COIC and advise on the resources and ability to test and evaluate the system.
- (3) Support the TRADOC advanced warfighting experiment (AWE) program and concept experimentation program (CEP).

**b. U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC).**

USAMRMC is the medical MATDEV, logistician, and developmental tester and is responsible for RDA and logistic support of assigned materiel in response to approved materiel requirements. In addition, USAMRMC will:

(1) Plan, program, budget, and execute medical RDTE tasks that support system RDA to include required system training support products, TADSS, and/or embedded training.

(2) Plan, coordinate, and provide functional support to USAMRMC organizations. Support includes, but is not limited to, procurement and contracting, legal, managerial accounting, cost estimating, systems engineering, conducting system TADSS and embedded training concept formulation, developmental testing, ILS, MANPRINT, environmental management, configuration management, and conducting various independent assessments and analyses.

(3) Assist the medical CBTDEV/TNGDEV in the requirement determination process.

(4) Review requirement documents to determine their adequacy and feasibility and for logistical support aspects of materiel systems to include ILS.

(5) Develop and maintain the physiological, psychological, and medical databases to support the HHA, system safety assessments (SSA), and human factors engineering analysis (HFEA).

(6) Evaluate and manage the materiel readiness functions in the medical materiel acquisition process.

(7) Function as TSG agency for the materiel acquisition of medical nondevelopmental items (NDI), commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items, and sets, kits, and outfits.

**c. U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School (AMEDDC&S).**

AMEDDC&S is the medical CBTDEV, TNGDEV, doctrine developer, and operational tester. In addition, AMEDDC&S develops doctrine, organizations, and systems requirements within the guidelines established by the CG, TRADOC and in accordance with Army health care standards established by TSG.

**SECTION IV**

**MATERIEL REQUIREMENTS DETERMINATION PROCESS.**

**11-20. Policy**

a. DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2 provide mandatory DOD acquisition policy and procedures including materiel requirements documentation and approval guidance for MDAPs for both materiel and AIS. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01A mandates policy and procedural guidance for the requirements generation system to include guidance on KPPs, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and the JROC. AR 70-1 provides Army acquisition guidance for materiel and information systems. AR 71-9 provides Army requirements determination and documentation policies and responsibilities implementing DODD 5000.1, DODI 5000.2 and CJCSI 3170.01A supporting all Army

ACAT I through IV materiel and information systems. ACATs are shown in Figure 11-4. The terms materiel and materiel system in this chapter apply to materiel and information systems unless specifically identified otherwise.

**b.** The main governing policies are summarized below:

(1) The requirements determination process provides a current and future Army capable of success in any contingency from humanitarian assistance to full tactical operations in joint and combined environments. The process will be responsive to the urgent materiel requirements of the deployed warfighter as well as project the full set of doctrine, training, leader development, organizational design, materiel, and soldier (DTLOMS) requirements for the Army to be mission capable in near-, mid-, and far-term operations.

(2) Field commanders document and submit their urgent warfighting and training operational requirements and obtain support via the ONS process discussed in AR 71-9, TRADOC Black Book #3 and TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9.

(3) Commanders with combat developments missions conduct continuing analyses identify and define near- through far-term DTLOMS requirements.

(4) Future operational requirements for all DTLOMS domains will be related to the TRADOC approved capstone operational concept and associated lower level supporting and integrating concepts (TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5). The current approved capstone warfighting concept for the Army is Army Transformation (Objective Force). Requirements not related to these warfighting concepts are not provided resources. TRADOC's integrated and approved listing of force level OFCs and proponent/branch level FOCs from these concepts serve as a process control mechanism; authority for supporting studies and experimentation; and a device for linkage between requirements documentation and the concepts. OFCs and FOCs are listed biannually in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66.

(5) Requirements determination is the work of ICTs, made up of people from multiple disciplines. Their efforts may include concept development or materiel operational requirements development and documentation. DTLOMS solution sets are documented in ICT minutes or reports. ICTs operate on principals similar to acquisition integrated product teams (IPTs) in DODI 5000.2 to identify and resolve issues early. An ICT includes representatives of Army requirements process stakeholders and other principal contributors, including academia and industry, when appropriate. OSD, other services, CINCs, and Joint Staff are invited to send representatives, as appropriate, when their interest is known or suspected.

(6) A materiel requirement is developed for an approved OFC/FOC only after all other possible doctrine, training, leader development, or organizational solutions are deemed unable to solve the OFC/FOC. The priority order of consideration is doctrine, training, leader development, organizational design, and finally materiel. MNSs are prepared in accordance with CJCSI 3170.01A format guidelines for those materiel requirements with ACAT I or IA program potential and other programs representing a new Army mission or a potential program using a significant leap ahead technology. ORDs are prepared in accordance with DODI 5000.2 format guidance.

(7) All ACAT I, IA, II, and III materiel programs have an ORD. ACAT IV materiel programs have ORDs, except ACAT IV base operations materiel that are not warfighting requirements. They can be procured following MACOM standard acquisition procedures.

(8) The Joint Staff, J-6, will conduct an interoperability requirements certification of all ACAT I, IA, II, and III MNSs, CRDs, and ORDs (CJCSI 6212.01B).

(9) All IT products must comply with the Army's operations, systems, and technical architectures. MACOM information management offices review and ensure compliance with architectures.

(10) Standardization is a key focus of CBTDEVs/TNGDEVs throughout the requirements determination and acquisition management process. Properly applied, standardization can significantly reduce life-cycle costs, schedules, and risks, while improving quality and logistic support.

(11) Close coordination is maintained between CBTDEVs/TNGDEVs and the S&T community to ensure that technology investments are appropriately focusing on identified OFCs/FOCs. Periodic reviews are conducted with program offices, laboratories, users, and maintainers to assess the technical status, emerging performance, affordability, and remaining technology shortfalls. Modeling and simulation (M&S) are used to preclude unnecessary and impractical development.

(12) All system developments have many capability characteristics that are defined in requirements documentation. Key performance parameters (KPP) are those system characteristics that define whether or not a system will be capable of mission accomplishment. KPPs are, by definition, characteristics that can cause a concept or system to be reevaluated and a program to be reassessed for restructuring or termination. All requirements documentation will contain KPPs, which will in turn be documented in the system APB. A KPP addressing interoperability is required (CJCSI 3170.01A). For ACAT I systems, KPPs are validated and approved by the JROC even if the authority for the requirements document has been delegated to the component. HQDA validates and approves other KPPs.

(13) When developing system characteristics and performance parameters, cost must be considered on an equal level. In other words, cost is treated as an independent variable along with others used to define a system. This concept - CAIV - does not preclude consideration and evaluation of a new high potential, leap-ahead but expensive DTLOMS technology.

### **11-21. Army science and technology**

a. The ultimate goal of the Army's S&T program is to provide the soldier with a winning edge on the battlefield. The accelerating pace of technological change continues to offer significant opportunities to enhance the survivability, lethality, deployability, and versatility of Army forces. High technology research and development is, and will remain, a central feature of the Army's modernization strategy. Key to this modernization strategy is the planned transition of promising technology developments into tomorrow's operational capabilities. Technology demonstrations (TDs), discussed later, which evolve into systems and system upgrades incorporated in the AMP accomplish this transition.

**b.** The Army's S&T program is an integral part of materiel acquisition. The S&T program consists of three stages - basic research (6.1), applied research (6.2), and advanced technology development (6.3). The identifiers--6.1, 6.2, etc.--are commonly used for identifying funds; but they are also used as a shorthand technique by members of the R&D community to identify levels of research development. For example, instead of referring to some project as being "in applied research," it is often referred to as being "6.2". The 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 categories are known as the "tech base". (A MNS is not required for 6.1, 6.2 programs, regardless of size.) Basic research (6.1) includes all efforts of scientific study and experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields related to long-term national security needs. Applied research (6.2) includes all efforts directed to the solution of specific military problems, short of major development projects. Advanced technology development (6.3) includes all efforts directed toward projects, which have moved into the development of hardware for testing of operational feasibility. Initiatives, such as the DOD advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTD), (discussed later in the chapter) obscure the distinction between S&T and development -- pre- and post-milestone A activities.

**c.** The Army Science and Technology Master Plan (ASTMP) is the strategic plan for the Army's S&T program. It is approved by the SA and the CSA. It is our S&T roadmap for achieving Army Transformation and Force XXI. This plan is provided to government, industry, and academia to convey the Army's S&T vision, objectives, priorities, and corresponding strategy. This document is explicit, resource-constrained DA guidance to drive funding priorities and the S&T program as a whole. The ASTMP provides "top down" guidance from HQDA to all S&T organizations. It also provides a vital link between DOD technology planning and the Army's major commands and laboratories. The core of DOD's S&T strategy is to fuel and exploit the information technology explosion; conduct extensive and realistic demonstrations of new technology applications; and provide for early, extensive and continued involvement of warfighters in S&T demonstration programs. S&T programs must be responsive to numerous national security considerations.

**d.** A mainstay of the Army strategy for military technology is a viable in-house research capability. Laboratories and research, development, engineering centers (RDECs) are the key organizations responsible for technical leadership, scientific advancements and support for the acquisition process. Activities of these organizations range from basic research to the correction of deficiencies in field systems. Academia and industry as well as hands-on bench work contribute to the S&T mission. Technology insertion into systems is accomplished via the flow of patents, data, design criteria, and other information into TDs, ATDs, new designs, and fielded systems.

**e.** The Army is streamlining the in-house research infrastructure through laboratory consolidation and placing significantly greater reliance on other Services S&T investments. In an effort to make the Army's 21st century research and development efforts more efficient and effective the Lab 21 study was initiated. One of the key elements of Lab 21 was the creation of a world class "flagship" laboratory called the Army Research Laboratory (ARL). Independent Army laboratories have been consolidated into technical directorates under the ARL management umbrella. ARL converted to a federated laboratory system, aligning Army researchers with the best that industry and academia have to offer to support Army Transformation and Force XXI.

**f.** Overall, the Army's S&T strategy and programs are committed to the maintenance of technological superiority, while preserving the flexibility to cope with a wide array of possible threat, technology, and budget environments. The Army's investment in S&T is paramount and is playing a greater role in acquisition than ever, particularly since the advent of DOD ACTDs.

**g.** A series of reviews of current and proposed S&T activities guide focused research. The first is an annual assessment of all proposed Army-funded S&T projects. It is conducted based on an appreciation of current capabilities, ongoing S&T activities and their applicability to the OFCs/FOCs described earlier in the chapter in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66. Building from the S&T project review, a list of the top 200 Army science and technology objectives (STO) candidates--the Army's most important S&T projects--is generated. Based on formal developmental milestones and achievement measures, the Army Science and Technology Working Group (ASTWG) approves each STO, which is then listed in ASTMP. The ASTMP and the AMP provide the basis for ATDs, which showcase a variety of advanced technologies and their potential military merit. In addition to advancing the technology, all of this in-house S&T activity assists the ICTs to better understand the "art of the possible" and refine the many requirements associated with them.

**h.** TRADOC Pamphlet 525-66 also guides independent research & development (IR&D) efforts. By providing the private sector an unclassified, descriptive list of desired OFCs/FOCs, the Army is able to tap into a wealth of information and new ideas on different means to achieve those capabilities. The Army encourages industry to share these ideas with appropriate CBTDEV and TNGDEV organizations.

**i.** A special program—Advanced Concept and Technology II (ACT II) program—encourages the application/demonstration of mature technologies, NDI, and/or prototypes to address highest priority OFCs/FOC needs. ACT II funds proposed TDs which, if successful and compelling, may be selected for expedited acquisition or funded through the normal Army acquisition process. ACT II projects are funded at a maximum of \$1.5 million with a planned period of performance not exceeding twelve months. The program is focused on applying mature technologies and unconventional concepts and approaches to address specific OFCs/FOCs which are solicited annually through a broad agency announcement (BAA). This approach shortens the acquisition cycle and reduces developmental costs. ACT II is sponsored by the CSA and ASA(ALT). TRADOC, AMC, and the Army Research Office (ARO) collaborate to build ACT II partnerships between the Army, industry, and the academic community.

**j.** As with some concepts, S&T research occasionally produces an item that is recognizable as a defined requirement that should be documented and resourced. Most S&T products must be evaluated in warfighting experiments before a decision is made to document them as materiel requirements.

**k.** Oversight of the S&T program is provided by the ASTAG, which is co-chaired by the AAE and the VCSA (Figure 11-6). The ASTWG, is co-chaired by the Army S&T executive (the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology) and the ADCSPRO-FD. The ASTWG provides general officer level resolution of pressing S&T issues prior to meetings of the ASTAG; recommends to the ASTAG revisions to the Army's S&T vision, strategy, principles, and priorities; and reviews and approves ATDs and STOs.




Figure 11-6. Army Science and Technology Oversight

11-22. Technology transition strategy

The basic strategy of the S&T program is to transition mature technologies into operational systems that satisfy approved warfighting materiel requirements. Key to this strategy are demonstrations. TDs, ATDs, ACTDs exploit technologies derived from applied research (6.2), which in turn build on new knowledge derived from basic research (6.1) programs. These TDs, ATDs, and ACTDs provide the basis for new systems, system upgrades, or advance concepts which are further out in time. The critical challenge is to tie these programs together in an efficient and effective way. TDs are not new. What is new is the scope and depth of the technology demonstrations, the increased importance of their role in the acquisition process, and the increased emphasis on user involvement to permit an early and meaningful evaluation of overall military capability. The following sections provide an explanation of TDs, ATDs, ACTDs, as well as systems/system upgrades.

**a. Technology demonstrations (TDs).** The primary focus of TDs is to demonstrate the feasibility and practicality of a technology for solving specific military requirements. They are incorporated during the various stages of the 6.2 and 6.3 development process and encourage technical competition. They are most often conducted in a non-operational (lab or field) environment. These demonstrations provide information that reduces uncertainties and subsequent engineering cost, while simultaneously providing valuable development and requirements data.

**b. Advanced technology demonstrations (ATDs).** Within the DTAP, previously discussed, specific ATDs are structured to meet established goals. Detailed roadmaps to guide their progress are developed, as well as exit criteria to define their goals. ATDs are risk reducing, integrated, “proof of principle” demonstrations designed to assist near-term system developments in satisfying specific operational capability needs. The ATD approach has been promoted by the Defense Science Board (DSB) and the Army Science Board (ASB) as a means of accelerating the introduction of new technologies into operational systems. They are principally funded with advanced technology development (6.3) funds. ATDs facilitate the integration of proposed technologies into full system integration (6.4) or system demonstration (6.5) prototype systems. As such, they provide the link between the technology developer, PEO, PM, and the Army user. As of this update, the Army has 20

ATDs which have been approved by the ASTWG. More detailed information including exit criteria for each ATD can be found in the ASTMP previously discussed. The criteria for establishing an ATD are:

- (1) Execution at the system or major subsystem level in an operational rather than a laboratory environment.
- (2) Potential for new or enhanced military operational capability or cost effectiveness.
- (3) Duration of three to five years.
- (4) Transition plan in place for known and/or potential applications.
- (5) Active participation by TRADOC battle lab and user proponents.
- (6) Participation by the MATDEV (PM).
- (7) Use of simulation to assess doctrine/tactical payoffs.
- (8) Exit criteria established with user interaction/concurrence.

**c. Advanced concept technology demonstrations (ACTDs).** The newest initiative in the DOD acquisition strategy is the ACTD. The DOD ACTD initiative, grew from the 1986 Packard Commission recommendation for rapid prototyping. ACTDs are joint Service in nature, featuring CINC sponsorship and provide as much as two years of leave-behind (residual) capability in the field. ACTDs apply advanced technologies to joint warfighting requirements to provide an advanced capability in limited time frames. The ACTD is an integrated effort to assemble and demonstrate a significant new military capability, based upon maturing advanced technology(s), in a real-time operation at a scale adequate to clearly establish operational utility and system integrity. ACTDs are jointly sponsored and implemented by the operational user, and MATDEV communities, with approval and oversight guidance from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Systems and Concepts) (DUSD(AS&C)).

(1) The ACTD concept is a cornerstone in the new acquisition strategy that relies on prototyping and demonstration programs to maintain the U.S. military technological edge in the face of declining procurement budgets. ACTDs are a maturer phase of the ATDs. They are two- to four-year efforts in which new weapons and technologies are developed, prototyped, and then tested by the soldiers in the field for up to two years before being procured.

(2) ACTDs are not new programs, but tend to be a combination of previously identified ATDs, TDs, or concepts already begun. They include high level management and oversight to transform disparate technology development efforts conducted by the various military services into prototype systems that can be tested and eventually fielded. The ACTD becomes the last step in determining whether the military needs and can afford the new technology.

**d. Systems and system upgrades.**

(1) The development of the next set of materiel systems requires prior demonstration of the feasibility of employing new technologies. "New-start" systems are those next in line after the ones currently fielded or in production. For these systems, most technical barriers to

the new capability have been overcome. Generally, these systems can enter system development and demonstration (acquisition system management process phase B) relatively quickly as a result of the successful demonstration of enabling technologies. Based on current funding guidance, the number of “new-start” systems is in a sharp decline.

(2) In the absence of “new-start” systems, the Army is pursuing incremental improvements to existing systems to maintain its technological edge, and capabilities. As defined in the ASTMP, these improvements are designated as systems modifications. System modifications are brought about through technology insertion programs (discussed in detail later), service life extension programs (SLEPs), preplanned product improvements (P3I), and block improvement programs. These modifications are based primarily on the success of funded 6.3 ATDs/TDs. The 6.3 ATDs/TDs either are the basis for the system modification or have a high probability of forming the basis for the system modification.

### **11-23. Warfighting experiments**

Warfighting experiments are the heart of DOD/Army’s warfighting requirements determination process. Progressive and iterative mixes of high fidelity constructive, virtual and live simulations using real soldiers and units in relevant, tactically competitive scenarios provide Army leaders with OFC/FOC insights. Warfighting experiments are conducted to gain understanding about some aspect of future warfighting. Capability insights from warfighting experiments are “way points” used by the Army to plot its future course to Army Transformation and Force XXI. There are four main categories of warfighting experiments -- concept experiments, limited objective experiments (LOEs), AWEs, and joint warfighting experiments (JWEs).

**a. Concept experiments.** The overwhelming majority of warfighting experiments is concept experiments pertaining to TRADOC individual operations or branches. Most concept experiments are conducted as part of the TRADOC CEP. CEP is a separately funded TRADOC initiative that provides quick reaction assessments of the military utility/potential for new or revised DTLOMS concepts. They are a means to “model-experiment-model” possible requirements and are the building blocks in the “progressive and interactive mix” of simulations. Additionally, they are usually small enough to support the detailed planning and data collection required by the test and evaluation communities. A concept proponent conducts the experiment or requests a battle lab to sponsor it. They either resource it in-house or request resources from HQ, TRADOC.

**b. Limited objective experiments (LOEs).** LOEs are designed around single events or progressive, iterative simulations with primary relevance to a single issue. LOEs allow the proponent and battle laboratory to conduct low-cost, quick analysis of an issue or to a limited set of issues. LOEs are normally sponsored by one battle laboratory, but there may be several battle laboratories participating in the planning and execution phases of an experiment. LOEs are funded by sources other than the CEP (i.e., within the experimentation campaign plan, school discretionary funds, or by funding from another government agency).

**c. Advanced warfighting experiments (AWEs).** AWEs are the Army’s capstone experimentation events focused on a major increase in warfighting capability across multiple branches and the full DTLOMS spectrum. Any concept proponent recommends the AWE, the TRADOC Commander sponsors it, and the CSA approves and resources it. Today, most AWEs employ live simulations--soldiers and units in field environments. However, live

simulations are very expensive, and if they involve new materiel, may occur late in the materiel development cycle. Future warfighting experiments will use a comprehensive suite of reconfigurable simulators and simulations in addition to live simulations. Distributed interactive simulations (DIS) connected by the Defense Simulations Internet (DSI) will create a synthetic theater of war (STOW) that enables Army leaders to quickly model, evaluate and change different requirements from any of the DTLOMS domains. Thus, future warfighting experiments will leverage relatively low-cost models to explore requirements across the DTLOMS spectrum, reserving expensive field exercises for the final defining event in the requirements determination process.

**d. Joint warfighting experiments (JWEs).** JWEs are a mechanism for experimenting with systems or systems involving advanced technologies prior to commitment to acquisition programs. They are conducted as part of JWEs. A JWE is a snapshot in time when prototypes from ATDs, ACTDs, development programs and technology base efforts are integrated to permit the warfighter to evaluate their combined potential and gain insight into future advanced joint warfighting concepts. JWEs are DOD-wide efforts to support the horizontal integration and synchronization of advanced technologies from ACTDs, ATDs, and advanced distributed simulation products for experimentation in joint warfighting exercises, such as the September 2000 Millennium Challenge 2000 joint warfighting experiment sponsored by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Joint Forces Command (CINC, USJFCOM). Warfighting experiments provide an unsurpassed means to understand future warfighting requirements. Planned and executed with the entire combined arms team and appropriate other Service elements, warfighting experiments open the “windows to the future”. Understanding the cost and benefits of change across the force and in all domains allows us to “maintain the edge” and conserve resources at the same time.

## **SECTION V**

### **MATERIEL SYSTEMS ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PROCESS**

#### **11-24. Initiation of the materiel acquisition process**


The materiel acquisition (RDA) process is initiated as a result of output--approved warfighting materiel requirements--from the requirements determination process efforts of the CBTDEV. Identified materiel requirements are first assessed to determine if they can be satisfied by nonmateriel solutions. Nonmateriel solutions include changes in doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and soldiers (DTLOS). Only if these nonmateriel solutions will not satisfactorily overcome the deficiency is a new development materiel program initiated. A hierarchy of potential materiel alternatives (strategies) must be considered before committing to a new start acquisition program. In order of preference, the DOD directed materiel alternatives are the following:

- Procurement of (including modification of) commercially available domestic or international technologies, systems or equipment, or the additional production (including modification) of previously-developed U.S. military systems or equipment, or Allied systems or equipment.
- A cooperative development program with one or more allied nations.
- A new joint component or government agency development program.

- A new component -unique development program.

**11-25. Framework of the materiel acquisition process**

In the broad sense, the acquisition process consists of a series of management decisions made in DOD or the Army as the development of a materiel system progresses from a stated materiel requirement to a fielded system. Product improvements (PIs) to existing systems or acquisition of NDI usually occurs through acquisition streamlining (discussed later in the chapter). The framework that is used in the materiel acquisition process is shown in Figure 11-7. A key aspect of the materiel acquisition process is that it is divided into three distinct activities (pre-systems acquisition, systems acquisition, sustainment); four phases (concept and technology development, system development and demonstration, production and deployment, and sustainment); and eight work efforts (concept exploration, component advanced development, system integration, system demonstration, low rate initial production (LRIP), full rate production (FRP) and deployment, operational support, and disposal). Entry into the acquisition process is at one of the decision points, called milestones (MS) or within phases dependent on the technological maturity of the alternative selected.



**Figure 11-7. System Acquisition Management Process**

**11-26. Determining and documenting materiel requirements**

All acquisition programs are based on identified future operational materiel needs. Determination of these needs is a result of continuing assessments of current and projected capabilities in the context of military threat and national military policy. A mission need may address: (1) a new operational capability, (2) improvement of an existing capability, or (3) a desire to exploit promising technologies. Mission needs can be identified by Unified Commands, the Military Departments, OSD, or the Joint Staff. In theory, mission need identification should first exhaust all nonmateriel solutions such as, doctrine, training, or organizational changes. When a need is identified that could potentially result in the establishment of a MDAP, a MNS is prepared that is a nonsystem-specific statement of operational capability. The MNS can be prepared by any DOD component which has identified a specific mission area materiel requirement or need.

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**11-27. Acquisition categories**

When the materiel requirement and manner of acquisition have been identified, the acquisition is designated as ACAT I-IV. This category determines the level of review, and who will make the milestone decisions. Dollar criteria and visibility of the potential program determine the ACAT. There are four acquisition categories, as shown in Figure 11-4.

**11-28. Acquisition strategies and program plans**

a. An acquisition strategy is the framework for planning, directing, and managing an acquisition program to satisfy an approved materiel requirement. Acquisition strategies and their supporting program plans are tailored to accomplish established program objectives and to control risk. They must also provide the information essential for milestone decisions. In this regard, acquisition strategies are event-driven and explicitly link major contractual commitments and milestone decisions to demonstrated accomplishments in development and testing.

b. Program plans provide for a systems engineering approach to the simultaneous design of the product and its associated manufacturing, test, and support processes. This concurrent engineering approach is essential to achieving a careful balance among system design requirements (for example, operational performance, producibility, reliability, maintainability, logistics and human factors engineering, safety, survivability, interoperability, and standardization). Maximum practicable use is made of commercial and other nondevelopmental items. The Army's first preference is to use performance specifications, the next is to use non-government standards (NGS), and as a last resort military specifications and standards (MILSPEC/STD) may be used. Use of MILSPEC/STD requires a waiver from the MDA. Additionally, changes to DODI 5000.2 resulting from the *Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASTA) of 1994* state the AS should be tailored to the extent feasible to employ commercial practices when purchasing commercial products or other nondevelopmental items.

c. Cost as an independent variable (CAIV) is the DOD cost reduction methodology utilized throughout the entire life-cycle of a programs acquisition process to ensure operational capability of the total force is maximized for the given modernization investment. In other words, cost is treated as an independent variable along with others used to define a system. Cost performance analysis is conducted on a continuous basis throughout the life-cycle. CAIV directly impacts the preparation of a program's requirements documents (MNSs, CRDs and ORDs), as well as acquisition documents (AS and APB).

**11-29. Environmental considerations**

Environmental impact is always considered in Defense acquisitions. The *National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969* mandates documentation of the environmental effects of proposed Federal actions. The Act requires initiation of NEPA compliance before development begins; environmental analysis for each milestone decision; accounting for all direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental impacts before production starts, and analysis of life-cycle environmental costs. The environmental documentation process can be lengthy and costly. Early consideration of environmental impacts and NEPA requirements will protect not only the environment, but cost and schedule as well.

### **11-30. Risk assessments and management**

Program risks and risk management plans are explicitly assessed at each milestone decision point prior to granting approval to proceed into the next acquisition phase. Risks must be well understood, and risk management approaches developed, before MDAs can authorize a program to proceed into the next phase of the acquisition process. To assess and manage risk, MATDEVs use a variety of techniques. They include TDs, prototyping, and T&E. Risk management encompasses identification, mitigation, and continuous tracking and control procedures that feed back through the program assessment process to decision authorities. PMs, and other MATDEVs develop a contracting approach appropriate to the type system being developed and acquired.

## **SECTION VI**

### **ACQUISITION ACTIVITIES, PHASES AND MILESTONES**

#### **11-31. Pre-systems acquisition activity**

Pre-system acquisition is composed of on-going activities in development of user needs, in science and technology, and in concept development work specific to the development of a materiel solution to an identified, validated materiel requirement.

#### **11-32. Concept and technology development phase**

One path into systems acquisition begins with examining alternative concepts to meet a stated mission need. This path begins with a decision to enter Concept and Technology Development at Milestone A. The phase ends with a selection of a system architecture(s) and the completion of entrance criteria into Milestone B and System Development and Demonstration Phase.

#### **11-33. Entrance criteria**

a. The Chief of Staff, Army, will approve all warfighting requirements. All Army warfighting requirements in the form of Mission Need Statements (MNS), Capstone Requirements Documents (CRD), and Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) will be submitted to HQDA for validation or approval. This applies to all requirement documents, regardless of Acquisition Category (ACAT) level. In this context, Army warfighting requirements include Joint and other Service requirements with Army participation or interest. The Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC) is established to advise the Chief of Staff on Army warfighting requirements.

b. After HQDA validates and approves a MNS, the MDA (through the ICT process) reviews the MNS, considers possible technology issues (i.e., technologies demonstrated in ATDs), and identifies possible alternatives before making a Milestone A decision, based on an analysis of multiple concepts (alternatives) to be studied, and considering cooperative opportunities.

#### **11-34. Milestone A**

At Milestone A, the MDA approves the initiation of concept studies, designates a lead agency, approves concept exploration exit criteria, and issues the acquisition decision memorandum (ADM). The leader of the CBTDEV-led ICT, working with the integrated test

team, develops an integrated evaluation strategy that describes how the capabilities in the MNS will be evaluated once the system is developed. For potential MDAPs, the integrated evaluation strategy is approved by the DOD Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and the cognizant OIPT leader 180 days after Milestone A approval. A favorable Milestone A decision does not yet mean that a new acquisition program has been initiated. Milestone A approval can lead to concept exploration or component advanced development depending on whether an evaluation of multiple concepts is desired or if a concept has been chosen, but more work is needed on key sub-systems or components before a system architecture can be determined and the technologies can be demonstrated in a relevant environment.

### **11-35. Concept exploration work effort**

**a.** Concept exploration typically consists of competitive, parallel, short-term concept studies. The focus of these efforts is to define and evaluate the feasibility of alternative concepts and to provide a basis for assessing the relative merits (i.e., advantages and disadvantages, degree of risk, etc.) of these concepts. The AoA, discussed later in the chapter, is used to facilitate comparisons of alternative concepts. In order to achieve the best possible system solution, emphasis is placed on innovation and competition. To this end, participation by a diversified range of businesses (i.e., small, new, domestic, and international) is encouraged. Alternative system design concepts are primarily solicited from private industry and, where appropriate, from organic activities, international technology and equipment firms, Federal laboratories, federally funded research and development centers, educational institutions, and other not-for-profit organizations. The work in concept exploration normally is funded only for completion of concept studies contracts. The work is guided by the approved MNS.

**b.** The most promising system concepts are defined in terms of initial, broad objectives for cost, schedule, and performance; identification of interoperability, security, technology protection, operational support, and infrastructure requirements within a family of systems; opportunities for tradeoffs, and an overall acquisition strategy and test and evaluation strategy (including development test (DT), operational test (OT), and live fire testing (LFT)). This work effort ends with a review, at which the MDA selects the preferred concept (alternative) to be pursued for which technologies are available.

### **11-36. Decision review**

During concept exploration, the MDA may hold a decision review to determine if additional component development is necessary before key technologies will be sufficiently mature to enter system development and demonstration phase for one of the concepts under consideration. If the concepts do not require technologies necessitating additional component development, the appropriate milestone (B or C) is held in place of this review.

### **11-37. Program initiations in advance of Milestone B**

The practical result of a preference for more mature technology is initiation of individual programs at later stages of development, after determination of technology maturity. As a consequence, most acquisition programs are initiated at Milestone B. On the rare occasions when an earlier program initiation is appropriate, it takes place at entry to or during component advanced development. At program initiation in advance of Milestone B, the

MDA approves the AS, the APB, IT certification for major automated information systems (MAISs), and exit criteria for the component advanced development work effort if not already established.

### **11-38. Component advanced development work effort**

The project shall enter component advanced development when the ICT leader has a concept for the needed capability, but does not yet know the system architecture. Unless otherwise determined by the MDA, the component technology to be developed shall have been proven in concept. The project shall exit component advanced development when a system architecture has been developed and the component technology has been demonstrated in the relevant environment or the MDA decides to end this effort. This effort is intended to reduce risk on components and subsystems that have only been demonstrated in a laboratory environment and to determine the appropriate set of subsystems to be integrated into a full system. This work effort normally is funded only for the advanced development work. The work effort is guided by the validated MNS, but during this activity, an ORD is developed by the CBTDEV-led ICT to support program initiation. Also, acquisition information necessary for a milestone decision (i.e., the acquisition strategy, program protection plan, etc.) is developed. This effort is normally followed by entry into the system development and demonstration phase after a Milestone B decision by the MDA.

### **11-39. Systems acquisition activity**

Systems acquisition is the process of developing concepts into producible and deployable products that provide capability to the user. The concept to exploit in systems acquisition is based on an analysis of alternative ways to meet the military need (done either in concept exploration or technological opportunities development), including commercial and non-developmental technologies and products and services determined through market analysis. The CBTDEV responsible for the mission area in which a deficiency or opportunity has been identified, but not the MATDEV, normally prepares the AoA. The goal is to develop the best overall value solution over the system's life cycle that meets the user's operational requirements.

### **11-40. System development and demonstration phase**

a. The purpose of the system development and demonstration phase is to develop a system, reduce program risk, ensure operational supportability, design for producibility, ensure affordability, and demonstrate system integration, interoperability, and utility. Discovery and development are aided by the use of simulation-based acquisition and test and evaluation and guided by a system AS and TEMP. System modeling, simulation, test, and evaluation activities are integrated into an efficient continuum planned and executed by a test and evaluation working-level integrated product team (TEWIPT). This continuum features coordinated test events, access to all test data by all involved Agencies, and independent evaluation of test results by involved Agencies. Modeling, simulation, and DT are under the direct responsibility of the PM or a designated test agency. All results of early operational assessments are reported by the ATEC used by the MDA in support of decisions. The independent planning, execution, and evaluation of dedicated initial operational test (IOT), as required by law, and follow-on operational test (FOT), if required, are the responsibility of ATEC.

**b.** This phase can be entered either directly out of technology opportunity and user need activities or from concept exploration. The actual entry point depends on the maturity of the technologies, validated requirements (including urgency of need), and affordability. The MDA determines the appropriate entrance point, which is Milestone B. There is only one Milestone B per program, or evolutionary block.

**c.** HQDA, along with the other services, is authorized by DOD to maintain a transition fund in the out-years of the FYDP to allow rapid transition of military or commercial projects from technology opportunity and user needs activities to system development and demonstration or commitment to low-rate production. HQDA determines the size of its transition fund. The transition fund for the first year of the program is distributed to individual budget lines prior to submission of the budget estimate submission (BES) for that year.

#### **11-41. Entrance criteria**

**a.** Entrance into system development and demonstration is dependent on three things: technology (including software) maturity, validated requirements, and funding. Unless some other factor is overriding in its impact, the maturity of the technology determines the path to be followed. Programs that enter the process at Milestone B have a system architecture and an operational architecture for their relevant mission area.

**b.** Technology is developed in S&T or procured from industry. Technology must have been demonstrated in a relevant environment or, preferably, in an operational environment (using the transition mechanisms) to be considered mature enough to use for product development in systems integration. If technology is not mature, alternative technology is used that is mature and that can meet the user's needs. The determination of technology maturity is made by the Army S&T Executive, with review of the determination for potential MDAPs by the DUSD(S&T).

**c.** Prior to entering system development and demonstration, there must be a HQDA approved ORD. The ORD, discussed later in this chapter, contains operational performance requirements and addresses cost for a proposed concept or system. Time-phased ORDs must be approved by HQDA prior to program approval. If a mature technology, non-developmental item, or commercial item is being considered for transition to an acquisition program at Milestone B or C, it must have an approved ORD prior to being approved as an acquisition program.

**d.** The affordability determination is made in the process of addressing cost as a military requirement in the requirements process and included in each ORD (paragraph 8), beginning with the acquisition cost but using life-cycle cost or total ownership cost where available and approved. Transition into system development and demonstration also requires full funding (i.e., inclusion in the budget and out-year program of the funding for all current and future efforts necessary to carry out the acquisition strategy), which is programmed when a system concept and design have been selected, a PM has been assigned, an ORD has been approved, and system-level development is ready to begin. In the case of a replacement system, when the Milestone B is projected to occur in the first 2 years of the FYDP under review, the program shall be fully funded in that PPBS/PPBES cycle. In no case shall full funding be done later than Milestone B, unless a program first enters the acquisition process at Milestone C.

### **11-42. Milestone B**

Milestone B is normally the initiation of an acquisition program. The purpose of Milestone B is to authorize entry into system development and demonstration.

**a.** Prior to approving entry into system development and demonstration at Milestone B, the MDA considers the validated ORD, system threat assessment (STA), program protection, independent technology assessment and any technology issues identified, any early operational assessments or test and evaluation results, AoA, the CCA, manpower estimate (if applicable), system affordability and funding, the proposed AS, cooperative opportunities, and infrastructure and operational support. At Milestone B the MDA confirms the AS approved prior to release of the final RFP and approve the development APB, LRIP quantities (where applicable), and system development and demonstration exit criteria (and exit criteria for interim program review, if necessary).

**b.** For MDAPs, the DOT&E and the cognizant OIPT leader approves the TEMP (including the LFT strategy, if applicable) for all OSD test and evaluation oversight programs. If full-up, system-level LFT is unreasonably expensive and impractical, a waiver can be approved by the DAE, for programs where he or she is the MDA, or by the AAE, for programs where he or she is the MDA, and an alternative live fire test and evaluation (LFT&E) plan shall be approved by the DOT&E before entry into system development and demonstration phase.

### **11-43. Entry into system development and demonstration**

**a.** Milestone B approval can lead to system integration or system demonstration. Regardless of the approach recommended, PMs and other acquisition managers continually assess program risks. Risks must be well understood, and risk management approaches developed, before decision authorities can authorize a program to proceed into the next phase of the acquisition process. Risk management is an organized method of identifying and measuring risk and developing, selecting, and managing options for handling these risks. The types of risk include, but are not limited to, schedule, cost, technical feasibility, risk of technical obsolescence, software management, dependencies between a new program and other programs, and risk of creating a monopoly for future procurements.

**b.** The nature of software-intensive system development, characterized by a spiral build-test-fix-test-deploy process, may lend itself to a combined system integration and system demonstration, rather than serial efforts more typical of hardware-intensive systems.

### **11-44. System integration work effort**

The program enters system integration when the PM has an architecture for the system, but has not yet integrated the subsystems into a complete system. The program exits system integration when the integration of the system has been demonstrated in a relevant environment using prototypes (i.e., first flight, interoperable data flow across systems), a system configuration has been documented, the MDA determines a factor other than technology justifies forward progress, or the MDA decides to end this effort. This effort is intended to integrate the subsystems and reduce system-level risk. The work effort is guided by a validated ORD. The work effort is followed by system demonstration after a successful interim progress review by the MDA (or the person designated by the MDA).

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**11-45. Interim progress review**

The purpose of an interim program review is to confirm that the program is progressing within the phase as planned or to adjust the plan to better accommodate progress made to date, changed circumstances, or both. If the adjustment involves changing the AS, the change must be approved by the MDA. There is no required information necessary for this review other than the information specifically requested by the decision-maker.

**11-46. System demonstration work effort**

The program enters system demonstration when the PM has demonstrated the system in prototype articles. This effort is intended to demonstrate the ability of the system to operate in a useful way consistent with the validated ORD. This system development and demonstration phase ends when a system is demonstrated in its intended environment, using engineering development models or integrated commercial items; meets validated requirements; industrial capabilities are reasonably available; and the system meets or exceeds exit criteria and Milestone C entrance requirements. Preference is given to the use of M&S as the primary method for assessing product maturity where proven capabilities exist, with the use of test to validate modeling and simulation results. The completion of this phase is dependent on a decision by the MDA to commit to the program at Milestone C or a decision to end this effort.

**11-47. Production and deployment phase**

The purpose of the production and deployment phase is to achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs. The production requirement of this phase does not apply to MAISs. However, software has to prove its maturity level prior to deploying to the operational environment. A system must be demonstrated before commitment to production (or procurement) and deployment. For DOT&E oversight programs, a system cannot be produced at full-rate until a beyond low-rate initial production report has been completed and sent to Congress, the SecDef, and the USD(AT&L). The MDA makes the commitment decision at Milestone C. Milestone C can be reached directly from pre-systems acquisition (i.e., a commercial product) or from system development and demonstration phase.

**11-48. Entrance criteria**

Regardless of the entry point, approval at Milestone C is dependent on the following criteria being met (or a decision by the MDA to proceed):

**a.** Technology maturity (with an independent technology readiness assessment), system and relevant mission area (operational) architectures, mature software capability, demonstrated system integration or demonstrated commercial products in a relevant environment, and no significant manufacturing risks.

**b.** An approved ORD.

**c.** Acceptable interoperability.

**d.** Acceptable operational supportability.

**e.** Demonstration that the system is affordable throughout the life cycle, optimally funded, and properly phased for rapid acquisition.

### **11-49. Milestone C**

**a.** The purpose of this milestone is to authorize entry into low-rate initial production (for MDAPs and major systems), into production or procurement (for non-major systems that do not require low-rate production) or into limited deployment for MAIS or software-intensive systems with no production components.

**b.** The following are milestone approval considerations:

(1) Prior to making the milestone decision, the MDA considers the component cost analysis (CCA), and, for MAISs, the CCA and economic analysis, the manpower estimate, compliance with the CCA, STA, and an established completion schedule for *National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)* compliance covering testing, training, basing, and operational support.

(2) At this milestone, the MDA confirms the AS approved prior to the release of the final RFP and approve an updated development APB, exit criteria for LRIP (if needed) or limited deployment, and the ADM.

(3) The DOT&E and cognizant OIPT leader approve the TEMP for all OSD T&E oversight programs. IT acquisition programs (regardless of ACAT) that entered system acquisition at Milestone C are registered with the DOD CIO before Milestone C approval.

(4) A favorable Milestone C decision authorizes the PM to commence LRIP or limited deployment for MDAPs and major systems. The PM is only authorized to commence full-rate production with further approval of the MDA. There is normally no more than one decision (i.e., either low-rate or full-rate) at the DAE-level for MDAPs.

### **11-50. Low-rate initial production (LRIP) work effort**

**a.** This work effort is intended to result in completion of manufacturing development in order to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing capability and to produce the minimum quantity necessary to provide production configured or representative articles for IOT, establish an initial production base for the system; and permit an orderly increase in the production rate for the system, sufficient to lead to full-rate production upon successful completion of operational (and live-fire, where applicable) testing. The work is guided by the approved ORD.

**b.** Deficiencies encountered in testing prior to Milestone C are resolved prior to proceeding beyond LRIP (at the Full-Rate Production (FRP) Decision Review) and any fixes verified in IOT. Outline test plans (OTPs) are provided to the DOT&E for oversight programs in advance of the start of operational testing.

**c.** LRIP may be funded by RDTE appropriation or by procurement appropriations, depending on the intended usage of the LRIP assets.

**d.** LRIP quantities are minimized (no more than 10 percent of the total production quantity documented in the AS). The MDA determines the LRIP quantity for MDAPs and major systems at Milestone B. Any increase in quantity after the initial determination is approved by the MDA. The LRIP quantity will not be less than one unit. When approved LRIP quantities are expected to be exceeded because the program has not yet demonstrated readiness to proceed to full-rate production, the MDA assesses the cost and benefits of a break in production versus continuing annual buys.

e. The DOT&E determines the number of LRIP articles required for LFT and IOT of DOT&E oversight programs. For a system that is not a DOT&E oversight program, ATEC determines the number of LRIP articles required for IOT. LRIP is not applicable to AISs or software intensive systems with no developmental hardware. However, a limited deployment phase may be applicable.

#### **11-51. Full-rate production (FRP) decision review**

a. Before making the full-rate production and deployment decision, the MDA considers—

- The CCA, and for MAISs, the CCA and economic analysis.
- The manpower estimate (if applicable).
- The results of operational and live fire test (if applicable).
- CCA compliance certification and certification for MAISs .
- C4I supportability certification.
- Interoperability certification.

b. The MDA confirms the AS approved prior to the release of the final RFP, the production APB, and the ADM.

#### **11-52. Full-rate production and deployment work effort**

Following IOT, the submission of the Beyond LRIP and LFT&E reports (where applicable) to Congress, the SecDef, and the USD(AT&L), and the completion of a full-rate production decision review by the MDA (or by the person designated by the MDA), the program enters full-rate production (or procurement) and deployment.

#### **11-53. Sustainment activity/phase**

The objectives of this activity phase are the execution of a support program that meets operational support performance requirements and sustainment of systems in the most cost-effective manner for the life cycle of the system.

#### **11-54. Sustain systems work effort**

a. **Sustainment program.** The sustainment program includes all elements necessary to maintain the readiness and operational capability of deployed systems. The scope of support varies among programs but generally includes supply, maintenance, transportation, sustaining engineering, data management, configuration management, manpower, personnel, training, habitability, survivability, safety, occupational health, IT supportability and interoperability, and environmental management functions. This activity also includes the execution of operational support plans. Programs with software components must be capable of responding to emerging requirements that will require software modification or periodic enhancements after a system is deployed. A follow-on operational test program that evaluates operational effectiveness, survivability, suitability, supportability, and interoperability, and that identifies deficiencies is conducted, as appropriate.

b. **Evolutionary sustainment.** Supporting the tenets of evolutionary acquisition, sustainment strategies must evolve and be refined throughout the life cycle, particularly during development of subsequent blocks of an evolutionary strategy, modifications,

upgrades, and reprocurement. The PM ensures that a flexible, performance-oriented strategy to sustain systems is developed and executed. This strategy includes consideration of the full scope of operational support, such as maintenance, supply, transportation, sustaining engineering, spectrum supportability, configuration and data management, manpower, training, environmental, health, safety, disposal and security factors. The use of performance requirements or conversion to performance requirements are emphasized during reprocurement of systems, subsystems, components, spares, and services after the initial production contract.

### **11-55. Dispose of systems work effort**

At the end of its useful life, a system must be demilitarized and disposed. The PM must address in the AS demilitarization and disposal requirements and ensure that sufficient information exists so that disposal can be carried out in a way that is in accordance with all legal and regulatory requirements relating to safety, security, and the environment. The Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office executes the PM's strategy and demilitarize and dispose of items assigned to the Office.

### **11-56. Total package fielding (TPF) process**

a. TPF is currently the Army's standard fielding process. In 1984 the Army began using TPF on a test basis and made it the standard fielding process in 1987. It is designed to ensure thorough planning and coordination between CBTDEVs/TNGDEVs, MATDEVs/fielding commands, and the gaining MACOMs and using units involved in the fielding of new materiel systems. At the same time, it is designed to ease the logistics burden of the using and supporting Army troop units. Regulatory and instructional guidance for materiel release, fielding, and transfer are contained in AR 700-142, and DA Pamphlet 700-142 respectively. TPF process is shown in Figure 11-8.


b. Identification of the TPF package contents for a particular fielding is known as establishment of the materiel requirements list (MRL). It is the responsibility of the MATDEV/fielding command to identify everything that is needed to use and support the new system and coordinate these requirements with the CBTDEVs/TNGDEVs and the gaining MACOMs. The total fielding requirements are documented, coordinated, and agreed on through the MFP and/or memorandum of notification (MON), the mission support plan (MSP) and the materiel fielding agreement (MFA).

c. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) operates unit materiel fielding points (UMFPs) in Pennsylvania, Texas, and California that support the Army. These three DLA UMFPs are sites where initial issue items are consolidated to support TPF worldwide. The staging site is the facility or location where the total package comes together. It is usually here that all end items, support equipment, and packages, if initial issue spare and repair parts, are prepared for handoff to the gaining units. To support TPF outside the Continental United States (OCONUS), the AMC operates a number of central staging sites in Europe, and two sites in Korea.

d. A joint supportability assessment takes place about 90 days before the projected FUED and 60 days before fielding to a unit in CONUS. The fielding command assures that those items requiring deprocessing are inspected and made fully operational-ready before

handoff to the gaining units. A joint inventory is conducted by the fielding and gaining commands to ensure all needed items are received, or placed on a shortage list for later delivery.

***INTENT: Reduce Logistics Burdens on the Gaining MACOMs and Their Subordinate User / Support Organizations***



**Figure 11-8. Total Package Fielding Concept**

e. The fielding command provides, at the time of handoff, a tailored customer documentation package for each gaining unit that allows the unit to establish property accountability and post a receipt for TPF materiel. The transactions in the package are tailored to the specific supply system in use at the unit. Each unit can choose between three media for their documentation package – hardcopy, magnetic tape, or floppy disk. Logistics changes are helping the U.S. Army prepare for the challenges and missions of the 21st century. Many of these changes will apply directly to TPF. Improved equipment, communications, automation, and transportation will continue to keep the U.S. Army the best equipped and supported Army in the world

### **11-57. Army system of systems (SoS)/unit set fielding (USF)**

#### **a. Introduction.**

(1) Army units have often experienced the TPF of 35-90 unsynchronized and non-integrated systems fieldings or software drops for major systems in a single year. This has been very disruptive to the unit's training program and readiness posture and has rarely provided to the unit a complete and fully integrated capability. A disciplined, synchronized approach that focuses the fieldings of systems and software into a single window designated specifically for modernization and training is crucial to reducing the disruptive impacts upon gaining units. This approach is USF.

(2) USF is a new management process for modernizing units by fielding fully integrated unit sets of equipment in support of the Army Transformation Campaign Plan (ATCP). This process expands on the current single system fielding process. The concepts will be applied to modernizing the 1ST Cavalry Division (1CD) and the first two Interim

Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs). Insights gained with these units will be the basis for developing the formal policies and procedures to institutionalize the process.

**b. Army SoS management process.** Under the current modernization/fielding process, units may receive multiple, separate, and unsynchronized issues of individual systems throughout the year. These TPF fieldings, previously discussed, are generally sequenced according to the DA master priority list (DAMPL) and Army order of precedence (AOP) memoranda. Each fielding has an impact upon the unit's readiness. With these multiple fieldings in a year, units have a difficult time maintaining unit readiness and achieving optimum effectiveness of the newly issued systems. Additionally, equipment is often fielded without the appropriate corresponding training modernization and training and installation/infrastructure items. As the Army moves forward with modernization and transformation efforts, the environment must shift from a focus on fielding "stand alone" systems to fielding "systems of systems" to maximize each unit's capabilities. The Army must develop a schedule for modernization, which forces synchronization of: requirements generation, materiel development, manpower and personnel considerations, funding, testing, training, fielding, and sustainment.

(1) The key to managing unit-configured sets of equipment is ensuring that all the available components for a required operational capability are properly integrated as a unit set. Subsequently, the hardware and particularly the software require updating and hardware or software errors must be corrected. An Army configuration management process is required that synchronizes, tests, integrates, and certifies hardware and software unit sets.

(2) The Army SoS management process will synchronize planning and execution of the activities required to field interrelated and interdependent systems to include training devices. It will provide a basis for POM input focused on enhancing unit warfighting capabilities and better enable HQDA to develop an effective force and defend the POM and budget.

**c. USF process.** For a unit to realize the full capability of new weapons, sensors, digital command and control systems, and training devices, equipment must be integrated, issued, and upgraded as a unit set. The Army requires a plan that packages these required items and identifies windows for fielding new capabilities by unit sets.

(1) Individual components or systems may provide significant standalone improvements in capability, but they do not achieve their full potential until they are integrated with the other systems comprising the unit-configured set. System integration plays a key role in prioritization of program adjustments at both technical and programmatic levels. The SoS management process provides a disciplined approach that identifies and synchronizes system fieldings and maximizes unit operational readiness. The disciplined approach to achieve this goal is USF.

(2) The key to USF is ensuring that all the components and associated support items of equipment (ASIOE) for a required capability are present and integrated during the fielding process. Unit sets of hardware and software must be identified and interoperability certified to establish a configuration baseline prior to fielding. That baseline must be maintained after fielding.

(3) USF serves as the synchronizing process to ensure that system fieldings are implemented in an integrated and complimentary fashion that supports a unit's modernization with the minimum disruption to unit readiness. USF applies to all Active Army and Reserve Component unit modernization.

**d. USF cycle.** The USF process is a cycle that begins five to seven years prior to the beginning of the unit's USF window and ends approximately two years after the window closes. A USF cycle consists of five steps: preparation, reorganization, equipping, training, and validation. The cycle may restart two years after step four is completed

(1) *Step 1 (Preparation):* This step covers actions from about five to seven years (lead-time for military construction, Army (MCA) projects) to six months before a unit enters its USF window. The Army modernization fielding plan (AMFP) defines the USF windows and will drive the development of the POM. MATDEVs estimate resource and transportation requirements in support of the AMFP to assist DA with the POM build process. MATDEVs also conduct surveys of installation facilities: ranges; motor pools; warehouses; training infrastructure, support, and facilities, information infrastructure requirements, etc. These requirements are then submitted to DCSOPS and MACOMs for inclusion in the POM build. Unit force modernization staffing is increased to support USF planning and execution. MACOMs and units receive the critical mission equipment list and schedule the USF windows on their long range training calendars. Other key actions include: identification of the unit to be modernized (HQDA unit identification code (UIC)); operational architecture finalization; systems architecture finalization; support strategy development; POM adjustments; development of the systems list comprising the unit set; development of training and sustaining documentation; integration testing to validate the unit's hardware/software configuration baseline; and identification of all changes for manning the units as well as any special personnel requirements for soldiers and leaders. During this phase the MATDEV prepares to execute the USF mission. The MACOM and unit will receive a detailed materiel fielding schedule (MFS) two years out. Notification memoranda are provided to the gaining MACOM and unit three years prior to fielding. The timing of this notification will coincide with development of MACOM POM submissions. HQDA will generate disposition instructions eighteen months out for the excess/displaced equipment that will trigger planning and resourcing to dispose of this equipment. New materiel introductory briefings (NMIB) and reorganization planning will begin one year out. Six months prior to a unit entering a window, the system of system manager (SOSM) will chair a review of the status all preparations to determine whether or not to proceed with the USF process.

(2) *Step 2 (Reorganization):* Unit reorganization begins about six months prior to the USF window and concludes at E-date. This reorganization includes actions and activities required to transition from the unit's current MTOE to a new MTOE, which reflects the new equipment in the unit. Facilities are completed, training devices, training support infrastructure, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are in place, personnel are assigned, and equipment turn-ins are completed.

(3) *Step 3 (Fielding):* Systems in the unit set will be fielded during the window. The PM for each system will conduct NET. Completion of NET for all systems in the unit set closes the window and the unit will be taken off C5 status.

(4) *Step 4 (Training)*: The unit is responsible for conducting collective and sustainment training. This training will start after completion of NET and will normally be completed within 18 months after the unit's E-date.

(5) *Step 5 (Validation)*: The MACOM is responsible for validating the operational readiness of the unit to execute its assigned mission. Validation will be the final activity conducted during the training step. MACOM validation completes the USF cycle.

### **11-58. Additional considerations**

The above discussion examined the activities performed in each phase of the nominal life-cycle of an acquisition system according to the current DODD 5000.1, DODI 5000.2, and AR 70-1. This is not to imply that all system developments must follow this exact sequencing of life-cycle phases and activities. On the contrary, DODI 5000.2 specifically authorizes and encourages a PEO/PM to devise program structures and acquisition strategies to fit the particulars of a program; an approach called "tailoring." Additionally, where justified (i.e., a NDI acquisition), milestones and phases may be omitted or combined, a procedure called "streamlining." Other aspects of acquisition planning and strategy; for example, involving P3I and technology insertion can also be accommodated under the broad guidance and direction contained in DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2. What remains constant is the task to develop and deliver combat-capable, cost-effective, and supportable systems to our Armed Forces.

## **SECTION VII ACQUISITION DOCUMENTATION**

### **11-59. Materiel requirements documents (MRDs)**

MRDs establish the need for a materiel acquisition program, how the materiel will be employed, and what the materiel must be capable of doing. As the acquisition program progresses, statements of required performance and design specifications become more and more specific. The MNS is the document that initiates the acquisition system management process. The ORD is the document that defines the system capabilities needed to satisfy an approved MNS, and is developed during Phase A, Concept and Technology Development.

#### **a. Mission need statement (MNS).**

(1) The MNS is a nonsystem-specific statement of operational capability need. The Unified Commands, the Military Departments, OSD, or the Joint Staff may identify mission needs. The CBTDEV is the proponent for the development of the MNS, but other participants in the process include the MATDEV, manpower and personnel planners, the TNGDEV, and the logistician. In preparing the MNS, mission needs are identified as a direct result of continuing assessments of current and projected capabilities in the context of changing military threats and national defense policy. The MNS reflects an evaluation that a nonmateriel solution is not a viable consideration. Potential materiel alternatives such as commercial systems, or known systems or programs addressing similar needs that are deployed or are in development or in production by any of the Services or allied nations are identified in the document.

(2) The MNS describes key boundary conditions related to infrastructure support that may impact on satisfying the need. These include logistics support; transportation; mapping, charting, and geodesy support; manpower, personnel, and training constraints; command control, communications, and intelligence interfaces; security; and standardization or interoperability within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or with other allies or DOD components. The document also contains a description of operational environments (including conventional; initial nuclear weapon effects; nuclear, biological, and chemical contamination; electronic; and natural) in which the developing system is expected to operate. The MNS is a one-time document, which is not revised. Potential ACAT I / IA MNSs format and content is in CJCSI 3170.01A, Enclosure A.

(3) MNSs that could potentially result in the initiation of new ACAT I programs are forwarded through DA, to the JROC for review and validation that the mission cannot be satisfied by a nonmateriel solution. The JROC determines the validity of the identified need, assigns a joint priority as appropriate, and forwards the MNS to the USD(AT&L) for appropriate action. For approved MNSs, a subordinate OIPT of the DAB reviews them for materiel alternatives and recommended study efforts prior to the DAB convening for a MS A, Concept Studies Approval, review.

**b. Operational requirements document (ORD).**

(1) Each concept proposed at MS B is described in an initial ORD in terms of minimum acceptable requirements (thresholds) that defines the system capabilities needed to satisfy a MNS. When appropriate, objectives for each parameter representing a measurable, beneficial increment in operational capability or operations and support are established. Objectives should not be stated if they cannot be supported with operational rationale.

(2) ACAT ID and IAM ORDs are approved by the JROC unless previously delegated. All other Army-generated ORDs are approved by HQDA. ORDs are refined and expanded for MS C to include thresholds and objectives for more detailed and refined performance capabilities and characteristics based on the results of trade-off studies and testing conducted during phase B. After MS C, ORDs are only refined when there is a change in the mission need or the CBTDEV/TNGDEV determines a need to significantly change the performance envelope represented by the ORD minimum acceptable value (threshold) requirements. The MATDEV uses the ORD to develop system performance requirements for contract specifications during each acquisition phase.

(3) ORDs specify at least two levels of performance characteristics, minimum acceptable value (threshold) requirement and objective requirement (DODI 5000.2 and CJCSI 3170.01A). The objective requirement for parameters is provided only when the CBTDEV/TNGDEV desire a relevant and operationally significant capability above the threshold requirement. ORDs identify recommended KPPs to appropriately focus the acquisition effort and decision-making. ORDs are adjusted only after the CBTDEV or TNGDEV, as appropriate, and the MATDEV agree that such changes are necessary to authorize development of the system or TADSS to the required capability. ORD format and content is in CJCSI 3170.01A.

**c. Capstone requirements documents (CRDs).** CRDs can be a combination of two or more MNS/ORDs/programs, which, when considered together form a family-of-systems (FoS) or SoS. The CRD identifies systems requirements to define a mission area and serves

as a guide for ORD development. The CRD is the bridge between the MNS and program ORDs. It is appropriate when a mission area requires more than one ORD and provides guidance to support ORD development. The CRD should be developed after the MNS is validated and prior to MS A. The CRD may identify common requirements that must be included in all program ORDs. Approval authorities may add or delete KPPs to ensure program ORDs are consistent with the CRD. The CRD is not an ORD and is not intended to be testable. It is a living document that reflects changes in threat or technologies.

**d. Operational need statement (ONS).** Operational field commanders use an ONS to document the urgent need for a materiel solution to correct a deficiency or to improve a capability that impacts upon mission accomplishment. The ONS provides an opportunity to the field commander, outside of the acquisition and CBTDEV/TNGDEV communities, to initiate the requirements determination process. The ONS is not a materiel requirements document. The CBTDEV, TNGDEV or MATDEV communities do not initiate or develop an ONS. Response to an ONS varies depending on the criticality of the need for the proposed item. Response can range from a HQDA directed requirement and fielding of a materiel system to the forwarding of the action to TRADOC for review and routine action. HQDA may decline to favorably consider an ONS for a variety of reasons, including conflicting needs, higher priorities for funding, existence of a similar system, or nonconcurrence of the criticality of the need. The response to an ONS is based on an ARSTAF validation supported by TRADOC, AMC, and MATDEV reviews. ODCSOPS determines validity of the need, availability of technology, and source of resources to fill this requirement. If the need is determined to be urgent, critical, and can be resourced (at least for the present situation) a directed requirement may result. If no solution is available or if the need is not urgent or critical the ONS will be turned over to CBTDEVs, TNGDEVs and MATDEVs to find solution. All ONS are reviewed by the CBTDEVs/TNGDEVs to determine applicability to future requirements or continuing need for which a standard requirement (ORD) and acquisition is needed. If validation of the ONS indicates that the concept has potential for Army-wide application and development of a new system is appropriate, TRADOC will initiate a MNS and/or ORD as appropriate. If validation indicates that there exists a specific limited but necessary critical need, HQDA may issue a directed requirement for ONS having Army-wide application; however, tailored development and standard documentation should be used in this instance. The ONS process may shorten NDI acquisition by shortcutting the requirements determination process enroute to a buy decision; however; the ONS is more important to users because it starts the requirements determination process moving in the absence of any other impetus.

### **11-60. Other service requirements**

The CBTDEV/TNGDEV reviews other Service warfighting capability requirements documents for potential Army interest. When the Army chooses to participate in the RDA of another Service program, HQDA initiates action to validate and approve the documentation. When another Service requirement document, to include an approved production RFP, adequately describes an Army requirement, the document may be approved as the Army requirement, that is, an ORD. The Army may also acquire other Service equipment with a national stock number (NSN) that has been identified through the MATDEV market investigation and meets an approved Army need. For joint programs, requirements documents are prepared and processed in accordance with the lead services procedures.

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Service peculiar requirements may be documented in the other Service's ORDs and other requirement documents.

### **11-61. Catalog of approved requirements documents (CARDS)**

CARDS is an unclassified DCSOPS publication that provides information on the status of approved requirements documents. It includes both active and inactive documents. An active document or assignment of a CARDS reference number does not automatically authorize the expenditure of funds. Each program must compete for funds in the Army prioritization and programming process. ODCSOPS assigns a CARDS reference number to each requirements document after approval and prior to publication and distribution.

### **11-62. Program review documentation and program plans**

The MDA is responsible for identifying the minimum amount of documentation necessary for milestone review purposes. Only those mandatory formats called for by DODI 5000.2 are required. All other formats are used as guidance only. Program plans are a description of the detailed activities necessary for executing the AS. Program plans belong to the PM and are used by the PM to manage program execution throughout the life-cycle of the program. The PM, in coordination with the PEO, determines the type and number of program plans. Program plans, excluding the TEMP, are not required in support of milestone decisions and are not required for milestone documentation or as periodic reports. Some of the typical program plans used to support the execution of a program's AS are:


**a. System threat assessment report (STAR).** The STAR is the basic authoritative threat assessment that supports the development and acquisition of a particular ACAT I or II system. The STAR contains an integrated assessment of projected enemy capabilities (doctrine, tactics, hardware, organization and forces) at IOC and IOC plus 10 years, to limit, neutralize or destroy the system. It explicitly identifies critical intelligence categories (CICs) which are a series of threat capabilities that could critically impact the effectiveness and survivability of the program. The STAR is a dynamic document that is continually updated and refined as a program develops. It is approved and validated in support of ASARC/DAB reviews. This report is the primary threat reference for the ORD, the modified integrated program summary (MIPS), the AoA, and the TEMP developed in support of a MDR. The STAR is approved by DCSINT and validated by the DIA for all ACAT I programs at MS B and updated for all ACAT ID programs at MS C and MS FRP. It is prepared for DCSINT review and approval for ACAT II and III programs, to include highly sensitive classified programs unless specifically waived by the MDA.

**b. Modified integrated program summary (MIPS).** The MIPS, with its annexes, is the primary Army decision document used to facilitate top-level acquisition milestone decision-making. It provides a comprehensive summary of program structure, status, assessment, plans, and recommendations by the PM and the PEO. The primary functions of the MIPS include a summary of where the program is versus where it should be; a description of where the program is going and how it will get there; an identification of program risk areas and plans for closing risks; and a basis for establishing explicit program cost, schedule, and performance objectives. It also includes thresholds in the stand-alone APB and program-specific exit criteria for the next acquisition phase. The MIPS provides answers to the following five key MDR core issues:

- (1) Is the system still needed?
- (2) Does the system work (from the viewpoints of the user, functional staffs, and the PM)?
- (3) Are major risks identified and manageable?
- (4) Is the program affordable (is adequate programming in the POM)?
- (5) Has the system been subjected to CAIV analysis?

**c. Acquisition strategy (AS).** The AS is the framework for planning, directing, and managing a materiel acquisition program. It states the concepts and objectives that direct and control overall program execution from program initiation through post-production support. An AS is required for all Army acquisition programs. The AS documents how the acquisition program will be tailored and identifies risks and plans to reduce or eliminate risks. The AS, prepared by the MATDEV-led IPT, is a living document that matures throughout the program. It provides fundamental guidance to the functional elements of the MATDEV/CBTDEV organizations. Individual functional strategies leading to the preparation of detailed program plans are required to implement the AS as depicted in Figure 11-9.

**d. Environmental analysis.** This is a congressionally mandated analysis of the potential environmental impacts of weapons systems. It identifies land, sea or air space requirements of the most promising alternatives and describes the potential effects on the land, sea, and air environment. It also describes the potential impacts on public health and safety by the development, test manufacturing, basing operation, and support of the proposed system. The environmental impact data is weighed against system cost, schedule, and performance in deciding how to best minimize environmental harm.



**Figure 11-9. Acquisition Strategy**

**e. Project office estimate (POE) and component cost analysis (CCA).** These documents are prepared in support of MS B and all subsequent MS reviews. The cost estimates are explicitly based on the program objectives, operational requirements, and contract specifications for the system, including plans for such matters as peacetime utilization rates and the maintenance concept. The estimates identify all elements of additional cost that would be entailed by a decision to proceed with development, production, and operation of the system. They are based on a careful assessment of risks and reflect a realistic appraisal of the level of cost most likely to be realized. Two cost estimates are prepared. The CBTDEV-led ICT in support of MS B, and the program office in support of MS C and all subsequent milestones do the POE. The other estimate is prepared by an organization that does not report through the acquisition chain. In the Army, this independent cost analysis, entitled CCA, is prepared by the Army CEAC for MDAP systems.

**f. Army cost position (ACP).** The ACP is the Army's approved life cycle cost estimate for the materiel system. It is used for DOD milestone reviews and is the basis for Army planning, programming and budgeting. For all MDAP programs, the CRB develops the proposed ACP after an intensive review of both the POE and CCA. This proposal becomes the ACP when it is approved by the ASA(FM&C) and then is provided to the AAE. DODI 5000.2 requires the component's cost position.

**g. Analysis of alternatives (AoA).**

(1) The independent AoA provides information to the decision authority at the MS B review to assist in determining whether any of proposed alternatives to an existing system offer sufficient military and/or economic benefit.

(2) The AoA focuses on broad operational capabilities, potential technology concepts, and materiel solutions that could satisfy the MNS. It examines the full range of materiel alternatives (including those identified in the MS A ADM). AoAs illuminate the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternatives being considered by identifying sensitivities of each alternative to possible changes in key assumptions (i.e., threat) or variables (i.e., selected performance capabilities). The AoA provides insights regarding KPPs for preferred alternatives and indicates how these parameters contribute to increases in operational capability. It identifies opportunities for trade-offs among performance, cost, and schedule; and determines operational effectiveness and costs (including estimates of training and logistics impacts) for all alternatives.

(3) If a new program is approved, the AoA may be useful for identifying alternatives that will be refined by cost performance trade-off studies during Phase B. It should be useful for limiting the number of alternatives to be considered during phase B. The MDA may direct updates to the AoA for subsequent decision points, if conditions warrant (i.e., AoA may be useful for examining cost-performance trade-offs at MS C).

**h. Acquisition program baseline (APB).** The APBs consist of the concept baseline, the development baseline, and the production baseline approved at MS B, C, and FRP, respectively. The purpose of the baselines is to enhance program stability and to provide a critical reference point for measuring and reporting the status of program implementation. Each baseline contains objectives for key cost, schedule, and performance parameters. Key parameters must meet minimum acceptable requirements, known as thresholds, at each milestone decision point. The thresholds establish deviation limits from which a PM may not

trade-off cost or performance without authorization from the MDA. The APB must cross-walk to the program ORD for performance parameters. The APB must track to the program ORD for performance parameters. Failure to meet the threshold requires a reevaluation of alternative concepts or design approaches. APBs and deviation reporting are required for all acquisition categories.

**i. Test and evaluation master plan (TEMP).** The TEMP is the basic planning document required for a system that focuses on the overall structure, major elements, and objectives of the T&E program. The TEMP is consistent with the AS as well as the approved MNS, ORD, and C4I support plan and is a reference document used by the T&E community to generate detailed T&E plans and to ascertain schedule and resource requirements associated with a given system. It provides a road map for integrated simulation, test, and evaluation plans, schedules, and resource requirements necessary to accomplish the T&E program. The TEMP describes what testing (i.e., developmental test and operational test) is required, who will perform the testing, what resources will be needed, and what are the requirements for evaluation. It relates program schedule, test management strategy and structure, and required resources to critical operational issues; critical technical parameters; measures of effectiveness and suitability; and milestone decision points. While the MATDEV has the overall responsibility, each T&E WIPT member contributes to the TEMP development and maintenance. The TEMP is initially developed at a system's first milestone review and is updated before each MS or program decision interim program review, when the program has changed significantly, or when the program baseline has been breached. Upon approval, the TEMP serves as a contract between the MATDEV and T&E community for executing the system T&E program. The TEMP provides key management controls for T&E in support of the acquisition process. Detailed TEMP mandatory procedures and format are at the USD(AT&L), ASD(C3I), and DOT&E Memorandum, 23 October 2000, subject: Mandatory Procedures for MDAPs and MAIS Acquisition Programs.

**j. Manpower estimate report (MER).** This Congressionally directed report documents the total number of personnel (military, civilian, and contractor) that are or will be needed to operate, maintain, support, and train for a ACAT ID program upon full operational deployment. The validity of the MER is dependent upon force structure, personnel management, and readiness requirements, as well as on the acquisition decision on the size of the buy.

### 11-63. Typical waivers and reports

**a. Live-fire test and evaluation waiver.** This certifies to Congress when live-fire survivability testing of a covered major system would be unreasonably expensive and impractical. However, some testing must still be accomplished at the subsystem level as described in the alternate LFT&E plan.

**b. Developmental test report.** This provides the results of developmental tests to include live-fire test results and reports.

**c. System evaluation report.** This provides demonstrated system effectiveness, suitability, and survivability information at each formal milestone decision. Report is produced by the independent system evaluator.

**d. System assessment report.** This provides potential system effectiveness, suitability, and survivability information at key points before and after each milestone decision. Report is produced by the independent system evaluator.

**e. Live-fire test and evaluation report.** Independent OSD report to Congress that provides test results and assessment of tests on a covered major system or product improvement program realistic survivability testing, and a major munitions or missile program realistic lethality testing. Congress mandates this report.

**f. Beyond low-rate initial production report.** This provides Congress with an assessment of the adequacy of initial operational testing and whether the test results confirm the items are effective and suitable for combat prior to the FRP decision to proceed beyond low-rate initial production. Congress mandates this report.

**g. Defense acquisition executive summary (DAES).** This provides standard, comprehensive reporting of ACAT I programs between milestone decision points. The DAES is an internal report for the DAE designed to highlight, on a regular and systematic basis, indications of both potential and actual program problems before they become significant. Recognizing that problems are expected to surface in these programs aids in communication and early resolution.

**h. Selected acquisition report (SAR).** This report provides standard, comprehensive summary reporting of cost, schedule, and performance information for MDAPs within DOD. The SAR provides the status of total program cost, schedule, and performance, as well as program unit cost and unit cost breach information to Congress.

#### **11-64. Other documentation**

**a. Acquisition decision memorandum (ADM).** The ADM documents the milestone decision authority's decision on the program's AS goals, thresholds, and the exit criteria for the next phase of the program. The ADM is used to document the decision for all ACAT I – IV programs.

**b. Integrated program assessment (IPA).** Information derived from the PM's MIPS allows the DOD OIPT to develop the IPA for program MDR. The IPA summarizes the DOD independent assessment of the PM's program. It identifies critical areas, issues, and recommendations for the MDA. For ACAT ID and IAM programs the IPA is prepared by the OIPT, approved by the OIPT leader, and submitted to the USD(AT&L) or ASD(C3I), as appropriate.

### **SECTION VIII**

#### **ACQUISITION OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW (O&R) PROCESS**

##### **11-65. Process control by decision reviews**

The materiel acquisition process is controlled by decisions made as the result of various acquisition programs MDRs conducted by appropriate management levels at program milestones. The reviews are the mechanism for checking program progress against approved plans and for developing revised APBs. Approval of APBs and plans in these reviews does not constitute program-funding approval; allocation of funds in the PPBS process is required.

### **11-66. Integrated product and process development (IPPD)**

As part of acquisition reform efforts, DODD 5000.1 directed the DOD acquisition community to apply the concept of IPPD throughout the acquisition process to the maximum extent practicable. IPPD is a management technique that integrates all acquisition activities starting with requirements definition through production, fielding/deployment and operational support in order to optimize the design, manufacturing, business, and supportability processes. At the core of IPPD implementation are the IPTs. The IPT is composed of representatives from all appropriate functional disciplines working together with a team leader to build successful and balanced programs, identify and resolve issues, and make sound and timely recommendations to facilitate decision-making. There are three general levels of IPTs: OIPTs focus on strategic guidance, program assessment, and issue resolution; working level IPTs (WIPTs) identify and resolve program issues, determine program status, and seek opportunities for acquisition reform; and integrating level integrated product teams (IIPTs), when necessary, is initiated by the PM to coordinate all WIPT efforts and cover all topics not otherwise assigned to another WIPT.

**a. Overarching integrated product teams (OIPTs).** In support of all ACAT ID and IAM programs, an OIPT is formed to provide assistance, oversight, and review as that program proceeds through its acquisition life-cycle. The OIPT for ACAT ID programs is led by the appropriate OSD Principal Staff Assistant (PSA). The DASD(C3I Acquisition) designates the OIPT Leader for each ACAT IAM. Program OIPTs are composed of the PM, PEO, Component Staff, Joint Staff, USD(AT&L) staff, and the OSD staff principals or their representatives, involved in oversight and review of a particular ACAT ID or IAM program.

(1) In the Army, an OIPT is established at the direction of the MDA for ACAT IC, IAC, II, III, and IV programs. The OIPT is a team of DA staff action officers and the PEO/PM/TSM responsible for integration of oversight issues to be raised to the DAB/ASARC/ ITOIPT/in-process review (IPR) review forums.

(2) The secretary/facilitator of the OIPT for ACAT I and II programs is the OASA(ALT) or ODISC4 DASC (depending where ARSTAF system coordination resides) for that specific program. OIPT membership consists of empowered individuals appointed by ASARC members (ACAT IC, or II programs), by ITOIPT members (ACAT IAC programs) and the MDA for ACAT III and IV programs. Team membership is tailored based on the needs and level of oversight for the individual program. Typical Army OIPT responsibilities include:

(a) Meeting together and individually with the PEO/PM throughout the program progress to raise and resolve issues early, providing recommendations for tailoring and streamlining the program.

(b) Linking vertically with the PM's WIPTs.

(c) Helping the PM successfully achieve a milestone decision

(d) Developing a memorandum documenting the issues/risks to be raised to the MDA with a recommendation to the MDA as to whether an actual ASARC, Army ITOIPT, or IPR needs to be convened, or a "paper ASARC/ITOIPT/IPR" can be held.

(e) Providing an independent assessment for the MDA in preparation of the MDR.

(3) The OIPT, at all levels, generally follow the general procedures which are described below for a typical ACAT ID and IAM program. Initially the OIPT meets to determine the extent of WIPT support needed for the potential program, who shall be members of the WIPTs, the appropriate MS for program initiation, and the minimum information needed for the program initiation review. The OIPT Leader is responsible for taking action to resolve issues when requested by any member of the OIPT or when directed by MDA. The goal is to resolve as many issues and concerns at the lowest level possible, and to expeditiously escalate issues that need resolution at a higher level, bringing only the highest level issues to the MDA for decision. The OIPT meets as necessary over the life of a program.

(4) In support of a planned MDR, the OIPT normally convenes two weeks in advance of the anticipated review to assess information and recommendations being provided to the MDA. Additionally, at that meeting, the PM will propose the WIPT structure, documentation, and strategy for the next acquisition phase, for approval by the MDA. The OIPT Leader, in coordination with the component acquisition executive, recommends to the MDA whether the anticipated review should go forward as planned.

(5) The OIPT leader provides an IPA, previously discussed, at major program reviews or MDRs using data gathered through the IPT process. The OIPT leader's assessment focuses on core acquisition management issues and takes account of independent assessments that are normally prepared by OIPT members.

**b. Working-level integrated product teams (WIPTs).** WIPTs are established for all acquisition programs. The number and membership of the WIPTs are tailored to each acquisition developmental phase based on the level of oversight and the program needs. They are comprised of DA and/or Service/functional action officers and normally chaired by the PM or designee. WIPTs provide advice to the PM and help prepare program strategies and plans. Each WIPT focuses on a particular topic(s), such as test, cost/performance (CAIV), risk management (both programmatic and safety), etc.

**c. Integrating level integrated product teams (IIPTs).** When necessary, an IIPT, a type of WIPT, is initiated by the PM to coordinate all WIPT efforts and cover all topics not otherwise assigned to another WIPT.

### **11-67. The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)**

**a.** The function of the DAB is to review DOD ACAT ID programs to ensure that they are ready for transition from one program phase to the next. The DAB is the DOD senior level forum for advising the USD(AT&L) on critical decisions concerning ACAT ID programs. The DAB is composed of DOD senior acquisition officials. The board is chaired by the USD(AT&L). The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) serves as the vice chairman. Other principal members include the Principal Deputy USD(AT&L); the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Strategy and Requirements); the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E); the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E); Service acquisition executives (SAEs) of the Army, Navy, Air Force; the cognizant OIPT leader; the cognizant PEOs and PMs; and the DAB secretary.

**b.** Approximately one week prior to the DAB review, a DAB readiness meeting (DRM) meets to pre-brief the USD(AT&L), VCJCS, and other DAB participants, to include cognizant PEO(s) and PM(s). The purpose of the meeting is to update the USD(AT&L) on the latest status of the program and to inform the senior acquisition officials of any outstanding issues. Normally the OIPT leader briefs the DRM. If outstanding issues are resolved at the DRM, the USD(AT&L) may decide that a formal DAB meeting is not required and issue the ADM following the DRM.

**c.** The JROC reviews all deficiencies that may necessitate development of ACAT I and ACAT IA systems prior to any consideration by the DAB or, as appropriate, DOD CIO at MS B. The JROC validates an identified mission need, assigns a joint potential designator for meeting the need, and forwards the MNS with JROC recommendations to the USD(AT&L). In addition, the JROC continues a role in validation of KPPs in program baselines prior to scheduled reviews for ACAT I and ACAT IA programs prior to all successive MDRs.

**d.** The OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) reviews the component cost position, prior to the scheduled MDR and determines if additional analysis is required. The product is an independent cost position assessment and recommendations based on its independent review of the life-cycle cost estimate(s), validation of the methodology used to make the cost estimate(s), and determination if additional analysis or studies is required.

**e.** A formal DAB review is the last step of the DAB review process. Following presentations by the OIPT and a full discussion, the USD(AT&L) as DAE decides to continue, alter, or terminate the program. This decision is published as an ADM. With the approval of the USD(AT&L), other committee reviews may be held for special purposes, such as to develop recommendations for the DAE on decisions other than milestone or program reviews (i.e., release of “withhold funds,” baseline changes, AS changes).

### **11-68. The Army Systems Acquisitions Review Council (ASARC)**

The ASARC is the Army’s senior-level advisory body for ACAT IC and II programs and ACAT ID programs (DAB managed) prior to a DAB. The ASARC convenes at formal milestones to determine a program or system’s readiness to enter the next phase of the materiel acquisition cycle, and makes recommendations to the AAE on those programs for which the AAE is the MDA. An ASARC may also be convened at any time to review the status of a program. The ASARC is co-chaired by the AAE and the VCSA.

### **11-69. The HQDA Information Technology Overarching Integrated Product Team (ITOIPT)**

**a.** The ITOIPT is the Army’s senior-level advisory body supporting the AAE and DISC4 in their acquisition oversight role of ACAT IAC programs. The purpose of the oversight is to assist managers in resolving major issues supporting information requirements. The ITOIPT is chaired by the DISC4 as the Army CIO.

**b.** ASARC/ITOIPT membership includes the DUSA(OR); DUSA(IA); ASA(FM&C); ASA(I&E); ASA(M&RA); CG, AMC; CG, TRADOC; GC; DISC4; DCSLOG; DCSOPS; DCSPRO; DCSPER; DCSINT; Chief, Army Reserve; Chief, National Guard Bureau; Chief, Legislative Liaison; MILDEP to the ASA(ALT); DPAAE; CG, ATEC and the Army IG (non-voting member). The following organizations are invited to attend if a significant issue is identified within their area of responsibility: The COE; TSG; CG, MTMC; CG, USASMDC;

Commander, Safety Center; and the Chief of Public Affairs. The AAE makes the final decision as to attendance at the ASARC or ITOIPT.

c. The effectiveness of the ASARC/ITOIPT review process results from presentation of thorough analysis of all relevant issues and face-to-face discussion among the principals from the Army Secretariat, ARSTAF, and MACOMs (AMC and TRADOC).

#### **11-70. In-process review (IPR)**

a. The IPR is a formal review forum for ACAT III, and IV programs. General policies for reviews for IPR programs are the same as for ACAT I and II programs. Reviews are conducted at milestones and at other times deemed necessary by the MDA. The MDA or designee chairs the IPR.

b. The IPR brings together representatives of the MATDEV, the CBTDEV, the trainer, the logistician, and the independent evaluators for a joint review and decision on proceeding to the next phase of development. Their purpose is to provide recommendations, with supporting rationale, as a basis for system concept, system development, type classification, and production decisions by the appropriate level of authority. They are the forums where agencies responsible for participating in the materiel acquisition process can present their views and ensure that those views are considered during development, test, evaluation, and production. Unless informed otherwise, the MATDEV is delegated IPR authority for the system. Participation is extended to the appropriate testing agencies, HQDA representatives, and to such others as the IPR chairman designates. The ASD(C3I), as the DOD CIO, is the MDA for ACAT IAM programs, as delegated by the DAE. The DISC4, as the Army CIO, is the MDA for ACAT IAC programs, as delegated by the AAE.

### **SECTION IX TESTING AND EVALUATION**

#### **11-71. T&E strategy**

a. There are three major subprocesses that support the overall management process of system acquisition. The first major subprocess is T&E. All Army acquisition programs must be supported by an integrated T&E strategy that reflects an adequate and efficient T&E program. T&E is the principal tool with which progress in system development and acquisition is measured. T&E is structured to support the defense acquisition process and user by providing essential information to decision-makers, assessing attainment of technical performance parameters, and determining whether systems are operationally effective, suitable, and survivable for intended use. Primary reasons for conducting T&E is to facilitate learning, assess technical maturity and interoperability, facilitate integration into fielded forces, and confirm performance. T&E can also assess and reduce program risk (i.e., schedule, cost, technical feasibility, technical obsolescence, and software management). The primary product of the T&E subprocess is information (hard facts) on a system so that the MDA can make informed decisions.

b. The planning, programming, and budgeting for T&E begins early in the acquisition process, concurrent with coordination of the validated MNS and ORD. Early T&E integration is accomplished through the use of the TEWIPT. The primary purpose of the TEWIPT is to optimize the use of the appropriate T&E expertise, instrumentation, targets,

facilities, simulations, and models to implement test integration, thereby reducing costs to the Army. The primary product of the TEWIPT is a TEMP, previously discussed. The DUSA(OR) is the TEMP approval authority for all programs on the OSD T&E oversight list

**c.** Continuous evaluation (CE) is used to provide a continuous flow of information and data to decision-makers, MATDEV, and CBTDEV. The data generated in early development phases is visible and maintained as the system moves into the formal testing, thereby avoiding duplication of testing. Continuous evaluation continues through a system's post-deployment so as to verify whether the fielded system meets or exceeds thresholds and objectives for cost, performance, and support parameters.

### **11-72. DT and OT**

**a.** DT encompasses models, simulation, and engineering type tests that are used to verify that design risks are minimized, system safety is certified, achievement of system technical performance is substantiated, and that readiness for OT is certified. DT generally requires instrumentation and measurements, is accomplished by engineers and technicians, is repeatable, may be environmentally controlled, and covers the complete spectrum of system capabilities. The PM shall design DT objectives appropriate to each phase and milestone.

**b.** OT is a field test of a system (or item) under realistic operational conditions with users who represent those expected to operate and maintain the system (or item) when it is fielded or deployed. Key OTs are:

(1) *IOT*. It is conducted before the full-rate production decision and is structured to provide data to determine the operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of a system operated by typical users under realistic conditions (e.g., combat and representative threat). Before an IOT commences for all programs on the OSD T&E oversight list, OSD (DOT&E) must approve the OT plan.

(2) *FOT*. FOT may be necessary during (or after) production to refine the estimates made during the IOT, provide data to examine changes, and verify that deficiencies in materiel, training, or concepts have been corrected. A FOT provides data to ensure that the system continues to meet operational needs and that it retains its effectiveness in a new environment or against a new threat.

**c.** OT and DT events requiring soldiers are funded through the Army's TSARC process. The TSARC is a HQDA GO/SES centralize management forum that meets semiannually to review and coordinate the resources required to support the tests to be included in the Army's five-year test program (FYTP). The TSARC is chaired by CG, ATEC. The TSARC process operates under AR 73-1. When approved for inclusion in the FYTP, a program's OTP becomes authority for tasking in the current and budget years. The OTP is an acquisition system's formal T&E resource planning and tasking document.

## **SECTION X INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT (ILS)**

### **11-73. ILS requirements and procedures**

The second major subprocess in support of acquisition system management is ILS. ILS is a disciplined, unified, and interactive approach to the management and technical activities

necessary to integrate logistics support into system and equipment design. This section outlines requirements and procedures used to plan, program, develop, acquire, test, evaluate/assess, train, and deploy (concurrent with fielding of a new/modified weapon system) all the necessary support resources to ensure the supportability and readiness of the system when fielded. The ILS process ensures the support resources required to keep a system and supporting training devices in an operational ready status throughout its operational life are identified and developed in a timely and cost effective manner. When the CBTDEV selects the best support concept during the acquisition process, he or she establishes and chairs the supportability integrated process team (SIPT), formerly known as the ILS management team (ILSMT), to provide detailed implementation of the support concept and develop the supportability strategy (SS). The MATDEV assumes the chair of the SIPT after being identified. The SIPT considers numerous alternatives and trade-offs. This supportability analysis (SA) is required to identify the optimum support system requirements. Both the MATDEV and CBTDEV perform SA tasks (either in-house or through contractors) applicable to their respective mission responsibilities as defined in AR 700-127. Life cycle software engineering centers (LCSECs) serve as members of the SIPT and provide support for the supportability analysis of software dependent systems, regardless of whether the LCSEC will perform software maintenance and support or only have a coordination role.

#### **11-74. ILS process**

**a.** The ILS process pursues three thrusts simultaneously. The first is design influence in order to reduce operating and support costs and simplify equipment operation and maintenance. The second concerns the design of support, identification of resources, development and acquisition of the necessary support resources, and fielding of support to assure satisfactory operation and readiness of the system. The third addresses supporting the design throughout the life of the system. The effectiveness of the first thrust reduces demands on the second. In the case of COTS/NDI acquisitions, the ILS thrust is attained by focusing on the source selection process.

**b.** Logistics support is a programmatic concern being an integral part of system performance including operational and performance characteristics of the system (DODI 5000.2). Thus, the effectiveness of an ILS program requires strong management, involvement, a tailored SIPT, and close coordination among SIPT members so that ILS is integrated throughout the materiel acquisition process. The integrated logistics support manager (ILSM) as the chairman of the SIPT works in conjunction with other members of the SIPT and the PM IPT. ILS strategies and requirements are developed IAW the strategies and requirements of the PM IPT. Continued coordination and cooperation between the CBTDEV and MATDEV ILS organizational elements and the PM IPT is essential.

**c.** In an effort to operate within resource constraints, the CBTDEV and MATDEV ILS communities generate improvements in readiness support and supportability related system design through:

- (1) Jointly developing necessary MANPRINT plans and strategies.
- (2) Jointly developing an early-on ILS program and SS (formerly known as the integrated logistical support plan (ILSP)).

- (3) Use of SA and HSI analytical techniques for the performance of ILS program objectives.
- (4) Development and/or change of doctrine, policy and procedure.
- (5) Investigation of HSI, SA and other analytical techniques for deriving manpower, personnel, training and logistics impacts from the mission needs determination and other CBTDEV and MATDEV analyses.
- (6) Identification of –
  - Contract incentives.
  - System readiness objectives (SROs).
  - Modification candidates.
  - Embedded training capability/options.
- (7) Emphasis on commercial, other Service and allies technical advances in supportability characteristics and techniques.

d. The CBTDEV and MATDEV in coordination with the HQDA ODCSLOG, jointly establish an ILS program. The CBTDEV is principally responsible for identifying and documenting general ILS requirements and constraints through studies and analysis and for developing the SA strategy during the Phase A. Generally, lead responsibility for ILS transfers to the MATDEV upon entry into Phase B.

## SECTION XI

### MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL INTEGRATION (MANPRINT) PROGRAM

#### 11-75. Seven MANPRINT domains

The third major subprocess in support of acquisition system management is the MANPRINT program. MANPRINT is the Army's application of the DOD HSI requirements in systems acquisition (DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2), in compliance with Title 10. MANPRINT, described in detail in AR 602-2, is the Army's program to ensure that the "human" is fully and continuously considered as part of the total system in the development and acquisition of all systems and that human performance is always considered as part of "total system performance. MANPRINT integrates and facilitates trade-offs among the following domains but does not replace individual domain activities, responsibilities, or reporting channels:

a. **Manpower.** The personnel strength (military and civilian) available to the Army. Manpower refers to the consideration of the net effect of Army systems on overall human resource requirements and authorizations (spaces), to ensure that each system is affordable from the standpoint of manpower. It includes analysis of the number of people needed to operate, maintain, and support each new system being acquired, including maintenance and supply personnel, and personnel to support and conduct training. It requires a determination of the Army manpower requirements generated by the system, comparing the new manpower needs with those of the old system(s) being replaced. If an increase in personnel is required to support a new (or modified) system, "bill payers" must be identified from existing personnel accounts.

**b. Personnel capabilities.** Military and civilians possessing the aptitudes and grades required to operate, maintain, and support a system in peacetime and war. Personnel refers to the ability of the Army to provide qualified people in terms of specific aptitudes, experiences, and other human characteristics needed to operate, maintain, and support Army systems. It requires a detailed assessment of the aptitudes which personnel must possess in order to complete training successfully as well as operate, maintain, and support the system to the required standard. Iterative analyses must be accomplished for the system being acquired, comparing projected quantities of qualified personnel with the requirements of the new system, any system(s) being replaced, and overall Army needs for similarly qualified people. Personnel analyses and projections are needed in time to allow orderly recruitment, training, and assignment of personnel in conjunction with system fielding.

**c. Training.** Considerations of the necessary time and resources required to impact the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to qualify army personnel for operation, maintenance, and support of army systems. It involves (1) formulating and selecting engineering design alternatives that are supportable from a training perspective (2) documenting training strategies, and (3) determining resource requirements to enable the Army training system to support system fielding. It includes analyses of the tasks that must be performed by the operator, maintainer, and supporter; the conditions under which the tasks must be performed; and the performance standards that must be met. Training is linked with personnel analyses and actions because availability of qualified personnel is a direct function of the training process.

**d. Human factors engineering.** Human factors engineering is the technical effort to integrate design criteria, psychological principles, and human capabilities as they relate to the design, development, test, and evaluation of systems. The human factors engineering goals are:

(1) To maximize the ability of the soldier to perform at required levels by eliminating design-induced error.

(2) To ensure materiel maintenance, support, and transport are compatible with the capabilities and limitations of the range of fully equipped soldiers who would be using such materiel. Human factors engineering provides an interface between the MANPRINT domains and system engineers. Human factors engineering supports the MANPRINT goal of developing equipment that will permit effective soldier-machine interaction within the allowable, established limits of training time, soldier aptitudes and skill, physical endurance, physiological tolerance limits, and soldier physical standards. Human factors engineering provides this support by determining the soldier's role in the materiel system, and by defining and developing soldier-materiel interface characteristics, workplace layout, and work environment.

**e. System safety.** The application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and techniques to optimize safety within the constraints of operational effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the system or facility life cycle.

**f. Health hazards.** The inherent conditions in the use, operation, maintenance, support and disposal of a system (e.g., acoustical energy, biological substances, chemical substances, oxygen deficiency, radiation energy, shock, temperature extremes, trauma, and vibration) that can cause death, injury, illness, disability, or reduce job performance of personnel.

**g. Soldier survivability.** A soldier within the context of MANPRINT may refer to a military or a civilian.

(1) *System.* The characteristics of a system that can reduce fratricide reduce detectability of the soldier, prevent attack if detected, prevent damage if attacked, minimize medical injury if wounded or otherwise injured, and reduce physical and mental fatigue.

(2) *Soldier.* Those characteristics of soldiers that enable them to withstand (or avoid) adverse military action or the effects of natural phenomena that would result in the loss of capability to continue effective performance of the prescribed mission.

### **11-76. MANPRINT objectives and concept**

**a.** MANPRINT is intended to influence the design of developmental systems and the selection of NDI systems with the primary objective of achieving maximum total system effectiveness at a reasonable and affordable life cycle cost of ownership. The implementation of MANPRINT impacts total system performance (both effectiveness and availability) by making explicit the role that soldier performance plays and is shaped by design factors. MANPRINT also addresses the manpower, personnel, and training resources needed to achieve the required performance and, where possible, indicates more affordable configuration of manpower, personnel, and training resources.

**b.** The engineering design philosophy of MANPRINT is focused on optimum system performance on the battlefield, which includes consideration of both soldier and equipment capabilities and survivability. MANPRINT is an option-oriented process as opposed to an objective-oriented process. The MANPRINT process will provide decision makers information upon which to make trade-offs in areas such as quality and numbers of people, training times, technology, conditions, standards, costs, survivability, safety, health hazard risks, design and interface features, and personnel assignment policy.

**c.** The body of MANPRINT expertise, formerly known as the MANPRINT Joint Working Group, will continue to function through the ICT and the IPT process. The MANPRINT members of the ICT will transition to the MANPRINT WIPT when applicable. The purpose of this body is to:

(1) Assist the CBTDEV (or functional proponent) and program manager to ensure MANPRINT principles are applied to the system,

(2) Provide MANPRINT input to the MNS and the ORD.

(3) Provide a tracking system and historical database of MANPRINT issues.

## **SECTION XII ACQUISITION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT**

### **11-77. Appropriations**

The “color of money,” or kind of appropriation, is an important factor in acquisition management. In general, a particular appropriation can be expended only for specified activities, and money cannot be changed from one appropriation to another. Acquisition management involves at least two appropriations, and may involve four. The two-year RDTE appropriation provides funds for research, design engineering, prototype production, and test

and evaluation activities in the course of developing a materiel system. The three-year procurement appropriation provides funds for procuring materiel that has been fully tested and type classified. Procurement funds are also used to procure LRIP systems for operational testing, initial spares, and support and training equipment. The Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation provides funds for retiring and retrograding the old equipment being replaced, for repairing systems after fielding, for fuel and ammunition for training and operations, for periodic system rebuild, for training both system operators and maintainers, except new equipment training, and, in general, anything else to keep a system in the field and operating. Some systems may require MCA appropriated funds for the construction of special facilities required for fielding that system.

### **11-78. Program and budget process**

Funds of the correct amount and appropriation must be planned and programmed into the Army budget, in general, two years before they are needed. In the program and budget process, fund requests are initiated or reviewed annually. Congress appropriates funds for RDTE (Title V) and Procurement (Title IV) as part of the “*Defense Appropriation Act.*” The RDTE and procurement appropriations must first be approved by DOD, submitted to Congress by the President, and then be authorized and appropriated in two separate congressional actions before any money can be spent. In the year of budget execution, the Army may reprogram funds, except for congressional interest items, within an appropriation subject to limits, or with prior congressional approval. Up to \$4 million of RDTE and \$10 million of procurement may be reprogrammed into a program without prior congressional approval (see Figure 11-10). The MATDEV is responsible for planning and programming the RDTE and procurement funds to cover a program, and the MCA, when needed. The MATDEV is responsible for programming all life-cycle system costs for the system while the system remains under his or her management control. This includes programming for outyear sustaining resources as well as RDTE and procurement. Once the management responsibility transitions to the managing AMC “commodity command”, it then becomes that command’s responsibility to continue the depot-level sustaining program. The field user MACOM is responsible to program day-to-day system below-depot operational support. The field user MACOM is responsible for planning and programming the OMA funds needed to ensure continued readiness of the fielded system. Responsibility for planning and programming funds for product improvements and sustaining supply spare parts is complex and divided between the MATDEV and the field MACOM.

### **11-79. RDTE appropriation activities**

To assist in the overall planning, programming, budgeting, and managing of the various R&D activities, the RDTE appropriation is divided into seven R&D budget activities. These categories are used throughout DOD. The current RDTE budget activities are as follows.

**a. Budget Activity—Basic Research.** Basic research efforts provide fundamental knowledge for the solution of identified military problems. Includes all efforts of scientific study and experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and understanding in those fields of the physical, engineering, environmental, and life sciences related to long-term national security needs. It provides farsighted, high payoff research, including critical enabling technologies that provide the basis for technological progress. It forms a part of the base for (a) subsequent applied and advanced developments in defense-related technologies,

and (b) new and improved military functional capabilities in areas such as communications, detection, tracking, surveillance, propulsion, mobility, guidance and control, navigation, energy conversion, materials and structures, and personnel support. Basic research efforts precede the system specific research described in the ASTMP.

APPN	MAX IN	MAX OUT	Level of Control	OBL AVAIL
RDTE	+ \$ 4M	Greater of \$ 4M or 20% of Program Element	PROGRAM ELEMENT	2 YEARS
PROC	+ \$ 10M	Greater of \$ 10M or 20% of Line Item	LINE ITEM	3 YEARS
OMA	+ \$ 20M	No Congressional Restriction	BUDGET ACTIVITY	1 YEAR
MILCON	Lessor of + \$ 2M or 25% of Project	No Congressional Restriction	PROJECT	5 YEARS

Note: Reprogramming thresholds apply to each appropriation during *entire* "active" life of that appropriation

**Figure 11-10. Below Threshold Reprogramming Levels**

**b. Budget Activity—Applied Research.** This activity translates promising basic research into solutions for broadly defined military needs, short of major development projects, with a view to developing and evaluating technical feasibility. This type of effort may vary from fairly fundamental applied research to sophisticated breadboard hardware, study, programming and planning efforts that establish the initial feasibility and practicality of proposed solutions to technological challenges. It should thus include studies, investigation, and nonsystem specific development effort. The dominant characteristic of this category of effort is that it be pointed toward specific military OFCs/FOCs with a view toward developing and evaluating the feasibility and practicability of proposed solutions and determining their parameters. Program control of the applied research element will normally be exercised by general level of effort. Applied research precedes the system specific research described in the ASTMP.

**c. Budget Activity—Advanced Technology Development.** This activity includes all efforts, which have moved into the development and integration of hardware and other technology products for field experiments and tests. The results of this type of effort are proof of technological feasibility and assessment of operability and producibility that could lead to the development of hardware for Service use. It also includes ATDs that help expedite technology transition from the laboratory to operational use. Projects in this category have a direct relevance to identified military needs. Advanced technology development may include concept exploration as described in the ASTMP, but is nonsystem specific.

**d. Budget Activity—Demonstration and Validation.** Includes all efforts associated with advanced technology development used to demonstrate the general military utility or cost reduction potential of technology when applied to different types of military equipment or techniques. It includes evaluation, synthetic environment, prototypes, and proof-of-

principle demonstrations in field exercises to evaluate system upgrades or provide new operational capabilities. The demonstrations evaluate integrated technologies in as realistic an operating environment as possible to assess the performance or cost reduction potential of advanced technology. It may include concept exploration as well as program definition and risk reduction as described in DODD 5000.1, but is system specific.

**e. Budget Activity—Engineering and Manufacturing Development.** Includes those projects in engineering and manufacturing development for Service use. This area is characterized by major line item projects and program control is exercised by review of individual projects. Includes engineering and manufacturing development projects as described in DODD 5000.1, and may include OT. DODD 5000.1 changed the acquisition phase names that Budget Activities 4 and 5 support from program definition and risk reduction (phase I) and engineering and manufacturing development (phase II) to phase B – system development and demonstration.

**f. Budget Activity—RDTE Management and Support.** Includes efforts directed toward support of RDTE installations or operations required for use in general research and development (R&D) and not allocable to specific R&D missions. Included are technical integration efforts, technical information activities, space programs, major test ranges, test facilities and general test instrumentation, target development, support of operational tests, international cooperative R&D, and R&D support.

**g. Budget Activity—Operational System Development.** Includes R&D effort directed toward development, engineering, and test of changes to fielded systems or systems already in procurement which alter the performance envelopes. Operational system development may include OT costs. FY01 R&D support to miscellaneous operational efforts include: Combat Vehicle Product Improvement Program (PIP), MLRS PIP, Horizontal Battlefield Digitization, Satellite Communication Ground Environment, etc. Program control is exercised by review of individual projects.

### **11-80. Procurement appropriations**

The procurement appropriation funds the procurement of materiel systems that has been fully tested and type classified. The army budget includes six separate procurement appropriations:

**a. Aircraft Appropriation.** Aircraft procurement includes the procurement of aircraft, aircraft modifications, spares, repair parts, and related support equipment and facilities.

**b. Missile Appropriation.** Missile procurement includes the procurement of missiles, missiles modifications, spares, repair parts, and related support equipment and facilities.

**c. Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles (WTCV) Appropriation.** WTCV procurement includes tracked and combat vehicles, weapons, other combat vehicles, and repair parts.

**d. Ammunition Appropriation.** Ammunition procurement includes procurement of ammunition end items, ammunition production base support, and ammunition demilitarization.

**e. Other Procurement, Army (OPA) Appropriation.** OPA covers three major categories: (1) tactical and support vehicles, (2) communications and electronic equipment, and (3) other support equipment.

**11-81. Research, development, and acquisition plan (RDA plan)**

a. The FY02-16 RDA planning process began with the construction of the FY02-07 RDA POM and continues with the development of the FY02 BES and the FY02 President's Budget. During each of these three stages, the extended planning period (EPP), FY08-16, is revised to ensure a reasonable progression from the period FY02-07.

b. The ODCSOPS RDA database represents the RDA plan. The principal elements of the RDA database, management decision packages (MDEPs), are grouped by budget operating system (BOS). A BOS is a set of MDEPs that represent a common function on the battlefield or a common activity of the supporting Army infrastructure. A HQDA division manages each BOS. The division chief (known as the BOS manager), assisted by his or her staff and his or her ASA(ALT)/DISC4 counterparts determines the requirements and priorities of the MDEPs of his or her BOS.

c. The Army RDA plan is a 15-year plan for the development and production of technologies and materiel to advance Army modernization. Modernization is "the continuous process of integrating new doctrine, training, organization and equipment to develop and field warfighting capabilities for the total force." Under ideal circumstances Army modernization would be fully supported by an unconstrained RDA program. However, the realities of limited resources restrict modernization to those efforts that are both technically and fiscally achievable. The RDA plan, therefore, is the result of a process that converts the Army's unconstrained planning environment into a constrained RDA program that maximizes warfighting capabilities and supporting infrastructure requirements within limited resources.

d. The RDA plan assumes the form of a 1-N priority list of RDTE/procurement program packages called MDEPs with funding streams for the entire 15-year planning period. An MDEP represents a particular program, function or organization and displays the resources (dollars, system quantities, civilian and military manpower) needed to achieve an intended goal. An MDEP may receive its resources (funding streams) from any number of appropriations; the RDA plan, however, includes only the RDTE and procurement funding streams of its MDEPs. There is no limitation to the number of commands to which the resources of an MDEP may be assigned. The RDA plan is recorded in and represented by the ODCSOPS RDA database.


e. The RDA plan is a continual process comprising periodic revisions to the 15-year planning period of the RDA database. The revisions occur during the three principal stages of the PPBES cycle: the POM, BES and President's Budget process. During each of these three stages, the Army adjusts the first six years of the 15-year planning period. After each stage, the Army's RDA community adjusts the final nine years, called the EPP, to ensure a smooth and reasonable progression from the FYDP to EPP. The 15-year planning period of the RDA database moves forward by two years each alternate January to conform to the OSD requirement for a biennial POM and budget. The FY02-16 RDA Plan began in January 2000; the FY04-18 RDA Plan will begin in January 2002.

f. During the second year of the biennial budget cycle, the Army develops a POM update of the preceding year's POM. The update includes years two through five of the planning period. In 2000, the POM covered FY02-07; in FY2001 the POM update will cover FY03-07. Similarly, the FY02-16 RDA Plan of 2000 will undergo an update in 2001; the

update will cover FY03-16. By definition the RDA plan includes the funding lines of the RDTE and procurement appropriations only. The equipping program evaluation group (EE PEG) develops and issues the RDA plan, which includes the RDTE and procurement lines of all PEGs. The EE PEG is responsible for about 90 percent of the RDA program dollars and, also, for a limited number of non-RDA programs. To facilitate management of its total program, the EE PEG places the non-RDA funding streams of its MDEPs in the database of the RDA plan. The non-RDA funding streams are not part of the RDA plan; they are simply displayed in the RDA plan database. The non-RDA funding streams have no EPP.

**11-82. TRADOC warfighting lens analysis (WFLA)**

a. WFLA exists for two reasons: to provide materiel resourcing recommendations to HQDA and to support TRADOC’s mission as “Architect of the Future Army”. WFLA is the TRADOC vehicle for materiel resourcing recommendations to HQDA to ensure linkage with PPBES (see Figure 11-11). TRADOC uses WFLA to provide input to the Army’s RDA plan and POM considerations. It is derived from a warfighter’s assessment of future battlefield requirements based on analysis.



**Figure 11-11. Warfighting Lens Analysis (WFLA)**

b. The materiel requirements determination process begins at the TRADOC schools and proponentencies. TRADOC assesses and integrates branch/proponent recommendations through the WFLA process. WFLA compares required future operational capabilities (OFCs/FOCs) of the total force against fiscal constraints in order to determine modernization needs. These priorities are established according to their objective measure of relative value to mission accomplishment. Recommendations are then developed to address those needs. WFLA modernization recommendations are provided to HQDA to ensure a balanced modernized warfighting capability for future Army.

c. TRADOC provides WFLA recommendations to DA as key input for POM (December odd year) and, if needed, for mini-POM (December even year). WFLA is a

living, evolving process and is initiated/updated each cycle through TRADOC implementation guidance developed to meet HQDA current year guidance.

### **11-83. Program stability**

Achieving early program objective consensus and following a good investment strategy will yield a stable program, clearly showing where we are today and where we want to be when we bring on the new system. To be successful, new systems acquisition programs must be developed and acquired in a timely and economical manner. Life-cycle cost estimates and changes to programs and schedules must be controlled. Changes to programs affecting established goals will be fully documented in the program management documentation, providing the justification for change (i.e., budget cut, design change). After entering Phase B (System Development and Demonstration), design changes in system components that are meeting the approved requirement are discouraged and must be individually justified. The design should be frozen in sufficient time prior to DT and OT to provide an adequate system support package for testing. Changes to programs as a result of DT/OT must be of the “objective” nature to satisfy the requirement and not a “threshold” type of change, unless it can be demonstrated that the change will not have a significantly negative impact on the cost, schedule, producibility, and ILS aspects of the program.

## **SECTION XIII ACQUISITION REFORM**

### **11-84. Reform process**

**a.** With a wide range of missions, global uncertainty, increased global technology transfer, and limited RDA resources, the Army has been a leader in acquisition reform. For example, the TRADOC battle labs and the AWEs have shown to be critical in simulating, experimenting, and assessing advanced technologies and concepts, thereby accelerating and improving both the requirement determination and acquisition processes. Every ATD is required to be sponsored by a TRADOC battle lab and have at least one experiment performed at a battle lab. The ACT II program, previously discussed, is funding competitively selected proposals from industry to demonstrate promising technology and prototypes of keen interest to all the battle labs in satisfying priority OFCs/FOCs. The OSD ACTD initiative allows rapid prototyping of promising technologies that provide real capabilities for the joint warfighting customer to evaluate.

**b.** A new partnership has been established among warfighter, Army acquisition, and industry organizations to identify technology options more quickly, establish the best technical approaches, conduct solid price-benefit trade studies, develop performance requirements, program the funding needed, and issue concise solicitations consistent with the foregoing. The battle labs, HTI ICTs, and team efforts such as Team Comanche and Team Crusader are examples of the power of IPPD and IPTs that bring the stakeholders together to solve tough acquisition and requirements tasks concurrently and quickly. The Army continues to overcome organizational stovepipes and is mastering HTI and information technology in a timely and affordable manner.

**c.** Another consideration in the acquisition reform process is how the Army deals with industry. Through performance specifications and streamlined, tailored, page-limited

solicitations, the Army gives them maximum flexibility by telling them what it wants as an end item and not how to do it or how to get there. Furthermore, the Army leverages commercial technologies, products, and processes and establishes open architectures that facilitate future upgrades, using to advantage the commercial information technology revolution and rapid advances in computers. These initiatives have shortened acquisition times for quality upgrades, reduced life-cycle costs, and allowed the acquisition community to easily integrate exciting new technologies as they become available. A highly successful process to focus and leverage all of our acquisition reform initiatives in support of Army XXI is the acquisition reform reinvention centers and laboratories.

### **11-85. Army XXI reinvention centers**

In the past several years, the SA has delegated far-reaching authorities to Army XXI reinvention centers in order to reengineer processes and redesign organizations to support core competencies required for the U.S. Army in the 21st century. To accomplish the Army's missions in an era of declining resources, it must complete a plan that will make it a more flexible organization that can reach out to both the fighting and sustaining elements of Army XXI with the best concepts and technologies available in the future. The reinvention center designation allows the Army to mass ongoing initiatives to overpower many current restraints impacting the Army's mission. The SA has designated three reinvention centers: FORSCOM, TRADOC, and HQDA. The authorities delegated by the SA to these three reinvention centers in pursuing reinvention efforts are:

- Coordination Authority: permission to deal directly with OSD and other reinvention centers or laboratories without having to go through the DA staff first.
- Authority regulatory waiver: permission to waive DA and MACOM regulations, directives, instructions, and/or publications, with certain limitations.
- Legislative change proposal authority: permission to submit proposed legislative changes directly to the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison (OCLL) without having to filter through the DA staff.
- Lab and prototype authority: Permission to designate reinvention center laboratories and prototypes, as needed, with no reporting requirements outside of the reinvention center.

### **11-86. Army XXI Acquisition Reform Reinvention Laboratory**

**a.** The Army XXI Acquisition Reform Reinvention Laboratory was approved by the SA and CSA on 1 July, 1996. The Reinvention Lab's focused goal was to identify, test, procure, and field technically advanced systems and equipment for Army XXI by the year 2000. The Reinvention Lab process will enable the Army to use acquisition reforms effectively, to take high value technologies from prototype status following AWE and convert them into fieldable materiel systems and equipment in time to field the first Army XXI digitized division by 2001 and the first Army XXI corps by 2004.

**b.** The Acquisition Reform Reinvention Laboratory is a conglomerate of 94 acquisition reform initiatives involving everything from lower staff levels at brigade headquarters to new software, hardware, acquisition processes and paperwork reduction. It takes advantage of every acquisition time and cost cutting initiative given to the Army by Congress and DOD, including simplifying procedures, using commercial practices, streamlining processes, and

using commercial credit cards and electronic commerce. The Reinvention Lab is responsible for making efficient and effective all processes involved in the acquisition and fielding of equipment for Army XXI. The WRAP is the primary streamlining process used by the Reinvention Lab to accomplish its Army XXI goals.

### **11-87. Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP)**

**a. WRAP.** The WRAP was established on 11 April, 1996 primarily to accelerate fielding of systems and technology that emerge from TRADOC battle lab warfighting experiments. WRAP applies to AWEs, CEPs, ATDs, ACTDs and similar experiments where a TRADOC-led ICT supported by a TRADOC battle lab are directly involved. Normally, such systems and technology emerge from the experimentation process as unfinanced “new starts.” If an approved new start cannot be acquired under existing MDA authorities and funding, the CG, TRADOC can initiate a WRAP ASARC to obtain approval of candidates based on compelling experimentation success and urgency of need. Supporting criteria include: technical merit and maturity, criticality and priority to warfighting requirements, affordability, effectiveness, and supportability and sustainability into the next Army POM. Successful WRAP candidates are ranked by priority and receive funding for operational prototypes in priority order.

**b. WRAP ASARC.** The WRAP ASARC is normally scheduled in the March-April and August-September time frames, to identify what projects to fund and to accommodate PPBES actions. A WRAP ASARC can be held at other times if appropriate. When convened by the CG, TRADOC the WRAP ASARC:

- (1) Reviews requirements and urgency.
- (2) Reviews affordability.
- (3) Reviews experimentation results.
- (4) Approves the AS.
- (5) Assigns management responsibility to an AMC advanced concepts manager (ACM) or designates PEO/PM.
- (6) Assigns a milestone entry point, as appropriate.
- (7) Approves a funding strategy.

**c. WRAP documentation.** The MNS is the normal document needed to support TRADOC AWEs. A MNS is not required if an OFC/FOC list can support the WRAP requirement traceability. For candidates selected for rapid acquisition, a streamlined operational requirement statement (ORS) is sufficient to support the WRAP ASARC and for documentation during the two years before regular programming begins. Items not approved for rapid acquisition will convert to normal documentation over a set time period. The ORS for rapid acquisition is not a requirements document. The format is provided in Appendix C, AR 71-9. Supplementary WRAP documentation normally includes: urgency of need statement, experimentation results documenting compelling success, proposed AS, and a budget estimate for the proposed program.

**d. WRAP funding.** In the *FY97 Appropriation Act*, Congress approved an Army budget line dedicated for WRAP initiatives. Financing from this line is used to jump start technology

programs and field limited quantities of approved requirements emerging from the Force XXI process as quickly as possible, without having to reprogram funds from other budget lines. Financing in this manner is limited to providing enough funds only to bridge the gap (normally two years) until the total funding requirements for a new start can be budgeted. WRAP initiatives can also be funded through reprioritizing or reprogramming activities. The execution of WRAP initiatives funding is subject to approval from the WRAP ASARC, which oversees WRAP efforts. The ASA(ALT) directs and controls the Army XXI acquisition reform efforts through the Deputy for Systems Management and HTI, who functions as the Director of the Reinvention Laboratory. WRAP will not initiate any new projects in FY01 as a result of reprogramming actions to fund the Army's new Transformation Strategy.

### **11-88. Horizontal technology integration (HTI)**

**a.** The Army's requirements and modernization processes must be an efficient, effective, and flexible force coping with the rapid changing technology and socio-political environments to provide the warfighter timely, innovative solutions providing or maintaining the edge in all missions. Today, the HTI program is the Army's primary modernization initiative providing a holistic approach to requirements determination; early enjoyment of the requirements, acquisition, and user communities in a team effort; and aggressive exploitation of leading edge technologies.

**b.** HTI is the Army's modernization strategy for the future--upgrading existing weapon systems instead of developing new ones. Through HTI, the Army upgrades the force, maintains its technological edge on the battlefield, and enhances its combat power through the synergy of applying synchronized and common technologies across the force rather than to one or a few systems. HTI breaks away from the traditional "mission specific" modernization approach. Second generation forward looking infrared (FLIR) capability, Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS), battlefield digitization, survivability enhancement systems, Combat Identification Dismounted Soldier System (CIDSS), driver's vision enhancement (DVE), thermal weapons sight (TWS), embedded diagnostics, tactical lasers, and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below System (FBCB2) are the major HTI efforts underway at this time. These ten enabling technology programs provide capabilities that, when combined, enable the Army to reduce fratricide, improve situational awareness, firepower effectiveness, and command and control.

**c.** HTI is defined as the application of common enabling technologies across multiple systems to improve the overall warfighting capability of the force; lowering research and development costs and development time; and obtaining lower unit production costs by procuring larger quantities of the same subsystem for different weapons systems. The Army also benefits from a common logistics base for the same subsystems on multiple platforms. Above all, HTI provides the warfighter with the necessary improvements in lethality, survivability, and tempo to defeat any threat on the 21st century battlefield. HTI depends upon the use of CBTDEV-led ICTs for horizontal requirements integration and MATDEV-led IPTs for program development and execution.

**d.** HTI is implemented within the framework of existing acquisition processes, structures and organizations. A HQDA general officer working group (GOWG) is the central authority for all formal Army HTI initiatives and programs. The GOWG is co-chaired by the

ADCSPRO-FD and the ASA(ALT) Deputy for Systems Management and HTI. GOWG members include HQDA representatives from ODCSOPS, ODCSPRO, ASA(ALT), ASA(FM&C), DISC4, and PA&E, along with TRADOC, AMC, and ATEC representatives. They establish the HTI “blueprint”, synchronize and prioritize efforts, provide specific guidance, resolve issues, and provide general officer-level direction, guidance, and oversight. In addition, the ASA(ALT) Deputy for Systems Management and HTI acts as the Army HTI executive agent and determines, coordinates, and issues specific guidance for HTI programs implemented across multiple PEO/PM structures and organizations.

e. The HTI process begins with an operational concept, OFC/FOC, or system requirement. The appropriate management structure is then chartered to implement an HTI initiative through the application of specific programs. HTI initiatives follow established acquisition management procedures. The ASA(ALT) ensures the technology insertion is completely synchronized through management oversight of the respective Army laboratory, Army RDECs, PEOs and PMs. The individual HTI efforts are managed as a part of planned (STOs), new system developments, and/or system modifications. This increased management focus ensures that the technology development plan or weapon system acquisition strategies/plans are designed with an overall horizontal approach to development and execution. This includes possible joint service, allied nation or industry applications. HTI initiatives are resourced through individual MDEPs on a case by case basis. There is an MDEP established to provide funding for both common, government-furnished hardware, and for the actual insertion and integration of the common hardware onto the designated weapon systems. As a process, HTI supports an integrated battlefield architecture that exploits the capabilities of combat, materiel and training developers, national laboratories, industry and academia to achieve total force synergism. Its purpose is to provide increased modernization efficiency and responsiveness while enhancing overall force warfighting effectiveness. As the HTI process matures, the need to create centralized funding lines, specific charters and requirements documents, along with creating specific task forces or PM organizations, are addressed.

f. Some potential challenges or disadvantages to using an HTI acquisition approach are acknowledged. Realigning program schedules, changing technical approaches, and altering funding strategies in order to horizontally insert technology or implement product improvements could result in higher up-front costs. Major modifications of certain older generation systems may also be required for those systems to accept newer technology. Additionally, funding the technology insertion for several different systems must be consistent and executable. HTI needs to be a basic part of program development and planning. However, HTI principles are applied only where it makes sense for total force efficiency and effectiveness. AR 70-1 provides more detailed information on HTI planning and execution.

### **11-89. Simulation and modeling for acquisition, requirements, and training (SMART)**

a. SMART is an initiative to integrate M&S into Army business processes. Army SMART goals are to reduce the time required to field systems, reduce total ownership costs, and increase the military utility of fielded systems.

b. The SMART concept, first adopted by the Army in 1997, capitalizes on M&S tools and technologies to address system development, operational readiness, and life cycle cost.

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This is accomplished through the collaborative efforts of the requirements, training and operations, and acquisition communities. The AAE has indicated that the SMART initiative is a key mechanism to achieving *The Army Vision* and building the objective force.

**c.** SMART is a framework to accomplish the vision of a disciplined, collaborative environment to reduce costs and time of providing solutions for Army needs. Key components are the ability to exchange data, algorithms, software and other information. SMART will yield four significant benefits that are key to Army Transformation:

(1) Reduced total ownership costs and sustainment burden for fielded systems throughout their service lives.

(2) Reduced time required for concept exploration, concept development, and fielding new or upgraded systems.

(3) Increased military worth of fielded systems while simultaneously optimizing force structure, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures.

(4) Concurrent fielding of systems with their system and non-system training devices.

**d.** The SMART concept is to leverage information technology to improve the processes that will lead to Army modernization. The ultimate end state is one of conducting these activities almost entirely digitally. The SMART vision includes two paths toward a fully mission ready force. Greater reliance will be placed on information technology tools to address DTLOMS solutions. Under SMART, achieving full mission readiness to address a new requirement in lieu of a materiel solution involves using M&S tools to develop changes in doctrine, organizational structure, training, and leadership. When a materiel solution is the answer, the same tools, in conjunction with numerous others, will be used to determine, design, test, evaluate, demonstrate and train on a hardware or software solution to satisfy all requirements from a holistic perspective.

**e.** It must be understood that SMART is not about eliminating all live activities associated with system development, testing, and operation. SMART is about gaining the maximum effectiveness and efficiency in our system design, development, fielding, maintenance, and testing through efficient human interface with information technology across the domains of training, analysis and acquisition. To accomplish all of the system development life cycle solely with computer-based models requires significant maturation of the mathematics and statistics that apply to the use of models, as well as considerable advancement in our ability to describe and reason about nonlinear systems. Gaining such technological ability does not imply an abandonment of contact with reality. Real systems will continue to be tested and soldiers will continue to train live. Such live activities, however, will be conducted, having benefited from the insights, efficiencies, and cost effectiveness of advanced computer based activities. Likewise, computer based activities should leverage the realism and insight that comes from live activities: this would constantly improve the fidelity of computer based models and algorithms

**f.** SMART is enabled by more than just M&S. Successful execution of SMART requires many different enablers such as:

(1) Supportive processes, policies, and laws.

- (2) Means to identify, obtain and protect reusable resources.
- (3) Data interchange standards to foster consistent understanding of shared information.
- (4) Standards for software interoperability.
- (5) Standards for credible verification and validation of M&S.
- (6) M&S that validly represents the relevant entities, attributes and interactions, including performance of human decision makers and operators.
- (7) Tools and methods to manage cross domain collaboration.
- (8) Competent and motivated professionals
- (9) Leadership commitment and support at all levels.
- (10) Data management.

**g.** Addressing system development, ownership costs, and training to modernize more quickly, effectively, and affordably, is not possible through the efforts of the acquisition workforce alone. It requires the up-front and continued collaboration among the CBTDEV/MATDEV/TNGDEV communities. In order to influence Army Transformation as soon as possible, the Army Model and Simulation Office (an ODCSOPS directorate) is responsible for implementing the SMART Execution Plan beginning in FY 2001.

**h.** SMART is the process that the Army will use to harness the power of the digital information age. Through modeling and simulation, the Army will gain the electronic agility that has never been available. The Army can now visualize the effectiveness of system as it develops its requirements. SMART offers the Army an effective means of engaging the soldier directly in the acquisition process. The Army can now develop insights into whether equipment designs need to be modified or changes in tactics are necessary, or both. The application of SMART will have a major impact on future Army capabilities and provides the means to reach the objective force faster.

## **SECTION XIV**

### **SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

#### **11-90. Summary**

**a.** This chapter provided a basic introduction to the management process, organization, and structure of research, development, and acquisition. Through the chapter description, the reader should gain an appreciation of the logic of the process, its organization and management. This chapter also highlights the current basic policies for materiel acquisition, recently updated DOD and Army policies for materiel systems, the Army's acquisition objectives, and descriptions of acquisition managers.

**b.** Difficult decisions, a scarcity of dollar resources, and honest differences of opinion cause disruptions and delays. It is unlikely that there will be total agreement on the best technical approach to satisfy a need--or, indeed, on the need itself. The annual budget cycle and budget constraints almost ensure that some projects will not be funded at the level desired--if at all. Tests are not always successful. Estimates of time, costs, effectiveness, and

technical feasibility are often wide of the mark for complex systems. After all, they are estimates that are projected well into the future based on sketchy data. These real-world problems reinforce the fact that RDA management is a complex task of great importance to national defense. RDA can be a wellspring of new and effective weapons systems where effective management and professionalism can make the difference on any future battlefield. As with any activity involving the use of scarce resources to meet organizational goals and objectives, the people involved—the acquisition managers and the soldier users and maintainers—constitute the most vital link to mission accomplishment.

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- x.** Army Regulation 700-127, *Integrated Logistics Support*.
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- z.** DA Pamphlet 73-1, *Test and Evaluation in Support of System Acquisition*.
- aa.** DA Pamphlet 73-2, *Test and Evaluation Master Plan Procedures and Guidelines*.
- bb.** DA Pamphlet 73-3, *Critical Operational Issue and Criteria (COIC) Procedures and Guidelines*.
- cc.** DA Pamphlet 73-4, *Developmental Test and Evaluation Guidelines*.
- dd.** DA Pamphlet 73-5, *Operational Test and Evaluation*.
- ee.** DA Pamphlet 73-6, *Live Fire Test and Evaluation Guidelines*.
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- gg.** DA Pamphlet 700-142, *Instructions for Materiel Release, Fielding, and Transfer*.
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- ll.** *Office, Chief of Staff, Army Vision Statement*, 12 October 1999.
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# CHAPTER 12

## LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT

*“You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.”*

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1945

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 12-1. Chapter content

The logistic lessons of World War II and subsequent wars and missions have taught us that the luxury of time is not always available and that planning and preparedness pays off in logistics as it does in all other operations. The concept of a force projection Army rather than a forward deployed force coupled with a reduced size has significant logistic implications requiring a smaller footprint outside the continental United States (OCONUS) while being more responsive to the troops in the field. The basic mission of the logistics system is to support the soldier in the field and in the garrison with what is needed, when, where, and in the condition and quantity required, at optimum expenditure of resources. This is the common thread, which connects all logistics activity. This chapter provides an overview of the Army’s logistics system from the Department of the Army (DA) and U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) levels. It includes:

- Logistics tasks and roles of major commands and agencies.
- Management, organization, and functions of the DA Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) and AMC.
- Standard systems.
- Funding procedures.
- Security assistance.

#### 12-2. Definitions

a. Army logistics includes those activities that support the movement and sustainment of a combat force. There are five functional elements of logistics.

(1) Supply involves acquiring, managing, receiving, storing, and issuing all classes of supply, except Class VIII, required to equip and sustain Army forces. It is a wide-ranging function that extends from determination of requirements at the national level down to issue of items to the user in the theater.

(2) Maintenance entails keeping materiel in a serviceable, operational condition, returning it to service, and updating and upgrading its capability. It includes performing preventive maintenance checks and services; recovering and evacuating disabled equipment; diagnosing equipment faults; substituting parts, components, and assemblies; exchanging serviceable materiel for unserviceable materiel; and repairing equipment. The ultimate key is to anticipate requirements.

(3) Transportation is moving and transferring units, personnel, equipment, and supplies to support the concept of operations. Transportation incorporates military, commercial, and supporting nation capabilities. Transportation assets include motor, rail, air and water modes and units; terminal units, activities, and infrastructure; and movement control units, and activities.

(4) Field services involve feeding, clothing, and providing personal services for soldiers. It consists of clothing exchange, laundry, shower, textile repair, mortuary affairs, preparation for aerial delivery, and food services.

(5) Engineering support affects the ability of combat service support (CSS) elements to support Army operations that are dependant on the capacities of the existing theater infrastructure such as force reception/bed down, and storage facilities, road/rail networks, and ports and airfields. Though not a CSS function, engineering support plays a critical role in the delivery of CSS by enhancing these capacities. Engineer units, normally in a direct support (DS) relationship to CSS assets, are responsible for constructing, maintaining, and rehabilitating the theater distribution system. Their responsibilities include support to other Services, agencies, and allied military forces in joint and multinational theaters of operations. The numbers and types of engineer units involved in such operations depends on mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time (METT-T) factors including the size of the support bases required, existing host nation (HN) infrastructure, and the perceived threat. Further details on operational engineering support are found in FM 3-0, FM 5-100, and FM 5-116.

**b.** The logistics system is a corporate process consisting of organizations, personnel, procedures, and equipment working within established policy toward the mission of planning, moving, and maintaining U.S. Army forces and other Services or allies.

**c.** Logistics doctrine is a body of fundamental principles guiding commanders and logistics staff planners and operators in their support of military forces. It is authoritative, but requires judgment in application.

**d.** Levels of logistics have traditionally been reflected by the type of work accomplished. Traditionally, the Army has operated two major levels of logistics support.

(1) *Strategic*. This includes the AMC integrated material management centers (IMMCs), which perform supply and maintenance management tasks oriented to commodity commands; depots, arsenals, data banks, plants and factories associated with AMC activities; and special activities under DA control. Examples of organizations other than AMC with strategic responsibilities to support Army logistics include the General Services Administration (GSA), and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Strategic functions have been generally performed in the continental United States (CONUS) and are intended to support and sustain retail level activities.

(2) *Retail*. This includes non-strategic functions subdivided into three types:

(a) General support (GS). This includes both modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and table of distribution and allowances (TDA) units at echelon above corps that perform GS-level logistical functions (typically involving supply ((receipt, storage, issue, and stock control)), and maintenance functions. GS-level functions are normally performed in support of the theater-level logistics system.

(b) Direct support (DS). This includes both MTOE and TDA units, which perform DS-level logistics directly in support of user units/activities.

(c) User. This includes MTOE and TDA units in the field, performing unit and operator maintenance on organic equipment and unit supply functions.

e. *Logistics concepts are evolving*: It is important to note that the traditional separation between wholesale and retail logistics processes is being altered by movement to centralized management and execution of logistics support under a national provider concept. Initiatives such as the single stock fund, national maintenance management, and efforts to modernize logistics automated information systems are designed to remove artificial barriers between logistics levels to ensure that units are fielded, equipped, and sustained in an integrated process. Thus, in this document we will refer to functions, which are national in nature, i.e., encompass broad responsibility ranging from foxhole to depot.

## SECTION II LOGISTICS TASKS AND ROLES

### 12-3. Logistics tasks

The Secretary of Defense issues logistics guidance to the Services as part of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). Within this broad guidance, the Services develop their own programs. The Army's logistics tasks stem from its primary Title 10 mission, "...to organize, equip, and train Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land." The implied logistics tasks are to:

- Equip Army forces.
- Sustain combat operations on land.
- Establish reserves of equipment and supplies and provide for expansion of peacetime components.
- Formulate logistics doctrine and support procedures.
- Develop, garrison, supply, equip, and maintain bases and other installations.

### 12-4. Logistics roles

Logistics roles evolve from the organization adopted to perform the tasks at each major level of logistics activity.

a. **HQDA.** At Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), staff supervision is exercised by—

- Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA(ALT)).
- DCSLOG.

- Chief of Engineers.
- The Surgeon General.
- Chief, National Guard Bureau.
- Chief, Army Reserve.

**b. Below HQDA.** Below HQDA, logistics responsibilities are fulfilled by—

- Major Army commands (MACOMs).
- Field operating agencies (FOA).
- Army National Guard Bureau.
- Non-Army agencies.

**c. Role of AMC.** AMC is the Army's readiness command – supporting every soldier every day. AMC performs assigned materiel and related functions for research, development, acquisition; logistics support, and technical assistance for materiel systems; and other materiel-acquisition management functions. Its complex missions range from the development of sophisticated weapon systems to cutting-edge research, to the distribution of spare parts.

**(1) AMC missions.**

**(a)** Provide equipment and services to other nations through the Security Assistance Program.

**(b)** Develop and acquire non-major systems and equipment.

**(c)** Provide development and acquisition support to program managers.

**(d)** Maintain the industrial mobilization capabilities necessary to support the Army.

**(e)** Manage Army pre-positioned stocks (APS), less Class VIII, worldwide.

**(f)** Manage the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).

**(g)** Serve as the Department of Defense (DOD) single manager for conventional ammunition.

**(h)** Provide national level maintenance support.

**(2) AMC personnel.** Personnel, working in approximately 350 locations in over 40 State and more than a dozen foreign countries carry out AMC's function. AMC operates through major subordinate commands (MSCs) and directs the activities of its depots, laboratories, and procurement offices throughout the world.

**(3) Challenges.** AMC has many challenges, which are similar to business operations in the private sector. It manages inventory accounts worth tens of billions of dollars and ranks in business volume with the top ten corporations in the United States. To develop, buy, and maintain materiel for the Army and other Services, AMC partners with industry, as well as colleges and universities to ensure that state-of-the-art technology is integrated for the defense of the nation. Soldiers, many with highly developed specialties in weapons development and logistics, work side-by-side with a large civilian work force of scientists, engineers, systems analysts, accountants, computer programmers, and many others.

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(4) *AMC functions.*

(a) AMC provides management direction and technical guidance in services such as laundry, dry-cleaning, clothing initial issue points, central issue facilities, field laundry and showers, demilitarization, and disposal direction.

(b) AMC has responsibility for the management and accountability of APS – less Class VIII. Similarly, AMC manages and accounts for operational projects stocks.

(c) AMC has forward commands in Far East, Southwest Asia, Europe and CONUS. The forward commands integrate AMC activities, which provide technical assistance and sustainment to the soldier everyday. They also plan AMC support to the warfighter. AMC has a rapidly deployable pool of highly skilled technicians to augment the forward command during military operations

(d) In addition to its military and DA civilians, AMC can deploy contractor personnel to augment the Army's force structure. AMC is the program manager for LOGCAP. The LOGCAP proponent within HQDA is the DCSLOG. LOGCAP is a program designed to pre-plan support as required to meet Army crisis and wartime support requirements worldwide using global corporate assets. Since 1992, LOGCAP has responded to several crises by providing superb and timely combat support and combat service support, including base camp construction and operations in the former Yugoslavia plus heliport support in East Timor. LOGCAP compliments and augments the Army's force structure as COMPO 9. LOGCAP does not replace force structure.

(e) AMC also manages operational policies, programs, objectives, and resources associated with operational projects worldwide. All of the above functions and capabilities are available to the Army component commander /Army forces (ACC/ARFOR) through the AMC logistics support element (LSE).

(f) AMC is the Army's single stock fund (SSF) manager and as such, will serve as the single national manager with sole obligation power for the Army Working Capital Fund, Supply Management Army (AWCF-SMA). In this capacity, AMC will consolidate management of current wholesale, theater, corps/installation, and division authorized stockage list (ASL) inventories into a seamless logistics and financial system and create an integrated supply and maintenance operation in the ACWF-SMA business area. Non-Army managed items (NAMIs) such as fuel, subsistence, clothing, engineer supplies, and medical items not included in the SSF will by pass the SSF and will be transmitted directly to DLA.

(g) AMC will oversee the National Maintenance Program . The National Maintenance Program is characterized by single maintenance standards for repair and return of components to AWCF stocks. The National Maintenance Program is an enabler of the SSF and will eliminate unnecessary maintenance redundancy throughout the Army. Under the National Maintenance Program, installations will be allowed to compete for contracts to conduct source of repair (SOR) work for reparable exchange (RX) line items that have a national requirement.

**d. Role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).** Designated a MACOM on 16 June 1979, the USACE plays a major role in the Army's overall logistics system. The USACE performs military construction, installation support, real estate, research and development, and civil works missions in peacetime. It provides a base for rapid conversion

of its resources to support general war and other national emergency conditions. The six components of the USACE mission are:

- (1) Manage and execute engineering, construction, and real estate programs for the U.S. Army and Air Force and perform research and development (R&D) in support of these programs.
- (2) Manage and execute installation support programs for Army installations.
- (3) Manage and execute civil works programs, including the design, planning, engineering, construction, and R&D functions in support of this program.
- (4) Perform R&D through nonsystem-specific advanced development in systems, specialized equipment, procedures, and techniques relevant to engineer support of combat operations.
- (5) Develop and maintain a capability to mobilize readily in response to national security emergencies, domestic emergencies, and emergency water planning programs.
- (6) Develop technology, and design and construct facilities and structures in support of Army space initiatives.

**e. Role of other MACOMs—CONUS.**

(1) The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) manages all individual schooling; formulates concepts, doctrine, organization, and materiel objectives and requirements for Army forces in CONUS and overseas; and develops and promulgates doctrine for the user, direct support, and general support levels of logistics.

(2) U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), a subordinate command of TRADOC, has the mission to develop, test, integrate, and disseminate CSS doctrine and systems for CONUS Army installations and for forces deployed overseas. There are five major functions performed by CASCOM.

(a) It develops and evaluates CSS concepts, doctrine, organizations, systems, and materiel concepts and requirements, and planning factors for the Army. It ensures the personnel service support, supply, maintenance, transportation, services, and facilities systems designed for the Army in the field and the CONUS retail logistics systems are compatible with the sustaining base system.

(b) It acts as TRADOC proponent for CSS training and monitors and evaluates CSS training at TRADOC schools. It ensures CSS course content is consistent with approved doctrine. It assesses the training evaluation process at associated schools.

(c) It conducts CSS exercises and manages the development of CSS training materials for Active Army and Reserve Component (RC) units.

(d) It serves as a principal adviser to DA, TRADOC, and AMC on all CSS matters. It provides direction, guidance, and taskings to assigned combat development activities, associated schools, MACOMs, and HQDA staff agencies for their contribution to CSS development and training.

(3) U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) is responsible for all operational Army forces in CONUS and, as such, provides retail-level logistics support to all assigned units and to those activities which are tenants of its installation.

(4) The U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM) provides a single manager for all health care delivery and supporting services in all 50 State and commands the Army hospital system.

(5) The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), as the DOD single surface traffic manager, provides traffic management, transportation engineering, and common-user surface terminal services to all DOD customers, requisitioners and contractors. As a jointly staffed Army component command of the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), MTMC's primary mission is executing the nation's first leg of strategic mobility. In this capacity, it ensures the safe, secure, and economical worldwide movement of DOD units, personnel, and materiel. It is also responsible for the movement of personal property for Service members, DOD civilians, and other government agency members, and manages the contract city-pair airfare, commercial bus, Federal rental car, and the Army's commercial travel program.

(a) To accomplish its vital role, MTMC is developing and fielding a number of information systems dedicated to the improvement of global transportation. These include the Transportation Coordinator - Automated Command and Control Information System (TC-ACCIS), which provides automation of Army unit deployments and peacetime transportation functions at U.S. and overseas mobilization stations. CONUS Freight Management (CFM) System provides automated electronic data interchange (EDI) / electronic commerce (EC) for the managing, rating, and routing of DOD freight movements within CONUS. It will increase the efficiency and accuracy of general cargo government bill of lading (GBL) preparation. The Worldwide Ports System (WPS) will support MTMC's terminal management and cargo documentation mission during peace and war. The Strategic Deployment System (STRADS) will be MTMC's command and control system for peacetime planning and wartime execution support. The Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System (TOPS) automates and standardizes the personal property movement, storage, and management functions at DOD transportation offices worldwide.

(b) MTMC Transportation Engineering Agency provides the scientific engineering and transportation expertise to analyze and improve the transportability of military equipment, the deployability of Army units, and the effectiveness of the DOD transportation programs for national defense.

**f. Role of MACOM (Theater of Operations).** Logistics in the theater of operations is tailored to support the combat force requirements for each situation. Consideration is given to the variety of missions, which tend to make each logistics requirement different in terms of amounts and types of supplies, maintenance, transportation, and services needed. Consequently, the organizations cover a full spectrum of possibilities ranging from a large theater of operations comprised of one or more corps to support levels required by a division or separate brigade.

(1) The theater army commander is responsible for providing logistics support to all Army units and contractors in the theater. This responsibility is executed through one or more subordinate theater army area commands or a functional command such as personnel,

transportation, medical, or engineer. The commander manages theater logistics support by establishing broad policies, allocating critical supplies, and assigning missions. Additionally, the commander manages and controls selected items through the theater army materiel management center (MMC) and provides for centralized movements control for U.S. Army forces through the transportation movement control agency (TMCA).

(2) The theater support command (TSC) is an intermediate command under Theater Army, and its area of operations is located in the communications zone (COMMZ). In peacetime and during hostilities, the TSC provides direct and general supply and maintenance support to all theater units in the COMMZ to include non-corps units, joint elements, allied forces, and units passing through the COMMZ. The TSC MMC manages the supply and maintenance support within the communications zone.

(3) The corps support command (COSCOM) provides maintenance, supply, transportation, health services, and field services support to an Army corps. Within the corps zone, nondivisional units receive supply and maintenance support from the COSCOM. Additionally, the COSCOM provides backup support to the divisional units. Its functional centers, the MMC and movement control center (MCC), perform the major tasks of managing the supply, maintenance, and transportation functions.

(4) The division support command (DISCOM) orchestrates divisional logistics operations. It directs support maintenance, supply, transportation, health services, and field service support to an Army division.

### **g. Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES).**

(1) AAFES is the provider of supply Class VI (personal demand items) for the Army and Air Force. It is a joint command of the Departments of the Army and Air Force. The AAFES commander is a general officer responsible to the AAFES Board of Directors (BOD). In turn, the Board is responsible to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force through their respective chiefs of staff. The chairmanship of the BOD alternates between the two Services approximately every three years. AAFES commander and vice commander positions also alternate between the Army and the Air Force. Primarily a civilian-run organization under military leadership, AAFES employs about 54,000 people, and operates approximately 10,500 facilities worldwide. AAFES worldwide headquarters is located in Dallas, Texas; two subordinate headquarters manage operations within the Europe and Pacific Regions.

(2) The mission of AAFES is to provide merchandise and services of necessity and convenience to authorized patrons at uniformly low prices, and to generate funds to supplement appropriated funds for the support of morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs. AAFES does this in peace and wartime. To accomplish its mission, AAFES:

(a) Operates retail, food, personal service, vending centers, theaters, automotive facilities, the military clothing sales stores (MCSS), etc., on military installations,

(b) Provides basic exchange support to military personnel engaged in contingency operations or field exercises by establishing military-run tactical field exchanges (TFEs) where regular AAFES operations are not possible. Class VI support in the field can be limited to basic health and hygiene needs or expanded to include food, beverages, and other comfort items based upon the requested needs of the theater commander,

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(c) Generates earnings that support MWR programs. AAFES pays dividends to the Army, which in turn allocates funds to specific programs and installations. The Army MWR BOD, which is formed under the Army Community and Family Support Center, controls the allocation of AAFES-generated MWR funds within the Army.

**h. Role of non-Army agencies.** The GSA provides general supplies and services that are common to more than one department of the Government. The GSA has multimission responsibility to manage the varied business activities of the Federal Government. GSA provides an extensive amount of supply support to the DOD for such commonly used items as office furniture and supplies, machine and hand tools, photo supplies, etc.

**i. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).** Headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Va., DLA performs its worldwide logistics with approximately 28,600 civilian and military personnel (as of May, 2000), in facilities ranging from supply centers, to property reutilization offices. DLA is the one source for nearly every consumable part, whether for combat readiness, emergency preparedness or day-to-day operations, including the following:

- A selection of more than 4 million items.
- A distribution system.
- Worldwide property disposal services as well as information on available excess Defense Department property.
- Worldwide hazardous materiel disposal services and information on management of hazardous materials.
- Latest logistics information from the Federal Catalog System, including sources, item descriptions and prices.
- Technical logistics services, such as specialized product testing.
- The agency provides a major portion of the worldwide logistics support and services that are vital to the armed services, through two main mission areas: materiel management, which encompasses supply, distribution, procurement, reutilization and logistics information management.

**j. The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).** Defense Contract Management Agency established in March 2000 from the DLA Defense Contract Management Command, provides contract administration services in support of all the DOD components, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, other designated Federal and State agencies, and foreign governments. These services include contract management, pre-award surveys, quality assurance, payment to contractors, support to small business and labor surplus areas, transportation and packaging assistance, and surveillance of contractor progress to ensure timely delivery of materiel.

**k. The Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA).**

(1) The DeCA was established in May 1990 and assumed full operational control of Army and other Services' commissary operations in October 1991. DeCA is an agency of the DOD operating under the direction and control of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) (USD(P&R)). DeCA is organized with a director and headquarters staff, three CONUS regions, a European region, and a DOD Liaison Office. The DOD Liaison Office is administratively assigned to the Director, DeCA. DeCA's primary mission is to:

(a) Provide an efficient and effective worldwide system of commissaries for the resale of groceries and household supplies at the lowest practical price to members of the military Services, their families, and other authorized patrons, while maintaining high standards for quality facilities, products, and service consistent with standards similar to those in commercial food stores.

(b) Operate commissaries as appropriated fund activities as an integral element of the military pay and benefits package. Provide an income-effect benefit through savings on food and household items necessary to subsist and maintain the household of the military member.

(2) The Commissary Operating Board (COB) has representatives from the different military services and serves as a forum for the discussion and resolution of issues concerning the commissary services provided by DeCA, addresses operational and policy concerns, and implements broad policy as directed by Defense Management Council (DMC).

**1. Army Center of Excellence (Subsistence) (ACES).** ACES provides support in the DCSLOG's execution of the Title 10 responsibility for food service. Provides management assistance to MACOMs and installations; validates functional layout of new and renovation construction of dining facilities and troop issue subsistence activities; executes the Army's food service award programs; and executes funding of replacement food service equipment.

### SECTION III


## MISSIONS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS

### 12-5. Mission, organization, and functions of the DCSLOG

**a. DCSLOG mission.** The ODCSLOG has responsibility for Army and international logistics concepts, policies, programs, plans, and systems. This responsibility is focused on the core logistics functions of supply, maintenance, transportation, soldier support, sustainment and quality of life. It promotes the sustainability, supportability, and logistics readiness of the total force. It assesses and continually improves logistics performances. It serves as the Army's advocate for logistics resources, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, and materiel.

**b. DCSLOG organization.** An organizational chart for DCSLOG is at Figure 12-1.

(1) *Logistics Integration Agency (LIA).* The LIA is a FOA. The mission of the LIA is to identify, develop, and recommend logistics concepts, policy, programs, plans, and systems. This responsibility includes assessing logistics readiness and sustainability and recommending improvements in the Army logistics performance. Other duties include evaluating logistics aspects of contingency plans and force structure; executing and monitoring selected DCSLOG programs; serving as the DCSLOG functional proponent for the development and extension of selected standard automated supply, maintenance, transportation, and troop support systems; and providing technical guidance and assistance to MACOMs and units.



**Figure 12-1. Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics**

(2) *Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA)*. Based on a memorandum of agreement with HQDA DCSLOG, HQ AMC, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), and LIA, AMSAA (an AMC organization) serves as the independent logistician for the DCSLOG on acquisition programs. AMSAA has responsibility for providing the HQDA DCSLOG with an assessment of each integrated logistics support (ILS) consideration to ensure supportability of the materiel system when fielded. Consider AMSAA also as an independent logistician to influence product definition as a member of the integrated product team beginning with pre-systems acquisition.

**c. DCSLOG functions.** The DCSLOG has Army Staff (ARSTAF) responsibility for the management of DA logistical activities. The DCSLOG is responsible for the development and supervision of Army logistics organization, operations, and systems worldwide, including logistics readiness, planning, policies, doctrine, resource determination and allocation, objectives, force structure, and standards. The DCSLOG's major functions include supply, maintenance, transportation, the Army energy program, troop support activities, and acting as the principal ARSTAF representative and focal point for security assistance (SA) matters. The DCSLOG participates in and contributes to all phases of the research, development, and acquisition process (concept through deployment) and is responsible for support of materiel systems from production output through disposal. The DCSLOG exercises general staff supervision over The Surgeon General as pertains to Army class VIII management for medical materiel. A complete list of DCSLOG responsibilities is contained in AR 10-5.

**(1) Logistics readiness.**

**(a)** The basic ingredients of military readiness are adequate, well-trained personnel in particular skills, possessing proper equipment in a combat-ready condition. Logistics readiness deals in large part with equipment and is measured by equipment on hand compared to that authorized, and equipment status in terms of serviceability.

**(b)** The DCSLOG has overall DA Staff responsibility to assess and improve the logistics readiness and sustainability of the Army in the field.

**(2) Command Logistics Review Program (CLRP).**

(a) The LIA is the focal point for the CLRP. CLRP is now a descriptor of an efficient and responsive process that provides greater flexibility finding and fixing impediments to logistics operations and materiel readiness.

(b) The CLRP is a tool used by DCSLOG to keep in touch with the field and provide field commander with a near real-time conduit to him or her. The overarching construct of the redesign uses three approaches to leverage the logistics reviews. They are:

**1** Scheduled visits 4-6 times during the year, geared primarily to collect and respond to command concerns identified during visits and through electronic input and research. Scheduled visits are also expected to generate issues that will provide opportunities for the other two components of the redesigned CLRP, namely, policy effectiveness reviews, and rapid assessments.

**2** Policy effectiveness reviews involve determining how existing, new or revised policy is affecting operations in the field. This is the means used to evaluate the impact on operations, the effectiveness of the policy and any recommended changes. It could also be used to evaluate the potential impact of proposed policy changes. Policy effectiveness reviews provide HQDA DCSLOG staff, MACOM staff, schools, and field commanders a unique opportunity to impact Army policies.

**3** Rapid assessments, involve evaluating Department level problems identified by command groups, the CLRP, the field reviews, etc. The CLRP will quickly determine whether a problem exists. If there is a problem, an end-to-end analysis will be initiated and the recommendations from that analysis implemented. Along with command logistics concerns gathered during scheduled visits, rapid assessments are a means to get field issues to the attention of the DCSLOG .

(3) *Logistics planning and operations.* Logistics planning focuses on the transition from peacetime to wartime. The ODCSLOG charter for Army Transformation, as part of the *Army Vision*, requires that the Army is capable of rapidly deploying in support of current and future forces, effectively sustaining the full spectrum of Army operations, and synchronizing Army and Joint efforts. The plans to meet this challenge focus on enhancing strategic responsiveness, reducing the combat support (CS)/CSS footprint in the battle space, and transforming the institutional Army by reducing costs for logistics/support without reducing warfighting capability and readiness.

(a) The time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) is the major tool used by the unified commanders to request forces to support their operation plans (OPLANs). In determining the adequacy of the logistics support for the TPFDL, the major factors considered are:

- Strategic lift.
- Sustainability.
- Pre-positioned war reserve stocks.
- Force shortfalls.
- Warning time.

(b) The U.S. continues to rely on allies for logistical support, in both peacetime and wartime, primarily for rear area requirements. This wartime host nation support (WHNS)

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supplements the organic support capabilities of U.S. units. WHNS capabilities are used in such areas as transportation, maintenance, construction, civilian labor, communications, facilities, utilities, air/seaport operations, rear area security, and the movement of U.S. forces and materiel between the ports of debarkation and combat areas.

(c) The LOGCAP is also considered as an alternative to complement organic force and WHNS capabilities. LOGCAP may be used if shortfalls are identified from other support sources, or if the other sources are not considered in the best interests (e.g., operational, fiscal, political) of the U.S. Government. The ODCSLOG, HQDA, is the LOGCAP proponent for program policy, guidance and sources. AMC is the executive agent for LOGCAP planning, exercises and other crisis or contingency operations.

(4) *Automated logistics.* The proliferation of information technology (IT) systems and the problems of interface between these systems have complicated logistics systems development. Current efforts are aimed at the reduction of the number of logistics systems and a concurrent simplification of new and existing systems and procedures. AMC has been assigned responsibility to integrate Army logistics management information systems. Currently, the process is twofold: the Global Combat Service Support System Army (GCSS-A) will provide an integrated, evolutionary enterprise information system for the Army CSS functions, and the Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program (WLMP) will modernize national logistics processing. Streamlining logistics information systems through logistics web-based information and decision support systems are important enablers to produce a more responsive and focused logistics effort for Army logistics transformation.

(5) *Supply.*

(a) Supplies include all items or materiel necessary for the equipping, maintenance, and operation of a military command. The level of supply requirements, usually expressed in days of supply, is the quantity of materiel authorized, or directed to be held in anticipation of future demands. DCSLOG prescribes levels of supply authorized to be on hand or on requisition. Levels are based on usage factors and experience data.

(b) APS are protected go-to-war assets, owned by HQDA and not linked to Army component commanders. They are pre-positioned ashore in OCONUS theaters, and afloat in order to support multiple CINCs and scenarios in more than one theater of operations.

(c) Stocks held by DS/GS units, when consisting of demand-supported items, mission-essential items, and initial-provisioning items, comprise an ASL. Inventory at the DS/GS level is used to support consuming organizations. A using unit's prescribed load list (PLL) consists of demand-supported and mission-essential items to support unit maintenance and initial-provisioning items. DCSLOG goals for the establishment of retail stockage policy consider:

- Optimum stockage for each class of supply.
- Best trade-off between economics and readiness.
- Simplicity in application and accuracy in determination of requirements.
- Conformation with automated systems.
- The method of distribution (air or surface).

- Essentiality.

(d) Increasing emphasis is being placed on the means to reduce the generation of excess stockage and the reexamination of materiel-returns programs, which return excess materiel to stock, and modernize and streamline supply management processes. The SSF is a HQDA business process change to streamline how secondary items are managed in the Army. The campaign plan includes three primary milestones: Milestone 1 involves capitalization of inventory currently in retail stock fund accounts, primarily at installation level; milestone 2 calls for capitalization of operations and maintenance (O&M) retention stocks; and milestone 3 calls for capitalization of divisional and non-divisional ASL inventories. The Army leadership has approved implementation of milestones 1 and 2 in a phased process commencing in FY01. Implementation of milestone 3, contingent on leadership direction, is scheduled to commence in FY03. SSF is improving the management of stocks through increased visibility, improved forecasting and the reduction of excess. The SSF end-state is being designed to place both Army-managed and non-Army managed, AWCFSMA secondary items into a single supply management business area under AMC management and control; improving the Army credit process by establishing serviceable and unserviceable credit values based on national need; and linking secondary item repair to national need. The overall objective is to make the materiel returns and redistribution system as effective and efficient as the distribution system. Supporting Class IX (repair parts) doctrinal, policy and procedural revisions to the supply system are being developed by the LIA, AMC, CASCOM and TRADOC in an effort to reduce inventory and operating costs.

(e) Also included under the supply class designation are the following troop support division-managed programs. The Army food program (subsistence, troop issue, strategic subsistence supply, and garrison and field food service), laundry and dry-cleaning program, clothing sales/initial-issue activities programs, organizational clothing and individual equipment items program, field laundry, showers, latrines, tentage repair programs, and the mortuary affairs (graves registration) program meet the supply class designation.

(f) The Director for Plans, Operations, and Logistics Automation, ODCSLOG, serves as the Army representative on the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB). A separate entity under the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the JMPAB is charged to establish materiel priorities and the allocation of resources in those instances when such issues cannot be resolved by the Services or CINCs.

### (6) *Maintenance.*

(a) Materiel maintenance is all required actions taken to keep materiel in a serviceable condition, restore it to serviceability, or upgrade its functional utility through modification. As a general policy, maintenance is performed at the location of the equipment operation or failure to the maximum extent consistent with the tactical situation and the cost-effective use of maintenance resources.

(b) The current framework within which maintenance (less aviation) is performed contains four levels of progressive complexity: unit, DS, GS, and depot. Aviation maintenance, however, is performed at three levels: aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) is a combination of organizational and limited DS maintenance; aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) is a combination of the remaining DS and limited GS maintenance

capabilities. The third level is depot and this includes some maintenance previously performed at GS level. Maintenance levels are described below.

**1** Unit. Unit-level maintenance is performed by the user and is characterized by quick turnaround based on repair by replacement and minor repair (adjust, clean, lubricate, and tighten). The cornerstone of unit maintenance is performing preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS).

**2** DS. This level is organized with DS units assigned at division, corps, and theater level. DS is characterized by high mobility, a forward orientation, and repair by replacement. Divisional maintenance units will support maneuver elements while non-divisional units will provide area support and reinforcing support to the division. DS units will be organized on a modular team basis to support specific systems and their auxiliary equipment, for example, tank battalion teams, engineer battalion teams, and Battle damage assessment (BDA) teams will be assigned to the non-divisional maintenance units.

**3** GS. GS maintenance will be characterized by semi-fixed facilities assigned at theater level. GS represents a deployable sustaining maintenance capability. Its fundamental purpose is to support the theater supply system through repair of components. Maintenance at this level will be job or production line operations as appropriate, and will be performed by modular units composed of commodity-oriented platoons. A GS maintenance unit may work as a theater special repair activity.

**4** Depot. Maintenance at this level will support the strategic supply system. It will be production line oriented and performed by AMC depots and contractor personnel.

(c) Integrated sustainment maintenance (ISM) is a business practice that has been implemented Army-wide to optimize regional and national level repair capacity and capability. Sustainment maintenance refers to all maintenance conducted above the DS level. Assigned at echelons above corps, sustainment maintenance organizations provide general support maintenance, depot-level maintenance, and limited backup support to direct support maintenance units. They repair failed or damaged repairable equipment and perform associated functions which directly support repair actions, including induction of unserviceable items and their subsequent inspection, repair, and testing. ISM optimizes the Army's sustainment maintenance capability to support the full spectrum of Army missions. The ISM strategy is to implement an automated management structure featuring centralized management of resources and work-loading, decentralized execution of maintenance requirements, and synchronization of personnel and equipment. ISM relies on a management information system integrating maintenance management at local, regional, and national levels and supporting national-level oversight of ISM operations.

(d) The maintenance allocation chart (MAC) remains the primary tool for assigning tasks. Equipment design will support a first, discard; second, repair forward; and third, evacuate maintenance priority. Greater use of built-in-test/built-in-test equipment (BIT/BITE), modularity, common tools and hardware, and discard of components and selected small end items will facilitate improved forward maintenance to the user. Other major policies (principles) are:

**1** Maintenance is a command responsibility;

**2** Unserviceable materiel that cannot be repaired because of the authorized level of repair assigned is to be promptly evacuated and a replacement item issued; and

**3** Unserviceable materiel being evacuated should have the same movement priority as serviceable materiel.

(e) Maintenance management within the Army is organized by commodity groups; for example, missiles or aircraft. Within commodity groups, management effort is predicated upon cost and item essentiality. High cost and high demand result in a greater degree of management, although management by exception is done when deviations from normal occur. Currently, the Army's key maintenance management thrusts are:

**1** Assure that logistics policies and doctrine support warfighting doctrine.

**2** Implement an improved concept for test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment (TMDE) calibration and repair.

**3** Review and improve maintenance float policies and procedures.

**4** Improve retail/strategic maintenance support of repairable secondary items.

**5** Improve strategic maintenance management.

**6** Modernize the Army's worldwide maintenance facilities.

(f) HQDA is implementing a new maintenance initiative called National Maintenance Management (NMM) in order to standardize the manner in which maintenance is performed throughout the Army. The process begins with the current ISM structure of local, regional/theater, and national maintenance providers but broadens it to tailor repairs to national need, returning repaired items to the supply system. Through centralized management, national work-loading, and decentralized execution, the NMM initiative will optimize the Army's maintenance capability by tailoring repair programs to national need

**(7) Transportation.**

(a) The primary DCSLOG transportation functions are strategic movement and mobility, ship modernization, transportation programs, development of transportation policy for DA-sponsored cargo and passenger movements, and management of Army responsibilities for the DOD Customs and Border Clearance Program.

(b) The Director of Transportation and Troop Support, ODCSLOG, is the Army member of the Joint Transportation Board (JTB). The JTB is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the effective employment of common-user transportation resources assigned or available to DOD. The director is also the ARSTAF member of the Mobility Studies Steering Group and the Army member of the Joint Intermodal Steering Group. Two divisions in the directorate manage the transportation program: the Strategic Mobility Division and, the Transportation Policy Division.

(c) Strategic mobility is defined as the capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in support of national strategy. The DOD concept for strategic mobility includes airlift, sealift, and overseas pre-positioning of materiel.

**1** The Strategic Mobility Division exercises supervision over strategic mobility aspects of war, contingency plans, and mobilization and deployment exercises; transportation concepts, doctrine, and force structure; strategic transportation resources; wartime transportation policy; transportability; and transportation assets (rail and watercraft). The Strategic Mobility Division represents the Army in developing the requirements and the knowledge-based architecture and systems need to support the Army's logistics mission. It is responsible for synchronizing Army efforts by linking strategic, operational and tactical transportation distribution systems with other Army logistics systems to form a seamless distribution process with integrated automated systems.

**2** The Strategic Mobility Division executes the Army's responsibilities as the Lead Service Agent for the development of the Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movements System II (TC-AIMS II). The Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) is the Army's plan to implement the recommendations of the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) and ensures a total fort to foxhole deployment system. This provides the ability to rapidly deploy CONUS-based forces. The Chief, Strategic Mobility Division, serves as the Army member of the Joint Surface Movements Board (JSMB), the JTB secretariat, and also serves as the logistics focal point of the ASMP.

**3** The Transportation Policy Division develops Army policy, procedures, and guidance on transportation and transportation services for DA-sponsored cargo shipments; passenger travel and personal property movements; hazardous material movements; movement forecasts; containers; and non-tactical vehicles. AMC is Army executive agent for military standard transportation and movement procedures (MILSTAMP). The division provides financial oversight for the transport of Army sponsored cargo worldwide and the implementation of Defense reform memorandums to use commercial bills of lading (CBL) and improve transportation accounting practices.

(d) The development of containerized shipping techniques permits the rapid surface movement of materiel. The Direct Support System (DSS), a standard system, is designed to take advantage of this capability and to deliver materiel directly to the user. Although airlift capabilities have increased, the Army still relies on surface movement for the bulk of its cargo.

(e) Management of the transportation program focuses on the maintenance of a wartime lift capability in a peacetime environment to ensure a continuous movement of supplies to deployed forces. To develop and maintain this capability, the most responsive transportation systems are incorporated into the transportation program. Containerization, intermodalism, EDI systems, CBL, and the air lines of communications (ALOC) concept are all being developed fully to improve transportation services during peace and war. The ALOC concept provides for the rapid movement of Army repair parts by air and is designed to capitalize on technological advances in communications and transportation systems permitting rapid movement of materiel. This concept is designed to conserve resources, reduce inventories, improve management, and increase responsiveness. The AMC Logistics Support Activity (LOGSA) is the Army airlift clearance authority (ACA) and, in accordance with the Defense transportation regulations, MILSTAMP and appropriate Army transportation regulations, is responsible for validating and controlling the flow of Army cargo into the Defense Transportation System (DTS).

**(8) Tactical water management.** The Army is designated the DOD executive agent for land-based water resources. The Army established a water office in ODCSLOG to carry out the following primary duties. In coordination with the other military department secretaries, develop and implement policy concerning joint plans, procedures, and requirements for water resources in support of land-based forces; advise the ASA(ALT) of water resource requirements and significant developments in connection with water resource research, equipment acquisition, and doctrine. Establish procedures for coordination of all DOD component regulatory documents and plans affecting water resource planning for joint employment and support, R&D, and equipment acquisition. Develop, in coordination with appropriate DOD components, joint doctrine for the employment of water resources. Develop an improved, expanded, and automated water resources intelligence database for the rapid retrieval of information on an area or point basis to assist commanders in making water support logistics decisions. Provide the data to the Defense Mapping Agency for incorporation into its terrain analysis program and establish a Joint Water Resources Management action Group (JWRMAG) as a mechanism to coordinate and resolve joint water support issues.

**(9) Energy Management.**

**(a)** Staff responsibility for Army energy management resides with the DCSLOG. The Army Energy Office (AEO) in the LIA, is charged with overall responsibility for supervising and coordinating the Army Energy Program. Assisting the DCSLOG in energy responsibility is the Army Environmental and Energy Policy Board composed of representatives from the ARSTAF agencies. The Secretary of the Army has appointed a Special Assistant for Energy to represent the Secretary on energy matters. The Special Assistant is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Logistics) (DASA(L)).

**(b)** The cost of energy makes energy management one of the foremost challenges for commanders and staff personnel at all levels. In order to meet this challenge effectively the AEO manages a comprehensive energy program addressing both facilities and mobility energy usage. AR 11-27, *The Army Energy Program*, implements the program. It provides the necessary direction and guidance to meet the goals and objectives established in Executive Order 13123, dated 9 Jun 99; 10 CFR 435; and the pending Global Climate Change Treaty (GCCT) - Kyoto Protocol, the magnitude of which we are just now realizing. This treaty could require an additional 7 percent, above and beyond the current 35 percent mandated reductions over the period 1985 to 2010, in mandatory energy reduction by DA. This will require intensive energy conservation management, awareness and education efforts through the year 2010. The purpose of the program is to ensure that the Army maintains a high state of readiness in an uncertain energy environment. The program anticipates the energy future, incorporates newly developed technologies, and provides the methodology and specific information required by MACOMs and installations to develop comprehensive and consistent energy programs.

**(c)** Because facility energy use represents more than 77 percent of Army energy consumption, and 85 percent of Army energy dollars, projects related to reducing energy consumption comprise a significant portion of the program dollars. In order to ensure the most efficient expenditure of these dollars, the AEO works in close coordination with the Assistant Chief of Staff Installation Management (ACSIM), and the USACE.

(d) Given the Army energy goals, MACOMs are assigned individual goals within that framework. The recommended MACOM goals are based on past performance and the ability of the MACOM to reduce energy consumption while maintaining the requisite state of readiness.

(10) *Petroleum logistics management.* The DCSLOG has ARSTAF responsibility for all matters pertaining to petroleum and packaged petroleum logistics. The primary functions are to develop and implement policies for bulk petroleum supply, distribution and accountability; develop and implement policy for the single fuel on the battlefield concept; and assist in the development of pre-positioned war reserve policies, guidance, stock levels and computation factors for bulk petroleum products worldwide. DCSLOG also participates in planning and development of force structure for petroleum units; establishes policy for DA quality surveillance programs for fuels and lubricants; provides liaison with other government agencies and military departments with respect to bulk petroleum matters; and coordinates with the Air Force and the Navy in the joint development of equipment requirements. DCSLOG chairs the Petroleum Advisory Group (PAG) to coordinate and direct the Army's effort to improve bulk petroleum receipt, storage and distribution capabilities and serves as the proponent for the Inland Petroleum Distribution System (IPDS) Operational Project, which is a HQDA owned project.

(11) *Troop support.* ODCSLOG staff responsibility for soldier support policy resides with the Troop Support Division. The primary troop support programs are food, clothing and individual equipment, and field services support. To achieve management of these programs, the Troop Support Division is comprised of three separate teams; the Subsistence Team, the Clothing and Individual Equipment (CIE) Team, and the Field Service Support Team.

(a) The Chief, Troop Support Division serves as the Army member of the DOD Food Policy Council, the DOD Joint Formulation Board of Food and Nutrition Research, and the Joint Service Operational Ration Forum. The Troop Support Division also provides the Army representative on the DOD Steering Committee for Subsistence Prime Vendor (direct vendor delivery of subsistence), and provides ODCSLOG representation on the Tri-annual Airdrop Malfunction Review and Safety Analysis Group and the Joint Committee for Tactical Shelters; as well as the executive secretary for the Army Uniform Board and the Subsistence Review Committee, and the Co-chair for the Army Nutrition Planning Committee.

(b) The Subsistence Team provides management for the Army Installation Food Service Program and the Field Feeding Program. The Subsistence Team provides management for the Army Installation Food Service and Field Feeding Programs; including:

1 Development of plans, programs and standards, and reviewing doctrine for management of the installation food service programs.

2 Development of plans and formulation of policy to support Army field feeding concepts, force structure, testing, and introduction of new equipment and rations.

3 Developing nutrition policies and programs of dining facilities consistent with the Surgeon General's nutrition policies.

4 Monitoring the DeCA support to Army personnel and families.

(c) The Subsistence Team also serves as the DA functional proponent for:

**1** Designing and equipping of installation dining facilities and troop subsistence activities.

**2** The Army Food Management Information System (AFMIS) and Food Service 2000 (FS-2000), which is the replacement System for AFMIS Class I tactical automation.

**3** Recognition for excellence in the Army Food Program to include the Philip A. Connelly Award for Excellence in Food Service and the Culinary Arts Program.

(d) The CIE Team. CIE is defined as organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), clothing bag (personal), and optional clothing items. The CIE Team is responsible for developing plans and formulating policies for management of Class II CIE (with the exception of chemical protective clothing) and Army military clothing sales stores (AMCSS), clothing initial issue points, and central issue facilities. The DCSLOG chairs the Army Uniform Board (AUB), which recommends concept approval and type classification to the Chief of Staff, Army for clothing bag, dress, and optional purchase items. The CIE Team serves as DA functional proponent for concept approval and type classification of clothing bag, dress, and optional purchase items included in Common Table of Allowance (CTA) 50-900. The CIE team also serves as the HQDA interface on CIE and AMCSS issues with DOD, other Services, other Federal and civilian agencies, MACOMS, and RC and as HQDA functional interface for DOD standardization and modernization of OCIE.

(e) The Field Service Support Team is responsible for developing plans, formulating policies and procedures, and providing functional oversight of the installation laundry and dry cleaning programs and selected Class VII supplies and equipment. Specific areas of concern include aerial delivery and airdrop systems and equipment, topographic equipment and map material, Special Forces operational equipment (diving equipment and rubber tactical boats), mobile electric power systems, physical security equipment, handheld mine detectors, camouflage, Class IV, bridging systems, aircraft landing mats, rigid and soft wall shelters, field laundries, field clothing repair equipment, showers, mortuary affairs equipment and collective support systems (Force Provider), containerized self service laundry, showers, shelters and latrines).

(12) *Resource management.* ODCSLOG staff support are responsible for stewardship and advocacy of logistics resources in support of the war-fighting capability of the Army, assess and improve the efficient use of logistics resources, and plan and implement business management concepts and practices for logistics programs.

## **12-6. Mission and organization of AMC**


**a. AMC Mission.** AMC is the *national provider*. AMC's missions include:

- (1) Equip and sustain a trained, ready Army.
- (2) Provide equipment and services to other nations through the Security Assistance Program.
- (3) Develop and acquire non-major systems and equipment.
- (4) Provide development and acquisition support to program managers.

- (5) Define, develop, and acquire superior technologies.
- (6) Executive agent for LOGCAP.
- (7) Maintain the mobilization capabilities necessary to support the Army.
- (8) Execute SSF and NMM operations
- (9) Manage the AWCF (an industrial fund designed to ensure logistics processes are available to meet customer needs)

(10) Continue to improve productivity and quality of life. The AMC national management mission can be restated this way: first, the acquisition of materiel; second, the responsibility for supporting the readiness of that materiel while in the user’s hands; and third, provide materiel disposal direction.

**b. Organization.** The present AMC organization includes nine MSCs and 29 separate reporting activities (SRAs). The MSCs include the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, concerned with research and development missions; the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, supporting developmental missions; the U.S. Army Operations Support Command (OSC), supporting manufacturing, ammunition and maintenance missions; the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command, concerned with SA programs to include foreign military sales; the U.S. Army Simulations, Training, and Instrumentation Command, providing training and test simulation, simulator, target, and instrumentation products and services; and the five remaining MSCs which are commodity oriented and perform life-cycle management over the research, development, engineering, initial and follow-on procurement, and materiel readiness functions for items and weapon systems in support of the Army in the field. Figure 12-2 shows the major elements of AMC.



**Figure 12-2. U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC)**

(1) OSC is a global organization with installations and activities in 35 States, 15 foreign nations and Puerto Rico. OSC provides a synchronized face to the warfighter, exercising centralized command and control over AMC’s forward logistics support elements. The command also manages the Army’s pre-positioned stockpiles of war reserve materiel

and its two manufacturing arsenals. As the single manager for conventional ammunition, OSC is the DOD agent for buying, making, maintaining, storing and transporting conventional ammunition for all military services.

(2) Field Support Command (FSC) is a subordinate of OSC. It maintains the readiness and accountability of the Army's war reserve combat, combat support, and combat service support equipment and materiel globally pre-positioned; this includes pre-positioned sets, operational stocks, and sustainment stocks. FSC hands-off Army pre-positioned stocks, equipment and materiel when and where required in support of the Army's global power projection mission. It further reconstitutes Army pre-positioned stock sets upon completion of operations.

(a) There are four FSC subordinate organizations; AMC-CONUS, AMC Forward-Europe, AMC Forward-Far East, and AMC Forward-Southwest Asia; plus AMC Combat Equipment Group-Europe (AMC CEG-E) and AMC Combat Equipment Group-Afloat (AMC CEG-A).

(b) LSE are subordinate to the OSC/FSC organization. Four multifunctional, highly mobile, tailorable TDA organizations of logistics technicians, military and civilian, can be deployed anywhere in the world in support of U.S. forces in a contingency operation. The LSE can be tailored to meet the requirements of the theater commander. A deployed LSE provides resources to fill gaps in functions where deployed military units may need technical or logistical assistance (e.g., maintenance support, supply support, etc.) The primary mission is to enhance readiness through unified and integrated application of logistics power projection of CONUS-base capabilities. The footprint the LSE places in a theater is based on METT-T and the desires of the CINC. With the usage of LOGCAP, which is controlled by the LSE, the LSE can perform any logistical support mission assigned. The LSE can function in a variety of scenarios ranging from a hostile environment, such as Desert Shield/Desert Storm or Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia-Herzegovina), to operations other than war (OOTW), such as disaster/ humanitarian relief, for example, the cleanup in Florida following Hurricane Andrew, the Mississippi River floods, fire fighting in the Pacific Northwest, or supporting United Nations relief efforts in Rwanda or Somalia.

(3) Munitions and Armaments Command: The mission of the Munitions and Armaments Command is to execute and manage the Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) mission for production, supply, storage, maintenance and demilitarization of conventional ammunition and serve as the national inventory control point (NICP) and national maintenance point (NMP) for the ammunition commodity. Manage the industrial base, both organic and non-organic, as it relates to ammunition as well as Rock Island and Watervliet arsenals and the U.S. Army Defense Ammunition Center

(4) Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM), with headquarters at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, is responsible for research, development, procurement and materiel readiness for communications, avionics, radar, radiac, IT, meteorology, night vision, combat surveillance, target acquisition, air traffic management, navigation, electronic warfare equipment/ systems, engine generators, intrusion detection, physical security equipment and environmental control equipment. CECOM also has the responsibility for administering the AMC worldwide LOGCAP umbrella contract and command of Tobyhanna Army Depot. In addition, the Army central design activities- Software Development Center- Lee (SDC-L),

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SDC - Washington (SDC-W), Logistics Systems Support Center (LSSC), Industrial Logistics Systems Center (ILSC), Fire Support Software Engineering (FSSE) Center, and Life Cycle Software Support Center (LCSSC) - assigned to CECOM on 1 October 1997, are organized under the CECOM Software Engineering Center.

(5) Tank Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM), with headquarters at Warren, Michigan, is responsible for research, development, procurement and materiel readiness for wheeled and tracked vehicles, construction equipment, and material handling equipment (MHE), armaments, small arms, mines, countermines, bridging and stream crossing equipment, water supply equipment and fuels distribution equipment. TACOM commands the Red River and Anniston Army Depots.

(6) Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM), with headquarters at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is responsible for research, development, and materiel readiness for Army aviation and missile systems. The Test Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) Activity remains as a separate activity on Redstone Arsenal. AMCOM commands Letterkenny and Corpus Christi Army Depots.

(7) Army Research Laboratory (ARL), with headquarters at Adelphi, Maryland, is the AMC corporate laboratory responsible for basic and exploratory research to provide the key technologies necessary to assure supremacy in future land warfare and provide the technology base for AMC's research, development and engineering centers (RDECs) and the Army program executive officers and project managers.

(8) Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) is headquartered at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. At its four subordinate installations and six other subordinate test centers/sites, TECOM plans and conducts developmental tests and live-fire tests of materiel systems and hardware and software subsystems throughout the materiel life cycle; verifies system safety, and supports operational testing. TECOM performs independent developmental assessments of non-major systems, develops new testing technology, and executes the international development test standardization program for AMC.

(9) U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), its headquarters collocated with AMC headquarters, performs AMC's role as the Army's executive agent for SA. As such, USASAC is responsible for the execution of the Army foreign military sales (FMS) program and exercising direction over the International Logistics/Security Assistance Management Directorates at the AMC commodity MSCs. This encompasses (1) developing fully supported and sustainable equipment sales offers, (2) delivering high-quality equipment and training on time and within the cost estimates contained in the letter of offer and acceptance (LOA), (3) developing the U.S. Army position on commercial export licenses for military equipment and technology, (4) negotiating co-production agreements with other nations, and (5) developing plans for transition to war.

(10) U.S. Army Simulations, Training, and Instrumentation Command (STRICOM), with headquarters in Orlando, Florida, is responsible for providing centralized management and direction for all Army simulation, training, and test requirements for distributed interactive simulation. Responsibilities include cradle-to-grave life-cycle acquisition, beginning with technical base programs and following through with each phase of the acquisition process.

**(11)** U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) comprises the former U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) at the Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; and the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Command (SSCOM) located in Natick, Massachusetts. From the blackboard to the battlefield, SBCCOM is responsible for research, development and implementation of chemical, biological and soldier missions. The new command has a mission to develop and implement soldier, chemical and biological defense systems to ensure the decisive edge and maximum protection for the United States; and provide for the safe storage and treaty compliance of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. SBCCOM will foster partnerships to achieve the best joint capability for military and civilian protection. One half of the partnership, SBCCOM was established for research, development and deployment of chemical and biological defense systems; remediation, demilitarization and safe storage of chemical weapons; and emergency preparedness and response. Well known as the nation's established center of chemical and biological expertise, SBCCOM partners with communities, industry and other government agencies to provide superior defense capabilities for our Nation.

**(12)** LOGSA, a separate AMC reporting activity, is a logistics products and services organization providing support to a diverse array of customers on a worldwide scale. LOGSA was created in 1993 through the consolidation of numerous Army logistics information centers and support activities as part of Army compliance with federally mandated base realignment and closure (BRAC) actions, implementation of defense management review decisions (DMRDs), and Army management decisions to maintain support levels with declining resources. The intended result is to provide the customers with logistics information and services at reduced cost. The LOGSA mission is to provide logistics information and management support to the DA and other services in the broad areas of logistics: integrated logistics support; logistics field support/ contingency planning; materiel distribution management, procedures and systems; packaging, storage and containerization policy and procedures; serves as the Army ACA and Shipper Service Control Office; and provides Army cataloging policy, operations, data management and distribution services. Currently, LOGSA is developing the Logistics Integrated Databases (LIDB), which consolidates the 66 database or automated file applications owned and maintained by LOGSA. The LOGSA objective of achieving a seamless logistics system operating in a common operating environment is evident in the development of the following products and services:

**(a)** LIDB. The LIDB initiative is LOGSA's strategic plan to bring all LOGSA databases under one architecture / umbrella. The LIDB will be the single authoritative source of information in support of managers and decision-makers at various echelons in user communities, throughout the Army. To achieve this goal, LIDB software engineers evaluate and re-engineer Army "business processes" that produce raw logistics data. Utilizing commercial off-the-shelf information management software and state-of-the-art object - relational database middle ware, the LIDB team will construct the unified database and "migrate" the information housed in all of the independent legacy databases and data files into one logical, streamlined data system. The LIDB program will also deliver powerful front-end graphical user interface (GUI) tools to access and manipulate data for diagnostic, prognostic and decision support functions. LIDB uses data from existing sources of force structure, weapons systems, asset visibility, readiness, maintenance, cataloging, packaging,

and interchangeability and substitutability (I&S) data without creating any additional reporting requirements. The resulting system prohibits access to redundant data, improves the accuracy of the information base, and delivers useful information distilled from the vast expanse of stored data. In a relatively short period of time, the user has all the pertinent information required for decision support, information-driven activity.

(b) Electronic Technical Manuals/Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals (ETM/IETM) - The AMC/LOGSA technical manual (TM) digitization initiative converted 3.5 million TM pages from paper to digital format and place those converted TMs on compact disk read only memory (CD-ROM). Some of the benefits of ETMs include monetary savings associated with distribution, storage and updates as well as enabling a lighter, easier deployment. The proliferation of ETM/IETM will also prove beneficial to readiness reporting, in that current preventive maintenance checks and services lists with "Not Ready If" column can aid the soldier in determining the exact status of the item of equipment. This information, provided to the Unit Level Logistics System (ULLS)-Ground (ULLS-G) and ULLS-Aviation (ULLS-A) systems with the Army Materiel Status System (AMSS), will result in more accurate and timely equipment readiness status reporting for reportable Army equipment.

### 12-7. Functions of AMC

AMC functions include materiel management, maintenance management, ILS, development of equipment, strategic maintenance, and operation of strategic depots. AMC through OSC/FSC also provides management of operational policies, programs, objectives, and resources associated with its worldwide Logistics Assistance Program. An overview of these functions follows. Emphasis is placed on strategic supply since this function has great impact on the units and activities supported by AMC.

**a. NMP functions.** The maintenance functions of the commodity commands are accomplished by a NMP. Each commodity command has a NMP for maintenance management of those items in its commodity grouping. The functions of the NMP are:

(1) Configuration management including equipment configuration baseline (specifications), management of techniques for changing the baseline (engineering change proposals), and configuration status reporting (modifications applied).

(2) Development of maintenance publications such as technical manuals, modification work orders, technical bulletins, maintenance digests, etc..

(3) Determination of repair parts to be provisioned as items are initially issued to troop units.

(4) Cataloging.

(5) Evaluation of equipment improvement recommendations.

(6) New equipment training.

**b. NICP Functions.** The supply functions of the commodity commands are accomplished by a NICP. Each commodity command has an NICP to manage those items in a commodity grouping. The functions of the NICP are:

(1) Requirements computation;

- (2) Cataloging direction;
- (3) Procurement direction;
- (4) Distribution management;
- (5) Establish overhaul/rebuild direction; and
- (6) Materiel disposal direction/ reutilization.

#### **12-8. Explanation of AMC functions**

An explanation of these functions will provide a better understanding of AMC's supply responsibility. The procedures that follow are applicable to most items. You should be aware that procedures used for the management of specialized commodities like ammunition are similar, but not identical. Because of their use or unique characteristics, other management procedures may be used instead of, or in addition to, those described here.

**a. Requirements computation.** In computing requirements, materiel is separated into major and secondary items. A major item is a final combination of parts and/or materiel ready for its intended use and of such importance that it is subject to continuing, centralized (HQDA), individual item authorization and management throughout all command and support echelons.

(1) *Army Acquisition Objective (AAO), major end items (Class VII) and Ammunition (Class V).* For major Class VII equipment and Class V missile items, the AAO process, as executed in the Force Builder databases, is the process used to compare the Army requirements needed by the force structure and the Army's on-hand inventory, both in storage and in the hands of troops, to determine the shortage or net equipment-on-hand (EOH) to meet force requirements (also considering due-in assets and projected losses). The resulting procurement program is developed on a commodity approach and reflects the various line items of equipment that are to be purchased to support Army requirements. The basic source calculations identifying overall procurement objectives are derived from the AAO concept. The AAO is the quantity of an item of equipment or ammunition required to equip the approved U.S. Army force and sustain that force, together with specified allies, in wartime from D-Day through the period prescribed in the latest OSD DPG. The AAO can be described as the gross quantity/total amount of equipment, by individual line item number (LIN) the Army is required to have in order to execute peace time missions as well as mobilize and execute the war time mission(s) prescribed in the DPG. The AAO consists of and is the sum of the following elements. These elements consist of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS) intensively managed Class VII equipment and Class V munitions - missiles only.

(a) Initial issue quantity (IIQ). The IIQ is derived from the Logistics Structure and Composition System (LOGSACS) and is computed based on the Master (M) Force of the Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS), as developed through the total Army analysis (TAA) and MACOM command plans. It contains all of the TOE/MTOE/TDA requirements for each item as modified by basis-of-issue plans (BOIP). The IIQ is a tabulation of all of the TOE/TDA requirements for that item in the Army's force structure. This portion also includes the APS.

(b) Operational project stocks. Supplies and equipment above normal TOE, TDA and CTA authorizations tailored to support one or more Army operational plans and/or contingencies. Quantities are approved by HQDA and become a specific component of the total requirement.

(c) War reserve sustainment stocks. Stocks acquired in peacetime and held to meet the Army's increased wartime sustainment requirements, until resupply at wartime rates or emergency rates is established. This requirement is arrived at by use of a computer model that deploys forces on a time phased deployment schedule, utilizing a specified scenario length and applying predetermined length and applying predetermined inter-theater and intra-theater attrition factors. It should be noted that sustainment stocks is reduced by an amount equal to IIQ left behind by units that deploy overseas and draw APS.

(d) War reserve stocks for allies (WRSA). An OSD directed program to assist designated allies in case of war. Computed quantities are included in this component of the gross requirement.

(e) Maintenance floats. The maintenance system requires that additional equipment be available for issue while repair and maintenance of unit equipment is being performed. Two types of floats are included in this component of the AAO - operational readiness float (ORF) for unit and intermediate levels and repair cycle float (RCF) for depot maintenance.

(f) Munitions/Class V—Missile requirements only. Missile requirements are based on the force structure that resides in the LOGSACS database. This requirement includes unit basic loads, war reserve sustainment stocks, war fighting requirements developed from projections, training requirements and testing requirements. The remaining Class V requirements are developed by the Single Item Manager for Conventional Ammunition of the AMC with a different database.

(2) *Army procurement objective (APO)*. The sum of the Class VII requirements developed above represents the AAO and is the gross/grand total equipment requirements for the Army. Adjustments to the AAO are calculated to arrive at the APO. Basically, the APO is developed by subtracting on-hand assets and due-in quantities while projected peacetime losses are added to the AAO. The DCSOPS is responsible for the system used to calculate AAOs, and the administration associated with the process. Force Builder is a computer program used to develop the AAO. The U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency (USAFMSA) maintains the program used to compute the AAO and the resulting product. To compute the AAO, Force Builder must utilize and capture data from many other databases sources, such as the Army Authorization Document System (TAADS), SAMAS, Consolidated TO&E Update (CTU) files, Total Army Equipment Distribution Program (TAEDP), Continuing Balance System, Expanded (CBS-X), and Supply Bulletin (SB) 700-20. The Force Development Directorate is responsible for coordinating with the appropriate agencies to ensure correct up to date information is obtained to develop an accurate AAO calculation. The ASA(ALT) is the proponent for the standard study number (SSN) system which groups similar items into levels of aggregation (for example, 5-ton trucks, all body types) suitable for DA staff analysis of requirements and formulation of program/budget requests. The SSN system enables HQDA to generate IIQ requirements for components of

major items in their own right (for example, radios). The SSN system is actually maintained and operated by LOGSA.

(3) *Procurement plan development.* When the AAO computations are completed, the requirements are analyzed to assist in the development of the procurement plan phased throughout the budget cycle. Development of the procurement plan requires careful attention to ensure that the eight factors listed here are incorporated as well as other factors while attempting to achieve the AAOs in a balanced and progressive manner that will enhance Army readiness at the end of each funded delivery period (FDP). The FDP data is reviewed and adjusted by the acquisition PEO/PM and the ARSTAF in terms of overall Army requirements and changed to accommodate new guidance and/or priorities and to assure the materiel program is fully integrated into, and supported by, other appropriations. Articulation of Army requirements and recommended procurement programs and budget are the responsibility of the ASA(ALT) in coordination with the DCSOPS and DCSLOG.

- Fiscal guidance.
- DA, OSD, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), congressional decisions.
- User (ODCSOPS, TRADOC) priorities.
- Current asset positions/projected loss data including FMS.
- Product improvement programs.
- Secondary item requirements (those procured within procurement appropriations—engines, transmissions, etc.).
- Production base status and capabilities.
- Interface of modernization programs (new products) with current procurement programs.

(4) *AAO purpose.* The AAO is, in the final analysis, the Army's stated gross requirement for an item of materiel and is used to justify budgets and programs submitted to OSD/OMB and Congress in order to obtain funding. The component parts of the AAO computation system are clearly definable and aid in the explanation of the total requirement. Tentative conclusions can be drawn about Army readiness by comparing current asset data to the AAO. AAO data are used repeatedly by the leadership of the Army in explaining the Army's need for procurement funds.

(5) *Secondary items.*

(a) There are about 307,700 secondary items, about 90 percent of which have an annual demand value of \$5,000 or less. Because of the large number and dollar value, it is not feasible to manage each item separately using the IIQ, AAO, AMP concept. Secondary items are classified in four categories for application of varying degrees of management. These categories are based on the annual dollar value of demands, not the unit cost of the item. (The higher-dollar value, the greater the management application.) These categories are:

- Low dollar value (up to \$25,000).
- Medium dollar value (up to \$100,000).
- High dollar value (up to \$1,000,000).

- Very high dollar value (over \$1,000,000).

(b) The key to requirements computation is a good knowledge of future needs. For secondary items, there are two methods used to estimate future requirements. The first is to project historical trends into the future. Past demands are recorded automatically by the computer and are projected into the future by a variety of mathematical means. The second method, while preferred, is more difficult. This method uses planned activities of the supported forces and their equipment; for example, major exercises, changes in end item density, and applied consumption and failure rates to project future needs. Normally the first method is used and program change factors are applied to combine human judgment with historical trends. The computer constantly measures trends and alerts the item manager to trend changes. Once future requirements are determined, the next step is to obtain the required items.

**b. Cataloging Direction.**

(1) Within disciplines established by the Federal Catalog System (a DLA administered system), this process develops a Federal Item Identification to describe an item-of-supply and acquires a national stock number (NSN) to establish and fix the unique identity of the item.

(2) The NSN is a 13-digit number used in all materiel management functions. The first four digits are the Federal supply classification (FSC) class code. The FSC relates like items of supply and, conversely, separates unlike items of supply. For example, in the FSC 5305, the notation '53' indicates that the item falls within the group "Hardware and Abrasives," and the '05' indicates that the item falls within the class of screws. The last nine digits of the NSN are called the national item identification number (NIIN). Each NIIN is permanently assigned to only one item-of-supply and remains with the item as long as it is used in the government supply system. The first two digits of the NIIN also identify the country of origin; 00 and 01 indicate the United States.


(3) The LOGSA maintains a consolidated Army Master Data File of all NSN that the Army uses or manages. This file contains coded item management data, nomenclature, packaging, freight classification information, interchangeable/ substitutable data, component references, and historical records on stock numbers. This information is disseminated throughout the Army with changes made monthly.

**c. Procurement direction.** Much of the administrative burden of initiating a purchase request is done by computer. As a by-product of the supply control study, the computer provides a procurement work directive (PWD) containing available technical specification data needed for the pre-award phase of a procurement contract. Depending upon a variety of factors including dollar value of the procurement, this request may be reviewed by the item manager and supervisory personnel or it may be forwarded automatically for procurement without review. Secondary items have an economic order quantity (EOQ) computed using a modified EOQ algorithm. Typically, secondary items are procured in quantities ranging from three months' to three years' supply, depending on the cost to buy versus the cost to store the item. When procurement is solicited, the prospective contractors are told where the item is to be delivered. This decision is made based on transportation costs, storage requirements, and the geographical location of the ultimate user.


**d. Distribution management of major items.** Distribution management is primarily a three-fold process: accounting for existing assets through the CBS-X, projecting the distribution of equipment against planned force structure utilizing the Army Flow Model (AFM), TAEDP, and executing the equipment distribution program through the use of the Requisition Validation Report (REQVAL) and the Equipment Release Priority System (ERPS).

**e. Accounting for assets.** The CBS-X is a transaction accounting system operated and maintained by LOGSA that provides worldwide asset visibility for the Army's reportable items. It covers approximately 14,500 NSNs, which are primarily major end items, but also includes other selected items (medical and secondary) on which worldwide visibility is required. CBS-X is updated monthly to reflect on-hand assets in units, storage, and in transit. The system is reconciled with property books and stock record accounts at least annually. CBS-X data is used by MACOMs, AMC, and HQDA to assess the overall preparedness of the force, as the source of on-hand asset data in the AFM and, when merged with unit equipment authorization data, the determinant in honoring requisitions. For ammunition, retail/strategic visibility is accomplished by the Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System (WARS). The WARS data is used as a baseline for requirements computation, procurement, distribution, maintenance direction, and disposal. Unique item tracking (UIT) provides visibility of small arms, controlled cryptographic items and radioactive testing and tracking systems.

**f. Projecting equipment distribution.** TAEDP is a program which projects distribution requirements and priorities using on-hand assets and projected deliveries to produce an equipment distribution program for the current, budget, and program years. The data source for requirements is LOGSACS. It incorporates near-term authorizations from TAADS with planned force structure as depicted in SAMAS. Requirements are prioritized by ODCSOPS through the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) in conjunction with equipment readiness codes (ERCs) as stated in TOEs (Figure 12-3). Assets from CBS-X are used as the baseline from which projected distribution of deliveries begins. Deliveries consist of new procurements, depot maintenance returns, and redistribution of displaced systems or assets generated through force structure changes. as reported in CBS-X are used as the baseline from which projected distribution of deliveries begins. Figure 12-4 depicts the merging of the inputs in order to create the projected distribution plan. The distribution is generally accomplished in ERC/DAMPL sequence, which maximizes the distribution to readiness policy. TAEDP is run in an ORACLE environment. As such distribution rules and priorities can be changed to reflect current or envisioned priorities, such as Army National Guard Redesign Study (ADRS), Medical Reengineering Initiative (MRI), Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), light infantry divisions, etc., when determined by ODCSOPS. TAEDP projects distribution to all valid unit and non-unit claimants which include MTOE, TDA, TDA Aug, Army War Reserves (APS), operational projects, ORF, Army Reserves, etc. The TAEDP is normally processed to align with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution system (PPBES) process, but can be run at any time for special analyses.




**Figure 12-3. Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL)**




**Figure 12-4. Projecting Distribution**

**g. Executing the distribution plan.** The REQVAL and ERPS reports are used to validate requisitions and release equipment. The REQVAL matches current equipment authorizations as stated in TAADS against assets reported in CBS-X in order to validate requisitions. (Figure 12-5).



**Figure 12-5. Executing Distribution-Requisition Validation (REQVAL)**

(1) ERPS takes the process one step further and overlays out-of-DAMPL or special initiative priorities as reflected in the planning system (AFM). ERPS tells the NICP item manager which units or non-unit claimants are to receive equipment and in what order. The Major Item Requisition Validation (MIRV) system compares ERPS and item manager equipment backorder files, validates requirements, and provides the proper equipment distribution sequence in an automated product (Figure 12-6).



**Figure 12-6. Executing Distribution-Equipment Release Priority System (ERPS)**

(2) The management of equipment distribution is a complicated process primarily used for allocating equipment, analyzing force capability, programming, budgeting, and as the link to correctly “growing” Army documentation. For ammunition, distribution planning for items in short supply is accomplished by the Committee for Ammunition Logistic Support (CALS), co-chaired by ODCSLOG and ODCSOPS. Distribution is generally accomplished in DAMPL sequence. The CALS meets twice each year and allocates supplies to the MACOMs for the upcoming six-month period. The MACOMs in turn sub-allocate down to the retail level.

**h. Total Asset Visibility (TAV).** Army Total Asset Visibility (ATAV) is a capability, which integrates data from automated systems and provides commanders/logisticians with information on location, quantity, condition, and movement of assets. It is a fully automated, near real time, open architecture capability which is migrating to be Defense Information Infrastructure /Common Operating Environment compliant under the LIDB. TAV has visibility of over 1.4 million Army NSNs (6.0 million DOD NSNs) and provides related logistics data to users throughout the Army and DOD. It has been successfully used during operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Operation Joint Endeavor (OJE)/Joint Guard (OJG) and Task Force Eagle/Falcon (TFE/TFF) to track assets. The Army has identified ATAV as the authoritative source for obtaining Army logistics data in support of joint programs, i.e., Joint Total Asset Visibility (JTAV).

(1) Lateral redistribution/procurement offset. ATAV is being used today to provide visibility of assets internal to the Army and across Service/DLA lines for use in utilizing assets for redistribution and procurement offset from the wholesale levels.

(2) ATAV client server prototype (ACSP). ACSP migrates ATAV from a mainframe-based remote access ATAV capability to a regional, server-based architecture. This prototype is currently operational in the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). The intent of ACSP is to provide an initial GCSS-A management module functionality to selected areas of responsibility. ACSP will also support corps and theater materiel management center and distribution management center analytical requirements. This prototype will allow for the smooth integration of ATAV capability into the emerging GCSS-A Management Module. The vision is to evaluate emerging technologies, develop plan for application in GCSS-A and LIDB, and develop vision in support of *Joint Vision 2020*.

(3) Automatic identification technologies (AIT). ATAV is supported by a suite of AIT for improved source data automation and tracking items from wholesale through critical transportation nodes to destination. This will help provide near, real-time accurate asset and logistics information and visibility. AIT will be implemented for multiple uses throughout Army logistics. The current suite of AIT includes: linear and two-dimension bar code printing and scanning, radio frequency (RF) identification, and contact memory buttons. Areas being implemented include: Ammunition/AIT Integration; CONUS Power Projection and Support Platforms; and AIT for IBCT. Maintenance AIT (RF) is currently being prototyped. Concept development is underway for the use of smart buttons in maintenance.

(a) Ammunition/AIT.

**1** LIA in partnership with the MTMC, AMC, CASCOM, USAREUR, the United States Army, Pacific (USARPAC), and industry is leveraging commercial technology by applying AIT to the ammunition business process. A pilot integration effort depicted below was completed in July 1998, and the program is being expanded to include the remaining tier I and tier II depots, three additional ammunition supply points (ASP) in Europe, three ASPs in the Pacific Theater, and two ammunition ports on the West Coast.

**2** Ammunition/AIT integration provides total asset visibility of Class V materiel as it is transported in containers from the depots through MTMC ports and on to ASPs in the theaters of operation. AIT is a family of data capturing devices designed to provide rapid and accurate acquisition, retention, and retrieval of source data. It includes a variety of read and write data storage technologies used to process asset identification

information. AIT also encompasses the hardware and software required to create the devices, read the information on them, and integrate that information with other logistics information. AIT devices can be interrogated using contact, laser, or RF devices. At the shipping depot, information obtained from those interrogations is fed electronically into automated information systems for updating status records and preparing shipping documentation. RF tags and 2-D bar codes attached to shipping containers will be "burned" or populated with essential data and accompany the shipped items throughout their journey to the receiving ASPs. Interrogators at each node will update ammo managers throughout the logistics pipeline.

(b) CONUS Power Projection and Support Platforms. Efforts are underway to install AIT (RF) at the FORSCOM Power Projection Platforms and Power Support Platforms, class I vendors, commercial transportation hubs, and ASPs.

(c) IBCT. Install AIT (RF) at Fort Lewis, WA, in support of the IBCT deployment and sustainment operations, provide training and initial operational capability (IOC) support to the IBCT.

(d) Maintenance AIT. Efforts are underway to integrate AIT into the maintenance process to provide source data automation, enhancement of the maintenance process, and tracking through Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS) and ULLS of maintenance actions from wholesale through transportation nodes to retail maintenance repair points. Concept development is continuing to utilize a smart button on the partnership for reduced O&S costs, engine (PROSE) for tracking the repair history of an item from cradle to grave.

(e) Computer Automated Transportation Tool (CATT). The CATT provides tools for generating standard DOD supply, transportation, and shipping documentation. It is designed for use in organizations which are required to ship materiel within the DOD transportation system but have no automated systems in place to support production of the required supply and transportation documentation or AIT media. CATT operates in a personal computer (PC) environment and provides the full power of a 4th generation language (4GL) relational database management system (RDBMS) to accomplish immediate search, retrieval, and reporting functions. It is a fully integrated AIT platform consisting of bar code scanning and printing, and capabilities RF tag. It incorporates freight consolidation and shipping functions to support the redistribution, redeployment or retrograde of materiel. CATT can be configured to operate standalone or on a local area network (LAN) for multi-user access.

**1** CATT produces the following documents:

- Military Shipment Labels (MSL - DD Form 1387). Also produces the new two-dimensional MSL.
- Issue Release/Receipt Documents (IRRD - DD Form 1348-1A).
- Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD - DD Form 1384).
- Packing lists.

**2** CATT supports DOD AIT and in-transit visibility/total asset visibility (ITV/TAV) initiatives through the following functions:

- Writes and reads linear and two-dimensional bar code labels.
- Writes and reads RF tags in JTAV format.
- Populates the regional in-transit visibility (RITV) fusion centers.

**SECTION IV  
STANDARD SYSTEMS**

**12-9. Defense standard systems**

There are a number of defense standard systems necessitated by the ever-increasing language of codes and formats readable by the computer, the supporting communications equipment, and the human operator. Items requisitioned by a single Army unit may be supplied by GSA, DLA, the commodity commands of AMC or any of the other military departments, thus the need for standard codes and formats. DLA has been assigned the responsibility for administering the 10 DOD standard systems generally referred to as the Defense Logistics Management Standards Office (DLMSO).

**a. Military standard requisitioning and issue procedures (MILSTRIP).** These procedures prescribe the uniform code and data elements to be used in requisitioning and issuing supplies. Within the DOD, a single line item requisition is used. Each requisition is for one specific item. The form and format are fixed, but some of the data elements may be manipulated and other data elements added may produce a variety of documents essential to supply operations. Common documents thus produced are requisitions, cancellations, supply status, shipment status, follow-up answers, materiel release orders, confirmations, and denials. Much of the information contained in these documents is the same. For example, each document contains the NSN, quantity, requisitioner, priority, funding data, etc. These procedures permit the requisitioner to say what he or she wants, and provides the supply system with the necessary documents for processing the request. AMC is the Army focal point for MILSTRIP.

**b. Uniform Movement and Materiel Issue Priority System (UMMIPS).** In the issue and movement of supplies it is necessary to determine the relative importance of competing requisitions. Priorities are determined by the force activity designator (FAD) and the urgency of need. Each unit in the Army is assigned a FAD based upon its relative position on the DAMPL and its present deployment, that is, positioned for combat, in combat, in support of troops in combat, etc. The urgency of need refers to the unit's need for the particular item being requisitioned, that is, a repair part to get equipment off deadline, stock replenishment, etc. The application of these two factors produces a total of 15 priorities. UMMIPS establishes time standards based on priority. From requisition to receipt, the standards are:

<b>Table 12-1. UMMIPS time standards</b>		
<b><i>Requisitioning Priority</i></b>	<b><i>Unit Location</i></b>	
	<b><i>United States</i></b>	<b><i>Overseas</i></b>

## How the Army Runs

01-03	7 days	11-12 days
04-08	11 days	15-16 days
09-15	28 days	67-82 days

These time standards are further subdivided for each activity involved in the supply and movement of materiel, that is, NICP, depot, transportation agencies, etc.

**c. Military standard transportation and movement procedures (MILSTAMP).** This system is designed to manage, control, and document materiel (including personal property, exchange, and commissary) moving in the DTS and clearly define the responsibilities of shipping, clearance, terminal, and receiving activities. MILSTAMP is structured to interface directly with MILSTRIP and to support the movement criteria prescribed by UMMIPS. It functions through a discipline of uniform documentation procedures, formats, data elements and codes, and data transmission time standards. It also supports the performance-assessment requirements of MILSTEP through in-transit data collection and the inventory visibility requirements of the Services and agencies. AMC is the Army focal point for MILSTAMP.

**d. Military supply and transportation evaluation procedures (MILSTEP).** The basic tools for evaluating the strategic system are the MILSTEP reports. This system of reporting uses the uniform data elements produced by MILSTRIP and MILSTAMP as a database to produce the various MILSTEP supply and transportation reports. To produce these reports, a reduced version of the computer history file for each commodity command is extracted onto tape and forwarded to LOGSA. The supply effectiveness reports display such things as: the percentages of requisitions on which stock was available, the number and age of back-ordered requisitions, and the number of stock numbers causing back orders. Using this same database, other reports are generated to evaluate depots, NICPs, and AMC's overall performance in key functional areas. AMC is the Army focal point for MILSTEP.

### 12-10. Department of the Army standard systems

Just as it is necessary for DOD to establish military standard systems to be used by all of the military departments, the Army establishes standard systems for use by its various elements. The overall concept for Standard Army Logistics Systems (SALS) embodies standard systems in every functional area. Many systems that will be included under the SALS concept are currently being developed and tested. The Army has developed a number of standard logistics systems. There are two standard systems developed and used by AMC that are a part of SALS. They are the Commodity Command Standard System (CCSS), which is used to support the NICPs; and the Standard Depot System (SDS), used to support depot operations.

**a. Direct Support System (DSS).** AMC serves as executive agent for DSS. The ALOC is a refinement of DSS and is used to airlift selected repair parts to designated overseas units. DSS was developed with the following objectives:

- Reduce intermediate stock levels overseas and at CONUS installations.
- Reduce the value of stock in the pipeline.

- Maintain or improve supply responsiveness and expend fewer resources through use of improved computer, communications, and container technology.
- Change existing procedures as little as possible.
- Maintain readiness.

(1) DSS–ALOC provides for direct supply of materiel from the strategic distribution depot to the direct support unit (DSU). This bypasses overseas general support and break-bulk points and CONUS installation supply activities. The DSU requisition is passed to the strategic supplier through the intermediate level and the Defense Automatic Addressing System (DAAS).

(2) DAAS is a worldwide computerized activity that acts as a message center. It automatically routes supply documents between requisitioners and the various supply activities. This routing is done on a near real-time basis and rarely is a supply document delayed more than a few minutes. The requisition is routed to the NICP who orders the appropriate distribution depot to ship the item. The distribution depot moves the item to the consolidation/ containerization point (CCP), located at the distribution depot, for consolidation with other supplies destined for the same DSU. Depending on volume, consolidation point personnel load a container for one unit or a number of units situated in the same geographic area. The container is loaded for ease of unloading and once closed at the CCP is not opened until it arrives at its destination. If all supplies in the container are for one DSU, the destination is that DSU. If supplies are for multiple DSUs, the destination is a drop point (a designated unit) within the geographical area and other units come to this point and pick up their supplies.

**b. CBS–X.** The CBS–X is the official Army asset position for selected Army equipment. The objective is to provide accurate, timely, and auditable worldwide asset positions at property book level of major end items of equipment and furnish the Army with an official inventory Figure for equipment procurement and distribution decisions.

**c. Logistics Intelligence File (LIF).** The LIF, maintained by LOGSA, is the Army's only database that consolidates worldwide supply and transportation pipeline data. It was originally created to monitor the performance of DSS–ALOC, but has evolved into the primary source for up to date logistic management information. It provides visibility of individual requisitions and shipments as they move through the logistics resupply channels. All Army requisitions on the strategic system except bulk petroleum products are recorded in the LIF. Customers can access LIF records using remote query procedures or by other conventional communication means. The LIF incorporates Unit Movement Visibility (UMV), Battlefield Distribution System (BDS), and interfaces with AIT such as RF Tag. Transportation information and RF Tag data is received from the source and posted to LIF database. Requisition and all other MILSTRIP documentation that flows through DAAS are routed to LOGSA for posting to LIF. This includes status documents, materiel release orders, confirmations, and backorders, etc. Each month a complete performance evaluation of DSS–ALOC is prepared and distributed worldwide. It contains individual unit activity performance reports as well as summary data for overseas commands, CONUS and MACOMs. LOGSA also maintains the Army-wide Materiel Returns Database, Central Demand Database and the Airlift Clearance File. Information contained in these databases is readily available as special and recurring reports.

**d. Tailored systems.** The Army currently employs a set of logistics systems that are each tailored to specific areas.

(1) The Standard Army Ammunition System (SAAS) supports tactical ammunition management and storage operations to produce accurate and timely Class V information during peacetime, contingency, and wartime operations on a highly mobile battlefield.

(2) SAMS is used to manage maintenance operations at the installation and in all tactical units.

(3) Standard Army Retail Supply System - Objective (SARSS-O) supports retail supply management operations. It consists of four integrated systems (SARSS-1, SARSS-2AD, SARSS-2AC/B, SARSS-Gateway). SARSS-1 is used for customer service and warehouse operations in GSU/DSU supply activities. SARSS-2AD is used for supply management at division and separate brigade and regiment. SARSS-2AC/B is used at materiel management centers at the corps and theater level in the Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve. SARSS-Gateway is provides the capability through improved communications and advanced automation techniques to place orders on the source of supply (SOS) the same day they are produced by the customer and to provide asset visibility of all assets that are available within a specified geographical area. SARSS Gateway is a relational database that interfaces with existing Army STAMIS to provide a near real-time supply system to unit level supply and maintenance activities.

(4) ULLS consists of three applications (ULLS-G, ULLS-A, ULLS-S4). ULLS-G is located at company level for The Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS) and prescribed load list (PLL). ULLS-S4 is found at company, battalion and brigade S-4. The ULLS-A is found at aircraft flight companies and AVUM/AVIM units. ULLS automates the logistics to include aviation, for unit supply, maintenance and materiel readiness management operations; prepares unit supply documents, maintenance management records, and readiness reports. It operates in all components of the Army (Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve )

(5) Standard Property Book System-Redesign (SPBS-R) is used for property accountability at battalion and higher levels in the tactical environment and at the installation/TDA levels. It automates overall property accountability/asset visibility functions. It creates master hand receipts which allow the ULLS to generate automated sub-hand receipts to the user level. Property accountability is maintained within SPBS-R, while asset data is passed to the next higher level for asset visibility and management.

(6) Department of the Army Movement Management System-Redesign (DAMMS-R) is divided into seven modules/subsystems (shipment management module (SMM), to include controlled movements, movement control team (MCT) operations subsystem, mode operations subsystem, highway regulation subsystem, convoy planning subsystem, operational movement programming subsystem, and transportation addressing subsystem (TAS). DAMMS-R is used to plan, schedule, and track the shipment of equipment and assets (containers) used for shipping equipment via air, ground, and sea. Shipment location is tracked and reported until a shipment reaches its destination. This system is scheduled for replacement by TC AIMS II, which is a joint Service system being developed by Army.

(7) AFMIS and FS-2000 automates management of food service and subsistence supply operations at the troop issue subsistence activity (TISA), installation food advisor (IFA), and the dining facility operations (DFO). The TISA module tracks issues, receipts, sales, reorders, and storage. The IFA module produces reports on dining facility operation and menus. The DFO module assists the dining facility manager in menu planning, production scheduling, inventories, headcount, and requisitioning. AFMIS/FS-2000 currently interfaces with Defense Subsistence Management Information System (DSMIS), Standard Army Financial Inventory and Accounting Reporting System (STARFIARS), and the Subsistence Total Order and Receipt Electronics System (STORES), the Joint Subsistence Prime Vendor Food Ordering System.

(8) TOPS is a joint Service system which has the capabilities to automate, streamline, and coordinate virtually every aspect of handling personal property shipments to include counseling, outbound, inbound, non-temporary storage, and quality assurance, and ends duplication of effort and documentation. The system is a network of computer systems located at a personal property shipment office (PPSO). Each site has a telecommunications link to central switching (SWITCHER), a site at MTMC, Alexandria, Virginia that serves as a data sorting and distribution point.

(9) The central issue facility (CIF) module of the ISM provides a standardized Army-wide, automated, user-friendly system for the receipt, storage, issue, exchange, and turn-in of authorized OCIE at Army installations. A standard automated CIF system is needed to support peacetime operations and deployment/redeployment of soldiers in support of both military operations and military operations other than war. The Army must field an automated CIF system, worldwide which is capable of outfitting soldiers with needed OCIE in time to meet deployment schedules while maintaining property accountability. The CIF module improves property accountability and inventory management. The module will allow CIF personnel to provide better support to soldiers and improve management.

**e. Initiatives.** Many of the legacy systems mentioned above were designed and developed based on old 1960's technology, i.e. data exchange via floppy diskette and modem, standalone workstations, fragmented/stove-piped, not dependent on constant communications, MILSTRIP, MILSTRAP data formats, just to name a few. These systems have served the Army well, but in an era of rapidly changing requirements and technology, many have reached the end of their life-expectancy. As the Army moves forward to transform into a more agile, lethal, and versatile force, it must transform itself to distribution-based logistics, by reconfiguring logistics and reengineering logistics systems by leveraging information and communication technologies that exist today and tomorrow. The logistics systems tomorrow must:

- Enhance deployability.
- Help reduce the logistics footprint in the battlespace.
- Reduce total obligation authority.

Ultimately the Army envisions a single, seamless, integrated logistics system that provides accurate and real-time information and, improves overall responsiveness and situational awareness. There are many initiatives underway to modernize and streamline logistics.

(1) *GCSS-A*. GCSS-A, is the Army's enterprise logistics systems, to eventually replace aging legacy systems. It is being designed to support the Army CSS mission area which includes the battlefield support functions of arming, fixing, fueling, manning, moving, and sustaining soldiers and their systems. GCSS-A will establish interfaces with other CSS automated information systems (AIS) so that users can gain access to information and exchange operational data in the areas of personnel, medical, finance, training, and unit administration. The databases and processes of the application programs will accommodate system operations in a distributed, shared data computing environment. There are three tiers to GCSS-A that are being developed simultaneously:

*Tier 1*—Tactical retail environment. This tier will produce a set of integrated modules to replace the existing legacy tactical logistics systems.

*Tier 2*—Wholesale/retail integration.

*Tier 3*—Joint interoperability requirements. The tactical-retail tier of GCSS-A will feed logistics information into the CSSCS to provide commanders with up to date real time logistics situational awareness

(2) *WLMP*. WLMP involves modernizing the Army's information management system for wholesale logistics and restructuring business practices to meet the needs of today's and tomorrow's Army. It is characterized as a non-materiel IT solution that is outsourced to private industry. The Army is purchasing a service, not a system. WLMP focuses on the modernization of current legacy systems, CCSS and SDS.

(3) *LIDB*. The LIDB is the Army's reengineering initiative to integrate all of its logistics data into one relational database. The LIDB stores wholesale and retail historical information and provides real time status of Army readiness, requisitions, supply, maintenance and asset information to customers worldwide. The LIDB will work with GCSS-A to ensure one vision, one product, one database becomes a reality. Integration of LIDB with GCSS-A via seamless data transfer will reduce the amount of time soldiers spend sending data to higher echelons.

(4) *TC AIMS II*. TC AIMS II is the Army's deployment planning/execution and in-theater transportation and distribution system that will eventually facilitate the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies during peace and war and, provides the source data to enable data visibility of forces from home station up to the National Command Authorities (NCA) via the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).

(5) Movement tracking system (MTS) will incorporate digital maps in the vehicles and allow two-way satellite messaging thereby allowing the transportation coordinator the ability to talk to the driver of any truck, regardless of location, without having to put up antennas or involve more soldiers. MTS will be adaptable to future incorporation of radio frequency technology, automatic reporting of vehicle diagnostics, and other features that support intransit visibility.

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**SECTION V**  
**FUNDING****12-11. Appropriations**

Congressionally approved funds and the Army budget structure are divided into appropriations, which support both the Active Army and Reserve Components. For logistics management purposes, these appropriations can be addressed in two categories; procurement appropriations and operations and maintenance appropriations.

**a.** Procurement appropriations are used to buy all major items and other selected end items. Selected end items with a unit price in excess of \$25,000 are purchased with procurement appropriations.

**b.** Operations and maintenance appropriations support day-to-day operations. It pays for such things as training; spare and repair parts; selected end items with a unit value of less than \$3,000; unit and major item depot maintenance; and administrative and associated activities. The operations and maintenance appropriation is allocated by Department of Army to Army commands based upon their mission and the importance of that mission to the Army. These funds are referred to as consumer funds. Between consumer funds and the procurement appropriations, the field commander purchases all of his or her secondary items.

**12-12. AWCF**

National logistics operations, support costs for secondary items are funded by the AWCF. The AWCF, an element of the Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF), was established by OSD beginning in FY 97, following Congressional concerns over the Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF). The AWCF incorporates the commercial or business operations previously managed within the individual revolving funds (Stock Fund and the Industrial Fund) into a single revolving or business operations fund. The AWCF is designed to provide a more effective means for controlling the costs of goods and services and a more flexible way of financing and accounting for those costs; to create and recognize contractual relationships between the activity and its customers; to enhance the effective acquisition and use of manpower, materiel, and other resources; and to support the performance budgeting concept by facilitating budgeting, reporting, and control of costs of secondary items. Simply, this means that the cost of providing a product or service "the cost of materiel and logistics support" is passed on to the customer, as in private industry. The payments by Army and other DOD customers (and other government agencies and private concerns as authorized) provide the capital to replenish the AWCF. The AWCF is an integral part of the DOD team, providing support services that are essential to the success of the operating forces. The AWCF is assigned to the command and control of AMC, which is responsible for managing their functional and financial performance. The four activity groups that make up the fund are:

**a. Supply Management, Army (SMA).** This activity group operates on a buyer-seller relationship basis, buying from industry and maintaining through depot and general support level maintenance, assigned stocks for sale to its customers - primarily to Army operating units. The availability of this materiel impacts the equipment availability, operational readiness, and the warfighting readiness of Army units. Until implementation of SSF the SMA activity consisted of a wholesale division (AMC) and retail division (MACOMs).

Under SSF, the two are merged into one national fund, which is subdivided according to commodity and assigned to major subordinate commands of AMC. This activity group also manages the Army's pre-positioned war reserves. The SMA activity also funds the inventory control point logistics support expenses. The prices for items purchased by the consumer cover the acquisition cost plus the cost of supply operations and transportation. On a fiscal year basis, the SMA has a total operating cost authority (OCA), which limits the total amount of supplies and equipment that can be purchased and/or repaired. That OCA is earned at the national level through sales to consumers. The SMA incorporates the funding procedures needed to purchase supplies in advance from industry for stockage so that items are available upon requisition.

**b. Depot Maintenance.** The Depot Maintenance activity group gives the Army the capability to repair, overhaul, and upgrade weapon systems and equipment; to store and distribute ammunition, war reserve materiel, and other selected items; and to provide tenant support to other AMC, Army, and DOD activities. The Depot Maintenance Group both competes with and partners with private industry to deliver goods and services efficiently and effectively.

**c. Ordnance.** The Ordnance activity group produces conventional and chemical munitions, manufactures large-caliber weapon system components, and provides stockpile management. The group's activities are managed by OSC, a major subordinate command of the AMC. The OSC serves all branches of the DOD, providing the industrial capability for the manufacture, renovation, and demilitarizing of materiel--specifically of howitzers, gun tubes, mounts, mortars, grenades and smoke rounds, gas masks, and tool sets and kits.

**d. Information Services.** The primary mission of the Information Services activity group is to provide for the development and operational sustainment of automated information systems and software. The group's mission covers a broad range of services, including requirements definition and analysis, system design, development, testing and integration; implementation support; and documentation services. In addition, this activity group provides customers with approved commercial sources for the purchase of small and medium s-sized computers, hardware, software, and support services.

## SECTION VI SECURITY ASSISTANCE

### 12-13. Security Assistance (SA)

SA is a group of programs authorized by the *Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961*, the *Arms Export Control Act (AECA)*, as amended, and other related statutes. These programs include: Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, which are grants; and the FMS Program, which is cash or financed purchases. Through these programs, the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other related services to allied and friendly foreign countries in furtherance of national security.

#### **a. Responsibilities.**

(1) The Secretary of State is responsible for the overall supervision and general direction of the SA program. The primary responsibility of the Secretary of Defense is to

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determine military equipment and training requirements, and to procure and supervise the use of equipment by each recipient country. The military departments execute and manage their portion of the SA program under the general direction of the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). They also provide technical support and information for use in negotiations on acquisition and co-production agreements that will ultimately affect their plans and programs.

(2) The President determines which foreign countries are eligible to purchase defense articles, training, and other services from United States' sources. Purchase requests from foreign countries of major items of equipment are sent to the U.S. Embassy with copies to Department of State, DSAA, and the military departments. Purchases of parts and other nonmajor items can be addressed directly with the military departments. Congress must be notified of any offer to sell defense articles and services valued at \$50,000,000 or more, major defense equipment valued at \$14,000,000 or more, and design and construction services valued at \$200,000,000 or more.

(3) The ARSTAF SA responsibilities are to develop and issue overall policy and program guidance. Operations are assigned to MACOMs. The major SA policy player in the ARSTAF is the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs) (DUSA(IA)). The DUSA(IA) coordinates the development and issuance of Army-wide SA policy in coordination with the DCSOPS, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), USACE, Judge Advocate General (JAG), and the various agencies within the Army Secretariat. The SA responsibilities of the various DA Staff elements are focused on overall program guidance with coordination of the various functional areas a prime responsibility of the Director for Security Assistance. The operational aspects of the SA program including management of FMS cases, FMF, and IMET are assigned to MACOMs. AMC, as the Army executive agent, is responsible for the operational aspects of approved FMF (except training and design and construction services) and military assistance programs (MAP). TRADOC manages the operational aspects of FMS training at CONUS/OCONUS schools, and IMET programs.

(a) The Director for Security Assistance (DUSA(IA)) is the principal ARSTAF spokesman and ARSTAF proponent for SA. He or she is responsible for SA policy and procedural guidance. He or she has direct access to and interacts with the VCSA, the Under Secretary of the Army, the other members of the Army Secretariat, OSD, other Military Departments, agencies, commands, and activities relative to SA matters. He or she has Chief of Staff tasking authority over all ARSTAF agencies, MACOMs, and field activities on matters pertaining to SA. As the DA Staff spokesman for SA, he or she is responsible for providing policy and guidance to the Army executive agent and other agencies or MACOMs for SA when required.

(b) AMC is the Army's principal agent for supplying FMS materiel, fulfilling its responsibilities through USASAC. USASAC, working with other AMC elements, develops the necessary data to consummate sales and supervise their execution. This operational responsibility extends from the initial long-range planning, which involves the development of requirements for materiel and services, to the signing of agreements, coordination of all aspects of support, delivery of the goods and services, and completion of final accounting. USASAC is the focal point between the U.S. Army and friendly nations, ensuring that actions remain on course throughout the life cycle of the SA process.

(c) USASAC oversees AMC's participation in the Munitions Control Program. This program involves the development of Army positions on commercial export license applications for the export of military items, technical data, and services to foreign countries. Export license applications, commonly called munitions cases, pertain to the export of defense articles and services, or technical data, described in the U.S. Munitions List contained in the Department of State's International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR). The Department of State and the Office of the Deputy under Secretary of Defense (Trade Security Policy) (ODUSD (TSP)) refer certain export license applications to the Army for evaluation. The objectives of this evaluation are: (1) to control the export of classified or critical technology for which the United States has the technological lead, and which has the potential to significantly threaten U.S. national security if provided to certain foreign governments; (2) to provide the Army position on the effect of proposed exports on national security; and (3) to control export sales that could interfere with Army programs. Through coordination with appropriate AMC technical elements, USASAC provides a recommended position on whether particular export license applications should be approved.

**b. Coproduction.** Another facet of USASAC's Security Assistance responsibilities is coproduction, which encompasses any program which enables an eligible foreign governmental organization, or designated commercial producer, to acquire substantial "know-how" to manufacture or assemble, repair, maintain, and operate a specific system or individual military item. The "know-how" furnished by the U.S. is on a reimbursable basis and may include research, development, production data, and/or subassemblies, managerial skills, procurement assistance, or quality control procedures. Coproduction may be limited to the assembly of a few end items with a small input of in-country produced parts, or it may extend to a major manufacturing effort requiring the build-up of capital industries. As in the case of conventional military sales and associated supply support arrangements, the coproduction programs perpetuate utilization of items common to U.S. forces, thereby promoting rationalization, standardization, and interoperability.

## SECTION VII SUMMARY AND REFERENCES

### 12-14. Summary

**a.** This chapter addressed the nature and structure of the Army logistics system. It is a large, complex system that must be properly orchestrated if it is to perform to expectations. The DCSLOG is the conductor, with overall responsibility to assure that the individual pieces fit together and operate in harmony, one with the other. To do this, the DCSLOG establishes broad policies and procedures, and monitors and guides the development of standard logistics systems for use at all echelons.

**b.** The Army's strategic logistics system is operated by the AMC through its MSCs to fulfill the Army's need for strategic support. The Army's materiel requirements are divided into commodity groupings with each commodity command assigned one or more of these groupings. The commodity commands collectively determine the Army's requirement, procure or overhaul necessary assets, position them in the appropriate depots, and issue in response to the Army's needs.

**12-15. References**

- a. Joint Publication 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.
- b. Army Regulation 12-1, *Security Assistance—Policy, Objectives, and Responsibilities*.
- c. Army Regulation 60-10, *Army and Air Force Exchange Service General Policies*.
- d. Army Regulation 220-1, *Unit Status Reporting*.
- e. Army Regulation 700-4, *Logistics Assistance Program*.
- f. Army Regulation 700-127, *Integrated Logistic Support (ILS)*.
- g. Army Regulation 700-138, *Army Logistics Readiness and Sustainability*.
- h. Army Regulation 750-1, *Army Materiel Maintenance Policy and Retail Maintenance Operations*.
- i. Field Manual 63-11, *Logistics Support Element, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.
- j. Field Manual 100-10, *Combat Service Support*.
- k. Field Manual 700-80, *Logistics*.



# CHAPTER 13

## MILITARY HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

*“You will work with lots of different kinds of soldiers, men, women, different races, different ethnic backgrounds. I will tell they are all high quality people. They have been sought after and they have been recruited and they are very, very good – and they want to show what they can do. They want to be all they can be. We have got to give them that opportunity. To help you, you will deal not only with some of the finest officers, but you will also deal with some of the very best NCO’s that you will ever come in contact with anywhere, anytime. Remember the great potential you have under your leadership. Remember what General Creighton Abrams meant when he said that “the Army is not made up of people, the Army is people.” They are our greatest strength.”*

General Dennis J. Reimer, Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Remarks to the USMA Graduating Class, 1998

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### **13-1. Chapter content**

When the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (CSA) called soldiers our “greatest strength” he might have also said soldiers and their Army civilian counterparts are our greatest resource. Recognizing this fact, the term “human resource management” (HRM) has been accepted by the Army leadership and over time will be integrated into policy and doctrine currently used to describe the functions of “personnel management” and “personnel administration.” Military HRM is the major component of the Army’s overall HRM operations. The name change is but one example of the dynamic nature of the business and signals a change in the human resources (HR) strategic and operational levels marking the transition into the 21st century. Today’s challenges require informed decisions on force structure requirements, recruiting and retention programs, quality of life and well-being programs, and personnel readiness from both individual and unit perspectives. HR managers must possess professional and specialized skills to fulfill this mission and maintain the programs that comprise the functions and integrating systems of the HR life cycle model.

#### **13-2. The transition to military human resource management (HRM)**

Within the Army several terms are being added to policy, doctrine, and reference texts to describe the workings of overarching HR operations. Management of the system has evolved from a supporting role to that of a strategic enabler for the Army's primary mission. This has

led to broader definitions of personnel management and personnel administration. As the transition from personnel management to HR management takes hold, the HR terminology is being promulgated in policy and used in daily lexicon. The definitions of the related, but distinct terms are summarized as follows.

**a. HRM.** HRM is the broad management function that integrates military specific HR business competencies, processes, and activities. In the most general sense, HRM is a series of integrated decisions about the employment relationship that influences the effectiveness of employees and organizations.

**b. Military human resources management (MHRM).** This is a HRM core function that sustains personnel manning of the force and provides personnel services and support to commanders, soldiers, and families

**c. Military personnel functions.** MHRM branches into the three sub-functions of personnel manning, personnel services, and personnel support.

(1) Personnel manning is the business function orientated towards achieving and maintaining Army personnel readiness or preparedness.

(2) Personnel services is the function responsible for providing administrative support to organizations, individuals, family members, and retirees.

(3) Personnel support is the business function that sustains quality of life through morale and welfare readiness of individuals, family members, and retirees.

### 13-3. Military HR life cycle functions

Thus in a broad sense, MHRM describes the process of managing people by performing the essential functions of planning, organizing, directing, and supervising effective procedures necessary in administration and operation of personnel management. The life-cycle HR management functions are derived from the Army's life cycle model but contain significant variances. The components of the model are as follows.

**a. Personnel structure.** This is the HR dimension of the Army's force development function. It is here where personnel requirements and authorizations are determined.

**b. Acquisition.** This function ensures the Army is staffed with the correct grades and skills in numbers sufficient to satisfy force requirements. This function has three components.

(1) *Manpower management.* The process of linking accession, retention, and promotion targets to Army requirements as measured against military manning program in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES) process.

(2) *Accession and retention management.* The process that converts manpower targets to missions and oversees execution.

(3) *Training integration.* The establishment of a demand for training programs and a system to control input and tracking of trainees and students.

**c. Distribution.** The function of assigning available soldiers to units based on Army requirements and priorities.

**d. Development.** This function begins with accession training and continues throughout a soldier's entire period of service. It includes institutional training, self-development, leader development and supporting programs such as the evaluation, promotion, and command selection systems.

**e. Deployment.** This function enables the Army to transition from the “prepare mode” to the “conduct of military operations” mode. Deployment includes mobilization, deployment, redeployment, demobilization, reconfiguration, non-combatant evacuation, and repatriating.

**f. Compensation.** This function encompasses the management of all pay, allowances, benefits, and financial entitlements for soldiers and retirees. The dollars involved exceed one-third of the Army's total obligation authority.

**g. Sustainment.** This function involves the management of programs to maintain and advance the quality of life and well being for soldiers, civilians, retirees, and family members.

**h. Transition.** As individuals leave the Active Army (AA) for either the Reserve Components (RC) or civilian life this function provides assistance to soldiers, Army civilians, and family members.

#### **13-4. Military human resources (HR) integrating functions**

In addition to the life cycle functions, the HR system includes eight major integrating functions. They are strategic planning, leadership, information management, HR research and development, deployment planning, process management, health, and human relations.

#### **13-5. Key military human resource (HR) publications**

**a. Army Regulation 600-8, *Military Personnel Management*.** This regulation establishes the military personnel management system. It describes the functional structure of the system and sets forth the organizational structures that direct, integrate, and coordinate the execution of the system.

**b. Field Manual 12-6, *Personnel Doctrine*.** This field manual describes the Army's personnel doctrine and how it fits into the Army's current operational concept, as well as how it supports unit commanders and soldiers. It encompasses the management concepts of personnel information and readiness; replacement, casualty, and postal operations; personnel accounting and strength reporting, and other essential personnel services.

**c. AR 600-3, *The Army Personnel Proponent System*.**

(1) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), manages the personnel proponent system. DCSOPS, PERSCOM, designates personnel proponents, assigns their basic responsibilities, and defines the personnel life-cycle management functions. The objectives of the personnel proponent system are:

(a) Identify a single agent (proponent) responsible for all personnel matters for each career field (officer, warrant, enlisted, and civilian).

(b) Fix responsibility for all career field-related matters.

(c) Ensure that the civilian work force is integrated into the personnel proponent system.

(d) Ensure personnel management policies and programs established by Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) incorporate career field-related considerations.

(e) Foster awareness and achievement of the objectives of the Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS), the Total Warrant Officer System (TWOS), the Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS), and the Civilian Integration into the Personnel Proponent System (CIPPS).

(2) The functions of personnel proponenty are accomplished through 54 personnel proponent offices in conjunction with the PERSCOM. Together the proponents assist the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) in all personnel-related matters.

(3) The framework for proponenty consists of the eight life-cycle management functions: structure, acquisition, individual training and education, distribution, deployment, sustainment, professional development, and separation. The personnel proponent system serves as the “honest broker” ensuring fairness, completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of all aspects of the personnel system.

### **13-6. Military Occupational Classification and Structure system (MOCS)**

a. The MOCS system translates manpower requirements into specific skills and grade levels. System policy is set forth in AR 611-1, *Military Occupational Classification and Structure Development and Implementation*. DA PAM 611-21 Military Occupational Classification and Structure contains the procedures and detailed officer, warrant officer, and enlisted classification and structure guidance. Both publications are available as electronic publication on the U.S. Army Publishing Agency (USAPA) web site ([www.usapa.army.mil](http://www.usapa.army.mil)). All changes resulting from the MOCS cycles (1 Dec - 31 May and 1 Jun - 30 Nov) are included. Reclassification guidance is provided through publication of a DA 611 series Circular in April of each year.

b. Within PERSCOM, the DCSOPS manages and controls the system. Changes to occupational identifiers within the MOCS are generally driven by the requirements determination process (see Chapter 2). Personal proponents submit proposed changes to the system in accordance with responsibilities in AR 600-3 for recommending classification criteria. The Personnel Occupational Specialty Code Edit (POSC-Edit) System, an automated system maintained by PERSCOM DCSOPS, is the official military occupational edit file used to edit and update data on authorized automated personnel systems. The file is updated based on approved revisions to the MOCS. It contains a listing of all authorized commissioned officer, warrant officer, and enlisted identifiers; grades associated with those identifiers; and other personnel information.

### **13-7. Human resources (HR) leadership and structure**

a. The following individuals discharge the responsibilities indicated—

(1) Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA(M&RA))) has principal responsibility for the overall supervision of manpower,

personnel, and RC affairs. General Orders 12, Assignment of Functions, Responsibilities, and Duties within the Office, Secretary of the Army, outlines the specific responsibilities.

(2) The DCSPER, as the Army's personnel proponent, determines the broad objectives of the military personnel management system. The DCSPER establishes policy for and exercises ARSTAF proponent supervision of the system's functions and programs.

(3) The CG, PERSCOM is the Army's functional proponent for the military personnel management system and operates the Army's active component system within the objectives set by the DCSPER. The CG, PERSCOM also supports the military personnel system's automation requirements in the design, development, and maintenance of personnel databases and automation systems.

(4) The CG, United States Army Soldier Support Institute (USASSI) develops and coordinates operational concepts, materiel requirements, organization and force design requirements, and integrates training in military personnel management into courses of instruction at the Adjutant General School.

b. The Army's military personnel management system and its supporting force structure are organized for war. Modifications have only been made to accommodate the requirements of peacetime stationing of the force. Personnel units actually perform their wartime missions in peacetime. As the Army transitions to war, only the focus of personnel work changes to match the volume, the difficulty of execution, and the level of hostilities encountered. Despite the change in focus, however, the basic personnel mission remains unchanged.

c. Later in this chapter some of the military personnel management system's major subsystems and functional responsibilities will be presented in greater detail.

## **SECTION II**

### **THE STRUCTURE FUNCTION**

#### **13-8. Personnel management authorization document (PMAD)**

The PMAD is built from annual updates of the force structure reflected in the HQDA ODCSOPS Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS) files. In between command plans, decisions are often made which cause significant changes to authorizations. An updated authorizations document (UAD) which makes adjustments to PMAD authorizations is produced periodically to capture such changes. The personnel community uses PMAD and its most current UAD as the sole source of AA authorizations to unit identification code (UIC), military occupational specialty (MOS), grade, and additional skill identifier (ASI) level of detail for the current and budget years. The focus of the PMAD and UAD is on detail for near-term distribution. The PMAD is the basis for decisions regarding accessions, training, force alignment, promotions, and distribution of personnel. Throughout this text the term PMAD refers to the PMAD itself or its most current UAD.

#### **13-9. Notional force (NOF) system**

a. TAADS, SAMAS, and, therefore, PMAD provide affordable MOS and grade requirements only in the execution and budget years. For personnel planning through the program objective memorandum (POM) years, ODCSPER has developed a NOF that

converts broad force structure guidance into MOS and grade projections. The NOF modifies the PMAD to make force structure changes that have been envisioned by ODCSOPS but have not been decided or coordinated. The NOF then generates data at major Army command (MACOM), type code (TYPCO) (modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE), table of distribution and allowances (TDA), augmentation table of distribution and allowances (AUGTDA)), MOS, and grade level of detail. The NOF does not generate UIC level of detail. The output from the NOF is available to users of the HQDA decision support system. Reports are from a menu-driven Personnel Authorizations Module (PAM) and report writer.

**b.** In contrast to the PMAD, which is focused on the execution and budget years, the NOF is focused on the program years. Combined with the PMAD the NOF provides a clear picture of affordable authorizations for the AA.

**c.** When a NOF is not published, for example, because all force structure changes are not announced, the PMAD is the sole document for the execution, budget and POM years. NOFs are built to examine supportability of special projects, specifically the total Army analysis (TAA) program.

### SECTION III THE ACQUISITION FUNCTION

#### 13-10. Interrelated documents and systems at the heart of the human resources (HR) acquisition process

**a. End strength (ES).** The total number of personnel authorized by the Congress to be in the Army on the last day of the fiscal year (FY)(30 September). This is normally provided in the *Defense Authorization Act*.

**b. Force structure allowance (FSA).** The sum of authorized spaces contained in all MTOE units and TDA type organizations.

**c. Total strength.** The total of all personnel serving on active duty in the Army, including soldiers in units and organizations and those individuals account.

**d. Operating strength (OS).** Those soldiers available to fill spaces in MTOE units and TDA organizations, sometimes referred to as the 'distributable' inventory.

**e. Individuals account.** This account often referred to as the trainees, transients, holdees, and students (TTHS) account, is comprised of those personnel unavailable to fill spaces in units. The six sub-accounts are trainees, officer accession students, transients, holdees, students, and United States Military Academy (USMA) cadets.

**f. The Active Army Military Manpower Program (AAMMP).** The manpower program is produced as monthly updates and as decision programs for the POM, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) budget submission, and President's Budget. It is the report produced by the Enlisted Loss Inventory Model–Computation of Manpower Program by Linear Programming (ELIM-COMPLIP) System. Inputs are the latest available strength, gains, and losses. Vital data for the AAMMP comes from (or will come from) several manpower systems, most of which are discussed later in this chapter. These systems include the Officer Aggregate (OA) Model; MOS Level System (MOSLS); the Trainees, Transients,

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Holdees, and Students (TTHS) Forecasting System; and the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). It also carries six years of historical loss behavior to use as a projective (predictive) databases. Using a linear program, ELIM-COMPLIP operates within constraints such as end strengths, man years, and recruiting capability to develop an OS that matches the FSA as closely as possible. Its report (the AAMMP) records and/or projects strength of the Army; losses and gains; FSA, training inputs; the officer, cadet, and female programs; and the TTHS account.

**g. Total Army Personnel Databases (TAPDB).** An automated, standardized database containing military personnel data to fully support manning and sustaining functions during peacetime and under mobilization required by PERSCOM, Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). It consists of integrated but physically distributed databases (Active Officer (TAPDB-AO), Active Enlisted (TAPDB-AE), USAR, ARNG, and Core). TAPDB Core contains selected data elements from each component database needed to support mobilization.

**h. Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS).** This automated personnel information system is the Army's primary personnel strength management system. SIDPERS provides commanders with management information reports; performs automated field records maintenance; and provides automated personnel information to the TAPDB-AE and TAPDB-AO. In fulfilling these functions, SIDPERS acts as a decentralized extension of these databases.

(1) Currently, SIDPERS exists in different versions for the AA, Army National Guard (ARNG), and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). SIDPERS-3 is a major Army objective to achieve a total personnel information management system. SIDPERS-3 is a standard information management system (STAMIS) being developed under the proponentcy of the DCSPER. It consists of hardware, software, and communications to support information about soldiers and units. SIDPERS-3 will replace all previous active Army versions and will eliminate mainframe processing in the field. Total fielding to the AA and high priority RC units will be completed in 1999.

(2) SIDPERS-3 features an electronic record on soldiers. There will be multiple databases where a soldier's automated record is located (installation military personnel divisions (MPDs)), division/brigade/battalion G/S1s, personnel service battalions, personnel groups/corps, and theater PERSCOMs). All echelons of command from units to HQDA will have access to information about soldiers and unit status within hours of change. Personnel changes such as gains/ losses will pass through command channels and update each database in the process to ensure that commanders have current information to support their decision-making processes.

(3) In addition to TAPDB, SIDPERS-3 interfaces with other major Army automation systems: TAADS; Defense Joint Pay System; Reception Battalion Automation Support System; Theater Army Medical Management Information System; and HQDA installation support modules. Future interfaces are planned for the Army Company Information System and Combat Service Support Control System.

(4) During split operations, information on personnel in deployed units will flow from the theater operations back to the sustaining base. The forward personnel element will

be responsible for synchronizing databases in the theater and for transmitting to and receiving updates from the supporting home station.

**i. MOSLS.** This is part of the HQDA decision support system. It is a personnel planning optimization model that computes recommended MOS and grade mix, enlisted accessions, training to support accessions, and in-service reclassification/ reenlistment and promotions to maintain force alignment through the POM cycle.

**j. The OA Model.** The OA Model is the first installment of the HQDA's next generation personnel decision support system, the Active Army Strength Forecaster (A2SF). The OA Model uses goal-linear programming to develop optimal officer accessions, promotion rates, promotion pin on points, and forced losses. It maintains force alignment by minimizing the difference between the desired and projected operating strength in each competitive category and grade. The major inputs are authorizations data, inventory data, loss rates, and promotion targets. The model provides output data that can be imported into spreadsheets or word processing documents for analysis and reporting. The OA Model's outputs support program and budget development, policy analysis, and other management activities.

**k. A2SF.** This system, currently under development by ODCSPER, will replace ELIM-COMPLIP, MOSLS, TTHS Forecasting System, and OA Model, in forecasting both officer and enlisted strengths, gains, losses, and force manning. The redesign will occur in four phases. As new processing functionality is developed over this period, it will incrementally replace similar functions performed by the current systems. The enhanced and integrated system will incorporate new capabilities, but, at the same time, will achieve many efficiencies by reducing or eliminating much duplicative processing contained in the current separate systems. Using updated methodologies, the object-oriented design of the new system is expected to provide more accurate and timely forecasting, as well as significantly enhanced detail (rates for specific populations, gender, etc.) to support ODSCPER decisions. Like the current systems, it will draw upon TAPDB for personnel source data and will produce the AAMMP as one of its primary reports.

**l. ATRRS.** ATRRS is an automated information system that provides personnel input to training management information for HQDA, MACOMs, schools, and training centers during both peacetime and mobilization operations. The system contains information at the course level of detail on all courses taught by and for the Army. A major product of ATRRS is the Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT).

**m. ARPRINT process.** The ARPRINT is a mission document that provides officer and enlisted training requirements, objectives, and programs for the AA, Army RC, DA civilians, other U.S. Services, and foreign military. Training is planned and executed on a fiscal year basis and the goal is to train sufficient numbers in each MOS/branch and functional area so that the total trained personnel in each MOS/branch and functional area equals the projected authorization as of the end of the fiscal year.

### 13-11. Military manpower management

In Chapter 5 we addressed unit structure and force planning. It describes how the force is sized and configured and how that force is accounted for in the documentation system. This

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section, which should be viewed as an extension of Chapter 5, will focus on how the Army manages manpower and personnel once the force is configured and sized.

**a.** Manpower management at the macro level is the function of determining requirements, obtaining manpower, and allocating resources. It includes the determination of minimum-essential requirements, alternative means of providing resources, and policies to be followed in utilization of manpower. It involves the development and evaluation of organizational structure and review of utilization. It includes soldiers in the AA, ARNG, and USAR, Army civilian manpower assets, and certain contractor assets when a requirement is satisfied by contractual services rather than by Army military or civilian personnel.

**b.** Manpower managers deal with HR requirements from the perspective of the organizational structure in which they will be most efficiently and economically used. First, they focus on requirements demanding explicit grades and skills to perform specific tasks. Then, they focus on determining which requirements will be supported with authorizations (“spaces”). Finally, they combine force structure authorizations with requirements in the TTHS Account, also referred to as the Individuals Account, to determine the needs of the Army by grade and skill within constraints that exist. Simultaneously, HR managers focus on supporting requirements through the acquisition, training, and assignment of personnel (“faces”) to authorized positions.

**c.** The Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), OSD, and the Office of the Secretary of the Army (OSA) are not directly involved in the management of military personnel. They do, however, establish policies that restrict the availability of this resource or limit the management latitude available to those involved in personnel management. For example, policies which limit permanent changes of station (PCS), establish tour lengths, set officer grade limitations, or place a ceiling on the hire of local national personnel can severely limit the flexibility of personnel managers. OSD and, to a more limited extent, OMB, are involved in the force-structuring process. At the Federal level, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is totally immersed and is a driving force in civilian personnel management.

**d.** Managers above the DA level are concerned primarily with the management of spaces, while at descending levels below HQDA they are increasingly concerned with the management of people and their associated costs. Much of the work at the departmental level involves decision dealing with the aggregate of the force structure and inventory rather than the subsets of grade and skill. At lower levels the HR process turns its focus more towards the “faces” and the management of people. Whenever the force-structure changes there is a significant cause and effect relationship on the many systems that support manpower planning and HR management.


### **13-12. Manpower management at HQDA**

**a.** In managing military manpower at the macro level, the key measurement used by HR managers is the Operating Strength Deviation (OpSD). OpSD is a measurement of how much the OS (faces) is deviating from the FSA (spaces). The OS must not be confused with the FSA. However, the anticipated size of the OS gives a good idea as to how large a structure can realistically be manned. Throughout the year there can be many causes for these deviations, such as unpredicted changes in retention rates and seasonal surges in acquisitions. Personnel managers must constantly monitor the OpSD and adjust personnel policies to

ensure the Army has an optimum match of faces to spaces. At the same time, the Army must comply with the congressional mandate to be at the authorized end strength on the last day of each fiscal year.

b. Although the goal is to minimize the difference (delta) or deviation between the FSA and the OS, some deviation, the OpSD, almost always exists. A positive deviation (OS greater than FSA) means personnel are present in units in excess of structure requirements. A negative deviation (FSA exceeds OS) means the structure is larger than the quantity of personnel available to fill it. The OS is easily computed by subtracting TTHS personnel from the total strength. The OpSD is computed by subtracting the FSA from the OS.

c. The size of the OS is affected by fluctuations in the two elements employed in its calculation: the total strength (“ES” at year end) and total TTHS at any particular time. Changes in the OS over time and the magnitude of the FSA affect the OpSD. Either could potentially be adjusted to minimize the deviation. Often these quantities are compared only at the end of the fiscal year (end strength). However, it is often much more meaningful to view the situation on an average throughout the year by calculating man year values for each of these quantities. This provides more information than the frequently atypical and skewed end strength picture, which represents only one day in the entire year. Figure 13-1 illustrates the relationships between the components of the force just discussed.



**Figure 13-1. Strength Relationships**

d. The total number of personnel in TTHS will fluctuate considerably throughout the year due to a variety of reasons, such as the seasonal increase in transients during the summer and in trainees during the fall and winter (except December). Past experience and estimates of the effects of policy changes, make the number of personnel in this account fairly predictable. In the recent past it has averaged about 13 percent of the total strength.

e. By knowing the TTHS and total strength projections, manpower planners can easily determine the size of the OS and use that as a basis for developing an FSA for building authorized units. TTHS, FSA, and OSD projections are all contained in the AAMMP.


f. The number of personnel in the TTHS is often directly attributable to the personnel policies in effect. Professional development decisions, tour length decisions, and training policies are but a few examples of policies which affect the size of TTHS. Since TTHS has a direct effect on the faces available for FSA manning, these same policies have a direct impact on the number of units and organizations which the Army can field. Thus, manpower and personnel managers face a constant challenge to ensure a balance exists between the use of authorized spaces and the acquisition, training, and distribution of personnel assets to meet the needs of the Army. The stated personnel needs of the Army as expressed in its various organizational documents change on a daily basis as different units and organizations are activated, inactivated, or changed. However, the process of providing personnel to meet these changing needs is much slower.

### **13-13. Military force alignment**

Force alignment is “managing changing faces and spaces” simultaneously by grade level and career management field (CMF)/ MOS—reshaping a force today to also meet tomorrow’s needs. The always changing AAMMP, PMAD, and budget are intensively managed monthly for the PPBES six-year cycle (see Chapter 9), ensuring military personnel strength is skill-qualified and available for distribution. Force alignment strives to synchronize military personnel programs: promotions, recruiting, accessions, training, reenlistment, reclassification, and special and incentive discretionary pay. Simultaneously, every effort is made to provide professional career development consistent with Army force manning levels for qualified soldiers. Management forums are the functional area assessment (FAA), functional review (FR), personnel functional assessment (PFA), structure manning decision review (SMDR), monthly military personnel review (M2PR), training requirements arbitration panel/process (TRAP), and quarterly career management field (CMF) reviews. Representation in shaping the officer and enlisted forces involves the entire personnel community in varying degrees of programming and execution. MOSLS is a major planning tool for enlisted force alignment analysis. The goal—to achieve a PMAD grade-CMF/MOS match to OS for the current year, budget year, and program years.

### **13-14. Enlisted procurement**

a. Based on input from the PMAD (authorizations by skill and grade), the TAPDB–AE (skills and grades on hand), and the AAMMP (projected accessions in the aggregate), the MOSLS projects the numbers and training requirements for the various MOSs. This in turn is used to develop the annual program (ANNPRO) and the ARPRINT and feeds the personnel input to the ATRRS which is linked to the Recruiting and Training Reservation System (REQUEST) and the Reenlistment Reservation System (RETAIN) (Figure 13-2).



**Figure 13-2. Enlisted Procurement**

**b.** The mission of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is to obtain the quantity and quality of recruits to meet both AA and USAR requirements. Enlistment options provide the vehicle by which Army applicants are attracted. The option packages vary and contain such incentives for applicants as training guarantees, unit/station of choice assignments, guaranteed periods of stabilization in a specific unit or area, and payment of bonuses or education incentives for enlisting for a particular skill. Additionally, the length of the enlistment period varies for certain options and skills.

(1) *Quality constraints.* The recruiter is constrained by quality standards which must be met. A potential enlistee is classified as a result of an Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) which has 10 aptitude areas. ASVAB results place individuals into test score categories and determine both basic enlistment and specific MOS eligibility. Both law and Army policy constrain the number of certain test categories the recruiting force may enlist. The Army non-prior service (NPS) accession quality program seeks to maximize the number of high school diploma graduates and those in the upper test score categories, with a ceiling established for the lower test score categories.

(2) *MOS training targets.* Title 10, United States Code, requires that all new soldiers receive twelve weeks of initial entry training (IET) prior to becoming available for deployment. All new soldiers recruited by USAREC contract for a specific MOS which is supported by a resourced training seat. Using projections from MOSLS, PERSCOM projects annual IET requirements for new soldiers in the ANNPRO for each MOS. These requirements then feed into the ATRRS. In ATRRS, IET requirements combine with professional development and other training requirements and are presented at the SMDR for resourcing. Once approved by the Army leadership, all training requirements and approved training programs are identified in the ARPRINT.

(3) *Management of recruiting objectives.* REQUEST is an enlistment and training space management system designed to support the Army's recruiting and RC retention missions. The system is a worldwide, real-time, interactive system and is the controlling

element for recruiters and RC retention noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in translating aggregate mission objectives to the MOS needs of the Army. It uses a worldwide telecommunications network with remote data terminals accessing a common data bank containing the Army's training programs determined by the ARPRINT. ATRRS provides class schedules and quota allocations to REQUEST which becomes visible to Army recruiters to enlist soldiers to fill those quotas. The system provides reservation processing for enlistment options, accession controls, and management information reports from remote data terminals.

(a) REQUEST, designed to enhance the efficiency of Army recruiting, provides the Army with a means of allocating training resources to accessions. Enlistment options during periods of nonmobilization result from a review of the applicant's qualifications based on the ASVAB, physical testing, individual preference, and Army MOS requirements. An automated matching algorithm aligns the applicant's qualifications and aptitudes to the Army's needs. Qualification checks and other features of the system preclude erroneous enlistments into skills for which the applicant does not qualify.

(b) The REQUEST Unit Distribution Program (RUDIST) adds a unit vacancy and distribution guidance file to the REQUEST System. A portion of the training spaces for those MOSs available under an enlistment option that guarantees a first assignment is allocated to specific units and stations. Allocations of first assignment are based upon projected unit requirements and distribution policies.

(c) The REQUEST System is the controlling element for recruiters in translating aggregate recruiting objectives to the MOS needs of the Army.

(4) *Military Entrance Processing Station (MEPS).*

(a) Once the recruiter has determined the applicant's desire to enlist and his or her areas of interest, he or she can administer an enlistment screening test which gives an informal indication of how the applicant might fare on the ASVAB. If the applicant continues his or her interest, he or she goes to a MEPS for further processing.

(b) The MEPS is a jointly-staffed Service activity charged with aptitude testing, medical examination, moral evaluation, and administrative processing of applicants for the Armed Forces. DA is the DOD Executive Agent for the MEPS. The Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM) commands and controls the MEPS.

### **13-15. Warrant officer (WO) procurement**

a. Warrant officers are single-specialty, system-oriented officers appointed based on technical competence to perform in a single function for an entire career. USAREC procures warrant officer candidates for the AA. ODCSPER develops a recruiting goal by MOS for each fiscal year. USAREC uses this and an internally created lead refinement list, to direct recruiting efforts, especially for hard-skill MOSs with existing or projected critical shortages. Most applicants for non-aviation MOS come from the AA enlisted ranks, primarily sergeants and staff sergeants, while aviation applicants generally come from outside the Army. Applicants also come from other in-service sources such as enlisted personnel from other Services, commissioned officers, and members of the RC.

**b.** Applications of all eligible individuals are evaluated by a HQDA selection board. USAREC conducts the selection board which is composed of a field grade officer board president and warrant officer members from each branch with applicants to be considered. Those recommended by the board are slated to attend, in a candidate status, the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS). Upon completion of WOCS, candidates receive conditional appointment to the grade of WO1. Each WO1 attends the appropriate warrant officer basic course (WOBC) to complete certification training and upon graduation their appointment becomes permanent.

**c.** The recruitment, application processing, and selection of warrant officers for the USAR is performed in a similar manner as the AA. However, USAREC recruits warrant officer candidates against specific USAR unit vacancies. In addition, USAREC accepts and processes applications for Active Guard/Reserve (AGR), Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA), and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) vacancies. The USAR uses boarding and school-slating procedures similar to those used by the AA. The ARNG solicits applications through announcement of vacancies through an internal recruiting effort. The boarding and school-slating procedures are as determined by each individual State adjutant general. All RC WO applicants attend WOCS and WOBC. A RC version of WOCS and most WOBCs is available.

### **13-16. Commissioned officer procurement**

The PMAD is the basis for projecting officer requirements while the ARPRINT projects the FY officer training needs of the Army by career field. This projection is based on an analysis of the current inventory and the known losses as determined by PERSCOM and the special branches (Chaplain, Judge Advocate General (JAG), and Army Medical Department (AMEDD)). There are some very important constraints associated with the management of officer end strength. First, OSD, with the consent of Congress, mandates officer strength ceilings. Second, Title 10, USC restricts the numbers of officers serving in the grade of major or higher. Third, enough new officers must be brought into the Army each year to ensure an adequate number of trained individuals by grade, branch, functional area, and skill are available, assuming normal attrition, to meet Army requirements over the life cycle of the year group. There is a definite floor below which failure to procure enough officers in a given year will result in a future shortage by grade.

**a. Officer sources.** Sources of officer procurement for basic branch officers include the officer candidate school (OCS), Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and USMA. Approximately 1,000 officers are commissioned annually from USMA and about 400 from OCS. Additional FY requirements are determined by DCSPER and filled through ROTC programs and Special Branch Programs. To supplement the above precommissioning programs, a few officers may be accessed each year through direct appointments, recall of reserve officers, recall of retired officers, and the reinstatement of temporary disability retirees.

#### **b. OCS.**

**(1)** OCS at Fort Benning, Georgia, trains and commissions officers for the AA and RC. AA OCS graduates receive an USAR appointment and incur a three-year active service obligation. RC graduates receive an USAR appointment and revert to Reserve status after completing officer basic course (OBC).

(2) In-service candidates are enlisted soldiers serving on active duty. Semiannual selection boards at PERSCOM select qualified soldier applicants for OCS. Branches are assigned based on the needs of the Army and soldier qualifications and preferences.

**c. ROTC.** The majority of new officer accessions each year are commissioned through ROTC which trains and commissions officers for both the Active Army and RC. Cadets receive an USAR appointment. They may serve in the AA as an other than RA (OTRA) officer. RC duty is limited to USAR/ARNG officers. Branching is accomplished through a HQDA board based on the needs of the Army and the cadet's qualifications and individual preferences. All ROTC commissioned officers incur an eight-year service obligation and fulfill it in one of the following ways:

(1) AA. Scholarship cadets have a four-year active-duty obligation, while nonscholarship cadets have a three-year obligation. The remainder of the eight-year obligation is served in the RC.

(2) RC. Scholarship cadets must serve in a troop program unit (TPU) all eight years, while nonscholarship cadets must serve at least six years in a TPU. The remaining two years may be spent in the IRR.

**d. USMA.** The USMA trains and commissions officers for active duty. A formal branch selection procedure based on branch quotas established by HQDA is conducted at West Point during the cadets' senior year. Effective with the Class of 1996, the active duty service obligation for USMA graduates was increased from five to six years and they receive OTRA commissions.

**e. Special branches.** The special branches generally procure officers through their individual programs, and service obligations vary depending upon the program. Recently, Medical and Chaplain officer procurement has been assigned to the USAREC.

## **SECTION IV THE COMPENSATION FUNCTION**

### **13-17. Compensation overview**

**a.** Compensation is a recent addition to the military HR life cycle functions. It achieves this status based on the significant cost of the program (over one third of the Army's total obligation authority) and that only through controlling the cost drivers (number, grade, and skill of soldiers) can the Army manage the dollars appropriated by the Congress.

**b.** The Army's personnel assets are centrally managed and so are Army resources tied to these assets. We pay against the inventory (assigned strength), but authorizations and personnel policies are the cost drivers. For FY01 the Military Personnel, Army (MPA) Appropriation is approximately \$22 billion. Additional costs for RC pay and entitlements (National Guard Personnel, Army (NGPA) and Reserve Personnel, Army (RPA)) and personnel costs from Operations and Maintenance, Army/ARNG./USAR (OMA/OMNG/OMAR), Other Procurement, Army (OPA), research, development, test and evaluation (RDTE) appropriations raise this total to \$28 billion.

**c.** Personnel management policies, force structure decisions, and content of the force influence the MPA appropriation requirement. Among these cost drivers are following:

## How the Army Runs

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- Pay rates.
- Stationing plans and manpower.
- Clothing bag.
- Entitlements.
- Reenlistment rates.
- Marital status.
- Size of the Army outside of the continental United States (OCONUS) and overseas station allowances.
- Tour lengths.
- Basic allowance for housing (BAH)
- Force changes.
- Grade and skill content.
- Entitlements.

d. The MPA account pays the force, moves the force, subsists the force, and supports the force. Pay includes pay and allowances for officers, enlisted, and cadets. Movement is managed under the PCS account, which is sub-divided into accessions, separations, training, operational, rotational, and unit moves. Subsistence provides payment for the basic allowance for subsistence and subsistence in kind. Finally, support comes in other military personnel costs such as education, adoption, unemployment, death gratuities, and survivor benefit programs.

### **13-18. Manning Program Evaluation Group (PEG)**

At the departmental level, all personnel related programs are contained within the Manning PEG. The Manning PEG has responsibility to determine the valid requirements for those programs in Figure 13-3. All should come together in providing the right and right skills, at the right place and time.

<b>Pay</b>	<b>Readiness</b>
Military Pay, Army (MPA)	Examining (MEPCOM)
National Guard Pay, Army (NGPA)	PERSCOM/ARPERCEN
Reserve Pay, Army (RPA)	Reception Battalions
Military Technicians (ARNG)	Recruiting & Advertising
<b>Service Wide Support</b>	Reserve Recruiting/Retention/ Fam Spt
Acquisition Corps	Officer accession programs
Army Broadcasting	<b>Automation Support</b>
Chaplain Support Agency	SIDPERS-3
Correctional Facilities	ACPERS
Disposition of Remains	ATRRS
Regional CPO	KEYSTONE
Civilian Personnel Offices	PERMS
<b>Special Programs</b>	MEPCOM Automation
Army Career Alumni Program	ARPERCEN Automation
Bands (Special & Garrison)	Total Army Personnel DB
Boy/Girl Scouts	PERSCOM Automation Spt
Golden Knights	USAREC Automation Spt
Junior ROTC	<b>Leader Development</b>
Army Museum Program	Army Continuing Education System
Veterans Education Assistance Pgm	Tuition Assistance
	Army Civilian Training & Education
	Development System (ACTEDS)
	Civilian Intern Program
	ARNG Continuing Education

**Figure 13-3. Manning Programs**

## SECTION V

### THE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION

#### 13-19. Enlisted distribution and assignment

**a. Distribution challenge.** In theory, the distribution planning and assignment processes place the right soldier in the right skill at the right place at the right time. In fact, the system does a very creditable job for those MOSs and grades which are nearly balanced, those for which the overseas-to- sustaining base ratio is supportable, and for those in which there is a high density of personnel in substitutable skills. The problem arises in the MOS where these conditions do not exist, and a sharing of shortages is required for all commands. When certain commands, or organizations, are exempted from the “shortage-sharing” requirements based upon special guidance, it compounds shortages to be shared by the organizations lower in priority. However, the readiness cost of this compounded “shortage-sharing” comes to light when each organization must assess its mission capable status in the monthly unit status report (USR).


(1) The USR displays an objective and subjective evaluation by the commander as to what degree of readiness his or her unit has achieved for the past month. To provide documented backup to his or her evaluation, the commander begins the manipulation of personnel: cross-leveling of unit strengths by MOS, filling critical vacancies with qualified personnel despite MOS considerations, and, where appropriate, initiating reclassification actions. The resultant impacts are MOS mismatch, misuse, and turbulence for the people involved—all adverse impacts in the areas of promotion, specialty pay, and career development. Granted many of these moves are mission essential, but many are precipitated solely by the pressures of monthly status reporting.

(2) In an effort to fix this problem, AR 220-1, *Unit Status Reporting*, states: “In preparation for computation of personnel data, commanders are discouraged from moving soldiers from one unit to another; in effect breaking up cohesive groups solely to cross-level for unit status reporting purposes.” Enlisted personnel distribution is a very complex business, replete with pitfalls and shortcomings because of the rapidly changing variables which exist—force structure changes, recruiting success, training attrition rates, retention rates, military personnel authorizations, dollar constraints, and most of all, the unpredictability of the individual soldier, his or her health, and his or her family. All of these variables point up the critical factors which govern successful distribution—the accuracy and timeliness of the databases being used for analysis. Authorizations not approved and posted expeditiously to PMAD and individual change data not properly reported for posting on the TAPDB-AE make the already complicated distribution system less responsive.

### **b. Distribution planning and priorities.**

(1) The basic document which defines priorities for the distribution of enlisted personnel to all units/activities is the FY HQDA AA enlisted distribution policy. ODCSPER publishes and distributes this guidance to PERSCOM and to MACOMs for implementation to unit level. The policy encompasses initial assignments, PCS reassignments, reassignments within commands, and unit moves. Distribution is driven by requirements to man approved authorizations documented in PMAD/UAD, directed military overstrengths (DMO), space imbalanced MOS (SIMOS) overstrengths, and overstrength in specific high priority units. Distribution is affected by recruiting and retention goal achievement; unprogrammed losses; and fiscal constraints affecting promotions, PCS movements, and end strength. Priorities are derived from personnel priority group (PPG) codes in the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL). Also, special priorities are based on operational and training requirements for special skills, such as Ranger qualifications and linguists and may not necessarily correspond to the PPG. Current distribution guidance is shown in Figure 13-4.

(2) The enlisted force is currently being distributed against three fill priorities established by DA DCSPER. For fill priority 1 units and excepted positions, fill will be 100 percent of authorizations by grade and MOS. Fill priority 1 encompasses PPG 1 and PPG 2 units, recruiting, drill sergeant and instructor positions, prison guards, the operations groups at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center, Battle Command Training Program, the Old Guard, the Active Army to Reserve Component (AA to RC) Program, and several other special management commands. Fill priority 2 units, which are composed of the contingency force (1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), 82d Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault Division), selected fire support packages and the 2nd Infantry Division, are to be filled 100-98 percent of authorizations in the aggregate. Fill priority 3, the rest of the Army, is filled with the balance of the enlisted force.



**Figure 13-4. Unit Fill Priorities**

**c. Specific distribution guidance.** To meet national security and preeminent Army objectives, the contingency force, the 2nd Infantry Division, and specific early-deploying forces are manned at near steady-state levels. European troop strength (Western and Southern Europe) is governed by Congressional mandates, OSD ceilings, program budget guidance, military manpower strength projection report by region and country, SAMAS, and NATO Guideline Areas (NGA). PERSCOM manages the aggregate enlisted strength against PMAD authorizations. Fill will be “fair share” consistent with its fill priority. The management of Northeast Asia troop strength (NEATS), which includes Army forces in Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, is against a DOD ceiling. This targeted ceiling cannot be exceeded as of the end of the fiscal year. Certain units in U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and U.S. Army Special Operations Command (SOCOM) are maintained at a higher level of fill than other forces. Whenever a unit is deliberately overmanned, another unit has to pay the bill by going short of PMAD authorizations.


**d. Enlisted Distribution Target Model (EDTM).**

(1) The EDTM is an automated system which creates enlisted distribution targets by MOS, grade and UIC. The model fills each UIC reflected in the PMAD with projected available inventory from the MOSLS in accordance with the DCSPER distribution policy. This results in an optimum distribution of scarce resources consistent with distribution policy fill priorities. The EDTM constrains the assignment process to coincide with the projected operating strength targets. It represents the assets the Army realistically expects to be available for distribution.

(2) The EDTM is maintained by the Enlisted Distribution Division, Enlisted Personnel Management Directorate (EPMD), PERSCOM. The targets are produced monthly.

EDTM targets for grade bands E1-4, E5-8 and E9 for months Calendar month (CM) +6 through CM+12 are visible to field personnel managers via Personnel Network (PERNET) using the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System.

**e. Management systems.** PERSCOM uses several automated data-processing systems to distribute, manage, and develop active duty enlisted personnel. These systems described below were implemented between May 1990 and September 1991 (Figure 13-5).



**Figure 13-5. Enlisted Automation Management Systems**

(1) TAPDB is the heart of the overall system. It consists of three logical components containing personnel, requisition, and organizational data. The personnel component (PER DB) contains personnel information on every active duty soldier in the U.S. Army. PERSCOM and ODCSPER use this information to determine Army readiness, strength, promotion eligibles, reassignable personnel, and training requirements. The requisition component (REQ DB) contains information on requirements to move individuals and information on those who have been directed to move (assignments). The organization component (ORG DB) contains information on location and status of Army units; it does not contain any authorization or unit strength information.

(2) PERSCOM Enlisted Personnel Data Update System (PEPDUS) is one of the major systems used to update the data on the TAPDB. It consists of two components, a batch component and an on-line, interactive component that allows managers worldwide to query and update personnel data.

(a) The batch component receives transactions daily from other systems. The primary source is SIDPERS, but other sources such as the Centralized Promotion System and the Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System (EDAS) submit transactions. PEPDUS is also designed to support mobilization. During a mobilization scenario it is able to process over 500,000 transactions daily. As PEPDUS updates the TAPDB, it also creates transactions that are passed back to SIDPERS (receipt notices, update transactions, DA error notices,

etc.), transactions to update the TAPDB Mobilization Databases (TAPDB–MOB), and feedback to other systems. It also creates a file every week which is used by the ODCSPER for strength accountability and projections.

(b) The on-line interactive component allows EPMD managers to update data items on the PER DB. Some examples are continental United States (CONUS) and OCONUS assignment preferences, assignment eligibility, and date eligible for return from overseas (DEROS). As EPMD managers update, PEPDUS creates and sends update transactions to the SIDPERS Personnel File.

(3) EDAS is an on-line system which allows EPMD managers to review and update requisition and assignment data. It also provides reports for those managers for strength management of the force. It has several batch programs that exchange information with external systems. Currently, EDAS processes millions of on-line queries/updates each month, and over 95 percent are processed in less than two seconds each. EDAS allows EPMD distribution and assignment managers to work with one collection of information on the same computer. Under previous systems, updates to information occurred only during the weekend; updates are now instantaneous. Consequently, decisions made by one manager are immediately available to all other managers. Moreover, EDAS provides field users the capability to view and in some cases update the same information that distribution and assignment managers use to make decisions. Finally, EDAS reduces the time to validate a requirement, select a soldier to fill the requirement, and transmit the assignment instructions to the field. A more detailed explanation on how EDAS is used in distributing and assigning soldiers is presented in a subsequent section.

(4) The PERSCOM Edit System (PEDS) was the result of one of the major undertakings associated with the development of TAPDB, EDAS, and PEPDUS which was the standardization of all data fields used in the system.

(a) In order to properly exchange data with nonstandardized systems, such as SIDPERS, numerous conversion rules were developed and stored in a central repository called PEDS. PEDS is an active dictionary which provides information about data fields, codes, and conversion data. PEPDUS and EDAS access PEDS to obtain the rules for editing and converting data.

(b) These systems, and others not described here, establish a new standard for on-line, interactive, databases-oriented, automated data processing within the personnel community. They not only support peacetime requirements, but also support mobilization scenarios. The TAPDB–AE provides a central source for all data. PEPDUS reduces the time to process SIDPERS transactions from days to less than 24 hours and provides for on-line, immediate update of select data fields. With EDAS, personnel managers can expeditiously create a requisition, determine who is best qualified to fill the requisition, and make the assignment on a single system.

(5) Assignment of newly trained personnel.

(a) Permanent unit assignments are based on input to PERSCOM from basic and advanced individual training centers via the Student/Trainee Management System–Enlisted (STRAMS–E), a module within the ATRRS. Information is passed by ATRRS to EDAS which processes newly trained personnel for assignment.

(b) If an individual has an enlistment agreement for a unit in an area, he or she is assigned according to the enlistment contract upon satisfactory completion of training. Soldiers who have no unit/area options are assigned against requirements in accordance with a distribution plan prepared by PERSCOM. Assignment instructions are generated by EDAS and sent directly to losing commands via the Defense Message System. The transaction is processed through EDAS and is posted to the TAPDB. EDAS advises the gaining command of the assignment by the Defense Message System.

**f. Enlisted distribution management.** PERSCOM Enlisted Distribution Division manages the strengths of major overseas commands, FORSCOM and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) installations in CONUS, and special management and functional commands worldwide. Strength managers at PERSCOM project the assigned strength of an activity ranging from the current month's strength out to 12 months, and determine how many soldiers are needed each month to ensure the commands meet targets established by the FY enlisted distribution policy. These aggregate totals (arranged by individual rank and rank bands, i.e., private-specialist, sergeant-staff sergeant, sergeant first class-master sergeant, and sergeant major) are the basis for transition into individual MOS requirements. These "Top of the System" strength managers then determine how many requisitions for replacements should be submitted by field commanders.

**g. Overseas requisitions.** Requirements for Korea, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Army South (USARSO) and U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) are analyzed 10 months into the future (8 months for USARPAC). Using the EDTM targets, distribution managers allocate requisitions to each command at the 4-character MOS level, allowing commands 2 weeks to submit requisitions at the 9-character MOS level, including any other special requirements.

**h. CONUS requisitions.**

(1) For CONUS installations, requisitioning is partially constrained through a process known as requisition allocation plan—CONUS (RAP—C). Since fill of vacancies in CONUS commands is based on eligible overseas returnees, RAP—C keys on DEROS data in the TAPDB—AE and calculates the number of soldiers in an MOS and grade who are expected to return to CONUS in a requisition month (two months after DEROS month). CONUS requisitions are normally validated 12 months out. Distributors at PERSCOM, using the EDTM, allocate these soldiers. If the EDTM requires more requisitions than soldiers returning from overseas, additional requisitions are loaded, which will require CONUS-to-CONUS moves.

(2) The next effort for HQDA distribution managers is validation, whether for CONUS or OCONUS. If an apparent over or under requisitioning exists, the manager attempts to resolve the discrepancy with the command/installation prior to making a decision to validate, or not validate, requisitions. Discrepancies in the two projections may be caused by a proponent-approved authorization change at the unit level not yet recorded in PERSACS, or by more current authorizations data available to PERSCOM through the use of the PMAD, or by more current gain and loss data. The problem is resolved prior to the submission of the validated requisitions for assignment processing in the EDAS.

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(3) Distribution managers continually monitor command and installation strength projections and adjust accordingly. Deletions, authorization changes, and other variables may create need for top loading or canceling requisitions.

i. **EDAS.** EDAS (generally described in an earlier section) consists of several major subsystems: management information, requisition, policy, nomination, assignment, and personnel.

(1) EPMD distribution managers use the management information subsystem to determine an organization's authorized, assigned, and projected strength. Managers can obtain this information by MOS, skill, CMF, grade, special qualification identifier (SQI), ASI, language, location (installation, state, country), command, requisition activity code, troop program sequence number (TPSN), and/or UIC. As described in the preceding paragraphs, this information is used to determine the number of valid requisitions needed to maintain that organization at an acceptable strength level.

(2) After the distribution managers determine the number of valid requisitions, the assignment managers must fill them. The policy and nomination subsystems assist assignment managers by recommending which soldier should be assigned to each requisition and also provide alternate recommendations.

(3) The policy subsystem allows EPMD managers to enter assignment policies into EDAS. For example, soldiers with Homebase/Advanced Assignment Program (HAAP) agreements can only be recommended for assignments which fulfill HAAP agreements.

(4) The nomination subsystem determines the eligibility of soldiers for particular requisitions and recommends (nominates) the best qualified soldier for each specific requisition. The assignment manager reviews the nomination using the nomination review module in the assignment subsystem. If the manager concurs with the nomination, it is converted into an assignment. Upon acceptance of the nomination, assignment instructions are stored in the requisition databases and electronically transmitted to the field. If the manager nonconcurs with the nomination, he or she can obtain alternate recommendations from the system.

(5) In addition to making assignments, the assignment subsystem provides the capability to delete or defer soldiers. If field users have the authority to approve a deletion or deferment, they can complete the action interactively through the assignment subsystem as an alternative to submitting it through SIDPERS. If field users do not have the authority to approve the action, they can request a deletion or deferment electronically through EDAS. The request is sent to a deletion/deferment manager who can act on the request or forward the request to the responsible assignment manager for comments. The assignment manager can electronically annotate his or her concurrence or nonconcurrence on the request and attach comments back to the deletion/deferment manager who then makes the final determination. Throughout this entire process, the field user can interactively monitor the current status of the request.

(6) One important aspect of EDAS is that the system tightly controls access and what the user can do in the system. Some modules allow users to query data, while others allow updates. EDAS controls access by individual user and provides system managers with audit trails which can be used to determine who accessed or changed data in the system.

Additionally, EDAS controls which records a user can query and/or update. For example, system managers can limit personnel clerks at Fort Hood to viewing information only on soldiers assigned to Fort Hood. Likewise, the system managers can limit the same personnel clerks to creating requisitions only for units stationed at Fort Hood.

(7) The EDAS promotion points update module allows field personnel managers to post promotion point data for soldiers in grades E4 and E5 directly to the TAPDB. This function allows personnel managers to review and update the information that is resident on the TAPDB. This information is then used by PERSCOM to determine the numbers of promotions for each month by MOS. By using the promotion subsystem, field managers can see those soldiers, by name, who were considered eligible for promotion when the calculations were performed. If the data on the soldiers is incomplete or in error, field managers use the EDAS promotion point update and promotion update functions to update the data, promote the soldier, or alert PERSCOM managers as to why soldiers will not be promoted. EDAS returns the promotion on the soldier to SIDPERS which then updates local databases and the Joint Defense Military Pay System.

(8) EDAS fully supports mobilization scenarios. First of all, the policy subsystem can store and maintain any number of scenarios (peace, limited mobilization, full mobilization, etc.) and the user can invoke any one of the scenarios in seconds. Second, the system can evaluate “what if” questions.

**j. RETAIN.** RETAIN is a real-time automated system that identifies and reserves training spaces or assignment vacancies for potential reenlistees and determines MOS availability for soldiers undergoing reclassification based upon the individual’s qualifications and the needs of the Army. It is also used to process enlisted soldiers for reenlistment or reclassification assignments. Soldier’s preferences are considered only within the Army’s priorities and needs.

(1) If the soldier is requesting a MOS training space, RETAIN accesses the REQUEST system to determine if there are any AA in-service quotas available for the school the soldier desires. If the seat is available, it allows the retention NCO or reclassification authority to make a reservation and puts the record on the RETAIN wait list for an ultimate assignment in the new MOS upon completion of training. One hundred twenty days prior to the start date of the school, the wait list manager is required to give the soldier an ultimate assignment. RETAIN is also used to process potential reenlistees for assignments. RETAIN will determine if there are any vacancies available for the installation/overseas area the soldier desires. If a vacancy exists, it will be offered to the soldier. If a vacancy does not exist, the soldier may elect to be put on the RETAIN wait list.

(2) The RETAIN wait list is for those soldiers desiring an installation/overseas area which was not available and no other area/location was available at the time of entry into RETAIN. Each week, after an update from EDAS, the RETAIN system attempts to match soldiers on the wait list to the place they desire to go. After this process, the wait list is printed with the remaining soldiers. The printed wait list is given to the wait list manager in the Reenlistment Management Branch for processing.

(3) RETAIN is a valuable tool that commanders, career counselors, and personnel service centers use in counseling soldiers for reenlistment and reclassification. Since

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RETAIN is a real-time automated system it can provide valuable, accurate information to the potential reenlistee or soldier involved in reclassification.


**k. Reclassification.** RETAIN also addresses reclassification. Reclassification is a process which provides for migration from one MOS to another. It supports policies and goals to reduce MOS overstrength and alleviate shortages. In addition to individual voluntary requests, mandatory reclassifications are necessary when a soldier loses qualification, for example, loss of security clearance, personnel reliability program (PRP) disqualification, or disqualifying medical condition. (Referral of soldiers to the disability system may be directed when it is determined there are no requirements for those MOSs in which the soldier may be qualified.) Special reclassification programs, such as “Fast Track,” realigns MOS overages through reenlistment and reclassification. Soldiers possessing the overstrength MOS may be allowed to reclassify or reenlist for retraining without regard to expiration of term of service (ETS).

### **13-20. Officer distribution and assignment**

The Army is rarely in a position where its officer assets by career field and grade equal the sum total found in authorization documents. This is because these documents are continually amended to reflect changes in mission requirements. Moreover, documentation is generally 5-12 months behind the latest budget and force structure decisions.

**a. Distribution planning.** The officer distribution planners and managers at PERSCOM are influenced by three principal factors in doing their job: officer assets, authorizations, and priorities. All three are in a constant state of change. Therefore, there is a need for a master distribution plan that will ensure that all commands, agencies, and activities receive, according to priority, an appropriate share of the available officer assets/inventory. The foundation of this master plan is a management tool known as the officer distribution plan (ODP). The ODP brings assets/inventory, authorizations, and priorities into balance and is one of the Army’s most important documents for officer distribution planning.

**b. The ODP process.** The ODP is produced annually based on a projected inventory of officers to the end of the budget year compared to projected PMAD authorizations. If the available officer assets matched the requirements identified through the PMAD, by branch, functional area, and grade, officers would simply be assigned against authorizations. However, this is never the case. As with most resources, particularly in peacetime, there is always a greater demand than there is a supply, and officer shortages result. Some system of priorities is needed to help manage these shortages. That system is the PPG portion of the DAMPL. After the officer inventory has been compared with the authorizations in the PMAD, a computer system called the Personnel Priority Model (PPM) is used to resolve the differences identified. By use of the PPM, officer assets are apportioned out to the appropriate commands based on the DAMPL and any special distribution guidance as determined by HQDA (Figure 13-6).



**Figure 13-6. Officer Distribution**

**c. Officer requisition system.** The officer requisition system is designed to fill the officer requirements of all major commands and activities.

(1) *Total Officer Personnel Management Information System (TOPMIS).* This is a fully integrated management information system which supports the officer management process within PERSCOM and at worldwide requisitioning activities. TOPMIS is composed of seven operational modules:

(a) The control module provides security of access and updating, creates individual user profiles, and provides on-line electronic mail service to all TOPMIS users.

(b) The strength module displays operating and projected strength down to the career management field (CMF) level for MACOMs and requisitioning activities in various report formats.

(c) The goaling and monitoring module displays assignment goals for the fiscal year by grade and CMF. It is also used to plan the ODP and monitor its progress.

(d) The requisition module allows distribution managers and the requisition activity managers to generate, edit, validate (based on the ODP), and update requisitions. This module generates and maintains requisitions based on projected strength. The final product is a list of requisitions for career managers to fill.

(e) The asset/officer record brief (ORB) module provides an on-line version of the ORB and the capability for on-line updating of ORB fields by career managers. This module also provides access to by-name reports of officers assigned and/or on orders.

(f) The assignment module provides access to personnel, requisition, and organization data; provides on-line extract/update capability from the TAPDB-AO; and processes assignments generated by PERSCOM managers in the Officer Personnel

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Management Directorate (OPMD). Assignment instructions are transmitted electronically on a daily basis to the gaining and losing requisition activity.

(g) The user assistance module allows users to review data name definitions and tables of valid codes used in officer management.

(h) TOPMIS interacts with the TAPDB–AO and is used by assignment and distribution managers of the basic branches, medical department branches, and the Chief of Chaplains and JAG offices. Worldwide requisition/officer management activities can access TOPMIS through the Defense Data Network or a variety of MACOM/HQDA host-to-host systems.

(2) *Requisition cycles.* Officer requisitions are generated on an alternating bimonthly basis for either overseas or CONUS. Overseas requisitions are validated so that officers will arrive nine or ten months after validation; CONUS officers arrive five to six months after validation. As a normal rule, overseas returnees and school requirements drive the assignment system because these officers must move on time. This is largely due to tour length policies and graduation dates. Others are assigned to replace these personnel and the cycle continues.

(3) *Assignment challenge.* Assignment officers within the divisions and branches of OPMD must take into consideration a wide variety of competing factors in the process of identifying the right officers to fill valid requisitions. Some, but by no means all, of these factors are listed below. They are in no particular order, because each assignment action is unique.

- Army requirements.
- Gaining and losing organizations' requirements.
- Tour equity (CONUS vs OCONUS).
- Time-on-station.
- Professional development.
- Officer preference.
- Joint domicile.
- Compassionate situations.
- Combat training center (CTC) experience.
- Joint duty/Title IV provisions.

## **SECTION VI**

### **THE DEVELOPMENT FUNCTION—ENLISTED**

#### **13-21. Enlisted development**

There must be a way of developing leadership, evaluating and rewarding those who do well, and eliminating those who do not measure up. This section will address some of the programs designed to accomplish these tasks and to create an environment which will motivate men and women to become career soldiers

### **13-22. Enlisted Personnel Management System (EPMS)**

- a.** The EPMS provides a logical career path from private to sergeant major, career-long training, and performance-oriented evaluation. Additionally, it is designed to eliminate promotion bottlenecks, provide all soldiers of the same grade with equal promotion opportunities, make assignments more flexible, and provide greater challenge by decreasing the number of MOSs.
- b.** A key feature of EPMS is to associate five standardized skill levels for the enlisted ranks, with privates and specialists having skill level 1 and master sergeants and sergeants major having skill level 5.
- c.** Another major feature of EPMS is the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) which is discussed in detail in Chapter 15 of this text. EPMS and NCOES are part of the same continuum. EPMS skill levels were selected so that the vital middle-grade NCOs would be distinct and visible for management purposes.

### **13-23. Enlisted Evaluation System (EES)**

- a.** At the heart of EPMS is the EES. It is used to assist in the identification of soldiers for assignment, promotion, reenlistment, reclassification, special training, elimination, and other personnel management actions.
- b.** The EES consists of academic evaluation reports and a NCO evaluation report (NCOER) for sergeant and above. Both reports serve as the official evaluation of duty performance and academic success and provide a record of each individual NCO's potential.

### **13-24. The NCO Leader Self-Development Career Model**

- a.** The NCO Leader Self-Development Career Model provides enlisted soldiers a guide in the selection of self-development activities recommended by CMF proponents. Career models have been developed by subject matter experts for each CMF and will be published in DA Pamphlet 600-25.
- b.** The career models correspond to the Army's leader development process relating self-development activities to institutional training and operational assignments. The models can help soldiers establish planned, progressive, and sequential self-development programs which enhance and sustain the nine military competencies as well as required skills, knowledge, and aptitudes (SKAs). The career models also contain CMF-proponent recommended goals, e.g., licensure, certification, or academic degree, and allow soldiers to combine experience and training with self-development activities for career progression as well as goal achievement.
- c.** Activities and goals are recommendations, not requirements, and do not preclude mission assignments and training. Completion does not guarantee advancement. The career models are tools for use by supervisors and professional education counselors to help guide soldiers in their professional and personal growth. They also may be used to help soldiers prepare for NCOES and NCO functional resident courses.
- d.** The elements in the leader development process—education, training, experience, assessment, feedback, and reinforcement—create a dynamic synergy to prepare soldiers for increasing responsibilities. Self-development is the only aspect of that process over which the

soldier has direct control. The career model can stimulate involvement in this vital imperative, which should be the goal of every career soldier. To foster this desire requires close cooperation between commanders, supervisors, education counselors, and the soldier.

### **13-25. Enlisted promotions**

**a.** The objectives of the enlisted promotion system are to ensure advancement of the best qualified soldiers, to provide career incentive, to promote soldiers based on potential rather than as a reward for past service, and to identify and preclude promotion of soldiers who are nonproductive and ineffective. Three programs make up the promotion system. They include: the decentralized program which controls advancements to private through specialist; the semicentralized program which controls promotions to SGT through SSG; and the centralized program which controls promotions to SFC through SGM/CSM.

**b.** Under the decentralized program, authority to appoint and promote soldiers is delegated to local commanders, but there must be compliance with standard policies and procedures established by HQDA. Promotion boards are not required.

**c.** Authority to promote soldiers under the semicentralized program is delegated to field commanders who are serving in an authorized lieutenant colonel or above command position in accordance with guidance from HQDA. In this case, eligible soldiers compete Army-wide on the basis of relative standings by points attained on a standardized point system. Soldiers recommended for promotion are required to appear in person for evaluation by a selection board. Names of soldiers selected for promotion by the board are placed on a locally maintained recommended list and grouped by MOS in an order of merit based on the total points attained under the point system. HQDA controls the number of soldiers who can be promoted in each MOS by establishing cut-off scores according to the needs of the Army. Soldiers whose scores equal or exceed the announced cut-off scores are promoted without regard to assignment. Those not immediately promoted remain on the recommended list until promoted, unless they are removed for administrative reasons or for cause. Soldiers on a recommended list may request reevaluation to improve their standing.

**d.** Promotions to sergeant first class through sergeant major are centralized and a board convened by HQDA makes selections. Selections are based on the “whole person concept.” No one single factor should be considered disqualifying, but rather an individual’s entire record is given careful consideration. Selections are made on a best-qualified basis in conjunction with Army needs.

### **13-26. Command sergeants major program**

The objective of this program is to ensure the selection and assignment of the best-qualified sergeants major, first sergeants, and master sergeants for command sergeant major positions. These positions are designated as the principal enlisted assistant to commanders of an organization with enlisted troop strength equivalent to a battalion or higher level and commanded by a lieutenant colonel or above. This is the final step on the enlisted career progression ladder, and it should be the goal of every career soldier. Boards convened by HQDA make selections. A list of those selected is published and maintained within PERSCOM for use in appointing personnel to fill vacancies. Command sergeants major are assigned only to positions, which have been designated by the DCSPER.

### **13-27. Total Army Retention Program**

This program consists of the Active Army Retention and RC Transition Programs and is responsible for assisting in manning the force with quality soldiers by achieving and maintaining a balanced career content in the Regular Army enlisted force. The Retention Program also focuses on improving the quality through the retention of trained, qualified, and experienced enlisted soldiers in the correct MOS and grade. Those not retained in the Active Force, being otherwise qualified, are recruited to serve in USAR or ARNG units. AA Retention and RC Transition Program objectives are assigned to the major commands by ODCSPER while PERSCOM provides overall program and personnel management of the programs. Personnel and fiscal support of the RC Transition Program is provided by the ARNG and USAR.

### **13-28. Qualitative Management Program (QMP)**

**a.** This program was developed as a means of improving the enlisted career force and consists of two subprograms—qualitative retention and qualitative screening.

**b.** The qualitative retention subprogram specifies that a soldier cannot reenlist beyond the time-in-service limits established for the soldier's rank. These limits are called retention control points (RCPs).

**c.** The qualitative screening subprogram is the DA bar to reenlistment aspect of the QMP. Regularly scheduled, centralized promotion/selection boards for sergeant first class, master sergeant, sergeant major/command sergeant major select individuals for promotion or retention in grade, as well as those soldiers to be barred. These boards consider the soldier's entire record using the "whole person concept," not just his or her current job or term of service. Soldiers separated with a DA bar receive a reenlistment eligibility code of "4" (no further military service authorized, any branch of Service).

**d.** Bars to reenlistment were designed as a personnel management tool to assist commanders in denying further service to soldiers whose separation under administrative procedures is not warranted, but where service beyond current ETS is not in the best interest of the Army. There are two types of bars to reenlistment: field imposed and DA imposed (QMP). Chapters 8 and 10, AR 601-280, contain the details of the field and DA bars. (Note: Locally imposed bars and DA-imposed bars to reenlistment are two distinct and separate actions. Imposition of one does not preclude imposition of the other).

**e.** Reenlistment is deemed a privilege and not a right. It is the responsibility of commanders, at all levels to ensure that only those soldiers of high moral character, personal competence, and demonstrated performance are allowed to reenlist in the Army.

Reenlistment should be denied soldiers who by their performance, conduct, and potential indicate further service will be non-progressive and unproductive.

**f.** Under QMP, commanders must initiate separation actions not later than 60 days following the date the soldier is notified of the bar unless the soldier elects to retire, appeal, or requests voluntary discharge. If an appeal is denied, commanders will initiate separation action not later than 60 days from the date of notification of denial. Appeals must be submitted within 90 days of completion of the option statement. Soldiers who have less than 90 days to ETS and who submit appeals may be extended until results of the appeal have been received from CG, PERSCOM.

g. Soldiers who have a DA-imposed bar to reenlistment must separate within 90 days of decision not to appeal or denial of appeal. Soldiers who have 18 but less than 20 years of service on that date may remain on active duty to attain retirement eligibility.

## **SECTION VII**

### **THE DEVELOPMENT FUNCTION—WARRANT OFFICER**

#### **13-29. Warrant officer development**

a. The implementation of TWOS in 1986, the *Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA) of 1991*, the Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP) in 1992, and the Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) in 1993 have had a major impact on the management and professional development of warrant officers. Under TWOS the Army recruits warrant officers earlier in their careers, trains them better, and retains them longer.

b. Every warrant officer position in the AA has been classified by rank based on the skills, knowledge, abilities, and experience needed in that position. Formerly there was no rank differentiation in warrant officer positions. When the review of warrant officer positions in the RCs is completed, all position requirements will be ranked into one of four levels. The levels are “Entry”: which includes WO1 and CW2; “Advanced” for CW3, “Senior” for CW4; and “Master” for CW5.

c. Warrant officer recruiting, education, and training will change to support this new requirements-based system of warrant officer management. Each year about 1,000 soldiers are selected for appointment as warrant officers. Some come directly from civilian life into warrant officer candidate training, but most come from the NCO ranks and already have several years of military service.

d. In the past, this enlisted service was included in personnel management decisions affecting warrant officer careers. About half of all warrants retired after 23 years of combined (enlisted and warrant officer) active Federal service.

e. Under WOMA, decisions on promotions, training, and assignments are based on years of warrant officer service (WOS). A careerist will have an opportunity to serve 30 years of warrant officer service if selected for CW5. All others will have an opportunity to serve up to 24 years of warrant officer service unless twice nonselected for promotion to the next higher grade.

#### **13-30. Warrant Officer Education System (WOES)**

WOES is based on a select-train-utilize concept, where warrant officers receive the training required to serve in the next higher grade only after selection for promotion. WOES consists of the following courses: WOCS; WOBC (military education level (MEL) 7); Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) (MEL 6); Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC) (MEL 4); and the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC) (MEL 1).

a. The WOAC is a combination of common core and MOS proponent training that prepares warrant officers to serve in CW3 level positions. WOAC is provided in two phases: a non-resident common core phase and a resident phase, which includes a common core

module and a MOS specific module. Career status is required for enrollment in the non-resident phase and selection for CW3 is a prerequisite for attendance at the resident phase.

**b.** The WOSC is a resident MOS/branch immaterial course to prepare warrant officers to serve in CW4 positions. Selection for CW4 is a prerequisite for attendance.

**c.** The WOSSC is a resident MOS/branch immaterial course to prepare warrant officers to serve in CW5 positions up to the HQDA staff level. Selection for CW5 is a prerequisite for attendance.

**d.** Constructive or equivalent credit is permitted for courses that generate a change to the warrant officer's MEL code. Credit may be granted for active duty experience, service school faculty service, or for attendance at equivalent schools. Warrant officers complete civilian schooling and MOS functional training as required.

**e.** The proponent for WOES is the Warrant Officer Career Center (WOCC) at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The WOCC serves as the TRADOC executive agent for the WOES. The WOCC evaluates Common Core instruction within the proponent specific program of instruction for WOBC and WOAC.

### **13-31. Warrant officer promotions**

The Active Army includes both Regular Army (RA) and OTRA warrant officers. Warrant officers are promoted under a single permanent promotion system similar to the commissioned officer system under *Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)*.

**a.** Promotions to CW3, CW4 and CW5 for warrant officers on the active duty list (ADL) are administered at HQDA. Promotion authority to CW2 is delegated to commanders in the rank of lieutenant colonel and above. Warrant officers may be promoted to CW2 after completion of 24 months in the grade of WO1 under current policy. WOMA allows CW2 promotion consideration after 18 months in grade. Promotions to CW3, CW4 and CW5 occur at approximately six year intervals that may be adjusted to meet grade and end strength requirements. WOMA allows chief warrant officers to be considered for promotion after the completion of three years in their current grade.

**b.** The promotion opportunities for warrant officers, based on the first time considered (primary zone) population, and the ideal TWOS pin on point for warrant officer promotions are depicted at Figure 13-7. These may be adjusted to meet end strength requirements.

**c.** Warrant officers twice nonselected for promotion to the next higher grade will be discharged or retired unless selectively continued on active duty to meet a valid Army requirement.

TO GRADE	PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY	YEARS AWOS
W2	FULLY QUALIFIED	2
W3	80%	8 +/- 0
W4	76%	14 +/- 1
*W5	44%	20 +/- 1

**\*BY LAW THE NUMBER OF CW5s IS LIMITED TO 5% OF THE WARRANT OFFICER FORCE.**

**Figure 13-7. TWOS Promotion Goals**

### 13-32. Warrant officer retention programs

Currently, voluntary indefinite (VI) status is offered in conjunction with promotion to CW2 to those warrant officers whose end of current service agreement (ECUR) is subsequent to 1 Oct 93. The Warrant Officer VI Board to consider warrant officers for VI in their fourth year of warrant officer service may be used as a force shaping tool.

- a. RA integration is concurrent with promotion to CW3. Officers who decline RA integration will not be promoted and shall be separated 90 days after the declination date or upon completion of any active duty service obligation (ADSO), whichever is later.
- b. Warrant officers appointed prior to 1 October 1987, may decline RA integration in writing when promoted to CW3 and remain on active duty until completion of 20 years active Federal service or until their mandatory release date. Retirement eligible officers who decline RA integration when promoted to CW3 will be separated after completing any ADSO, including promotion, unless earlier release is required to meet the needs of the Army.
- c. Separate RA integration boards were discontinued during the Army drawdown. Future boards are planned to only consider exceptions; for example, an USAR CW3 who requests and is called to active duty to fill a valid requirement.
- d. Warrant officers are released from active duty after being twice nonselected for promotion to the next higher grade unless they are selectively continued in their current grade.

### 13-33. Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA)

a. WOMA was enacted on 1 February 1993. It provides a comprehensive and uniform personnel management system, similar to DOPMA, for warrant officer appointments, promotions, separations, and retirements. The key provisions of WOMA include:

- (1) Authorized the grade of CW5, to include pay and allowances. Maximum number of CW5s on active duty is limited to five percent of the total number of warrant officers on active duty.
- (2) Eliminated the dual promotion system and established a DOPMA style promotion system for warrant officers.
- (3) Established minimum time in grade (TIG) requirement for consideration for promotion.

(4) Established authority to convene selective retirement boards (SRB) to consider retirement eligible warrant officers for involuntary retirement.

(5) Established the management of warrant officers by years of WOS rather than by active Federal service (AFS). A CW5 may serve for 30 years WOS. Retirement eligibility at 20 years AFS remains unchanged.

(6) Established selective continuation for warrant officers twice nonselected for promotion. Very limited use and normally in shortage skills.

(7) Modified the involuntary separation date from 60 days to the first day of the seventh month. This provision applies to warrant officers twice nonselected for promotion and those selected for involuntary retirement.

b. WOMA modernized warrant officer life cycle management, offers all warrant officers the potential for a full career, provides tools to shape the force, and enhances readiness by providing the Army with a highly qualified and experienced Warrant Officer Corps.

## **SECTION VIII**

### **THE DEVELOPMENT FUNCTION—OFFICER**

#### **13-34. Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS)**

a. The OPMS provides a framework within which the careers of all commissioned officers, except those assigned to The Surgeon General, Chief of Chaplains, and The JAG, are managed. OPMS consists of three major and interrelated subsystems: strength management, professional development, and evaluation.

b. To ensure that the Army develops the required number of officers with the necessary skills, a framework for professional development has been established. This framework consists of all OPMS career fields, with each one being a grouping of duty positions whose skill, knowledge, and job requirements are mutually supportive in the development of officers to successfully perform in the career field. Each career field contains sufficient duty positions to support progression to the grade of colonel. Military and civilian educational opportunities are also geared to the officer's career field. Army requirements and an individual's qualifications and preference are the major considerations in determining the designation of career fields.

#### **13-35. Officer Personnel Management System XXI (OPMS XXI)**

In May 1997, the CSA approved implementation of several changes in OPMS as a result of the recommendations of the OPMS XXI Task Force.

##### **a. Historical perspective.**

(1) OPMS XXI is an evolutionary system that balances the needs of the Army with the aspirations and developmental requirements of the officer corps. It is the logical outgrowth of the continuum of constructive change, which has occurred to officer personnel management over many years. OPMS was instituted in 1972 as a result of The U.S. Army War College Study on Military Professionalism and a follow-on analysis directed by the DCSPER. After passage of the DOPMA by Congress in 1981, the CSA ordered a major review to examine the impact of the legislation on OPMS policies. As a result, OPMS II was

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developed in 1984 to accommodate the changes brought about by DOPMA, including the creation of functional areas, dual tracking and RA integration. In 1987, the CSA directed a review of officer leader development to account for the changes in law, policy, and procedures that had occurred since the creation of OPMS II. As a result of the study, the Leader Development Action Plan was approved for implementation in 1989. Over 50 recommendations representing the latest revisions to the officer personnel system were incorporated into the OPMS.

(2) During the last decade the Army has undergone significant changes with widespread affect on the officer personnel system, brought about by the drawdown at the end of the Cold War and by major legislative initiatives. The *DOD Reorganization Act of 1986* (“Goldwater-Nichols”) required the Services to improve interoperability and provided the statutory requirements for joint duty assignments, joint tour credit and joint military education. In 1986, Congress also passed Public Law 99-145, which specified the acquisition experiences and education necessary for an officer to be the project manager of a major weapons system. This law later led to the creation in 1990 of the Army Acquisition Corps (AAC). The *Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvements Act of 1990 (DAWIA)* placed additional requirements on Acquisition Corps officers and directed them to single track in their functional area. Congressional Title VII (1992) and XI (1993) Legislation placed additional officer requirements on the AA in their support of the RC. The *Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA) of 1996* brought the RC officer promotion systems in synchronization with the AA. This legislation established a best-qualified promotion system for RC officers, thereby replacing the fully qualified system previously used.

#### **b. Initiation of OPMS XXI.**

(1) With a 12-year span since the last formal OPMS review, the DCSPER assembled a team of senior field grade officers to examine a series of OPMS-specific issues and to determine whether a general review of the OPMS was warranted. This OPMS XXI Precursor Study Group ultimately reviewed more than 60 individual issues. Based on the collective body of these issues, the OPMS XXI Task Force convened in July 1996 to review and revise the personnel management system as necessary to ensure its viability for meeting future challenges. The Task Force focused on the development and career management of officers of the Army Competitive Category (ACC). The special branches (Chaplain, JAG, and the branches of the AMEDD) were not specifically addressed although some OPMS XXI issues and solutions dealing with education, officer evaluation, and general promotion policies will apply to them as well.

(2) Consistent with the task of developing capabilities to meet the challenges of the next century, the Task Force to linked its work with other ongoing Army planning efforts: Force XXI for the near-term, Army XXI initiatives for the mid-term and Army After Next projections for the long-term planning environment. In designing the personnel system for the future, the CSA directed the Task Force also create a conceptual framework that integrated OPMS with the Leader Development System, ongoing character development initiatives and the new officer evaluation report

(3) The Task Force concluded that, in order for OPMS XXI to work effectively, three sets of strategic recommendations for change must be jointly addressed.

(a) The first recommendation called for the creation of an officer development system (ODS) as part of an overall Army development system. ODS will encompass and integrate officer leader development, character development, evaluation and personnel management.

(b) The second recommendation recognized the need to adopt a holistic, strategic human resource management (SHRM) approach to officer development and personnel management for the 21st Century.

(c) The final strategic recommendation by the Task Force called for the creation of an officer career field-based management system composed of four career fields: Operations, Operational Support, Institutional Support and Information Operations. Under OPMS XXI, officers are designated into a single career field after selection for major and serve and compete for promotion in their designated career field from that point on Figure 13-8.

(d) The results of these strategic recommendations, approved by the CSA, in December 1997, form the basis for the changes to OPMS.




Figure 13-8. OPMS XXI—Four Career Fields

### 13-36. Fundamental officer management changes

The Army needs--and will continue to need--the finest officers imbued with the warfighting ethos and with the right skills, knowledge and experience to meet effectively any challenges. Further, the Army continues to be a values-based organization, steeped in core principles and beliefs that set the "muddy boots" soldier apart as a unique professional. In order to grow an Officer Corps with the right skills, knowledge and attributes to respond to evolving future challenges--to remain ready not only today, but also tomorrow--OPMS XXI will change many aspects of how officers are managed, developed and promoted. OPMS XXI significant actions that are beginning to affect the officer corps directly are discussed in the following subparagraphs.

**a. Career field based management.** Officers are developed in only one branch, and the branch will remain primary for the first ten years of an officer's career. Coincident with selection for promotion to major, all ACC officers will be designated into one of four career fields. Officer preference will be a key factor in terms of board selection criteria in the career field designation process. Single track management and dual track assignments are replacing the old system of "dual-track" management.

**b. Functional areas.** Incorporating what are referred to as nonaccession specialties, functional areas provide a management and development system to effectively use the vast talents of a diverse officer corps. Functional areas are not related to any branch.

**c. Multiple career tracks.** There are a variety of career patterns (dual and single tracking) available to the officer corps to provide the flexibility to develop individual officers with different abilities based upon Army needs. Officers are managed, developed, and promoted by branch and/or functional area.

**d. Branch transfers.** Requests for branch transfers from an overstrength branch to an understrength branch from about the third to the eighth year of service are considered. Branch transfers requested after the eighth year of service from an overstrength branch are normally approved.

**e. Document coding.** A total review of all authorization documents was conducted to accurately code all commissioned officer positions in accordance with the revised classification system and to incorporate the three immaterial codes (01A—branch immaterial; 02A—combat arms immaterial; and 04A—personnel immaterial). Centralized approval at HQDA is required on document coding changes to control the amount and frequency of changes.

**f. Revised officer classification system.** Officers are no longer classified by specialties formerly called INSPECs and ADSPECs, but are classified by branch, functional area, area of concentration, and skill.

**g. Career fields and functional areas.** OPMS XXI restructures the ACC by grouping interrelated branches and functional areas into officer management categories called career fields. Each career field has a coordinator who is the senior Army leader responsible for oversight of the personnel proponents who collectively comprise his or her career field. The career field coordinators are as follows:

- Operations: CG, TRADOC
- Information Operations: CG, TRADOC
- Operational Support: CG, AMC
- Institutional Support: Dir, ARSTAF

### 13-37. Career fields

Officers will compete for promotion to requirements only with other officers in the same career fields. This will end the practice of "double counting" during promotion boards, in which selected officers count against promotion floors for their branch and their functional areas. Under OPMS XXI, officers selected for promotion will satisfy requirements only in their branch or functional area. Each career field will have its own unique characteristics and

development track for officers which reflects the readiness requirements of the Army today and into the 21st century. The latest edition of DA PAM 600-3 reflects the new development tracks. Officers from every branch and functional area, regardless of career fields, will continue to fill officer generalist and combat arms generalist (01/02) positions across the Army, just as they do today. Career fields are discussed in the following subparagraphs.

**a. Operations (OP) Career Field.** The OP career Field provides the Army with officers qualified by training, education and experience in areas directly related to the deployment, employment and sustainment of land forces. It is composed of officers in the Army's sixteen basic competitive branches and two functional areas, FA 39 (PSYOP and Civil Affairs) and FA 90 (Logistician Program). Officers in this career field will retain their designated functional area for the remainder of their careers. Officers will be assessed into the basic branches and generally serve their first 10-12 years learning the leadership and tactical skills associated with that branch. Officers who are selected into one of the functional areas will continue to wear their branch insignia throughout their military service. Command opportunities will exist only for officers in the OP Career Field, with the exception of AAC commands. Further, during the transition years of 1998 to 2002, officers already selected for battalion command will be designated into the OP Career Field.

**b. Information Operations (IO) Career Field.** The IO Career Field responds to the requirements of the 21st century information age, consistent with the *Army Vision*, which identifies "Gaining Information Dominance" as fundamental to all future Army patterns of operation. The IO Career Field brings together related disciplines with associated functional areas and creates several new ones. The functional areas in this career field are FA 24 (Information Systems Engineer), FA 30 (Information Operations), FA 34 (Strategic Intelligence), FA 40 (Space Operations), FA 46 (Public Affairs), FA 53 (Information Systems Management), and FA 57 (Simulation Operations).

**c. Institutional Support (IS) Career Field.** The IS Career Field focuses on the increasingly technical and complex nature of running the Army as an organization. The emphasis in this career field is management, planning and programming of Army resources, both near-term and into the future years; projecting requirements and developing capabilities in the mid and long-term. The functional areas in this Career Field are FA 43 (Human Resource Management), FA 45 (Comptroller), FA 47 (US Military Academy Permanent Associate Professor), FA 49 (Operations Research/Systems Analysis (ORSA)), FA 50 (Force Management), FA 52 (Nuclear Research and Operations), and FA 59 (Strategic Plans and Policy).

**d. Operations Support (OS) Career Field.** The OS Career Field strengthens current readiness while building the future force through its liaison, procurement, programming and development specialties. This career field contains the FA 51 (Army Acquisition Corps) and FA 48 (Foreign Area Officer).

### **13-38. Career field assignment**

Career fields will be assigned to officers through a career field designation process, under the direction of the PERSCOM. An important part of the process will be the convening of a formal board to recommend career fields for individual officers, based on the files forwarded from PERSCOM. PERSCOM will identify officers in the window for career field designation and notify them of required actions to be taken in advance of the board.

PERSCOM will also provide the board with the number of officers to be designated into each career field, as well as the branches from which these officers will be drawn, based on Army requirements. This process will be similar to the way in which promotion requirements by branch and functional area are determined today. The board will be charged to identify and take into consideration officer preference, aptitudes, and abilities in order to meet best the needs of the Army in assigning career fields to the individual officers. The career field designation process will include the following considerations:

**a. Officer evaluation report (OER) input.** The new OER (DA Form 67-9) requires the rater and senior rater to recommend a career field for all ACC captains through lieutenant colonels. When recommending career fields for rated officers, rating officials will consider the "whole person." Factors such as: demonstrated performance; educational background; technical or unique expertise; military experience or training, and personal preference of the officer will be important parts of the process. Career field recommendations of raters and senior raters on the OER will be an important factor taken into consideration during the career field designation process. Another factor for consideration will be the Officer Career Field Preference Statement.

**b. Officer Career Field Preference Statement.** At the required time, each officer will submit to PERSCOM an email Officer Career Field Preference Statement, indicating his or her preferred Career Field. This form will not be submitted through the officer's chain of command. At the appropriate time, PERSCOM will forward each officer's file and preference statement to a formal board for career field designation.

**c. Career Field Designation Board (CFDB).** The CFDB will be convened formally to review the officer's total file, to include the officer's requested preference, any additional information the officer may choose to submit, past performance, assignments, civil and military education, demonstrated skills/aptitudes and the chain of command's input. Based on the information submitted in each file, the CFDB will make recommendations for career field designation for each officer before it.

**d. Final approval.** The CFDB will forward its recommendations to the Office of the Chief of Staff for final approval.


### **13-39. Status of OPMS XXI**

**a.** OPMS XXI began its phased implementation at the beginning of FY99. Over 100 management improvements have been approved for implementation. A formal issue tracking process has been established in the form of the Officer Development Update (ODU). The ODU is presided over by the CSA and twice yearly reviews the progress of OPMS XXI issue resolution and implementation.

**b.** The sum of all OPMS XXI changes is contained in the form of guidance to officers and their commanders and mentors in the revised edition of DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Career Management and Development, dated 1 October 1998. In addition to its hard-copy form, DA Pamphlet 600-3 is available on-line at two locations: <http://www.perscom.army.mil/opmsxxi/> and [http://books.hoffman.army.mil/cgi-bin/bookmgr/BOOKS/p600\\_3](http://books.hoffman.army.mil/cgi-bin/bookmgr/BOOKS/p600_3).

**13-40. OPMS as a part of human resources management (HRM)**

The preceding discussions make clear that OPMS XXI is more than just a warmed-over version of personnel management. It is an intrinsic component of the holistic development of human resources, and it has leadership and character development components. Figure 13-9, OPMS as a Part of Human Resource Development, displays the manner in which the key management and organizational elements of OPMS fit into the Army’s structure to guide and develop human resources. Each of the participants discussed above fit into the HR paradigm, and additional levels of review are in place in the form of a council of colonels (COC), a general officer steering committee (GOSC). The CSA’s Board of Directors has as one of its roles, oversight authority for OPMS XXI and its contribution to HR development.



**Figure 13-9. Human Resource Management Senior Leadership**

**13-41. Branch detail program**

The branch detail program, beginning with FY 90 accessions, takes lieutenants from Signal, Quartermaster, Ordnance, Transportation, and Finance branches and details them to combat arms branches for two years. Military Intelligence and Adjutant General Corps officers are detailed for four years. Chemical Corps officers are not detailed. The two-year detail is designed to provide an officer with combat arms experience in Infantry, Field Artillery, Armor, or Air Defense, followed by an assignment in his or her basic branch while still a lieutenant. The program eliminates PCS costs by assigning detailed officers only to installations, which can provide both experiences. Technical training (a short temporary duty (TDY) course) is provided by proponent schools prior to the detailed officer assuming duties in his or her basic branch. Volunteers are requested. If the volunteer pool is to meet requirements the Accessions and Branching Board selects officers to be detailed. Additionally, all USMA graduates, beginning with the Class of ‘90, commissioned into a Combat Service Support or Combat Support Arms branch are detailed.

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**13-42. Centralized selection for command positions**

There are several changes to the command selection process under OPMS XXI. First, the name change from command designated positional list (CDPL) to command selection list (CSL). This emphasizes the new preference based approach to an officer's career pattern. Second, and most significant, is the fact that all CSL commands will be filled by officers in the Operations Career Field. The CSL will include four functional categories of commands: Tactical; Training and Strategic Support; Institutional; and TRADOC Systems Managers (TSM) (colonel level only). The CSL commands include all those commands formally on the CDPL and the battalions and brigades of the USAREC. Prior to convening each command selection board, officers being considered will be given the opportunity to indicate the functional category(ies) in which they desire to compete for selection. The board will select officers for command within the given categories and PERSCOM will conduct the slating process and recommend the specific unit or organization. The CSA has the final decision on the command slate.

**13-43. Army Acquisition Corps (AAC)**

**a.** The mission of the AAC is to create a corps of dedicated military and civilian acquisition managers capitalizing on the operational experience of the military officers and the technical skills of the civilians. Successful weapon system development and all the support activities required throughout its life cycle requires a balance between keen regard for current operational realities and technical knowledge.

**b.** The AAC program develops world-class acquisition specialists to fill approximately 850 military and 3,000 Army civilian critical positions. Critical positions require the level of education, training, and experience stated in the DAWIA and the DOD implementing instructions. The positions include program managers (PMs), program executive officers (PEOs) (general officer/ Senior Executive Service level), deputy or assistant PEOs/PMs, senior contracting officials, and selected positions in procurement commands, matrix support commands, and headquarters staffs.

**c.** The Army Acquisition Executive (AAE), Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (the ASA(ALT)), is dual-hatted as the AAE), acting for the Secretary of the Army (SA) through established structure, implements DOD Acquisition Workforce policy and tailors the Army program. The Director, Acquisition Career Management (military deputy to the AAE) provides requirements to the DCSPER.

**d.** DCSPER provides personnel policy management for the AAC as for the rest of the Army. The Army Acquisition Corps Management Office (AACMO), OPMD, PERSCOM, centrally manages all officer and civilian AAC members. The AACMO consists of a Military Acquisition Management Branch and a Civilian Acquisition Management Branch. Each branch manages members of its component from accession through the members' entire career life cycle.

**e.** Only qualified officers and civilians may fill critical positions. The AAC targets branch-qualified captains and civilians in grade GS-13 as candidates for competitive entry into the AAC. Once accessed into the AAC, members attend schooling and obtain acquisition experience to meet acquisition certification requirements for critical positions.

**f.** Under OPMS XXI the three AAC functional areas of FA 51, Research, Development, and Acquisition; FA 53, Systems Automation; and FA 97, Contracting & Industrial Management are consolidated into one - FA 15, AAC. As OPMS XXI transitions, AAC FA 51 will be recoded into six developmental areas of concentration (AOCs) (51A, Systems Development; 51C, Contracting and Industrial Management; 51R, Systems Automation Engineering and Acquisition; 51S, Research and Engineering; and 51T, Test and Evaluation). The population remains relatively unchanged. The total AAC is unique in that it also contains selected individuals from 11 civilian career programs. These include CP 11, Comptroller; CP 13, Supply Management; CP 14, Contracting & Acquisition; CP 15, Quality & Reliability Assurance; CP 17, Materiel & Maintenance Management; CP 18, Engineers & Scientists; CP 23, Automatic Data Processing; CP 24, Transportation; CP 25, Communications; and CP 33, Ammunition Management.

**g.** Recognizing the difficulty in pursuing branch qualification for battalion and brigade command and at the same time achieving the acquisition requirements, AAC members are precluded from TOE command. AAC officers compete for acquisition-related TDA commands and product manager (battalion-level command equivalent) and project manager (brigade-level command equivalent) positions.

**h.** Department of the Army Acquisition Selection Boards select AAC commanders and product and project managers. Commanders normally serve three-year tours and product/project managers serve four-year tours.

**i.** AAC TDA commands include the research & development centers and laboratories, and procurement and contracting offices. Product/project managers are charged with managing and executing the day-to-day activities for development, production, and fielding of a system in accordance with approved performance, schedule, and cost requirements.

**j.** DA Pamphlet 600-3 details the professional development requirements for commissioned officers within the AAC. AR 690-950 and the Army Civilian Training, Education, and Development System (ACTEDS) list requirements for civilians in the AAC.

### **13-44. Officer Evaluation System**

**a.** The Officer Evaluation System is the Army's method of identifying those officers most qualified for advancement and assignment to positions of increased responsibility. The system includes assessments of officer performance and potential accomplished in the organizational duty environment; in an academic environment, both military and civilian; and at Department of the Army.

**b.** The Department of the Army potential assessment of an officer is a subjective judgment as to the officer's capability to perform at a specified level of responsibility, authority, or sensitivity. Although potential is normally associated with the capability to perform at a higher grade, judgments are also made by DA on retention and increased responsibility within a specified grade. The assessment is based on three major factors: the Army's officer requirements, the individual officer's qualifications, and a summation of the individual officer's performance.

**c.** The performance assessment by DA differs significantly from that accomplished in the organizational duty environment. Whereas the organizational duty assessment involves a personal knowledge of the situations surrounding a specific period of time, DA assessment is

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accomplished by an after-the-fact assessment of a series of reports on performance over a variety of duty positions and covering the officer's entire career.

### **13-45. Officer Evaluation Reporting System**

**a.** The Officer Evaluation Reporting System is a subsystem of the Officer Evaluation System. It includes the methods and procedures for organizational evaluation and assessment of an officer's performance and an estimation of potential for future service based on the manner of that performance. The official documentation of these assessments is the OER and the academic evaluation report (AER).

**b.** The primary function of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System is to provide information from the organizational chain to be used by DA for officer personnel decisions. The information contained in the OER is correlated with the Army's needs and individual officer qualifications providing the basis for personnel actions such as promotion, elimination, retention in grade, retention on active duty, reduction in force, command designation, school selection, assignment, career field designation, and RA integration.

**c.** A secondary function of the Officer Evaluation Reporting System is to encourage the professional development of the officer corps. To enhance accomplishment of this secondary function, emphasis is placed on the responsibility of senior officers to counsel their subordinates. While this has always been a major aspect of leadership, continual reemphasis is necessary. The Officer Evaluation Reporting System contributes significantly by providing a natural impetus to continual two-way communication between senior and subordinate. It is through this communication that the rated officer is made aware of the specific nature of his or her duties and is provided an opportunity to participate in the organizational planning process. The rater uses the communication to give direction to and develop his or her subordinates, to obtain information as to the status and progress of his or her organization, and to plan systematically for the accomplishment of the mission. The senior/ subordinate communication process also facilitates the dissemination of career development information, advice, and guidance to the rated officer. This enables the rated officer to take advantage of the superior's experience when making career field or assignment-related decisions.

**d.** There have been nine OER systems since WW II. The first seven experienced a relatively rapid system turnover because inflation had gotten out of hand. 67-8, which introduced the support form process and senior rater concept was effective far longer (18 years, 1 month) than any previous system. The current OER, 67-9 is an evolution of the 67-8.

**13-46. Officer promotions**

As of 15 September 1981, the DOPMA amended Title 10, United States Code, for officer promotions. DOPMA, as implemented, is applicable to all officers on the ADL. It does not apply to warrant officers. The act provides for a single promotion system for all officers (RA and OTRA), thus eliminating the previous dual (AUS/RA or AUS/USAR) system of promotions. The intent is for promotions to be made within fairly uniform promotion timing and opportunity goals, as vacancies occur. Eligibility for consideration for promotions based on minimum TIG and time in service (TIS) with the below-the-zone selection rate established at a maximum of 10 percent (or 15 percent when so authorized by Secretary of Defense (SecDef)) of the list for any grade above captain. DOPMA goals for promotion opportunity and phase point (i.e., TIS when most officers are promoted) are listed in Figure 13-10.

TO GRADE	PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY	DOPMA PHASE POINT
FIRST LIEUTENANT	FULLY QUALIFIED	13 MOS TIS MINIMUM TIG
CAPTAIN	90%	NOT LESS THAN 2 YEARS TIG
MAJOR	80%	10 +/- 1 YEAR
LIEUTENANT COLONEL	70%	16 +/- 1 YEAR
COLONEL	50%	22 +/- 1 YEAR

Opportunity and TIS are set by policy. TIG for promotion to 1LT and CPT is set by law.

**Figure 13-10. Career Progression Pattern**

**13-47. Officer quality management**

a. The goal of the officer management program is to ensure that only those individuals demonstrating satisfactory performance and possessing acceptable moral and professional traits be allowed to serve on active duty, retain their commissions, and remain on DA promotion lists.

b. Commanders and DA agencies are continually striving to maintain the quality of the officer corps by identifying and processing for involuntary separation those officers whose performance or professional or moral traits are deficient. To this end, the records of OTRA officers are screened continually to identify officers whose degree of efficiency and manner of performance and/or misconduct, moral or professional dereliction require separation. Records selected under this program are referred to a Department of the Army Active Duty Board (DAADB), and selection by this board results in a release from active duty.

c. Records of RA officers are also screened but go before a “show cause” board rather than the DAADB. In both the DAADB and “show cause” proceeding, the officer is afforded the opportunity to resign in lieu of undergoing the entire process. Similarly, Department of the Army (DA) agencies are tasked to review promotion and command selection lists to ensure that no officer is promoted or allowed to command who has become mentally, physically, morally, or professionally disqualified after being selected. The records of officers whose fitness for promotion or command has become suspect are referred to a DA Promotion/Command Review Board which will recommend to the SA whether the officer should be retained on or removed from the promotion/ command selection list.

d. The promotion system also serves as a qualitative management tool through the mandatory separation from active duty of officers who fail to be selected for promotion to certain grade levels. Additionally, reserve officers serving under an initial service obligation must demonstrate acceptable performance, professional and moral traits, in order to qualify for voluntary indefinite status.

e. No person has an inherent right to continue service as an officer. The privilege of service is his or hers only as long as he or she performs in a satisfactory manner. Responsibility for leadership and example requires officers accomplish their duties effectively and conduct themselves in an exemplary manner at all times.

### **13-48. Officer strength management**

When manpower reductions are necessary the Army has several programs that may be applied to reduce the number of officers on active duty. When possible, reductions are accomplished through normal attrition and voluntary release programs coupled with reduced officer accessions. Because Congress directed the Services to include senior as well as junior officers when implementing officer strength cuts, selective early retirement boards (SERBs) and reductions-in-force (RIFs) may be implemented when required. RIFs target mid-career officers by year while SERBs select a fixed number of retirement-eligible officers, not to exceed 30 percent of the eligible population, for involuntary early retirement. RIFs and SERBs are quantitative measures that are qualitatively administered.

### **13-49. Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA)**

DOPMA evolved from the continued inability of the *Officer Personnel Act (OPA) of 1947*, as changed by the *Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA) of 1954*, to meet the changing requirements for a modern and equitable officer management system for the active forces. The intent of DOPMA was to provide all Services with an equitable, effective, and efficient system to manage their officer corps below the brigadier general level through revision of Title 10, United States Code.

a. The management objective is to provide consistent career and promotion opportunities across all Services in order to attract and retain high-caliber officers, and promote them at a point in service conducive to effective performance. The integration into a single promotion and grade authorization system of the old dual-track RA/Reserve system mandated by OGLA and OPA provides a favorable environment in which to achieve this goal. DOPMA does not mandate, per se, the creation of a regular force at the 11th year of TIS. It merely enlarges the RA officer corps. The current policy is to tender an RA appointment to all active duty captains upon promotion to major; however, this policy is subject to review.

b. The provisions for selective continuation of captains and majors, combined with the capability to instruct promotion boards on skill needs, provides a mechanism through which specialty needs can be filled, while enhancing an officer's opportunity to stay on active duty until retirement. Under DOPMA, a first lieutenant who twice fails to be selected for promotion to captain is involuntarily released from active duty. By law, captains and majors may be selectively continued to remain on active duty until 20 and 24 years respectively. However, current Army policy and strength constraints preclude selective continuation of captains and restrict continuation of majors unless authorized by the SA based on the need. In

FY97, the Army returned to the pre-drawdown policy to continue two time nonselected ACC majors to their retirement eligibility date (20 years of service). Officers not promoted and not selected for continuation will be retired or separated as appropriate. Additionally, DOPMA establishes uniform, general constructive provisions for all Services, thus recognizing that special skills acquired prior to service are essential for effective performance in special branches. This provision impacts most on AMEDD, Chaplain, and the JAG Corps accessed after the effective date of the act.

### **13-50. DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (“Goldwater-Nichols”)**

Goldwater-Nichols has had significant impact on the assignment of officers throughout the Army. The congressional goal is to improve the performance of officers in joint duty positions by establishing management procedures for their selection, education, assignment, and promotion. Key provisions of the law are listed below.

**a. Assignments.** The qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty assignments will be such that they are expected to meet certain specified promotion rates comparable to their Service headquarters and the overall board selection rate. Officers assigned to joint duty assignments will be assigned in anticipation that they will serve the prescribed tour length for their grade: two years for general officers and three years for others. Assignments for officers possessing critical occupational specialties, which for the Army are defined as the combat arms branches, may be curtailed to a minimum of 24 months under certain conditions. All graduates of professional joint education (e.g., National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces) who are designated as joint specialty officers (JSO), and a high proportion (greater than 50 percent) of those graduates not designated as JSO will be assigned to a joint duty assignment immediately following graduation.

**b. Promotions.** Selection boards considering officers serving in, or who have served in, joint duty assignments will include at least one officer designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) who is currently serving in a joint duty assignment. The letter of instruction for selection boards include the following guidance: “You will give appropriate consideration to the performance in joint duty assignments of officers who are serving in, or who have served in such assignments.” Prior to approval by the Secretary of the Military Department, the results of selection boards considering officers who are serving in, or who have served in, joint duty assignments will be forwarded by the Secretary to the CJCS. The CJCS will review the results to determine whether appropriate consideration was given to performance in joint duty assignments.

**c. Reports.** Each Secretary of a Military Department must provide periodic progress reports on their promotion rates in relation to the promotion objectives specified above.

**d. General/flag officer actions.** In the absence of a waiver by the SecDef, officers selected to the grade of O-7 subsequent to 1 January 1994 must have completed a full joint duty assignment before selection or their first assignment as a general/flag officer will be in a joint duty assignment. A capstone military education course has been created and all newly promoted general/flag officers must attend this course within two years after selection, unless such attendance is waived by the SecDef.

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**SECTION IX**  
**THE SUSTAINMENT FUNCTION****13-51. Sustainment function overview**

The sustainment function includes a broad range of activities that are focused on the well being of soldiers, retirees, and their families. The range includes, but is not limited to quality of life activities, awards and decorations, casualty and memorial affairs, housing, morale, and recreation, personnel actions, and soldier readiness.

**13-52. Army Continuing Education System (ACES)**

**a.** ACES is a critical element in the recruitment and retention of a quality force. The ACES exists to ensure soldiers have the opportunities for personal and professional self-development. Education opportunities are offered through Army education centers and Army learning centers located worldwide. Educational programs include:

(1) On-duty functional academic skills training, which provides job-related instruction in the academic areas of reading, mathematics and English grammar at no cost to the soldier.

(2) High school completion programs for soldiers without a high school diploma.

(3) Undergraduate and graduate college courses and programs which provide financial assistance such as the Tuition Assistance Program.

(4) Foreign language programs for qualified Army linguists assigned overseas.

(5) Skill development programs to prepare non-commissioned officers for NCOES training.

(6) Counseling to establish challenging yet attainable short and long-term goals; academic testing through the Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education Support (DANTES).

(7) Army personnel testing; and training support services such as MOS reference libraries and language and computer laboratories.

**b.** In addition, the Servicemembers Opportunity College Army degree system of college and university networks promoting credit transferability and the American Council on Education/Army Registry Transcript System documenting recommended credit for soldier training and experience help soldiers earn degrees despite frequent transfers and rotations. The ACES, focused on soldiers, yet available to DA civilians and adult family members, represents a primary quality of life program.

**13-53. Equal Opportunity Program**

**a.** The thrust of the Army Equal Opportunity Program is firmly embedded in fundamental American values and the basic philosophical tenet on which effective leadership and the exercise of command is built. Army equal opportunity is resonant in leadership that is rooted in taking care of soldiers and is crucial to unit cohesion, readiness, and mission accomplishment. Ensuring soldiers are treated with fairness, justice, and equity is central to an Army culture dedicated to the highest professional and personal standards, and to sustaining our most important resource—people. It is an underlying responsibility of leaders

to ensure soldiers and their families receive equal opportunity and treatment, without regard to race, color, religion, gender, or national origin, and are provided an environment free of sexual harassment.

**b.** Leaders are assisted in sustaining Army equal opportunity (EO) goals and objectives by an equal opportunity adviser (EOA) at brigade level and above, and EO representatives (EOR) at battalion and company level. The EOA is a specially trained officer or NCO whose role is technical adviser to the commander. EOA positions are filled by NCOs/officers possessing the skills and knowledge characteristic of the units they will serve. EOAs are soldiers who possess MOSs found in the brigade or installation to which they are assigned. Soldiers selected as EOAs receive 15 weeks of intensive training at Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), receive a SQI of “Q”, and then serve one special duty tour as an EOA, similar to that of a drill sergeant or recruiter. The EOA provides the commander a valuable subject matter resource for sustaining EO programs, training, and developing remedies to eliminate discriminatory practices or treatment.

### **13-54. The Army casualty system**

**a.** The Army casualty system includes casualty reporting, casualty notification, next of kin assistance, mortuary affairs, burial honors, escorts, disposition of remains and personal effects processing, line of duty determination, and missing persons act determinations. The reporting system records, reports, verifies and processes casualty information from unit level to HQDA. Casualty information flows up, across and down the command and medical reporting chains to help account for soldiers and reportable civilians. Each management level in the casualty reporting chain verifies information as necessary to meet the 100 percent accuracy standard.

**b.** The Army Casualty Information Processing System (ACIPS) is the HQDA level management system designed to track the flow of casualty information and the status of required actions from the place of incident through final disposition. ACIPS is accessible to casualty area commands, personal effects depots, and port mortuaries via modem. Units prepare and submit initial and supplemental casualty reports using ACIPS-Light, a field deployable software package, which allows units to produce casualty reports. Commanders, soldiers, and deployed civilians must ensure that casualty information is processed only through official channels as for official use only information until notification of next of kin has been verified.

## **SECTION X THE TRANSITION FUNCTION**

### **13-55. Transition function overview**

The transition function includes a broad range of activities focused on ensuring soldiers and their families are treated with dignity and respect and assisted in every way possible as they transition from the AA to a RC and/or civilian status. Selected transition activities are described in greater detail below:

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**13-56. The Army Career and Alumni Program (ACAP)**

a. The ACAP orchestrates a broad spectrum of programs and services designed to assist soldiers in making critical career and transition decisions. These highly organized and professional services are available from 70 operating locations in 26 State and five countries. ACAP provides transition services to soldiers, DA civilians, and their family members. RC personnel are also eligible to receive ACAP services upon serving a minimum of 180 consecutive days of active duty immediately prior to separation.

b. ACAP is not a job placement service but instead a program through which a wide range of services are made available to users through a combination of DOD, Department of Labor, Department of Veteran Affairs, U.S. Army, and contractor provided services. Transition counseling and career planning are the cornerstone services that assist the user to properly focus on their career path and the value of their experience should they remain on active duty or transition to civilian life. Individuals using ACAP services have access to an abundance of reference materials and a wealth of information about benefits, civilian employment opportunities, career planning and services available through many Federal, State and local government agencies.

c. Participation in ACAP is mandatory for all active duty soldiers who are separating or retiring. Individuals are encouraged to start using ACAP services 180 days before their separation date. Eligible individuals may continue to use ACAP for up to 90 days after separation. Referral to ACAP is mandatory for civilians who are departing because of force alignments, reductions in force or base closures. ACAP participation is optimal for transition of family members and eligible RC soldiers.

d. ACAP establishes a strong partnership between the Army and the private sector, creates a recruiting multiplier, improves employment prospects for transitioning personnel, reduces unemployment compensation costs to the Army and allows career soldiers to concentrate on their mission. ACAP is an enduring program, institutionalized into the Army culture and life cycle functions.

**13-57. Army Retirement Services Program**

a. The Department of the Army has a worldwide network of retirement services offices to assist retiring soldiers and their families make a smooth and successful transition into retirement. Each major Army installation has a full-time, paid employee, called a retirement services officer (RSO), to administer this program. The program prepares soldiers and family members for retirement by providing assistance and information on their benefits and entitlements. These services are available to the surviving spouses of retired soldiers.

b. The RSO conducts a periodic preretirement briefing, which covers subjects from computation of retired pay to survivor benefits. Soldiers must attend a preretirement briefing between submission of their retirement application, but no less than 120 days before retirement. Spouses are encouraged to attend. The RSO also provides mandatory Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP) counseling to these individuals. By law, retired pay stops with a soldier's death unless the soldier is enrolled in SBP. The soldier makes the SBP decision before retirement. In addition to SBP counseling, the RSO provides a printout comparing SBP to commercial insurance. The RSO has videos on preparing for retirement and SBP that may be borrowed by soldiers or their spouses.

**c.** The DA Retirement Services Office provides policy guidance to the installation RSOs and is also responsible for publishing “Army Echoes,” the quarterly newsletter sent to all retirees and retirement eligible active duty personnel. He or she also administers the Chief of Staff’s Retiree Council and the Survivor Benefit Plan Program and monitors the operation of the Armed Forces Retirement Homes.

**d.** Retiring from the Army constitutes a significant lifestyle change. If not prepared for properly, retirement can be extremely difficult. The RSO is the soldier’s tool to assist in making the transition easier and more enjoyable.

### **13-58. Separation**

Separation includes voluntary and involuntary release from active duty, discharge, nondisability retirement, and physical disability retirement. Because the type of discharge and character of service are of such great significance to the Service member, it must accurately reflect the nature of service performed. Eligibility for veterans’ benefits provided by law, eligibility for reentry into service, and acceptability for employment in the civilian community may be affected by these determinations.

### **13-59. Enlisted separation**

**a.** An enlisted soldier may be separated upon ETS or prior to ETS by reason of physical disability (see below), sentence of general or special court-martial, or one of the administrative separation programs prescribed in AR 635-200. Both voluntary and involuntary administrative separation actions are outlined in AR 635-200.

**b.** Voluntary separations are initiated by the soldier. Reasons include hardship/dependency, surviving family members, acceptance into an ROTC program, orders to active duty as an officer or warrant officer, defective enlistment, pregnancy, for the good of the service in lieu of trial by court-martial, and early separation when denied reenlistment. Soldiers who have tested positive for the HIV antibody may request discharge under Secretarial authority. Soldiers may also be allowed to separate early to further their education.

**c.** Commanders may initiate involuntary separation proceedings for parenthood, personality disorder, concealment of an arrest record, fraudulent or erroneous entry, alcohol or drug abuse rehabilitation failure, failure to meet body composition/weight control standards, entry-level performance and conduct, unsatisfactory performance, misconduct, or homosexual conduct. To separate a soldier involuntarily, the unit commander must notify the soldier in writing. Any involuntary separation action involving a soldier with six or more years of total active and reserve military service entitles the soldier to a hearing by an administrative separation board. If the soldier has 18 or more years, the board is mandatory and cannot be waived. Administrative discharges of soldiers with 18 or more years of AFS must be approved at the Secretariat level.

**d.** Discharge certificates are furnished only to soldiers who are honorably discharged or discharged under honorable conditions. All soldiers leaving active duty are issued a DD Form 214, Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty. The DD Form 214 documents the characterization of service, except when a soldier is separated while in an entry-level status. Entry-level separations normally have service described as “uncharacterized.” Honorable, general, and under other than honorable conditions characters

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of service are assigned administratively. Bad conduct and dishonorable discharges are issued upon conviction by a court-martial.

### **13-60. Enlisted nondisability retirement system**

To qualify for voluntary retirement, an enlisted soldier must be on active duty and have completed 20 or more years of AFS on the retirement date. A soldier who has completed 20 years, but less than 30 years AFS and who has completed all required service obligations may be retired at his or her request. Enlisted soldiers who have completed 30 years AFS have the vested right under law to retire and may not be denied. DA policy requires that all service obligations incurred by promotion, schooling, or PCS be completed prior to approval of voluntary retirement of soldiers with less than 30 years' service. However, a soldier may request waiver of a service obligation, and approval would depend upon whether the best interests of the Service are involved or whether a substantial hardship might exist should retirement be denied. Enlisted retirements are normally approved by field commanders of general officer rank. Enlisted soldiers retire in the grade they hold on the date of retirement unless they have 10 years active commissioned service. Additionally, enlisted soldiers who have completed 30 years combined active and retired list service may be eligible for advancement on the retired list to the highest grade held satisfactorily. Requests for grade determination are acted upon by HQDA.

### **13-61. Officer nondisability retirement system**

a. There are two types of retirement—voluntary and mandatory. To qualify for voluntary retirement, officers must have completed at least 20 years' AFS on their retirement date. All service obligations incurred must be completed unless waived by HQDA. Mandatory retirement dates are established by law and only in very rare cases are individuals retained on active duty beyond these dates. Lieutenant colonels and colonels may remain until 28 and 30 years respectively, unless involuntarily retired through the SERB process.

b. While majors and below must have served six months in their grade to retire at that grade, lieutenant colonels and colonels must normally serve three years in grade to retire in that grade. Some programs like the Voluntary Early Release and Retirement Program (VERRP) can waive one year of the three-year obligation, subject to a 2 percent limitation imposed by Congress. Officers who are selected by SERB retain their grade regardless of time held.

### **13-62. Temporary early retirement authority (TERA)**

The *FY99 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)* granted a further extension to the temporary additional management tool to draw down the force first authorized by the FY93 NDAA. TERA allows members on active duty with 15 but less than 20 years service to apply for early retirement. This authority was used extensively during the drawdown, primarily for nonselect officers and those in overstrength skills or specialties. The current authority for this program runs through FY03.

### **13-63. Physical disability separation**

The laws governing physical disability separation from a military Service provide for the retirement or separation with severance pay of a member who is determined to be unfit by reason of physical disability to perform the duties of his or her office, grade, rank, or rating.

When a member, at the time of separation, is considered fit to perform his or her duties, he or she must be separated or retired under programs already discussed. It is possible, of course, to receive a nondisability separation and still have physical disabilities, which could affect potential for civilian employment. In this instance, one may qualify for compensation for those disabilities from the Department of Veteran Affairs.

## **SECTION XI**

### **SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

#### **13-64. Summary**

**a.** The primary purpose of the MHRM system is to satisfy valid Army requirements and, insofar as practicable, accommodate the legitimate needs of its members. The system is a complex, dynamic, multifaceted mosaic of interacting subsystems, which interface in a variety of ways with all other major Army systems. A tremendous state of flux and uncertainty exists today as the Army transitions to a smaller, more flexible force and to new steady state. During this period of significant change, personnel decisions must be based on careful, comprehensive review and analyses from a holistic perspective. If this concept is not followed, serious, far-reaching second- and third-order effects could impact very negatively on the people in the Army, as well as the readiness of the force.

**b.** The processes designed to structure, acquire, train, educate, distribute, sustain, professionally develop, and separate soldiers must be continuously evaluated and refined to ensure they support current and future Army requirements. The subsystems within these processes must have the flexibility to meet the needs of the Army not only as the force reduces in size, but also if expansion is required. Whether the Army is reducing or expanding, there are a few critical operating principles to guide decision makers as they choose between difficult, challenging options in either scenario: maintain force readiness at the prescribed levels; maintain quality in recruiting, retention, and development programs; make changes in a balanced and orderly way throughout all grades and specialties, both officer and enlisted; maintain current board selection functions to continue to build on the best; additionally, use boards to reduce the force as well as to offer recall; rely on RC; protect quality of life; and, finally, in order to reduce uncertainty, ensure there is an understandable, comprehensive plan.

**c.** This chapter was designed to provide a broad overview of the personnel management system in order to describe how the major processes are designed to interact. During the next several years the policies, functions, and processes within every one of the personnel management subsystems will be continuously challenged to ensure Army requirements are satisfied and to take care of its most important resource—people.

**d.** The following web sites contain valuable current information on military HRM policy and programs:

- [www.perscom.army.mil](http://www.perscom.army.mil)
- [www.army.mil/opms/](http://www.army.mil/opms/)
- [www.dcsper.army.mil](http://www.dcsper.army.mil)
- [www.usarec.army.mil](http://www.usarec.army.mil)

**13-65. References**

- a. Army Regulation 600-Series Publications, *Personnel - General*.
- b. Army Regulation 601 - Series Publications, *Personnel Procurement*.
- c. Army Regulation 614 - Series Publications, *Assignments, Details, and Transfers*.
- d. Army Regulation 621 - Series Publications, *Education*.
- e. Army Regulation 623 - Series Publications, *Evaluations*.
- f. Army Regulation 624 - Series Publications, *Promotions*.
- g. Army Regulation 635 - Series Publications, *Personnel Separations*.
- h. Army Regulation 680 - Series Publication, *Personnel Information Systems*.
- i. Field Manual 12-6, *Personnel Doctrine*.



# CHAPTER 14

## CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

*“Finding the right balance of military personnel, civilian employees, and contractors is subject to continuous evaluation and is the cornerstone of effective Army manpower management. It is readily apparent that we must define our total manpower requirements, to include a flexible workforce mix, in an integrated manner. This strategy will ensure that we can man our combat units at 100 percent, while transforming our Institutional Army to meet the future National Military Strategy. “*

Robert Bartholomew III, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Force Management, Manpower & Resources)


*“We must ensure the continuing development of a technically competent and confident Civilian Human Resource (CHR) team that provides customers with flexible human resource strategies and solutions to recruit and retain a highly effective, capable force.”*

David L. Snyder, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civilian Personnel Policy)

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 14-1. Chapter content

a. Civilians have been an integral and important component of the Army since the Revolutionary War. They are an integral part of the force utilized to accomplish today's multiple, complex missions. Department of the Army (DA) civilians include both appropriated and nonappropriated fund employees and comprise 20 percent of the Army's total manpower. As of September 2000, there were 221,611 U.S. citizen and 26,370 foreign national employees paid from appropriated funds (to include those Army civilians in the Civil Works Program). There were also 28,232 nonappropriated fund U.S. and foreign national full and part-time civilian employees on the rolls (Figure 14-1). These civilians are employed in over 550 different occupations with the highest concentrations in logistics, research and development, and base operations functions. Civilians are excluded from positions that by law require military incumbents or for reasons of security, maintenance of military morale and discipline, combat readiness, or military training. Additionally, there are approximately 268,000 contractor employees supporting the Army's mission. This chapter discusses the personnel management of civilians employed by the Department of the Army and its nonappropriated fund organizations, but does not address the management of contractors' employees.



**Figure 14-1. U.S. Army Assigned Strength as of 30 September 2000**

b. In order to better understand the management and administrative environment within which civilian personnel management systems operate, an understanding of the types of employees and the rules and regulations that govern each of them is necessary. Because of different fund sources, laws, and regulations, personnel policies and practices differ for the various types of Army civilian employees.

**14-2. Categories of civilian personnel**

a. **Appropriated fund civilians.** The term appropriated funds (APF) refers to those funds provided by the Congress, normally in annual *Defense Appropriations Act* legislation. U.S. citizens and eligible U.S. aliens are paid from appropriated funds and are managed within a structure of Federal civil service laws. APF employees are further divided into two categories based on the nature of work performed. Military-function civilians perform support duties associated directly with the Army's National Military Strategy objectives. Civil-function civilians perform duties associated with the Army's Civil Works Program. Civil works includes planning, design, construction, and operation and maintenance of projects to improve the nation's water resource infrastructure, for example, navigation, flood control, and hydroelectric power, plus other civil functions prescribed by law. The laws governing APF employees are administered by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this chapter.

**b. Nonappropriated fund (NAF) civilians.**

(1) NAF employees are paid from funds generated from sales, fees, and charges to authorized patrons. This category comprises U.S. civilians; foreign nationals, usually from the local labor market; and enlisted service personnel working part-time during off-duty hours. All compete for employment on the basis of merit.

(2) NAF employees play an important role in providing morale, welfare, and recreation services to military personnel and their family members. Army clubs, guest

houses, child care centers, craft shops, bowling centers, swimming pools, gymnasiums, and many other NAF activities employ a considerable number of employees at most Army installations and contribute to the overall quality of life.

**c. Foreign national civilians.** The Army also employs local nationals in both APF and NAF positions in overseas areas. The status of forces agreement (SOFA) in effect with a given host country forms the basis of the employment systems for these employees. Within this framework, administration must be consistent with host country practice, U.S. law, and the management needs of the Army. In some cases the host government may reimburse the salary and associated personnel costs in whole or in part.

### **14-3. Army workforce mix**

**a.** Our strategic environment has changed, mandating that the Army change too. The DOD overall, and the Army specifically, have experienced numerous challenges aimed at refining and reducing the size and structure of our forces. The number and scope of the missions that the Army must perform has grown significantly since the end of the Cold War, while the Army will have downsized approximately 48 percent of its civilian employees and 38 percent of military structure from FY89 to the programmed end state in FY07. Contractor employees have offset some of these losses.

**b.** The Army is undergoing a fundamental change in how it defines its total manpower. The contractor workforce is being incorporated into the total need. Notably, while the in-house strength has been reducing, the contractor workforce has either stayed constant or slightly increased. The challenge is to achieve the right balance of civilian employees, contractors, and soldiers in our Army.

## **SECTION II ARMY CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT**

### **14-4. Decentralized management**

The systems for recruiting, utilizing, developing, and sustaining DA civilians are in large part decentralized. Decentralized management of civilians is very different from the centralized management of military personnel (Figure 14-2). Most authorities for the supervision and management of civilians have been delegated through the chain of command to the lowest practicable level. Certain civilian personnel functions, however, are performed on a regional, MACOM-wide, or DA-wide basis when doing so results in more efficient operations (e.g., the Army Benefits Center-Civilian at Fort Riley provides individual employees DA-wide with counseling on their benefits and automated support for benefits changes) or when a managerial perspective above the local level is required to meet program objectives (e.g., HQDA manages the intake and training of interns in DA career programs). The Army's organization for civilian personnel management follows this concept of operations. There are approximately 107 civilian personnel advisory centers (CPACs) and 10 regional civilian personnel operations centers (CPOCs). Additionally, there are several major Army command (MACOM) civilian personnel offices involved in command management functions. Because the CPACs generally provide support on a geographic basis, in some cases Army civilian employees may work for one command but receive personnel services from a CPAC belonging to another command.

<u>Military</u>		<u>Civilian</u>
Title 10, USC	<u>Statute</u>	Title 5, USC
Rank in Person	<u>Authority</u>	Rank in Job
Fill based on structure and authorizations. Managed by USAREC, USMA, Cadet Cmd, PERSCOM, DCSPER.	<u>Acquisition</u>	Fill based on position vacancy. Managed by supervisor, Cdr, CPAC/CPOC, Career Pgm Mgr, ASA(M&RA).
Hierarchy of schools for military and leadership skills.	<u>Individual Training</u>	Functional training primarily occupation related.
Mandatory movement to meet worldwide requirements.	<u>Distribution</u>	Voluntary mobility - (generally).
Based on Army requirements - (involuntary).	<u>Deployment</u>	Voluntary- (unless part of job criteria).
Central selection and management.	<u>Professional Development</u>	Heavy decentralized management.
Contractual obligation and forced separation/retirement.	<u>Transition</u>	More individual choices and longer tenure.

**Figure 14-2. Differences Between the Military and Civilian Systems**

**14-5. Appropriated fund civilians**

**a.** The Congress, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and HQDA establish and modify manpower controls on civilian employees. The method of control may be issued in the form of legislation or administrative directive. Prior to FY85, Congress assigned Department of Defense (DOD) a civilian end strength ceiling that limited the number of civilians that could be employed on the last day of the fiscal year. The most significant problem inherent in end strength management was the inefficient practice of removing employees near the end of the fiscal year and rehiring them at the beginning of the new fiscal year. To eliminate this practice, Congress prohibited end strength ceiling management in DOD in FY85, but was quite clear in stating its desire that DOD closely manage the number of civilians employed.

**b.** During the year of execution, supervisors have broad choices in determining the types of civilian employees that will be employed. They may hire employees on a permanent appointment, term appointment, or temporary appointment. Term appointments allow employment for a period of more than one year but less than four years to a position where the requirement is not permanent. A temporary appointment may be for a specified period not to exceed one year. The appointment may be extended up to a maximum of one additional year or 24 months of total service. Temporary appointments may be terminated at any time upon written notice from the employing agency.

**c.** Permanent or temporary employees may be hired on work schedules ranging from full-time (40 hours per week) to part-time (16-32 hours per week) or intermittent (as needed).

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While most civilians are full-time employees with permanent appointments, the variety of appointments and work schedules enables the supervisor to tailor his or her civilian workforce to unique workload situations.

#### **14-6. Nonappropriated fund civilians**

**a.** NAF staffing controls are based solely on the ability to pay the number of positions deemed necessary to ensure successful mission accomplishment. Under this concept, the local activity manager develops and maintains a NAF personnel requirements document (PRD). The PRD, which requires both labor and cost schedules, is also aligned with the annual operating budget process. Approved positions and attendant funding become the basis for supervisors to fill vacant positions.

**b.** There are only two appointment categories, regular and flexible, and NAF supervisors have broad choices in determining the types of employees that will be hired. They may hire employees in continuing positions on a regular full-time or part-time appointment, with the latter group working a minimum 20-hour week. They may also hire employees in indefinite positions on a flexible appointment on either a scheduled or an as-needed basis. There are no upper limits to the number of hours a flexible employee may work.

**c.** Supervisors may also designate full-time and part-time positions as "limited tenure" to meet special work requirements that are known to be non-permanent, and will cease to be needed upon completion of the project or a projected period of time.

### **SECTION III**

#### **ORGANIZATION FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT**

#### **14-7. U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM)**

**a.** OPM is the personnel agency of the executive branch charged with the mission to administer most Federal laws and Executive orders dealing with all aspects of civilian personnel management and administration in the Federal sector. Some laws and Executive orders place certain personnel management responsibilities directly on agency and department heads, subject to OPM policy and review. In other cases, OPM retains the authority to establish specific program standards and regulate and control the means of carrying out major aspects of agency or departmental personnel management operations.

**b.** OPM develops proposals for Federal personnel legislation and Executive orders and develops and publishes specific policies, procedures, and regulations implementing Federal personnel laws and Executive orders. It also provides testing, evaluation, and referral of job applicants to agencies; evaluates agency personnel management systems; and provides advice and assistance to agencies in developing effective personnel management programs. Further, OPM develops standards by which jobs are classified (pay systems, title, job series, and grade); administers retirement, health, and life insurance programs; and adjudicates position classification appeals.

**c.** Merit is the primary principle guiding OPM, OSD, and the Army in policy development and operational standards within the personnel system. The following merit principles govern all personnel practices:

- (1) Recruitment from all segments of society, and selection and advancement determined solely on the basis of ability, knowledge and skills after fair and open competition.
- (2) Fair and equitable treatment of all employees and applicants in all aspects of personnel management without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or disabling condition and with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights.
- (3) Equal pay for substantially equal work within each local pay area, in keeping with work and performance distinctions.
- (4) High standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for the public interest.
- (5) Efficient and effective use of Federal employees.
- (6) Retention of employees based on the adequacy of their performance.
- (7) Effective education and training when it would result in better organizational and individual performance.
- (8) Protection against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political purposes.
- (9) Prohibition against employees using their official authority or influence to interfere with elections or nominations for election.
- (10) Protection against reprisal for lawful disclosures of information on violations of laws and/or mismanagement ("whistleblower" protection).

d. OPM executes, administers, and enforces civil service rules and regulations through audits, reviews and inspections. Failure on the part of agencies to observe the prescribed standards, requirements, and instructions may result in the withdrawal of personnel management authority delegated by OPM.

#### **14-8. Other agencies with Federal government-wide authority**

In addition to OPM controls and procedures, four separate, independent Federal agencies also provide oversight to ensure that the principles of merit, labor relations guarantees, and equal employment rights are adhered to:

a. **U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).** The MSPB monitors the civil service system and hears and decides appeals on adverse actions. It can order corrective and disciplinary actions against an agency or an employee when it finds abuse of the merit principles.

b. **Office of Special Counsel.** The Office of Special Counsel serves as an investigator and prosecutor before the MSPB for statutorily defined prohibited personnel practices. It also provides a secure channel to address allegations involving a violation of law, rule, or regulation, or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. Allegations may be brought forward and investigated without fear of retaliation and without disclosure of identity. The *Whistleblower Protection Act* guarantees this provision.

**c. Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA).** The FLRA administers the Federal labor-management relations program. It resolves questions of union representation of employees; prosecutes and adjudicates allegations of unfair labor practices; decides questions of what is or is not negotiable, and reviews certain kinds of arbitration decisions on appeal.

**d. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).** The EEOC develops guidance for and monitors Federal agencies in development and implementation of affirmative employment program plans. The Commission monitors agency actions and efforts to increase the representation of minorities, women, and individuals with disabilities; develops policy and provides guidance on complaints; conducts hearings on complaints of discrimination; issues recommended decisions to agencies; and evaluates program effectiveness. EEOC implements the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) program by issuing directives and guidelines setting forth the responsibilities of Federal agencies.

#### **14-9. Department of Defense**


Under Executive Order (EO) 9830, the President has delegated authority to agency heads, including the Secretary of Defense, to act in civilian personnel matters in accordance with applicable policies, program requirements, standards, and instructions.

**a. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).** Within OSD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civilian Personnel Policy) (DASD(CPP)) have responsibility for DOD-wide Civilian Human Resource policy. In coordination with the services, and within the framework established by Federal law, Executive orders and government-wide regulations, the DASD(CPP) develops plans, policies, and programs to manage the DOD civilian workforce, including NAF and foreign national employees. Through its Civilian Personnel Management Service (CPMS), the DASD(CPP) also provides certain civilian personnel services on a DOD-wide basis.

**b. DOD Office of Complaint Investigation (OCI).** OCI investigates and recommends resolution options to EEO complaints and formal employee grievances not covered by negotiated grievance procedures and which have not been resolved through an informal process at the organizational or installation level. Upon request, OCI can also serve as a third party appellate review level for nonappropriated fund employees in NAF EEO cases. In a complex formal grievance of a NAF employee, or a formal grievance of an APF employee under the Administrative Grievance System, the deciding official may elect to retain the services of the OCI to review the facts and make recommendations.

#### **14-10. Department of the Army**

Authority for civilian personnel management is further delegated by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Army (SA). By General Order No. 2001-01, dated 12 January 2001, the SA has assigned full responsibility for civilian personnel management within the Army to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), ASA(M&RA). Responsibility for developing and implementing Army civilian personnel policy and program guidance and for making operational decisions which cannot be further delegated has been assigned to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civilian Personnel Policy) (DASA(CPP)). (Figure 14-3)



**Figure 14-3. Civilian Personnel Policy and Operations Organization**

**a. U.S. Army Civilian Personnel Evaluation Agency (USACPEA).** USACPEA is a field operating agency (FOA) of ASA(M&RA) responsible for conducting civilian personnel management and administration surveys and special Army-wide reviews. The purpose of these surveys and special reviews is to fulfill the SA oversight responsibility by assessing program effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance.

**b. Army Community and Family Support Center (CFSC).** CFSC is a field operating agency of the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), HQDA. CFSC's mission is to develop and administer systems and programs for the Army family and community activities under the general heading of morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR). The CFSC administers a central referral program for specified MWR managerial jobs (both APF and NAF) and a benefits program for all Army NAF employees.

**c. Intelligence Personnel Management Office (IPMO).** The IPMO is a subordinate element of the Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT), HQDA. It serves as the focal point in the Army for the management of the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) and reports jointly to the DCSINT and the DASA(CPP). It maintains liaison with the rest of the Federal intelligence and civilian personnel management communities on civilian personnel management issues, develops policies and programs, and develops and provides civilian personnel management training and guidance. The IPMO also provides personnel management advice and assistance to CPACs and CPOCs that, in turn,

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provide civilian personnel management support to intelligence organizations or those with DCIPS employees.

## **SECTION IV CIVILIAN PERSONNEL REGIONALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION**

### **14-11. Regionalization Initiative**

**a.** Starting as early as 1989, a number of management initiatives focused on the DOD-wide restructuring of the civilian personnel function. These initiatives had the objective of improving efficiency of civilian personnel service delivery and reducing its costs by:

- (1) Realigning personnel office servicing responsibility by geographic region (commonly referred to as “regionalization”)
- (2) Enhancing automation support for civilian personnel functions
- (3) Improving civilian personnel business practices
- (4) The latter two purposes, taken together, represent “modernization”.

**b.** A primary aspect of this initiative was to achieve a servicing ratio of one civilian personnelist for every 88 customers. As a result, there were significant manpower reductions in the civilian personnel organization.

### **14-12. Regionalization structure**

**a.** With the completion of regionalization in 1999, responsibilities for the delivery of civilian personnel services throughout the Army were functionally realigned under two new types of offices: Civilian Personnel Advisory Centers (CPACs) and Civilian Personnel Operations Centers (CPOCs). Typically, advisory functions requiring face-to-face interaction between personnel specialists and managers and employees reside at the CPAC (installation/activity level). Action processing, record keeping, and database management functions are centralized at one of the Army’s 10 CPOC regional offices. The commander/manager/supervisor responsibility for civilian personnel management remains unchanged. Only the administrative support functions have been realigned. The following describes the organization for regionalized service delivery and, in the next section, some of the automation initiatives supporting regionalization and systems modernization.

**b.** The Army has established 10 geographically based regions, each with a CPOC as its regional service center. The three OCONUS regions and their CPOC locations are: Europe Region-Seckenheim, Germany; Pacific Region-Fort Richardson, Alaska; and Korea Region-Taegu, Korea. Seven regions are in the Continental United States (CONUS): Southeast Region-Fort Benning, Georgia; National Capital Region-Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Southwest Region-Fort Riley, Kansas; Northeast Region-Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; North Central Region-Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois; South Central Region-Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; and, the Western Region-Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Within the regions are a total of approximately 107 CPACs. Each CPAC is typically located at or near the installation(s) to which it provides advisory services.


**c.** The OCONUS CPOCs and CPACs are under the organizational control of the respective MACOM. Within CONUS, the ASA(M&RA) has operational control of the

## How the Army Runs

CPOCs, exercised through the CPOC Management Agency (CPOCMA), while the MACOM and installation commanders control the CPACs. Civilian personnel administration responsibilities in the Army are carried out by the CPAC and CPOC directors who are designated to “act for” commanders with delegated personnel management and appointing authority. These relationships are shown in Figure 14-4. To illustrate the “act for” relationship, whenever a CPOC director “signs off” on an official personnel action (such as the appointment of someone to a position), he or she is doing so on behalf of the commander of the serviced organization, exercising that commander’s personnel management authority. CPAC and CPOC directors are directly responsible to each of the commanders they service for the proper exercise of this authority.

**d.** Specific responsibilities are to—

- (1) Provide the civilian personnel service and assistance necessary to obtain, compensate, develop, use, and retain an effective civilian work force.
- (2) Promote equality of opportunity in the organizational units serviced.
- (3) Coordinate personnel management requirements and needs of the organizations serviced.
- (4) Provide information and staff assistance and guidance to managers and supervisors to assist them in obtaining the most effective use of civilians through improved management.



NOTES: 1. OCONUS CPOCs AND CPACs REPORT DIRECTLY TO MACOM COMMANDER  
2. CPACs IN NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION REPORT TO ADMIN ASST TO SEC OF THE ARMY

**Figure 14-4. Civilian Personnel Management Support Relationships**

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(5) Establish labor management relationships focused on supporting and enhancing the Army's national security mission and creating and maintaining a high performance workplace that delivers the highest quality products and services at the lowest possible cost. Such relationships should be committed to pursuing solutions that promote increased quality and productivity, customer service, mission accomplishment, efficiency, quality of life, employee empowerment, organizational performance, and military readiness. Consensual means of resolving disputes, such as alternate dispute resolution and interest based bargaining, should be sought.

#### **14-13. Modernization**

a. The Modern Defense Civilian Personnel Data System ("Modern DCPDS" or "the modern system") is a collaborative effort with OSD as the program lead. The Army and other Defense Components are playing a key role in requirements development, system testing, and infrastructure procurement and installation. Deployment of the modern system began in 1999 and is targeted for completion in FY01. Once fielded throughout DOD, it will contain the world's largest relational database, housing and processing all of DOD's civilian HR data. The system is designed to support appropriated fund, nonappropriated fund, and local national HR operations. It offers a comprehensive array of state-of-the-art personnel processing capabilities. Managers can access organizational, historical, and employee data through a variety of reports and individual screens. Personnelists can process personnel actions, automatically interface with payroll, and generate confirming documents that can print at the originating manager's office printer. Along the way, the action can be acted upon by those with the need and access, such as resource management for coding and budgetary data

b. A myriad of new automated tools has been developed to support remote processing and enable fewer personnelists to provide the same or better customer service. These tools include:

(1) *COREDOC*. COREDOC is a desktop computer application that produces a single core document that integrates a position description, a performance plan, basic training competencies, and knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) for recruitment. By providing managerial access to a repository of occupational information, COREDOC allows the manager to classify positions, develop recruitment criteria (KSAs), establish training requirements, and create performance plans.

(2) *PERMISS*. The Personnel Management Information and Support System (PERMISS) is "an on-line supervisors' and employees' handbook". It contains over 800 articles providing general civilian personnel guidance and information, with links to source and reference documents (e.g. applicable laws and regulations). PERMISS may be accessed through the Army Civilian Personnel Online (CPOL) website on the Internet. Although PERMISS is not designed to answer questions pertaining to a specific individual's entitlements or job status, it does provide access to many of the general concepts and logic involved in making personnel decisions. It is not a forum for raising situation-specific questions, which should be answered through the supervisory chain of command or by the servicing CPAC.

(3) *Civilian Personnel Online (CPOL) Library*. Akin to PERMISS is the CPOL Library, which contains policy, and guidance documents on the management and

administration of the Army civilian workforce, including newsletters, bulletins, operating manuals, directives, forms, per diem rates and salary schedules.

(4) *RESUMIX*. This staffing support tool rates, ranks and refers applicants, utilizing electronic formats. Applicants can submit resumes electronically for vacancies listed on the CPOC's regional Internet homepage or through OPM's electronic job vacancy sites. Personnelists can create vacancy announcements electronically and electronically match received resume to the skills identified in the advertised position.

(5) *Résumé Builder*. *Résumé Builder* is an on-line program for applicants to use in creating resumes and responding to vacancy announcements or data calls. It replaces a cumbersome application process and provides significant efficiencies to CPOC staffing specialists.

(6) *FASCLASS*. The Fully Automated System for Classification (FASCLASS) delivers standardized classification information to the customer's desktop. It provides on-line access to active position descriptions and organizational information, products that, until now, usually were available only in the CPAC.

(7) *ABC-C*. The Army Benefits Center-Civilian enables customers to access and change their civilian benefits, such as health and life insurance, over the telephone or on the Internet. ABC-C also processes employee retirements.

## SECTION V

### PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AT INSTALLATION/ACTIVITY LEVEL

#### 14-14. Personnel management responsibility and authority

The responsibility for providing day-to-day leadership of Army civilians resides primarily at installation and activity level. The SA has delegated personnel management authority to major commanders with authority to further delegate to commanders of independent field activities. Thus, the actual management of DA civilians, including professional development, incentive awards, discipline, evaluation, and almost all other life cycle personnel functions is decentralized to installation and activity commanders and local managers and supervisors. The CPOC and CPAC organizations assist the chain of command in exercising this responsibility.

#### 14-15. Commander responsibilities

Installation commanders are responsible for leading and managing civilian employees and are held accountable for effective utilization of their human resource assets. Responsible commanders develop, empower, and utilize subordinate supervisors, managers, and the CPAC staff to establish a work environment for positive employee motivation and high performance. Specific command responsibilities are to carry out civilian personnel management policies, procedures and programs as set forth in Title 5, United States Code - "*Government Organizations and Employees*"; Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations - "*Administrative Personnel*"; and DOD 1400.25M, "*DoD Civilian Personnel Manual*"; and other applicable laws and regulations, consistent with applicable negotiated agreements.

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**14-16. Supervisor responsibilities**

a. Commanders generally delegate authority for leading and managing civilian employees to subordinate managers and supervisors. This carries with it specific responsibilities to—

- Maintain accurate position descriptions.
- Recruit, select, and assign employees.
- Evaluate employee performance, and train and develop employees.
- Administer award and incentive programs.
- Maintain management-employee communications.
- Administer constructive discipline.
- Maintain a positive labor-management relations program.

b. Supervisor responsibilities in each of these areas and the functional systems established to assist in carrying out these responsibilities are described below.

c. Although the Army has no formal civilian mentoring program the mentoring of civilians is encouraged at all levels. Mentoring in the context of civilian employee development focuses on enhancing the employee's career competitive status and on developing the skills, knowledge and abilities required by the organization to carry out assigned missions and functions. Mentoring can enhance the career of the one being mentored and also has a beneficial affect on the mentor.

**14-17. Maintain Accurate Position Descriptions****a. Position Classification and Pay for APF Positions.**

(1) Individual positions are classified by comparison with the appropriate classification standards or guides. These are developed by OPM based on comprehensive occupational studies of representative work found in the Federal service. Army regulations assign responsibility for maintaining accurate job descriptions to supervisors. Differences in pay must be attributed to differences in the difficulty, responsibility, and skill requirements of jobs.

(2) Most positions are covered by the following pay systems: the General Schedule (GS), covers white-collar workers in professional, administrative, technical, clerical, and protective occupations; the Federal Wage System (FWS) covers workers in trades, crafts, labor, and similar occupations. Salary rates for most GS positions, to include locality pay, are based on surveys of private sector salary rates conducted by the Department of Labor. FWS wage rates are established based on local surveys of private sector rates conducted by Federal agencies in accordance with OPM policies. Personnel demonstration projects authorized by the *Defense Authorization Acts of FY95, 96, and 98*, operate under broad pay band systems rather than the GS schedule. For positions with unusual recruitment and retention problems, OPM can authorize special salary rates and agencies may use a number of other pay flexibilities, as discussed in the “recruitment” section below.

**b. Position classification and pay for NAF positions.**

(1) The DOD NAF pay band system is the biggest single difference in the APF and NAF rules governing employee classification and pay. Pay banding involves the

establishment of several broad salary ranges and allows managers to set individual salaries within an established pay band. It is easier for managers to provide high performing NAF employees greater compensation short of a promotion action or performance award. The DOD pay band system includes all NAF clerical, administrative, sales, technical, managerial, executive, professional, and personal service positions, exclusive of child caregiving and crafts and trades positions.

(2) There are six pay bands, referred to as pay levels and identified using codes NF-1 through NF-6. They have minimum and maximum pay rates that are overlapping. The minimum and maximum rates for the first two levels and minimum only for level NF-3 are determined by locality-based wage surveys of comparable private sector jobs. Conversely, the maximum rates for NF-3 and rates for NF-4 through NF-6 are related to the Federal schedule (GS) and Senior Executive Service (SES) pay range.

(3) Child caregiving pay band positions are covered by a separate pay band system implemented in consonance with the DA caregiving personnel pay program. There are two pay bands, also referred to as pay levels, and they are distinctly identified through use of terms "Pay Band I" or "Pay Band II." The range in pay for child caregiving pay band positions is equal to the hourly rate of pay for a GS-2, Step 1, through GS-5, Step 10, and pay rates prescribed for GS child caregiving positions also apply.

(4) Crafts and trades positions are not affected by pay banding. Pay is determined through the prevailing rate system used for those positions covered under the Federal Wage System (FWS).

**c. Position classification and pay for foreign national positions.** These positions are generally not included in either of the pay systems described above. Employees in these positions are paid under local host-nation pay scales and conditions.

### **14-18. Recruit, select, and assign employees**

**a.** Management has the right to consider candidates from all appropriate sources, including merit promotion, reinstatement and transfer eligibles, *Veterans Employment Opportunity Act (VEOA)* eligibles, individuals with severe physical or mental disabilities, family member eligibles under EO 12721, and those certified as eligible for appointment by OPM or under a delegated examining authority. In deciding which sources to tap, consideration should be given to those which are expected to produce candidates who will meet the agency's mission requirements, contribute new ideas and viewpoints, and meet the agency's affirmative action and special employment programs. Recruitment sources also encompass special employment programs, e.g., summer employment, cooperative education, upward mobility, and stay-in-school programs. Persons with statutory or priority placement rights to a vacancy must be given appropriate consideration before the normal recruitment process may proceed.

**b.** All personnel selection decisions must be based solely on merit based and job-related reasons.

**c.** In recent years the Department of the Army, like other employers, has found the recruitment and retention of highly skilled employees a challenge, particularly for jobs in shortage occupations or in locations with an especially tight labor market. In the next several years, due to an anticipated wave of retirements, DA expects to have to fill many more

vacancies in a highly competitive environment. It is important, therefore, that supervisors and managers be aware that special incentives are available for staffing positions with unusual recruitment and retention problems. These incentives may include recruitment bonuses, relocation bonuses, and retention allowances (each up to 25 percent of basic pay); superior qualifications appointment (appointment at a rate above the minimum for the GS grade because of superior qualifications or a special need for the candidates' services); and special salary rates (minimum rates and rate ranges above those of the General Schedule). In addition, activities may identify local shortage positions for purposes of paying first duty station and preemployment interview travel expenses for permanent positions. Information about these and other incentives is available in PERMISS. Army employment also offers attractive leave, insurance, and retirement benefits, and typically provides a "family friendly" environment, meaningful public service work and good opportunity for training and advancement based on merit, all of which can be important tools in marketing Army as an employer.

#### **14-19. Evaluate employee performance and administer awards/incentives programs**

**a.** Administration of the evaluation and performance incentive functions of civilian personnel management requires managers and supervisors to exercise both leadership and fiscal responsibilities. It also requires an appreciation of the work place environment and an understanding of individual needs for counsel, recognition, and reward. The following Army civilian performance management programs are detailed in regulations and pamphlets listed in the reference section of this chapter:

(1) Performance planning and evaluation programs for SES, GS, FWS, and NAF employees.

(2) Base pay adjustment policy and procedures for all civilian employees. (SES pay increase; GS and FWS within-grade increase; NAF pay increase.)

(3) Cash and honorary award programs to recognize significant individual and group contributions. (SES performance bonus; GS and FWS performance award; GS quality step increase; time-off and honorary awards.)

(4) Policy and procedures for dealing with employees who fail to meet performance expectations.

(5) Personnel demonstration projects use systems that reward high performance or contributions to mission, and place less emphasis on longevity for pay and retention.

**b.** As with the military performance evaluation systems, the civilian evaluation process is designed to enhance supervisory/employee communications and day-to-day relationships to improve overall performance. At the beginning of each rating period, the rating chain and the employee agree to job requirements and develop a performance plan for the year. The performance plan should reflect the organization's mission and goals and the duties and responsibilities set forth in the individual position description. The performance plan may change during the year if the mission requires a re-ordering of responsibilities and priorities. At the end of the rating period, the rating chain compares the individual's contributions to the requirements in the performance plan and renders an overall summary rating. The summary rating is used to adjust base pay (SES only), make promotion and training decisions, document justification for performance-based cash awards and honorary awards, and give

additional years' service credit for reduction-in-force seniority status. The evaluation process is also used to assist employees who experience performance problems. The counseling component may be used to help them improve to an expected level or the evaluation can serve to document removal from the position if the employee fails to meet standards. The keys to successful performance management are frequent, two-way communication and timely, appropriate action to either recognize superior contributions or correct inferior performance.


### **14-20. Train and develop employees**

Managers and supervisors, working with the CPAC, define organizational training requirements. Based on these requirements, the CPOC develops and maintains training programs that involve all types of training activities in support of employee and organizational mission accomplishment. Training may include technical skill courses, human relations, transition (retirement) planning, leadership, and self-development (upward mobility) programs. Other training may focus on the career development requirements for a given job series. The CPOC, in coordination with CPAC and management, also develops, coordinates, and administers training and development programs which have regional application.

**a. Training programs.** Training categories cover a broad field from "executive and management" to "adult basic education." Training is classified as either short- or long-term (more than 120 days). The actual training can be delivered through on-the-job training at local activities, Army schools, DOD schools, interagency schools, formal schools, and a host of other government and nongovernment sources. Individual civilian members also compete for attendance in formal training programs such as attendance to the Army Management Staff College and the Senior Service Colleges. The AR 215-series establishes training requirements for both APF and NAF employees in morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) activities. This training is met largely through training courses sponsored or conducted by the CFSC Training Center.

**b. Career management system.**

(1) To establish basic policies and program requirements for the intake, assignment, training, and development of employees in designated occupations, the Army developed a civilian career management system (AR 690-950). This system supports supervisors in recruiting candidates for long-term career opportunities and ensures a steady flow of capable, fully qualified, and trained personnel for Army positions in more than 22 civilian career professional, technical, and administrative fields. The relative strength in these fields is shown in Figure 14-5.



Data supplied by HQ ACPERS dated October 16, 2000

**Figure 14-5. Department of the Army  
Civilian Career Program Strength as of October 15, 2000**

(2) The career management system provides clear lines of progression to successively more responsible positions and a coordinated training and development program for occupational specialties, using both Army and outside facilities. Procedures are provided for counseling employees; planning individual development programs; and appraising employee knowledges, skills, and abilities for advancement. New employees participate in planned work or rotational assignments designed to develop technical and leadership competencies to prepare for future managerial responsibilities. The Army Civilian Training, Education and Development System (ACTEDS) is the DA-wide program by which these objectives are accomplished and funded.

(3) At the higher grade levels (typically for promotion to grades GS-13 through GS-15), candidates are considered on an Army-wide basis. Application procedures depend on the particular career program

(4) The above procedures apply to APF personnel, including those working in MWR programs. NAF employees also benefit from a central referral program. CFSC is the executive agent for NAF MWR career programs and maintains a central roster of NAF pay band employees eligible for level NF-3 and above positions. Outside applicants may also register in the program. The system provides selecting officials with names and information on employees who are interested in being considered for a given NAF position.

**c. Army Personnel Proponent System (Civilians).** The Army Personnel Proponent System integrates civilians into established career fields and aligns them with appropriate personnel proponents. The personnel proponents are responsible for the overall personnel life-cycle management of their respective career fields. The life-cycle structure includes the following functions: structure, acquisition, individual training and education, distribution, deployment, sustainment, professional development, and separation. This has resulted in

Army civilians becoming more closely related to their uniformed counterparts in areas of qualifications, schooling, promotion potential, and managerial responsibility.

#### **14-21. Communication, discipline, and labor-management relations**

Supervisors are responsible for participating in the development and implementation of policies that contribute to the negotiations and administration of labor-management agreements; communicating management objectives, decisions, and viewpoints to their subordinates; and communicating their subordinates' views to higher-level management. Supervisors must analyze problems, develop solutions, and evaluate the results of decisions. The CPAC is responsible for assisting management in day-to-day business of employee performance, discipline, individual adverse actions, effective use of recognition and awards, labor-management-employee relations, administration of leave, hours of work, and monitoring of health and safety conditions.

**a.** If an employee believes that his or her rights have been denied, or that improper procedures have been followed, or that an action taken by management is unwarranted, he or she may utilize appropriate forums for relief. MSPB may be used for adverse actions (except a short suspension, that is, 14 days or less) and subsequently the courts may be used. Short suspensions and reprimands may be contested through the Administrative Grievance System or negotiated grievance procedures.

**b.** The grievance procedures, both in policy and negotiated agreement, set forth specific steps to be followed for resolving employee dissatisfaction with any aspect of working conditions, working relationships, or employment status. Army policy encourages timely resolution at the lowest level practical; however, grievances can escalate up the chain of command to a fact finder, or, if under a negotiated grievance procedure, to arbitration.

**c.** Negotiated grievance procedures are outlined in labor contracts which are jointly developed by management and the local labor union that is granted exclusive recognition to represent all bargaining member employees in the unit (whether the employees are union members or not). The legal basis for the labor-management relations program for Federal employees is Chapter 71, 5 USC. The law states that labor organizations (unions) and collective bargaining are in the public interest and establish the rights and obligations of employees, unions, and agency management. AR 215-3 provides the framework for addressing labor-management relations for NAF employees.

**d.** Supervisors are obliged to maintain a willingness to bargain collectively with labor organizations. Despite earnest efforts, there may be a time when an impasse will result, and if both parties fail to resolve their differences, the law provides for a neutral third party to resolve the impasse. This is the job of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) and the Federal Service Impasses Panel (FSIP). The FMCS assists the parties in reaching a voluntary agreement. Failing this, the FSIP may impose a settlement on the parties.

**e.** Management should strive to ensure that non-adversarial labor-management relationships are nurtured so mission accomplishment is enhanced rather than inhibited by the labor relations process. Management is also responsible for—

**(1)** Negotiating in good faith regarding conditions of employment (that is, personnel policies, practices, and matters affecting working conditions).

(2) Furnishing official time to union representatives for negotiating collective-bargaining agreements and for other representational purposes as provided for by negotiated agreement.

(3) Deducting union dues from the pay of eligible employees who authorize such deductions and allotting those deductions to recognized unions.

(4) Notifying recognized unions and giving them the opportunity to be present at formal discussions between management and one or more employees.

(5) Allowing the union the opportunity to be represented at any examination of an employee pursuant to an investigation if the employee reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary action and if the employee requests representation (Weingarten Right).

**f.** Certain ground rules are established to safeguard the basic intent of the law. The previously discussed FLRA is an independent regulatory agency headed by three members appointed by the President. The FLRA is the central policymaking body of the Federal labor-management relations program. It decides representation questions (whether a union should represent certain groups of employees), hears negotiability appeals (whether there is an obligation to negotiate on specific proposals), adjudicates unfair labor practices (ULPs) (a violation of the provisions of Title VII), and hears some appeals of arbitrators' awards.

**g.** Responsibilities of civilian personnel advisory center directors.

(1) The CPAC director is the designee of the installation/activity commander and, as head of the CPAC, is responsible for administering the civilian personnel management program (Figure 14-4). This does not include the commander's overall responsibility for leadership. The CPAC director has responsibility for implementation, maintenance, and evaluation of local personnel programs designed to assist supervisors with their personnel management responsibilities and achieve activity mission objectives. The CPAC Director interprets personnel policies and regulations and provides guidance and assistance in personnel matters in his or her assigned areas of responsibility. The CPAC Director must seek to ensure that management actions affecting civilian employees will enhance the Army's reputation as a good and fair employer, ensure employee productivity, support EEO, and maintain effective community relations. The CPAC Director also has oversight of the local NAF personnel program.

(2) These responsibilities would also apply to NAF activities at installations where commanders opted to more closely monitor those activities. However, for many functions, for example, recruitment, classification and pay, and so forth., the CPAC's role would be more advisory in nature at installations where commanders opted to delegate more authority and accountability for these functions to line managers.

## SECTION VI

### EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

#### 14-22. Equal employment opportunity statutory requirements and Army implementation

a. While it has long been the policy of the Federal Government to provide EEO on the basis of merit and fitness, the *EEO Act of 1972 (as amended)*, Public Law 95-454, and the *Civil Rights Act of 1991* placed Federal employees and agencies under the equal employment provisions of Title VII of the *Civil Rights Act of 1964*. The *EEO Act of 1972* made it unlawful to discriminate in Federal employment based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The *Equal Pay Act of 1963* made it unlawful to pay a different rate to members of either sex for equal work on jobs that require substantially similar skill, effort, and responsibility under similar working conditions. The *Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967* prohibits discrimination based on age. The *Rehabilitation Act of 1973* prohibits discrimination based on disabilities in employment and federally funded programs and activities funded from appropriations in Federal agencies. The *Architectural Barriers Act of 1968* prohibits discrimination based on accessibility to facilities and structures constructed, altered, or leased by Federal agencies. The *Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990* prohibits discrimination based on disability.

b. The authority to administer the Army's EEO policy and program is delegated by the SA to the ASA(M&RA) and further delegated to the Director of Equal Employment Opportunity. On the staff of the Assistant Secretary are two agencies responsible for separate aspects of the EEO program for civilians. First, the Equal Employment Opportunity Agency (EEOA) is responsible for developing DA policy, guidance, evaluation criteria and managing the affirmative employment and affirmative action programs. Second, the Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance and Complaints Review Agency (EEOCRA)—

- (1) Develops Army policy on complaints processing.
- (2) Renders final agency action on complaints of discrimination.
- (3) Reviews mediation/alternative dispute resolution (ADR) program plans of Army commands.
- (4) Ensures compliance with equal employment opportunity commission directives.
- (5) Provides guidance to the field on new developments, be they regulatory, statutory, or trends in case law.

c. Commanders are responsible for providing sufficient resources to the EEO program to ensure efficient and successful operations. Commanders are responsible and held accountable for an effective EEO program of affirmative action and employment programs for minorities and women, and individuals with disabilities and for the administration of the discrimination complaint system for all serviced and tenant organizations.

d. The EEO officer provides commanders advice and assistance on program implementation. The EEO office is responsible for developing affirmative program plans (APP) for minorities, women, individuals with disabilities, and Disabled Veterans in accordance with guidance provided by EEOC, OPM, DOD, and DA. The EEO Officer takes the lead in the development of the plans for minorities and women. The EEO Officer

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provides individuals with Disabilities and Disabled Veterans advice and assistance on program implementation.

e. Army activities are responsible for development of Affirmative Employment Program (AEP) plans for minorities, women, and individuals with disabilities in accordance with guidance provided by the EEOC and DA. The CPAC normally takes the lead in development of the AEP plan at an installation for individuals with disabilities and the EEO Officer takes the lead in the development of the plan for minorities and women.

f. Commanders are responsible for leadership of affirmative action programs for minorities, women, and individuals with disabilities and for the administration of the discrimination complaint system for all serviced and tenant organizations.

#### **14-23. The discrimination complaint process**

a. Pre-complaint activity may be initiated by Army civilian employees, certain contract employees, or an applicant for an Army civilian position, who believes that he or she has been discriminated against because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, physical or mental handicap, age and/or reprisal in an employment-related matter. Individuals from other Federal agencies receiving Army EEO support through a servicing agreement may also initiate pre-complaint activity. During this pre-complaint (or informal) stage, the aggrieved individual may choose traditional counseling or, if offered, the aggrieved individual may choose to attempt resolution through the local alternative dispute resolution program. If the matter at issue is not resolved during the pre-complaint state, the aggrieved individual may file a formal complaint of discrimination. If the complaint is accepted, there will be an investigation. Following the investigation, the complainant has options in terms of requesting a decision on the record from EEOCRA or a hearing from an EEOC Administrative Judge. Specific procedures and time frames may be found in AR 690-600, *Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaints*.

b. Commanders should understand that the commander's decision-making options are essentially removed as soon as a formal complaint is filed. Once a complaint of discrimination has been filed, the only option available is to resolve the complaint or allow the investigation to proceed. The process requires that investigative results be provided to EEOCRA. EEOCRA makes the determination on whether to accept the recommendation by the investigative agency, that is, OCI or EEOC, and announces findings which may subsequently direct the installation commander to initiate corrective action

c. The Equal Employment Opportunity Agency makes the determination on whether to accept the recommendations by the investigative official on complaints received from individuals alleging discrimination based on facilities, and program and activities accessibility, and announces findings which may subsequently direct the installation commander to initiate corrective action. Specific procedures and processing guidelines are described in AR 600-7, *Nondiscrimination of the Basis of Disability in Programs and Activities Assisted or Conducted by the Department of the Army*.

d. The procedure does not apply to employees or applicants of the Army and Air Force Exchange Service or to non-U.S. citizens employed by DA outside the U.S. Specific procedures and time processing guidelines are described in AR 690-600, *Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaints*.

## **SECTION VII**

### **SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE**

#### **14-24. Senior Executive Service structure and composition**

**a.** The Senior Executive Service (SES) was established in 1979, and brought to fruition over 40 years of efforts to create a separate system for top civilian executives within the Federal civilian service. Members of the SES are not in the competitive service like most other civilians. The SES was designed to ensure that professional civilian executive management of the government is responsive to the needs, policies, and goals of the nation.

**b.** OPM establishes the policies and quotas for SES positions. OSD and DA request quotas and use the allocated authorizations. Army has 294 authorizations for FY01. This quota system does not limit the number of civilian positions that are needed, but limits the number of positions that may be filled at the SES level. SES positions are positions above the GS-15 level and salaries are in the same general range as those for general officer.


**c.** The Army's authorized SES positions include a broad range of occupational series. Fifty-eight percent are in the fields of engineering and science. Command distribution of SES authorizations shows that Army Materiel Command (AMC), having the largest civilian population in the Army, also has the largest population of SES members (Figure 14-6). About half the Army's SES positions are located in the National Capital Region. In the last two years, over 90 percent of the appointees to the Army's SES positions were current Army employees.

**d.** The Secretary of the Army delegated responsibility for the SES program to the ASA(M&RA) who is assisted by a Civilian Executive Resources Board (CERB), a committee of Secretariat and ARSTAF-level executives and general officers. Law and policy require CERB involvement in hiring, promotion, and executive development that has resulted in the board taking on a broad policy and program management and oversight responsibility. A CERB Operations Committee (CERBOC) gives operational and procedural support to the CERB in SES matters and assists in developing the Army's programs for major issues involving civilian employees in grades GS-13 to 15. The CERBOC members are principal deputies to the CERB members, or represent the ARSTAF and MACOMs with the majority of SES members and program emphasis areas. The Army SES Office develops policy for CERB approval and is the primary action office for coordination of all SES selections, executive development, and implementation of policies governing the SES.

#### **14-25. Qualification of SES members**

**a.** There are five executive core qualifications that all potential SES members must possess:

(1) First, “Leading Change” encompasses the ability to develop and implement an organizational vision, which integrates key national goals, priorities, values, and other



factors.

**Figure 14-6. Senior Executive Service Assigned Strength as of 30 September 2000**

(2) Second, “Leading People” involves the ability to design and implement strategies, which maximize employee potential and foster high ethical standards in meeting the organization’s vision, mission, and goals.

(3) Third, “Results Driven” stresses accountability and continuous improvement.

(4) Fourth, “Business Acumen” involves the ability to acquire and administer human, financial, material and information resources in a manner which instills public trust and accomplishes the organization’s mission, and to use new technology to enhance decision-making.

(5) Fifth, “Building Coalitions/Communication” involves the ability to explain, advocate and express facts and ideas in a convincing manner, and negotiate internally and externally. It also involves developing an expansive network and the ability to identify the internal and external politics impacting the organization.

**b.** The executive development of people in GS-14 and 15 grade levels is an important command responsibility. SES members are expected to possess leadership competencies that parallel those of Army general officers. Therefore, attendance at a Senior Service College program is a highly desirable experience for civilians who aspire to SES positions. Appointment to the SES marks achievement of the highest nonpolitical civilian executive position. These positions are given protocol precedence equivalent to lieutenant general, major general, and brigadier general.

## **SECTION VIII**

### **MOBILIZATION PLANNING**

#### **14-26. Designation of deployable and non-deployable civilian positions**

**a.** DA civilians are an essential part of the Total Army team and contribute significantly to the Army's efforts to accomplish its mission in peace and war. Many civilian positions are designated to reflect a required role in the event of future operations. The designation may require the incumbent to deploy or may identify a CONUS position that cannot be vacated.

**b.** Some important definitions falling under the heading of civilian preparedness are as follows.

(1) *Key position.* A position, normally in CONUS, that cannot be vacated during war or national emergency without seriously impairing the capability of the parent organization to function effectively.

(2) *Emergency-essential (E-E) position.* A position requiring uninterrupted performance to provide immediate and continuing support. Either it is located overseas or the incumbent may be sent overseas during a military operation.

(3) *Cadre employee.* Part of a nucleus of trained personnel capable of setting up new operations and training others.

(4) *Alternate employee.* A non-emergency employee who agrees to perform the duties of an E-E position in the absence of an E-E employee during a military operation.

(5) *Contingency essential employee.* A local national employee in a position equivalent to an E-E position.

#### **14-27. Civilian personnel mobilization planning**

**a.** The Army includes mobilization planning as an essential element of the total civilian personnel program. In those operations involving civilians in overseas areas where the potential for hostilities exist, management's planning includes identifying, training, equipping, deploying, utilizing, and redeploying emergency-essential personnel. Lessons learned from recent contingency operations have resulted in the establishment of civilian mobilization cells at ASA(M&RA), DCSPER and PERSCOM to integrate policy, execution, and deployed civilian personnel accountability systems.

**b.** DODD 1404.10, DODD 1400.31, DODI 1400.32, AR 690-11 and AR 215-2 provide guidance for civilian personnel mobilization planning and management for APF and NAF personnel. Based on these regulations, commanders and managers, with the assistance of CPAC staffs, develop and maintain appropriate emergency plans, procedures, standby implementation documents, and the organizational and staffing arrangements required to plan for and manage the deployment of their civilian employees during contingencies, national emergencies, and war.

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**SECTION IX**  
**DEFENSE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SYSTEM****14-28. Structure and composition of the Defense Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS)**

a. DCIPS employees are U.S. citizens paid from appropriated funds. Unlike most other appropriated fund civilians, they are managed through a statutorily based excepted personnel service administered by the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the DOD Intelligence Community.

b. There are currently approximately 3,700 civilians in the Army under this personnel system. The Army has included in DCIPS all employees in series and specialties with clear ties to intelligence wherever they are found. Good examples are intelligence specialists in the 132 series and intelligence assistants in the 134 series regardless of function as well as security specialists in the 080 series and security assistants in the 086 series where 51 percent or more of their duties are intelligence related (not law enforcement related). DCIPS coverage by series/function has resulted in most major commands having at least some DCIPS employees. The Army has also included in DCIPS all employees (except local nationals) in commands that have a primary intelligence mission. Therefore you will find many of the administrative, technical and support series, and a few wage grade employees in DCIPS, as well as Army's intelligence and security professionals, in such commands as the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

**14-29. Relationship of DCIPS to the Army Civilian Personnel Program**

a. DCIPS is considered a part of the Army's overall civilian personnel program and has tested innovative personnel management features for the Army and the Department of Defense. DCIPS is a statutorily required alternative personnel management system for intelligence personnel. DCIPS is exempt from Title 5 job classification provisions and has adopted the use of the National Security Agency's classification system to better align grades with the rest of the intelligence community. It is also exempt from many OPM hiring provisions and can directly consider applications from non-government employees through its own merit system.

b. DCIPS has chosen to follow many provisions of the OPM administered Competitive Service such as the Performance Management System. DCIPS utilizes the Total Army Personnel Evaluation System (TAPES) within Army. Civilian personnel management support for CONUS intelligence activities is being consolidated at the National Capital Region CPOC and at the Personnel and Employment Services-Washington CPAC to increase efficiency. DCIPS was implemented in FY90, first as a tri-service system known as the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS).

c. The *DOD Authorization Act of 1997* further changed DCIPS. A provision of that Act, known as the *Department of Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel Policy Act of 1996*, combined all civilian personnel management systems for intelligence components in DOD into one broad excepted service system. The legislation, and a number of additional Administration initiatives, strives to create a broad common architecture of policies, systems and standards while protecting individual Service and agency prerogatives. Common employment and compensation architecture is planned along with inter-community rotational

and development programs. Common senior leader programs are also being developed. There will be a Defense intelligence senior leader (DISL) program for senior experts. In the first step to creation of a true DCIPS, CIPMS employees were converted to the DCIPS legal authority, and from the General Schedule (GS) to the GG schedule, during the summer of 2000.

## **SECTION X**

### **SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

#### **14-30. Summary**

**a.** The purpose of the Army Civilian Personnel Management System is to provide a motivated and technically qualified work force to meet Army requirements. There is no doubt that the civilian work force is an integral part of the Army team. Army civilians play an important role in all our missions and share in the organization's accomplishments. The Army employs civilians because they possess unique skills, ensure operational continuity, are economical, and permit military personnel to perform pure military duties. The civilian personnel management system and its supporting policy and service organizations contribute to the overall mission.

**b.** The majority of civilian positions are bargaining unit positions represented by labor unions. Army leaders, be they civilian or military, must accept their labor-management responsibilities. As the Army becomes ever smaller in size the impact of the civilian workforce will significantly increase. The efficiency of our operations cannot be allowed to fall due to an unhealthy labor climate where leaders did not accept obligations to advise, consult, and bargain, as the law requires

**c.** As the force continues to downsize, more and more civilians will assume key roles in headquarters and support activities, schools and training centers, and base operations. For many of these important positions it may not be possible to hire people with the necessary skills. Therefore, the Army must develop civilians from within the current ranks.

**d.** This chapter was designed to provide only a broad overview of the Civilian Personnel Management System in order to describe how the major processes are designed to support Army leaders. It is important to understand the legal basis for the Federal Civil Service and how the Army's system works within that system and also the regulatory basis and practices for the Army's NAF Personnel System. Furthermore, commanders and managers at all levels must have a clear understanding of the nature of the civilian personnel structure, programs, and mission, as well as their responsibilities to provide effective leadership and management. DA civilians are part of an Army team comprised of a blend of people dedicated to doing the best job possible to ensure Army missions are accomplished effectively. The Army and DOD civilian personnel web sites contain a great deal of helpful information and may be accessed at [cpol.army.mil](http://cpol.army.mil) and [www.cpms.osd.mil](http://www.cpms.osd.mil), respectively.

#### **14-31. References**

- a.** Army Regulation 10-89, *U.S. Army Civilian Personnel Evaluation Agency*.
- b.** Army Regulation 570-4, *Manpower Management*.
- c.** Army Regulation 600-3, *The Army Personnel Proponent System*.

- d.** Army Regulation 600-7, *Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Programs and Activities Assisted or Conducted by the Department of the Army.*
- e.** Army Regulation 672-20, *Incentive Awards.*
- f.** Army Regulation 690-11, *Mobilization Planning and Management.*
- g.** Army Regulation 690-12, *Equal Employment Opportunity Program.*
- h.** Army Regulation 690-13, *Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System (CIPMS) - Policies and Procedures.*
- i.** Army Regulation 690-400, Chap. 4302, *Total Army Performance Evaluation System (TAPES).*
- j.** Army Regulation 690-600, *Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaints.*
- k.** Army Regulation 690-900, Chap. 920, *Senior Executive Service.*
- l.** Army Regulation 690-950, *Career Management.*
- m.** DA Pamphlet 672-20, *Incentive Awards Handbook.*
- n.** DA Pamphlet 690-11, *Guide to Civilian Personnel Management.*
- o.** DA Pamphlet 690-30, *Administering the Labor Agreement.*
- p.** DA Pamphlet 690-400, *Total Army Performance Evaluation System (TAPES).*
- q.** DA Civilian Personnel Pamphlet No. 70, *Labor Negotiations at the Local Level*, May 1971.
- r.** United States Office of Personnel Management, *Management Practices Manual, Unfair Labor Practices*, (Undated).
- s.** *Morale, Welfare, and Recreation UPDATE*, 10 October 1990.



# CHAPTER 15

## ARMY TRAINING

*“The tactics of the patrol (Infantry Rifle Squad) is all that is necessary in the way of tactical training. All that replacements need to know about attack and defense of units, they will know if they are proficient in scouting and patrolling. Unit training is not essential.”*

MG Charles W. Ryder CG, 34th 7Division, 1944

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 15-1. The training goal

Much has changed since General Ryder voiced what was then a popular and accepted view regarding the training requirements of Infantry soldiers. What has not changed is the Army’s primary mission; to organize, train, and equip forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat operations—to achieve and sustain the capability to deter and when necessary to fight and win America’s wars. The Army must be trained and ready today. Senior Army officials predict that the explosive growth of commercial information sharing networks and other technologies will fundamentally change the way the Army conducts much of its training both at the soldier and the unit levels. The three pillars of the Army training system are institutional training, unit training, and self development. Each serves one underlying purpose, to enhance the ability of units to perform their missions. Unit readiness is the objective of all Army training.

**a. Institutional training.** Provides institutional centers of excellence in military knowledge and progressive resident and non-resident training and education to enhance individual potential, initiative, and competence in task performance and warfighting skills.

**b. Unit training.** Unit training prepares units to perform their mission essential task lists (METL) so that they are ready to perform their assigned missions when required. Unit training (individual, collective, and joint or combined) takes place outside the Army’s institutional base.

**c. Self development.** Provides a means for Army personnel to posture themselves for promotion, better job, or self-motivated improvement in personal performance. Proponents publish a self-development training strategy as Part 2 of the Career Development Model consisting of directed and self-motivated components.

#### 15-2. Chapter organization

This chapter examines Army training by systems. The discussion is presented in seven sections listed here. The chapter concludes with a summary and a list of pertinent references.

- Army Training Overview.
- The Policy, Requirements, and Resourcing Process.
- Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Organization.
- Training Development System.
- The Army School System.
- Training in Units.
- The Training Support System.

## **SECTION II**

### **ARMY TRAINING OVERVIEW**

#### **15-3. Army training**

The Army Training System is shown in Figure 15-1. Over the years there has been little change in the desired output, but the basic concepts, techniques of training, and methods of measuring and evaluating training are constantly evolving. FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25-101, *Battle-Focused Training*, contain the Army's standardized training doctrine applicable throughout the force. They provide the necessary guidelines on how to plan, execute, and assess training at all levels. The manuals provide authoritative foundations for soldier, leader, and collective training.


#### **15-4. The three major components of the training system**

The three major components of the training system—individual, training in units, and training support—also reflect the mutually supporting role and close balance needed within the system. Training does not operate in a vacuum. It is related to all other Army management systems, including personnel, research and development, resourcing, and logistics.

#### **15-5. Combined arms training strategy (CATS)**

**a. Overarching strategy.** The CATS is the Army's overarching strategy for the current and future training of the force. CATS also provides a foundation for quantifying and justifying required Army training resources, which feed into the budgeting process. These training strategies:

- Describe how the Army will train the total force to standard.
- Consist of unit, individual, and self-development training strategies.
- Identify, quantify, and justify the training resources required to execute the training.



**Figure 15-1. The Army Training System**

**b. Training strategies development.** The development of training strategies is the first step in designing training:

(1) The Army's Training Strategy provides a capstone strategy for unit, institutional, and self-development training to help ensure the operational readiness of the current and future force.

(2) There are both long- and short-range individual and collective training strategies. Development of these strategies involves decisions on who (unit) what (job or task), how (media, method), when, and where (site) to attain and sustain critical task performance proficiency. They establish the need for training and training programs, courses, products, and materials. These decisions are identified in supporting plans/models.

(3) A process overview would appear as follows:

- Long-range Strategies (3-20 years after execution year)
- Short-range Strategies (execution plus 2 years)
- Program/product design (execution year)

**c. Long-range training strategies.** Long-range training strategies are an initial determination of who (individuals or units) needs training, what type of training is needed, and where and when the training will take place. They cover the third year following the execution year and beyond. Training proponents add these requirements to appropriate plans/models to ensure resources are available for product development and/or training support.

**d. Short-range, or current training strategies.** Short-range, or current training strategies, are based on task analysis data. They are the training design (plan) to attain and sustain the desired level of performance proficiency on each critical task.

**e. Self-development.** Self-development is the individual's responsibility. The purpose of this training strategy is to assist individuals in developing a personal self-development training strategy. It provides a guide for individuals to posture themselves for promotion, better job, or self motivated improvement in personal performance.

**f. Self-motivated component.** The self-motivated component focuses on general recommendations that address skills and knowledge successful individuals have found beneficial to their career development. It consists of the training individuals personally take on to improve their performance, gain new or additional capabilities, or prepare for a new job prior to being assigned.

### **15-6. Future Army training**

**a. Distance learning (DL).** To meet the challenge of the future, the Army is in the process of implementing a DL system consisting of a network of information architectures and linkages to support all audiences— individuals, schools and units. The DL network will serve as the conduit through which soldiers, leaders, and units receive information and courseware that meet their specific needs to train and prepare for a broad spectrum of global contingencies. The use of automation technologies doesn't change performance standards expected of soldiers. The Army's DL vision is to transition from the current training framework into a 21st century model. DL does not fundamentally change the way the Army trains, it enhances the way it goes about training by using current and emerging technologies for management and delivery of training to the soldier when and where it is needed. Soldiers in the field, at units, institutions, and at home will train by accessing informational databases and tuning in to, rather than attending, traditional platform instruction. AA and RC units will select training options (resident and non-resident) based upon their need, time available to train, distance from the “on-site” training site, and other resource constraints. Reliance on traditional training methods will continue, but will be enhanced by the availability and use communications power of the commercial World Wide Web, Internet, and other information transfer systems. Exploiting these technologies takes the classroom to the unit, and the unit to the classroom, providing training in a worldwide virtual training environment. To attain this vision the Army has three primary initiatives, DL, Classroom XXI, and the Reimer Digital Library (RDL). DL is a concept for the delivery of training to the soldier when and where needed; it makes education/training learning facilities achievable. The Total Army DL Program documents and related materials are available on the Internet at <http://www-dcst.monroe.army.mil/adlp/distancelearning/index.html>. Registration for formal Army training including DL courses will be accomplished in the Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS). The U.S. Army Formal Schools Catalog (DA PAM 351-4) was last published in Oct 95. Current course information is available in ATRRS and on the ATRRS homepage <http://www.atrrs.army.mil>.

**b. Classroom XXI.** Classroom XXI is another major effort that will lead TRADOC into the 21st Century. It focuses on the leveraging of technology to use information in a variety of ways so as to increase the Army's warfighting capability. The TRADOC Classroom XXI

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Installation Master Plan is available on the Internet at <http://www-dcst.monroe.army.mil/crxxi/toc.htm>.

c. **RDL.** RDL is the information foundation to support Army XXI. It will provide an interactive library for trainers, training and combat developers, resource managers, and AA and RC soldiers world wide. The completed products are available on the Internet at the RDL Home Page (<http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdls.html>).

### **SECTION III THE POLICY, REQUIREMENTS, AND RESOURCING PROCESS**

#### **15-7. General**


The Policy, Requirements, and Resourcing Process for AA and RC is displayed in Figure 15-2. Input is provided by manpower programs (Chapter 5), force structure changes (Chapters 4, 6, and 7), and resourcing actions (Chapters 9, and 10). Training activities draw Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) appropriation funds from Budget Activity 3 (Training), and Budget Activity 2 (General Purpose Forces). Other contributing appropriations are National Guard Personnel, Army; Operations and Maintenance, ARNG, Reserve Personnel, Army; and Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve.

#### **15-8. Organization**

In October 1978, the Training Directorate was formed in ODCSOPS. The Training Directorate combines the functions of institutional and unit training and training support. It provides the Army a single point of contact for all issues which have training impact. Other DA staff elements which have a direct or indirect impact on the training systems are:

a. **Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Manpower and Reserve Affairs (OASA (M&RA)).** OASA(M&RA) has a training division to assist in the development, implementation, and review of policies and programs related to achieving the Army goal of effective and efficient training and education for the Total Army.

b. **Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER).** The DCSPER is responsible for linking personnel readiness and training. ODCSPER manages ATRRS and Resources System (ATRRS), the system that supports the Army's institutional training management process (Army Program for Individual Training (ARPRINT)). They manage execution year training program change requests driven by personnel readiness requirements through the training requirements arbitration panel (TRAP). DCSPER also manages administering the manpower requirements of the precommissioning programs for officers (USMA, ROTC, and OCS); and training for equal opportunity, and alcohol and drug abuse (Chapter 13 and 14)



**Figure 15-2. The Policy, Requirements, and Resource Process**

**c. U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC).** Objective is to obtain the quantity and quality of volunteers to meet Army requirements (Chapter 13).

**d. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM).** Projects training requirements for the AA, both officer and enlisted, by fiscal year. ODCSOPS allocates training spaces for AA officers and enlisted based on projected unit requirements and distribution policies.

**e. Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM).** Commands and controls all individual ready reserve (IRR) members. Provides individual training management to the IRR, both officer and enlisted (Chapter 7). It is responsible for OPMS-USAR and EPMS-USAR, and projects training requirements for USAR, both officer and enlisted, by fiscal year. ARPERCEN allocates training spaces for USAR officers and enlisted based on projected training requirements.

**f. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management).** Formulates the Army budget, issues manpower and dollar guidance, distributes funds to commands and agencies, and monitors obligation rates and reprogramming actions (Chapter 9).

**g. Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology).** Manages the life cycle of materiel and nonmateriel items used by individuals and units in mission performance (Chapter 11).

**h. Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG).** Responsible for logistics readiness of Army forces, to include supportability/maintainability of equipment in troop units (Chapter 12).

**i. Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT).** Responsible for Opposing Force (OPFOR) program and assisting ODCSOPS on intelligence training policy (Chapter 18).

**j. Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications and Computers (DISC4).** Provides policy and procedural guidance for Army visual information and multimedia support. Manages the Information Management Program Evaluation Group (PEG) which resources MACOM and installation visual information/training support center (VI/TSC) operations.

**k. Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG).** Projects training requirements and allocates course spaces internal to AMEDD.

**l. Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB).** The National Guard Bureau promulgates training policy for ARNG units through National Guard Regulation (NGR) 350-1. CNGB also programs the resources for NG training and allocates training spaces to the State. National Guard unit commanders are responsible for their units' training. FORSCOM establishes training criteria and supervises training of ARNG units. Policy and guidance are contained in FORSCOM/ARNG Regulation 350-2.

**m. Chief, Army Reserve (CAR).** The CAR programs training resources for the Army Reserve and monitors USAR training activities. The CAR manages professional development training for USAR officers, warrant officers, and senior noncommissioned officers through ARPERCEN (Chapter 7).


### 15-9. Requirements and resourcing

**a. Training PEG.** As one of the Army's six Title X PEGs, the Training PEG programs approximately \$7.8B of Army resources each year. The PEG manages all aspects of training dollars within all components, individual through unit. The Training PEG has 260 management decision packages (MDEPs). The Training PEG is chaired by the Director of Training, ODCSOPS and the ASA(M&RA). MDEP managers articulate and defend resource requirements to the PEG during the building of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). MDEP managers use various costing models to determine requirements.

**b. Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS).** ATRRS is the total Army system of record for resident and DL instruction. The database maintains three major segments. They are: (1) records the Army's institutional resident and distance learning training programs; (2) displays class schedules, individual training seat reservations, DL site information, and; (3) course statistical information (input and graduation data). ATRRS allows resource managers to develop individual training requirements, resource courses, and execute training programs based on its program scheduling, reservation and statistical information. It is also capable of supporting DL mission immediate training.

### 15-10. Development of the Army individual training requirements

**a. Development of individual training requirements.** The development of individual training requirements (Figure 15-3) for the AA begins with the identification of force structure authorizations from the Personnel Management Authorizations Document (PMAD) and AA Military Manpower Program (AAMMP). PMAD is produced semiannually, usually in August and January. PMAD displays authorizations at the MOS and grade level. The AAMMP is produced monthly and contains manning data such as AA end strength, monthly recruiting requirements, and inputs to training for seven fiscal years.




**Figure 15-3. Developing Training Requirements and Resourcing the Training Base**

**b. Military Occupational Specialty Level System (MOSLS).** Using the PMAD, the MOSLS process predicts AA (enlisted) skill requirements. MOSLS compares MOS and grade inventory, aged to the fiscal year under consideration by applying gain, loss, and promotion factors. The difference between the authorizations and the aged (to the fiscal year) inventory constitutes the number of trained soldiers, by skill, that must be produced from the training base (output). Applying training attrition rates at the skill level to the number provides the number required to begin training (input).

**c. Other training requirements.** Other training requirements are identified by PERSCOM for officer and enlisted in-service personnel who require training to support professional development, reenlistment or reclassification programs, and mission requirements. Additionally, PERSCOM solicits in-service training requirements from other MACOMs, State adjutants general, and other Services and agencies via the Total Army Centralized Individual Training Solicitations (TACITS). The TACITS survey is conducted annually. The accession-driven, in-service, and other task based training requirements are combined as total raw training requirements within the ATRRS. The ATRRS’ automated databases includes a list of Army task based training courses that includes length, capacity, frequency, and location. It also includes other Services’ courses attended by Army personnel. The task based requirements are translated into course requirements and become the total Army’s training requirements at the course level of detail by component and fiscal year.

**d. Training program development for each MOS.** After the training requirements for courses are developed, the next major task in the process is the development of the training program for each MOS. The first step in establishing a training program is the structure manning decision review (SMDR), co-chaired by ODCSPER and ODCSOPS. It includes representatives from ODCSPER, ODCSOPS, OTSG, TRADOC, AMC, Army Medical Department Center and School, PERSCOM, ARPERCEN, FORSCOM, NGB, OCAR, USAREC, ODCSLOG, OCE, other services, foreign military sales (FMS), international military education and training (IMET), and the individual proponent school. The purpose of the SMDR (Figure 15-4) is to reach a consensus within the Army for the institutional training program for the first and second POM years and any major changes for the upcoming budget year. Additionally, the SMDR validates training requirements, compares training requirements with school house current resource capabilities (facilities, billeting, manpower), and adjusts training requirements or training resources to form recommended training programs. The SMDR is conducted annually in October. Training requirements are initially established for the third POM year, validated for the second POM year (the primary focus of the SMDR), and “fine tuned” for the first POM year.



**Figure 15-4. Structure Manning Decision Review (SMDR)**

**e. SMDR categorization by course.** The SMDR categorizes each course. The first category is composed of those courses where the total training requirement can be trained with available resources. The second category consists of courses where the requirements exceed the resourced capability of the training base, but either resources can be provided or the requirements reduced to the resourced level without significant impact on the manning program. The third category is those courses where the requirement exceeds the capacity, requires significant resources, and cannot be reduced without significant impact on the manning program. These courses are termed “constrained.” The results of the SMDR are briefed to a council of colonels (COC) which attempts to confirm category two

adjustments/resources and move as many courses as possible from category three to category two.

**f. General officer steering committee (GOSC).** All courses in categories two and three are then referred to a GOSC. At that meeting, the general officers take action on the recommendations of the council of colonels. Each course remaining constrained is reviewed as to current authorizations, projected operating strength, training requirements, training capability, source of constraint, resources required to eliminate the constraint, availability of required resources, and a recommended course of action. That review results in a resourced training requirement that is called an approved training program for each course for that fiscal year.

**g. ARPRINT.** After the GOSC is completed, both the training requirement and the training program are published by ODCSPER in the ARPRINT. The ARPRINT is a mission document for the training base as well as the Army in terms of recruitment and professional development education. The ARPRINT identifies, by fiscal year, projected individual training requirements for established courses and for task based courses, where new courses are required. Based on identified training requirements, subsequent actions are taken to provide resources (manpower, money, facilities, ammunition, and equipment) to train the required number of soldiers. The desired flow of soldiers into the schools and training centers aids in development of class schedules to support the ARPRINT for each course. The class schedules are entered into ATRRS. TRADOC reviews the class schedules to ensure that they support the ARPRINT requirement and TRADOC scheduling policy. More information on ARPRINT is found in Chapter 17.

**h. Mobilization Planning System (MPS).** MPS is a subsystem of ATRRS and is designed to give training managers, at or above installation level, prompt access to information necessary to plan for implementation of the mobilization of the Army training base. MPS is used to produce the Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training (MOB ARPRINT) which provides a projection of trainee and student inputs by task based course to satisfy post mobilization requirements for trained manpower as determined by Mobilization Manpower Planning System (MOBMAN).


## SECTION IV

### TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND (TRADOC) ORGANIZATION.

#### 15-11. Training in institutions—general

Training in institutions (proponent schools) is managed by the TRADOC. Figure 15-5 shows the organization of Headquarters TRADOC.

**a. TRADOC responsibilities.** TRADOC is responsible for developing training and providing support for individual and unit training. This responsibility includes determining requirements for range, ammunition and target guidance, and training devices and facilities, as well as training courses, products, and programs.



**Figure 15-5. Headquarters, Training and Doctrine Command**

**b. Single manager for training.** The single manager for training in TRADOC is the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training (DCST). Within TRADOC, the DCST interfaces with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations Support (DCSBOS); Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments (DCSCD); Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine (DCSDOC); Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (DCSRM); and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management (DCSIM) in resource validation, safety and environment, battlefield organization and systems development, doctrine, and management information system areas, respectively. The DCST coordinates with PERSCOM for management of trainee accessions.

**c. DCST.** The DCST has the following directorates and activities to manage the TRADOC training program: Individual Training Directorate (ITD), Combat Training Center (CTC) Directorate, Training Development and Analysis Directorate (TDAD), Program Management Directorate (PMD), Training Operations Management Activity (TOMA), and Security Assistance Field Activity (SATFA). The DCST – West manages the CTC and Collective Training Directorates under the DCST.


**d. Army Training Support Center (ATSC).** The ATSC, a field operating agency of TRADOC, provides training support services for the planning and integration of products and programs that support individual and collective training in the AA and to the RC.

**e. HQDA.** HQDA authorizes direct communication between MACOMs and TRADOC; moreover, HQDA authorizes TRADOC to task non-TRADOC commands, schools, and agencies (except the Army Medical Center and School) to provide specialized subject materials for instruction with the The Army School System (TASS).

**SECTION V**  
**TRAINING DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM**

**15-12. The Systems Approach to Training (SAT)**

TRADOC is responsible for developing training and providing support for individual and unit training. Training is developed using the SAT model. The SAT is a disciplined, iterative, logical approach to making decisions about collective, individual, and self-development training for the Army. The approach, based on the model shown at Figure 15-6, helps users decide whether or not education/training is needed. Users then apply (Table 15-1) the approach to determine what to train, whom to train, how to train, what training support and resources are required, and how to assess training effectiveness as described in TRADOC Regulation 350-70. The systems approach makes certain that critical performance requirements of the Army establish the content of training in the training base and in the fielded force. The SAT involves five training-related phases: evaluation, analysis, design, development, and implementation. SAT phase functions and requirements are as shown at Table 15-1.



**Figure 15-6. Systems Approach to Training (SAT) Model**

**15-13. Automated Systems Approach to Training (ASAT)**

Under development is an ASAT “Train-the-Trainer” sustainment training of the ASAT software package. ASAT provides the capability to develop, produce, and manage doctrine and training information and products. ASAT provides the foundational information for the Standard Army Training System (SATS), the Automated Instructional Management System-Redesign (AIMS-R), and the Army Doctrinal Training Digital Library (ADTDL). This

integration across these major systems and all axes of ATXXI provides for real-time, doctrine and task based information shared from proponents to unit to any customer worldwide. The software outputs standardized products like field manuals, mission training plans (MTPs), drill books, and soldier training publications (STPs) as well as produces unlimited ad hoc outputs like task analysis matrices and Force XXI Training Strategies. ASAT also provides an electronic staffing capability using the aspects of its relational database to set forth leading edge technology for use in the build of the applications functionally.

## **SECTION VI THE ARMY SCHOOL SYSTEM**

### **15-14. The objectives of The Army School System (TASS)**

Training in schools is individual or collective training in the training base which uses approved programs of instruction and includes education/training which is structured, developed, and supported by a Service school, Service training center, or any educational institution under DOD sanction. The Army School System, through centers and schools, must provide recruits, noncommissioned officers, and officers with a solid foundation of individual tasks and standards with which they can become fully effective members of units. The peacetime and mobilization training base is part of an overall system that produces a well-trained, modern, mission-capable Army.

### **15-15. Total Army Training System (TATS)**

A TATS course is a single course designed to train the same MOS/AOC skill level, skill qualification identifier (SQI), additional skill identifier (ASI), language identifier code (LIC), and skill identifier (SI) within the Army (see Figure 15-7). It also includes MOS qualification (MOSQ, i.e., reclassification), Army leadership, functional, professional development, and civilian courses. The course's Army structure (phases, modules, tracks, lessons, tests) and media ensure standardization by training all soldiers (regardless of component) on course critical tasks to task performance standard

- Initial TATS Course redesign focuses on existing comparable AA and RC courses that are being redesigned.
- Officer Basic Courses (OBCs) and Warrant Officer Basic Courses (WOBCs) as well as initial entry and initial active duty training (IET/IADT) (which includes Basic Combat Training (BCT), Advanced Individual Training (AIT), and one-station unit training (OSUT)) are already considered as TATS Courses as they are "one-of-a-kind" courses attended by AA/RC soldiers at the same applicable AA training sites.
- All new development of training packages exported to TASS training battalions will be TATS Course training support packages (TSPs).


## How the Army Runs

<b>Table 15-1. SAT Phase Functions and Requirements</b>													
<b>SAT Phase</b>	<b>Requirements</b>												
Evaluation determines how well the training takes place, Army personnel / units perform, and products support training	<p>Evaluation reports with identified deficiencies and corrective actions.</p> <p>Follow-up on identified deficiencies.</p> <p>Validated training courses/products.</p> <p>Accredited training institutions IAW accreditation schedule.</p> <p>Certified instructors; qualified evaluators and training developers.</p> <p>Validated evaluation instruments.</p> <p>Master Evaluation Plan and supporting TD Project Management Plans as required.</p>												
<p>Analysis identifies—</p> <p>Need for training.</p> <p>Who gets the training.</p> <p>What tasks (collective and individual (including leader) tasks) and supporting skills and knowledge are critical.</p> <p>Note: A critical task is a collective or individual task a unit or individual must perform to accomplish their mission and duties and to survive on the battlefield and across the entire spectrum of military operations.</p>	<p>There are different types of analysis:</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Type</th> <th>Identify—</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Needs analysis</td> <td>Training solutions to the performance deficiency(ies).</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Mission analysis</td> <td>Recommendation(s) for non-training solutions to the performance deficiency(ies).</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Collective critical task analysis</td> <td>The requirement to improve training efficiency and effectiveness. TD requirement(s).</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Job analysis</td> <td>Mission list.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Individual critical task analysis</td> <td>Critical collective task list. Supporting individual tasks (as appropriate) Collective task performance specifications. Individual tasks performed as part of the critical collective task. Command-approved critical task list for a specific job/special category. Total task inventory by job; Individual task performance data; Statistical Analysis Report; Nominated critical task list; and, Collective-to-individual task matrix Individual task performance specifications, including task performance standard. Task analysis report. soldier training publications (STP) task summary data. Individual-to-collective task matrix. Individual-to-skill/knowledge matrix.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Type	Identify—	Needs analysis	Training solutions to the performance deficiency(ies).	Mission analysis	Recommendation(s) for non-training solutions to the performance deficiency(ies).	Collective critical task analysis	The requirement to improve training efficiency and effectiveness. TD requirement(s).	Job analysis	Mission list.	Individual critical task analysis	Critical collective task list. Supporting individual tasks (as appropriate) Collective task performance specifications. Individual tasks performed as part of the critical collective task. Command-approved critical task list for a specific job/special category. Total task inventory by job; Individual task performance data; Statistical Analysis Report; Nominated critical task list; and, Collective-to-individual task matrix Individual task performance specifications, including task performance standard. Task analysis report. soldier training publications (STP) task summary data. Individual-to-collective task matrix. Individual-to-skill/knowledge matrix.
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<p>Design determines—</p> <p>When, where and how the training takes place.</p> <p>Training resource requirements (instructors, equipment, ammo, ranges, facilities)</p>	<p>Establish unit, individual, and self-development long-range combined arms training strategies (CATS)/milestones.</p> <p>Establish short-range unit, individual, and self-development</p>												

<b>Table 15-1. SAT Phase Functions and Requirements</b>	
<b>SAT Phase</b>	<b>Requirements</b>
equipment, ammo, ranges, facilities)	CATS /milestones. Design training media/TADSS. Design individual Training courses. Produce student performance measurement documents, e.g., tests; exercises
Development produces validated training/ training products.	Write the training material, e.g., lessons plans, TSPs. Produce training media/TADSS. Validate the training material, including tests. Prepare material for reproduction. Reproduce the training material. Acquire training resources. Train instructor, training management, staff, faculty, and cadre. Prepare facilities and equipment.
Implementation executes— Standardized training at resident and unit training sites. Distribution of training products. Use of training products.	Distribute the training material. Schedule the training. Train the students/soldiers/units. Administer the tests/exercises. Counsel students/soldiers. Conduct After-Action Reviews (AARs). Maintain student records.

### **15-16. Enlisted Initial Entry Training (IET)**

IET is the introductory training given to all personnel on initial entry into the Army. It provides an orderly transition from civilian to military life, motivation to become a dedicated and productive member of the Army, introduction to the basic skills required by all members of the Army, and training to the apprentice level in those critical skills taught in the training base. At Department of the Army, the DCSOPS exercises general staff supervision of initial entry-level training except for AMEDD personnel. The CG, TRADOC is responsible for conducting IET, and accomplishes that task through the Deputy Commanding General for Initial Entry Training (DCG, IET) and the Commandants of the TRADOC schools and commanders of the U.S. Army Training Centers (USATCs). The DCG for IET focus is to ensure that IET remains challenging, safe, relevant, realistic, and executed to Army standards. The Army Medical Department Center and School performs this function for AMEDD personnel.



**Figure 15-7. Total Army Training System**

**a. Basic combat training (BCT).** BCT is nine weeks of training in basic military skills given to all newly enlisted personnel who have no or limited prior military service. BCT provides a logical progression of training to transition civilians into soldiers who are well-disciplined, motivated, physically fit, and proficient in basic combat survivability skills.

**b. Advanced individual training (AIT).** AIT occurs after completion of BCT. AIT builds on the soldierization skills acquired in BCT while developing each soldier to the level of proficiency required for the award of an MOS. Soldiers take one of two AIT paths:

- MOS training at a USATC.
- MOS training at a school.

**c. One station unit training (OSUT).** OSUT is conducted at one installation, in the same company-size unit, with the same cadre, and with one program of instruction. The OSUT mode is used for most combat arms MOSs (except Aviation) and selected combat support MOSs. OSUT integrates common skill and MOS-specific training in a single program.

**d. Split training option (STO).** STO permits selected individuals to enlist in the ARNG or USAR and complete Initial Active Duty for Training (IADT) in two phases separated by a period of not more than 12 months. The program is designed to attract students and seasonal workers to enlist in the ARNG or USAR by minimizing the lost time from education or employment.

### 15-17. Noncommissioned officer training

Institutional training is the primary source of the formal military training and education noncommissioned officers receive. It is here that NCOs train to perform critical tasks by

learning skills, knowledge, and attitudes (SKAs) that are essential to high-quality leadership. NCOES and other functional courses make up the institutional training pillar of NCO leader development. It provides progressive and sequential training for NCOs through four levels of schooling: primary leader development training for promotion to sergeant; basic and advanced (branch) training for promotion to staff sergeant and sergeant first class, respectively; and senior-level training for promotion to sergeant major (Figure 15-8). Functional courses are generally based on specific skills required for special assignments or duties.

### **15-18. NCO functional courses**

**a. Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC).** The primary-level training course for NCOs is PLDC. This is a non-MOS-specific, field-oriented leadership course built around basic soldier skills. PLDC is taught at NCO academies throughout the Army, and training focuses on the SKAs needed for team-leader level of leadership responsibilities at the rank of sergeant. Completion of PLDC is required for promotion to Sergeant.

**b. Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC).** BNCOC is the basic-level course of NCOES. It is taught using small-group instruction (SGI) with courses ranging from 4 to 20 weeks depending on the soldier's career management field (CMF). Training at BNCOC progressively and sequentially builds upon the instruction received in PLDC. BNCOC consist of a residence common core phase and one or more MOS/CMF phases conducted in residence and/or DL. Completion of BNCOC is required for promotion to Staff Sergeant.

**c. Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC).** The advanced-level course of NCOES is ANCOC. ANCOC prepares NCOs to assume the duties and responsibilities needed to lead a platoon-sized element. ANCOC has a common leadership core as well as hands-on and performance-oriented training to emphasize warfighting skills. As with BNCOC, ANCOC consist of a residence common core phase and one or more MOS/CMF phases conducted in residence and/or DL. Completion of ANCOC is required for promotion to sergeant first class.

**d. U.S. Army Sergeants Major Course (USASMC).** The Sergeants Major Course (SMC) is the capstone of NCOES. It prepares selected sergeants major and master sergeants for both troop and staff assignments. SMC is a prerequisite for promotion to sergeant major and appointment to the duty position of command sergeant major. For both AA and RC NCOs, this senior-level training is obtained through a permanent change-of-station (PCS) resident course taught at the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA), Fort Bliss, Texas, or through the two-year Corresponding Studies Program. AA NCOs are selected by an Army selection board. National Guard NCOs are chosen by a board commanded by the CNGB. Noncommissioned officer functional courses provide training for individuals selected for command sergeant major, first sergeant, and staff assignments.

**e. Command Sergeants Major Course (CSMC).** This is a one-week, task-based course designed to prepare master sergeants (promotable) and sergeants major to perform the duties and execute the responsibilities of a battalion command sergeant major.

<u>RANK</u>	<u>SKILL LEVEL</u>	<u>COURSES</u>	<u>TRAINING LEVEL AND LOCATION</u>
SGM	5	SGM COURSE	SR (SGM Academy)
MSG/1SG	5	1SG COURSE	SR (SGM Academy)
SFC	4	ANCOC	ADVANCED (NCOA)
SSG	3	BNCOC	BASIC (NCOA)
CPL/SPC	2	PLDC	PRIMARY (NCOA)
PVT	1	OSUT (CA) OR BCT/AIT (CS/CSS)	INITIAL ENTRY (ATC & SERVICE SCHOOLS)

NOTE: PLDC, BNCOC, AND ANCOC RC CONFIGURED COURSES TAUGHT AT ARNG ACADEMIES/SCHOOLS AND USARF

**Figure 15-8. Enlisted Training Program**

**f. First Sergeant Course (FSC).** The FSC is a branch immaterial, two-phased course consisting of an asynchronous DL Phase I and a resident/VTT Phase II. Phase II is conducted at multiple TASS locations. Phase I is managed by USASMA at Ft. Bliss, Texas. NCOs selected for attendance must be a first sergeant, master sergeant, or sergeant first class assigned or scheduled for assignment to first sergeant positions. Course awards SQI "M."

**g. Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officer Course (BSNCOC).** As with the FSC, the BSNCOC is a branch immaterial, two-phased course consisting of an asynchronous DL Phase I and a resident/VTT Phase II. Phase II is conducted either at Ft. Bliss, TX or Ft. McCoy, WI. Phase I is managed by USASMA at Ft. Bliss, Texas. Attendees must be staff sergeants or higher rank assigned or scheduled for assignment to enlisted ASI "2S" positions. The course awards ASI "2S."

**15-19. Warrant officer training**

The Warrant Officer (WO) Education System (WOES) established in 1993, is configured as shown in Figure 15-9. The Warrant Officer Career Center (WOCC) located at Fort Rucker, Alabama, is the Executive Agent for all common WO training. The WOCC exercises command and control over the Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS) as well as the Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC) and Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC). In addition to a revised education system, the Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP) resulted in the expansion of WO position coding by rank (WO1/CW2, CW3, CW4, and CW5). Expanded position coding is intended to eliminate assignments of WOs without regard to grade.


**a. Preappointment applicants.** Applicants for preappointment submit their files to the respective DA MOS proponent office for determination of eligibility. The evaluation/training process of qualified applicants requires; (1) selection by a centralized selection board (USAREC and State adjutants general), and (2) successful completion of WOCS, but no later than two years after appointment. The WOCS is a six-week course that provides standardized training to WO candidates. The WOCS is taught in a high stress environment where candidates are subjectively evaluated by training, advising, and counseling (TAC) Officers and academically evaluated through written examinations. All AA and RC candidates attend WOCS in residence at the WOCC. RC-configured WOCS is available for the USAR and ARNG candidates. Warrant officer candidates are appointed to WO1 upon graduation from WOCS.

**b. Branch Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC).** Immediately following WOCS, newly appointed WOs attend their branch WOBC to be certified as MOS qualified. Courses vary in length from 4 to 39 weeks depending on the technical nature of the MOS. Many WOBCs are RC-configured or may be challenged through test based alternative certification programs. Some WO certification training, such as flight training, is available only in resident mode.

**c. Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC).** At six year WO service, WOs are automatically enrolled in the nonresident phase of the WOAC. Upon selection for promotion to CW3 (three years time in grade for ARNG), WOs are scheduled to attend Phase II, WOAC at their respective branch schools.

**d. Warrant Officer Staff Course (WOSC).** Upon selection to CW4, WOs are scheduled to attend the WOSC. The WOSC, a five-week common course at the WOCC is intended to prepare WOs for higher-level assignments requiring broadened staff and technical skills.

**e. Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course (WOSSC).** CW4s selected for promotion to the grade of CW5 are scheduled to attend the WOSSC. The WOSSC is a two-week Army common training course at the WOCC, which provides the most senior Army WOs with broad “how the Army runs” knowledge to operate effectively at the highest organizational levels of the Army.



**Figure 15-9. Warrant Officer Education System**

**15-20. Lieutenants’ training**


Lieutenants’ training consists of the Officer Basic Course (OBC) conducted by the officer’s basic branch school and other required resident functional training. OBC will focus on the lieutenant’s first assignment and will prepare him or her to lead, train, sustain, and fight as a part of a unit. POIs are structured to provide a mix of training and education in leadership and ethics, tactics, training the soldier, equipment maintenance, unit logistics, and specialty-unique subjects. OBC prepares officers for their first duty assignment. OBC and its relationship to other officer training is shown in Figure 15-10.

**15-21. Captains’ training**

Training for captains includes Captains’ Career Course (CCC); resident and nonresident functional training, as required; task based training; and the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3).

**a. CCC.** The mission of CCC is to produce technically and tactically competent officers who are professionally qualified for their next assignment (especially command) and prepared for future development. CCC contains a core of common and branch-specific tasks which all students study and a series of modules which are individually selected for each student based on an area of concentration, experience, or professional development requirements. Additional modules of up to six weeks are available to provide training for the next assignment. The common component of the CCC core consists of leadership training, combined arms, combat service support, and other mandatory instruction directed by HQDA and HQ TRADOC. The branch component of the core consists of those tasks required by all captains in the branch. Length and content is determined by each commandant and varies by branch. Commandants also determine the number and length of modules within the 20-week CCC and the number and type of add-on modules which provide intensive training for the next assignment. In the combat service support (CSS) branches, the CCC curriculum includes

five weeks of branch training, seven weeks of common core, and eight weeks of multifunctional material. Multifunctional tasks are those shared tasks which are common to the CSS grouping.



**Figure 15-10. Officer Training System**

**b. Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3).** CAS3 provides training for captains in staff skills required at battalion, brigade, division, and installation level and serves as a transition to field grade responsibilities. It emphasizes staff interaction and develops skills in thinking, analyzing, decision-making, and defending decisions in an intense small-group environment. Subject matter includes logistics, training management, budget, mobilization, deployment, and combat operations.

**15-22. Field grade training**

Training for field grade officers consists of Command and General Staff Officers' Course (CGSOC) or equivalent, battalion and brigade Pre-Command Course (PCC), Senior Service College (SSC), and other resident and nonresident functional training, as required.

**a. CGSOC.** The CGSOC mission is to prepare officers for field grade command and principal staff positions. It concentrates instruction on command and staff skills required to plan and to implement the AirLand Operations doctrine at division level and above in the field Army and on skills needed for high-level TDA assignments. The Advanced Military Studies Program (AMSP) provides selected officers enhanced professional development in staff skills required in the tactical and operational employment of combined arms formations. Officers are selected during their year tour as a student in the CGSOC. Following graduation from AMSP, Army students are assigned to operational duties at division and corps headquarters.

**b. Joint professional military education (JPME).** The Army is working closely with the Joint Staff to ensure that its intermediate and senior command and staff colleges receive full accreditation for JPME. Army is implementing changes in military and faculty mix and course curriculum to meet joint professional military education requirements. Once an officer has completed this phase of his or her military education, he or she is then qualified in Phase I of JPME. Selected officers will then attend a special 9 or 11-week course at the restructured Armed Forces Staff College. Graduates of this course will be qualified in Phase II of JPME.

**c. Pre-Command Course (PCC).** AA and RC commanders selected for battalion and brigade command attend the PCC prior to assuming their assignments. Officers attend a one to two-week course conducted by their branch. Here, the command designees receive necessary branch technical and tactical training. The designees then attend a one-week course conducted at Fort Leavenworth that includes command team training for the commander and spouse. Selected command designees are then enrolled in the two-week Tactical Commanders' Development Program, a course that focuses on synchronization on the battlefield. Designees may also attend legal, logistics, and language training as they believe their requirements dictate.

**d. Army War College.** The Army War College prepares officers for senior leadership in the Army, Defense, and related departments and agencies by professional military education in national security affairs, with emphasis on the development and employment of military forces in land warfare. The resident course lasts 44 weeks. Its parallel is a corresponding studies version which takes two years and includes two two-week resident phases.

### **15-23. General officer training**

General officer training has historically not been formalized. Preparation has been through varied assignments over the course of a career. General officer training now consists of various functional and assignment-specific courses. Initiatives to institutionalize training (some as a result of the Professional Development of Officers Study) include: (1) The "CAPSTONE" seven-week course through the National Defense University, which includes visits to MACOMs and Services to enhance understanding of key factors influencing planning for and employment of U.S. forces in joint and combined operations; (2) Brigadier General transition ("charm school"), eight days; (3) Army Force Management GO/SES Course; (4) Leadership Development Program through several accredited civilian institutions; (5) Division/Assistant Division Commander Course at Fort Leavenworth, one week; and (6) Joint Warfighting Course conducted jointly by the U.S. Army War College and Air War College at Maxwell AFB, two weeks, on campaign planning and employment of Services and joint forces.

### **15-24. Self development training**

Self-development is the individual's responsibility. The purpose of this strategy is to assist individuals in developing a personal self-development training strategy. It provides a guide for individuals to posture themselves for promotion, better job, or self-motivated improvement in personal performance (see Figure 15-11).

#### IV-2-6. Self-development Training Strategies

**Description.** Self-development is the individual's responsibility. The purpose of this strategy is to assist individuals in developing a personal self-development training strategy. It provides a guide for individuals to posture themselves for promotion, better job, or self-motivated improvement in personal performance. It is created for each enlisted and warrant officer MOS, officer AOC, or civilian career field for which DA has responsibility for training. It is published as Part 2 of the Career Development Model. The self-development training strategy consists of directed and self-motivated components.

(1)The directed component identifies training required (or suggested) by the Army for promotion or performance improvement. This includes activities to ---

(a)Prepare for the next higher level of responsibility (i.e., prepare for promotion).

(b) Function in the current duty assignment.

(c) Develop leadership capability (improve personal ability to perform common core leadership tasks and the nine competencies identified in FM 22-100, Military Leadership).

(d)Prepare for the phase/module of a training course.

(e)Meet required/recommended reading level requirements.

(2)The self-motivated component focuses on general recommendations that address skills and knowledge successful individuals have found beneficial to their career development. It consists of the training individuals personally take on to improve their performance, gain new or additional capabilities, or prepare for a new job prior to being assigned. Recommended activities include ---

(a)Education levels, college degrees, or college level courses.

(b)Professional reading.

(c)IMI (e.g., computer-based instruction [CBI]).

(d)Other self-development activities found in Army Learning Centers (ALCs)/

Distance Learning Classrooms.

(e)Certificates, licenses, and degrees recommended by Branch proponent.

**Note:** See Chapter VI-4, Individual Training Design: Individual Training Strategies and Course/Product Design for a sample Career Development Model.

**Figure 15-11. Excerpt from TRADOC Reg 350-70**

#### 15-25. Mobilization Training Base

The mobilization training base is tasked to ensure that soldiers arrive in-theater, ready to fight as teams or individual replacements. It must provide combat-ready soldiers who are proficient in those skills that ensure their immediate contribution and survival as members of teams/crews/units in a theater of operations.

**a. Levels of mobilization.** The training base will accomplish its task by planned expansion geared to varying levels of mobilization. During Presidential Reserve Call-Up (PRC) and partial mobilization, existing USATCs and Service Schools are augmented by elements of USAR Divisions (institutional training). Reserve Reception Battalions are also activated during phased mobilization to augment reception stations. USAR assets scheduled to expand or augment the training base are under the peacetime control of USARC, but placed under the command of TRADOC during the establishment and execution of the mobilization training base. Primary planning emphasis for mobilization expansion of the training base is on partial mobilization, with pre-deployment MOS/AOC certification of mobilized IRR members the primary mission.

**b. PRC and Partial Mobilization.** During PRC and Partial Mobilization, all peacetime training programs continue, with the IRR in-processing certification training mission being added.

**c. Mobilization planning guidance.** Detailed planning guidance for mobilization is contained in the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System (AMOPES) and TRADOC's Mobilization, Planning, and Execution System (TMOPES).

## **SECTION VII TRAINING IN UNITS**

### **15-26. General**

Training in units includes individual and collective systems-oriented training in units, combined arms and support training, joint and combined operations and interoperability training, and training in the TDA Army. A model of the system is at Figure 15-12. The Army training mission is to prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to deploy, fight, and win in combat at any intensity level, anywhere, anytime. The training focus is on the Army's wartime missions. The Army's program for training in units is explained in FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25-101, *Battle-Focused Training*.


### **15-27. Organization for training in units**

**a. Training and Doctrine Command.** TRADOC is responsible for conducting initial-entry training, developing combat-leader training, and supports unit training to include doctrinal and training literature, and TADSS. Additionally, TRADOC provides guidance for ranges, targets, and ammunition.

**b. Army Training Support Center (ATSC).** ATSC, a TRADOC field operating agency located at Fort Eustis, Virginia, is the Army's headquarters for the management and distribution of training support products. The mission of ATSC is to manage the production, procurement, warehousing, and delivery of training support products in support of individual and collective training in America's Army.

**c. Troop units.** Central Command (CENTCOM) Forces Command (FORSCOM); U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR); Eighth U.S. Army (EUSA); U.S. Army, South (USARSO); U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USARSOC); and U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC). All are tasked to organize, equip, station, train, and maintain the readiness of assigned units.

**d. U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC).** The training mission for AMC is directed toward specialized training of personnel in the materiel area, to include planning for and conducting New Equipment Training (NET) in coordination with FORSCOM, TRADOC, and other field commands. AMC is further tasked to assist TRADOC and FORSCOM on matters associated with supply and maintenance concepts, doctrine, training and individual and collective training products.



**Figure 15-12. The Forces Training System**

**e. The U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM).** USAMEDCOM provides health services for the Army in CONUS, Panama, Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories in the Pacific, and professional education and training for Army Medical Department (AMEDD) and other personnel as directed. The AMEDD center and school is responsible for the execution of the training management function for the AMEDD. It provides training and education to all AMEDD personnel, on a worldwide basis.

### 15-28. Training of soldiers and leaders in units

**a. Concept.** Soldiers learn common tasks and a selected portion of their MOS/branch critical tasks in the training base and are then transferred to field units. Unit commanders are responsible for integrating task training under the battle-focus concept.

**b. Goal.** The goal of unit training is to develop and sustain capability to deploy rapidly and fight effectively in a variety of environments as combined arms teams. Unit training includes the requirement to teach those tasks not trained in the training base as well as sustaining unit mission-related tasks which were taught. Also included in unit training is the development of unit leaders as well as the development of the interdependencies and teamwork that make up team performance (collective training).

**c. System for training soldiers and leaders in units.** Soldiers newly assigned to a unit must be initially trained on those wartime tasks since the TRADOC School and/or NCOES cannot train all tasks in the resident mode. The commander must define his or her mission-essential task list and relate his or her training program to it. This focus will provide the trainer with the definition of what collective and individual training must be performed. The unit's individual training program is a major portion of daily training and must be intensely

managed. The system for training soldiers and leaders in units is depicted at Figure 15-13. Training of soldiers in units depends on qualified noncommissioned officer trainers. NCOs have the task of continuing the training new soldiers began in the training base.

### **15-29. Soldier training publications**


STPs consisting of soldier's manuals and training guides support this training in units.

**a. Soldier's Manual (SM).** SMs support training of common, shared, and branch-specific critical tasks in both the training base and in the unit. Each task summary describes the minimum acceptable standard and the conditions under which the task must be performed, lists the references soldiers need to master the task, and provides a guide to evaluate hands-on performance. Proponent schools develop branch-specific SMs that provide conditions, standards, and performance information to support training and evaluation of tasks at each skill level. The U.S. Army publishes two Soldier's Manuals of Common Tasks (SMCT) that provide similar information for the Skill Levels 1-4 common tasks. These are tasks that soldiers must know to fight, survive, and win on the battlefield.

**b. Training Guide (TG).** The TG is a tool to guide the unit trainers and individual soldiers in establishing an individual training plan. The TG includes the career development model (job specific) with the long-range training strategy for the CMF, the short-range training strategy for each included skill level, and the self-development strategy for each skill level. It also includes cross training strategy (if appropriate).

### **15-30. Collective training**

Collective training refers to developing in a group of soldiers those interdependencies and teamwork that go to make up team performance. The terms "collective training" and "unit training" cannot be used interchangeably. Unit training includes collective and individual training (the training of soldiers and leaders). The primary features of collective training are that it is decentralized and performance-oriented. Performance-oriented collective training is training units to do the same tasks or missions that they will do in wartime, and to do them well enough to ensure success on the battlefield. The performance objective is the basis of the performance-oriented approach. Training is conducted to attain the objective. Included within the training objective are the tasks, conditions, and evaluation standards. The standards are used to determine the unit's ability to accomplish the task and are measured in GO/NO GO terms. The evaluation is designed to be used to develop timely remedial training programs.



**Figure 15-13. System for Individual Training in Units**

### 15-31. Risk management

The training mission cannot be considered fully successful if it is not accomplished safely. The principles of integration and risk management have special relevance to the training situation. Commanders must integrate safety as a training management factor from the moment the mission is defined and the METL is developed. When safety is realistically integrated in training, the benefits extend to the garrison environment, off-duty activities, and most importantly, to the combat arena.

### 15-32. Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP)

Using ARTEP manuals, which include battle drills and MTPs, commanders evaluate and develop collective training based on unit weaknesses, then train to overcome those weaknesses and reevaluate. During training, the unit leadership continuously evaluates the performance of individuals and units against the prescribed standards. This “train-evaluate-train” philosophy acknowledges that observed deficiencies are noted by the commander and become the focus of follow-on training.

### 15-33. ARTEPs, mission training plans (MTPs) and drills

There are MTPs for each type TOE/MTOE platoon, company, battalion, combined arms task forces, and brigade, division, and corps staffs. The MTPs provide a clear description of “what” and “how” to train to achieve critical wartime mission proficiency for each unit echelon. Each MTP contains mission outlines, sample situational and field training exercises (STXs and FTXs), and comprehensive detailed training and evaluation outlines. MTPs provide other training management aids such as leader tasks, resource requirements, and evaluation methods. Included are matrices linking collective tasks to missions, references to

collective tasks, drills/ collective tasks to individual tasks, and STXs to missions. The MTP is based on the training principles listed in FM 25-100.

### **15-34. Combat Training Center (CTC) Program**

The CTC Program consists of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), and the National Training Center (NTC). The CTC Program has had the most significant influence on Army training, doctrine, and combat readiness of any program in recent years. The objective of the CTC Program is to provide highly realistic and stressful joint and combined arms training according to Army doctrine. This training simulates combat. Specifically, the CTC Program was established to: (1) increase unit readiness for deployment and warfighting; (2) produce bold, innovative leaders through stressful tactical and operational exercises; (3) embed doctrine throughout the Army; (4) provide feedback to Army and joint/combined participants; and (5) provide a data source for lessons learned to improve doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and materiel focused on soldiers.

**a. Battle Command Training Program (BCTP).** The BCTP, located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has a three-part mission. First, BCTP trains corps and division commanders, their battle staffs, subordinate divisions, and maneuver and separate brigades, to conduct the full range of military operations with a focus on combat operations. Second, it prepares selected Army organizations to operate in a joint/combined environment as Army Component or nucleus to a JTF. Third, BCTP conducts contingency support operations as required. BCTP provides division and corps commanders and their battle staffs advanced combat training opportunities through the medium of state-of-the-art automated battle simulations. The BCTP organization consists of four operations groups, and a standardized professional opposing force known as the “World Class OPFOR.” The program is conducted in three phases, generally within the first six months of a new commander’s tour.

(1) *Phase I.* Phase I is the commander’s seminar, which focuses on team building. The seminar lasts five days and enables the commander and his or her battle staff to participate in AirLand Operations discussions, threat doctrine/force structure updates, decision exercises, and training simulation familiarization.

(2) *Phase II.* Phase II, called WARFIGHTER, is an intensive five to seven day command post exercise using the Corps Battle Simulation (CBS). The WARFIGHTER exercise pits the division or corps against a “thinking” OPFOR, which fights to win. Integration of SOF, CSS, IO, and public affairs operations into all BCTP training scenarios provides corps and division commanders the opportunity to conduct full dimensional operations. Phase III is a comprehensive after-action review (AAR) package given to the unit following each WARFIGHTER exercise. Corps, division, ARNG brigade and selected AA brigade commanders participate in a WARFIGHTER exercise and seminar early in their command tour.

**b. Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC).** The CMTC, located at Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, provides joint and combined arms training focused on developing leadership of battalion task forces in the mid to high intensity environments. CMTC provides an annual opportunity for USAREUR battalions to train in a realistic battlefield environment. Through integration of instrumentation and observer-controllers (OCs), the CMTC gathers valuable information for unit after-action reviews and Army lessons learned CMTC has a

permanent OPFOR and a fully operational instrumentation system. The CMTC provides several unique training opportunities including computer simulations exercises and company situational training exercise (STX) training. The USAREUR Leaders Training Program (ULTP) is focused on training task force battle staffs and allows the unit to conduct two computer simulation exercises prior to force-on-force missions. CMTC provides OC teams to begin working with the task force during both computer exercises. Company STX training is also included in the rotational density and allows the brigade leadership to conduct EXEVALs while deployed to CMTC. The STX support package includes both OC and OPFOR participation. Increased emphasis is placed on full brigade operations while maintaining the training focus at the maneuver battalion task force level. Each USAREUR brigade headquarters is presented with an excellent opportunity to synchronize its battlefield operating systems (BOS) by its units operating in simultaneous force-on-force and simulated environments. CMTC's current combat model for continuous operations, allows for two battalion task forces, and selected aviation assets to simultaneously maneuver under brigade control several times during each brigade rotation. Currently, CMTC conducts 15 battalion-size task force rotations each year. Additionally, CMTC devotes 52 days annually to German Army and other NATO unit training.

**c. Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC).** The JRTC, located at Ft. Polk, Louisiana, provides an advanced level of joint training for Army and Air Force contingency forces exercising an infantry brigade task force and joint special operations forces under tough, realistic conditions ranging from stability and support operations (SASO) to war in deployment and tactical operations under realistic conditions. All light (non-mechanized) maneuver battalions will be afforded the opportunity to train at the JRTC during standard rotations. The goal is for each AA brigade to train at the JRTC or another CTC once every 24 months while RC brigades will train at a CTC once every 48 months. JRTC conducts 10 rotations annually. JRTC rotations are brigade rotations consisting of two battalions (force-on-force) plus a CPX battalion. One rotation is reserved for a National Guard separate brigade and one for a USASOC battalion during each fiscal year. Every other year, a rotation is reserved for a brigade-level Partnership for Peace (PFP) exercise. The intermediate staging base (ISB) activities are planned and conducted by elements of corps support groups (CSG) or area support groups (ASG), which provide a range of services from joint PSYOP/civil affairs units to replacement detachments. Approximately 6,500 RC soldiers participate in training at the JRTC annually. Joint and combined arms operations are the norm at JRTC. Air Force elements from Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command participate in every rotation. United States Marine Corps (USMC) air, naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) teams and close air support aircraft participate frequently. Rotations include Army special forces units, often with augmentation from Air Force special operations and Navy sea, air, land team (SEAL) personnel. Rotations also include the attachment of an armor or mechanized company/team to the light brigade. Initiatives incorporated at the JRTC include civilians and media on the battlefield, terrorist events, host nation operations, civil-military operations, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) integration during rotations, and the development of peace operations scenarios for rotational units.

**d. National Training Center (NTC).** The NTC, located at Fort Irwin, California, provides tough, combined arms and services training in accordance with Joint/Airland operations doctrine for brigade combat teams and regiments in a mid- to high-intensity environment, while retaining the training feedback and analysis focus at battalion task force

level. Additionally, the NTC provides a lessons-learned data source for training, doctrine, organization, and equipment improvements. Comprised of 636,300 acres in the California Mohave Desert with sophisticated targetry and fully instrumented battlefield, the NTC maneuver space allows for doctrinal array of high-speed armored forces with realistic movement and engagement distances. Currently, the NTC conducts ten 28-day rotations, training over 50,000 AA and RC soldiers per year. Rotation training units include two battalion task forces in a brigade combat team (-), with some rotations exercising mixed mobility by adding a light, airborne, or air assault infantry battalion task force in brigade operations. The rotation strategy now includes the heavy division cavalry squadrons and aviation brigades (-). Additionally, RC CS/CSS units are routinely integrated into rotational support operations. Training scenarios are based on the battalion/brigade's METL while conducting continuous operations. Training units face two major challenges by conducting live fire operations at the battalion task force level, and force-on-force using MILES up to brigade level. Full-time OCs provide training, coaching, and monitoring to their counterparts while also controlling the training exercise. A fully instrumented battlefield provides the necessary visual and computerized graphic AAR data that allows the OCs to accomplish their multifaceted roles. A dedicated, well-trained OPFOR using representative equipment, weapons, and tactics of a motorized rifle regiment provides the training unit a realistic tactical environment.

### **15-35. Unit training management**

The Army must prepare to cope with the future demands of the year 2000 and beyond. Training management will be complicated by constrained resources, force restructuring, the introduction of new doctrine and organizational concepts related to it, and the continuing requirement for individual training in the unit. Effective training programs and exercises must be designed to get the most use from available resources.

**a. Training management.** Training management is the process commanders and their staffs use to plan training and to identify the related resources needed to conduct and evaluate training. It involves all echelons and applies to every unit in the Army regardless of strength, mission, organization, or equipment. Training management must work in unison with other unit programs to achieve the common goal—a well-trained unit. FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, has application for leaders at all levels and for every type organization. The principal focus is on AA and RC battalion equivalent and higher-level commanders, their Command Sergeants Major, and staff. TRADOC has developed FM 25-101, *Battle-Focused Training*, that complements FM 25-100 on the importance of battle focus in training and applies to battalion and company soldiers, leaders, and units. This FM provides practical “how to” guidelines for officers and NCOs, including techniques and procedures for planning, executing, and assessing training.

**b. Army training management publications.** The FM 25 series manuals, TC 25 series circulars, and AR 350-41, *Training in Units* establish the system and policy for Army training management. The manuals provide commanders with a management system they can use to plan training; take necessary resource actions; and evaluate soldier and unit proficiency, training, and training management. They describe long-range, short-range, and near-term planning and the related resource actions. Execution of training, evaluation, and organizational assessment are also described. The methods and examples presented in these manuals have proved successful in units throughout the Army.

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**c. Standard Army Training System (SATS).** SATS provides unit commanders with automation support to facilitate the execution of the training management process described in FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, FM 25-101, *Battle-Focused Training*, and FM 100-5 *Operations*, and other related documents. It accomplishes this by enabling unit commanders to use their existing office automation systems to perform functions such as—

- Access relevant training management documents and records, such as MTPs, STPs, drills, the CATS and others as available.
- Perform nearly all analyses inherent in the training management process, such as ammunition forecasts and assessments.
- Identify resource requirements for training activities.
- Prepare and print required schedules, calendars, and reports.

(1) *Mission essential task list (METL)*. SATS integrates key management functions which support developing the METL to determine training requirements, planning, resourcing, scheduling, and the assessment of training in units. It assists the management of training from company through corps, and serves as the Army's single, standard training management tool.

(2) *Automated Systems Approach to Training*. SATS utilizes data created by the ASAT software application. ASAT is used by proponent developers to create task-based data and associated information necessary for units to effectively and efficiently conduct training.

(3) *Battle focus*. This module contains the METL development process from mission identification to METL Worksheet development; requesting METL approval; to inputting approved METL information. It also provides for the development of non-documented local missions and tasks that may not appear in a published MTP. In addition it facilitates the crosswalking of individual soldier common and MOS tasks to each approved METL task along with other supporting collective task associated with the METL.

(4) *Planning*. Training strategies, long and short range plans, training calendars, coordination details, training schedules, and training resource projections are developed in this module.

(5) *Execution/assessment*. Training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs) may be printed from this module as well as exporting of training execution matrices (TEM) to the training feedback module (TFM), evaluation of training (either using paper T&EOs or the automated TFM), input of the evaluation results back into SATS, the commander's subsequent assessment of task preparedness, and the recording of the actual resource expenditures.

(6) *SATS - additional tools*. Additional tools provided as part of the SATS "suite of tools" are the TSP module, the TFM, and other support tools which can be found in the Commander's Toolbox which is hosted on the SATS web site.

(7) *Training support package (TSP)*. The TSP automatically extracts task, unit, and planning data from SATS for the creation of unit TSP to support all forms of training. TSPs developed with this module can be created at any level and shared with other units Army wide using this module. The TFM also extracts the same type of data for the purpose providing an automated observer/controller tool. The TFM will provide task evaluation and

after-action reporting data back into SATS for unit commander assessments, to the Center of Army Lessons Learned for archive and general information, and to the ASAT for product improvement.

**d. Reserve Component Automation System (RCAS).** RCAS is an automated information system that supports the decision-making needs of all commanders, staffs, and functional managers responsible for RC forces. The RCAS uses state-of-the-art office automation, telecommunications, databases, and processing capability to provide timely and accurate information for planning, preparation, and execution of mobilization and to improve the accomplishment of routine administrative demands. It is a self-sufficient system capable of exchanging data with related information systems. The RCAS will link all Army Reserve Component (ARNG and USAR) units, mobilization stations, and MACOMs. The training management portion of RCAS is SATS and will automate training management for the RC. It will be able to interface with ATRRS.

### **15-36. Army modernization training (AMT)**


AR 350-35, *Army Modernization Training (AMT)*, provides policy and procedures and assigns responsibilities for the planning and execution of new systems training. The regulation provides a process for the expeditious integration of equipment into the force structure through NET, displaced equipment training (DET), doctrine and tactics training (DTT), and sustainment training (ST).

**a. NET.** NET is designed to support force integration and modernization through identification of personnel, training, and training devices required to support new or improved equipment; by planning for the orderly transfer of knowledge from the materiel developer to the trainer, user, and supporter by documenting requirements in NET plans (NETPs); and the deployment of NET teams (NETT) to train soldiers to operate, maintain, and provide instruction on modernized equipment. NET is tied to the System Acquisition Management Process (Chapter 11). The interface of NET and this process is shown in Figure 15-14.

**b. DET.** DET applies to systems that are being replaced by new equipment, but remain in the inventory. Planning for and executing DET is similar to the process used in NET; the objectives of both training DET planning differs: FORSCOM and USARPAC, as applicable, are responsible for planning DET for the USAR, CNGB for the ARNG, and TRADOC for programs are the same.

**c. DTT.** DTT is conducted in conjunction with NET or DET. DTT provides commanders, battle staffs, operators, and trainers with a doctrinal basis for employment of new or displaced materiel.

**d. ST.** ST is a command responsibility. The training base shares the responsibility for ST by assuring that a pool of trained replacements is established to support the sustainment effort. The ultimate responsibility for ST, however, remains with the commander.



**Figure 15-14. New Equipment Training: Planning Process**

**15-37. The Security Assistance Training Program (SATP)**

**a. Security Assistance Training Program.** SATP consists of U.S. military training assistance to eligible countries. Security assistance includes all training of international military personnel conducted within Department of Defense (DOD) activities under the *Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961* as amended, and the *Arms Export Control Act (AECA)* as amended. The components of the SATP are the following:

- IMET (under FAA) represents education and training provided for which the military departments are reimbursed from foreign assistance appropriations.
- FMS (under AECA) covers the sale of defense articles, services, and training to eligible foreign governments and international organizations. These sales are reimbursed as required by law.
- Counter-narcotics, peacekeeping and other international training programs are sometimes included under the security assistance umbrella.

**b. HQDA executive agent.** CG, TRADOC has been designated as HQDA executive agent for security assistance training provided by the U.S. Army. The CG, TRADOC discharges these responsibilities through the TRADOC DCST, the Security Assistance Training Field Activity, and the Security Assistance Training Management Office at Fort Bragg, NC.

**c. Objectives of the SATP.** The objectives of the SATP are the following:

- Develop skills needed for effective operation and maintenance of equipment acquired from the United States.
- Assist the foreign country in developing expertise and systems needed for effective management and operation of its defense establishment.


## How the Army Runs

- Foster the foreign country's development of its own professional and technical training capability.
- Promote U.S. military rapport with the armed forces of the foreign country.
- Promote democratic ideals such as civilian control of the military and establishment of effective military justice system.
- Promote better understanding of the United States, its people, political system, institutions, and way of life through a DOD-sponsored Information Program.
- Increase the international military student's awareness of the U.S. commitment to the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights.

## SECTION VIII THE TRAINING SUPPORT SYSTEM

### 15-38. Training support—general

Training support provides the foundation on which the Army training system runs. That foundation includes training management, training facilities, ranges, advanced collective training facilities, troop schools, equipment and supplies, training land, ammunition, devices and simulators, simulations, resident course materials, extension training materials, publications, visual information materials, learning centers, video teletraining, correspondence courses, and evaluation/ standardization. This foundation enables the training system to meet Army training needs with trained individuals and units. The system model is at Figure 15-15.



**Figure 15-15. The Training Support System**

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### 15-39. Organization for training support

**a. Army Training Support Center.** The ATSC is tasked to standardize, publish, and distribute the bulk of training support products, which are developed at the Service schools as described earlier. Each MACOM manages installation VI/TSC for "One-Stop Service" VI documentation of operations and field exercises, training support queries, products, and coordination through ATSC to proponent schools and activities for new requirements.

**b. Process.** The Training Support System provides training materials and services supporting the training base and unit training programs including resident training. It provides the processes as well as the manuals, visual information/multimedia products, simulators, devices, real estate, ranges, ammunition, and other tools necessary to conduct training in units and institutions. It is a multibillion dollar program.

**c. Automated Systems Approach to Training.** The ASAT provides education/training products and materials to the RDL for distribution.

**d. RDL.** The RDL is the primary means of identifying products that will provide field commanders and trainers with the exportable education/training materials necessary to support training outside the U.S. Army service schools. Exportable training includes both collective and individual training and is based on tasks, conditions, and standards. It is specifically designed for use in the field or garrison training environments to bring both individuals and units to the desired level of training. The MACOM and operational units, like TRADOC, also get involved in the preparation of training materials, but on a limited scale. The remainder of this section will examine the principal training support available.

### 15-40. New training technologies

**a. Simulations.** OPTEMPO and ammunition costs are expected to continue to increase for the foreseeable future. This coupled with a decline in maneuver and range land will warrant the continued expansion and integration of simulations into the training base. Embedded or strap-on simulation systems in the future will provide the leaders and operators with realistic training within units by training on the actual equipment. Seamless simulation technologies can expand training horizons available beyond the confines of a unit.

**b. Distributed interactive simulation (DIS).** This concept calls for the linking of all types of unit training into the same network. The capability would permit the wide-scale integration of various simulation systems and live training without regard to geographical constraints. Thus, an early-deploying RC unit could play the same scenario as its forward-deploying counterpart. The tactical, operational, and strategic battlefield operating systems can provide the common skeletal foundation for this linkage.

(1) *Simulation networking technology.* One of the first steps taken toward achieving this concept was the development and fielding of Simulation Networking Technology. This proof of principle demonstration of technology, jointly developed and fielded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Army showed that large numbers of simulators could participate in a virtual battlefield.

(2) *Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT).* In the decade of the nineties, the Army built upon this concept by developing CATT programs. CATT is a part-task trainer that builds upon the networked simulation technology currently in use with SIMNET. CATT, in combination with maneuver training in the field, contributes to that portion of the CATS

that deals with collective task training at the crew through battalion echelons. CATT addresses maneuver, synchronization, and command and control.

(3) *Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT)*. CCTT is the lead CATT program. Based upon training transfer demonstrated in the company/team CCTT, the Army may expand this trainer to meet battalion/task force FTX training requirements. The Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (FSCATT) is undergoing contractor proposal assessment for its Engineering/ Manufacturing Design (EMD) phase. FSCATT will be fielded in two phases. Phase I will evolve to a full crew virtual system which will provide full combined arms training environment for artillery platoons and batteries. Three other branch trainers—Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (AVCATT), Air Defense Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (ADCATT), and Engineer Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (ENCATT)—are in the requirements development process. Other Army proponent branches may develop networked simulation training requirements. CATT trainers will be fielded with common software and protocols so that they can use open architecture and operate with each other. Each CATT program benefits from software/hardware developments of the preceding programs. CATT trainers are developed and fielded to meet stand-alone proponent training requirements. Through the use of Semi-Automated Forces (SAFOR) and emulator workstations, proponent training is conducted in a combined arms battlefield environment. Each proponent determines its mixture of simulation and field training.

(4) *Embedded training*. Embedded training is a concept that involves a number of discrete technologies. It will focus on system-peculiar tasks. Hardware will be configured either as an integral part of the tactical system or as a strap-on. Embedded training will allow the weapon system to be used as an individual and crew trainer. Ultimately networking of embedded systems will permit crews to interact with other crews as required in an actual tactical scenario (as MILES does today). Embedded training, like distributed training, will dramatically change the way the Army is organized to train. From both a training and cost-effectiveness perspective, more training will shift to the unit as tools like embedded training become the rule rather than the exception.

(5) *Virtual reality*. Psychologists have long known that the sense of sight can dominate the other senses. Theme parks, such as Disney World, have capitalized on this dominance. For example, wide-screen, stereophonic presentations of roller coaster rides create the physical sensations of the actual rides. The same phenomenon is observable in high-fidelity flight simulations which create sensations of nausea or vertigo especially in the novice. Until recently training applications have been limited. Virtual reality is a new and emerging technology that melds the real world with a computer-generated world. It is an outgrowth of research and development efforts by NASA to simulate space conditions and to link human beings with robots so that complex repairs and maintenance can be performed without humans leaving the confines of the space craft. Virtual reality can be used to insert the individual into a world which is too hostile, too expensive, or too remote to duplicate in a training environment. Furthermore, the computer could simulate interaction with these images. Thus, the prospect of surrogate travel exists to permit a tank commander to perform in a virtual battlefield. For example, if tank crew members were wearing virtual reality helmet visor systems, computer imaging could turn an open field into a city which the tank commander could drive through. This technology coupled with an embedded training system which would allow the fighting of a realistic battle without ever leaving the motor pool.

(6) *Voice input/output.* One of the current hindrances associated with computers in training is the reliance on either a keyboard or mouse to input commands. This severely restricts their use to a “clean environment.” It also adds another dimension to the training—the ability to type affects student completion times. The rapidly maturing technology of voice recognition may eliminate some of these hindrances. Voice-recognition systems coupled with dial-up testing will make language sustainment and certification more effective by minimizing the need for a trained linguist. Visor miniature screen monitors and voice commands will allow maintenance personnel to use computer technologies without leaving a “dirty environment.”

(7) *Artificial intelligence (AI).* As with the other technologies discussed, AI will greatly alter the way the Army currently trains, maintains, and fights on the battlefield. Industry has found that by utilizing AI technologies in diagnostic equipment they could reduce training time for a journeyman from three years to three months with improved on-the-job performance. Since AI will provide round-the-clock expertise to unit-level maintenance, it should cause a restructuring of the current maintenance echelon structure. This will add credence to shifting the training focus from predominantly service school to a unit orientation in the future. AI will also have a great impact in improving target acquisition, engagement, and command and control. It will minimize human interaction and the chance for human error during periods of combat stress. It will be the precursor of passive engagement systems which identify and engage targets automatically. As in maintenance training, these technologies will reduce training time associated with mastering gunnery/operator/maintainer military occupational specialty.

## SECTION IX SUMMARY AND REFERENCES

### 15-41. Summary

**a. Training mission and focus.** As stated in FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25-101, *Battle-Focused Training*, the Army’s capstone training manuals, the Army’s training mission is to prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to deploy, fight, and win in combat at any intensity level, anywhere, anytime. The training focus is on the wartime missions. The top priority is training. Realistic, sustained, multi-echelon, totally integrated combined arms training must be continuously stressed at all levels. Every individual (soldier and leader) and collective training program must be carefully planned, aggressively executed, and thoroughly assessed.

**b. Battle focus.** Battle focus is the concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions. Battle focus guides the planning, execution, and assessment of each organization’s training program to ensure its members train as they are going to fight. Battle focus is critical throughout the entire training process and is used by commanders to allocate resources for training based on wartime mission requirements. Its implementation enables commanders at all levels and their staffs to structure training programs which cope with nonmission-related requirements while focusing on mission-essential training activities.

**c. Five training systems.** This chapter discussed five training systems: policy, requirements, and resourcing; training development; training in schools; training in units; and

training support. Training policy, requirements, and resourcing are the responsibility of HQDA ODCSOPS, specifically the Director of Training. Resourcing necessitates some interesting interfaces with other systems. The ARPRINT, for example, relies on input from ODCSPER as well as ODCSOPS.

**d. TRADOC.** TRADOC is the center for Army training worldwide and as such provides ongoing resident/nonresident training to AA and RC alike. Forces training includes training conducted in units and collective training following the guidance set forth in FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25-101, *Battle-Focused Training*.

**e. Training support.** Training support is the foundation of Army training. It manages training materials and services supporting the training base and unit training programs. It is a multibillion dollar enterprise managed by TRADOC through the U.S. Army Training Support Center. Probably the single biggest current training challenge is establishing a cost-effective training strategy as the budget and size of the force become smaller. More so than ever before, the challenge to commanders at all levels will be to execute efficient, meaningful training that ensures trained individuals and units that are ready to meet the country's military requirements worldwide.

### 15-42. References

- a. Army Regulation 5-13, *Training Ammunition Management System*.
- b. Army Regulation 12-15, *Joint Security Assistance Training*.
- c. Army Regulation 25-1, *The Army Information Resources Management Program*.
- d. Army Regulation 25-30, *The Army Integrated Publishing and Printing Program*.
- e. Army Regulation 34-4, *Army Standardization Policy*.
- f. Army Regulation 210-21, *Ranges and Training Areas*.
- g. Army Regulation 350-10, *Management of Army Individual Training Requirements and Resources*.
- h. Army Regulation 350-17, *Noncommissioned Officers Development Program*.
- i. Army Regulation 350-35, *Army Modernization Training*.
- j. Army Regulation 350-38: *Training Device Policies and Management*.
- k. Army Regulation 350-41, *Training in Units*.
- l. DA Pamphlet 350-38, *Standards in Weapons Training*.
- m. Field Manual 25-4, *How To Conduct Training Exercises*.
- n. Field Manual 25-5, *Training for Mobilization and War*.
- o. Field Manual 25-100, *Training the Force*.
- p. Field Manual 25-101, *Battle-Focused Training*.
- q. TRADOC Regulation 350-70, *Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes, and Products*.

# CHAPTER 16

## ARMY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

*Our vast, unapplied deposits of corporate knowledge and information have little power when they're tucked away in reports, file drawers, and databases. Organizations today do not lack information. They lack the tools to get the right information to the right people at the right time.*

*Information Ecology: Mastering the Information and Knowledge Environment, Thomas H. Davenport and Laurence Prusak, Oxford University Press, 1997*

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 16-1. General background

**a. Financial.** According to Thomas H. Davenport, noted knowledge expert and consultant, in the United States more than fifty percent of all capital spending goes to information technology (IT). Over the past decade, IT spending in the U.S. alone, has been estimated to be over three trillion dollars.

**b. Importance.** IT is now considered a strategic resource and its management has been elevated to the top reporting level in most organizations. The National Defense University, located at Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. has added an Information Resources Management College to support the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies.

**c. Enabler.** IT supports and increases value to strategic planning, organization core competencies, and is a critical enabler in organizational transformations. IT is a powerful technology that is changing how things are done in the world and how we will work in the future. Time and distance are no longer considered to be barriers or constraints to organizations, which must now consider themselves global participants.

**d. Information Age transformation.** The Industrial Age is transforming into the Information Age. IT is accelerating this change by replacing the paradigm of wealth and power based on physical things to one based on knowledge and information. New metrics for controlling and measuring organization effectiveness are required and are beginning to emerge. Organizations that are transforming themselves are taking new names such as, knowledge-based, learning, or sense and respond.

#### 16-2. The Army in the Information Age

The Army's vision for information technology is to support and enable the United States Army as the preeminent land power in the world. The command, control, communications, computers and intelligence/information technology (C4I/IT) investment strategy stems from

this vision as it embodies the basic tenets of *Joint Vision 2020* and *The Army Vision*. The vision serves as a vector for the Army's C4/IT investment strategy for the future. Information dominance is the key to successful operations on the 21st Century battlefield. Information dominance is the organizing principal for *Joint Vision 2020* and *The Army Vision*, with IT as the critical enabler to achieve the Army's Transformation Strategy.

### **16-3. Army Transformation Strategy**

C4/IT programs are key to the core of the *Army Vision* and the Army Transformation Strategy. The *Army Vision* and Transformation Strategy stress the importance of IT for both achieving a decisive edge in operational warfighting capabilities, as well as the means to support those capabilities through the concomitant business economies and efficiencies that these technologies provide. The Army's Transformation Campaign Plan strongly relies upon the integrated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities for joint situational awareness and the global velocity and agility of the projected force required by 21st century warfighting doctrine. Power projection and reach-back connectivity for split-base operations and support requires a secure, robust information infrastructure. This infrastructure is the central platform for the strategic communications also required by ready and rapidly deployable active Army forces in accordance with the operational concepts of *The Army Vision* and *Joint Vision 2020*.

## **SECTION II**

### **CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (CIO)**

#### **16-4. CIO authority**

**a. Law.** On 10 February 1996, the *Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA)* became law as Division E of the *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996*, Public Law 104-106. The law later designated as the *Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA)*, directs that each executive agency appoint a chief information officer (CIO) who reports directly to the head of the agency. The Secretary of the Army designated the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4) and the Vice DISC4 as the CIO and Deputy CIO respectively.

**b. Clinger-Cohen Act (CCA) objectives.** The CCA increased the Secretary of the Army's responsibility, authority, and accountability for the use of IT and other information resources in performing Army missions. The National Security Systems provisions of the Act include the CIO responsibility for any telecommunications or information system operated by the U.S. Government, the function, operation or use of which involves: intelligence activities; crypto logic activities related to national security; command and control of military forces; or, equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system. The Act emphasizes the importance of completing effective planning, analyzing processes, and, where appropriate, improving processes before applying C4/IT solutions to known requirements. The CCA requires a process for maximizing the value, managing, and assessing the risks of IT acquisitions.

**c. CCA on the World Wide Web.** The entire text of the CCA can be viewed at [http://www.itpolicy.gsa.gov/mks/regs-leg/s1124\\_en.htm](http://www.itpolicy.gsa.gov/mks/regs-leg/s1124_en.htm).

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**16-5. CIO responsibilities and duties contained in the CCA**

The Army CIO's responsibilities and duties are taken from the CCA and presented below (section references are to the Act):

**a. Responsibilities.****(1) Business process analysis/improvement.**

**(a)** Sec. 5113(b)(2)(C): "...analyze the missions of the executive agency and based on the analysis, revise the executive agency's mission-related processes and administrative processes, as appropriate, before making significant investments in information technology to be used in support of those missions..."

**(b)** Sec. 5125(b)(3): "Promote the effective and efficient design and operation of all major information resources management (IRM) processes..., including improvements to work processes."

**(2) IT architecture.** Sec. 5125(b)(2): "developing, maintaining, and facilitating the implementation of a sound and integrated information technology architecture for the executive agency."

**(3) Information resources management.**

**(a)** Sec. 5125(b)(1): "providing advice and other assistance to the head of the executive agency and other senior management personnel of the executive agency to ensure that information technology is managed for the executive agency..."

**(b)** Sec. 5125(b)(3): "...promoting the effective and efficient design and operation of all major information resources management processes for the executive agency."

**(4) Information assurance.** Sec. 5113(b)(2)(D): "...ensure that the information security policies, procedures, and practices are adequate."

**b. Duties.**

**(1) IT acquisition oversight.** Sec. 5125(c)(2): "...monitor the performance of information technology programs of the agency, evaluate the performance of those programs on the basis of the applicable performance measurements, and advise the head of the agency regarding whether to continue, modify, or terminate a program or project;"

**(2) Business process analysis/improvement.** Sec. 5113(b)(2)(C): "...analyze the missions of the executive agency and, based on the analysis, revise the executive agency's mission-related processes and administrative processes, as appropriate, before making significant investments in information technology to be used in support of those missions..."

**(3) Capital IT investment control.** Sec. 5125(c)(2): "...monitor the performance of information technology programs of the agency, evaluate the performance of those programs on the basis of the applicable performance measurements, and advise the head of the agency regarding whether to continue, modify, or terminate a program or project."

**(4) Professional development and training.**

**(a)** Sec. 5125(c)(3)(A): “Assess requirements established for agency personnel regarding knowledge and skill in IRM and adequacy of such requirements for facilitating achievement of the IRM performance goals.”

**(b)** Sec. 5125(c)(3)(B): “Assess the extent to which the executive and management levels of the Army meet the IRM knowledge and skills requirements.”

**(c)** Sec. 5125(c)(3)(C): “...develop strategies and specific plans for hiring, training and professional development” in the areas of IRM and IT.

**SECTION III  
ARMY ENTERPRISE**

**16-6. Definition**

The Army Enterprise (AE) is defined as the entire Army—major commands, headquarters, agencies, installations, and Army forces—and the activities that those organizations perform, including relationships with external organizations and activities, that is the Army and government and on-government organizations and activities. The AE represents the Army as a corporate entity and prescribes a new way of accomplishing the Army’s missions by taking full advantage of IT, using innovative business practices, and synchronizing Army IT resource management activities toward common goals.

**16-7. Army Enterprise Strategy (AES)**

**a. Definition.** The AES is the single, unified vision for the Army command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) community and is presented in the Army Enterprise Vision document.

**b. AES goals.** The AES focuses on the information needs of the Army. It emphasizes a seamless information environment to support the Army warfighter into the 21st Century. This strategy supports the objectives of *Joint Vision 2020* and *The Army Vision*. It defines what the Army must do to “win the battlefield information war,” including the Horizontal Technology Integration (HTI) initiative and the digitization of the Army in support of the Army transformation Campaign.

**c. AES scope.** The scope of the AES is to encompass all embedded and stand alone C4I systems for sustaining base (Power Projection Platforms), Theater/Tactical, and Strategic environments. The AES provides a holistic view of the information systems and interconnections required to enable a Force Projection Army to attain the *Joint Vision 2020* Information Dominance objective. AES also addresses the requirement to organize, train, and equip the force and to operate and sustain the force as a component of any Joint and Combined force from home base to the foxhole.

**16-8. Components of the AES**

The Army Enterprise Strategy consists of two documents, the AES Vision and the Enterprise Implementation Plan (EIP).

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**a. The AES Vision.** The AES Vision describes the principles necessary to ensure warfighter information technology superiority over any opponent. These principles are—

- Focus on the warfighter.
- Ensure joint interoperability.
- Capitalize on space-based assets.
- Digitize the battlefield.
- Modernize power projections platforms.
- Optimize the information technology environment.
- Implement multilevel security.
- Acquire integrated systems using commercial technology.
- Focus on information security.
- Exploit modeling and simulation.

**b. Enterprise Implementation Plan (EIP).** The EIP shapes the Army's C4I/IT Investment Strategy as described by the Army Enterprise (C4I/IT) Architecture. The Enterprise General Officer Steering Committee (EGOSC) monitors the development of this architecture using a common set of evaluation criteria to analyze, assess, and prioritize future information system capabilities, which the warfighter needs.

### **16-9. Major participants in the process**

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) (ASA(ALT)), the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management and Comptroller (ASA(FM&C)), the DISC4, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) co-sponsor the Enterprise Strategy. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is also a major player, as are other functional proponents.

## **SECTION IV CIO INVESTMENT STRATEGY**

### **16-10. General background**

The investment strategy provides a focused approach and enables the Army to evolve into a network-centric force in 2010 and finally into the knowledge-centric force of 2025 through the Army Transformation Strategy. This evolution will provide soldiers with the ability to capitalize on knowledge obtained from unlimited access to a global, seamless, secure enterprise network to achieve information dominance. Central to these concepts is the creation of a global secure network. This network will allow soldiers to access the knowledge capital offered by the network, thus enabling the realization of a knowledge-centric force.

### **16-11. Army CIO strategy and implementation**

Executive Order (EO) 13011 mandates that Federal executive agencies promote the effective design and operation of all major IRM processes with oversight by a CIO. CIO management focuses on those policies, processes, and organizational responsibilities necessary to accomplish the mission-defined primary in governing legislation and other guidance. Such

responsibilities include strategic planning, business process analysis and improvement, assessment of proposed systems, resource management (to include investment strategy), performance measurements, IT acquisition, and training.

**a. Participants.** HQDA, MACOMs, installations, and other Army activities are required to participate in executing the IRM management process and assisting the CIO.

**b. The Army Plan.** The Army C4I/IT Investment Strategy conveys the CIO's investment framework and is based upon the Army's strategic plan, that is, The Army Plan (TAP). TAP provides a focused and consistent azimuth for the development of the Army's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to meet the strategic planning objectives of the Army Transformation Strategy. TAP also provides the strategic framework for sound C4I/IT programming decisions by providing the Army strategic direction, required operational capabilities, and the programmatic guidance, which ultimately produces the Army's investment program and budget.

**c. Processes.** TAP mission areas are supported by operational tasks, capabilities, and performance standards linked to six program evaluation groups (PEG). The PEGs represent funding for the six Title X functional areas, resource goals, objectives, and tasks. This linkage ensures that the CIO's C4I/IT investment strategy supports the Army's core competency and core warfighting and business processes required for the Army Transformation Campaign. The CIO's investment strategy focuses on investment capability areas critical to attaining information dominance. Focusing on capabilities rather than individual systems or programs is the key underpinning of the C4I/IT investment strategy. Capabilities needed to accomplish the Army's mission are highlighted and aligned with C4I/IT investments required to achieve the Army's transformation objectives. The C4I/IT capabilities that Army warfighters and decision-makers depend upon must be interoperable and effective to ensure information dominance across the operational continuum. Basing the C4I/IT investment strategy on required mission capabilities strengthens the linkage between programs and successful mission performance outcomes.

**d. Value.** The CIO investment strategy framework adds value to Army C4I/IT investments in two respects:

(1) Planners and programmers work collaboratively to determine optimal, affordable C4I/IT investments that will deliver a capabilities-based return on investment in support of the A TAP.

(2) The investment strategy is based upon a crosscutting analysis of the value that C4I/IT investments can leverage - or balance - across the mission areas of TAP.

**e. Continuous transformation.** The CIO investment strategy continues to undergo process improvement through subsequent iterations and the involvement of C4I/IT stakeholders. This strategy helps ensure that the Army's information and communications systems are strategically aligned with enterprise-wide mission needs to achieve both dominant warfighting capabilities and world-class business process success.

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## SECTION V ARCHITECTURE

### 16-12. Army Enterprise Architecture (AEA)

The Army Enterprise Architecture fulfills the CCA requirement to develop enterprise-wide IT architecture. The AEA is an Army-wide IT architecture that describes the relationships among key Army institutional processes and IT to ensure the alignment of information systems acquisition and related processes with validated warfighting operational and support requirements. It also ensures adequate Army, joint, and combined interoperability; redundancy and security of information systems; and the application and maintenance of a set of standards by which the Army evaluates and acquires new systems. (The DISC 4 Architecture Directorate Home Page is at <http://arch-odisc4.army.mil>.)

### 16-13. Tool and products

**a. Tool.** The AEA is both a tool and a set of products. The AEA is a tool to describe the Army's IT requirements and capabilities. As a tool the AEA directs the development, management, and use of architecture and supporting architecture products through such means as the AEA Guidance Document (AEAGD). In addition, the AEA includes a recapitulation of applicable architecture policy and a set of architecture development and management tools.

**b. Products.** As a set of products, the AEA is the validated description of the Army's IT requirements, existing capabilities, projected needs, and prescribed IT standards based on a consistent methodology.

**c. Evolution.** It is important to note that the AEA is not an entity unto itself. It derives from the AES and the Army EIP, which were agreed to at the highest levels in the Army in 1993 and 1994. These efforts gained additional impetus from *Joint Vision 2020* and *The Army Vision* and from the CCA of 1996. The AEA continues to evolve in concert with The Army Plan and Army Strategic Planning Guidance.

### 16-14. Army Operational Architecture (AOA)

The AOA is the operational elements, assigned tasks, and information flows required to accomplish or support a warfighter function. It defines the type of information, the frequency and timeliness of the information exchange, and the tasks supported by these information exchanges. An operational architecture can also be described as the total aggregation of missions, functions, tasks, information requirements, and business rules. TRADOC, as the Army's Operational Architect, develops and maintains the AOA. The AOA products are reviewed and integrated into the Joint Operational Architecture. DCSOPS, as the DA staff proponent for the AOA, will be supported by the Army CIO throughout the AOA process.

### 16-15. Army Systems Architecture (ASA)

The ASA is a high-level systems architecture that describes the IT systems that support the principal activities of the Army. The ASA identifies the physical connections and locations of key nodes, circuits, and networks. It is constructed to satisfy AOA requirements per standards defined in the Army Technical Architecture (ATA). The ASA shows how the

Army's major IT systems inter-operate and link to joint IT systems. The ASA may also describe the internal construction or operations of particular systems in the ASA. A systems architecture is a physical implementation of the operational architecture, the layout and relationship of systems and communications. The Army CIO develops and maintains the ASA.

#### **16-16. Joint Technical Architecture—Army**

**a. What it is.** The JTA-A is minimal set of rules governing the arrangement, interaction, and interdependence of the parts or elements of a system that ensures that a compliant system satisfies a specific set of requirements. It identifies services, interfaces, standards, and their relationships. It provides the framework, thus guiding the implementation of systems, upon which engineering specifications are based, common building blocks are built, and product lines are developed. These technical rules, or the building code, are based on Operational Architecture requirements and will constrain Systems Architecture development. A technical architecture has been described as the "building codes" upon which systems are based.

**b. Responsibility.** The CIO maintains the JTA-A. The JTA-A serves as the Army's implementation of the DOD Joint Technical Architecture (JTA).

### **SECTION VI PROCESS ANALYSIS AND REVISION**

#### **16-17. Responsibilities**

**a. CCA.** The CIO is the functional proponent for business process reengineering/improvement with a C4I/IT impact. The CCA mandates that the CIO will be responsible for "promoting the effective and efficient design and operation of all major information resources management processes for the executive agency, including improvements to work processes of the executive agency." It also directs that the head of the executive agency analyze the missions of the executive agency and based on the analysis, revise the executive agency's mission-related processes and administrative processes, as appropriate, before making significant investments in information technology. Also see AR 25-1, *Army Information Management*.

**b. CIO.** The CIO proponent will ensure that a process is analyzed and revised, as appropriate, before making significant C4I/IT investments in support of those processes. Additionally, process analysis and appropriate revision will be accomplished as mission needs change and periodically for mission and performance effectiveness.

**c. Office of the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (ODISC4).** The ODISC4 provides a value added to HQDA functional proponents, MACOM commanders, and others by means of a clearinghouse on the CIO Website of the DISC4 homepage at [www.army.mil/disc4.htm](http://www.army.mil/disc4.htm).

#### **16-18. Documentation**

**a. Process analysis documentation.** Process analysis for warfighter and warfighter-related processes will be documented in the mission needs statement (MNS) and operational requirements document (ORD) using the doctrine, training, leader development, organizational design, material, and soldiers (DTLOMS) requirements methodology in AR

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71-9, *Material Requirements* and TRADOC Pamphlet 71-9. Process analysis and revision will be accomplished before submitting a MNS or ORD.

**b. Army Process Improvement Database System.** Process analyses, improvements, and reengineering of mission-related and administrative work processes are documented in the Army Process Improvement Database System at <https://armypi.us.army.mil/armypi>. Army organizations, through a designated point of contact who is authorized to input to the database, provide information and data on improvement initiatives for the database. Army organizations can search the database for similar processes to eliminate redundancy of process analyses.

## SECTION VII PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

### 16-19. Objectives

Measuring IT performance assesses IT effectiveness and efficiency on an organization's missions, goals, and quantitative objectives. The impact is measured using quantifiable, outcome-based criteria that are compared against an established baseline.

### 16-20. Measurement types

IT performance measurements consist of the following:

**a. Effectiveness.** Measures of effectiveness demonstrating that an organization is executing its mission. These focus on outcomes, for example, achievement of missions and goals, quality of work, and/or customer satisfaction.

**b. Efficiency.** Measures of efficiency demonstrate that an organization is executing its mission optimally. These include outputs, e.g., quantity of work and timeliness of delivery.

**c. Performance.** Performance measures are developed for each IT investment which supports organizational missions before execution or fielding of that investment. The performance measures:

(1) Gauge the value-added contribution of the IT investment to missions, goals, and objectives;

(2) Include only the critical few measures that provide a clear basis for assessing accomplishment, aiding decision-making, and assigning accountability at each management level.

**d. Cost-benefit analysis.** A cost-benefit analysis must be applied against any proposed performance measurement system. If the cost of collecting and analyzing the required data exceeds benefit to the organization, a measure will not be used unless directed by higher authority. Performance measures in support of warfighting materiel requirements with a C4I/IT impact will be included in the appropriate requirement document per AR 71-9, *Material Requirements*.

## SECTION VIII

### CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (CIO) ACTIVITIES

#### 16-21. Digitization of the battlefield

**a. Background.** The Army of the next century will be required to operate across a broad operational spectrum including space, cyberspace, and ever-larger segments of the electromagnetic spectrum. On the other hand, the information age and the absence of a peer competitor provide the United States the opportunity to pursue transformation to achieve radically new and more effective capabilities. Thus, we must transform to maintain overmatch over potential enemies and threats, operate in new environments, and capitalize upon opportunities to achieve unprecedented leaps in capabilities.

**b. Digitization.** Digitization is the means by which we will achieve information dominance to enable mental agility, and is the number one modernization priority for the near- and mid-term. Digitization involves the use of modern communications capabilities and computers to enable commanders, planners, and executors to rapidly acquire, share, and use information. The digitization effort includes the fielding of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), the central framework for networking the battlespace, to execute operations faster and more decisively than the enemy. The cornerstone of this effort is the equipping of the first digitized division (FDD) by 2000 and the first digitized corps (FDC) by 2004.

#### 16-22. Digitizing the sustaining base

The primary initiative for digitizing the Army installation is the Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program (I3MP). I3MP modernizes the digital infrastructure of Army installations to enable us to import best commercial practices and labor saving technology. This is a “key enabler” for implementing the Revolution in Military Logistics, Business Process Reengineering, and supporting the Defense Reform Initiatives. This infrastructure is also critical to supporting deployed warfighters with reach back capabilities. I3MP has four components: (1) Outside Cable Rehabilitation which replaces totally inadequate copper wiring with a high capacity fiber backbone, (2) Common User Installation Transport Network (CUITN) provides servers and cables to connect the backbone to buildings and distribution nodes for high-speed data transfer on installations, (3) the Defense Information System Network (DISN) Router Program that provides gateways to the DISN (off-post connections) and network management capabilities, and (4) the MACOM Telephone Modernization Program that provides modern digital telephone switches and linkages to Army users.

#### 16-23. Information assurance

The Information Assurance Directorate is responsible for developing and overseeing the Army's Information Systems Security Program (ISSP), which is the overarching program for securing the Army's portion of the Defense Information Infrastructure. The DISC4, as the Army's Chief Information Officer, is responsible for implementing protective measures, developing plans, policies and procedures, developing and monitoring training, and validating requirements to protect SECRET and below command, control, communications, and computer capabilities. The Information Assurance Directorate develops and directs the implementation of the ISSP for product procurement, the Network Security Improvement Program (NSIP) Plan for the Army sustaining base, and the Army Protection Plan for the

tactical force. Additionally, the Directorate is responsible for developing a robust biometrics program designed to help eliminate passwords as the primary means of safeguarding against illegal or forced access to workstations, systems, and networks.

#### **16-24. Army acquisition and CIO assessment**

**a. Need requirement.** The process for acquiring systems or capabilities begins when an organization's C4I/IT needs are established (per AR 71-9, Material Requirements) through the appropriate requirement document.

**b. Acquisition.** Acquisition involves the description of requirements to satisfy the needs, how business process analysis was accomplished, outcome and output-oriented performance measurements, solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contract financing, contract performance, contract administration, and those technical and management functions directly related to the process of fulfilling the needs by contract.

#### **c. CIO responsibilities.**

(1) The Army CIO ensures that IT systems are acquired and information resources are managed within an integrated acquisition strategy and framework. The Army CIO provides oversight for C4I/IT systems during the acquisition approval process (AR 25-1, *Army Information Management* and AR 70-1, *Army Acquisition Policy*).

(2) Per the CCA, the Army CIO recommends to the Secretary of the Army whether to continue, modify or terminate Army programs with a C4I/IT impact. CIO assessments are conducted at the appropriate acquisition milestone.

**d. Army responsibility.** To successfully implement the CCA, the Army must embrace new ways of doing business and ensure that IT investments provide measurable improvements in mission performance.

#### **16-25. Electronic commerce (EC)**

**a. Army need.** The quick and seamless transfer of knowledge is key to the Army achieving its vision of the future. The *Army Vision* focuses on six aspects of achieving full spectrum dominance: project the force, protect the force, shape the battlespace, decisive operations, sustain the force, and gain information dominance. This last aspect is by no means the least; it is fundamental to the success of each of the preceding aspects. To gain information dominance, the Army must have a strategy that addresses the effective and efficient management and use of EC technologies.

**b. EC origins.** Electronic business/electronic commerce (EB/EC) continues to emerge as one of the dominant concepts in commercial IT. A number of trends have contributed to this development, including the need to cut costs and realize savings through process improvements, paperwork reduction, and reengineering. In 1997, Congress defined electronic commerce (EC) as "electronic techniques for accomplishing business transactions, including electronic mail or messaging, World Wide Web (WWW) technology, electronic bulletin boards, purchase cards, electronic funds transfers, and electronic data interchange." Since that time, the more descriptive term electronic business/electronic commerce has been adopted throughout the Government and the private sector.

**c. Army implementation.** For the Army, an integral part of implementing EB/EC is the application of business process improvement/reengineering to streamline and remove non-value added functions from Army business processes prior to the incorporation of technologies facilitating the electronic exchange of business information. Examples of technologies that are frequently employed as EB/EC enablers include bar coding, workflow management systems, public key infrastructure, smart cards, and web based applications. The Army policy is that its activities will use EB/EC technologies to the maximum extent practicable to promote the goal of a paper-free (or near paper-free) business environment within the Army.

**d. Army planning and implementation.** The Army has developed, formally coordinated, and published three key EB/EC documents that lay the foundation for Army-wide adoption of EB/EC techniques. These documents are the Army Electronic Commerce Strategic Plan (March 1998), HQDA Letter 25-99-1, U.S. Army Electronic Commerce Policy (15 October 99), and the U.S. Army Electronic Business/Electronic Commerce Implementation Plan (Oct 99). All three of these documents affirm the value of a process-based view of EB/EC and emphasize the need to streamline business processes and leverage EB/EC technologies to support the information needs of the warfighter and other stakeholders. Collectively, these three documents provide the policy framework, strategic roadmap, and implementation details to achieve an Army-wide integrated electronic business environment targeting all functional areas (logistics, transportation, procurement, etc.) with special emphasis on cross-functional integration. These key Army EB/EC documents may be viewed at <http://www.armyec.com/core.html>.

**e. Enabling technology programs.** Two key enabling technology programs, Smart Cards and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), are managed under the EB/EC umbrella. These technologies are EB/EC enablers mandated for Department-wide implementation. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2001 and through 2002, the Army will issue Smart Cards to 1.4 million Active Army, Selected Reserve, National Guard, civilian, and eligible contractor personnel. The Smart Card will be used as a common access card (CAC) for personnel identification, building access, and network access via PKI certificates. Once implemented, the Smart Card/CAC has the potential to facilitate EB/EC and provide portable electronic capabilities to multiple business processes across the Army. The Army CIO released interim CAC and PKI Policy messages in December 2000. These documents establish the policy and roles and responsibilities in the Army for CAC and PKI implementation. Key Army Smart Card, CAC, and PKI documents may be viewed at: <http://www.armyec.com>.

**f. Results.** Through the cost-effective application of EB/EC, the Army will be able to achieve improved business processes, respond to changing environments, and effect timely, accurate, and secure information sharing. Moreover, by capitalizing on streamlined and technically innovative business practices, Army EB/EC unites all functional areas into a cohesive electronic business network. Further information on EB/EC—both within the Army and more broadly—can be found at the Army's EB/EC website located at <http://www.armyec.com>.

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**SECTION IX**  
**SPACE AND NETWORKS****16-26. Contracting for telecommunications services**

Telecommunications support provides inter- and intra-communications between various information systems. To foster improved telecommunications economy and discipline, Army personnel should be familiar with contracting telecommunications services through the U. S. Army Signal Command Networks, Engineering, and Telecommunications Activity (USANETA), Army Network and Systems Operation Center (ANSOC), and U.S. Army Communication and Electronics Command's (CECOM) Systems Management Center (SMC).

**16-27. Roles of USANETA, ANSOC, and CECOM**

USANETA at Fort Huachuca provides deployable contingency information systems engineering and implementation support to warfighting commanders-in-chief; serves as the Army's centralized office for long-haul telecommunications (Defense Information Systems Network, Federal Technology Service 2001, etc.) and provides support for short-haul telecommunications. The ANSOC consists of dedicated teams providing system, network, database management, and information assurance (security) support to U.S. Army customers. CECOM's Systems Management Center acquires and fields telecommunications systems, equipment, and services for Army and DOD customers.

**16-28. The Global Command and Control System-Army (GCCS-A)**

**a.** GCCS-A provides for the apportionment, mobilization, allocation, deployment, and sustainment of Army forces to the combatant commands during a war, crisis situations, stability and support. The GCCS-A is also the Army's link into the Joint GCCS – the DOD's GCCS-A supports the Army's functional "mission needs" defined for the Joint GCCS and the Army Horizontal Integration of the Battlefield MNS. GCCS-A provides a modernized and integrated C4I system supporting the monitoring, planning, and execution of the full range of Joint, Combined and Army operations.

**b.** Serving as the bridge between the tactical components of Army Battle Command System (ABCS) and the Joint GCCS, GCCS-A provides additional Army specific strategic and component command level functionality that leverages existing ABCS and GCCS capabilities. GCCS-A provides Army command and control (C2) at the strategic and operational/theater level of command. As part of the ABCS, GCCS-A incorporates the necessary interoperability, integration, and common requirements of the ABCS Capstone Requirements Document (CRD). GCCS-A is an operational C2 system that supports the force projection strategy by providing a suite of applications, mission critical information, and automated decision support tools to Army commanders, operators and planners, operations, or peacetime.

## **SECTION X C4/IT INFRASTRUCTURE**

### **16-29. Synchronization tool**

The Installation Information Infrastructure Architecture (I3A) is a synchronization tool encompassing major Army automation and communications programs, thus supporting the sustaining base of the JTA-A. It is used for designing target system architectures and cost models for Army installations worldwide.

**a. Compliance.** Army organizations must comply with I3A guidelines for modernizing IT infrastructures from the installation gateway to the end user boundary.

**b. Components.** I3A includes all components of the office installation communications capabilities. It addresses the details of the common user facilities providing the transport capability for voice, data and imagery and the appropriate information assurance thereof. The I3A also addresses the components that are required to provide connectivity from the installation long-haul point of presence to the end user device, supporting the warfighter.

### **16-30. CIO responsibilities**

The CIO is the Army's functional proponent for modernization of the installation C4/IT infrastructure. Using the I3A, the CIO determines the infrastructure requirements. C4/IT Infrastructure modernization is the main initiative to digitize installations and provide connectivity within the installations and to other CONUS support activities as well as the deployed combat forces. The C4/IT Infrastructure consists of all the elements of the communications capability required to transmit voice, data and images within the installation and provide the connection to government and commercial long haul networks. C4/IT infrastructure represents the installation-level distribution portion of the Warfighter Information Network (WIN). Modernization of the C4/IT Infrastructure provides the necessary installation infrastructure to enable process improvement and mission economies which will implement efforts such as paperless contracting, digital publication distribution, internet commerce, public key initiatives, the redesigned travel system, and velocity logistics management initiatives.

## **SECTION XI RESERVES**

### **16-31. General background**

According to the CCA, Executive Branch offices below the agency level may be delegated the authority for a CIO at the discretion of the agency head. This authority was extended to the U.S. Army Reserve by the Secretary of the Army. In September 1997, the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) established a program to stand up the Army Reserve CIO. The following year, the first Army Reserve CIO was appointed. While the first and second Army Reserve CIOs were military people, the current CIO is a civilian. The long-term nature of the organizational development task and the need for continuity led to the decision ultimately to staff the Army Reserve CIO position with a Senior Executive Service (SES) level civilian.

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**16-32. Reserve overview**

**a. CIO goals.** The immediate goals of the CIO were to unify and improve the provision of IT services across the U.S. Army Reserve while building the capabilities necessary to perform the IT investment management processes envisioned in CCA. To meet these goals, organizational capabilities are required in the areas of services planning and management, IT investment management, architecture planning, data management, personnel management, financial management, and information assurance. Initial CIO organizational capabilities existed in the area of services management, implementation planning, financial management, and system and technical architecture planning.

**b. Organizational changes.** Information assurance expertise was transferred into the CIO from the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSIntel), along with the network security mission formerly provided by the DCSIntel. From the beginning, the Army Reserve CIO has been engaged in developing the additional capabilities.

**c. Other CIO responsibilities.** The Army Reserve CIO retains responsibilities that are not related to CCA. The CIO subsumed the positions and responsibilities of the Director of Information Management, Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR); the Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management (DCSIM), USARC; and elements of Personnel Systems Information Operations (PSIO), Army Reserve Personnel Command (AR-PERSCOM). As a result, the Army Reserve CIO functions as a Director of Information Management (DOIM) for those three major headquarters and as the program manager for automation, telecommunications, postal services, printing, and publications Army Reserve wide. As the result of recent directives, the CIO also has program management responsibility for all cross-functional application systems. The principle application that is of concern at this time is the Regional Level Application Software (RLAS), an application suite of personnel, finance, and training functions provided to Army Reserve units and their command and control up-trace.

**d. Accomplishments.** As a part of the organizational development effort, the CIO has begun the annual development and revision of the Army Reserve CIO Strategic Plan. The Strategic Plan covers both on-going CIO activities and development of the specific CCA related capabilities that the organization requires. The Army Reserve CIO Strategic Plan serves these purposes:

- (1) Integrate the principles and processes of strategic planning for information management into the CIO organization.
- (2) Help communicate to Army Reserve CIO customers where the CIO program is today and where it needs to be in the future.
- (3) Begin to satisfy IT management strategic planning requirements established by the CCA.
- (4) Set the stage for further CIO and Army Reserve level IT strategic and operational planning cycles under the direction of the CAR and other Army Reserve senior leaders.
  - (a) The Plan sets forth the following Army Reserve CIO mission and vision:

**1** Army Reserve CIO Mission – Provide centralized direction and accountability for information technology and information resource management to enhance Army Reserve users’ ability to achieve recruiting, retention, readiness, resourcing, and relevance goals and objectives.

**2** Army Reserve CIO Vision – Users working in a seamless, integrated, compatible, secure, robust, and cost-efficient Army Reserve information technology enterprise environment. An environment capable of providing effective mission support and ease of use at all levels.

(b) The Plan sets forth seven top-level CIO goals supported by 37 transition objectives. The goals are these—

**1** Establish a SES-level Army Reserve CIO reporting to the CAR/CG USARC.

**2** Provide unified information systems support to the Army Reserve.

**3** Establish Army Reserve and command-level IT/C4 investment management capabilities.

**4** Establish a data management capability in the CIO organization.

**5** Establish an IT/C4 career development program.

**6** Improve information systems service levels and performance.

**7** Create an environment in which information security requirements are fully understood and risks are mitigated in the most cost-effective manner.

**e. Metrics.** From these goals and associated transition objectives, the CIO has fashioned specific transition programs with performance metrics suitable for rigorous results management. This work includes the construction of a balanced scorecard.

## SECTION XII

### ARMY MISSION AND TRANSFORMATION CAMPAIGN PRIORITIES

#### 16-33. General background

IT has been identified as a critical enabler for the Army to achieve its Transformation Campaign objectives in a timely and cost effective manner. The Army is looking to IT to speed its transformation from a platform-centric organization to a knowledge-centric organization where the right information is given to the right individual at the right time.

#### 16-34. CIO priorities

The Army CIO has identified the following priorities that support the Army’s mission and Transformation Strategy:

**a. Digitizing the battlefield.**

(1) *Definition.* Digitization is the collective name for Army programs that provide warfighters a horizontally and vertically integrated digital information capability to support warfighting systems and to assure command and control decision cycle superiority. A unique management structure is used to oversee, coordinate, and direct the integration of digitization

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activities. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (DCSPRO) provides guidance across the Army on matters related to digitization.

(2) *Benefits.* Digitization improves effectiveness by enabling near real-time situational awareness, making it possible for soldiers to know their location, the enemy's location, and the location of other friendly forces. Inter-netted computers, linked to sensors and satellite-based navigation systems by robust communications networks, are the essential components of this capability. The Army is fielding a suite of command and control systems, selectively procuring weapons systems designed for the digitized battlefield, and integrating required digital components on fielded systems to tap the potential of digitization.

**b. Knowledge management.**

(1) *Vision and mission.* The Army's Knowledge Management (KM) vision is to transform the Army institutional elements and operating forces into an information-age, networked organization that leverages its intellectual capital to better organize, equip, and maintain the world's premier land combat force. Our mission is to institutionalize knowledge management into Army culture and processes to achieve a sustaining momentum that will carry it forward through the Army beyond 2025. We will accomplish this through changes in organizational structure, facilities, people, processes, and technology.

(2) *Army Knowledge Online.* The Army Knowledge Online (AKO) is the Army's focal point for knowledge management. Essentially, AKO is digitizing the institutional Army just as the Army Transformation Campaign is digitizing the tactical Army. AKO users are projected to reach over one million by 2005. Ultimately the intent is to have all uniformed, civilian, reserve, and (possible) retired Army personnel as AKO users, with each group and sub-group of users having access to content based on their specific information requirements and access permissions.

(3) *Other projects.* Two on-going KM projects that hold a great deal of promise to support force management and knowledge sharing efforts are the Army Flow Model and the HQDA Data Sharing initiative. The Army flow model integrates functional systems across the personnel, logistics, and operational communities to support production of the Total Army Equipment Distribution Plan (TAEDP), the digitized force conversion studies, the Army National Guard Redesign, and Total Army Analysis. The HQDA Data Sharing Initiative allows for a single data collection effort, allows staff analysts to view one authoritative, and single repository for Army systems meta-data; essentially a data mart for specific analytical requirements allowing expanded cross-functional analysis from a single source, leveraging the best commercial practices to support our warfighters.

**c. Information assurance.**

(1) *Objectives.* The Army Information System Security Program (AISSP) supports two major Army force protection initiatives, which are information assurance and computer network defense (CND) with the goals to secure the Army portion of the Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) and to provide secure information and information based system protection to the force. Securing the DII is accomplished by investments that develop, procure, and sustain Information System Security hardware, software, techniques, procedures, and technologies needed to ensure sustainment of information and communications across the full spectrum of military operations. Information Assurance is

not simply an “add-on” to existing IT, but is an integral part of IT development and investment from the identification and validation of a material solution to counter a threat or exploit technology.

(2) *Training programs.* The AISSP also provides for System Administrator/Network Administrator training to assess and counter computer hacker attacks and provides training for Information Systems Security Managers/Officers to assist them in understanding their ISSP responsibilities, as well as providing education and awareness for their leadership and Army commanders.

(3) *Response.* The AISSP program includes defense of major Army Automated Systems both at the perimeter and in-depth, to protect them from disruption caused by attacks originating at multiple entry points. Operational support for Army Information Assurance is enhanced by the Army Computer Emergency Team (ACERT), at Fort Belvoir, VA; and its regional computer emergency response teams (RCERT) in Hawaii, Fort Huachuca, AZ, and 5th Signal Command in Europe. The mission to provide information and information systems protection to the force consists of ensuring that vulnerabilities to Information Warfare Operations are mitigated and computer network attacks within all phases of military operations in all environments are quickly detected and are protected to the greatest extent possible. The AISSP supports detecting system intrusions, alteration, and provides capability to react to information warfare attacks in a measured and coordinated manner. Another RCERT is being developed in Korea. Sustainment of the Army’s initial network security improvements for the out years and continuation of information assurance modernization are key to realization of a truly protected force.

**d. Army Enterprise Architecture.** Successful warfighting in the 21st Century depends upon warfighters making rapid and correct decisions using accurate and timely information. The availability of such information depends upon information systems that are robust and fully interoperable within Army units and within the joint environment. Using DOD methodology embodied in the C4ISR Framework Document, and under the mandate of the *Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996*, the Army Enterprise Architecture (AEA) is a cohesive approach to tying the design and fielding of such systems to warfighter requirements. It is now the basis for the Army CIO’s (theODISC4) C4I/IT Investment Strategy that encourages synergies between functional areas. Thus, funding the AEA is necessary to attain the goals of *Joint Vision 2020* and the CSA’s goal of a digitized division by the year 2000, a digitized corps by 2004. Current AEA efforts include the development of the First Digitized Division architecture and the Installation Information Infrastructure (I3A).

## SECTION XIII SUMMARY AND REFERENCES

### 16-35. Summary

The Army is in the process of transforming itself into a 21st Century fighting force that employs state-of-the-art IT technology to dominate the information battle space at all times. IT is the critical enabler the Army is employing to achieve its Transformation Campaign Plan goals.

**16-36. References**

- a. Army Regulation 25-1, *Army Information Management*.
- b. Army Regulation 70-1, *Army Acquisition Policy*.
- c. Army Regulation 71-9, *Materiel Requirements*.
- d. Army Regulation 380-19, *Information Systems Security*.
- e. DA Information Technology Exhibit, *FY 2001 Budget Estimate*, February 2000.



# CHAPTER 17

## INSTALLATION COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT

*“The Army installation is the Army's home. Its land, buildings and infrastructure support soldiers and their families, sustain our mission and showcase our values and heritage. It is the place where Army families live, work, and play, and the platform for projecting Army combat power. Its location, layout and livability can help or hinder the readiness of our force.”*

Army Green Book, Association of the United States Army, October 2000: “Army Installations and the Future,” by Major General Robert Van Antwerp Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management.

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 17-1. Chapter content

- This chapter describes how the Army manages installations. It includes—
- An overview of the Army’s installation environment.
- Major command (MACOM) installation management organization.
- A description of key installation management positions.
- Installation management professional development.
- Organization of installation staffs.
- The Army Installation Strategy.
- Major installation management initiatives and programs.

#### 17-2. The Army’s installation environment

a. The United States Army today is a power projection force capable of responding rapidly to threats against national interests anywhere in the world. Army installations are power projection bases, power projection support bases, and sustaining bases. However, they all have one important aspect in common – they must continue to provide an adequate working environment for our quality people. Quality of life for soldiers, civilian employees and family members is an integral part of sustaining the force.

**b.** The Army, now largely based in the continental United States (CONUS), continues to refine and enhance its power projection and sustainment capabilities. Constrained budgets are focusing renewed attention on effective installation management.

**c.** What is an installation? An installation is defined as an aggregation of contiguous or near contiguous, common mission-supporting real property holdings under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense (DOD) or a state, the District of Columbia, territory, commonwealth, or possession, controlled by and at which an Army unit or activity (Active Army, USAR, or ARNG) is permanently assigned. Installations reflect a diversity of organizations, tasks, and missions – all of which challenge the ability to command and manage. Within the Army, an installation may be referred to by such names as post, camp station, fort, subpost, depot, arsenal, proving ground, base, laboratory, or ammunition plant. No two installations are exactly the same.

**d.** Installations are the Army's "face" to the nation and the world. CONUS installations are the only "Army installation" most Americans see on a regular basis while OCONUS installations provide that perspective to the international community. Most CONUS installations today are more than 50 years old; many are more than 100 years old. Most OCONUS installations were acquired directly after World War II and the Korean War. Installations are assigned to MACOMs or components based upon the units that are located at the installations.

**e.** Installations are big business. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM), Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) manages Defense and Army resources in excess of \$11 billion. Approximately 97,000 persons, paid by military funds, appropriated funds, and non-appropriated funds, perform installation management functions. Installations cover over 15 million acres of land, more than the combined acreage of the States of Maryland, Connecticut and Rhode Island. Installations maintain more than 160,000 buildings covering more than one billion square feet (the area of 160 Pentagons). Army facilities represent a replacement value of more than \$216 billion.

**f.** Most importantly, installations are home to the force and home to the Army family—where the Army lives, works, trains, sustains and prepares to meet tomorrow's challenges. Army posts and surrounding communities are home to well over one million service members and their families. Installations house half of Army families and nearly 200,000 single soldiers. Army posts are where a quarter of a million civilian employees and tens of thousands of contract employees come to work every day.

**g.** What is installation management? Installation management is defined as the process of directing and integrating the provision of all functions, to include base support, military construction (MILCON), and Army family housing, as well as the resources needed to operate the installation on a day-to-day, long-term, strategic basis. Installation management is a fairly new term in the Army. During the 1980s and early 1990s a host of inspections, studies, and surveys determined that installations could be managed far more efficiently and effectively. As a result, the Army leadership in the mid-1990s took these major actions—

- (1) Establishment of the ACSIM in 1993.
- (2) Establishment of centrally selected garrison commanders in 1993.

(3) Establishment of pre-command courses for both garrison and installation commanders in 1994.

(4) Publication of the first installation management doctrine, FM 100-22, *Installation Management*, in 1994.

h. These actions were taken to improve integration of the widely varying, often competing, functional areas at the DA level and to better train commanders for the increasingly complex and important work of running installations.

### **17-3. ACSIM mission and functions**

The ACSIM is an element of the Army Staff and acts for and exercises authority of the Army Chief of Staff in the promulgation of policy and integration of doctrine pertaining to the operation of Army installations. Major responsibilities of the ACSIM are:

a. Formulates and executes plans, policies, programs and procedures on matters relating to overall management and resourcing of Army installations worldwide.

b. Develops and directs execution of Army programs and management concepts to ensure installations are capable of supporting and promoting stationing plans, strategic mobility power projection, military training and readiness, environmental quality, and quality of life for soldiers and their families.

c. Develops and directs policy, planning, budgeting and programming for installation resource requirements including family housing construction and operations, unaccompanied personnel housing, military construction (MILCON), real property maintenance and repair, energy, environmental compliance, conservation, pollution prevention, restoration, base realignment and closure (BRAC), community and family support programs, morale, welfare and recreation (MWR), and other base operations support.

d. Advises senior Army and OSD leadership on planning, development, implementation, and resourcing of comprehensive installation management requirements.

e. Sets standards and evaluates the condition of installation facilities, environmental quality and base operations services.

f. Serves as the proponent for installation management doctrine, professional development of installation and garrison commanders and staff, and operational policy for the reorganization, realignment and closure of installations.

g. Recommends and directs the implementation of policies and procedures to identify and exploit opportunities to achieve economies and efficiencies through outsourcing and privatization of base operation activities.

## **SECTION II**

### **MAJOR COMMAND (MACOM) INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION**

#### **17-4. General**

a. While all MACOMs exercise some sort of installation management, installation management at the MACOM level is usually associated with the Training and Doctrine

Command (TRADOC) and the Forces Command (FORSCOM). FORSCOM uses the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Installation Management (DCSPIM) while TRADOC uses the Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations (DCSBOS) to manage their installations. Both concepts combine most base operations under a single organization. Army Material Command (AMC) installations are typically depots, proving grounds, arsenals, laboratories and ammunition plants. The industrial nature and low troop strength of these installations differs from the troop environment typically found at TRADOC and FORSCOM installations.

**b.** The Army uses a concept of sub-installations and sub-communities to enhance the effectiveness of operations. For example, in CONUS the Army assigns multiple installations in the same geographical area to a given MACOM. The Army also uses the concept OCONUS where a given mission element is located at multiple locations.

### **17-5. Installation organization**

A typical installation organization consists of a command element and four functional groupings of organizations.

**a. The mission element.** The mission element is the primary organization(s) of the installation. It is the installation's reason for being. An example of a mission element is the III Corps Headquarters at Fort Hood, Texas or the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. There is no single mission element at installations established solely to support tenants.

**b. Non-supporting tenants.** Non-supporting tenants are present at most Army installations. These are organizations that contribute to neither the primary mission nor the specific support function of the installation. An example is the Military Traffic Management Command, Transportation Engineering Agency located near Fort Eustis, Virginia.

**c. Supporting tenants.** There is a relatively standard grouping of supporting tenants at most Army installations. These are organizations assigned to MACOMs other than the installation's MACOM. They are located at an installation to provide a particular service. Examples are health services, criminal investigations, exchange and commissary services, the Corps of Engineers, and dependent schools at OCONUS locations.

**d. U.S. Army garrisons.** These may include area support groups or installation support activities in some MACOMs. The garrison organization operates the installation and provides supporting services.

## **SECTION III KEY INSTALLATION POSITIONS**

### **17-6. Installation commander**

The installation commander is usually the senior Army commander on the installation. The installation commander has responsibility for the real estate, facilities, operations, activities and personnel on an installation. Commanders of depots, arsenals, proving grounds, and Army divisions and corps may also be installation commanders. Commanders of divisions or corps must consider that in most cases they will deploy with the force. Therefore, garrison or

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installation support activity commanders provide the continuity of the installation command when the installation commander deploys.

#### **17-7. Garrison commander and installation support activity commander**

Garrison commanders are centrally selected for lieutenant colonel and colonel posts on the command selection list (CSL). They are selected for a two-year assignment and unlike all other CSL positions may be extended for a third year by the MACOM commander. The garrison and installation support activity commanders are responsible for day-to-day operations. They are responsible for the comprehensive planning necessary to achieve and maintain excellent living and working conditions for all personnel on the installation. They are also responsible for supporting local mobilization plans. During deployment they remain at the installation to receive follow-on reserve components. They also care for the families and civilians left behind and sustain other critical post missions. The installation commander may assign other missions for the garrison and installation support activity commander to accomplish as required. For example, on some installations the garrison commander is assigned the additional duty of being the installation chief of staff. The garrison commander may be assisted in all aspects of base operations management (except in instances of command authority) by a civilian executive assistant (base operations).

#### **17-8. Area support group commander**

a. The Army uses an area support group (ASG) to manage multiple, geographically dispersed installations OCONUS. Unlike organizations in the reserve components with the same title, these active component units generally do not have a mission of providing combat service support. In Europe and Korea the ASG serves as a command and control headquarters for subordinate base support battalions. Although some may have an on-order to support continuity of operations (CONOPS), most are focused exclusively on a fixed installation management mission.

b. Central selection boards select the commanders for these groups. These officers are colonels or promotable lieutenant colonels. Area support group commanders execute the day-to-day management of installations under their control in much the same way garrison and installation support activity commanders perform in the CONUS.

#### **17-9. Base support battalion commander**

The Army may use the base support battalion (BSB) to manage garrisons OCONUS. Usually these base support battalion commanders operate under the command of an ASG. They perform their functions in much the same way garrison and installation support activity commanders do at a CONUS sub-installation. Their primary focus is the delivery of services with policy and management oversight provided by the ASG. OCONUS ASGs and BSBs use area support teams to manage sub-installations. These are small activities of service providers who operate under the command and control of the ASG or BSB.

#### **17-10. Executive assistant (base operations)**

The executive assistant (base operations or BASOPS) is a civilian position that functions as the deputy to the garrison commander in CONUS or the ASG/BSB commander OCONUS. The incumbent may act in the absence of the commander on all matters except those involving command authority. An executive assistant is generally responsible for the overall

administrative management within the garrison, coordination of requirements and activities between the garrison and multiple clientele, and assistance to the commander in implementing all policies, programs and services in support of base operations. This position may serve as a target for base operations civilian employees engaged in cross-functional professional development.

## **SECTION IV INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

### **17-11. Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) 6Y (Installation Management)**

The complexity of installation management presents a challenge to the managerial expertise of military garrison staff officers. Officers having performed effectively in their BASOPS capacity may be recommended by their commander for ASI 6Y validation. The installation commander is the certifying official for awarding of the 6Y skill identifier at the installation level. This ASI identifies positions requiring personnel trained in installation functions such as resource management, engineering management, logistical management, contract management, plans and training management, and community and family support management. This personnel designation may lead to BASOPS assignments as an installation commander, garrison commander, deputy garrison commander, chief of staff, installation manager at a MACOM or HQDA, or as a principal garrison staff officer.

### **17-12. Garrison Pre-Command Course (GPCC)**

The Army Management Staff College conducts this course, with a target population of lieutenant colonels and colonels centrally selected for garrison command. The course is also available to civilian executive assistants (BASOPS). It is an intensive 2 ½-week coverage of personnel, financial, facility engineering, environmental, morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) practices and issues, as well as other related topics. It is taught in small group seminars that focus on real-world issues, problems, options and relationships. Hands-on experience is achieved through field trips, staff walks and roundtable discussions with current garrison commanders. In addition, presentations are made by the ACSIM or Deputy ACSIM.

### **17-13. General Officer Installation Commander's Course (GOICC)**

The Community and Family Support Center (CFSC), in conjunction with the Army Management Staff College offers this 4 ½-day course for general officer installation commanders which focuses on installation management and morale, welfare and recreation (MWR) functions. The Chief of Staff, Army has designated the course as mandatory for all installation commanders, deputy installation commanders, and MACOM staff principals with installation responsibilities. The course is conducted as a small group seminar and requires active participation by the attendees. The course utilizes groups processes and case study techniques to challenge values and assumptions and provide important information and tools enabling attendees to excel in executing their BASOPS and MWR program responsibilities.

### **17-14. Garrison Sergeant Major Course (GSGMC)**

This one-week course is designed for garrison/area support group/base support battalion sergeants major. It is focused at the command group level and deals with the decisions that

the garrison commander/sergeant major team will be asked to make on a daily basis, and on the information that they will need to make those decisions. The course introduces BASOPS and Installation Management functional area structure, as well as current doctrine and policy. Employing panels, case studies, and practical exercises, the program explores actual garrison situations, and the tools, techniques, and procedures in use by commanders and sergeants major across the MACOMs to achieve mission requirements under conditions of limited resources. The course is conducted in an interactive, seminar format. Participants must actively participate in order for the objectives to be reached. Each GSGMC is conducted concurrently with a GPCC so that there is interface between the participants of both programs. The course includes senior Army leaders and functional area experts as guest presenters, addressing current and future garrison issues.

## **SECTION V INSTALLATION STAFF ORGANIZATION**

### **17-15. Installation special and personal staff**

The commander appoints and specifies the duties of the installation special and personal staff. The staff size and composition will vary by installation based on its mission. The positions are listed below. FM 100-22, *Installation Management*, provides descriptions of their responsibilities.

- a. Inspector general (IG).
- b. Staff judge advocate (SJA).
- c. Internal review and audit compliance (IRAC).
- d. Command historian.
- e. Public affairs officer (PAO).
- f. Installation chaplain.

### **17-16. Garrison/area support group/installation support activity**

The installation, area support group, or installation support activity staff provides the garrison commander assistance and functional area expertise in assigned areas of responsibility. Functional areas are listed below. Refer to the functional descriptions in FM 100-22 as a guideline for organization structure considerations.

- a. Directorate of plans, training and mobilization (DPTM).
- b. Directorate of counterintelligence and security (DCINT/SEC).
- c. Equal employment opportunity office (EEO).
- d. Director of health services (DHS)/ director of dental services (DDS).
- e. Headquarters commandant.
- f. Office of the provost marshal (PM).
- g. Directorate of personnel and community activities (DPCA).
- h. Directorate of resource management (DRM).

- i. Directorate of logistics (DOL).
- j. Directorate of public works (DPW).
- k. Directorate of installation support (DIS).
- l. Directorate of information management (DOIM).
- m. Directorate of contracting (DOC).

#### **17-17. Installation management personnel designations**

AR 600-3, *The Army Personnel Proponent System*, reflects the following career designations for Army installation management proponency:

- a. Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) 6Y, Installation Management.
- b. Career Field 29, Executive Assistant (BASOPS).
- c. Career Program 27, Housing Management.
- d. Career Field 51, Morale, Welfare and Recreation.
- e. Career Program 18, Engineers and Scientists (Resources and Construction) (limited to facilities engineering and environmental management responsibilities).

### **SECTION VI INSTALLATION STRATEGY**

#### **17-18. Installations: A Strategy for the 21st Century**

The Army's vision for installation management is found in *Installations: A Strategy for the 21st Century*. This document, first published in 1992 and updated in 1998, is the result of a HQDA cross-functional effort which developed an installation vision, eight strategic goals (listed below), and broad guidance for installation-related actions. It represents a shared view among the functional elements of what must be done to achieve the desired end state: world-class power projection platforms. It also serves as a lens to focus the efforts of the diverse programs, organizations, and offices involved in managing and supporting our installations. The intent is to achieve these goals, obtain the requisite commitment and programming of resources, and support the required changes in business practices and policies to accommodate the needs of installation commanders.

#### **17-19. Strategic goals**

Eight strategic goals have been established to guide accomplishment of the installation strategy.

- a. **Goal 1:** Reshape installations to meet power projection specifications.
- b. **Goal 2:** Formulate soldier and civilian employee programs to enhance quality of life and improve the living and working environment for soldiers, families and civilians.
- c. **Goal 3:** Achieve total integration of environmental stewardship into installation operations.

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- d. Goal 4:** Establish and resource an Investment Plan for our enduring installations to revitalize or replace installation infrastructure operations.
  - e. Goal 5:** Complete installation-level business process and functional design to offset the impact of downsizing and continuing resource constraints, improve service, and reduce the costs of running installations. Incorporate modernized telecommunications networks to support voice, data and image services.
  - f. Goal 6:** Promote community, interservice, and interagency partnerships for facilities and services to improve operations, customer service, and fiscal effectiveness and efficiency.
  - g. Goal 7:** Attain resource management flexibility for the garrison commander through policy, procedures and systems changes that will enable commanders to operate their posts as business activities and maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of resources.
  - h. Goal 8:** Transform the Army's human resource programs to build a participative committed installation management team capable of meeting the uncertainties and technological complexities of a constantly changing environment.

## SECTION VII

### MAJOR INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES AND PROGRAMS

#### 17-20. Strategic communications

ACSIM makes every effort to keep garrison commanders and other members of the BASOPS community informed. ACSIM has established a home page site on the Internet at <http://www.hqda.army.mil/acsim> that provides news of current initiatives, commentary from the ACSIM, and an on-line version of the quarterly newsletter as well as links to ACSIM division sites, MACOMs, posts, and other BASOPS-related web sites. The ACSIM also provides Garrison Commanders' Notes—items of interest to garrison commanders, executive officers, and base operations action officers—via email on an as-needed basis.

#### 17-21. Doctrine

The ACSIM established installation management doctrine with the publication of FM 100-22, *Installation Management*, on 11 October 1994. The doctrine describes how installations support the Army's role in the National Military Strategy and warfighting doctrine. It serves as the authoritative foundation for organizing, structuring and managing garrison operations. The scope of this doctrine provides the impetus for change in how installations are managed. Its publication gave commanders the flexibility to organize their garrison structure to operate as efficiently and effectively as possible within their resources. Consequently, AR 5-3, *Installation Management and Organization*, was rescinded. FM 100-22 is currently under revision at TRADOC.

#### 17-22. Privatization and outsourcing

**a.** Outsourcing is a powerful tool that the Army uses to re-engineer, streamline, become more business-oriented, and ultimately to make better use of resources. Outsourcing is defined as the transfer of a function previously performed in-house to an outside provider. Privatization is a subset of outsourcing that involves the transfer or sale of government assets to the private sector.

**b.** Privatization and outsourcing provide opportunities to leverage technology and achieve cost savings. These management tools can assist in increasing the share of resources applied to other Army priorities such as modernization. The installations conducting the studies and implementing the initiatives are key to the success or failure of the effort. Installations should take the broadest possible view of outsourcing, one that explores innovative partnerships with both private enterprise and the public sector, i.e., state/local governments, other DOD/Federal entities, and non-profit agencies. If outsourcing is narrowly defined as simply contracting out in-house functions, other opportunities for economies and efficiencies will be missed. As privatization and outsourcing opportunities continue to be examined, risks and capabilities must be assessed before taking action.

**c.** Private industry support is imbedded in many of the Army's functions today. Army training, maintenance and other logistics functions, research and development, manufacturing, and base level services are all carried out with substantial industry support. The current Army outsourcing focus is on the Department of Defense effort to address and implement Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) recommendations in the areas of depot maintenance, material management, housing, base commercial activities, education and training, data centers, and finance and accounting. The Army is researching and implementing solutions to problems through greater reliance on private industry in other areas as well. Specific initiatives are cited below.

**(1)** In February 1996, President Clinton signed into law the Defense Authorization Bill, now Public Law 104-106, known as the Military Housing Privatization Initiative. These authorities provide the Services with alternative means for construction and improvement of military housing (family and unaccompanied personnel). Under these authorities, the Services can leverage appropriated housing construction funds and government-owned assets to attract private capital in an effort to improve the quality of life for our soldiers and their families. This legislation provides a way to maximize use of limited appropriated funds, land, and existing facilities to encourage private sector investment. Under the Residential Communities Initiative (RCI), the Army plans to establish long-term business relationships with private sector developers for the purpose of improving military family housing communities. The Army will provide the developer a long-term interest in both land and family housing assets. These developers will become the master community developers for the Army community. The primary source of financial return for the developers will be the revenue stream generated from the military personnel's basic allowance for housing, which will be paid as rent. The Army is engaged in a pilot program for family housing privatization, which includes projects at Forts Carson, Hood, Lewis and Meade. In November 1999, Fort Carson became the first Army installation to privatize family housing. The other three pilot projects are in various stages of development and will be fully privatized in FY 2001. These projects represent almost 14 percent of all the Army's owned military family housing units in the United States. The Army plans to extend privatization to other sites once pilots can be fully evaluated. Recently, Congress extended housing privatization authorities through 31 December 2004.

**(2)** Owning and operating utilities are not Army core functions. Privatizing installation utilities frees the Army of ownership responsibilities and leverages the financial, technical and management capabilities of public and private utility organizations. Since December 1997, privatizing utilities is also a Defense Reform Initiative. The Army goal is

now to privatize 320 electric, gas, potable water and sanitary wastewater utility systems worldwide by 30 September 2003, where economical and not prevented by unique security reasons. At the end of FY 2000, the Army had privatized 13 systems and exempted 28 systems. The *National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998* granted to the Army authority to privatize utility systems after a 21-day notification period. The Army is partnering with the Defense Energy Support Center within the Defense Logistics Agency to assist installations by streamlining the procurement process and seeking opportunities to regionalize or bundle utilities across installation, MACOM and Service boundaries.

### **17-23. Commercial activities**

**a.** The Army has had an active Commercial Activities Program in place since the late 1970s. Studies are conducted at the installation level, under the guidance of OMB Circular A-76, *Commercial Activities*. The circular provides for competition between the government and commercial sources and specifies how to conduct cost comparisons. Army Regulation 5-20 and DA Pamphlet 5-20 provide the Army's policy and instructions for meeting the statutory and other regulatory guidelines. The Army and DOD understand the problems associated with the Commercial Activities Program and are working to change laws, remove barriers, and streamline the processes to facilitate outsourcing where it makes good business sense. Commanders have a variety of lessons-learned and other documented experience, audit and inspection reports, and standard study and contracting documents that can help reduce the work of the study process so that efficiencies and economies can still be achieved in the near-term.

**b.** In conducting an A-76 cost competition, installations—

- Solicit bids or proposals from private firms.
- Streamline the in-house organization into a most efficient organization (MEO).
- Develop an “in-house bid” based on the MEO (following detailed costing rules) and have it reviewed by an auditing organization (Army Audit Agency or Installation Internal Review).
- Select the lowest bid or best value proposal from the solicitation, and add 10 percent of the personnel-related in-house costs to account for intangible transition costs.
- If the result is lower than the “in-house bid,” convert to contract; if the result is higher, reorganize into the MEO.

**c.** Between 1 Oct 96 and 13 Dec 00, the Army completed 85 A-76 cost competitions covering over 3,867 manpower positions. An additional 23 studies of 6,724 positions have reached cost comparison (tentative decision), but possible appeals and protests are still pending as of 13 Dec 00. These 108 studies included many entire DOLs and DPWs, as well as other functions and activities such as custodial services, laundry, and food services. The results achieved include—

- 23 full cost comparison decisions (16 in-house and 7 contract decisions).
- 42 direct conversions.
- 23 tentative cost comparison decisions (10 in-house and 13 contract decisions).
- 110 ongoing studies of 23,800 spaces.

- Total dollar savings averaged 33 percent (comparing pre-study in-house cost, estimated using A-76 costing procedures, to the winning bid, whether in-house or contract). (These A-76 calculations include non-agency costs).
- d. The above facts highlight the effect that competition has on the cost of performing a function.
- e. Over time, the laws and rules associated with contracting-out have become more specific and constraining. While these may inhibit outsourcing decisions and implementation, only a limited number of absolute prohibitions to contracting exist. For example, firefighter and security guard services may not be contracted within the Department of Defense (DOD), unless they were already contracted as of September 24, 1983. Title 10, United States Code, Chapter 146, provides most of the legal foundation for reporting and conducting the studies of commercial activities. Of primary concern is the impact of contracting-out on Federal employees. Additionally, the Army has exempted childcare and youth service functions from competition.
- f. While commercial activities cost competitions are difficult, lengthy and stressful, they make the Army more efficient and significantly reduce costs.

### **17-24. Environmental Compliance Program**

This program focuses on activities designed to ensure that current operations at Army installations and activities (including civil works project sites) meet or exceed Federal, State and local environmental requirements, as well as the applicable final governing standards (FGS) overseas. These requirements include statutes, case law, Presidential Executive orders, regulations, policies and directives principally in the areas of air quality, radon, asbestos, lead-based paint, environmental noise, safe drinking water, wastewater, hazardous and munitions waste, solid waste, underground storage tanks (USTs), and the *National Environmental Policy Act*. This makes full compliance a very challenging and sometimes elusive goal. Nevertheless, the Army continues to make progress in this area as reflected by the gradual decline (beginning in FY 1992) in the overall violation rate and number of enforcement actions received and the number of open enforcement actions. The greatest challenge for the Army will be to continue to improve its compliance posture, and at the same time, effectively transition to a compliance through pollution prevention mode of operation.

### **17-25. Hazardous Substances Management System (HSMS)**

In January 1996, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) signed a message mandating pharmacy-like centralized hazardous materials management systems be established at all AMC installations not already utilizing that practice. Since that time ACSIM has fielded an initial operating capability for centralized hazardous material management at 45 Army installations worldwide. Another 12 installation programs will be established in FY 2001. The Army utilizes the Hazardous Substances Management System as the standard management information system supporting the business practice of centralized hazardous materials management. It provides installation-level cradle-to-grave management of hazardous materials and hazardous waste, as well as preparing many required environmental reports for the installation.

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**17-26. Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Reduction Strategy**

Army installations have been required to inventory their toxic releases beginning in calendar year (CY) 1994. Facilities exceeding certain toxic chemical release thresholds report these amounts annually to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in accordance with the *Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act*. The Army was required to significantly reduce agency-wide releases from the calendar year 1994 baseline that was then established. Subsequent analysis led to an Army-wide TRI Reduction Strategy maximizing cost savings and eliminating sources of pollution, while minimizing the investment of required Army resources. The Army successfully met and exceeded the reduction requirement. Beginning in CY 2000, release reports are required for open burning / open detonation sites which exceed the release threshold. By 1 July 2002 installations with ranges that meet specified employee work hour and usage thresholds will report range releases.

**17-27. Installation pollution prevention plans**

Army installations are required to maintain pollution prevention plans. Executive Order 13148 requires that these plans be updated by 31 March 2002 to reflect its new requirements. These plans support the overall Army Pollution Prevention Strategy and focus on meeting all the pollution prevention measures of merit identified by OSD. Projects identified through installation level pollution prevention opportunity assessments are incorporated in the plan and submitted forward as requirements in program development. Installations are also required to develop plans for the elimination of ozone depleting substances (ODS) identified in the Montreal Protocol and the 1990 Amendments to the *Clean Air Act*. These plans are an integral part of the overall installation pollution prevention plan.

**17-28. Recycling**

Army installations must recycle to be in compliance with Executive Order 12873, *Acquisition, Recycling and Waste Prevention*, 20 Oct 93; Executive Order 13101, *Federal Acquisition, Recycling and Waste Prevention*, 14 Sep 98; and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 4715.4, *Pollution Prevention*, 18 Jun 96. The DODI requires installations to have, or be associated with, a qualifying recycling program (QRP) which is available to all tenants. This recycling policy includes contractors and contractor facilities on installations. QRPs may sell their recyclable materials directly on the open market or through local Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices (DRMOs). DRMO will return 100 percent of the proceeds from sales of recyclable materials, including firing range scrap (expended brass and mixed metal gleaned from firing range clearance) to installations with a QRP. Sales proceeds must first be used to reimburse installation-level costs incurred in the operation of the recycling program. The installation commander may then use up to 50 percent of the remaining proceeds for pollution abatement, energy conservation, and occupational safety and health projects. Finally, any remaining sale proceeds may be transferred to the non-appropriated MWR account of the installation. Additional financial benefits of recycling, beyond the revenues generated, are reduction of current year solid waste handling and landfill costs, extension of landfill capacity, and avoidance/deferral of future landfill costs. Installation reporting of recycling activities is captured in the Solid Waste Annual Reporting (SWAR) System for determination of progress towards achieving the DOD Measure of Merit (MoM) of 40 percent diversion of solid waste from landfills and

incineration by 2005. This program does not apply to Army Working Capital Fund operations.

### **17-29. Army Energy Program**

**a.** Energy management on Army installations is focused on improving efficiency, eliminating waste, and enhancing the quality of life while meeting mission requirements. Accomplishing these objectives will reduce costs and ensure that the program goals are achieved. Executive Order 13123 established the facilities energy reduction goal of 30 percent by FY 2005 and 35 percent by FY 2010, using FY 1985 as the baseline year. At the end of FY 2000, the Army had achieved a reduction of 22.9 percent toward the FY 2010 goal. The challenge now is to maintain this momentum in a rapidly changing fiscal and business environment.

**b.** The facilities energy program is decentralized, with Army installations managing site-specific energy and water conservation programs. The installations are responsible for maintaining awareness, developing and implementing projects, and ensuring that new construction meets their requirements. Army headquarters provide guidance and funding through the major commands. The responsibilities and functions of Army elements implementing the program are outlined in AR 11-27, *Army Energy Program*, and in the DOD Energy Manager's Handbook.

**c.** The energy program uses a multifaceted approach made up of several interrelated initiatives. These include energy awareness, energy manager training, energy engineering and project development efforts, project implementation, new construction standards, and demonstrations of innovative technology. Funding of projects also has a multifaceted approach with a combination of government and alternative financing initiatives.

### **17-30. Energy savings performance contracts (ESPC)**

**a.** The *Energy Policy Act of 1992* authorized Federal agencies to use private sector capital funding sources to finance costs associated with achieving mandated reductions in energy consumption levels. Various Federal mandates required that energy consumption be significantly curtailed in Federal facilities, regardless of funding source. As such, the government must achieve these mandated reductions by implementing energy efficiency measures, either through appropriate funding sources or alternative financing approaches. Executive Order 13123, issued in June 1999, changed the energy reduction goals for all the Services. Using 1985 as a baseline for our energy usage, the Army must reduce its energy usage by 35 percent by 2010. The Executive order increased the reduction goal from 30 to 35 percent with an additional five years to meet the target. The Executive order also emphasizes the use of renewable resources and new and innovative approaches. To meet these goals, the Army must invest more than \$800 million in its facilities.

**b.** Many Army facilities have outdated energy equipment in lighting, heating and cooling systems and other energy consuming devices. The limited resources available to maintain and improve facilities are a major challenge to our installations and their commanders. In order to improve facilities and reduce energy costs, the Army must look to the private sector for the necessary capital.

**c.** ESPC is a contracting methodology in which a private contractor, called an energy services company (ESCO), performs services that include audits, evaluation, design,

financing, acquisition, installation and maintenance of energy efficient equipment, altered operation and maintenance improvements, or technical services for the installation. The ESCO receives compensation based on the savings generated. The terms and conditions set forth in the contract determine the level of compensation to the ESCO, with the remainder of savings retained by the installation. Current statutes allow DOD components to enter into such contracts for their installations and/or facilities, including leased facilities. ESPC provides an alternative method of implementing energy saving projects when installation resources such as manpower, technical expertise, or funding are not available.

d. A number of regional and national contracts have been awarded in the past and are available to Army installations. These contracts have capacity available to meet the Army's goals for improving our facilities. The following agencies can provide assistance and task order development: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville Engineering and Support Center (CEHNC); Department of Energy/Federal Energy Management Program (DOE/FEMP); U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM); and Defense Energy Support Center (DESC).

### **17-31. Army Installation Restoration Program (IRP)**

a. The Army's IRP is a comprehensive program to identify, investigate and clean up contamination at active Army installations (including off-post migration). The program focuses on cleanup of contamination associated with past Army activities. The IRP is part of the DOD Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) which was formally established by Congress in 1984 under Title 10 USC 2701-2707 and 2810. The IRP provides centralized management for clean up of hazardous waste sites consistent with provisions of the *Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERLA)*.

b. The objective of the IRP is to clean up contaminated sites. The IRP is funded by the Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA), established by Section 211 of the *Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA)*. The IRP complies with state, regional and local requirements applicable to the clean up of hazardous materials contamination. The IRP has the following goals:

- (1) To protect the health and safety of installation personnel and the public.
- (2) To restore the quality of the environment.

### **17-32. Army conservation program**

The Army's conservation program is focused on compliance with a wide variety of natural and cultural resource laws. Major areas of conservation compliance fall within the *Sikes Improvement Act of 1997, Endangered Species Act of 1973, Clean Water Act, National Historic Preservation Act, Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, American Indian Religious Freedom Act, and Archeological Resources Protection Act*. The Army Conservation Program emphasizes the integration of compliance requirements into natural and cultural resources management plans. These required plans are designed for installation commanders to make informed decisions regarding the management of natural and cultural resources to enable maximum short and long term availability of Army lands for mission use and ensure compliance with law.

### **17-33. Military Construction Army (MCA) Process**

**a.** Although installation commanders may see military construction (MILCON) projects completed and occupied on their installations, a predecessor, or a predecessor's predecessor will likely have initiated the projects. Normally an installation commander will be planning and programming projects that will not be completed during that assignment. Identifying the point in time when DA and the MACOM issue programming guidance to the installation as 'Day One,' it will likely be more than 36 months from Day One before construction of a MILCON project would begin, and another 18 to 24 months for construction to be completed. In an ideal and simplified situation, events will unfold over a period of four years:

(1) During the first year, the installation will develop the DD Form 1391 based on the using agency's requirements and submit proposed projects to the MACOM. The MACOM will submit proposed projects to HQDA and concept designs will start, with installation participation.

(2) During the second year, concept designs will be completed and final designs started, with installation participation. HQDA will submit proposed projects to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for next year's budget submission.

(3) During the third year, OSD submits a budget to Congress that includes MILCON projects; final designs will be completed; and projects will be prepared for advertisement for construction.

(4) At the start of the fourth year Congress approves the budget and funds, and authorizes the MILCON projects. Projects are advertised for construction, bids are opened and projects awarded for construction.

**b.** The list of projects submitted by the installations to the MACOMs is pared down by the MACOMs before the list is submitted to HQDA. In turn, that list is pared down by HQDA before it is sent to OSD, and again the list is pared down by OSD before being submitted to Congress.

**c.** Because of the length of time involved in the process, and because of the competitiveness of the process, the installation commander must be farsighted and determined, especially in the current fiscal environment. He or she must be farsighted in order to plan and program years ahead of the true requirement, and be determined in order to fully justify and support a project through the planning and programming years.

### **17-34. Army Facility Reduction Program**

**a.** Army policy is to maximize the utilization of existing facilities and aggressively reduce facility inventory excess to mission requirements. Army facilities continue to deteriorate because of insufficient real property maintenance (RPM) funding necessary to properly sustain them. Excess facilities aggravate this problem by using RPM dollars that should be spent on required facilities. The Army's funding policy, therefore, is to only fund required facilities.

**b.** At the direction of the Vice Chief of Staff, the Army initiated facilities reduction in FY 1992, funded at \$20 million per fiscal year through FY 1997. By the end of FY 1997, the Army had disposed of 47 million square feet (MSF) of excess space. Recognizing the

importance of further reducing excess space, the Army adopted a three-pronged approach to analyzing and correcting the excess space problem:

- Ensure installation real property inventories are accurate and current.
- Ensure installation requirements are reflected properly in the Real Property Planning and Analysis System (RPLANS), the Army's system to calculate allowances and requirements).
- Centrally fund a Facility Reduction Program (FRP).
- c. The Army's Facility Reduction Program has three objectives:
  - Focus on stewardship of facilities through maximizing utilization and maintaining only required facilities.
  - Focus limited RPM resources on required facilities.
  - Reduce infrastructure through consolidation and disposal of excess.

d. In May 1997, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) issued Management Reform Memorandum (MRM) #8 that endorsed the Army's emphasis on the demolition of excess facilities. OSD required the services to submit a list of excess facilities and plan for disposal. The Army submitted 53 MSF based on its ongoing program. OSD subsequently issued Defense Reform Initiative Directive (DRID) #36 in May 1998, setting an Army target of 53.2 MSF of disposal between FY 1998 and FY 2003, and directed that funding be provided to accomplish disposals.

e. The Army programmed approximately 100 million dollars per year for FYs 1998-2003 for facility disposal. Through FY 2000, the Army had disposed of 28.5 MSF of excess and was on track to meet the FY 2003 goal.

### **17-35. Revitalization**

a. The Secretary of Defense directed the Services to eliminate all inadequate family housing by FY 2010 and barracks by FY 2008. For family housing, the Congress directed in Public Law 106-52 for each service to submit a Family Housing Master Plan (FHMP) to demonstrate how they will meet the Secretary's goal. The Army submitted their first FHMP to Congress in June 2000, which used a combination of traditional military construction, operation and maintenance support, as well as increased reliance on privatization to reach the goal in Europe and Korea by FY 2010 and in the U.S. by FY 2014. The Congress requires an annual update of the FHMP. As for the barracks program, Public Law 105-621, the *Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1999*, requires the Secretary of Defense to provide an annual report to Congress on Service plans and estimated costs to improve housing for unaccompanied members. In February 2000 the first annual barracks report on the status of the goal to meet the FY 2008 buyout was submitted to Congress.

b. Revitalization is the cornerstone of our vision to provide excellent facilities. We must revitalize in a systematic way to repair, upgrade, or replace our family housing and barracks facilities, as well as our infrastructure to modern standards. The ACSIM has developed two programs to focus scarce revitalization resources where the greatest benefit is achieved.

**(1) *Army Barracks Modernization Program.***

**(a)** Started in FY 1994, the Army Barracks Modernization Program upgrades permanent party enlisted unaccompanied personnel housing through two programs: the Whole Barracks Renewal Program (WBRP) and the Barracks Upgrade Program (BUP). The WBRP is a MILCON funded program primarily for new construction. The BUP is a centrally funded OMA RPM program predominately for major renovations of Volunteer Army (VOLAR) era barracks, and other barracks where it is more cost effective to renovate to the DOD 1+1 barracks standard versus replacing them.

**(b)** Based on the DOD 1+1 barracks construction standard, a typical barracks complex may include—

- Barracks buildings accommodating one soldier per room; two rooms share a private bath and service area, including refrigerator, sink and microwave oven.
- Room size 11 square meters or 118 net square feet (NSF).
- 22 NSF closets provided in lieu of wardrobes (in addition to 11 square meters).
- Each room has separate temperature controls and is wired for cable TV and telephone.
- Consolidated laundry facilities (1 washer/dryer per 15 soldiers).
- Separate soldier community building with day rooms, mail area, common kitchen, bulk storage for each soldier, and charge of quarters (CQ) office.
- Company operations buildings with storage for Common Table of Allowances (CTA)-50 equipment, mud room and shower facilities.
- Dining facility, brigade/battalion headquarters in separate buildings.
- Increased parking, landscaping, and recreational/open space.

**(c)** The Army Barracks Modernization Program is the Army's number one facilities priority. Currently, this program is planned to revitalize over 160,000 spaces in the United States, Korea and Europe and is programmed to meet the FY 2008 buyout.

**(2) *Whole neighborhood revitalization.***

**(a)** According to the Family Housing Master Plan, the Army plans to expand privatization beyond the four pilot sites to a total of 20 installations. These 20 projects will privatize approximately 70 percent of the U.S. family housing inventory. The privatization authorities allow the private developer to build houses to local standards. For those units that remain under government control and are not privatized, the Army will continue to use the Whole Neighborhood Revitalization approach as a guide for renovating these units to current construction and energy standards. This includes construction replacement housing that is comparable in size and floor plan to that available in the local community.

**(b)** Whole neighborhood revitalization takes a holistic approach to renewing entire neighborhoods and includes revitalization of dwelling units, neighborhood infrastructure and neighborhood amenities accomplished at one time, thereby eliminating the piecemeal approach.

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**17-36. Installation Status Report (ISR)**

a. In 1992, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), the United States Military Academy Operations Research Center (ORCEN), and MACOM commanders jointly developed a decision support system, the Installation Status Report (ISR), designed to assist installation commanders with installation management. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) also participated in ISR development and field testing. The effort has been guided by an executive steering committee and working group comprised of representatives from HQDA functional offices, ACSIM and the MACOMs.

b. The ISR assists installation commanders in determining the readiness of installations much like the unit status report indicates unit readiness. ISR Infrastructure estimates facility resource needs, assists in prioritizing programs and projects, assists in resource allocation, and then measures progress. ISR infrastructure was fielded in CONUS in FY 1995 and OCONUS in FY 1996. ISR Environment captures macro-level status of installations' environmental programs and improves the justification and prioritization of limited resources. ISR Environment was fielded in CONUS in FY 1996 and OCONUS in FY 1998. ISR Services evaluates the quantity and quality of basic services required at installations and will form the basis for standardizing service support Army wide. The first data collection for approved service performance standards (SPSs) for 37 of the 95 services was conducted during FY 2000 using a common list of 95 installation services.

c. The ISR program provides an overall picture of an installation's status and shows how deficiencies in installation condition affect the environment and mission performance. It provides information which links installation conditions, priorities and resources to readiness. While serving the needs of different customers--HQDA, MACOMs, and installations--the ISR is also the installation commander's opportunity to influence the Army's strategy. The ISR provides a common standard and language for the Army to speak with one voice. Details concerning the ISR are contained in AR 210-14, *Installation Status Report Program*.

**17-37. Army Facility Strategy**

a. The Army Facility Strategy is a program to bring the Army to an overall C-2 facility condition by modernizing selected facilities to C-1 in ten-year increments within a 30 year time period, beginning in FY03. The selected facilities were based on the facility condition as evaluated against standards in the ISR.

b. Building upon the success of the barracks and strategic mobility buy-out programs, the Army Facility Strategy requires continuing the level of modernization funding (approximately \$1.5 billion annually) to tackle the most critical facilities issues of the Army.

c. The key to the success of the Army Facility Strategy is fully funding the minimum annual sustainment of RPM in order to halt further deterioration and properly maintain the facilities we are modernizing. The cost of resourcing minimum sustainment RPM at 100 percent is estimated at \$2.3 billion per year.

d. Based on an analysis of the ISR for the Army, twelve types of facilities are most in need of a central buy-out program. These twelve types represent facilities having C-3 and C-4 Army level ratings for quality or quantity. These facilities are key facilities where soldiers

and civilians live, work or train. Facility types covered under other DA initiatives are not included (e.g., permanent party barracks and training ranges).

e. The first 10-year increment for both Active Army and Reserve Components consists of vehicle maintenance facilities and supporting hardstand requirements, classrooms, fitness centers, one-third of reserve centers and one-third of National Guard readiness centers.

### **17-38. Managing installations to standards**

a. **Managing to standards.** Installation readiness is an important aspect of the *Army Vision* and Transformation process. As Army Transformation progresses, we must—

- Focus investments to gain the most benefit from limited resources.
- Identify required infrastructure and support services necessary for the desired level of readiness.
- Make a dedicated effort to stop further deterioration of existing infrastructure and prevent erosion of services.
- Target limited modernization dollars to mission critical and soldier well being requirements.

b. **Army Base Operations and Support Strategy.** Standards allow us to manage this process. Managing Army installations to standards will ensure that installation support for the warfighter is ready and available when needed. Based on a mature ISR process, we now have an Army Facility Strategy to focus our investments on facilities. As the ISR services reporting process matures, we will establish an Army Base Operations and Support Strategy parallel to the Army's Facility Strategy. An Army Base Operations and Support Strategy will focus our investments and apply resources to services where critically needed to support the warfighter and the well being of our soldiers and family members.

c. **Establishing Standards.** ISR standards for infrastructure and environment have already been implemented. Efforts to establish standards for services have been initiated.

(1) *Infrastructure.* Defined, published standards cover about 90 percent of the real property inventory. Detailed standards have been grouped into 60 subcategories encompassing 219 facility category groups, each defining similar types of facilities.

(2) *Environment.* Defined standards are established for 19 media, such as air, water, and hazardous wastes; grouped in 5 pillars of Compliance, Conservation, Restoration, Pollution Prevention, and Foundation.

(3) *Services.* An ongoing effort is underway to provide a means for commanders to report results against defined standards of performance. Specific metrics and standards were developed for each of 37 installation services. As noted above, data against approved standards Army-wide was collected during FY 2000. Ongoing development and implementation will capitalize on lessons learned as the ISR program evolves.

d. **Resourcing to standards.** A prerequisite to resourcing to standards is articulating “ground truth” requirements necessary to achieve the standard.

(1) *Infrastructure.* Standards allow us to succinctly show the cost to maintain current facility conditions and to improve facility conditions to achieve specific C-ratings.

(2) *Environment.* Standards direct attention to projects which need funding to correct a non-compliant issue (i.e., exceeding permit limits) or to prevent future environmental violations.

(3) *Services.* The key here is to maintain a link between cost and performance against established standards. This is accomplished by using a common list of 95 installation services and the Army's methodology for accumulating the costs of services (service based costing).

### **17-39. Improved business practices**

a. Today's fiscal restraints make it imperative that the Army goes even further in doing business differently. We must be innovative in setting new standards for financial management, in implementing good business practices and in seeking every opportunity to "make money" in order to provide quality base services. Normally, the law precludes installations from using assets that are supported with appropriated funds to generate revenues to offset costs. Unless specifically authorized by law to retain revenues, those proceeds or "profits" from installation operations or sale of assets must be deposited in the U.S. Treasury. However, Congress demonstrated some willingness to consider limited, amendatory legislation to use proceeds from the sale or outlease of property for the specific purposes of maintenance and repair and environmental restoration.

b. Specifically, the *FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act* included two new authorities that were initially authored by the Army. Sections 2805 and 2806 of Public Law 101-510 provide DOD the authority to retain revenues generated from the sale or transfer of excess non-base realignment and closure (BRAC) real property and the outlease of non-excess real and personal property, respectively. Any funds earned by an installation through these authorities would not be offset by a reduction elsewhere in the installation budget. The Resource Recovery and Recycling Program, under which installations with a "qualified Recycling Program" market recyclable materials through the DRMO or through direct sales, provide that all proceeds go to the generating installation. Proceeds will first cover program operating costs and of the remaining amount, up to 50 percent can be used for environmental, energy or safety programs with all other proceeds used for MWR activities.

### **17-40. Civilian inmate labor programs**

In pursuing new and more economical methods of providing services, several installations have sought minimum security civilian inmates as an alternative source of labor. Such an arrangement benefits both the Army and correctional facilities. Civilian inmates accomplish tasks not otherwise possible under current manning and funding constraints. Correctional facilities benefit because the Army provides meaningful work for inmates, and in some cases additional space to relieve overcrowding. Except for nominal operating costs, this labor pool has no direct labor cost to the Army. An evaluation of initial test cases revealed that under certain circumstances this arrangement can be very beneficial to the Army - cost-avoidance has been significant. A civilian inmate labor program can be implemented on an installation simply with a HQDA approved memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the commander and the warden, and an installation inmate labor plan.

#### **17-41. Army Communities of Excellence (ACOE)**

**a.** The ACOE program is a commander's process that is broad enough to accommodate a variety of approaches that can be tailored to any organization, command or installation. Leaders and managers take advantage of the entrepreneurial genius of the people within the community to develop better ways of helping people and getting work done. It is a program that encourages ideas and initiatives to float upward.

**b.** The mission of the ACOE Program is to provide a quality environment, excellent facilities and services. Our installations, both at home and abroad, will have an increasingly critical role in sustaining and launching our forces worldwide. Continuing to strive for greater excellence in customer service and facilities will contribute significantly to the improvement of Army readiness.

**c.** The ACOE program is a multiyear/component program that spans the current year, prior year, and one out year. This funding profile allows the program manager to manage long lead items such as trophies for the award ceremony in May and near term requirements such as training for MACOM examiners during September. Finally, out year funding presents incentive award dollars to winning communities in the first quarter following the competition (October/November).

**d.** Since 1993 there has been a fifty percent reduction in the ACOE program. For example, award dollars were reduced from \$10 million dollars to \$4.2 million dollars. The funding profile annually distributes \$4.2 million dollars to winning communities, and includes an additional \$890 thousand dollars in operations/administration cost.

**e.** The ACOE process will contribute to Installation Management Vision 2000 goals and objectives by providing service excellence and facilities excellence.

**(1) *Service excellence.*** Services cut across the entire functional spectrum of the community and affect mission accomplishment. This includes personnel services; morale, welfare and recreation; medical and pharmacy services; family services; commissary; post exchange; transportation; logistics; engineering; information; housing; contracting; finance; and the environment. The key ingredient of service excellence is a concept of customer service: commitment to courtesy and promptness in delivery.

**(2) *Facilities excellence.*** Excellent facilities constitute the physical environment in which services are performed and in which activities take place. They are a direct reflection of individual and community pride. The pursuit of excellence is encouraged among soldiers who live in quality barracks, bachelor enlisted quarters (BEQ), bachelor officer quarters (BOQ), and family housing; train in classrooms, in National Guard armories, in reserve centers or on ranges in good repair; and work in facilities that are bright, well furnished and well maintained.

**f.** ACOE now integrates Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award criteria in the Army performance improvement criteria (APIC) for installation assessments. The Baldrige criteria are the standard for world-class quality. The Baldrige criteria comprise a comprehensive and integrated change management framework, allowing an organization to assess its approach, deployment, and results of its effort to change. All posts, regardless of size, are assessed against the criteria, not against each other. The Baldrige criteria focus on self-assessment to identify strengths and weaknesses in planning and execution with emphasis on customer

satisfaction. The value in preparing an ACOE competition package is the feedback gained through self-assessment and the awakening of self-awareness. This assessment focuses on the entire community, with emphasis on internal and external facility excellence and customer service.

**g.** Performance and productivity are enhanced within a community that instills pride and imparts a sense of accomplishment and purpose among its people. Through improvements in the living and working conditions for those who use, live, train and work in Army communities, the Army can better focus on its primary day-to-day mission of being ready to fight and win.

**h.** The ACOE program is designed to change the thinking from "minimal essential" to "maximum possible" philosophies in providing support to soldiers. Soldiers are deserving of nothing less than excellence. They are entitled to quality of life commensurate with that of the society they are sworn to defend. Authority and responsibility must be pushed down into the organization. Competition must be promoted and winners celebrated.

**i.** The ACOE program makes an unambiguous contribution to the single overarching characteristic that must be the Army's hallmark into the 21st Century: the quality of the force.

## **SECTION VIII SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

### **17-42. Summary**

**a.** Installation management is a complicated but essential process with which too few Army officers are familiar. The importance of vigorous, innovative management at the installation level has become more critical as the combined effects of resource limitations and escalating costs squeeze the Army's capability to support existing structure and maintain essential readiness through training. The challenge of wringing maximum utility, efficiency, and productivity from each available dollar is the professional obligation not only of the Director of Resource Management, but also of the installation commander, the garrison commander, directorate staff, subordinate commanders, and responsible people at all levels. Sound, efficient installation management contributes directly and materially to fundamental mission accomplishment. The installation commander functions as the mayor of his or her city. The garrison commander and the garrison staff directors are comparable to the city manager and department heads. They operate the city with all the associated daily challenges and short and long term planning responsibilities. They strive to provide the best possible quality of life to soldiers and families, protect the environment, use allocated funds and other resources wisely and legally, and maintain good relations with surrounding communities. It is imperative that our "military cities"—the places where our soldiers, family members and civilians train, work, live, and play—be maintained at the highest levels of readiness, capable of projecting the power necessary to win the next war.

**b.** Army installations are—

- Home to the force.
- Serving our nation in peace and war.
- Continuously improving communities of quality facilities and services.

- Valued neighbors, trusted community partners, and recognized leaders in city management and public administration.
  - Environmental stewards for present and future generations.
  - World-class strategic power projection and sustainment bases.
- c. Army installations are changing to meet the demands of training highly technical forces within limited geographical and physical assets, frequently mobilizing, deploying and recovering operating forces, and providing sustainment and support services beyond the installation boundaries. The ability to deploy forces rapidly from CONUS is central to the Army's role in the National Military Strategy.
- d. Army installations today face tougher challenges than ever before due to years of underfunding and the infrastructure deterioration that has resulted. Efficient and effective management of installations is more critical than ever. Army installations must continue to make every effort to provide the quality of life that soldiers, families and workers deserve.

### **17-43. References**

- a. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 (Revised), *Performance of Commercial Activities*.
- b. Army Regulation 1-1, *Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System*.
- c. Army Regulation 5-1, *Army Management Philosophy*.
- d. Army Regulation 5-9, *Area Support Responsibilities*.
- e. Army Regulation 5-20, *Commercial Activities Program*.
- f. Army Regulation 11-27, *Army Energy Program*.
- g. Army Regulation 200-1, *Environmental Protection and Enhancement*.
- h. Army Regulation 200-2, *Environmental Effects of Army Actions*.
- i. Army Regulation 210-14, *Installation Status Report Program*.
- j. Army Regulation 210-20, *Master Planning for Army Installations*.
- k. Army Regulation 210-50, *Housing Management*.
- l. Army Regulation 405-70, *Utilization of Real Property*.
- m. Army Regulation 405-90, *Disposal of Real Estate*.
- n. Army Regulation 415-15, *Army Military Construction Program Development and Execution*.
- o. Army Regulation 420-10, *Management of Installation Directorates of Public Works*.
- p. Army Regulation 600-3, *The Army Personnel Proponent System*.
- q. Field Manual 100-22, *Installation Management*.

# CHAPTER 18

## INTELLIGENCE

*"We exist to support a transforming Army by fielding and sustaining the world's premier Military Intelligence Organization."*

Lieutenant General Robert W. Noonan, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,  
Headquarters, Department of the Army

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 18-1. Chapter content

**a.** Army Military Intelligence provides commanders, operators, and other consumers timely and accurate information and finished intelligence for the commander to identify the enemy's center of gravity and to conduct dominate operations at every echelon. Intelligence is also an integrated element of battle command and a fundamental enabler for information operations (IO).

**b.** This chapter defines intelligence and provides an overview of the need for intelligence by decision makers. It includes the composition and responsibilities of the various intelligence organizations at national, Department of Defense (DOD), non-DOD, and Service (including HQDA) levels. It also describes the Army concepts for the production of intelligence and the relationship of intelligence to operations security; targeting; electronic warfare; and the requirement for seamless intelligence support "from space to mud".

**c.** Intelligence is the product obtained from the systematic planning and directing, collection, processing, analysis and production, and dissemination of information. This chapter addresses the management of this effort.

#### 18-2. Intelligence drivers

**a. Presidential direction.** President Reagan signed Executive Order (EO) 12333 on 4 December 1981. The EO provides for the effective conduct of U.S. intelligence activities and the protection of the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens. EO 12333 superseded EO 12036, which regulated U.S. intelligence activities during the Carter Administration. The original EO on the subject was 11905, signed by President Ford. EO 12333 has not been superseded under subsequent administrations. The Army implements EO 12333 through Army Regulations 381.10 and 381-20. President Clinton signed a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) entitled U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness – Counterintelligence for the 21st Century on 5 January 2001. The PDD directed the establishment of a National Counterintelligence Board of Directors chaired by the Director, Federal Bureau of


Investigations (FBI) and composed of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) and a senior representative of the Department of Justice. It also directed the establishment of a National Counterintelligence Executive to serve as the substantive leader of national-level counterintelligence and execute responsibilities on behalf of the National Counterintelligence Board of Directors. In addition, the PDD outlines other specific steps that will enable the U.S. counterintelligence community to better fulfill its mission of identifying, understanding, prioritizing and counteracting the intelligence threats faced by the United States.

**b. Army Transformation.** Military Intelligence (MI) is an integral element of the Army's Transformation goals and objectives. The Army is developing a single, cohesive picture of Army MI in the future, that is who and what Army MI must be, and what direction Army MI must take to support the commander during full spectrum operations. This foundation builds from a vision and guiding set of principles for MI: quality people and leadership; focused analysis and synthesis; integrated in facilitating situational understanding; gaining information superiority; support to force protection; and the ability to leverage joint and national intelligence support. Each principle provides overarching guidance and direction Army MI soldiers and civilians need to accomplish MI's mission.

(1) As the Army transitions to provide rapid, decisive, and sustained land power, MI requires a new approach toward conducting intelligence operations. Intelligence sources currently collect, process, analyze, and disseminate information as either single or multidiscipline intelligence, focused principally on collection methods and capabilities. Within this architectural framework, the ability to rapidly share critical, time-sensitive information is hindered. The commanders' need for a shared, up-to-the minute understanding of the battlespace, coupled with the explosion of the availability of information, mandates a shift toward creating a collaborative, distributed, and integrated information environment as illustrated in Figure 18-1.

(2) Implementing this vision will require the Army to integrate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to help shape the battlespace from the strategic to the tactical levels; to leverage national agencies and sister services to better support the warfighter; and focus on core intelligence competencies. Changes in Army intelligence that support this vision include the use of intelligence support elements at all levels and changes to the intelligence force structure that better support a strategically deployable Army.

**c. Need for intelligence.** Timely, relevant, accurate, predictive and useable intelligence addressing the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign leaders and their governments is needed to develop sound national security and foreign policies. It is critical to international negotiations and to the development and monitoring of international agreements.



**Figure 18-1. Army Intelligence—Changing Methods and Balance**

(1) Within the DOD, planners and managers responsible for the development of weapons systems and force structure need accurate, long-range projections of the combat capabilities and technologies of foreign powers as the basis for their recommendations and decisions. The ability of U.S. forces to deter or defend against attack requires detailed knowledge of the current deployment and capabilities of potential adversaries and their future plans.

(2) At the operational and tactical levels of warfare, intelligence must provide a commander with information and knowledge in order to facilitate situational understanding so that he or she can position and employ his or her forces successfully to accomplish the assigned mission. It is a key component of battle command and will provide the enemy and environment portions of the common operating picture to the commander and his or her staff. Finally, as our focus shifts to strategic responsiveness, the potential for a rapid deployment into a small scale contingency requires detailed information on the cultural, historical, economical, technological, and political factors of the area in which they will deploy. One technique to meet this requirement is a new concept termed intelligence reach. The amount and fidelity of intelligence necessary to maintain strategic responsiveness and to counter asymmetric threats require a tremendous amount of information to ensure mission accomplishment with minimal casualties and limited collateral damage.

### 18-3. Intelligence products

**a. Categories of intelligence.** Intelligence products may be categorized in several ways depending on the needs of the intended recipients as well as the scope, level of detail, and the perishability of the product. The distinctions between these types of intelligence products are becoming less pronounced as the nature of offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations overlap within any larger operation. Additionally, technology, including web-

enabled technology, facilitates the development, acquisition, and integration of all-source intelligence through a “seamless” architecture from the national to the tactical levels. Examples include the U.S. Army’s All Source Analysis System (ASAS), the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), and other similar types of multidimensional systems and capabilities.

(1) National intelligence is integrated departmental intelligence coordinated by the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) and approved by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). It covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one department or agency, and transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency.

(2) Departmental intelligence is intelligence that any department or agency of the Federal Government requires to execute its own mission. This may include any or all of the following: National Security Council (NSC) Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of State and its intelligence and research (INR) staff, Department of the Treasury (Secret Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms), Department of Justice (FBI), Department of Transportation (U.S. Coast Guard); the National Drug Enforcement Office; and the DOD and its agencies to include the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Armed Forces.

### **b. Levels of intelligence.**

(1) Strategic intelligence is intelligence required for the formulation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at theater level and above. Strategic intelligence—

- Concentrates on the national political, economic, and military considerations of a state
- Identifies a nation’s ability to support U.S. Forces and operations (for example, ports and transportation infrastructure)
- Predicts other nation’s responses to U.S. operations.

(2) Operational intelligence is the intelligence required for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Intelligence at this level serves as a bridge between strategic and tactical levels. Operational intelligence—

- Supports friendly campaigns and operations by predicting the enemy’s campaign plans, identifying their military centers of gravity, lines of communication, decisive points, pivots of maneuver, and other components necessary for campaign design.
- Focuses primarily on the intelligence needs of commanders from theater through corps and task force.

(3) Tactical intelligence is intelligence required for planning and conducting tactical operations as an integral part of battle command. Intelligence provides the tactical commander with the information and knowledge that is needed to reach situational understanding and employ allocated forces in order to meet assigned objectives. Tactical

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intelligence is distinguished from other levels by its perishability and ability to quickly influence the outcome of the commander's mission.

**c. Types of intelligence.**

(1) Basic intelligence is encyclopedic type information, which is not time-sensitive and describes all aspects of a nation - physical, social, economic, political, geographical, cultural, and military - which is used as a base for intelligence products in support of planning, policymaking, and military operations.

(2) Current intelligence includes all types and forms of perishable, time-sensitive, information of immediate value and interest to specific consumers. It may be disseminated without complete evaluation, interpretation, analyses, or integration.

(3) Estimative intelligence is that intelligence which projects forward in time and is predictive in nature.

(4) Crisis intelligence is comprised of specific types and forms of very perishable, time-sensitive information of immediate value, and usually intense interest at the international, national, and theater levels. It is narrowly focused on a precise area, individual(s), or event, which is closely monitored until termination or closure. Usually after 30 days, this type of intelligence becomes current intelligence and eventually basic intelligence.

(5) Combat information is data obtained through intelligence collection sources and methods, which are passed rapidly to the user without benefit of analysis, interpretation, or integration. A sensor-to-shooter system transmitting highly perishable, potential targeting data, is an example of this data. Tactical commanders often must make decisions based on the immediate access to and availability of combat information.

**d. Intelligence disciplines.**

(1) Intelligence is categorized by a series of interdependent disciplines. No single discipline can normally satisfy the commander's requirements. The actual mix of disciplines tasked to satisfy a requirement is situation dependent.

(2) Human intelligence (HUMINT) is a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources as opposed to technical sources. HUMINT includes such overt activities as attaché duty, liaison functions, interrogation of prisoners of war, debriefing of displaced persons/refugees/evacuees/and line crossers, solicitation of information from indigenous persons, document exploitation, and controlled collection operations such as clandestine operations. A HUMINT collector is a person, who by training is tasked with and engages in the collection of information from individuals for the purpose of answering specific intelligence requirements.

(3) Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors such as synthetic aperture radar wherein images of objects are reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. The resulting imagery may be analyzed in either hard-copy (photographic) or soft-copy (electronic display) format for distribution.

(4) Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence obtained through the exploitation and analysis of electromagnetic emissions and includes communications intelligence, electronic intelligence, and foreign instrumentation SIGINT.

(5) Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) uses information collected by technical means such as radars, lasers, passive electro-optical sensors, radiation detector, seismic, and other sensors to measure objects or events to identify them by their signature. MASINT exploits other information that is not collected through SIGINT, IMINT, or HUMINT. It plays a significant role in theater missile defense. It includes unmanned aerial vehicle video and JSTARS moving target indicators.

(6) Technical intelligence (TECHINT) is a multidiscipline function that supports commanders by either identifying or countering an enemy's momentary technological advantage, or by maintaining a technological advantage. The two parts of TECHINT are battlefield TECHINT and scientific and technical intelligence. TECHINT is also derived from the exploitation of foreign material produced for strategic, operational, and tactical commanders.

(7) Counterintelligence (CI) is that intelligence which deals with the information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, subversion, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or terrorist activities. CI is integrated with operations security (OPSEC) and force protection through the CI assessment of the vulnerability of specific U.S. Forces, areas, or activities to foreign intelligence collection, terrorist activities and other hostile operations by intelligence and security services.

(8) Open source intelligence (OSINT), within Army intelligence doctrine, is recognized as important information but OSINT is not recognized as a discipline. However, OSINT is a discipline within joint doctrine. Open source intelligence is intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of information, which is unclassified, and largely in the public domain. Open source intelligence may cut across other disciplines to include broadcast, imagery and mixed media sources. This type of information however must be carefully analyzed because it is potentially subject to inaccuracies and adversary deception.

## **SECTION II**


### **THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM, SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT, AND MANAGEMENT OF COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION**

#### **18-4. U. S. intelligence community goal and organization**

The goal of the U.S. intelligence effort is to provide the President, the National Security Council, U.S. policymakers, and military leaders information on which to base decisions concerning the development and conduct of foreign, defense, and economic policy, and the protection of U.S. interests from foreign threats. To reach this goal, the U.S. intelligence community (IC) is organized as shown in Figure 18-2.

**a. The National Security Council (NSC).** The NSC supported by the NSC Staff reviews, guides, and directs the conduct of all national foreign intelligence, CI, special activities, and attendant policies and programs. Within the NSC system, the Senior

Interagency Group - Intelligence formulates policy, monitors decisions, and evaluates the adequacy and effectiveness of collection efforts.



**Figure 18-2. Organization of the National Intelligence System**

**b. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).**

(1) The PFIAB reports directly to the President and provides advice concerning the objectives, conduct, management and coordination of the various activities of the agencies of the IC. In addition to the President, the DCI, the CIA, or other government agencies engaged in intelligence activities can request PFIAB recommendations concerning ways to achieve increased effectiveness in meeting national intelligence needs.

(2) By Executive Order 12863, signed by President Clinton on 13 September 1993, the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) was established as a standing committee of the PFIAB. The IOB is required to report through the PFIAB to inform the President of intelligence activities that any member of the Board believes are in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, Executive orders, or Presidential directives; to forward to the Attorney General reports received concerning intelligence activities that the Board believes may be unlawful; to review the internal guidelines of each agency within the IC concerning the lawfulness of intelligence activities; to review the practices and procedures of the inspectors general and general counsels of the IC for discovering and reporting intelligence activities that may be unlawful or contrary to an Executive order or Presidential directive; and to conduct such investigations as the Board deems necessary to carry out its functions under this order.

**c. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).** The DCI is concurrently Director, CIA, and is directly responsible to the President and the National Security Council. The DCI is the primary adviser to the President and other members of the NSC on national foreign intelligence and is the intelligence system's principal spokesman to Congress. The DCI develops objectives and prepares guidance for the IC to enhance its capabilities for responding to expected future needs for foreign national intelligence, formulates policies concerning intelligence arrangements with foreign governments, and coordinates intelligence arrangements between agencies of the IC and the intelligence or internal security services of foreign governments. The DCI is responsible for the development, presentation, and justification of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget. A complete list of DCI responsibilities is contained in EO 12333.

(1) Other senior officials are responsible for contributing, within their areas of capability, to the national foreign intelligence collection effort and for cooperating with other IC members to achieve efficiency and provide mutual assistance. In addition, they are responsible for management of the collection of departmental intelligence.

(2) Pursuant to EO 12333, the DCI establishes boards, councils, committees, or groups as required for the purpose of obtaining advice from within the IC. Two of the advisory boards the DCI chairs are the National Foreign Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Community Executive Committee.

**d. The Community Management Staff (CMS).** The Community Management Staff was established by the DCI in 1992, replacing the Intelligence Community Staff. It is an independent element and its head is the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs (EXDIR/ICA). The EXDIR/ICA is the DCI's principal adviser on IC matters and assists the DCI in planning and implementing national foreign intelligence production responsibilities. The CMS is charged with developing, coordinating, and executing the DCI's community responsibilities for resource management; program assessment and evaluation of policies; and collection requirements management. It also performs other functions and duties as determined by the DCI, Federal statutes, or executive action.

**e. The National Intelligence Council (NIC).** The NIC, managed by a chairman and a vice chairman, is comprised of National intelligence officers--senior experts drawn from all elements of the community and from outside the Government. The National intelligence officers concentrate on the substantive problems of particular geographic regions of the world and of particular functional areas such as economics and weapons proliferation. Through routine close contact with policymakers, collection, research, and community analysis, the NIC provides the DCI with the information needed to assist policymakers as they pursue shifting interests and foreign policy priorities. Finally the NIC assists the IC by evaluating the adequacy of intelligence support and works with the community's functional managers to refine strategies to meet the most crucial needs of our senior consumers.

**f. National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB).** The NFIB is responsible for approving all National intelligence estimates, for coordinating interagency intelligence exchanges and the numerous bilateral relationships with foreign nations that share intelligence with the United States, and for developing policy for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

**g. Intelligence Community Executive Committee (IC/EXCOM).** The IC/EXCOM advises the DCI on priorities and objectives for the NFIP budget, national intelligence policy and planning, and IC management and evaluation. Permanent IC/EXCOM members include the DCI; DDCI; Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS); Director, NSA; Director, DIA; Assistant Secretary of State and INR; Director, NRO; Director, NIMA; Chairman, NIC; Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) (ASD/C3I); and EXDIR/ICA.

**h. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).** The Central Intelligence Agency is an independent agency, responsible to the President through the DCI, and accountable to the American people through the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress. The CIA's mission is to support the President, the NSC, and all officials who make and execute national security policy by: Providing accurate, comprehensive, and timely foreign intelligence on national security topics, conducting CI activities, special activities, and other functions related to foreign intelligence and national security, as directed by the President.

(1) To accomplish this mission, the CIA works closely with the other organizations in the IC to ensure that the intelligence consumer—whether Washington policymaker or battlefield commander—receives the best intelligence possible. As a separate agency, the CIA serves as an independent source of analysis on topics of concern to these consumers.

(2) The CIA collects foreign intelligence information through a variety of clandestine and overt means. The Agency also engages in research, development, and deployment of high-leverage technology for intelligence purposes and - in support of the DCI's role as the President's principal intelligence advisor - performs and reports all-source analysis on the full range of topics that affect national security. The CIA is organized along functional lines to carry out these activities and to provide the flexible, responsive support necessary for its worldwide mission.

(3) Throughout its history, but especially as new global realities have reordered the national security agenda, the CIA has emphasized adaptability to meet the needs of intelligence consumers. To assure that all of the Agency's capabilities are brought to bear on those needs, the CIA has tailored its support for key policymakers and has established on-site presence in the major military commands.

(4) Also, the CIA contributes to the effectiveness of the overall IC by managing services of common concern in imagery analysis and open source collection, and by participating in strategic partnerships with other intelligence agencies in the areas of research and development and technical collection. Finally, the CIA takes an active part in community analytical efforts and coordinates its analytical production schedule with appropriate agencies to ensure efficient coverage of key topics.

(5) The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) was established in the CIA to support military plans and operations. The OMA falls under the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, a flag rank military officer and provides a central point of contact to the military departments to facilitate coordination with the CIA.

### **18-5. Executive and Congressional intelligence resource management**

The National Security Council provides overall executive branch guidance, direction, and review for all national foreign intelligence and CI activities. Within the legislative branch,

the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) along with the Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, and the Armed Services Committees are responsible for authorizing intelligence resources and overseeing intelligence activities. The appropriations committees are authorized by the Constitution to appropriate funds for all government activities, including intelligence activities. The NSC system has special committees within its framework, which deal with its intelligence responsibilities. In addition to the management of the individual agencies or elements thereof, which constitute the intelligence system, management of intelligence focuses mainly on intelligence resources, requirements, collection tasking, collection, analysis, production and dissemination. While not a member of the IC, the Office of Management and Budget provides program and budget guidance to the Director of Central Intelligence for development of the National Foreign Intelligence Program as part of the Federal budget. Within the DOD, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) is the single DOD focal point for intelligence management

**a. National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP).** The NFIP provides funds for the bulk of all national-level intelligence, CI, and reconnaissance activities of the CIA, DOD, and all civilian Federal agencies and departments, as well as the IC management structure. The program is comprised of two major components – national level intelligence programs within the DOD and those in Federal departments and agencies outside DOD. The defense programs include the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), the Consolidated Cryptologic Intelligence Program (CCP), the DOD Foreign Counterintelligence Program (FCIP), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency Program (NIMAP), the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and specialized DOD reconnaissance activities. The Program Manager for the GDIP is the Director, DIA; Program Manager for the CCP is the Director, NSA; Program Manger for the FCIP is the Director of Counterintelligence who is subordinate to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Security and Information Operations), under the ASD(C3I). Program manager for the NIMAP is the Director, NIMA and program manager for the NRP is the Director, National Reconnaissance Office.

**b. Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP).** The JMIP focuses on joint, defense-wide initiatives, activities and programs that predominantly provide intelligence information and support to multiple defense consumers; bridge existing programmatic divisions across Service, departmental and national intelligence lines to provide more effective and coherent intelligence programmatic decision-making; and ultimately support military intelligence consumers, that is warfighters, policymakers, and force modernization planners. The JMIP is composed of four programs: the Defense Cryptologic Program, Defense Imagery and Mapping Program, the Defense Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Program and the Defense General Intelligence and Applications Program. The Defense General Intelligence and Applications Program, coordinated by the Director, DIA is further divided into five components. The components of this program include the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program, the Defense Intelligence Tactical Program, the Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program, the Defense Intelligence Special Technologies Program, and the Defense Space Reconnaissance Program.

**c. Combatant command and Service participation.** Combatant commanders formally participate in the Capabilities Programming and Budgeting System and influence

the DOD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) process for intelligence resources through their Commander in Chief (CINC) Integrated Priority List. Through the Command Intelligence Architecture Program, combatant commanders identify their intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination resource requirements. The Command Intelligence Architecture Program has become the driving force for acquiring the requisite military intelligence capabilities into the 21st century.

(1) Within Headquarters, Department of the Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) and DCSINT staff participate in the PPBS through the program evaluation groups and membership on the PPBS Council of Colonels, Planning, Programming, and Budget Committee, and Senior Resource Group.

(2) The Army participates directly in three of the programs of the National Foreign Intelligence Program: the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the Foreign Counterintelligence Program and the General Defense Intelligence Program. Program and budget information is prepared by the Army and sister Services and forwarded through program managers to the DCI.

(3) In addition to the NFIP budget, many Army intelligence resources are included in the DOD Joint Military Intelligence Program and tactical intelligence and related activities (TIARA) funding. These programs include most intelligence resources directly supporting operational commanders at the joint and Service levels.

**d. TIARA accounts.** TIARA accounts provide funding for timely intelligence support primarily to tactical operations of military forces. TIARA activities and systems are planned, programmed, and executed by the military Services and U.S. Special Operations Command and compete for funding with the combat and combat-support programs they support. As defined by the Congress, TIARA funds represent those portions of the DOD budget devoted to Service level military intelligence activities outside the NFIP. TIARA is an aggregation of portions of the DOD budget that provide tactical intelligence and related support to military operations. In contrast to the NFIP, countless military officials on a decentralized basis manage TIARA assets.

**e. Intelligence oversight.** The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence play key roles in the conduct of intelligence oversight. These roles, specified by law, require that the committees be kept fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of any department; that they be furnished any information or material concerning intelligence activities requested in order to carry out authorized responsibilities; and that the committees be informed in a timely fashion of any illegal intelligence activity or significant intelligence failure and any corrective action.

(1) Within the DOD the officer responsible for the oversight of intelligence activities is the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD-IO). DOD Directive 5148.12, dated 20 July 1989, established the position and assigned its responsibilities. The ATSD-IO had been designated as the sole conduit between the DOD and the President's Intelligence Oversight Board. Upon the establishment of the JMIP, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) also created the Defense Intelligence Executive Board as a management mechanism to provide oversight of Defense intelligence programs, and to make key decisions for the allocation of available resources to meet defense needs.

(2) The Army General Counsel and the Army Inspector General share responsibility for the oversight of intelligence activities within the Army.

### **18-6. Intelligence cycle**

The intelligence cycle consists of planning and direction; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and production; dissemination and integration; and evaluation and feedback. Intelligence collection and production management guide the bulk of the process and the expenditures of resources.

**a. Collection management.** The intelligence cycle begins and ends with the consumer. A consumer's requirements are passed to the producer for fulfillment. If the producer cannot satisfy the consumer's requirements, the producer levies the requirement on the collector. The user must be able to state clearly his or her intelligence interests or needs (requirements) in addition to those that are already satisfied by existing finished intelligence. Requirements compete for limited collection resources at the national, departmental, strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Requirements are prioritized in accordance with the intelligence requirements contained in a classified 2 March 1995 Presidential Decision Directive 35, which established as its highest priority, intelligence support to military operations. The military commander must however make a case for the priority of his or her requirement if resources not assigned or organic to his or her command are needed to fulfill the requirement.

(1) The DIA, in its support role to the JCS, prepares a listing of intelligence priorities for strategic planning for JCS publication and validates the intelligence requirements of the Services. A prioritized list of both long-term and short-term national interests is established by the NSC and passed to the CIA. There a determination is made as to whether sufficient intelligence exists to fulfill the requirement or whether additional intelligence is needed. If it is, detailed prioritized requirements are passed to the DCI's Community Management Staff for collection tasking.

(2) All collection operations are conducted in response to validated requirements for the production of finished intelligence. The CMS tasks its members for collection to fulfill prioritized requirements. The selection of the specific collection resource rests with the department or the program manager. The management aspects of collection involve ensuring that the assets selected are the most cost-effective that can fulfill the requirement on a timely basis.

(3) Collection operations tasked by the DIA in response to DOD-generated requirements are normally conducted on an all-source, common-service basis. Conduct of intelligence operations at the tactical level to directly support the commander's immediate needs is usually accomplished by assigned or supporting intelligence organizations. Tactical commanders obtain most information on their areas of operation from assigned or supporting assets including MI units, artillery, cavalry, aviation, and maneuver units in contact. Tactical commanders leverage national capabilities by placing small numbers of tactical force intelligence soldiers at key nodes in the intelligence system to provide direct response to supported commanders' requirements. Additional information and intelligence on the area of interest is provided from higher echelons.

**b. Analysis and production management.** National intelligence production is the responsibility of the DCI and is exercised through the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence,

which establishes schedules and priorities for all national intelligence production. Further, the directorate retains the resources and capability to produce intelligence assessments that are not coordinated with other elements of the IC.

(1) The Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence is the principal adviser to the DCI on the production of national intelligence, both as to the manner in which it is accomplished and what it contains. The Deputy is responsible for organizing national efforts to assess and evaluate foreign intelligence data in support of intelligence objectives established by the NSC. The Deputy is the head of the Directorate of Intelligence and oversees production generated in response to standing requirements, new requirements, or as the need is perceived.

(2) No single intelligence product format meets the needs of all consumers. It is necessary to have a continuing dialogue between the consumer and the producer of intelligence while assuring that the consumer does not influence the conclusions of the final product.

(3) The most prestigious intelligence product is the President's Daily Brief (PDB), which is prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence for DCI approval and forwarding to the President. The PDB may be considered as the DCI's principal daily report to the President. Other national reports include the national intelligence brief and the Military Intelligence Digest. national intelligence estimates and similar publications are reviewed by the NFIB prior to submission to the DCI for approval and subsequent dissemination.

(4) Individual departments and agencies establish their own production schedules and priorities for the production of departmental intelligence. The DIA establishes production schedules in the DOD and distributes responsibilities among the unified and specified commands.

(5) The DIA Directorate for Analysis and Production produces, or manages the production of, all-source military intelligence to support the policy, planning, and operational requirements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), JCS, the Services, and the combatant commands. As the DOD Production Functional Manager, the Directorate for Analysis and Production ensures that DOD intelligence production requirements are articulated; resources are programmed and executed in compliance with national and DOD guidance; and programs are re-evaluated as missions, technical capabilities, and threat environment change.

### **SECTION III**

## **DEFENSE AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND USES OF INTELLIGENCE**

### **18-7. Department of Defense**

The DOD is the nation's largest user of intelligence information and the largest investor in intelligence programs. The DOD has an overriding responsibility to support commanders at all levels.

**a. Secretary of Defense.** The SecDef exercises full direction, authority, and control over the intelligence activities of the DOD. Effective performance of DOD missions depends

upon the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of timely, relevant, accurate, synchronized, and predictive intelligence on the capabilities and intentions of foreign powers.

(1) Defense intelligence, as part of the IC, is faced with a growing number of challenges to the successful accomplishment of its defense intelligence mission. The international environment has grown more complex. Changing political alignments and instability, growing economic interdependence, nationalistic tendencies and ethnic rivalries, increased international terrorism and transnational threats, international narcotics trade, and so forth, have resulted in more diverse intelligence requirements. A significant challenge is presented by trying to collect against targets protected by relatively sophisticated command, control and communications systems, which are readily available to even the poorest countries.

(2) To strengthen the DOD performance of its intelligence functions, on 15 March 1991 the SecDef approved a plan for restructuring defense intelligence. Among other changes, the DOD reorganization of defense intelligence resulted in the consolidation of existing unified and major or joint combatant commands and component intelligence processing, analysis, and production activities into joint intelligence centers and joint analysis centers, and the consolidation of the various intelligence commands, agencies, and elements into a single intelligence command/agency within each Service.

**b. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) (OASDC3I).** The ASD(C3I) has as a principal duty the overall supervision of command, control, communications, and intelligence affairs of the DOD. The ASD(C3I) is the DOD principal staff assistant for the development, oversight, and integration of DOD policies and programs relating to the strategy of information superiority for the DOD. He or she is responsible for providing capabilities that enable the U.S. military forces to generate, use, and share the information necessary to survive and succeed in accomplishing national security missions.

**c. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).** The Director, DIA is responsible for satisfying the foreign military requirements (less cryptologic) of the SecDef, OSD, CJCS, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), Joint Staff, CINCs, major DOD components, and other U.S. Government agencies, allied governments, and coalition partners (when required), and has been designated by the CJCS as a DOD combat support agency. DIA provides defense intelligence contributions to national intelligence estimates and production capabilities. The Director, DIA is a member of the National Foreign Intelligence Board and is the DOD intelligence collection manager. DIA produces, or through tasking and coordination, ensures the production of foreign military and military-related intelligence. The Director, DIA works extensively with the Services to provide support that meets a wide variety of needs. To provide daily support to the combatant commands and U.S. Forces Korea, NATO, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), DIA initiated on-site liaison elements managed by an experienced senior civilian intelligence officer. These liaison elements, called Defense Intelligence Support Offices, expedite actions and communications between the Agency and the commands.

(1) To provide tailored support to a joint force commander, DIA can deploy national intelligence support teams (NIST) composed of DIA, NSA, and CIA personnel as well as personnel from other organizations, as required. The NIST deploys with its organic support

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capability and provides critical on-site intelligence connectivity between the supported command and Washington to ensure receipt of national-level intelligence. Cooperative Service efforts go into the GDIP and the Joint Military Intelligence Program, providing a broad range of recommendations to improve future intelligence capabilities. DIA also shares or provides intelligence support to the President, National Security Council Staff, National Warning Staff, Departments of Energy/State/ Treasury/ and Commerce, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. The DIA provides central management for the Central MASINT Organization and operates the Defense HUMINT Service, with its subordinate Defense Attaché System and HUMINT Operating Bases. DIA also operates the Joint Military Intelligence College.

(2) The Military Intelligence Board (MIB), chaired by the Director of the DIA and composed of the senior intelligence officers of the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps, advises the SecDef and Defense agencies on matters pertaining to military intelligence. The concerns of the combatant commands are represented by DIA's Directorate for Intelligence which functions as the J2, Joint Staff. The MIB serves as the senior "Board of Governors" for intelligence organization in DOD and advises the SecDef, CJCS, Military Service Chiefs, CINCs, and defense agencies on matters pertaining to military intelligence. The Director DIA seeks consensus across the intelligence community through the MIB process.

(3) The DIA supervises the DOD Indication and Warning System and provides support to the National Military Command Center through the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC). The DIA has the responsibility to satisfy the DOD intelligence collection requirements and to coordinate and review activities of the DOD collection resources not assigned to the DIA.

**d. National Security Agency (NSA) and Central Security Service.** The Director of the NSA is the Chief of the Central Security Service and manages the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the largest single program in the National Foreign Intelligence Program. The Director is responsible for the operations of an effective unified organization for SIGINT activity. This responsibility requires extensive interaction, coordination, and cooperation with the Services and other national intelligence agencies. No other department or agency may engage in such activity without a delegation of authority by SecDef. NSA's SIGINT activities are extremely sensitive and are normally handled in special channels available to specifically designated personnel in direct support of military commanders, operations, and national foreign intelligence collection requirements. The NSA's SIGINT collection, processing, and dissemination activities involve both positive and CI information and are in direct support of military commanders and military operations and responsive to national foreign intelligence requirements.

(1) The Director of the NSA is responsible for the research and development required to meet the needs for SIGINT and communications security (COMSEC). The Director is the executive agent for executing the responsibilities of the SecDef for the COMSEC of the Government. The Director also has oversight of the Defense Cryptologic Program that lies outside the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and is responsible for providing cryptologic training and training support to the Services.

(2) In addition, the NSA was given the additional mission of information security, which, in turn, has two components—communications security and computer security.

**e. National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA).** The NIMA was established on 1 October 1996 to address the expanding requirements in the areas of imagery, IMINT, and geospatial information.

(1) The NIMA consolidated to the extent practicable all functions of the Defense Mapping Agency. These include defense mapping, charting, and geodetic operations; production, source data storage and retrieval, and management of distribution facilities; and supervision of the Hydrographics/Topographic Center and the Defense Mapping School. NIMA also incorporated all functions of the Central Imagery Office. NIMA develops and makes recommendations on national imagery policy and is chartered to ensure responsive imagery support to the DOD, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other Federal Government departments. The NIMA tasks and evaluates imagery elements of the DOD in meeting national intelligence requirements and ensures imagery systems are exercised to support military forces.


(2) Within the DOD, the NIMA establishes the architectures for imagery tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination. The NIMA has responsibility for establishing standards for imagery systems for which the DOD has responsibility, and ensures compatibility and interoperability of these systems. Standards for training of personnel performing imagery tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination functions are established by the NIMA. The NIMA also supports and conducts research and development activities related to this imagery function. The NIMA serves as the functional manager for the Consolidated Imagery Program within the National Foreign Intelligence Program and for the Tactical Imagery Program (tactical intelligence and related activities). The SecDef and the Director of Central Intelligence are advised by the NIMA on future needs for imagery systems.

**f. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).** The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is the single, national program to meet U.S. Government needs through spaceborne reconnaissance. The NRO is an agency of the DOD. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, as recommended by the Director of Central Intelligence, declassified its existence on 18 September 1992. The mission of the NRO is to ensure that the U.S. has the technology and spaceborne assets needed to enable U.S. global information superiority. This mission is accomplished through research, development, acquisition, and operation of the nation's intelligence satellites. The NRO's assets collect intelligence to support such functions as indications and warning, monitoring of arms control agreements, military operations and exercises, and monitoring of natural disasters and other environmental issues.

**g. Defense Security Service (DSS).** The Defense Investigative Service was established in 1972 to consolidate all DOD personnel security investigations and industrial security oversight within one agency and thereby reduce resource requirements, increase managerial efficiency, and provide a more prompt response to overall defense needs for personnel security investigations. As a result of the recent Defense Reform Initiative, the Defense Investigative Service was renamed the Defense Security Service (DSS) in November 1997 to reflect its broader security mission within the DOD. The new DSS includes the DOD Polygraph Institute, the Personnel Security Research Center and the DOD Security Institute.

**18-8. Army intelligence system**

The Secretary of the Army has delegated to the Under Secretary of the Army responsibility for the general supervision of the intelligence, CI, investigative, and intelligence oversight activities of the Army. The intelligence and CI elements of the military Services are responsible for the planning, direction, collection, processing, and dissemination of military and military-related intelligence, including information on indications and warnings, foreign capabilities, plans and weapons systems, and scientific and technical developments. . See Figure 18-3 for a simplified organization of the Army intelligence system. The conduct of CI activities and the production and dissemination of CI studies and reports is a Service responsibility as are the development, procurement, and management of tactical intelligence systems and equipment; the conduct of related research, development, and test and evaluation activities; the development of intelligence doctrine; and the training of intelligence personnel.



**Figure 18-3. Army Intelligence Organization**

**a. Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT).** The DCSINT is the senior intelligence officer in the U.S. Army and is responsible to the Chief of Staff for the policy

formulation, planning, programming and budgeting (shared with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (DCSPRO) for JMIP and TIARA), management, propriety and overall coordination of the intelligence and CI activities of the Army. The DCSINT has general staff responsibility for intelligence, CI, intelligence automation, signals intelligence, IMINT, MASINT, censorship, threat validation, intelligence collection, security, meteorological, topographic, and space activities; and monitors Army intelligence training, force structure, and readiness for both the Active Army and Reserve Components. The DCSINT, under the general guidance and tasking of DIA, exercises general staff supervision over Army and Army-supported Intelligence Data Handling System resources and over all-source intelligence production within the Army. The DCSINT is responsible for Major Force Program 31 (Intelligence) within the Army. The DCSINT is also responsible for the Army's input into the DOD Consolidated Cryptologic Program; the General Defense Intelligence Program; the Foreign Counterintelligence Program; the Defense Joint Counterintelligence Program and Service funded programs supporting the Army Security and Intelligence Activities Program. In addition, the DCSINT is responsible for the Army input to TROJAN, foreign language sustainment, imagery dissemination, unique MI skill sustainment for Active Army and Reserve Component soldiers, Personnel Security Investigations; and is the Army SIGINT focal point. The DCSINT participates in Army Program Objective Memorandums (POMs) building by providing advice to senior program managers on ranking of intelligence requirements. Moreover, the DCSINT coordinates top intelligence requirements with major Army commands during submission of the POM assessments.

(1) The DCSINT also shares management, in the Department of the Army, with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) for the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) (formerly known as the Civilian Intelligence Personnel Management System). DCIPS is an excepted service personnel management system for the management of intelligence and intelligence-related civilian personnel throughout the DOD.

(2) The baseline document for the management of intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) within the Army is the Army Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP). The AIMP is a requirements-based, threat- and technology-driven, comprehensive developmental strategy for the future. It is not constrained by fiscal or force structure resources. The AIMP, supported by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition) developed IEW Program Plan for the research, development, and acquisition of IEW systems, provides the basis for the development of the force structure and the fiscally constrained IEW annex of the Army modernization plan (AMP) by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (DCSPRO), DA. The IEW Annex of the AMP implements the Army's force modernization principles and is the key planning document in providing long-term continuity of effort within the IEW functional area.

**b. Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).** INSCOM, a major Army command, provides a single commander for those Army intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) units that operate at echelons above corps (EAC). INSCOM units, which are located both in CONUS and at many overseas locations, support requirements across the operational continuum. The operations of INSCOM units include: planning and direction, collection, processing, production and dissemination of all-source, multidiscipline intelligence.

(1) In each major overseas area, a military intelligence brigade or group provides multidisciplined IEW support to Army EAC and joint commanders in theater, reinforces MI units organic to operational and tactical commands at the echelons below corps, and satisfies tasking from national and departmental authorities for SIGINT, IMINT, TECHINT, MASINT, tactical HUMINT, and CI operations in response to strategic, operational, and tactical requirements. These activities are pursued through a multidisciplined force projection brigade concept.

(2) In CONUS, single and multidiscipline INSCOM MI brigade units and other organizations, some of them strategically deployable for contingencies, provide a wide range of collection capabilities as well as threat analysis, security, and OPSEC support to national and departmental agencies, contractors for sensitive projects and systems, and CONUS-based tactical consumers, including Forces Command units and the Army component of the United States Central Command. INSCOM also plays a significant role in training at the National Training Center and with its Readiness Training (REDTRAIN) Program, which supports maintenance and development of intelligence skills in EAC and echelons below corps MI units. Finally, INSCOM supports the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in the EAC IEW combat-development process with doctrinal and force structure input, and is a materiel developer for certain specialized types of intelligence-related materiel.

**c. U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC).** The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), subordinate to INSCOM, as the Army's production center for the DOD Shared Production Program, provides basic ground intelligence to U.S. Government agencies and decision makers. NGIC produces all-source scientific, technical, and general military intelligence on foreign ground forces capabilities and systems in support of Army Title 10 requirements. This intelligence supports customers at all echelons, including Army and DOD force planners, wargamers, doctrinal developers, force modernizers, warfighters and theater joint intelligence centers with a wide range of futures-oriented threat assessments. The NGIC key products and production programs include order-of-battle and tables of organization and equipment for foreign ground forces, projection out 20 years; detailed assessments of future threats tactical/operational capabilities; conflict scenarios; and forecast of future regions of conflict of interest to U.S. force planners. The NGIC also provides threat documentation for Army research and development (R&D) and procurement programs. These products and programs require collection (MASINT and multidisciplinary collection); all-source analysis, production integration; and requirements management.

### **18-9. General uses of intelligence**

Intelligence must quickly reach, or be accessible, to leaders and their staffs who require it to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations. Commanders, G2s/S2s, action officers, and managers must develop a broad understanding of what intelligence they need; what can be reasonably obtained; and how it can be beneficial in the development of their programs. They must clearly state, and if possible, prioritize their intelligence requirements to the appropriate organization. Along with the development of capability based forces and systems to meet needs in the 21st century, the following are a few examples of program areas in which intelligence can have a significant impact.

**a. Organizational design and force structure.** Force structure designers must consider the multiplicity of the threats and must also include non-threat factors such as the deployment capabilities and limitations of allied forces. There must also be balance between the greatest threat or enemy capability and the most imminent threat in the development of a force structure. The force planner must include intelligence participation in every phase of his or her planning and decision-making. To do this, he or she must be aware of the intelligence support available and how to task the system.

**b. Materiel acquisition and force modernization.** The product/project/program manager must consider technical developments in foreign countries, new foreign weapons systems and countermeasures developments and future developments, as well as terrain and weather considerations. This includes an assessment of how an adversary may react to the development of a new, friendly system. The product/project/program manager must have the latest intelligence available which could affect his or her product/project/program. He or she must make the intelligence systems aware of his or her intelligence needs.

(1) The combat developer must also be aware of technical developments and must work closely with the materiel developer to ensure that a product/project/program will counter or surpass assessed threat capabilities. Both must be prepared to amend a product/project/program prior to its completion to counter a new threat capability. Intelligence requirements are not limited to hostile forces.

(2) Technological breakthroughs in friendly or neutral nations must also be factored into materiel acquisition planning. Managers of systems of breakthrough technology must use available intelligence support to protect characteristics of the developing system as a measure of OPSEC in the R&D arena.

(3) In addition to the intelligence needs stated, the product/project/program manager must also have high quality up-to-date intelligence on the foreign collection threat directed at his or her product/project/program. Threats from both foreign government and non-government sponsored collection make up this category. These threats must be identified, collected against, and neutralized by CI assets on behalf of the materiel developer. It is important to keep the Army materiel development community continually aware of and safe from technological loss from foreign directed and controlled collection services. This strengthens the Army's technical base against illegal technology transfer and markedly improves the Army's ability to maintain technological superiority.

(4) Other factors that should be taken into account in these processes include long-range planning and consideration of opponent's strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. As the rate of technological growth continues to increase and as the threat becomes harder to define, materiel developers lean toward generic threats defined in technical terms, thereby avoiding the potential trap of being locked to a specific adversary or region.

**c. Doctrine and training systems development.** Doctrine and training decisions must be based on sound intelligence. Foreign military capabilities and deployments are dynamic, and U.S. Army doctrine and training decisions must be equally dynamic. To be effective in battle, U.S. soldiers must know the enemy, including the enemy's doctrine, tactics, equipment, strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities, and if possible, the enemy's intentions. Doctrine and training development and implementation must be closely tied to materiel systems management. Training to operate in a hostile information warfare

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environment anywhere in the world places a heavy emphasis on learning about a broad range of technical command and control capabilities. Future adversaries may employ combinations of hostile, friendly, and neutral command and control systems, as well as commercial products.

**d. Information operations (IO).** The capability to execute IO places an increased demand on intelligence to identify rapidly and accurately both friendly and enemy vulnerabilities. Although IO is an operations function, intelligence is an integral part of the IO planning and execution actions that will degrade an adversary's use of information while protecting those of friendly forces. Successful IOs require a thorough and detailed intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). IPB includes, but is not limited to, information about enemy/threat capabilities, decision-making style, information systems, considerations about the effects of: the media and the attitudes; culture; economy; demographics; politic system and parties; governmental systems and leaders; criminal organizations; and personalities of people in the area of operations.

(1) IOs are actions taken to affect adversary, and influence others' decision-making processes, information, and information system while protecting one's own information systems. IO are primarily shaping operations that create and preserve opportunities for decisive operations and sustaining operations. IOs are both offensive and defensive in nature. Successful IO influences the perceptions, decisions, and will of enemies, adversaries, and others in the area of operations, this includes the local population, displaced persons, and civil leaders. Offensive IO's desired effects are to destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence enemy functions. Defensive IO protects friendly access to relevant information while denying adversaries and enemies the opportunity to affect the friendly information and information systems. The elements of IOs are—

- Military deception.
- Counterdeception.
- Operations security.
- Physical security.
- Electronic warfare.
  - Electronic attack.
  - Electronic protection.
  - Electronic warfare support.
- Information assurance.
- Physical destruction.
- Psychological operations.
- Counterpropaganda.
- Counterintelligence.
- Computer network operations.
  - Computer network attack.
  - Computer network defense.
  - Computer network exploit.

(2) Related IO activities are public affairs (PA) and civil affairs (CA). PA and CA are related IO activities that are distinct from IO because they do not manipulate or distort information; their effectiveness stems from their credibility with the local populace and news media. PA and CA link the force, the local populace, and the news media.

(3) In FY95, the Army organized and activated the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) within the Intelligence and Security Command to assist the land component commander deal with the complexities of command and control warfare planning and execution. Tasked by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS), HQDA, LIWA, patterned after the Joint Command and Control Warfare Center deploys tailored field support teams to specific land component commands during exercises, contingency planning, and operations. LIWA provides technical expertise and operational connectivity with other organizations and agencies supporting command and control warfare operations.

**e. Support to the tactical commander.** Commanders use IEW support to anticipate the battle, understand the battlespace, and influence the outcome of operations. The preeminent function of Army intelligence is to support the tactical commanders' decision-making process. The tactical commander drives the Army intelligence effort; the G2/S2 and the intelligence unit commander, are responsible for planning and directing, collecting, processing, analyzing and producing, and disseminating intelligence within the command. At corps, division, armored cavalry regiment, separate brigade, and special operations forces group/battalion, a MI unit is organic to the command, as shown in Figure 18-3. The MI unit commander plays an integral part in the intelligence mission through his or her command and control of collection operations and by training and maintaining the organic and attached intelligence assets. Additional assets leverage national, theater, sister Service, and other intelligence systems to provide intelligence to the tactical commanders at all echelons. FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, the keystone intelligence manual, expands upon FM 100-5, *Operations*, and provides details on the doctrinal foundations for IEW operations and the employment of tactical MI units.

**f. Reserve Component (RC) support.** The Reserve Components (RC) participate with Active Army MI units at all echelons and are involved in virtually every aspect of military intelligence operations. In certain areas, USAR and National Guard MI capabilities, that is scientific & technical analysis, political-military estimates, substantive basic intelligence, are equal to, or even exceed, those in the active force. This phenomenon can be attributable to the fact that many MI reservists, officer and enlisted, are professional civilian intelligence employees of the national intelligence and reconnaissance agencies, the Services' intelligence departments and agencies, federally funded research centers, colleges and universities, and other U.S. Government departments performing similar activities. Consequently, their exposure to, and involvement in, intelligence operations on a daily basis rival their uniformed counterparts. The RC's contributions to filling the Army's linguist requirements are critical. The RC MI force is in the process of increasing its capacity for timely response to intelligence production requirements. RC MI centers across the country are now connected to DOD telecommunications networks. This connectivity allows RC MI units and soldiers to receive tasks from Active Army intelligence organizations, perform research and analysis within DOD databases, and file production reports back to the AA organization—all within a relatively short time. RC MI is moving rapidly to a force

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architecture that will integrate it more fully into the operational capabilities of the Active Army, making the Reserve Components an increasingly valuable partner.

## **SECTION IV**

### **SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

#### **18-10. Summary**

Intelligence is vital to preserving the national security of the United States, and to the accomplishment of U.S. national and military security objectives. The U.S. intelligence organizations and management will continue to transform at every level to meet the needs of U. S. policy officials and military leaders faced with the uncertain environment of the 21st century and the demands of a knowledge oriented era.

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# CHAPTER 19

## THE ARMY HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT SYSTEM

*What Army Medicine does for the nation, the Army and the soldier is easy to explain, but people need reminding... It never hurts to refresh memories:*

- *About grim battles long ago, when wounded lay suffering on the field for days; and how Jonathan Letterman's evacuation concepts saved American soldiers from that.*
- *About armies wiped out by epidemics or too weakened by disease to fight; and how the AMEDD has almost eliminated disease as an operational factor.*
- *About heroic medics and medevac crews whose rescue of wounded soldiers under fire is a combat multiplier, boosting the morale and fighting power of combat soldiers.*
- *About families kept healthy by world-class Army health care, so that soldiers can concentrate on the business at hand.*

LTG Ronald R. Blanck, Surgeon General, U.S. Army, 1996-2000

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### **19-1. The revolution in military medicine**

Since 1775, innovations in technology, the development of new treatment modalities and the evolution of human goals have revolutionized the practice of military medicine. Military medicine has made a dedicated effort to keep pace with the constantly changing battlefield doctrine to meet the needs of both commanders and soldiers. The Army Medical Department (AMEDD) is taking major steps to incorporate advanced technology into patient care. What was science fiction yesterday is in the laboratory today, and tomorrow will be put to use by combat medics and hospital staffs. The current military health service support system is based on the Joint Health Service Support Strategy that directly supports the National Military Strategy by—

- a. Delivering a fit force.
- b. Preventing disease and non-battle injury.
- c. Caring for and managing casualties.
- d. Providing peacetime healthcare to eligible retirees and family members.

### **19-2. Scope of the AMEDD**

The AMEDD is one of the world's largest health systems, with over three million beneficiaries. The Army health service support system encompasses all levels of medical, dental, veterinary, and other related health care from the policy and decision-making level to the combat medic in the field. The Surgeon General (TSG) directs health services within the Army. TSG commands AMEDD units and facilities within the U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM), a major Army command (MACOM), and monitors and manages health services Army-wide through the Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG), the AMEDD element of the Army Staff. Hand in hand with other Army management systems, the AMEDD conducts various programs specifically designed to meet the force modernization, unit readiness, research and development, preventive medicine, and patient care missions for the armed forces.

### **19-3. The health service support system and the Army**

Medical and dental benefits are an important element of overall military compensation. Providing comprehensive, quality health care to military personnel is required by law. Other eligible Army categories, such as retirees and family members, are entitled to medical and dental care subject to availability of space, facilities, and medical and dental staff as defined by Title 10, United States Code, and other regulatory requirements. Health services are essential to recruiting and retaining a quality force. Soldiers' confidence on the battlefield is enhanced by the knowledge that they are supported by a superb medical evacuation and treatment system. The availability of high quality health care for soldiers and their families helps motivate individuals to enter or remain in military service. The military health system embodies the concept that the Army cares for its own.

## **SECTION II**

### **AMEDD MISSION AND SUPPORT TO COMMANDERS**

#### **19-4. Mission of the Army Medical Department**

The mission of the AMEDD is to “maintain the health of members of the Army, to conserve the fighting strength, to provide health care for eligible personnel, and to prepare health support to members of the Army in time of war, international conflict, or natural disaster.” This mission has two facets, both relating directly to Army combat readiness:

**a. Combat health support.** The AMEDD is responsible for maintaining the clinical, technical, and combat readiness of medical units and personnel to support Army forces in the theater of operations.

(1) The deployable medical units of the Army carry out this task, with a heavy reliance on the Reserve Components (which constitute approximately 70 percent of the Army's medical forces). These units are apportioned to combatant commands around the world.

(2) Tactical medical units are directly supported by the fixed installation table of distribution and allowance (TDA) medical units assigned to the AMEDD. The TDA AMEDD mission includes the delivery of medical care to soldiers and family members at medical centers, community hospitals, and clinics; dental care; veterinary services; medical

research and development; education and training, combat developments, test, and evaluation; and health promotion and preventive medicine.

(3) The recruitment and retention of health care professionals and sustainment of their skills are central to the maintenance of a high quality, combat ready health service support force. Deploying the medical force is one of the AMEDD's primary missions. Readiness to accomplish this essential function can only be ensured through the practice of medicine and its related disciplines in a patient care environment. In peacetime, the vast majority of health care professionals and technical support personnel who deploy with medical units are employed within the Army's fixed hospitals, medical centers and other health care facilities. The day-to-day practice of health care professionals and their support staff in these environments is the basis for maintaining the clinical skills and teamwork necessary to care for sick and wounded soldiers during combat operations.

**b. Peacetime health care and TRICARE.** The second but equally important aspect of the AMEDD mission is to help maintain the personnel readiness of the entire Army by maintaining the health of individual soldiers and their families.

(1) Quality health care for soldiers, retirees and their families is an essential and valuable benefit. Physical readiness, good health and the knowledge that family members will be cared for contribute to the ability of each soldier to deploy and perform his or her mission in the combat environment. Projecting a healthy and protected force and caring for soldiers and their families are responsibilities of the Army Medical Command and its subordinate commands. These are accomplished through the delivery of patient care, health promotion, preventive medicine activities, education and training, and medical research and development.

(2) As military medical facilities consolidated or closed during the post-Cold War drawdown, it became increasingly necessary to use health care providers and facilities in the civilian community to augment the military health system and give soldiers, retirees, and their families the health care they expect and deserve.

(3) To meet readiness requirements and serve soldier and family health needs better, Congress directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop and implement a new model for military health care that would improve patients' access to health care, assure high quality of care, and control rising health care costs. The result, TRICARE, is now the medical program for active duty service members, their family members, retirees and their family members, and survivors of all uniformed service members. TRICARE eligibility formerly ended at age 65, but recent legislation has it for life. TRICARE relies on interservice and civilian-military sharing of medical resources to improve accessibility of care and achieve efficiencies. A DOD program under the oversight of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs) (ASD(HA)), it is managed by the military in partnership with civilian contractors. Each TRICARE region has an Army, Navy, or Air Force lead agent (usually the commander of a military treatment facility) responsible for the regional program.

(4) TRICARE offers three health care options—

(a) TRICARE Prime, care through a military treatment facility or at a private provider in the TRICARE network (the "health maintenance organization/HMO option" with lowest out of pocket costs for military patients).

(b) TRICARE Extra, care through a private provider of choice who offers reduced fees to military patients as part of the TRICARE network (the "preferred provider option").

(c) TRICARE Standard (essentially the same as the former CHAMPUS program), care through a private provider of choice who is not part of the TRICARE network, and bills at the usual and customary rate (the "fee for service" option, with higher co-payments and out of pocket costs than TRICARE Prime or Extra).

(5) Active Army soldiers are enrolled in TRICARE Prime. Other beneficiaries may choose to enroll in TRICARE Prime or use either of the other TRICARE options.

(6) TRICARE was implemented in all 12 regions by FY98. Enrollment in TRICARE dramatically exceeded initial projections. As TRICARE has matured, ongoing surveys have documented progressive improvement in beneficiary satisfaction with the program. Recent surveys indicate TRICARE has improved both access and satisfaction with health care.

### **19-5. AMEDD support to commanders**

a. Commanders are responsible for the health and physical fitness of their soldiers. The AMEDD supports commanders by acting as the proponent for medical doctrine, advising commanders in all health related matters, and executing command policy in the area of health service support. The AMEDD—

(1) Advises the command of measures to assure the health, fitness, and vigor of all members of the Army.

(2) As directed, acts as the proponent to provide those measures needed to assure health and fitness.

(3) Develops, trains, and maintains forces necessary for medical support to the Army in a wartime environment.

b. The importance of the medical system on the battlefield is paramount. It supports the prevention of disease and non-battle injury to ensure maximum warfighting capability. When casualties occur, the medical system provides for the rapid evacuation to medical treatment facilities. The prompt evacuation of combat casualties is not only essential for the preservation of life, but also assists the combat commander in continuing the battle by clearing the battlefield of wounded soldiers.

## **SECTION III THE ARMY MEDICAL DEPARTMENT SYSTEM**

### **19-6. Key elements**

a. **The Surgeon General (TSG)/Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG).** The Surgeon General is responsible for development, policy direction, organization, and overall management of an integrated Army-wide health service system and is the medical materiel developer for the Army. OTSG is the Army Staff element that develops policy and regulations on health service support, health hazards assessment, the establishment of health

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standards, and medical materiel. The Surgeon General also has proponency for personnel management within the AMEDD.

**b. Army Medical Department (AMEDD).** The AMEDD is comprised of personnel, units, organizations, and facilities of the Army that are under the supervision and management of TSG. In addition to USAMEDCOM, these include the special branches of the Medical Corps (MC), Dental Corps (DE), Veterinary Corps (VC), Medical Service Corps (MS), Army Nurse Corps (AN), and Army Medical Specialist Corps (SP). Also included within the AMEDD are medical enlisted soldiers in Career Management Field (CMF) 91 and Department of the Army (DA) civilians employed within AMEDD organizations and activities.

**c. Health services.** Health services are all services performed, provided, or arranged for (regardless of location) which promote, improve, conserve, or restore the physical or mental well-being of individuals or groups, and those services which contribute to the maintenance or restoration of a healthy environment. Health services include, but are not limited to, preventive, curative, and restorative health measures; medical doctrine; medical aspects of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense; health promotion; assessment of medical threats and countermeasures; medical operations planning; health professional education and training; health-related research; transportation of the sick and wounded; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; health care administration; medical logistics; medical equipment maintenance; medical facility life cycle management; and the delivery of medical, nursing, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optical, and other specialized services.

**d. Programming and budgeting.** Since 1991, peacetime military health care has been funded through the DOD Unified Medical Program and the Defense Health Program (DHP) Appropriation, rather than the services' budgets. The ASD(HA) issues policy guidance and the TRICARE Management Activity (TMA) manages and monitors Service execution of the DHP Appropriation and the DOD Unified Medical Program.

(1) The OTSG/USAMEDCOM Staff (see "One Staff," below) programs funds and manpower using both the DHP and Army appropriations. DHP funds provide for most peacetime health care operations in TDA units such as Army medical centers and community hospitals and for TRICARE Managed Care Support Contracts. The vast majority of AMEDD manpower is funded by the DHP. Army funding supports deployable medical table of organization and equipment (TOE) units and medical readiness missions.

(2) The OTSG/USAMEDCOM Staff programs for Army funds and provides its input to the Army's Program Objective Memorandum (POM). It programs for DHP funds and provides input to the DHP POM through the TMA. Military personnel costs are programmed by TMA in the DHP POM and the programmed total obligation authority (TOA) transfers to the Military Personnel, Army appropriation when the budget estimate submission is prepared. Civilian personnel costs are reimbursable from DHP Operations and Maintenance Defense funds during the year of execution. Authorizations for both military and civilian personnel are on Army manpower documents.

### **19-7. Staff relationships and responsibilities**

**a. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs).** The ASD(HA) has statutory responsibility for overall supervision of health affairs within DOD and is the principal staff assistant and adviser to Secretary of Defense for all DOD health policies, programs, and activities.

**b. TRICARE Management Activity.** The TMA is a DOD field activity of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) that operates under the authority, control, and direction of the ASD(HA). The mission of TMA is to administer and manage TRICARE and administer, manage, and monitor Service execution of the DHP appropriation and the DOD Unified Medical Program. TRICARE lead agents coordinate health care within each TRICARE region, ensuring cooperation among military treatment facilities of all Services and efficient management of the regional managed care support (MCS) contract. MCS contractors organize networks of civilian providers to augment the military direct care system, process health care claims, and provide other services for the region.

**c. Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG).** OTSG has the following Army Staff responsibilities:

(1) Assisting the Secretary of the Army (SA) and the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) in discharging Title 10 responsibility for health services for the Army and other agencies and organizations entitled to military health services.

(2) Representing the Army to the executive branch, Congress, DOD agencies, and other organizations on all health policies affecting the Army.

(3) Advising and assisting the SA and CSA and other principal officials on all policy issues pertaining to health and military health service support to include:

(a) Policies and regulations concerning the health aspects of Army environmental programs.

(b) Health professional education and training for the Army, to include training programs for all medical, nursing, dental, and veterinary specialty areas.

(c) Research and development activities for nutrition and wholesomeness in support of the DOD Food Service Programs.

(d) Medical materiel life-cycle management.

(e) Medical materiel concepts, requirements, validity and viability.

(f) Technical review and evaluation of medical and nonmedical materiel to determine the existence of possible health hazards.

(g) Program management for Army health care automation.

(h) Army execution of the Defense Medical Systems Support Center (DMSSC).

(i) Medical aspects of the Security Assistance Program.

(j) Program sponsor for Operations and Maintenance, Army – Program 84 (Medical).

- (k) Executive agent of the Secretary of the Army for all DOD veterinary services.
- (l) Medical facility life cycle management.
- (m) Field medical support concepts, doctrine, training and leader development programs and user test.
- (n) Medical intelligence training.
- (o) Medical mobilization training.

#### **SECTION IV COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT**


##### **19-8. AMEDD reorganization**

**a.** In 1992, the AMEDD began a reorganization effort designed to ensure the ability to accomplish the health care mission well into the 21st century. The reorganization focus was a streamlined command and control system with missions and functional areas linked to the organizational structure, with the mental complexity of the work to be performed linked to organizational level, and with command authority and accountability congruent throughout the organization.

**b.** The AMEDD vision of “a world class system for total quality health care in support of America’s Army at home and abroad, accessible to the total Army family, accountable to America’s people” served as the basis for the reorganization. Based on a power-down concept, the objectives for this reorganization included the creation and sustainment of a fully integrated AMEDD poised to provide cost-effective, high-quality health services. It also included a full integration of medical units in the Active Army and Reserve Components in both the TOE (tactical) and TDA (fixed facility) settings.

**c.** In 1993, the CSA approved a plan to reorganize the AMEDD. The major reorganization was completed in 1996. Health Services Command was replaced by the broader USAMEDCOM, and TSG was dual-hatted as its commander.

**d. One Staff.** In 1998, TSG directed the implementation of the One Staff concept, consolidating the staffs at OTSG and Headquarters, USAMEDCOM, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Personnel at both locations now function as a single staff with one set of leaders who coordinate ARSTAF functions and the MACOM functions (Figure 19-1). The One Staff reduced manning requirements by 300 positions, a 40 percent reduction from the prior organizations.



**Figure 19-1. The Army Medical Department**

**19-9. U.S. Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM)**

- a.** The major subordinate commands of USAMEDCOM include—
  - (1) U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command.
  - (2) U.S. Army Dental Command.
  - (3) U.S. Army Veterinary Command.
  - (4) U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine.
  - (5) U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School.
  - (6) Six regional medical commands.

**b.** The consolidation of worldwide medical assets under the USAMEDCOM in 1996 greatly enhanced command and control efficiency to meet the health care needs of the Army of the 21st century. Implementation of the One Staff concept to achieve the most efficient and effective command and control structure underscored the AMEDD’s commitment to

continuous quality improvement and poised the AMEDD for its role in the Army Transformation.

c. The OTSG/USAMEDCOM Staff ("One Staff") is responsible for AMEDD policy, planning, and operations worldwide, with a focus on strategic planning. Its mission is to—

- (1) Provide the vision, direction, and long-range planning for the AMEDD.
- (2) Develop and integrate doctrine, training, leader development, organization, materiel, and soldier support for the Army health service system.
- (3) Allocate resources, analyze health services utilization, and conduct assessments of performance worldwide.
- (4) Coordinate and manage graduate medical education programs at the Army medical centers.

#### **19-10. U. S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC)**

a. The mission of USAMRMC is to discover and develop medical solutions to protect and sustain the health and performance of the force across the continuum of operations. Mission responsibilities include—

- (1) Serving as materiel developer and logistician for medical materiel (Class VIII).
- (2) Conducting basic research, exploratory testing, engineering development and deployment development for medical materiel systems.
- (3) Serving as the programmer for Army medical facilities.
- (4) Performing research, development, testing, and evaluation in five critical areas—
  - (a) Infectious disease.
  - (b) Combat casualty care.
  - (c) Operational medicine.
  - (d) Medical biological defense.
  - (e) Medical chemical defense.
- (5) Functioning as DOD lead agent for medical research and development in the areas of biological and chemical defense, infectious diseases, combat dentistry, and nutrition.
- (6) Planning and executing medical logistics mobilization support and management of the Medical War Reserves Materiel Program.
- (7) Operating the National Maintenance Point for medical equipment.
- (8) Providing the Army Service Item Control Center for medical, dental, and veterinary equipment and supplies.

#### **19-11. U.S. Army Dental Command**

The mission of the Dental Command is to assist in maintaining readiness of the Army by—

a. Serving as the proponent for meeting the dental health needs of the Army and eligible beneficiaries.

b. Maintaining graduate dental education, leader development and research programs to support readiness requirements.

### **19-12. U.S. Army Veterinary Service**

The Army is the DOD executive agent for veterinary services, and provides veterinary support to all the military services. The Army Surgeon General is responsible for providing DOD veterinary support and directs the DOD Veterinary Service Agency, the U.S. Army Veterinary Command, and the veterinary assets of other Army commands to accomplish this task. Army veterinarians and veterinary specialists support Army and DOD operations worldwide. Their missions include:

- a. Control of animal diseases communicable to man that may affect any aspect of military operations.
- b. Veterinary care for government-owned animals.
- c. Development of sanitary standards for commercial food plants providing products to DOD components.
- d. Developing lists of subsistence suppliers approved for DOD procurement.
- e. Inspection of food products at all joint procurement and storage facilities or other facilities under control of the Departments of the Army and Navy.
- f. Complete laboratory examination of subsistence products.

### **19-13. U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM)**

a. USACHPPM was fully activated on October 1, 1995. This organization is an outgrowth of the former U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency. The mission of USACHPPM is to provide health promotion and preventive medicine leadership and services to counter environmental, occupational, and disease threats to health, fitness, and readiness in support of the National Military Strategy. Mission responsibilities include but are not limited to—

- (1) DOD health hazard assessment.
- (2) Deployment environmental surveillance.
- (3) Risk communication.
- (4) Defense Medical Surveillance System

b. The Commander, USACHPPM is designated as the Functional Proponent for Preventive Medicine (FPPM). The Proponency Office for Preventive Medicine (POPM) is the staff element that supports the FPPM in all issues of preventive medicine policy and strategy development.

### **19-14. U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School**

The mission of the AMEDD Center and School is to—

- a. Develop, integrate, coordinate, implement, and sustain training and training products for Active Army and Reserve Component medical and allied health officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, and civilian personnel worldwide.
- b. Analyze, develop, integrate, test, and validate concepts, emerging doctrine and medical systems, and doctrine and training literature.
- c. Conduct all officer, enlisted, and civilian proponent functions, force structure development, personnel inventories, and life-cycle management of all AMEDD career fields.
- d. Develop concepts and systems for combat health service support of the Army.
- e. Serve as the integration center for all doctrine and training requirements; systematically develop courses, training devices, manuals and sustainment materials to ensure medical readiness.
- f. Provide training, education, and evaluation of AMEDD personnel.
- g. Test and evaluate new and replacement items of equipment having medical implications.
- h. Act as the proponent for combat medical support, theater medical services, and medical logistics force design.
- i. Conduct healthcare studies to improve the operational efficiency and effectiveness of the AMEDD.

#### **19-15. USAMEDCOM Acquisition Activity**

The mission of the USAMEDCOM Acquisition Activity is to plan, develop, and implement an integrated delivery system of contracting support to meet the needs of all USAMEDCOM activities.

#### **19-16. Regional medical commands (RMCs)**

a. The RMCs provide overall command and control of health care operations within a defined geographical region, with each Army medical center and Army medical activity in a region responsible for the day-to-day delivery of health services within a designated area. Figure 19-2 reflects regional boundaries for medical and dental commanders. Mission responsibilities include—

- (1) Regional command and control of an affordable, multidisciplinary, customer-focused, quality military health service system.
- (2) Supporting the readiness requirement of the Army.
- (3) Developing and sustaining technical health care and leader skills in support of USAMEDCOM readiness goals.
- (4) Allocating resources, analyzing utilization, and assessing performance across the RMC.



- |                                                                                     |                                    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1. Tripler AMC, Hawaii                                                              | 4. Eisenhower AMC, Fort Gordon, GA |
| 2. Madigan AMC, Fort Lewis, WA                                                      | 5. Walter Reed AMC, Washington, DC |
| 3. Brooke AMC, Fort Sam Houston, TX<br>(Great Plains Reg Dental Cmd, Fort Hood, TX) | 6. Heidelberg, Germany             |

**Figure 19-2. Regional Medical Commands and Collocated Dental Commands**

**b.** As the primary integrator of medical readiness, the RMC is responsible for—

- (1) Daily utilization of TOE-TDA medical assets, integrating Active and Reserve training, and development of mobilization requirements.
- (2) Budgeting, defending, and allocating readiness costs and funding.
- (3) Preplanning the medical treatment facility (MTF) professional backfill requirements during deployment by expanding network coverage, shifting RMC assets, and coordinating Reserve Component coverage.
- (4) Ensuring that Army medical readiness requirements are fully integrated into the activities of DOD health care regions.
- (5) Conducting training exercises in MTF mobilization, professional backfill activities, and deployment actions.
- (6) Providing medical planning and preparation programs for worldwide contingency operations.
- (7) Sponsoring readiness-based clinical research.

### **19-17. AMEDD role in combat service support units**

**a.** In addition to its fixed health care facilities, the Army maintains medical units with a combat service support (CSS) mission within all deployable commands. These medical units work in concert with logistics and personnel units to form the CSS core for Army forces. The deployable medical assets consist of TOE units in both the Active Army and Reserve Components. The Active Army medical units are integral to U.S. Army Forces Command, U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Army South, and U.S. Army Pacific. Deployable medical units

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range in size, scope of mission, and capacity from medical detachments to theater hospitals. Collectively they establish an integrated continuum of medical evacuation and treatment from point of injury on the battlefield, to the corps/COMMZ, and eventually to specialized treatment in CONUS.

**b.** In the event of mobilization, AMEDD Reserve Component medical units will often be among the earliest deploying forces. With approximately 70 percent of the medical force in the ARNG and USAR, the AMEDD truly exemplifies The Army. Using individuals pre-designated under the Professional Officer Filler Information System (PROFIS), fixed Army health care facilities will provide a large portion of the professional personnel to units deploying to and already stationed in the theater of operations. Well-trained and combat ready Reserve Component medical units are absolutely essential for ensuring that the combat health support (CHS) missions of the Army are accomplished during periods of mobilization.

### **19-18. Staff surgeons**

**a.** The senior AMEDD officer present for duty with a headquarters (other than medical) will be officially titled—

- (1) The “Command Surgeon” of the Army component commands.
- (2) The “Surgeon” of the field command (e.g. corps, CONUSA).
- (3) The “Chief Surgeon” of the overseas major Army command.
- (4) The “Director of Health Services (DHS)” at the installation level.

**b.** The surgeon and DHS are responsible for the staff supervision of all health matters and policies, except dental matters. The DHS and the director of dental services (DDS) will serve on the installation commander’s staff. Normally, the commander of the medical center (MEDCEN) or medical department activity (MEDDAC) is the DHS, and the commander of the Army dental activity (DENTAC) is the DDS.

### **19-19. Health service logistics**

**a.** Health service logistics is integral to Army health service support and is managed by the AMEDD. This gives the command surgeon the ability to influence and control the resources needed to save lives. TSG establishes medical logistics policies and procedures within the framework of the overall Army logistics system. Health service logistics includes the management, storage, and distribution of medical materiel, blood and blood products, optical fabrication, and medical equipment maintenance. The medical commodity (Class VIII) has characteristics that make it distinctly different from other classes of supply. Medical materiel includes pharmaceuticals, narcotics, and blood products that are potency and shelf life dated, and require special handling and security. Most items are subject to the regulations and standards of external agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. Medical logisticians have extensive knowledge of those requirements as they relate to health service support.

**b.** The Single Integrated Medical Logistics Manager (SIMLM) mission designates a single organization or Service component to manage and provide health service logistics support to joint forces operating in the theater. The AMEDD is the SIMLM in Korea,

Southwest Asia, Southern Command, and Europe. Blood is the only medical material not directly under control of the SIMLM. Blood supplies are coordinated and managed by the Joint Blood Program Officer in each of the Combatant Unified Commands.

### **19-20. Medical Reengineering Initiative (MRI)**

**a.** In October 1993, the AMEDD initiated the redesign of combat health support (CHS). The initiative focused on split-based operations; improving tactical mobility; reducing footprint; fixing communications; exploiting information technology; and flexibility, deployability, and tailorability. The resulting new design supports the tenets of Army Force XXI and The Army Transformation. It enhances the combat commander's operational tempo; reduces the logistics burden; and, most importantly, reduces the morbidity and the mortality of wounded soldiers. MRI will convert the entire echelons above division/echelons above corps (EAD/EAC) CHS force of the AMEDD. MRI represents a reorganization of CHS units, not merely equipment modernization (although equipment modernization will occur simultaneously).

**b.** MRI encompasses 391 medical units among all three Army components. This major Army initiative will convert/activate 165 of the 391 medical units by the end of FY 05. MRI will provide full spectrum combat health support to the Army in joint operations. The MRI will ensure that medical units can rapidly deploy with sufficient capability to meet the most demanding missions. The MRI design facilitates scalability through easily tailored capabilities-based packages and includes hooks for augmentation, to permit rapid integration of additional enabling capabilities.

## **SECTION V**

### **SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

#### **19-21. Summary**

This chapter has discussed the mission, organization, functions, and staff relationships of the AMEDD. The health service support system encompasses all levels of medical, dental, veterinary, and other related health care, from the policy and decision-making level to the combat medic in the field. Health services within the Army are directed and monitored by the Surgeon General through USAMEDCOM and the Office of the Surgeon General. TRICARE has markedly altered the peacetime military health system. MRI will transform the AMEDD's TOE medical units to support The Army of the future.

#### **19-22. References**

- a.** DOD Directive 5136.1, *Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs*.
- b.** Army Regulation 10-5, *Headquarters, Department of the Army*.
- c.** Army Regulation 10-87, *Major Army Commands in the Continental United States*.
- d.** Army Regulation 10-64, *Joint Field Operating Agencies of the Office of The Surgeon General of the Army*.
- e.** Army Regulation 40-1, *Composition, Mission, and Functions of the Army Medical Department*.

- f.** Army Regulation 40-4, *Army Medical Department Facilities/Activities*.
- g.** Army Regulation 40-61, *Medical Logistics Policies and Procedures*.
- h.** Army Regulation 350-41, *Training in Units*.
- i.** Field Manual 8-10, *Health Service Support in a Theater of Operations*.
- j.** US Army Medical Command Regulation 10-1, *Organization and Functions Policy*.
- k.** U.S. Army Medical Command Memorandum 10-2, *Organizations and Functions, Headquarters, U.S. Army Medical Command*.
- l.** U.S. Army Medical Department Website, [www.armymedicine.army.mil](http://www.armymedicine.army.mil).



# CHAPTER 20

## MANAGEMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS

*“I find it scarcely possible to get on without some legal person in the situation of Judge Advocate.”*

Duke of Wellington in letter to Earl of Bathurst, 1815

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### **20-1. Law and the commander**

The Army provides legal advice to commanders and soldiers, primarily through or under the supervision of judge advocates (JAs) of the Judge Advocate General's Corps (JAGC). JAs are soldier-lawyers who are commissioned officers of the Army and licensed attorneys. To use JAs and other legal resources effectively, commanders should understand the general organization and functions of the servicing staff judge advocate (SJA) or command judge advocate (CJA) office. This chapter surveys essential JA functional areas: administrative and civil law, including environmental law, legal assistance, and claims; military justice; international/operational law; and contract/fiscal law.

#### **20-2. Office of the staff judge advocate**

An office of the staff judge advocate (OSJA) is organic to units commanded by a general court-martial convening authority. An organization with a general officer in command may also be assigned an OSJA, even if there is no general court-martial convening authority. The OSJA has sections, most commonly military justice, administrative and civil law, claims, operations/international law, and legal assistance, and provides all legal services except those that must, by law, be independent, such as judicial and defense counsel support.

#### **20-3. Staff judge advocate**

An SJA is a member of the commander's personal staff and, as such, communicates directly with the commander to provide legal advice for all matters affecting morale, good order, and discipline of the command. The SJA is also a member of the commander's special staff. As such, the SJA serves under the supervision of the chief of staff, provides legal services to the staff, and coordinates with other staff members to provide responsive legal services throughout the organization.

## SECTION II ADMINISTRATIVE AND CIVIL LAW

### 20-4. The Army as an administrative agency

The Army is an armed force, but it is also a large Federal administrative agency that encounters significant internal and external legal issues every day. Administrative and civil law is the body of law containing the statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions that govern the establishment, functioning, and command of military organizations. The practice of administrative and civil law includes advice to commanders and litigation on behalf of the Army involving many specialized legal areas, including military personnel law, government information practices, investigations, relationships with private organizations, labor relations, civilian employment law, military installations, regulatory law, intellectual property law, government ethics, and environmental law. Legal assistance and claims are major, essentially independent, subsets of administrative and civil law.

### 20-5. Corrective administrative personnel actions

**a. Commanders and administrative law.** Commanders spend an inordinate amount of their time on comparatively few soldiers. Some of these soldiers, for a variety of reasons, cannot or will not perform their duties; some are “troublemakers.” Personal problems plague many that might otherwise be good soldiers. Some corrective administrative actions by the commander educate, train, rehabilitate, or correct without adverse consequences. Others are adverse and implicate important legal rights and responsibilities. The procedures in Army regulations governing the use of adverse actions protect the legal rights of soldiers. These rules are also in the Army’s interest as they ensure that commanders only impose adverse actions on soldiers who deserve them, and do so in a fair and lawful manner.

**b. Corrective, adverse actions short of separation.** In many instances, commanders want to motivate soldiers to improve duty performance or be more efficient, or to ensure mission accomplishment. A number of useful administrative actions are available to deal with problem soldiers whose conduct or performance does not warrant action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or administrative separation. These include counseling, extra training, written or oral reprimands, bars to reenlistment, adverse-performance evaluation reports, relief for cause, suspension or revocation of security clearance, suspension or revocation of on-post driving and other privileges, military occupational specialty (MOS) reclassification, administrative reduction for misconduct or for inefficiency, administrative reprimand, removal from promotion list, and suspension of favorable personnel actions (flagging).

**c. Adverse administrative separations.** The Army invests substantial assets in recruiting, training, equipping, and other resources when it transforms civilian men and women into soldiers. Separation before the end of an enlistee’s obligated term of service wastes resources and requires expensive recruiting and training of a replacement. Moreover, the impact of adverse separations on soldiers can be severe, as some separations can result in discharges under other than honorable conditions. Senior commanders must understand the fundamentals of the administrative separation system. AR 635-200, *Enlisted Personnel* and AR 600-8-24, *Officer Transfers and Discharges*, are the Army regulations that govern administrative separations. These regulations specify the proper processes and provide

substantive and procedural protections. Official roles in administrative separations vary. In some, commanders review the action and forward the file to the separation authority with recommendations. In others, they make the decision. Commanders should thus advise and educate subordinates on the correction or separation of problem soldiers. JAs are a resource available to assist the commander in such leader development.

## **20-6. Improper relationships**

### **a. Improper superior-subordinate relationships.**

(1) This section discusses the various relationships subject to the punitive regulatory requirements of AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*. The Army policy on relationships between soldiers of different ranks is found in AR 600-20. This regulated conduct is considerably broader than the specific UCMJ offense of fraternization. Furthermore, these provisions of AR 600-20 pertaining to improper relationships are punitive, thus violations of this lawful general regulation may be punished under Article 92, UCMJ.

(2) Relationships between soldiers of different rank (without regard to the individuals' sex) are prohibited, if they compromise, or appear to compromise, the integrity of supervisory authority or the chain of command; cause actual or perceived partiality or unfairness; involve, or appear to involve, the improper use of rank or position for personal gain; are, or are perceived to be, exploitative or coercive in nature; create an actual or clearly predictable adverse impact on discipline, authority, morale, or the ability of the command to accomplish its mission.

(3) In addition, certain types of personal relationships between officers and enlisted personnel are prohibited. The term "officer," as used in the policy, includes both commissioned and warrant officers, unless otherwise stated. The policy applies to relationships between soldiers and also between soldiers and personnel of other military services. These prohibited relationships include—

- On-going business relationships between officers and enlisted personnel. This prohibition does not apply to landlord/tenant relationships or to one-time transactions such as the sale of an automobile or house, but does apply to borrowing or lending money, commercial solicitation, and any other type of on-going financial or business relationship. In the case of National Guard or U.S. Army Reserves (USAR) personnel, the prohibition does not apply to relationships that exist due to civilian occupation or employment.
- Dating, shared living accommodations other than those directed by operational requirements, and intimate or sexual relationships between officers and enlisted personnel. This prohibition does not apply to—
  - Marriages entered into before 1 March 2000.
  - Situations in which a relationship that complies with this policy would move into non-compliance due to a change in status of one of the members (for instance, a case where two enlisted members are married and one is subsequently commissioned or selected as a warrant officer).
  - Personal relationships outside of marriage between members of the National Guard or USAR, when the relationship primarily exists due to

civilian acquaintanceships, unless the individuals are on active duty (other than annual training) or full-time National Guard or USAR duty (other than annual training).

- Personal relationships outside of marriage between members of the Regular Army and members of the National Guard or USAR when the relationships primarily exists due to civilian association and the reserve component member is not on active duty (other than annual training) or full-time National Guard duty (other than annual training). Soldiers and leaders share responsibility for ensuring that these relationships do not interfere with good order and discipline. Commanders must ensure that personal relationships that exist between soldiers of different ranks emanating from their civilian careers will not influence training, readiness, or personnel actions.

- Gambling between officers and enlisted soldiers.

(4) These prohibitions are not intended to preclude normal team building associations that occur in the context of activities such as community organizations, religious activities, family gatherings, unit-based social functions, or athletic teams or events. Furthermore, all military personnel share the responsibility for maintaining professional relationships. In any relationship between soldiers of different grades or ranks, however, the senior member is generally in the best position to terminate or limit the extent of the relationship. Nevertheless, all members may be held accountable for relationships that violate this policy.

(5) Commanders should seek to prevent inappropriate or unprofessional relationships through proper training and leadership by example. Should inappropriate relationships occur, commanders have available a wide range of responses. These may include counseling, reprimand, order to cease, reassignment, or adverse action. Potential adverse action may include official reprimand, adverse evaluation report(s), nonjudicial punishment, separation, bar to reenlistment, promotion denial, demotion, and courts-martial. Commanders must carefully consider all of the facts and circumstances in reaching a disposition that is warranted, appropriate, and fair.

### **b. Other prohibited relationships.**

(1) *Improper trainee and soldier relationships.* Any relationship between permanent-party personnel and trainees not required by the training mission is prohibited. This prohibition applies to permanent-party personnel without regard to the installation of assignment of the permanent-party member or the trainee.

(2) *Improper recruiter and recruit relationships.* Any relationship between permanent-party personnel assigned or attached to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) and potential prospects, applicants, members of the Delayed Entry Program (DEP), or members of the Delayed Training Program (DTP) not required by the recruiting mission is prohibited. This prohibition applies to USAREC personnel without regard to the unit of assignment of the permanent-party member and the potential prospects, applicants, DEP or DTP members.

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(3) *Fraternization, Article 134, UCMJ.* Unlawful fraternization is a specific offense under the UCMJ, although most such cases will also involve violations of AR 600-20. Commanders should consult the SJA before acting on reports of this type of misconduct.

### **20-7. Standards of conduct**

a. Ethical violations of standards of conduct impair the trust and confidence placed in officers by superiors and subordinates, and undermine the public's respect for the Army.

b. Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch went into effect in 1993. Published by the Office of Government Ethics (OGE), these standards are reprinted in and supplemented in DOD Directive 5500.7-R, *Joint Ethics Regulations (JER)*. The JER also reprints other OGE regulations that govern the conduct of DOD personnel, and provides additional guidance and regulations on ethical issues, such as acceptance of travel benefits from non-Federal sources.

c. Commanders are responsible for being familiar with the JER and its established standards of conduct. Commanders should ensure that all personnel are properly trained and fully aware of expected ethical conduct. The first commander (or civilian supervisor above the grade of GS-11) in the chain of command or supervision of a soldier or civilian employee serves as an "agency designee" under the JER, with responsibilities that may include—

- Deciding important standards of conduct questions.
- Ensuring that financial disclosure reports are timely and accurately filed.
- Waiving conflicts not likely to affect the integrity of the Government.
- Determining that an individual employee may not acquire or hold a specific financial interest.

d. The Army General Counsel is the Army's Designated Agency Ethics Official. The Chief, Army Standards of Conduct Office, is responsible for overseeing the Army's ethics program and for ethics support for HQDA. Army commands, installations, and organizations should have an assigned ethics counselor.

e. Ethics counselors advise and assist with common ethics problems, such as gifts to superiors; acceptance of gratuities and benefits from outside sources; use of government facilities, property, and personnel for unofficial purposes; improper use of benefits received as a result of official travel; post-government employment restrictions; and commercial solicitations. Ethics counselors represent the Army, and do not have an attorney-client relationship with the commanders and supervisors they advise.

### **20-8. Legal basis of command**

a. **Who commands.** Command is the responsibility of the senior, regularly assigned officer present for duty, unless that individual is ineligible for command by law under Army regulations or preempted by the authority of the President. The term "command" has two distinct meanings. It describes the authority of military officers over soldiers in their charge; and legal aspects of the actions of a post commander as a manager of real property and activities occurring upon that property. This latter section has equal application to troop commanders in regulating activities of individual soldiers or units.

**b. Command authority.**

(1) Commanders are vested with the authority to command by virtue of their military office. Commanders are responsible for the welfare of their command and the success of the mission, and have the authority to demand obedience to lawful orders.

(2) The U.S. Constitution, laws, and regulations of higher authority determine the lawfulness of orders. Courts have described a commander's authority as "inherent" and "broad," and will defer to a commander's decision in an appropriate exercise of discretion. Nevertheless, courts insist that decisions be reasonable and consistent with law and regulation, not arbitrary or capricious. A commander should seek the advice of a supporting JA should that commander have doubts as to the reasonableness and/or consistency of a pending decision.

**c. Maintenance of law, order, and discipline on post.** An installation commander may maintain law and order over civilians on post pursuant to his or her inherent authority and by enforcing the *Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA)*, 18 USC § 13, and the *Federal Trespass Law*, 18 USC § 1382.

(1) *Inherent authority.* As recognized by the United States Supreme Court, an installation commander has the inherent authority and responsibility to maintain law and order, security, and the discipline necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the installation.

(2) *Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA).* The ACA provides that Federal authorities, including military commanders, may sometimes "assimilate," that is, apply, State criminal law. These circumstances include when a person commits a crime on an installation over which the United States exercises exclusive or concurrent legislative jurisdiction, and where Congress has not specifically passed a law describing the conduct as a Federal crime. This is a complex matter of law, policy, and civil-military relations; prudent commanders work closely with the SJA and other staff on these issues.

(3) *Trespass.* Under the Federal Trespass Statute, a post commander may bar an individual from the installation when that person has committed a crime or has violated a post regulation. To bar, the installation commander must notify the individual in writing. The trespasser may be punished with a fine of not more than \$500 or not more than six months' imprisonment, or both.

**d. Free speech and dissent by civilians.** Regulating speech on the installation is dependent on whether the installation, or a part of it, can be characterized as a "public forum." Generally, military installations are not public forums for First Amendment statement. However, installations, or portions of them, can become public forums by allowing access to persons or groups who engage in statement that is not supportive of the military mission. The courts recognize the right of a commander to prohibit demonstrations and similar protests by civilians on military installations. Commanders may allow some speech, such as a lecture against drug-abuse, without opening the door to all speakers. The command must be able to state a rational basis for distinguishing between speakers. For example, the command may contend that the drug lecture supports the mission by helping to ensure a drug-free force; a lecture on ending U.S. military involvement overseas may erode command and control. Accordingly, if a commander unwittingly permits their access, that

can be interpreted as a precedent for future requests, or even to characterize all or part of the installation as a public forum. Thus, the commander should know what such persons or groups are going to say and do before permitting access.

**e. Free speech and dissent by soldiers.** The courts apply a similar analysis when reviewing command authority over soldiers' exercise of free speech. The UCMJ prohibits certain speech, such as disrespectful words and gestures toward superiors. Regarding other aspects of expression, the courts have not adopted an "area" approach in determining the extent of a commander's authority to limit a soldier's activities. They have insisted that any regulatory prohibitions specifically describe the prohibited activity. AR 600-20 prohibits soldiers from participating in partisan or nonpartisan political meetings or rallies, picket lines or any other public demonstrations that may imply Army sanction of the cause. Unless commanders specifically permit, soldiers may not take part if—

- Required to be present for duty elsewhere.
- In uniform, on a military reservation, or in a foreign country.
- The activities breach law and order.
- Violence is reasonably likely to result.

**f. Distribution of literature on the installation.**

(1) Unlike demonstrations and protest activities, Army installations are open forums for news publications, even those critical of government policies or officials. The general rule is that literature is allowed on the installation, rather than kept off. Installation commanders must not attempt to control or restrict dissemination of publications, unless a publication constitutes a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale. Soldiers are entitled to the same free access to publications as are other citizens. Installation commanders may, however, require that distribution of printed media be made only through regularly established and approved distribution outlets, such as post exchanges. An exception is available if those seeking distribution obtain prior approval from the commander or authorized representative.

(2) Commanders must weigh literature restrictions against the standard of "clear danger to loyalty, discipline, and morale." If it appears that a publication presents a "clear danger" to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of soldiers, the installation commander may delay distribution subject to review for final decision by HQDA. Some have challenged words such as "clear danger to loyalty, discipline, and morale" as vague, on the grounds that they fail to give adequate notice of the type of conduct prohibited, and thus violate the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, recognizes a difference between freedom of expression in the military and in the civilian community.

**g. The Commander's regulatory authority.** Commanders may publish regulations and policies necessary to the functioning of their commands, as long as they are not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful. Courts are willing to defer to a commander's assessment of the military necessity for a particular program, action, or rule, but the commander's action must have a reasonable basis in fact and the remedy must be reasonably related to the problem. JAs can provide assistance to the commander in formulating regulations and policies that will withstand legal challenge.

## 20-9. Environmental law

**a. The challenge.** Environmental protection poses an increasing challenge to military leaders. Environmental laws control all sources of pollution, and protect many natural and cultural resources. Under most environmental statutes, the Army is as much a member of the regulated community as any corporation. Commanders must integrate Federal, state, and local environmental requirements within the defense mission. JAs are a vital resource in guiding the commander through environmental issues.

### **b. Environmental regulation of military installations.**

(1) Until about 1970, the most environmental protection responsibility that Congress mandated for the military was to try to implement whatever measures were feasible in light of mission and resources. States were the operative agencies for cleaning up pollution, and the Constitution insulated Federal entities from most State efforts to enforce State laws.

(2) This isolation changed with the enactment of the *National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)*, 42 USC §4321, et seq. NEPA directed the Department of Defense (and all other Federal agencies) to identify, quantify, and evaluate environmental impact before any Federal undertaking, and to consider alternative courses of action. Although NEPA is a procedural (what process must be followed prior to taking an action(s) possibly adversely impacting the environment), rather than substantive statute, failure to properly address its requirements can expose a command to injunctions that can restrict or entirely halt military operations.

(3) Congress enacted numerous environmental statutes after NEPA. A common component of each statute was the Federal Government's ability to delegate the administration of the program to the individual State. The delegation of authority to the individual State and the waiver of sovereign immunity in some statutes potentially expose Federal agencies to lawsuits if they fail to implement State laws. For example, recent changes to the *Clean Air Act* require all major sources of air pollutants within the United States, including most Army installations, to obtain a state-issued, facility-wide operating permit, or cease to operate without a presidential exemption. Army installations must submit detailed permit applications, which commanders must certify as true, accurate, and complete.

(4) Almost all current Federal environmental statutes require the Army to comply with an extensive complex of Federal, state, and local laws in the—

- Installation, operation, and maintenance of air- and water-pollution control technology.
- Quantitative and qualitative limitations on air and water emissions.
- Pollution monitoring, record keeping, and reporting requirements.
- Operating permits for pollution sources and the payment of reasonable permit fees.
- Handling, transportation, storage, treatment, and disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste.
- Reporting and cleanup of spills.
- Monitoring virtually all underground storage tanks for leaks.
- Cleanup of active and closed hazardous-waste disposal sites.

- Conservation of endangered and threatened species and wetlands.

### **c. Compliance.**

(1) Army compliance with environmental laws and regulations was once largely voluntary, but is no longer so. The *Federal Facility Compliance Act (FFCA) of 1992* expanded the waiver of sovereign immunity under the *Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)*, 42 USC §6901, et seq. The Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and State regulators can now assess punitive fines against Federal agencies, including the Army, for violations of Federal, state, and local solid- and hazardous-waste laws and regulations. Recent amendments to the *Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)*, 42 USC §300f, make it the second major environmental statute to waive the Federal Government's sovereign immunity to punitive fines. In addition to punitive RCRA and SDWA fines, installations are subject to court-imposed penalties for failure to comply with court orders or court-approved consent decrees under other environmental laws. It should make no difference whether a regulator has the authority to impose a penalty, as Army installations are required to maintain compliance at all times or face enforcement actions that may prevent mission-essential training and operations.

(2) Current environmental laws affect many daily activities at military installations, and enforcement of the laws is strengthening. Several installations have been assessed more than \$1 million in fines and penalties for environmental violations. Moreover, Federal environmental statutes specifically authorize individual citizens to act as private attorneys-general by initiating lawsuits to force compliance through injunctions and fines. Finally, Army leaders are not immune from the threat of personal criminal liability for environmental crimes. Again, JAs can be a valuable resource to Army leaders in avoiding personal liability.

(3) The FFCA is silent on the source of payment of fines and penalties, but Presidential, DOD, and DA policies provide installation or activity operational accounts of those most directly responsible for the violation will pay environmental fines. The policies are intended to motivate compliance at the lowest level by requiring those that are responsible for the violation to bear the burden of any resulting fines.

(4) Commanders must handle environmental matters skillfully or risk substantial disruption of crucial training and other operations that may reduce combat readiness. Commanders who do not include environmental-protection strategies as a fundamental aspect of planning may find a court injunction standing in the way of their overall mission accomplishment. Finally, even relatively minor compliance problems can be costly to taxpayers, the Army, and local installations.

### **d. Pollution prevention and conservation.**

(1) Army leaders must also stress pollution prevention and hazardous-material minimization. DOD policy is that ongoing operations should incorporate practices to reduce pollution and the use of hazardous materials. This approach should reduce overall costs to the Army, and promote environmental compliance.

(2) Commanders are increasingly required to ensure that mission activities conserve natural resources on Army installations. The *Endangered Species Act (ESA)*, 16 USC §1531, et seq., requires all Federal agencies to carry out programs for the conservation of federally listed endangered and threatened species. The ESA prohibits taking any Federal action that is

likely to jeopardize listed species. Moreover, actions that may affect such species are subject to formal consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries. Commanders must also protect the quality and quantity of the installation water supply, conserve the water source, and seek to preserve wetlands that provide important habitat for fish and wildlife.

## **20-10. Federal labor relations and the role of the labor counselor**

### **a. Unions.**

(1) Unions represent many Federal employees within DA. Federal labor law requires the Army to notify unions before implementing changes in working conditions. Working conditions include, but are not limited to, changes in office hours, changes in shifts, major task/objective changes for the division/directorate, and reassignment of personnel. Commanders should consult the installation labor-relations specialists and labor counselors on all matters concerning unions or employees who are covered by collective bargaining agreements to ensure compliance with the existing negotiated labor agreement and applicable laws and regulations.

(2) Good management-union relationships are essential. Through Executive Order 12871, Labor-Management Partnerships, the President charged each executive agency to create labor-management partnerships by forming labor-management committees and councils, and by providing partnership training. In recent years, DOD installations have successfully dealt with a wide range of issues through labor-management partnerships, including compressed schedules, childcare, downsizing, and alternative dispute resolution programs.

(3) The installation labor counselor, a JA or an Army civilian lawyer, is the primary adviser to the commander, supervisor, and the civilian personnel advisory center (CPAC) on legal aspects of civilian personnel and labor relations.

(4) The labor counselor's duties include review of proposed adverse civilian personnel actions and pending equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints; participating in contract negotiations with labor unions, particularly when opposing lawyers are involved; representing management in third-party proceedings, such as bargaining-unit determinations, unfair-labor-practice complaint proceedings, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission hearings, Merit System Protection Board hearings, arbitration hearings; advising activity negotiating committees; and advising on interpretation and application of negotiated labor agreements. AR 27-40, *Litigation*, also designates installation labor counselors, as the activity liaison officers for Office of Special Counsel investigations concerning allegations of prohibited personnel practices and whistle-blower reprisal.

### **b. Discipline of civilian employees.**

(1) Commanders will likely supervise numerous Federal civilian employees or command those who do. Chapter 751 of the Army's regulation on civilian employee discipline, AR 690-700, *Personnel Relations and Services*, establishes two categories of disciplinary actions. The first is informal disciplinary action. This includes oral admonishments, oral counseling, and written warnings. The second category, formal disciplinary actions, includes letters of reprimand, suspensions, reductions in grade or pay, and removal. Similarly, employee conduct requiring discipline falls into two categories,

corrective and punitive. Corrective discipline includes behavioral offenses for which progressive discipline, aimed at correcting the behavior is appropriate. Punitive measures are appropriate for more serious matters, such as fraud, waste, and abuse.

(2) Informal discipline is appropriate for most minor unacceptable behavior. Supervisors take informal action on their own initiative, and should advise the employee that continued misbehavior might result in formal disciplinary action.

(3) Formal disciplinary action is appropriate because of the severity of conduct or when informal discipline for minor misbehavior has not worked. The CPO and the labor counselor advise and assist supervisors about appropriate penalties and related concerns.

(4) The severity of the imposed penalty and the status and union affiliation of an employee determine the appeal rights available to the disciplined employee. If the employee raises a discrimination claim in conjunction with the appealed action, the appeal rights may vary. The Army defends disciplinary and performance actions in administrative hearings and Federal court.

(5) Civilian personnel laws and regulations also permit supervisors to take appropriate action against employees whose job performance is unacceptable. These include, but are not limited to, adverse appraisals, special appraisals, and extra training.

**c. Equal employment opportunity allegations of discrimination.** One of the labor counselor's most important duties is advising the installation EEO officer and commander on equal employment opportunity. Civilian employees are protected by law, executive action, and regulation from discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, religion, age, disability, and sexual orientation. They are also entitled to be free from sexual harassment. Finally, civilian employees have the right to complain about conduct they perceive to be discriminatory.

**d. Deployment considerations.** The civilian work force is vital to mission accomplishment. Civilian employees accompany Army units in exercises and operations worldwide. Commanders should thus include the many legal issues of civilian employee support, administration, and discipline in deployment planning.

## 20-11. Legal assistance

The legal assistance program is designed to meet the continuing legal needs of soldiers and their families. Legal assistance also helps to support military readiness, high morale, discipline, recruiting, and retaining a quality force.

**a. Mission.** As stated in AR 27-3, *The Army Legal Assistance Program*, this program exists to assist soldiers and their families with personal legal affairs. JAs do that by meeting clients' needs for legal information and resolving their personal legal problems when possible. The first part of this mission is preventive: legal-assistance officers inform soldiers and their families of legal pitfalls, issues, and services, so soldiers may avoid difficulties and unnecessary expense in garrison, during field training, and when deployed. The second part of this mission is providing legal assistance directly to eligible clients.

**b. Readiness.** Senior leaders often overlook their own personal and legal affairs. Soldiers preoccupied with such matters may not be effective; leaders with similar problems affect unit readiness and mission accomplishment. One of the continuing lessons from

deployments and operations is that leaders can do more to ensure that soldiers have their personal legal affairs in order. Troops request wills and powers of attorney at the last minute, while in staging areas or, literally, boarding aircraft. This detracts from scarce time needed for other critical tasks. Automation has assisted JAs in providing such services, but commanders can help unit readiness by ensuring that soldiers are ready to deploy. Routine legal assistance appointments can satisfy most soldiers' legal needs well before deployment, and they are certainly preferred over the "assembly-line" wills that frequently result from inadequate counseling time at soldier readiness programs (SRPs).

**c. Client eligibility.** Legal assistance adds to soldier morale and unit readiness. The authorization of personal legal assistance is subject to availability of legal resources. Generally, all Active Army (AA) and retired soldiers and their families are entitled to legal assistance as are, with some restrictions, Reserve Component (RC) soldiers and their families. In addition, Army civilian employees may be eligible for legal assistance if deploying, or in such matters as responding to reports of survey.

**d. Client services.**

(1) Army legal offices provide legal assistance on many issues, including family law, wills, leases, contracts, powers of attorney, disputes with creditors, veteran reemployment rights, torts, taxes, and appeals of adverse efficiency reports or reports of survey findings.

(2) Legal assistance may include notary services, legal counseling, telephone calls and letters on behalf of clients, and preparation of some legal documents. With command support, attorneys working in conjunction with unit tax assistance officers and Army Community Service volunteers help soldiers prepare Federal and State income tax returns, and also may provide electronic tax return filing services. Some legal offices help clients in local courts on uncontested or simple legal matters, such as adoptions, uncontested divorces, or small claims. Where offered, eligibility for in-court representation is generally limited to soldiers in pay grades E-4 and below if they have substantial financial hardships.

(3) Soldiers do not pay for Army legal assistance. If the legal assistance office cannot solve a legal problem, it will ordinarily refer the client to the appropriate local bar association so that the client can get a civilian lawyer. Sometimes, referral may be to RC JAs who provide legal assistance for retirement points without cost to the soldier. Furthermore, RC JA units and individuals often perform drill by supplementing legal assistance at AA legal offices.

**e. Preventive law.**

(1) Preventive law, educating soldiers and their families to avoid personal legal problems is an important mission under AR 27-3. Legal assistance offices do this by—

- Teaching soldiers, families, and military organizations about local consumer problems, such as businesses that charge excessive interest or sell shoddy merchandise.
- Alerting leaders to local legal problems, solutions, and, available legal assistance resources.

- Writing articles for installation newspapers or posting information on the legal assistance web site.

(2) Direct action against unscrupulous merchants is an effective method of solving widespread problems. The local Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Board can recommend placing establishments off-limits for a variety of reasons, including business practices that have an adverse effect on command health, discipline, or morale. The mere prospect of an off-limits sanction may cause businesses to treat soldiers fairly. Command cooperation and initiatives with local chambers of commerce and better-business bureaus often solve less serious cases and identify and fix systemic problems.

## 20-12. Claims

**a. Army Claims System.** The Army Claims System investigates, processes, adjudicates, and settles claims on behalf of and against the United States world-wide under the authority conferred by statutes, regulations, international and interagency agreements, and DOD directives. Categories of claims include claims for property damage of soldiers and other employees arising incident to service, torts alleged against Army or DOD personnel acting within the scope of employment, and claims by the United States against individuals who injure Army personnel or damage Army property. The Army's implementing regulation is AR 27-20, *The Army Claims System*.

**b. Supporting commanders.** The Army Claims System supports commanders by preventing distractions to the operation from claimants, promoting the morale of Army personnel by compensating them for property damage suffered incident to service, and promoting good will with the local population by providing compensation for personal injury or property damage caused by Army or DOD personnel.

**c. U.S. Army Claims Service.** Under The Judge Advocate General's (TJAG) supervision, the U.S. Army Claims Service (USARCS) administers the Army Claims System and designates area claims offices, claims processing offices, and claims attorneys. SJAs or other supervisory JAs operate each command's claims program and supervise the area claims office (ACO) or claims processing office (CPO) designated by USARCS for the command. ACOs and CPOs are the normal claims offices at Army installations that investigate, process, adjudicate, and settle claims against the United States; and identify, investigate, and assert claims on behalf of the United States. Claims attorneys at each level settle claims within delegated authority and forward claims exceeding that authority to the appropriate settlement authority.

**d. Soldier misconduct.** When the claim results from soldier misconduct, AR 27-20 permits deducting from the wrongdoer's pay to compensate the victim.

## 20-13. Command authority and judicial review of military activities

**a. Federal courts.** Federal courts have consistently held that control and operation of the military establishment are functions of the executive and legislative branches, not the judicial. Judges do not try to command or interfere unduly with military operations. Notwithstanding this fundamental judicial and political philosophy, no individual or organization is above the law.

**b. Commander response.** Commanders should know what kinds of military decisions and activities Federal courts will review; the extent the courts recognize the unique requirements and conditions of command; how to respond to a court order; internal command procedures for proper handling of court orders and other legal process; and DA requirements when a command is sued.

**c. Scope of judicial review.**

**(1) Courts defer to the military.**

**(a)** In the important military case, *Parker v. Levy*, the U.S. Supreme Court remarked that: “While the members of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”

**(b)** When the Constitution clearly confers a function to the executive or legislative branch of government, the courts generally refrain from reviewing the merits of a controversy. Even where the Constitution is not specific, courts are reluctant to become involved in questions about the military. Most courts ask first whether the complaint alleges a violation of regulation, statute, or constitutional provision.

**(2)** Failure to follow military regulations and statutes may result in judicial sanctions. Numerous decisions establish the principle that military officials may not legally ignore Army regulations in carrying out their mission. Courts will generally view violations of regulations written for the benefit of the Government as harmless but will overturn actions that violate regulations intended for the benefit of an individual

**(3)** Denial of soldiers’ Constitutional rights usually leads to judicial intervention. The public and the courts recognize that soldiers are subject to a judicial code and other disciplinary standards different from those that apply to civilians. At the same time, soldiers do not waive all the protections of the Constitution merely because of their military status. Army violations of soldiers’ rights to a limited form of free speech or to due process in courts-martial and adverse administrative personnel actions have led to numerous lawsuits against commanders and other military officials.

**(4) Commanders may face individual liability for their acts.**

**(a)** People usually sue the Government to force it to act or to reverse an action previously taken. Frequently, these lawsuits allege that the decision maker violated the person’s constitutional rights. A personal liability lawsuit seeks money damages from the individual governmental officer.

**(b)** The Department of Justice (DOJ) will represent most government defendants who are sued for acts within the scope of their assigned duties. Generally, military personnel cannot sue other military personnel for monetary damages arising out of duty-related conduct. Moreover, government defendants may be entitled to a qualified immunity from suits by civilians. Officers sued for common law torts, such as assault and battery, will be removed from the lawsuit and the United States substituted as the proper defendant, if the officers were acting in the scope of their duties at the time. (A scope of

employment determination is a fact specific determination that certifies the officer was within the performance of his or her duties for the conduct that is being challenged; an honest error or mistake committed while in the performance of duties will not result in conduct being outside the scope of employment.) Officers sued for alleged constitutional violations receive protections known as qualified immunity. In cases involving constitutional violations, qualified immunity results in the dismissal of a plaintiff's claim if the officer acted in good faith and if constitutional guidelines are not clearly established or a reasonable person would not know that clearly established guidelines exist.

**d. Response to litigation.**

(1) There are strict requirements for complying with Federal court orders, notifying HQDA of lawsuits, and forwarding litigation reports from commands to the Army Litigation Division. JA advice must be obtained immediately to ensure proper response by the Army.

(2) The primary objectives of JAs in litigation are early dismissal of lawsuits, minimizing interference with command activities by ongoing lawsuits, and insulating official defendants against suits for money damages. Many lawsuits continue for several years. Such litigation consumes enormous command time and resources, and can take a toll on the lives and careers of affected officers and their families.

### **SECTION III MILITARY JUSTICE**

#### **20-14. Background**

**a. Military justice purpose.** Military justice is more than merely criminal law in battledress. The purpose of military criminal law is to promote justice, assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, and promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment.

**b. Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM).** From Bunker Hill to Bastogne, the Army administered military justice under the Articles of War (AW). These AW, which George Washington and others had adopted from the British AW early in the Revolutionary War, traced their origins to Roman models that had been refined during the Renaissance. The AW had worked well enough for the British and continued to serve our own small army well for almost two centuries. Nevertheless, abuses noted during the massive mobilization of World War II led to calls for reform. In 1950, Congress passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to provide uniform rules for all services. The UCMJ is found at Title 10, United States Code, Sections 801-946, but the sections are commonly referred to as Articles 1 through 146 of the UCMJ. Pursuant to the constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief, and the authority granted by Congress in the UCMJ, the President signed an Executive order creating the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (MCM). The MCM consists of a preamble, rules for courts-martial, military rules of evidence, punitive articles, and nonjudicial punishment (NJP) procedures. AR 27-10, *Military Justice*, is the implementing Army regulation.

## **20-15. Providing military justice legal services**

**a. TJAG responsibility.** TJAG is responsible for the overall supervision and administration of military justice within the Army. The commander is responsible for the administration of military justice in the unit, and must communicate directly with the SJA about military justice matters.

**b. SJA responsibility.** The SJA is responsible for military justice advice and services to the command. The SJA advises commanders concerning the administration of justice, the disposition of alleged offenses, appeals of nonjudicial punishment, and action on court-martial findings and sentences. The SJA also supervises the administration and prosecution of courts-martial, preparation of records of trial, the victim-witness assistance program, and military justice training.

**c. Trial Defense Service (TDS).** JAs of the U.S. Army Trial Defense Service (TDS), under the supervision of the Chief, U.S. Army Trial Defense Service, not the SJA, advise and represent soldiers before courts-martial. TDS attorneys also represent soldiers in adverse administrative hearings. They are not within the local chain of command.

**d. Military Judges.** Military judges of the U.S. Army Trial Judiciary, who are not within the local chain of command or technical chain of the SJA, preside at general and special courts-martial, promulgate rules of court, maintain judicial independence and impartiality, conduct training sessions for trial and defense counsel, and perform or supervise military magistrate functions (review of pretrial confinement and issuance of search, seizure, or apprehension authorizations).

## **20-16. Active Army jurisdiction**

As a result of the Supreme Court's 1987 ruling in *Solorio v. United States*, jurisdiction of a court-martial depends solely on the accused's status as a member of the armed forces, and not on whether the offense is service-connected. The *Solorio* ruling means that both the military and civilian authorities may have jurisdiction over a soldier who commits an offense off post. This is commonly referred to as concurrent jurisdiction. Army policy is not to prosecute soldiers for offenses if civilian authorities are prosecuting the same soldiers for similar or like offenses.

## **20-17. Jurisdiction over Reservists**

**a. Military Justice Amendments of 1986.** As a part of the Military Justice Amendments of 1986, Congress amended the UCMJ to extend jurisdiction over members of the RC during both active duty and inactive duty training. In short, RC soldiers are subject to the UCMJ for misconduct committed during training periods. One significant change allows the military more flexibility to exercise court-martial jurisdiction over reservists who commit crimes during weekend drill (inactive duty training or IDT) and over members of the National Guard of the United States when in Federal service.

**b. Continuing jurisdiction.** Recognizing that IDT periods are brief, usually lasting only one weekend, the amendments provide for continuing jurisdiction during the entire period of IDT, including those short periods when the soldier is not physically present at the IDT site. Additionally, the Government can involuntarily order to active duty (for Article 32

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investigations, courts-martial, and NJP) RC soldiers accused of violating the UCMJ during a training period.

**c. Trial.** AA convening authorities should be familiar with changes in RC jurisdiction, because all general and special courts-martial are tried at the active duty post that supports the RC unit (including ARNG units when federalized). In addition, only the AA general court-martial convening authority (GCMCA) can authorize involuntary recall of an RC soldier to active duty for UCMJ action. The Secretary of the Army must give prior approval for the involuntary recall if pretrial restraint will be imposed or if there is possibility of confinement as the result of a court-martial sentence.

## **20-18. The commander's role**

### **a. The commander's prosecutorial discretion.**

(1) One of the commander's greatest powers in the administration of military justice is the exercise of prosecutorial discretion—deciding whether a case will be resolved administratively, or if referred to a trial, determining what level of court-martial is appropriate, or what the charge will be. Although commanders should seek advice from the SJA and review available investigative reports, the commander alone must ultimately decide. Commanders should resolve cases at the lowest level appropriate for the offense and the offender, a fundamental theme of military justice.

(2) Military justice procedures are not always the best way to dispose of disciplinary problems. A variety of administrative alternatives exist, including—

- Counseling.
- Written or oral reprimands and admonitions.
- Withdrawal of pass privileges.
- Extra training.
- Withdrawal or limitation of privileges (commissary, PX, on-post driving, etc.).
- Alcohol and drug rehabilitation programs.
- Administrative separations.
- Officer and NCO evaluations.
- MOS reclassification.
- Reduction for inefficiency.
- Bar to reenlistment.
- Reassignment or transfer.

(3) The decision to refer offenses to a court-martial is often difficult. When an apparently serious offense occurs, there may be pressure on a commander to “do something.” Congressional inquiries and expressions of interest in the incident from higher command may tempt some to refer cases to trial to settle the matter. A case should not be referred to trial unless the convening authority finds reasonable grounds to believe that an offense triable by court-martial has been committed; reasonable grounds to believe the accused committed it; the specification alleges an offense; and a court-martial is warranted (Rules for Courts-

Martial 601(d)(1)). If the crime is minor, NJP or administrative alternatives are generally a first consideration.

(4) The standard for referral does not conflict with the lawful presumption of innocence surrounding the accused at a court-martial. The perceptive commander will find occasions when the accused's conduct satisfies the legal elements of a crime, but for reasons of compassion, interests of justice, or other considerations, punitive action is not required. Similarly, commanders must resist the temptation to avoid use of the military justice system in order to create a misleading statistical picture of morale and discipline. Serious crime should be prosecuted in accordance with the law.

**b. The commander and the defense function.** Commanders should understand that our Constitution, laws, regulations, and ethical codes require defense counsel to represent their clients. Representation does not mean halfway measures, but zealous advocacy within the bounds of ethics and the law. Any suggestion by a commander that defense counsel do less is improper, and may lead to loss of authority to convene courts-martial and to other adverse action. The defense counsel who does not fully and vigorously represent a client is professionally derelict under the UCMJ, and liable to punishment, as well as sanctions under AR 27-26, *The Army Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers*, and discipline by a State bar association.

## **20-19. Options available to the commander**

This section discusses the various measures for dealing with an accused before trial, and examines the various forums and administrative measures a commander may use.

**a. Pretrial restraint.** Soldiers pending military justice action, including trial by court-martial, should ordinarily continue to perform duty (AR 27-10, para. 5-13a). If required to ensure the soldier's presence at trial or to prevent further serious criminal misconduct, the MCM allows pretrial restraint. As are any citizens, soldiers are presumed innocent until convicted. Pretrial restraint is not punishment, but is obviously a significant restraint on liberty. Because there is no military bail system, such restraint may not be more restrictive than necessary under the circumstances.

**b. Nonjudicial punishment (Art. 15, UCMJ).** One of the most valuable disciplinary tools available to the commander is nonjudicial punishment. This option is proper in cases of minor offenses for which administrative measures are considered inadequate or inappropriate, unless it is clear that nonjudicial punishment is not sufficient to meet the ends of justice. There are three levels of nonjudicial punishment, each with increasing severity of punishment: Summarized, Formal Company Grade, and Formal Field Grade. Maximum punishments are listed in Table 3-1, AR 27-10. A soldier may demand trial by court-martial at any time before the commander imposes punishment. Commanders may find the details in the UCMJ, MCM, and AR 27-10, but one occasionally misunderstood point is worth noting here. Soldiers who accept an Article 15 and do not demand trial by court-martial are not admitting guilt, but are merely agreeing to nonjudicial punishment procedures.

### **c. General considerations in referring charges to a court-martial.**

(1) *Be objective.* A court will consider the case objectively on its merits; commanders should do the same.

(2) *Act promptly.* Commanders and subordinates should act rapidly on reports of misconduct. The Army and accused soldiers are entitled to prompt disposition of allegations. Unexplained delays in the administrative processing of charges may result in the dismissal of charges for lack of speedy trial. Generally, the Government should bring an accused to trial within 120 days of preferral of charges or imposition of pretrial restraint. If a soldier is in pretrial confinement, charges must be processed with due diligence, which may require bringing the soldier to trial even more quickly.

(3) *Ensure evidence supports charges.* No matter how convinced a commander may be of an individual’s guilt, there will be no conviction if there is insufficient competent evidence. The convening authority must ensure that the evidence warrants trial. Trial counsel assist commanders in evaluating evidence.

(4) *Consider the individual.* Commanders should select the option that fits the soldier and the offense, considering the background of the accused and the effect on the unit.

**d. Types of courts-martial.**

(1) *Summary court-martial (SCM).*

(a) The SCM is the lowest level trial court in the military justice system, and is designed to dispose of minor offenses under simple procedures. It is composed of one commissioned officer, ordinarily of field grade.

(b) SCM convening authority is generally vested in battalion-level and higher commanders. SCM can only try enlisted soldiers, and is sometimes used after an accused has been offered and refused nonjudicial punishment for the offense. An accused may also decline trial by SCM. The punishment powers of the SCM are listed in Figure 20-1.

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CONFINEMENT</u>	<u>FORFEITURE</u>	<u>REDUCTION</u> <sup>1</sup>	<u>PUNITIVE DISCHARGE</u>
SUMMARY	1 MO <sup>2</sup>	2/3 PAY PER MO (1 MONTH)	≥ E-5 ONE GRADE ≤ E-4 TO E-1	NONE
SPECIAL	6 MO <sup>3</sup>	2/3 PAY PER MO (6 MONTHS)	TO E-1	NONE
BCD SP	6 MO <sup>3</sup>	2/3 PAY PER MO (6 MONTHS)	TO E-1	BCD ENLISTED ONLY
GENERAL	SEE PART IV, MCM	ALL PAY AND ALLOWANCES	TO E-1	BCD (ENLISTED) DD (ENLISTED & WARRANT OFF) DISMISSAL (COMM OFF)

<sup>1</sup>ONLY ENLISTED SOLDIERS MAY BE REDUCED BY CM.

<sup>2</sup>A SUMMARY CM MAY IMPOSE CONFINEMENT AND HARD LABOR WITHOUT CONFINEMENT ONLY ON SOLDIERS IN GRADE OF E-4 AND BELOW.

<sup>3</sup>A SPECIAL CM MAY IMPOSE CONFINEMENT ONLY ON ENLISTED SOLDIERS.

**Figure 20-1. Court Martial Maximum Punishments**

**(2) *Special court-martial (SPCM).***

**(a)** The SPCM is the intermediate military court. The SPCM convening authority is usually a brigade-level commander. Figure 20-1 depicts the punishment powers of the SPCM.

**(b)** SPCM membership normally consists of at least three members and a military judge, or solely of a military judge, if the accused so requests. If an enlisted accused requests, at least one-third of the court members must be enlisted.

**(c)** SPCM also have trial counsel (prosecutor) and defense counsel. The trial counsel need not be a lawyer. The accused, however, has a regulatory right to representation at trial by an appointed military lawyer certified by The Judge Advocate General. As a matter of practice, both trial and defense counsel are usually qualified lawyers. At all courts-martial, the accused is entitled to representation by civilian counsel at no expense to the Government. The accused may retain detailed military counsel in addition to a civilian attorney.

**(3) *Bad conduct discharge (“BCD”) special court-martial.***

The “BCD” SPCM is the same type of court as the “regular” SPCM, except that this court-martial has the additional power to impose a bad-conduct discharge (BCD) as part of the sentence. Certain requirements must be met before such punishment may be imposed: a qualified defense counsel and a military judge must be detailed; and a verbatim record must be made. In the Army only a GCMCA may convene a “BCD” SPCM. Figure 20-1 depicts the punishment powers of the “BCD” SPCM.

**(4) *General court-martial (GCM).***

**(a)** The GCM is the highest trial court in the military justice system. Only a GCMCA, usually a commander at division-level or above, may convene a GCM, and then only upon the written pretrial recommendation of the SJA. GCM punishment is limited only by the maximum punishments for each offense found in Part IV of the MCM. Figure 20-1 depicts the punishment powers of the GCM. A GCM may sentence soldiers to death, life imprisonment, or dishonorable discharge (DD). This court-martial is thus reserved for the most serious crimes. Any officer requiring trial by court-martial is also ordinarily tried by GCM, as only that court may sentence a convicted officer to confinement or dismissal.

**(b)** GCM may consist of a military judge and not fewer than five members, or a military judge alone, if the accused so requests. The accused may elect trial by judge alone in all cases except those referred to trial as capital (with potential for the death penalty). A military judge is detailed to the court in all cases. As with SPCM and BCD-SPCM, an enlisted soldier is also entitled, on request, to trial before a court-martial panel that includes at least one-third enlisted members.

**(c)** Trial and defense counsel, lawyers certified by The Judge Advocate General, represent the parties at all GCM.

**(d)** Unless the accused waives the right, Article 32, UCMJ, requires that a GCM can only try charges that a field grade officer or an officer with legal training and experience has thoroughly and impartially investigated. The purposes of the investigation are to inquire into the truth of the charges, determine the correctness of the form of the charges, and to get information to decide the proper disposition of the case.

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(e) The accused and counsel are present during the investigation's hearings. The Article 32 investigating officer's recommendations are advisory only, and not binding upon the convening authority.

**e. Administrative elimination in lieu of court-martial.** Not all misconduct warrants trial. Administrative elimination instead of court-martial may sometimes serve the interests of justice. Chapter 10, AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel Management System, provides that enlisted soldiers charged with an offense punishable by a BCD or DD may submit a request for discharge for the good of the service in lieu of trial by court-martial. The GCMCA is normally the approval authority for these requests.

**f. Pretrial agreements.** The accused and the convening authority may agree that in return for the accused pleading guilty, the convening authority will either drop certain charges or limit the sentence the accused will serve. The agreement must be in writing, so that all parties and reviewing authorities know exactly what was agreed.

## **20-20. Unlawful command influence**

Article 37, UCMJ, makes it unlawful for a convening authority to attempt to influence the members of a court-martial as to the outcome of the trial. The dangers of unlawful command influence extend beyond the members of a court-martial. No officer mindful of the commissioning oath would intentionally interfere with the due process of law. Nevertheless, commanders must exercise great care that their actions not constitute or be construed as unlawful command influence.

### **a. Pretrial stage.**

(1) Commanders may personally investigate allegations or, in more serious cases, rely on the reports of law enforcement professionals such as Criminal Investigation Command (CID) or military police. Commanders also have the authority to dispose of cases involving subordinates. This power includes the right to take any nonpunitive or punitive action authorized at their own or any inferior level of command. For example, a GCMCA may refer a case to a lower court-martial or not refer the case at all.

(2) When taking punitive action, the commander acts in a judicial capacity and must make an independent determination that punishment is appropriate. For example, if a field-grade commander believes that a soldier's misconduct, if proven, deserves company-grade punishment, that commander can either impose the appropriate punishment personally or send the case to the company commander for disposition. The higher commander may not, however, send the case to the company commander with instructions to administer a company-grade Article 15 or impose a specific type of punishment, because that would prevent the subordinate commander from exercising independent discretion.

(3) Commanders who believe that a case demands a more serious disposition than can be administered at their level may forward the case to a higher authority with a disposition recommendation. An accused is entitled to a fair and independent recommendation as to disposition at each level of command. A commander cannot have a fixed, inflexible policy regarding level of disposition, and cannot establish guidelines suggesting an "appropriate punishment" for any category of case. Subordinate commanders must be free to make an honest, independent assessment of how each case should be handled.

(4) Although commanders may not direct subordinate commanders to impose designated punishments or to refer cases to courts-martial, they may exercise authority to dispose of certain cases in any lawful manner. For example, a senior commander may direct subordinates to forward all cases of alleged officer misconduct or all illegal drug cases with recommendations for disposition.

**b. Trial stage.**

(1) Once trial begins, commanders usually are not actively involved beyond authorizing administrative support. GCMCAs can grant immunity to witnesses to facilitate their testifying, but subordinate commanders should scrupulously avoid statements of favorable treatment or negotiating “deals” with witnesses or accused under circumstances that could be construed as involving a promise, express or implied, of immunity.

(2) The most rare but egregious incidents of unlawful command influence are those that impact directly on the trial process by pressuring court members to convict or punish contrary to their actual conscience. It is, of course, criminal to subvert justice by putting command pressure on court members or witnesses.

(3) The more common problem is actual or perceived discrimination against soldiers who participate as witnesses at a court-martial. Some subordinates, eager to obey their commanders, may read more into their superior’s remarks than the superior intended. If they do that in military justice, the consequences could be grave. Appellate courts are not bound by the actual intentions of the commander, however noble. Unlawful command influence often results from the reasonable, if unintended, perceptions of subordinates. If subordinates reasonably misunderstand or misinterpret the superior commander’s actions or statements in a manner that deprives an accused of a fair trial, unlawful command influence exists.

**c. Post-Trial stage.**

(1) After trial, the commander has the opportunity to review the results of the trial, to approve or disapprove findings, and to approve, suspend, reduce, or defer the adjudged sentence. The SJA provides a written recommendation in all GCM and BCD-SPCM before the convening authority acts.

(2) Article 37 prohibits commanders from censuring, reprimanding, or admonishing any court-martial member, military judge, or counsel about the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or about any other exercise of judicial duties. It also prohibits giving unfavorable evaluations or ratings to court members because of court-martial participation.

**SECTION IV  
INTERNATIONAL/OPERATIONAL LAW**

**20-21. International law**

**a.** International law is the application of international agreements, international customary practices, and the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations to military operations and activities. Within the Army, the practice of international law also includes foreign law, comparative law, martial law, and domestic law affecting overseas, intelligence, security assistance, counter-drug, and civil-assistance activities.

**b.** The SJA's international law responsibilities include implementation of the DOD Law of War Program, including law of war training, advice concerning the application of the law of war to military operations, and supervision of war crime investigations and trials; assistance with international legal issues relating to U.S. Forces overseas, including the legal basis for conducting operations, status of forces agreements, and the impact of foreign law on Army activities and personnel; monitoring of foreign trials and confinement of Army personnel and their dependents; assistance with legal issues in intelligence, security assistance, counter-drug, and civil assistance activities; advice to the command concerning the development of international agreements; and legal liaison with host or allied nation legal authorities.

## **20-22. Operational law (OPLAW)**

**a.** OPLAW is that body of domestic, foreign, and international law that directly affects the conduct of military operations. OPLAW tasks support the military decision-making process, the command and control, and sustainment of military operations. OPLAW encompasses the law of war and international stationing arrangements, but goes beyond these traditional international law concerns to incorporate all relevant aspects of military law that affect the conduct of operations. The JAGC provides operational law support in all operations.

**b.** The OPLAW JA supports the commander's military decision-making process by performing mission-analysis, preparing legal estimates, designing the operational legal support architecture, war-gaming, writing legal annexes, assisting in the development and training of Rules of Engagement (ROE), and reviewing plans and orders. The OPLAW JA supports command and control by advising and assisting with targeting, ROE implementation, and information operations, and by facilitating the delivery of legal support in the core legal disciplines.

**c.** The Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) is a resource organization for land-based operational lawyers. Established at the Judge Advocate General's School (TJAGSA), CLAMO examines legal issues that arise during all phases of military operations and devises training and resource strategies to address those issues. CLAMO—

- Is the JAGC's central repository for memoranda, lessons-learned and after-action materials of legal support for deployed Army and Marine Corps forces.
- Supports JAs in the field by gathering and disseminating key lessons learned, building databases of legal issues encountered by deployed judge advocates, and creating guides to the Combat Training Centers and other successful OPLAW training.
- Integrates lessons learned from operations into emerging doctrine and into the curricula of all relevant courses, workshops, orientations, and seminars held at TJAGSA.
- Sponsors conferences and symposia at TJAGSA for operational lawyers.

## **20-23. U.S. Forces stationed overseas under a status of forces agreement (SOFA)**

**a. Status of forces agreement (SOFA).** A SOFA is an international agreement that defines the privileges and obligations of U.S. Forces deployed or stationed overseas.

Members of the command must be thoroughly familiar with the SOFA and any supplements to that agreement. Key terms in any SOFA include—

(1) *Forces*. How inclusive is this term? Are civilians to be treated as members of the U.S. Forces?

(2) *Civilian component*. Does inclusion depend upon nationality? Are certain classes of individuals, e.g., host country nationals, excluded from this definition?

(3) *Dependent*. How does the stationing arrangement define family members? Does the definition include only a soldier's spouse and children? Are the soldier's parents, grandparents, sisters, and brothers included?

**b. Military justice.**

(1) Jurisdiction is the key consideration in military justice. The SOFA must specify whether the sending state (United States) or the receiving state (host nation) possesses the authority to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses. Ideally, the U.S. will have the exclusive right to exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of the U.S. Forces, but host nations are usually reluctant to relinquish jurisdiction over more serious offenses. Typically, the host nation will retain the prerogative to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed against its property or citizens.

(2) Furthermore, although SOFAs generally do not address this issue, U.S. law does not permit trial by court-martial, in peacetime, of U.S. members of the civilian component or dependents. (Congress, however, recently enacted provisions that give jurisdiction over civilians to Federal district courts. Procedures to implement these provisions are under development at this printing. Check with the SJA to determine if these new provisions are in effect.)

(3) Other areas of concern are double jeopardy, production of witnesses for courts-martial, searches and seizures, and host-nation confinement of members of the U.S. Forces.

(4) If jurisdiction is assumed by the host nation over U.S. Forces personnel, the Army will hire competent local counsel to represent the accused military member. The SJA also will monitor the trial.

**c. Administrative law.** The guiding principle governing administrative legal matters overseas is U.S. recognition of the territorial sovereignty of the host nation. U.S. Forces are generally subject to the civil jurisdiction of the host nation and host-country law. Key provisions in the SOFA establish entry and exit requirements; specify the facilities to be provided U.S. Forces; establish requirements for the payment of customs, duties, and taxes; and indicate whether local labor laws will apply to civilians who are employed by the U.S. Forces.

**d. Overseas procurement.**

(1) Overseas procurement is the acquisition of supplies and services (including construction) by and for the use of U.S. Forces stationed or deployed overseas. The U.S. should ensure that the stationing agreement stipulates that host-country law will not govern U.S. acquisitions. This enables the U.S. to resolve contractual disputes under U.S. law and avoids the requirement that U.S. lawyers become familiar with the contract law of each receiving state.

(2) Contracting overseas depends upon the industrial and cultural climate of the receiving state. Members of the command must be familiar with the business environment within the receiving state to provide the commander with accurate and workable contracting advice.

**e. Payment of claims.**

(1) SOFAs apply specific rules and procedures for the investigation, adjudication, and payment of claims overseas. Typically, SOFAs establish various categories of claims involving military and nonmilitary property and third-party claims.

(2) In the absence of specific claims provisions within a SOFA, and in evaluating ex gratia payments (a common international legal term that means payments made as a favor, not by legal necessity), the *Foreign Claims Act* will apply to determine whether the foreign claim may be paid. The terms of this Act define who are proper claimants, the elements of foreign claims, the forms such claims may take, and the procedural requirements for processing such claims.

**f. Legal assistance.** SOFAs generally do not address domestic-relations issues and consumer matters. The law of the receiving state or U.S. law will ordinarily apply. While members of the U.S. Forces generally have access to the courts of the receiving state, language barriers and unfamiliarity with the legal remedies and procedural rules may limit effective recourse in foreign courts.

**g. NATO. Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement.** In 1995, the North Atlantic Council approved the Partnership for Peace (PFP) SOFA, which was thereafter ratified by the United States. The provisions of this agreement are essentially those of the NATO SOFA, with minor modifications. The PFP SOFA has entered into force for non-NATO PFP States such as Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The PFP SOFA will be effective for exercises conducted by U.S. Forces in countries that have ratified the agreement.

## **20-24. Deployment for conventional combat missions**

The SJA is responsible for providing legal advice to the commander concerning the broad range of legal issues associated with the preparation for and deployment of U.S. Forces on combat missions.

**a. International agreements.** Members of the command must be familiar with international agreements, if any, in effect between the U.S. and that country to which U.S. Forces are deploying and any countries with which the U.S. has overflight, transit, staging, or other arrangements. Consideration should be given, time permitting, to requesting the SJA to provide appropriate briefings regarding such agreements.

**b. Case Act.** The *Case Act* (1 USC § 112b) limits the ability of members of the executive branch to negotiate agreements with foreign governments. The *Case Act* also requires that the Secretary of State transmit the text of written international agreements to Congress.

**c. International agreements and CINC authority.** DOD Directive 5530.3, *International Agreements*, delegates authority to negotiate and conclude international

agreements to the Secretary of the Army and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The CJCS has delegated this authority to the combatant command CINCs.

**d. Authority and responsibility for negotiating, concluding, forwarding and depositing of international agreements.** AR 550-51, International Agreements, implements the *Case Act* and DOD Directive 5530.3 for the Department of the Army and delegates, subject to certain restrictions, authority to negotiate and conclude agreements to the heads of staff agencies and MACOMs.

**e. Legal bases for U.S. intervention.** The commander should be aware of the legal bases for the use of U.S. Forces abroad. These bases define, and possibly restrict, the objectives and execution of the operation. An operation to protect U.S. nationals, for example, could not be used to justify other military objectives. The legal bases for use of force or forces overseas include—

- Protection of U.S. nationals.
- Through collective self-defense, by treaty or request, assisting a state in resisting armed attack/aggression, to include externally-supported insurgent activity within a state.
- Unilateral self-defense against armed attack undertaken against U.S. Forces/property overseas.
- Participation in properly authorized enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
- Disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

**f. War Powers Resolution (WPR).** Absent a declaration of war or specific congressional approval for use of U.S. Forces abroad, the War Powers Resolution imposes consultation and reporting requirements and time constraints upon the President when U.S. Forces are introduced into actual or potential hostilities. Generally, Congress asserts in the WPR that the Congress must approve deployments falling within the purview of the WPR which last more than 90 days.

**g. Review of OPLANs.** Operational lawyers must become part of the planning team at each headquarters. They should review every operations plan, concept plan, contingency plan, and operations order during each step of the planning process. SJAs must focus on assisting commanders in developing plans that will enable them to accomplish the mission within the limits of the law. The following documents set forth the operational lawyer's role in the planning process.

**(1) The DOD Law of War Program.** DOD Directive 5100.77, *DoD Law of War Program*, requires that all services ensure that their military operations comply with the law of war and designates the Secretary of the Army as the executive agent for implementing the program. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum (MJCS) 59-8 provides that legal advisers should attend planning conferences for joint and combined operations and exercises involving ROE and related topics. The memorandum further provides that all plans, ROE policies, and directives should be consistent with the DoD Law of War Program. The joint command legal adviser should review these throughout their preparation.

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(2) Legal operations. FM 27-100, *Legal Operations*, provides valuable additional guidance concerning operational law issues and legal support during war and small-scale contingencies.

**h. Rules of engagement (ROE).**

(1) ROE is a self-defining term, but the longer, official definition is that ROE are directives that a government may establish to delineate the circumstances and limitations under which its own military forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with enemy forces. (Joint Publication 1, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*). Each command will establish ROE consistent with guidance from higher headquarters. In the absence of superseding ROE, this guidance may be found in JCS standing ROE. See CJCS Instruction 3121.01A, *Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces*.

(2) Based on examination of the OPLANs and the command SOPs, the legal reviewer should be familiar with the operation and should consider the following questions:

- Is the right and obligation of self-defense sufficiently stressed?
- How are the ROE transmitted to the soldiers, and how are the soldiers trained?
- Does the field sop or the tactical sop advise soldiers how to act in various situations?
- Are cards and pamphlets or other tools available to guide soldiers' actions?
- Have situational training exercises been developed to train soldiers in the appropriate mix of initiative and restraint?
- Do the ROE or coordinating instructions cover—
  - Hostile forces, acts, and intent.
  - Use of chemical munitions, including herbicides, or CS and other riot control agents.
  - Use of nuclear munitions.
  - Use of booby traps.
  - Air defense artillery weapons status.
  - Employment of mines and mine fields, including the Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM).
  - Employment of electronic warfare (EW) assets.
  - Employment of indirect fires and observers.
  - Cross-border/boundary operations.
  - Employment of special operations forces.
  - Transition ROE (threat/peace to hostilities).

**i. Rules of deadly force.** Broader than standing ROE addressed above, the rules of deadly force policies are grounded in DOD Directive 2000.12, *DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program*, and DOD Directive 5210.56, *Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties Overseas*, they apply primarily as a matter of force protection and are triggered by the mere presence of U.S. Forces, whether conducting operations, exercises, transit, or leave in theater.

DOD Directive 2000.12 has been further supplemented by the regional commands. Nevertheless, commanders must know the consequences of using force, particularly in a host nation that retains criminal jurisdiction and may regard the U.S. application of force as criminal. Accordingly, legal review and advice should be obtained prior to implementing local rules of deadly force.

**j. Law of war.** Commanders must be sensitive to law of war issues and must plan for providing instruction to the members of the command concerning the essential provisions of The Hague and Geneva Conventions, as well as other conventions and treaties. The following discussion highlights the areas of the law of war most critical to commanders.

**(1) Regulation of hostilities.**

**(a)** Three general principles form the foundation for this area of the law of war:

**1** Military Necessity. This principle justifies those actions not forbidden by international law that are indispensable for securing complete submission of the enemy in the shortest period of time. This enables commanders to act in furtherance of the military mission (Para. 3, FM 27-10).

**2** Unnecessary Suffering. Military necessity does not allow the commander to employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering (Para. 34, FM 27-10).

**3** Proportionality. The loss of life and damage to property must not be out of proportion to the military advantage to be gained (Para. 41, FM 27-10).

**(b)** In addition to the three principles stated above, commanders must be aware of the lawfulness of certain weapons, targets, stratagems, and reprisals (Para. 497, FM 27-10). The commander must be aware of the U.S. policies toward nuclear weapons (Para. 35, FM 27-10), biological, and chemical weapons (Executive Order No. 11850, 40 CFR 16187 (1975)); (Para. 38, FM 27-10), including limitations on the use of riot control agents and herbicides in combat (Para. 38c, FM 27-10) (Chemical Weapons Convention, 1993, and additional Protocols I & II).

**(2) Geneva Conventions.** The 1949 Geneva conventions prescribe how commanders must treat prisoners of war (Chapter 3, FM 27-10), and sick and wounded on the battlefield and at sea (Chapter 4, FM 27-10). Commanders also have legal obligations to civilians in the area of operations. At division and above, commanders have an assistant chief of staff, G-5 (civil affairs) to coordinate the political, social, cultural, and economics aspects of military operations in foreign areas. During deployments, organic assets may be augmented by civil affairs units, drawn mainly from the Reserve Components (see FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*)

**(3) War crimes.** Commanders have an affirmative obligation to investigate and report war crimes, and to discipline those who commit such crimes (FM 27-10). Further, under certain circumstances, commanders may be criminally liable for war crimes committed by their subordinates (FM 27-10).

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**20-25. Security assistance missions****a. Missions responsibility.**

(1) Security assistance consists of those statutory programs and authorities under which the U.S. may provide or regulate forms of assistance and sales to foreign governments (and international organizations) for the purpose of enhancing U.S./mutual security.

(2) The principal purpose of security assistance is to enhance U.S. strategic objectives through the implementation of regional and individual country programs. These programs are designed to assist allies and friendly countries in meeting their security threats, while U.S. interests are promoted by—

- Securing en route access, overflight, transit, and base rights essential to rapid deployment.
- Promoting force commonalities and interoperability.
- Increasing U.S. geopolitical influence.
- Improving/maintaining access to raw materials.

(3) The National Security Council establishes overall strategic planning and goals. Security assistance programs, as one means of accomplishing these goals, are managed by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology. The Under Secretary is responsible for coordinating security assistance plans and programs normally conducted by the U.S. military; he or she also chairs the Arms Transfer Management Group (ATMG), which provides policy planning and reviews security assistance matters.

(4) Coordination is accomplished in a given nation by the U.S. country team. The team consists of representatives of all in-country U.S. Government departments and includes a military officer who normally is in charge of the security assistance organization. The ambassador, as the President's personal representative, functions within the organization of the State Department and has full responsibility for directing and coordinating the activities and operations of all elements of the U.S. diplomatic mission. The CINC of an U.S. combatant command exercises authority, direction, and control over U.S. Forces within a particular country that are assigned or attached to that command.

(5) Within DOD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is the principal point of contact and policy spokesman for security assistance matters. The Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is responsible for the day-to-day management, control, and implementation of approved and funded security assistance programs.

(6) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) develop plans and systematically review ongoing security assistance programs for specific countries and geographical regions in order to ensure their compatibility with U.S. global security interests and to confirm that military assistance resources are being utilized in ways that promote U.S. strategic objectives.

(7) The military departments develop, negotiate, and execute agreements pertaining to security assistance programs. They also provide logistical advice and resources and administrative support necessary to move assets to a recipient country.

(8) CINCs are responsible for ensuring that all security assistance programs within their geographical areas of responsibility are coordinated, integrated, and in consonance with

regional U.S. defense plans. The CINCs also identify and apply the security assistance resources required to achieve U.S. strategic goals at the regional level.

(9) Component commands of combatant commands participate in the planning and execution of security assistance programs and specifically perform the following functions:

- Assist in the development and execution of long-range plans, to include foreign military sales.
- Provide technical advice on weapons systems, tactics, doctrine, and information relative to logistics support, training, and technical assistance offered by mobile training teams (MTTs) and technical assistance teams (TATs).
- Ensure component contingency plans and international activities undertaken in conjunction with allied and friendly forces (such as combined training exercises and standardization conferences) are correlated with security assistance programs and overall U.S. military objectives.
- Advise on the capabilities and limitations of allied and friendly forces, to include their capability to operate effectively with U.S. Forces in support of U.S. contingency plans.
- Advise on the organization, force objectives, and modernization programs of allied and friendly forces.
- Stay informed of the item content of a particular country's security assistance program.
- Provide advice and assistance directly to component sections in the military assistance advisory groups (MAAGs).
- Make field trips to assist in accomplishing the security assistance mission.

**b. Role of the operational lawyer.** Operational lawyers are prepared to advise commanders concerning the various security assistance and arms transfer programs. They can advise on applicable legislative and regulatory requirements and interpretations of law, in order to avoid legal difficulties and actual or perceived abuses of security assistance aims.

**c. Security assistance programs.** Congress appropriates security assistance funds to the State Department, which affects overall coordination of the security assistance process. Congress funds specific programs annually on a program-by-program and country-by-country basis, a reflection of the significant congressional interest and participation in security assistance.

(1) *The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (22 USC § 2151 et seq.), Part I.* This act provides economic, agricultural, medical, disaster relief, and other forms of assistance to various countries. Part II of the FAA authorizes the U.S. to furnish security assistance to friendly countries and international organizations, upon request and after congressional approval.

(2) *Foreign Military Financing Program (FMFP).* The purpose of FMFP is to enable U.S. allies and friends to enhance their self-defense capabilities through the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and training. The high cost of modern weapon systems means that FMFP is primarily a grant program. FMFP is the primary component of military assistance to other nations under the security assistance policy.

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(3) *International military education and training (IMET) (22 USC § 2347)*. IMET authorizes the President specific dollar amounts each fiscal year to furnish military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries. This education and training may be provided in both the U.S. and abroad. IMET must foster mutually beneficial relations between the U.S. and participating countries, and improve the ability of participating countries to use their resources, including defense articles and services provided under FMFP.

(4) *Expanded IMET (22 USC § 2347)*. Expanded IMET permits the President to train foreign civilian officials with defense oversight responsibility and their military forces about human rights, the role of the military in a democracy, and effective military-justice systems.

(5) *Antiterrorism assistance (22 USC § 2349aa, et seq.)*. This program authorizes the President specific dollar amounts each fiscal year to assist foreign countries in order to improve the ability of their law enforcement personnel to deter terrorist activities.

(6) *Economic Support Fund (ESF) (22 USC § 2346, et seq.)*. This program authorizes the President to provide, when U.S. national interests dictate, economic support in certain amounts or to certain countries. ESF is designed to promote economic or political stability in recipient countries, although ESF may not be used for military or paramilitary purposes.

(7) *Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) (22 USC § 2348, et seq.)*. This program authorizes assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations. This authority may be used to provide financial resources, equipment and supplies, or services.

(8) *Police training prohibition (Section 660, FAA, 22 USC § 2420)*. The Army cannot use FAA funds to provide training, advice, or financial support to police, prisons, or other law-enforcement forces of a foreign government or for any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of a foreign government. Longtime democracies, with no standing armed forces and which do not violate human rights, are exempt from Section 660 prohibitions. Other countries may also enjoy specific legislative exemption. There are also narrow exceptions for training foreign police personnel who primarily engage in counter drug activities.

(9) *Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (22 USC § 2751m et seq.)*.

(a) The AECA provides for the transfer of arms and other military equipment, as well as various defense services, through government-to-government agreements. AECA establishes the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. Under this program, DOD purchases military equipment or services from U.S. firms or takes equipment from U.S. stocks (under limited conditions) and sells the equipment or services to a foreign government or international organization. The services of DOD personnel, such as training or management advice, may also be sold. Authority is provided for the leasing of defense articles in DOD stocks to eligible recipients. The AECA also authorizes the President to finance sales of defense articles and services or to guarantee financing to friendly foreign countries or international organizations. Note that the FMS program established under the AECA is not a

grant program. Defense articles and services may not be provided to countries, under the AECA, on a nonreimbursable basis.

(b) The AECA is subject to revision on an annual basis and contains complex and sensitive legislative requirements, prohibitions, and limitations. A principal example of this is Section 21 (c)(1), which prohibits personnel performing defense services under the AECA from any duties of a “combatant nature.” This includes duties related to training and advising that may engage U.S. personnel in combat activities outside the U.S. This provision effectively bars U.S. military trainers or advisers from accompanying units from AECA-recipient countries engaged in combat.

(10) *The Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA)*. The LOA is a document used to effect transfers under the AECA and details the status DOD personnel providing defense services to a particular country enjoy in that country. This status is usually that of administrative and technical privileges and immunities (P&I), that is, limited diplomatic immunity.

**d. Other legislation.** Commanders should also be aware of country and issue-specific security assistance legislation. Examples of the latter include provisions that—

- Limit or prohibit the provision of assistance to countries that violate human rights (22 USC § 2304, Human Rights and Security Assistance).
- Prohibit the provision of security assistance to countries that illegally expropriate U.S. property.
- Prohibit the provision of security assistance to countries that deliver nuclear enrichment or nuclear reprocessing equipment, materials, or technology to any other country, or receive such equipment, materials, or technology from any other country. The United States also denies security assistance to countries that transfer nuclear explosive devices to nonnuclear states. Nonnuclear weapon states that receive or detonate nuclear explosive devices likewise may not receive security assistance funds. These prohibitions are subject to limited exceptions that require the President to certify that termination of assistance to such a country would be detrimental to the national security of the U.S.
- Completely stop foreign assistance to any country more than six months in arrears on payment of accrued debts to the U.S.

### **20-26. Deployment for overseas exercises**

**a. Potential legal issues.** Before overseas exercise deployments, the SJA must consider every aspect of the operation to ensure that planning addresses all potential legal issues. This process will closely parallel that required for deployment for conventional combat missions. Examples of this pre-exercise planning include—

- Determining if international agreements exist between the U.S. and the host country; ensuring that if agreements exist, they contain essential provisions; and determining whether, in the absence of applicable agreements, such agreements should be negotiated.
- Reviewing the exercise plan through the use of the OPLAN checklist.
- Preparing the legal annex to the exercise plan.

- Using the deployment checklist as a guide in order to assure that all exercise preparations are complete.

**b. Overseas training exercises.** The expanded use of overseas training exercises requires the commander to be aware of legislation concerning construction activities, training activities, and exercise-related civic and humanitarian assistance undertaken in conjunction with overseas exercises.

**c. Construction in support of training exercises.**

(1) Congress has passed legislation (10 USC § 2805(a)(2) and (c), Unspecified Minor Construction), concerning the funding of exercise-related construction and unspecified minor military projects coordinated or directed by the JCS outside the U.S during any fiscal year.

(2) Congress has also established certain guidelines for determining the cost of projects constructed in support of military training exercises:

- Transportation costs of materials, supplies, and government-furnished equipment are excluded.
- Travel and per diem costs applicable to troop labor and costs of material, supplies, services, and fuel furnished by sources outside of DOD on a nonreimbursable basis are excluded.

(3) Congress has also reaffirmed a Comptroller General determination that the structures of a minor and temporary nature (such as tent platforms, field latrines, range targets, and installed relocatable structures) completely removed at the termination of an exercise may be funded through Operations and Maintenance (O&M) exercise accounts.

(4) Given the evolving law and regulations applicable to exercise-related construction, theater operators and planners should consult with the combatant command's legal adviser before planning exercise construction.

**d. Training activities.** Units deployed on overseas exercises may familiarize host-nation forces with U.S. equipment for interoperability and safety purposes. The Army must meet security assistance requirements when the instruction before a combined exercise rises to a level of formal training comparable to that normally provided through security assistance. 10 USC § 2011, Special Operations Forces: Training with Friendly Foreign Forces, permits U.S. Special Operations Forces to conduct training missions with friendly foreign forces, provided the missions are designed primarily to train U.S. special operations forces.

**e. Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) (10 USC § 401).**

(1) The SJA is prepared to provide advice to commanders concerning the scope and nature of humanitarian and civic assistance that may be provided to nationals of a host country. DOD Directive 2205.2, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations*, and DOD Instruction 2205.3, *Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program*, implement the HCA program and give detailed procedures.

(2) HCA activities are designed to promote foreign policy, the national security interests of the U.S. and the country where the HCA is carried out, and the specific

operational readiness skills of the U.S. Armed Forces that participate in the activity. HCA consists of—

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas.
- Construction of rudimentary roads and bridges.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
- Detection and clearance of landmines, including the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance related to such.

(3) HCA may be provided only to those countries that are specifically approved by the Secretary of State acting upon DOD request.

(4) Except for “minimal” expenditures, only funds specifically appropriated for HCA may be used for that purpose. O&M funds may be used for the minimal expenditures.

### **20-27. Smaller-scale contingencies (SSC)**

SSC often occur within the context of one of three levels of conflict discussed below. The U.S. response to a given situation is based upon the level of the conflict and applicable international law. The SJA must advise commanders of the legal basis for U.S. responses to situations and the legal issues associated with security assistance programs and exercises conducted by the U.S. in conjunction with such responses. Examples of SSC include peace enforcement, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), show of force demonstrations, strikes, raids, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, antiterrorism, counterdrug, nation assistance, disaster relief, and civil support. (See Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, for a detailed discussion of these missions.)

**a. Levels of conflict.** It may be useful to categorize conflict into three levels:

(1) *Level I—Disruptive actions against a constituted government.*

(a) This level of conflict involves actions committed by individuals and small, loosely organized groups. They foment discontent through propaganda, protests, and demonstrations. They also engage in subversive, violent, and nonviolent acts of sabotage and/or terrorism.

(b) The domestic law of the state applies to these individuals and groups. The state may treat them as common criminals, as their activities have no international legal status.

(c) Third-party states may not aid those engaged in such activities. These states have a duty to prevent their territory from being used as a base of operations by those engaged in disruptive activities.

(d) U.S. actions with the recognized government generally consist of security assistance, arms transfer programs, and combined training exercises.

(2) *Level II—Insurgency.*

(a) Insurgencies are characterized by organized military operations against the constituted government. Insurgents may exercise de facto control over portions of a state's

territory and portions of the population and may engage in all forms of disruptive activity against the constituted government.

(b) The insurgents are treated in accordance with the law of the state. They are, however, protected by the provisions of common Article III of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

(c) Third-party states may not aid the insurgents, but may recognize that the insurgents exercise control over portions of the territory and population. The legality of third-party state assistance to the constituted government may be largely dependent upon whether insurgent activity is externally supported or controlled. Assistance to the constituted government may be viewed as illegal intervention in some cases. Just as in Level I, third-party states have a duty to prevent their territory from being used as insurgent bases of operations.

(d) Assuming the U.S. intervention is not illegal, it may employ and exercise the full range of security assistance activities in support of the constituted government, and the use of U.S. combat/combat support forces on a unilateral or regionally collective basis may be required.

(3) *Level III—Belligerency.*

(a) A conflict rises to the level of a belligerency when the insurgents have governmental and military organizations of their own, their military operations are conducted in accordance with the law of war, they have a determinate percentage of territory and population under effective control, and the conflict becomes conventional in nature.

(b) The law of armed conflict applies to belligerencies, which have similar status under international law as wars between sovereign states. Any assistance afforded to either belligerent by a third-party state constitutes an act of war against the other. Further, participation in the conflict by third-party states gives the conflict an international character requiring application of the international law norms of neutrality.

(c) U.S. response may consist of appropriate unilateral or regional military actions. The U.S. may also participate in peacekeeping operations following a cease-fire in the conflict. FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*, and Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peacekeeping*, describe categories of such operations and missions.

**b. Special Operations.** The Army must conduct all special operations in compliance with U.S. law, national policy, DOD directives, and Army regulations. U.S. law, regulations, and policy guidance apply to all U.S. Army personnel, whether performing special or conventional operations (DA Policy on Special Operations, 10 July 1986). JAs assigned to special operations units must actively participate in all phases of mission planning and execution to ensure compliance with applicable U.S. law and policy.

## **SECTION V**

### **CONTRACT/FISCAL LAW**

#### **20-28. Overview**

**a.** Contract law is the application of domestic and international law to the acquisition of goods, services, and construction. Fiscal law is the application of domestic statutes and regulations to the funding of military operations. The practice of contract and fiscal law includes battlefield acquisition, contingency contracting, bid protests and contract dispute litigation, procurement fraud oversight, economy act transfers, commercial activities, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements, and support to non-Federal agencies and organizations.

**b.** The SJA's contract and fiscal law responsibilities include furnishing legal advice and assistance to procurement officials during all phases of the contracting process, to include advice on the labor, environmental, intellectual property, and tax law applicable to contractors; determining the proper use and expenditure of funds; overseeing an effective procurement fraud abatement program; and providing legal advice to the command concerning battlefield acquisition, contingency contracting, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the commercial activities program, interagency agreements for logistics support, overseas real estate and construction, foreign military sales cases, and support to non-Federal agencies and organizations.

#### **20-29. Contract legal review**

**a.** Commanders should ensure that their contracting officers work closely with legal support. DA policy requires that legal counsel—

- Participate fully in the entire acquisition process.
- Participate as a member of the contracting officer's team, and advise as to the legal sufficiency of actions taken.

**b.** Legal counsel shall inform the contracting officer whether the proposed action is legally sufficient, the details of any insufficiency, and a recommended course of action to overcome the insufficiency. The head of contracting activities (HCA), ordinarily at MACOM level and higher, decides differences between the contracting officer and the legal counsel as to legal sufficiency that cannot be resolved at the contracting-office level. Other acquisition areas in which legal counsel may assist the commander include—

- Bid protests by disappointed bidders.
- Contract performance problems.
- Contractor requests for equitable adjustment or contract modification.
- Contract litigation pursuant to the "Disputes Clause" of a contract or pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 USC §§ 601-613).
- Issues relating to the Commercial Activities Program.
- Issues relating to NAF contracting.
- Issues relating to funding of Government contracts.

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**20-30. Fiscal law**

**a. Fiscal limitations.** The Constitution gives Congress the authority to raise revenues, borrow funds, and appropriate money for Federal agencies. Under these express constitutional powers, Congress strictly limits the obligation and expenditure of public funds by the executive branch. Congress regulates virtually all executive branch programs and activities through the appropriations process. Violating congressionally enacted fiscal procedures subjects the offender to potential serious adverse personnel actions or even criminal penalties. There are three major fiscal limitations:

- An agency may only obligate and expend appropriations for a proper purpose.
- An agency must obligate within the time limits applicable to the appropriation (for example, O&M funds are available for obligation for one fiscal year).
- The obligation must be within the amounts established by Congress.

**b. Availability as to purpose.**

(1) The “purpose statute,” 31 USC § 1301(a), provides that appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were made, except as otherwise provided by law. DOD has nearly 100 separate appropriations available to it for different purposes. The statute does not require that an appropriation act specify every item of expenditure. DOD has discretion in determining how to accomplish the purpose of an appropriation. A particular expenditure not specified in the statute must meet one of the following criteria:

- Reasonably necessary in carrying out an authorized function.
- Will contribute materially to the effective accomplishment of the function.

(2) By regulation, DOD has assigned most types of expenditures to a specific appropriation.

(3) One common problem is the failure to use procurement appropriations properly. O&M appropriations are generally available to pay for day-to-day operating costs. Procurement appropriations are required, however, when acquiring end items that are centrally managed or cost more than a specified amount.

(4) Another common problem relates to proper use of "contingency funds." Contingency funds are appropriations made available to the executive branch that may be expended without the normal controls. Congress has provided contingency funds throughout our history for use by the President and other senior agency officials. Contingency funds are tightly regulated because of their limited availability and potential for abuse. Official Representational Funds are available to extend official courtesies to dignitaries, officials, and foreign governments. Restrictions apply to using these funds for retirement and change of command ceremonies, classified and intelligence projects, entertainment of DOD personnel, personal expenses, and other related categories of expenses.

(5) An additional area of concern is the use of O&M appropriations for military construction. Congressional oversight of the Military Construction Program is extensive and pervasive. Most construction projects costing \$1.5 million or more require specific prior approval by Congress and funding under a military construction appropriation. The Unspecified Minor Military Construction, Army, appropriation covers projects costing

\$500,000 to \$1.5 million. Congress must still be notified before execution of those projects. Some projects under \$500,000 may be presently funded with O&M funds. Maintenance and repair projects are funded using either O&M or, if applicable, Real Property Maintenance, Defense appropriations.

(6) There is also a potential for misuse of O&M funds for improvements to family housing. Congress provides funds for the operation, maintenance, repair, and construction of military family housing in the annual *Military Construction Appropriation Act*. Each family housing appropriation consists of two subappropriations, one for operations and maintenance, and one for construction. All projects for new or replacement construction must be specifically authorized by Congress. Improvement projects exceeding statutory limits (\$50,000 per unit per year, adjusted by an area cost factor; \$60,000 for handicapped accessibility) also require congressional approval. Less costly improvement or maintenance and repair (M&R) projects are funded from the family housing operations and maintenance accounts. These projects may require MACOM and/or DA approval, depending on the type of work involved and the cost per dwelling unit. Different limits apply to improvement projects involving multiple dwelling units. Commanders responsible for family housing M&R work should consult with legal counsel and the Army family housing office to determine current cost limitations, required approval authority, and options for accomplishing the work.

(7) Money spent on general officer quarters is closely scrutinized. Many general officer quarters are older and larger than the vast majority of family housing units. Many are also historic and architecturally significant. These factors tend to make these units the most expensive to operate and maintain. Chapter 13, AR 210-50, Housing Management, establishes detailed procedures for spending money on general officer quarters and must be consulted regularly. General officers are responsible for knowing how much money is spent to maintain their quarters, and must be familiar with cost limitations and approval authority levels. Accidental or intentional abuse may lead to allegations and embarrassing and expensive investigations.

### **c. Availability as to time.**

(1) Appropriations are available for limited periods. An agency must incur a legal obligation to pay money within the period of availability. If funds are not obligated before they expire, they are no longer available.

(2) Appropriations are available to support bona fide needs of their period of availability. The “bona fide needs” statute, 31 USC § 1502(a), provides that the balance of an appropriation or fund limited for obligation to a definite period is available only for payment of expenses properly incurred during the period of availability or to complete contracts properly made within that period of availability.

#### **(a) Supplies.**

**1** Supplies are bona fide needs of the period in which they are needed. Orders for supplies are proper only when the supplies are actually required now. Thus, supplies needed for operations during a given fiscal year are bona fide needs of that year.

**2** Supplies ordered in one fiscal period that will not be required until a subsequent fiscal period are bona fide needs of the first period under two circumstances:

- The Inventory Exception. A bona fide need for supplies exists when there is a present requirement for supply items to meet an authorized stockage level (replenishment of operating stock levels, safety levels, mobilization requirements, authorized backup stocks, etc.); and
- The Lead-Time Exception. If goods or materials will not be obtainable on the open market at the time needed for use because the time required to order, produce, fabricate, and deliver them requires that they be purchased in a prior fiscal year, such supplies are a bona fide need of the first year.

(b) **Services.** As a general rule, services are presumed to be bona fide needs of the fiscal year in which they are performed. The proper appropriation is that available during the period in which the services will be rendered or delivered. There is a statutory exception to the general rule (see 10 USC § 2410a). Defense agencies may enter into a contract for procurement of severable services for a period that begins in one fiscal year and ends in the next fiscal year if (without regard to any option to extend the period of the contract) the contract period does not exceed one year. Funds made available for a fiscal year may be obligated for the total amount of an action entered into under this authority.

**d. Availability as to amount.**

(1) *Apportionment.* Appropriations are apportioned to agencies for obligation by the Office of Management and Budget over their period of availability. Agencies subdivide these funds among their activities. In the Army, the operating agency/MACOM is the lowest command level at which the formal administrative subdivisions of funds required by 31 USC § 1517, Prohibited Obligations and Expenditures, are maintained. Below the MACOM level, subdivisions are informal targets or allowances.

(2) *Prohibitions.* The *Antideficiency Act*, 31 USC §§ 1341, 1342, 1349, et seq., and 1517 et seq., prohibits any government officer or employee from—

- Making or authorizing an expenditure or obligation in excess of the amount available in an appropriation.
- Incurring an obligation in advance of an appropriation, unless authorized by law.
- Making or authorizing expenditures or incurring obligations in excess of formal subdivisions of funds; or more than amounts permitted by regulations prescribed under 31 USC § 1514(a).
- Accepting unauthorized voluntary services from government employees or contractors (31 USC §1342).

(3) *Commander responsibilities.* Commanders who become aware of possible violations of the *Antideficiency Act* must investigate and report them promptly. If substantiated, the violation must be reported to the DOD, Congress, and the President.

**e. Government operations during funding gaps and continuing resolutions.** During a continuing resolution, the Army is generally not allowed to initiate or increase the scope of existing programs, projects, and activities. Operations continue at the rate of funds available during the previous fiscal year, or at some specified lower amount. Army activities can expect to receive guidance from OMB and the Army Comptroller addressing what activities the Army can continue during the absence of appropriations. While certain employees and activities are exempt from Government suspension or shutdown during a funding gap, the

Army must suspend other activities and may not accept voluntary performance of non-exempt services by non-exempt employees.

## **SECTION VI SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

### **20-31. Summary**

Army JAs and civilian lawyers stand ready to advise commanders on myriad and complex legal issues that confront Army leaders every day. Commanders should form close professional relationships with the command legal adviser. SJAs can do much more than advise on the legality of an action. They can assist commanders in accomplishing legitimate command objectives, and can provide sound advice and judgment.

### **20-32. References**

- a. Executive Order 12871, as amended by Executive Orders 12983 and 13156, *Labor Management Partnerships*.
- b. *Manual for Courts-Martial, United States*, 1995 Edition.
- c. DOD Directive 2000.12, *DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program*.
- d. DOD Directive 2205.2, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Provided in Conjunction with Military Operations*.
- e. DOD Directive 5100.77, *DoD Law of War Program*.
- f. DOD Directive 5210.56, *Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement for U.S. Forces*.
- g. DOD Directive 5500.7-R, *Joint Ethics Regulation (JER)*.
- h. DOD Directive 5530.3, *International Agreements*.
- i. DOD Directive 7000.14-R, *Financial Management Regulation (FMR), Volume 10, Contract Payment Policy and Procedures, and Volume 14, Administrative Control of Funds and Antideficiency Act Violations*.
- j. DOD Directive 7200.1, *Administrative Control of Appropriations*.
- k. DOD Instruction 2205.3, *Implementing Procedures for the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Program*.
- l. Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
- m. Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.
- n. Joint Publication 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations*.
- o. CJCS Instruction 3121.01A, *Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces*.
- p. Army Regulation 27-3, *The Army Legal Assistance Program*.
- q. Army Regulation 27-10, *Military Justice*.

- r.** Army Regulation 27-20, *Claims*.
- s.** Army Regulation 27-26, *Rules of Professional Conduct for Lawyers*.
- t.** Army Regulation 27-40, *Litigation*.
- u.** Army Regulation 210-50, *Housing Management*.
- v.** Army Regulation 550-51, *International Agreements*.
- w.** Army Regulation 600-8-24, *Officer Transfers and Discharges*.
- x.** Army Regulation 600-20, *Army Command Policy*.
- y.** Army Regulation 635-200, *Enlisted Personnel*.
- z.** Field Manual 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*.
- aa.** Field Manual 27-100, *Legal Support to Operations*.
- bb.** Field Manual 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*.
- cc.** Field Manual 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*.
- dd.** The Judge Advocate General, *OPLAW Handbook*.
- ee.** Office of Government Ethics (OGE), *Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch*.



# CHAPTER 21

## CIVIL FUNCTIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

*“We must now look forward to the future needs of the Nation.... Protecting investments, developing and marshalling resources to enhance trade and economic growth and helping others (for example in toxic and nuclear waste clean-up) through planning and engineering management, are important components of a ...strong and responsive program that promotes economic growth and protects the environment, thereby enhancing the quality of life for all our citizens and future generations.”*

Dr. Joseph W. Westphal, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works)

### **SECTION I INTRODUCTION**

#### **21-1. Civil functions defined**

A number of activities traditionally carried out by the Department of the Army are commonly referred to as civil functions. The most extensive of these functions is the Civil Works Program managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE or "the Corps"). The Civil Works Program focuses on responsible development, protection and restoration of the Nation's water and related land resources. Civil works projects are implemented and operated for commercial navigation, flood damage reduction, environmental restoration and allied purposes. Civil functions also include USACE engineering and construction support to non-Defense-related activities of the Federal Government, State, and local agencies; and USACE foreign activities not exclusively in support of U.S. forces overseas. Arlington National Cemetery and Soldiers' and Airmen's Home National Cemetery complete the list of civil functions.

#### **21-2. Funding sources for civil functions**

Several funding sources finance these activities. For example, the financial and personnel resources associated with the Civil Works Program are principally authorized and funded under the biennial *Water Resources Development Acts* and the annual *Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts*, respectively. Civil Works Program authorization acts require contributions from State and local government project sponsors to help fund many civil works activities. USACE support activities for other, non-Defense, agencies are reimbursed by those agencies. Moreover, congressional committees like the Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (for the Civil Works Program) and the Subcommittee on Compensation, Pension,

Insurance and Memorial Affairs of the House Committee on Veterans Affairs (for Arlington National Cemetery) provide legislative oversight. Although they differ from other Army programs in financing and oversight, the civil functions are an integral part of the overall mission of the Army and the service it provides to the Nation.

### **21-3. Relationship to warfighting competencies**


The civil functions complement and augment the Army's warfighting competencies, providing the capability to respond to a variety of situations across the spectrum of conflict. They provide a valuable tool with which to support the national security strategy by maintaining a trained and ready engineer force, sustained at a world-class level of expertise, at no expense to the Department of Defense military budget and at minimum expense to personnel allocations (military personnel assigned to USACE are funded from civil appropriations). This force is familiar with the Army culture and responsive to the chain of command. Skills developed in managing large, complex projects transfer to most tactical engineering-related operations. In addition, the expertise and research developed for the civil functions are leveraged to support military operational needs. As a byproduct, the civil functions provide Army engineer officers with valuable training — available nowhere else — in contracting and managing large projects.

### **21-4. Leadership and organization**

**a. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works).** Through specific statutory provisions, General Orders from the Secretary of the Army (SA), and internal Department of the Army regulation, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works) ((ASA(CW)) has been assigned responsibilities for civil functions. The ASA(CW) reports directly to the SA. Congress established the position of the ASA(CW) in Section 211 of the *Flood Control Act of 1970*, Public Law (PL) 91-611, and reaffirmed it in Section 501 of the *Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986*, PL 99-433. The *Goldwater-Nichols Act* specifies that the Assistant Secretary's duties include overall supervision of the functions of the Department of Army relating to programs for conservation and development of national water resources, including flood control, navigation, shore protection and related purposes.

**b. USACE.** Most of the Army's civil functions are executed by USACE, a major Army command (MACOM) consisting of about 34,000 people, which also plans, designs, and builds military facilities for the Army, Air Force, and other Federal agencies. USACE is commanded by the Chief of Engineers, who holds positions as both a principal HQDA Staff officer and a MACOM commander. The Chief of Engineers and the Corps' Director of Civil Works report to the ASA(CW) on the Civil Works Program. Under the Chief's command are eight divisions, the Engineer Research and Development Center, two engineer centers, and one MTOE battalion—the 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power). Under the divisions, there are 41 districts, 38 of which are within the United States. Division and district boundaries for the Civil Works Program within the CONUS generally follow watersheds and drainage basins, as shown in Figure 21-1. This distinction is reflective of the water resources mission of the Corps of Engineers. Boundaries for military construction districts follow State boundaries, as shown in Figure 21-2. The Corps also includes a number of overseas offices with missions in construction in support of U.S. Forces, assistance to other countries and international organizations, and support to other U.S. agencies. The Pacific Ocean Division, headquartered in Honolulu, Hawaii, includes subordinate districts in Hawaii, Alaska, Japan,

and Korea. The North Atlantic Division includes Europe District as well as five stateside districts. Several CONUS-based districts carry out overseas missions, such as Mobile District's support of USSOUTHCOM. One of the engineer centers, the Transatlantic Programs Center, in Winchester, Virginia, oversees most Corps of Engineers activities in Africa, and the Middle East. The other center, the Huntsville Engineering and Support Center, has a world-wide mission of providing engineering and technical services as well project management for functions, such as chemical demilitarization, which are not accomplished by other USACE elements.



**Figure 21-1. Civil Works Divisions and Districts**

**c. The role of the private sector.** The private sector is an essential element of the Engineer team. The Corps employs private architectural, engineering and construction firms for over half of its design and all of its construction work. The partnership between USACE and the private sector represents an immediate force multiplier of several hundred thousand architects, engineers, and builders, ready to support the Nation in times of emergency.




Figure 21-2. Military Programs Organization

## SECTION II CIVIL WORKS PROGRAM

### 21-5. Civil works program activities

**a. Overview.** The Civil Works Program provides for nationwide resources development and management, including the planning, design, construction, rehabilitation, operation and maintenance of flood control, navigation, ecosystem and other environmental restoration, and multiple-purpose water resource projects. Completed Corps projects may include hydroelectric power, water supply, recreation, and natural and cultural resource management and, collectively, they include approximately 12 million acres of land and water. Replacement value of these projects is estimated at over \$150 billion. In addition to this direct Federal investment program, the Civil Works Program includes an important regulatory mission in which the Corps of Engineers regulates construction in navigable waters under the *Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899*. The Corps also regulates the deposition of dredged and fill material in waters of the United States, including wetlands, under the *Clean Water Act of 1972*. In addition, the Civil Works Program includes emergency flood fighting, recovery operations, repair and restoration of flood control works, all performed under USACE's own authority as specified in PL 84-99. USACE also carries out DOD's responsibilities under the Federal Response Plan as the lead planning and operating agent for public works and engineering, in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other Federal agencies.

**b. Funding sources.** The Civil Works Program receives its principal funding through the annual *Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts*. The program also receives funding from non-Federal project sponsors who share in project costs according to formulas established by Congress in PL 99-662, the *Water Resources Development Act of 1986*, and subsequent water project authorization acts. Figure 21-3 shows Civil Works Program FY 2001 funding totaling \$5.0 billion, identified by funding sources. Of this amount, \$140 million is appropriated by Congress for the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). This continues the policy, begun in FY 1998, of placing program administration and execution responsibilities for the FUSRAP in the Civil Works Program. The safe, timely cleanup of these Department of Energy facilities is a high priority for the Corps.

<b>Energy and Water Development Appropriations</b>	<b>\$ Millions</b>
General Investigations (Potential Project	160
Construction, General (Note	1,717
Operation and Maintenance, General	1,902
Flood Control, Mississippi River and	348
Regulatory Program (Waterway/wetland	125
Flood Control and Coastal	0
General	152
Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action	140
<b>Sub Total Energy and Water Development</b>	<b>4,544</b>
<b>Contributions from Non-Federal</b>	<b>281</b>
<b>Bonnevill Power</b>	<b>108</b>
<b>Coastal Wetlands Restoration Trust</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Permanent</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Total Funding: Civil Works</b>	<b>5,004</b>

## Notes:

1. Includes \$96M from Inland Waterway Trust Fund and \$4M from Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund
2. Includes \$700M from Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund and \$34M from Recreation User Fee Receipts

**Figure 21-3. Fiscal Year 2001 Sources of Funding for Civil Works Program**

**c. Economic infrastructure.**

(1) The Corps of Engineers traditionally has been a major contributor to the development, construction, and maintenance of a sound water resources infrastructure. Commercial navigation and flood damage reduction are long-standing missions of the Civil Works Program. The navigation function includes improvement and maintenance of harbors handling all of the Nation's seaborne commerce. With funds from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund, the Corps maintains navigability in 299 deep draft harbors and more than 600

smaller harbors. With more than 15 million American jobs dependent on U.S. import and export trade, the Nation's commercial ports are vital to the economic security of the United States.

(2) The Corps has built an intracoastal and inland commercial waterway network of 12,000 miles and over 200 locks and dams. Major segments of this network include these waterways: Lower Mississippi River (1,015 miles), Upper Mississippi River (936 miles), Ohio River (981 miles), Tennessee River (785 miles), Missouri River (735 miles), Arkansas and White River (706 miles), Columbia River System (468 miles), South Atlantic Coast (1,111 miles), Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW)-West (1,501 miles), and GIWW-East (431 miles). Major improvements to inland waterway facilities are financed in part by the Inland Waterway Trust Fund. More than 600 million tons of commerce are moved every year on these waterways. Maintaining the system of ports and inland waterways involves removing more than 300 million cubic yards of dredged material each year.

(3) The Nation's \$38.5 billion investment in flood control (1928 through 1997) has prevented over \$387 billion in flood damages — a return of more than ten dollars in flood damage reduction for each dollar invested. Civil works projects seek to prevent flooding and its related damages with structural measures such as reservoirs, levees, improved channels, and floodwalls. Nonstructural measures, such as advice and encouragement for local zoning regulations, flood proofing of individual homes, and setting aside land in the floodplain as open space also contribute to this mission. Flood control efforts range from small, local protection projects to large lakes and dams. Today, 383 dams and reservoirs are maintained and operated by the Corps for the purpose of flood control. Since passage of the *Water Resources Development Act of 1986*, most flood control projects have been constructed as joint ventures between the Federal Government and non-Federal sponsors. These projects, once built, are operated and maintained by the sponsor.

(4) The Corps operates 75 power plants, which represent almost one fourth of the Nation's hydroelectric capacity or three percent of the Nation's total generating capacity. This makes the Corps of Engineers the Nation's fourth largest electric utility. Dams built by USACE provide water storage for drinking water, irrigation, and fish and wildlife habitat. Additionally, 456 of the flood control dams and reservoirs and multiple purpose power projects mentioned above (mostly lakes) are developed for recreational use. These projects accommodate nearly 400 million visits a year. The Corps estimates that 25 million Americans (one in ten) visit a civil works project at least once a year. Visitors to these recreation areas generate 600,000 private and public sector jobs. For many citizens, USACE rangers at the recreation sites will represent their only contact with the Department of the Army. The Army is exploring ways to take advantage of these visits to Army Engineer facilities to inform the public about the Army.

(5) The transportation infrastructure developed in the Civil Works Program plays a role in national defense. Ports and waterways serve as a vital logistics link when large volumes of materiel and personnel must be moved around the country and around the world. Practically all the heavy equipment and supplies bound for operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm moved by ship through ports maintained by the Civil Works Program. USACE works with the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and the local port authorities to ensure that ports are ready when needed. Waterways built and operated and

maintained by the Army Corps of Engineers similarly have direct military uses for strategic mobility. Units of the Texas, Oklahoma, and Arkansas National Guard have conducted successful movements over the Arkansas, Mississippi, and Illinois Rivers to their summer training sites, and the 101st Air Assault Division conducts annual movements by waterway from Ft. Campbell, Kentucky to Louisiana. This saves thousands of dollars from the cost of other modes of transportation. Corps of Engineers flood control projects also contribute to force projection by protecting important highway and railway links. Thus, through activities as diverse as facilitating the movement of materiel to protecting vital infrastructure, the Civil Works Program contributes to National security.

**d. The environment.**

(1) *Project activities and regulatory programs.* The Civil Works Program makes important contributions toward meeting the Nation's environmental goals by constructing projects for restoration and protection of ecosystem and other environmental functions and values. In addition, USACE provides stewardship for Corps-administered lands, includes appropriate mitigation in the design of all its projects, protects important aquatic resources such as wetlands through its regulatory program, and ensures environmental compliance at civil works project sites. Much of this work proceeds in partnership with other Federal and State agencies, as well as local communities. Some work may involve federally recognized American Indian Tribes or Alaskan Natives.

(2) *Project authorities.* Legislation passed in 1990 established environmental restoration and protection as one of the primary missions in the planning, design, construction, operation and maintenance of water resources projects — along with navigation and flood damage reduction. This new direction has allowed USACE to expand its traditional environmental activities and enhance or restore natural resources at civil works projects as well as plan and implement new projects with environmental restoration as a primary project purpose. Like other Corps projects, large restoration projects must be authorized specifically. In one of the largest environmental restoration and protection projects ever undertaken, the Departments of the Army and the Interior have been cooperating with the State of Florida to restore the physical form, functions, and hydrologic regime of the Everglades in South Central Florida. Congress authorized the Corps' Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan as a planning framework for this project as well as ten initial construction projects in Title VI of the *Water Resources Development Act of 2000*, PL 106-541. In addition to specifically authorized projects such as the Everglades restoration project described above, environmental restoration is accomplished through three programmatic authorities for small projects. Under Section 1135 of the *Water Resources Development Act of 1986*, PL 99-662, USACE is authorized to modify projects constructed by the Corps in the interest of improvement of the environment. Section 1135 also authorizes USACE to accomplish environmental restoration when the original Corps project contributed to environmental loss. Section 204 of the *Water Resources Development Act of 1992*, provided authority for beneficial uses of dredged material. This authority allows USACE to utilize material from the dredging of authorized Corps navigation projects for environmental restoration projects. The third authority is Section 206 of the *Water Resources Development Act of 1996*. This provision established a program for Aquatic Ecosystem Restoration under which small projects may be constructed and no link to an existing Corps' project is required. Working

toward a national goal of “no net loss of wetlands,” the Civil Works Program is undertaking projects to restore existing wetlands and to create new ones.

### (3) *Regulatory program.*

(a) The regulatory program of the Corps of Engineers has a long history of protecting the Nation’s waters. The *Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899* authorizes the regulation, by permit, of dredging, construction and similar activities in navigable waters of the United States. A principal objective of this program is to ensure that unobstructed waterways are maintained for commercial and recreational users. Over time, the Corps “public interest review” has become an important part of the decision process used by Corps district commanders in granting, modifying or denying permit applications. This review involves the consideration and balancing of a number of interests besides navigation — among them aesthetics, conservation, economics, and general environmental factors.

(b) The *1972 Clean Water Act* authorized the regulation, by permit, of dredge and fill material discharge activities in all waters of the United States, including wetlands. This Act expanded the Corps of Engineers’ regulatory responsibilities beyond those contemplated in the *Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899*. Also, other environmental laws that were enacted at about the same time require Federal decision makers to consider and take responsibility for the environmental consequences of their actions. Section 103 of the *Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972*, as amended, authorizes the Secretary of the Army (SA) to issue permits for the transportation of dredged material for ocean disposal. In its determination, the Corps insures that the dumping will not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological system, or economic potentialities.

(c) Today the regulatory program consolidates the public interest and environmental consequence reviews into a comprehensive evaluation process for decision-making. The evaluation process promotes the balancing of environmental protection with responsible economic growth. This balancing is reflected in the program’s goals to protect the aquatic environment, render fair and reasonable decisions, and use efficient decision-making procedures. The Corps regulatory program provides the public a valuable service—protection of the Nation’s waters and wetlands.

(4) *Stewardship.* The Corps of Engineers is steward for almost 12 million acres of land and water in 42 States. Conservation of forests, range wildlife habitat, fisheries, and soils involves multiple use of resources and practice of sound ecosystem management principles. USACE accomplishes this through a mix of its own management capabilities, partnerships with State and local governments, volunteers, and working agreements with a wide range of interest groups.

(5) *Compliance.* The Corps of Engineers conducts compliance assessments at all of its projects on a five-year cycle through the environmental compliance assessment program. The Environmental Review Guide for Operations (ERGO), the tool used to conduct assessments, is a checklist containing Federal and State environmental statutes and Corps requirements. Project and facility managers, as well as external organizations, use ERGO to systematically locate and correct environmental deficiencies.

(6) *Environmental activities and warfighting competencies.* Environmental activities in the Civil Works Program are essential elements of the Army's Environmental Strategy now and for the 21st Century. People who learn their specialties in civil missions that concern natural and cultural resources, water quality, flood plain management or hazardous waste management help the Army go "beyond compliance" to take on a leadership role in natural resources stewardship. Civil works expertise helped the Army develop such tools as the Environmental Compliance Assessment System (ECAS) and Integrated Training Area Management (ITAM). The Civil Works Program is responsible for about half the Army's land holdings, and is familiar with balancing preservation of the natural environment with human use — a major issue facing the Army. This program is also the Army's reservoir of cultural resources expertise, which the Army has used on several priority missions.

**e. Emergency preparedness and disaster response.**

(1) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers responds to the Nation's needs in case of natural or man-made disasters and emergencies. USACE programs provide a wide variety of assistance to protect human life and improved property, reduce human suffering, help communities recover from the effects of disasters, and mitigate damage and future threats. Response and recovery activities supplement State and local efforts.

(2) Under PL 84-99, USACE undertakes planning and preparedness activities for all types of natural disasters, and provides response and recovery activities necessitated by floods and coastal storms. PL 84-99 activities are funded by the Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies (FCCE) appropriation. Included in these preparedness and response efforts are disaster preparedness measures, advance measures to alleviate high potential flood threats, flood fighting activities, preservation of threatened Federally-constructed shore protection projects, and life-saving rescue operations. Recovery and mitigation measures include repair and rehabilitation of damaged flood control works and shore protection projects or nonstructural projects in place of structural rehabilitation. PL 84-99 also authorizes USACE to provide emergency supplies of clean water to localities whose water source has been contaminated and to drought-affected areas. In addition, USACE is authorized to provide essential services and restore essential public infrastructure, for a period of up to 10 days, in any area victimized by a natural disaster for which the Governor of a State has requested Federal assistance under *Stafford Act* authority.

(3) Under The *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act* (42 USC 5121 et seq.) (88 Stat.143) (the *Stafford Act*), USACE uses its engineering expertise and its response and recovery capabilities to carry out DOD's responsibilities under the Federal Response Plan (FRP) as the lead planning and operating agent for the Public Works and Engineering Emergency Support Function in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other Federal agencies in responding to disasters and emergencies of all kinds. Under authority of the *Stafford Act*, FEMA has developed the FRP, which coordinates the execution of response and recovery operations of the 28 Federal signatory departments and agencies. Under the FRP, DOD has delegated its responsibility for Emergency Support Function Number 3 (ESF-3), Public Works and Engineering, to USACE.

(4) As the lead DOD (and Federal) agency for ESF-3, USACE has a number of standing missions, to include provision of water, ice, emergency power, debris removal,

temporary housing, and temporary roofing. Other missions in the Public Works and Engineering area are assigned by FEMA to USACE, as needed. All of these missions are tailored to the needs of, and coordinated with the impacted State, and all are funded by FEMA. Each mission assignment is based on the capabilities of USACE, including its significant and responsive contracting capability. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (DCSOPS), Directorate of Military Support, coordinates DOD requirements not in the realm of ESF-3 missions.

(5) No new funding for the FCCE account has been provided since \$415 million was provided in the *1997 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act*. The carryover of available funds has been sufficient to fund all needed PL 84-99 activities and is expected to be sufficient through the end of FY 2001. After that, however, or if an extraordinary natural disaster occurs before the end of FY 2001, additional funding will be required for the FCCE account to carry out authorized activities.

(6) In FY 1999 and FY 2000, the USACE responded to several significant natural disasters. The largest event was Hurricane Floyd, which devastated portions of North Carolina and Virginia with high winds, storm surges, and massive floods. Another significant event was the Cerro Grande fire. The USACE assisted the Los Alamos National Laboratory and two Indian pueblos with flood-fighting assistance, constructed a 113-unit temporary housing development, and constructed a major Advance Measures project to protect a main road in the city of Los Alamos from the threat of heavy flooding resulting from the burned watershed. Other events to which USACE responded included Hurricanes Irene, Dennis, Lenny and Brett and small-scale floods in the Midwest, Oregon, and Washington.

### **21-6. Research and development**

**a. Organizing philosophy.** The U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) includes all of the Corps of Engineers dispersed research and development (R&D) facilities. The Center supports the Army and the Nation with high quality research, leading edge technology, and state of the art facilities. ERDC applies the “One Door to the Corps” philosophy to the Corps’ vast R&D capabilities to undertake research not only for Corps civil works and military projects, but also for other Federal agencies, State and municipal authorities, and, through innovative work agreements, for U.S. industry. This research and testing has produced excellent results, including innovation and significant improvements in the cost-effectiveness of support to civil works projects and associated operations and maintenance activities.

**b. Laboratories and locations.** The ERDC organization consists of eight unique laboratories in four locations: Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL) at Champaign, Illinois; Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) at Hanover, New Hampshire; Topographic Engineering Center (TEC) at Alexandria, Virginia; and the Coastal and Hydraulics, Structures, Geotechnical, Environmental, and Information Technology Laboratories at Vicksburg, Mississippi. ERDC laboratories work both individually and cooperatively to address a wide range of problems facing civil works projects. ERDC staff totals over 2,500 engineers, scientists and support personnel. Its scientific and engineering assets include some of the most modern facilities and equipment in the world and are valued at \$1.2 billion.

**c. Mission areas.** ERDC civil works research mission areas are highly diverse and encompass some of the toughest engineering problems faced by our Nation today. Research is conducted in the fields of mapping and terrain analysis; infrastructure design; construction and maintenance; cold region effects (snow, ice, frozen ground); flooding and coastal storm damage reduction; navigation channels and harbors; hydraulic structures (locks, levees, reservoirs, dams); dredging; groundwater modeling and contaminants; hazardous wastes and environmental chemistry; water quality; wetlands; threatened, endangered and nuisance species; earthquake engineering; concrete research; high performance computing; geographic information systems; and scientific visualization.

**d. Unique laboratory capabilities.** Each laboratory has unique capabilities. TEC does state of the art research in mapping and charting, including exploring applications for satellite ground positioning systems (used to position dredges when working on navigation channels), stand-off sensing (to check underwater channel conditions), and computer/satellite based terrain analyses. CERL specializes in construction technologies, energy conservation, and environmental operations. CRREL studies the effects of low temperature on materials, equipment, and engineer operations. CRREL's research includes the effects of cold weather on tactical engineering. The five laboratories located in Vicksburg, collectively known as the Waterways Experiment Station (WES), specialize in water systems, but they also conduct research in soil and rock mechanics, earthquake engineering, coastal engineering, mobility assessments, computer aided design and drafting, and weapons effects on structures.

### **SECTION III SUPPORT TO OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES**

#### **21-7. Overview of support to other government agencies**

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provides engineering and construction support to over 60 non-DOD Federal agencies, State, and local governments under the Support for Others Program. Funds for this program are included in the appropriations of the agencies receiving support and payment made to USACE. USACE support of other agency infrastructure programs includes managing the design and construction of border control and detention facilities for the Immigration and Naturalization Service, construction management support for the Drug Enforcement Agency, engineering and construction management support for the upgrade and modernization of the Washington, DC Public Schools, and emergency management assistance to the Federal Emergency Management Assistance agency. USACE also supports programs and projects of other Federal agencies designed to meet important national environmental objectives. These include the Superfund Program of the Environmental Protection Agency, cleanup and decommissioning of a nuclear reactor for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and cleanup of nuclear production facilities for the Department of Energy.

#### **21-8. Value of support activities**

In FY 1999, the value of the engineering and construction effort managed by USACE was approximately \$717 million. Non-DOD entities having Corps support costing more than \$1,000,000 in FY 1999 are listed in Figure 21-4.

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Construction Effort</u>
Department of Agriculture	\$ 1,838,000
Department of Commerce	2,507,000
Department of Energy	25,496,000
Environmental Protection Agency	372,610,000
Federal Emergency Management Agency	80,934,000
General Services Administration	5,133,000
Dept of Health and Human Services	1,529,000
Dept Housing and Urban Development	3,232,000
Department of the Interior	43,773,000
JFK Center for the Performing Arts	1,033,000
Department of Justice	124,244,000
Department of Transportation	14,997,000
Department of Treasury	3,083,000
Panama Canal Commission	3,648,000

**Figure 21-4. Construction Support for Non-DOD Agencies**

**SECTION IV  
NATIONAL CEMETERIES**

**21-9. Overview of national cemeteries**

For over 125 years, Arlington National Cemetery (ANC) has served as a place of honor and recognition for the men and women who have served in the Nation’s Armed Forces. It is the site of numerous important national ceremonies. The Soldiers' and Airmen’s Home National Cemetery, located in Washington, D.C., also provides a final resting place for those with military service. The Army takes pride in exercising its assigned responsibilities for operation, maintenance, and improvement of these cemeteries. The ASA(CW) provides program formulation and budget oversight to Arlington and Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Home National Cemeteries. The day-to-day activities of the cemeteries are the responsibility of the Commanding General, Military District of Washington, who executes these responsibilities through the Superintendent, ANC. The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) is responsible for burial policy. The Corps of Engineers supports Arlington National Cemetery by providing planning, engineering, design and construction management assistance for cemetery property and facilities.

**21-10. Funding**

The Army receives funds to operate these cemeteries in the Cemeterial Expenses, Army, appropriations account. These funds are included in the Departments of Veterans Affairs, Housing and Urban Development, and *Independent Agencies Appropriations Act*. The amount sought by the Administration and appropriated by Congress in FY 2001 — \$17.9 million — will provide for a continuation of the high standard of maintenance expected for these two important national cemeteries.

**21-11. Master plan for Arlington National Cemetery**

The development and improvement of the infrastructure at ANC had been based on a master plan that originally was prepared in 1967. In 1998, a new master plan was completed and approved by the SA. That plan provides a vision of the cemetery's priorities and needs into the next century. The master plan identifies projects and policies to respond to the challenges confronting ANC. These challenges include an aging infrastructure, declining availability of space for initial interment, and preserving the dignity and serenity of ANC while accommodating over 4,000,000 visitors annually.

**SECTION V****ENGINEER OVERSEAS ACTIVITIES****21-12. Overview of engineer overseas activities**

The Army Corps of Engineers conducts a broad range of foreign activities. Many are exclusively in support of U.S. forces overseas. All others are considered part of the civil functions of the Army. In coordination with the Deputy Undersecretary of the Army (International Affairs), the ASA(CW) provides program direction to the foreign activities of the Corps of Engineers, except those which are exclusively in support of U.S. military forces overseas. In FY 2000, the Engineers supported U.S. foreign policy in about 80 countries. Through the Africa Civil Action Program, assistance and support was provided to developing African nations to improve the construction expertise of their military engineers. The Corps also continued several major efforts to support U.S. initiatives in Africa including assisting on the U.S.-Nigeria Joint Economic Partnership Committee and the U.S.A.-Angola Bi-National Cooperation Commission. Through the Counter-Narcotics Program in three Central and South American countries, the Corps provided reimbursable engineering and construction support on 17 projects required to control the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics. It also provided significant remediation support to the U.S. Agency for International Development resulting from Hurricane Mitch.

**21-13. Foreign military sales**

As the DOD Construction Agent in many parts of the world, the Corps provides reimbursable design and construction services under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program. FMS assistance currently is being provided to nine countries in Latin America and the Middle East, with a total project value of approximately one billion dollars. Working for the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the Corps is supporting the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs with work in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. The work includes design and

construction assistance for nuclear storage facilities and a chemical weapons destruction program. The current program is valued at approximately \$600 million.

### **21-14. Partnership for Peace**

The Corps assists the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs) in developing programs to increase trans-boundary cooperation between civilian and military emergency planners in Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations. Numerous workshops are being conducted in the PfP nations to leverage USACE expertise in disaster planning, flood damage reduction, and application of topographic and remote sensing technologies.

### **21-15. Support for U.S. agencies**

The Corps is also called upon frequently to provide support for U.S. agencies overseas. For example, the Corps is managing construction of a \$150 million road project in Palau for the U.S. Department of Interior as part of the Compact of Free Association with that country.

### **21-16. Benefits to warfighting capabilities**

Goodwill generated by international work sometimes pays unexpected dividends. In the 1970's and 1980's, a team drawn largely from the Civil Works Program managed the construction of billions of dollars worth of military and transportation facilities in Saudi Arabia, all financed by the Saudi government. The trust developed between the Army and the Saudi government was vital in reaching agreements needed for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The facilities themselves also played a key role. Troops and equipment moved through ports and airfields developed under the Corps program, and King Khalid Military City, near the Iraqi border, became a major staging center.

## **SECTION VI SUPPORT TO COMMANDERS IN CHIEF**

### **21-17. Overview of support to commanders in chief (CINCs)**

Expertise in water resource development, flood damage reduction, waterway operations, dredging, coastal engineering, environmental stewardship, and disaster response supplement the skills maintained through the Army's military construction and installation support programs. This expertise is routinely called upon by the warfighting CINCs and by other DOD agencies and is supplied by the Corps of Engineers on a reimbursable basis. When the Army goes to war, personnel involved in civil functions provide timely information to the battlefield. Corps of Engineers knowledge of beach dynamics—including the Sea State Prediction Models developed at the Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg, Mississippi—help determine the sites for shore landings. Corps expertise in soil mechanics determines the best routes for armored vehicles; often roads are built using technologies developed in the Civil Works Program. Corps of Engineers experience gained from work on winter navigation helps the Army to cross frozen rivers. Commanders at all levels make use of topographic products and satellite-based navigation systems developed at the Topographic Engineering Center at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

**21-18. Examples of support to CINCs**

Soldiers and civilians who are assigned to civil functions are available to deploy with the Army, and have done so in support of operations in Grenada, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. They are key to evaluating and developing the infrastructure the force needs to enter and move about. For Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, more civil works personnel volunteered for deployment than the mission required. Especially noteworthy are the Contingency Real Estate Support Teams (CRESTS) who can deploy within 48 hours, worldwide, to acquire the troop housing, work space, hardstands, and covered storage areas the entering force will need. Other examples of how civil capabilities can be used to support CINCs include the following:

- Digital mapping and soil trafficability studies for Central Command in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
- Post-conflict cleanup of Kuwait, reestablishing utilities, and supervising repair of roads, buildings, and airfields.
- Water/flood level prediction modeling as Engineer soldiers bridged the Sava River in Bosnia.
- Environmental and water resource assessments in Central and South America.
- River channel surveys in Bangladesh at the request of USARPAC.
- Dam safety, disaster response, and water resource development.
- Expertise for military-to-military contacts in European Command.
- Archaeological support to the Army Central Identification Lab to help recover the remains of U.S. Servicemen in Southeast Asia.
- Coastal modeling to map optimum locations for logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) operations in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and Haiti.

**SECTION VII  
SUMMARY AND REFERENCES****21-19. Summary**

The Army, through its civil functions, provides valuable services in maintaining and enhancing the economic and environmental health of the Nation. Civil functions also continue to prove invaluable in furthering national security objectives, both directly and indirectly. The financial and personnel resources associated with these functions are principally authorized and funded under the biennial *Water Resources Development Acts* and annual *Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts*, respectively. Consequently, civil functions activities, as well as the significant training of Corps of Engineers personnel they provide, are at virtually no cost to the Department of Defense's military budget.

**21-20. References**

- a. Public Law 84-99, *Amendment of Flood Control Act of August 18, 1941 (Emergency Flood Control Work)*.
- b. Public Law 91-611, *Flood Control Act of 1970*.

## How the Army Runs

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- c.** Public Law 93-288, *Disaster Relief Act of 1974* (also known as the *Stafford Act*).
- d.** Public Law 99-433, *DOD Reorganization Act of 1986* (also known as the *Goldwater-Nichols Act*).
- e.** Public Law 99-662, *Water Resources Development Act of 1986*.
- f.** Public Law 105-245, *Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act*, 1999.
- g.** Public Law 105-277, *Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act*, 1999.
- h.** Public Law 106-541, *Water Resources Development Act*, 2000.
- i.** HQDA General Orders No. 10, *Assignment of Functions, Responsibilities, and Duties within the Army Secretariat*, 12 August 1997.

# CHAPTER 22

## PUBLIC AFFAIRS

*“Public Affairs fulfills the Army’s obligation to keep the American people and the Army informed and helps to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America’s Army and its readiness to conduct operations in peacetime, conflict and war.”*

FM 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations*

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### 22-1. Chapter content

- a.** Army commanders and senior officials have a legal and moral responsibility to the elected leadership and American public to account for resources entrusted to their care. These resources include fiscal accounts, equipment, real property, and most importantly, the individuals who are the Army.
- b.** This accountability may take several forms—Congressional hearings and reports, white papers, speeches, news conferences, press releases, etc.—but all involve some form of communication. Communicating the success or failure of the Army’s mission or supporting programs, as well as the future needs, is the primary mission of Army public affairs.
- c.** The terms “public affairs” and “public relations” are not always interchangeable. Public relations efforts involve opinion research, press agency, product promotion, publicity, lobbying, fund-raising, special event management and public affairs. The public affairs subset includes the execution of some public relations functions; however, its primary mission is to build trust relationships with the American public by providing forthright, truthful information in a timely manner, either as it becomes available (active public affairs policy) or on demand (responsive public affairs policy). The communication of this information is typically provided through the U.S. mass media. The practice of Army public affairs should be planned and executed to present the Army’s story as favorably as possible. The need for truth remains paramount and any attempt to withhold information from the public simply because the information is unfavorable or could prove embarrassing to the Army is a breach of trust.
- d.** Public affairs (PA) is a command function and responsibility. The commander can communicate through a command spokesperson, but the success or failure of that spokesperson and the commander’s public affairs program hinges on his or her support and direct involvement. No matter how good the public affairs officer (PAO) or

noncommissioned officer (PANCO) is, they can never fully substitute for the commander in either the public's or the soldier's eyes.

e. The commander's staff cannot substitute for him or her; however, they can provide specialized advice and counsel and assist in the execution of assigned missions. The PA professional is no exception and serves as the commander's primary advisor with regard to communicating the command's messages to its internal and external publics. Together with his or her staff, the PAO formulates the command's communications – or public affairs – strategy as well as provides public affairs input to all operations plans and orders.

f. This chapter is designed to give senior commanders and civilian officials an insight into the functions and systems involved in the prosecution of the commander's responsibility to communicate the Army's story both directly and indirectly, primarily through the mass media, to the American public.

## **22-2. Specialized and specific terms used in public affairs**

a. **Public affairs.** Public information, command information and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense (Joint Pub 3-61).

b. **Public affairs operations.** A related part of a command's information operations as set forth in FM 46-1. Public affairs operations consist of three components: public information, command information, and community relations. These three components are not conducted separately. Every public affairs communications effort or plan should integrate all three, as any communication, given today's technology, whether primarily directed at internal or external audiences, is likely to spill over to other groups of the public. Operations, which consider all three components of public affairs, have the benefit of mutual support during the execution phase. The governing regulation for the Army's conduct of public affairs activities is Army Regulation (AR) 360-1.

c. **Public information.** Information provided to American and foreign publics through the civilian mass media.

d. **Command information.** Communication by a military organization with service members, civilian employees, retirees and family members of the organization. Command information creates an awareness of the organization's goals, informs of significant developments affecting people and the organization, increases their effectiveness as ambassadors of the organization, and satisfies their desire to be kept informed about what is going on in the organization (Joint Pub 3-61).

e. **Community relations.** Public affairs programs which address issues of interest to the general public, business, academia, veterans and service organizations, military-related associations, and other non-news media entities. These programs are usually associated with the interaction between U.S. military installations and their communities. Interaction with overseas non-news media civilians in a wartime or contingency theater will be handled by civil-military operations (CMO) with public affairs support as required (Joint Pub 3-61)

**f. Active public affairs policy.** Open dissemination of information to inform the mass media and public about an issue or activity. An active approach is characterized by announcing the event or addressing the issue through media advisories, news releases, personal contacts, news conferences, or other forms of public presentation. Such a policy encourages and supports media coverage (Joint Pub 3-61).

**g. Responsive public affairs policy.** A responsive posture by which no direct effort is made to initiate, or participate in, the public discussion about an issue or activity. When a responsive policy is in effect, authorities must be prepared to respond to media inquiries about the issue or activity; that is, to make brief statements to avoid confusion, speculation, misunderstanding or false information that may prevail if media queries go unanswered (Joint Pub 3-61).

**h. Accreditation.** Accreditation is the process whereby a sovereign nation authorizes a media representative to practice the journalism profession in that country. While the host nation may delegate the practice of accrediting media representatives to embassies or the military representing countries from which those media representatives come, accreditation is a host nation responsibility within a theater of operations. U.S. military public affairs organizations typically credential or register media representatives from both the United States and other nations to account for the number of media representatives in theater as well as to distribute media ground rules for coverage of the operation.

**i. Propaganda.** Propaganda is the practice of disinformation or misinformation designed to confuse or mislead an audience. By the nature of its relationship with the American public and as a matter of Department of Defense (DOD) policy, the Army is precluded from conducting any information operation that as a result misleads or deludes the American public.

## **SECTION II PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY**

### **22-3. Public affairs strategic goals**

FM 46-1 is the capstone document for Army public affairs. It establishes a basis for modernization and provides an analytical framework linking doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel and soldiers (DTLOMS) issues critical to the future of Army public affairs. It lists eight strategic goals identifying the optimum conditions for the successful accomplishment of the PA mission. Attainment of these eight goals is the intent on which PA strategy development and operations planning is based.

**a.** Accurately assess the information needs and perceptions of external and internal publics.

**b.** Fully integrate PA estimates and recommendations into the planning and decision-making process at all levels and across the continuum of operations.

**c.** Achieve open and independent reporting and access to units appropriate with the mission and national security.

**d.** Expedite the flow of complete, accurate and timely information about the Army.

- e. Achieve a balanced, fair, and credible presentation of information about the Army.
- f. Communicate the Army perspective to all audiences.
- g. Educate and train all leaders and soldiers on their PA roles and responsibilities.
- h. Achieve full integration of PA and related functional areas and institutionalize effective joint, combined and interagency PA operations.

#### **22-4. Public Affairs Vision**

The Public Affairs Vision presented in FM 46-1 also defines the critical parameters that the PA functional area must meet if it is to achieve the strategic goals and accomplish the mission in the evolving information communication environment: “A trained, readily deployable Total Army force of Public Affairs professionals, sufficiently resourced, technologically capable, and modularly organized to conduct operations in peace, conflict and war and maintain a timely flow of accurate, balanced information to the American public, the Army and other key audiences.”

### **SECTION III PUBLIC AFFAIRS DOCTRINE**

#### **22-5. The Constitution and First Amendment**

There is no mention of the press in the Constitution as originally drafted. The First Amendment reads only that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” As the First Amendment has been variously interpreted in the courts, the media today enjoy significant freedom to pursue their mission of keeping the American public informed of events they deem worthy of the public’s attention. It is incumbent on the Army to participate actively in that process or be prepared to respond in a complete and timely fashion to queries when it consciously decides not to assume an active posture. Otherwise, the public mass media will tell a story about the Army without the Army’s participation. In which case, both the Army’s position on an issue and public understanding or acceptance of that position, will be lost.

#### **22-6. Freedom of Information Act**

The *Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)* allows anyone, including foreign nationals, to query the U.S. Government for specifically described records in its possession. The act requires the U.S. Government to respond in a timely manner to such requests, provide copies of nonexempt records, review the classification of records that have been classified to ascertain whether such classification still has a valid purpose and provide the requesting agency with frequent updates as to the Government’s progress in providing the records. DOD policy with regard to media requests for information known to be releasable under FOIA is to provide requesting media representatives with the information without requiring them to submit a FOIA request.

#### **22-7. Privacy Act**

The *Privacy Act* is designed to balance the individuals right to privacy with the public’s right to know. The more senior in rank an individual, the less “right” to privacy he or she

may have. This is understandable in view of the amount of national resources entrusted to more senior officials. Items generally releasable concerning a soldier under the *Privacy Act* include: name, rank, age (date of birth), unit, hometown (not street address), education, awards, duty status, the results of judicial actions, board (e.g., promotion board) results and official photo. Items generally not releasable concerning a soldier under the *Privacy Act* include the soldier's social security number, marital status, race, religion, investigative findings or the results of nonjudicial/administrative boards or actions.

### **22-8. DOD principles of information**

DOD Directive (DODD) 5122.5 serves as the cornerstone for DOD policy with regard to providing information to the media. The policy requires a supporting role to be played by Army public affairs. The directive's provisions are the following:

- a. Timely and accurate information will be made available so that the public may assess and understand the facts about national security, defense strategy, and ongoing joint and multinational operations.
- b. Requests for information from media organizations and private citizens will be answered in a timely manner. In carrying out this policy, the following principles apply:
  - (1) Information will be made fully available consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security classification. The provisions of the *Freedom of Information Act* and the *Privacy Act* will be complied with in both letter and spirit.
  - (2) A free flow of general and military information will be made available without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their family members.
  - (3) Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment.
  - (4) Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national and operations security or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces.
  - (5) The DOD obligation to provide the public with information on its major programs and operations may require detailed PA planning and coordination within DOD and with other Government agencies. The sole purpose of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public. Propaganda or publicity designed to sway or direct public opinion will not be included in DOD PA programs.

### **22-9. Guidelines for coverage of DOD combat operations**

In the aftermath of Desert Storm, representatives from the military and the media developed nine principles that have served since then to define the media's role in covering DOD operations. The principles that are published in DODD 5122.5 are—

- a. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations.

**b.** Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. Pools may sometimes provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity; within 24-36 hours when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage of journalists already in the area.

**c.** Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited.

**d.** Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and will be required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations.

**e.** Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases.

**f.** Military public affairs officers should act as liaisons but should not interfere with the reporting process.

**g.** Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools.

**h.** Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, and compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. In cases when government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news organizations, but electromagnetic operational security in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems.

**i.** These principles will apply as well to the operation of the standing DOD National Media Pool System.

## **22-10. Operational security**

The media's desire to publish information, as it becomes available and the military's desire to safeguard information that could compromise an operation are naturally at odds. While the media believe they are capable of recognizing such dangers themselves, their knowledge of military matters is not as extensive as the military would desire, and it is not getting better as a result of fewer and fewer journalists having had any firsthand military experience or being assigned a full-time military beat. It therefore becomes incumbent on the military to practice "security at the source" in dealing with the media and to establish clear, concise, intuitively understandable ground rules that the media can easily follow and abide by with regard to the protection of information that could have operational security considerations. The PAO will clear all information with possible operational security concerns with the operations staff prior to release. Should a journalist inadvertently gain access to information considered operationally sensitive, he

or she should be so informed of the reasons why the information is considered sensitive and asked to observe an embargo on the information until such time as it would no longer be considered sensitive.

## **SECTION IV PUBLIC AFFAIRS CORE PROCESSES**

### **22-11. Core processes**

The following sections focus on core processes, within the framework of the three broad public affairs functional areas, allowing Army public affairs to meet the challenges of supporting the Army Transformation in the Information Age. The public affairs core processes are—

- a.** Conduct public affairs planning.
- b.** Execute information strategies.
- c.** Facilitate media operations.
- d.** Conduct public affairs training.
- e.** Maintain community relations.

### **22-12. Public affairs planning**

**a.** Public affairs planning is conducted in concert with all information operations planners, and when appropriate, with the information operations battle staff.

**b.** Public affairs planning begins with the receipt of a mission. PAOs prepare the public affairs estimate, and advise the commander on global information environment issues (such as expected media interest) which might impact on the mission. They provide input during the development of possible courses of action and the war gaming of those potential courses of action. They identify critical public affairs risk factors, consider branches and sequels, judge the impact on internal audiences and external community relations, develop a public affairs strategy, prepare the public affairs annex to the operation plan/operation order and publish public affairs guidance.

**(1) *Public affairs assessment.*** The Public Affairs Assessment addresses all aspects of the information environment, whether or not they are under the control of the commander. Primary emphasis is placed on identifying, measuring and evaluating the implications of the external information environment that the Army does not control, but can influence through a coherent, comprehensive strategy and early integration in the planning and decision-making process. The Public Affairs Assessment serves as the foundation from which the Public Affairs Estimate is written and focuses on:

**(a) Media presence.** A commander needs to know the number of media representatives in the theater before the deployment of forces, and what level of media presence should be anticipated once deployment begins. The commander must also have an analysis of the type of media (print or broadcast), the visibility of the media (local, national, international, American or foreign) and the style of the media (news, information or entertainment) covering the operation. The assessment of the media

presence should address the authority under which media representatives are operation in the theater and the degree of access to the theater of operations.

(b) **Media capabilities.** A commander needs an analysis of the technological capabilities of media representatives present in the theater. The commander needs to know, for example, if they have live video transmission capability or interactive satellite telecommunications access.

(c) **Public opinion.** A commander needs to know how the American people and their civilian leaders perceive the situation and the use of military power. The commander needs to understand the perceptions held by international audiences, both those traditionally allies with the United States and those traditionally considered to be adversaries.

(2) **Public affairs estimate.** The public affairs estimate is an analysis of a specific mission from a public affairs perspective. It includes interpretation of the mass media and public environments to evaluate the degree of understanding about strategic and operational objectives and military activities and to identify levels of public support.

(3) **Public affairs plans.** Based on the information developed in the public affairs estimate, planners develop a strategy to support the operation. The public affairs strategy links the national strategic goals and operational objectives. It defines the Army perspective of an operation, and describes how an operation supports strategic goals. It provides the intent for public affairs operations and the Army's approach to meeting the information needs of critical internal and external audiences. In final form, it becomes the public affairs annex to the operations plan and serves as the framework for developing public affairs guidance for the operation. Public affairs plans are integrated into the operation plan/operation order through the PA annex. The annex provides the details for media facilitation, news and information, and force training operations.

(4) **Public affairs guidance.** Public affairs guidance provides mission-specific guidance to support public discussion of the operation. Public affairs guidance establishes the command's public affairs policies, identifies issues likely to be of interest, delineates the Army perspective, recommends appropriate themes, and addresses the methods, timing and authority for releasing information to media representatives.

### **22-13. Information strategies**

a. The proliferation of personal computers, the Internet, on-line services, fax machines, e-mail, cable television, direct broadcast satellites, copying machines, cellular communication, wireless communication and many other information technologies have created an endless stream of data and information that flows into a world filled with images, symbols, words, and sounds. Much of this information is a strategic asset, capable of altering high-level decisions by the National Command Authority and senior military leaders.

b. To deal effectively with this barrage of information, public affairs professionals must be skilled at informing their publics, both internal (command information) and external (public information). Information strategies are synchronized plans for using all available and appropriate methods of communication to achieve specific goals of

informing target audiences. The process includes acquisition of information, production of media pieces and distribution to sources.

#### **22-14. Media operations**

The commercial news media are major players in the global information environment. Fewer than 150 reporters covered the 1944 D-Day invasion of Europe. More than 800 covered Operation Just Cause in 1990, and more than 1500 journalists from around the world covered the Persian Gulf War in 1991. There is no question that the mass media will cover future military operations and in most cases will be on the ground before American forces arrive. Images of events as they happen, in real-time, from both sides of the conflict will be transmitted to the world. It is the commander's task, through the public affairs officer and staff, to develop a well-resourced and responsive infrastructure to facilitate media operations. Media facilitation includes—

- a. Assisting media entry into the area.
- b. Registering media representatives.
- c. Orienting them on ground rules for coverage.
- d. Ensuring they understand security policies.
- e. Arranging interviews and briefings.
- f. Coordinating unit visits and escorts.
- g. Providing thorough and timely responses to media queries.
- h. Embedding media in operational units.

#### **22-15. Public affairs training**

a. The underlying principle of Army training is to train in peacetime in a way that replicates expected wartime conditions. Public affairs training includes—

(1) Journalism and media training for public affairs officers, enlisted soldiers and civilian personnel.

(2) Media interaction training for non-public affairs soldiers, civilian employees and family members.

b. The goal of public affairs training is to prepare soldiers to interact with and operate under the scrutiny of the press. It teaches soldiers that journalists are not adversaries, and focuses on obtaining accurate, balanced coverage. It helps soldiers understand that the media is a communication channel to the American public as well as to audiences worldwide.

c. Training for public affairs personnel expands on soldier and leader training. It stresses individual as well as collective tasks with an aim of developing units fully prepared to accomplish the range of public affairs missions. It integrates public affairs into the battle staff. It ensures public affairs is involved in mission assessment, planning and execution.

d. Public affairs training can also be conducted for journalists. They should be educated on the rights and responsibilities of military community members, as well as the roles and mission of particular units and the Army.

## **22-16. Community relations**

a. The Army relies on communities and regions surrounding its installations for direct and indirect support of both the Army and its people. Maintaining effective community relations not only contributes to the morale of soldiers and their families, but also enhances the projection and sustainment capabilities of Army posts and hometown support directly affecting the combat power potential of mobilized or deployed Army forces. Communities can provide the Army access to resources needed to train and maintain readiness and also can extend support to families of deployed soldiers. Public Affairs helps commanders build and sustain the community relationships that generate support for America's Army.

b. Overseas, host nation civilians are often employed as media and community relations specialists. They advise PAOs and commanders of host nation sensitivities, local political issues and press reaction to American activities.

c. The objectives of Army community relations programs are to—

- (1) Increase public awareness of the Army's mission, policies and programs.
- (2) Inspire patriotism.
- (3) Foster good relations with the various publics with which the Army comes into contact at home and abroad.
- (4) Maintain the Army's reputation as a respected professional organization responsible for national security.
- (5) Support the Army's recruiting and personnel procurement mission.

## **SECTION V**

### **ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS**

#### **22-17. The Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, Department of the Army**

a. Title 10, USC, paragraph 3014, establishes the Office of the Secretary of the Army and gives "sole responsibility within the Office of the Secretary and the Army's staff" for public affairs. The office designated by the Secretary of the Army for the conduct of public affairs operations across the Army is the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (OCPA). The Chief of Public Affairs (CPA) is responsible for the formulation, management and evaluation of public affairs policies, plans and programs for all components of the Army. The CPA is responsible to the Secretary of the Army and responsive to the Army Chief of Staff.

b. The CPA has Department of the Army (DA) responsibility for preparing, coordinating and monitoring the worldwide implementation of Army public affairs strategies, plans, policies and programs for internal and external information. The CPA has DA responsibility for:

- (1) Developing public affairs plans and programs to support other Army plans and programs.
  - (2) Managing the Army's Public Information Security Review Program.
  - (3) Managing the review and clearance of information for release outside the DOD by the Army Secretariat (ARSEC) and the Army Staff (ARSTAF).
  - (4) Managing the ARSEC and ARSTAF public affairs program.
  - (5) Exercising operational control over the U.S. Army Field Band.
  - (6) Exercising operational control over the Army Broadcasting Service.
  - (7) Serving as the proponent for all public affairs issues across the requirement domains of DTLOMS.
- c. Additionally, the CPA supervises the Army element of the Army and Air Force Hometown News Service.
- d. In support of its information mission, the Office of the Chief of Public Affairs also maintains an interactive web site <[www.dtic.mil/armylink.gov](http://www.dtic.mil/armylink.gov)> that provides immediate press releases, speeches, contact points and other Army related information. This information is available to government, media and civilians to foster support and awareness of the Army's various missions.

#### **22-18. Installation public affairs**

The installation public affairs officer can be either military or civilian. The grade of the PAO and size of his or her staff is dependent on the size of the installation, although the PAO is typically a lieutenant colonel or major equivalent. The position for this officer is documented on the installation table of distribution and allowances (TDA). The installation PAO is responsible for assessing the information requirements of the installation and the surrounding area, including tenant activities of other commands such as Medical Command and Army and Air Force Exchange Service activities; developing the commander's public affairs and communications strategy; and coordinating and executing public information (media relations), command information and community relations programs and activities for the installation. The PAO serves as the installation commander's personal spokesperson and is normally a member of the commander's special staff. The PAO must also be prepared to coordinate DOD and HQDA media and community relation's support as required on an area basis, to include casualty assistance support.

#### **22-19. Unit public affairs**

Small public affairs sections are embedded in the headquarters of separate Army brigades, divisions, corps and echelons above corps. These sections provide PA support to the command and direct support to subordinate PA units and sections. The public affairs section is documented on the unit modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE). The PAO serves as the commander's principal advisor on PA issues and is responsible for developing communications strategies and campaigns in support of the command's operations. Personnel and materiel constraints require that these sections

be augmented for most operations by separate PA TOE units, the vast majority of which are in the Reserve Component.

#### **22-20. Theater army PAO**

An Army level PAO is a colonel serving on the special staff of the Army commander. The Army PAO is responsible to the Army commander for developing information strategies and campaigns in support of operations. An Army headquarters will typically be augmented by a mobile public affairs detachment (MPAD) should the Army commander be designated the Army forces commander for an operation.

#### **22-21. Corps and theater army area command (TAACOM) PAOs**

A corps or TAACOM PAO is a lieutenant colonel serving on the special staff of the corps or TAACOM commander. When the commander is deployed as the senior ground commander for operations, the PA section will be augmented by a public affairs operations center (PAOC) and one MPAD for every three brigades in the task force.

#### **22-22. Division and corps support command (COSCOM) PAOs**

A division or COSCOM PAO is a major serving on the special staff of the division or COSCOM commander. When the commander is deployed as the senior ground commander, the PA section is augmented by an MPAD.

#### **22-23. Reserve Component public affairs**

The vast majority of public affairs assets are in the Reserve Components. This often requires the Active Army PA staffs to augment a joint task force (JTF) PA staff for the early stages of an operational deployment. Should no Reserve Component call-up be authorized, the Active Army PA staffs will likely be called upon to support the JTF for the duration of the mission. The four types of PA units available are discussed in the following paragraphs.

#### **22-24. Public affairs operations center (PAOC)**

The PAOC is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and staffed by eight other officers and 19 enlisted personnel. The PAOC has nine high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and audio-visual equipment sufficient to produce radio, television and print products for an internal audience as well as resources to credential, brief, escort and support visiting media. The PAOC has a command section, an escort section, a briefing section and an audio-visual section. There are three in the Army National Guard and four in the Army Reserve.

#### **22-25. Mobile public affairs detachment (MPAD)**

The MPAD is commanded by a major and is staffed with three captains and 14 enlisted personnel. An MPAD can support a division or corps headquarters or be broken down into five-man public affairs detachments (PADs). Their equipment and capabilities are similar to a PAD (see description below) but more robust. There is only one MPAD in the Active Army stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. There are 23 MPADs in the Army National Guard and 17 in the Army Reserve.

**22-26. Broadcast operations detachment (BOD)**

The BOD is commanded by a major and staffed by two captains and 24 enlisted personnel. It is organized into two broadcast teams and a maintenance section. Its transportation assets include four HMMWVs, and its audio-visual equipment is sufficient for the BOD to establish and operate field radio and television broadcast facilities in support of Armed Forces Network operations. There are three BODs in the Army, all in the Army Reserve.

**22-27. Public affairs detachment (PAD)**

A PAD is commanded by a captain and has one staff sergeant, two print journalists and one broadcast journalist. The PAD comes with its own transportation two HMMWVs and sufficient still and video equipment to produce print, radio and television products for internal audiences. The PAD typically supports a brigade-sized unit. There are 26 of these units authorized, 12 in the Active Army, six in the Army National Guard and eight in the Army Reserve. The majority of the Active Army PADs are located at divisions, but they are assigned and controlled by U.S. Army Forces Command.

**SECTION VI****JOINT AND COMBINED PUBLIC AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS****22-28. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA))**

As established by DOD Directive 5122.5, the ASD (PA) is the principal staff advisor and assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for DOD public information, internal information, the *Freedom of Information Act*, mandatory declassification review and clearance of DOD information for public release, community relations, information training and audiovisual matters. The ASD (PA) is charged with developing policies, plans and programs in support of DOD objectives and operations and with ensuring a free flow of information to the media, the general public and the internal audiences of the Armed Forces and other appropriate forums limited only by national security constraints as authorized by Executive Order 12356 and statutory mandates. The ASD(PA) reports directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and acts as their spokesperson and the reviewing and releasing agency for DOD information and audiovisual materials to media representatives. As a practical matter, the ASD(PA), or his or her designated representative, conducts regular media conferences in the Pentagon with the Pentagon Press Corps on Tuesdays and Thursdays.

**22-29. Joint information bureau (JIB)**

a. A JIB as the name implies is made up of service members from two or more Services. A JIB varies in size and composition in accordance with the requirements of the mission and the degree to which the different Services are involved. The JIB director and deputy JIB director are typically colonels. The operations officer would be a senior lieutenant colonel, and ideally each of the sections would be run by lieutenant colonels. Typically, the JIB will consist of an operations section, a media response section, a media support section and liaison cells and sub-JIBs as appropriate.

b. The JIB operations officer and his or her staff are responsible for the preparation of PA plans; oversight of military media communications and assessing published media products. The media response section is the primary interface with the media and responds to their queries, issues news releases and media advisories. The media support section credentials media, assists in transportation and filing needs, arranges for unit visits and escorts. Interagency government personnel as well as nongovernmental and private volunteers typically man the liaison cells.

### **22-30. Combined information bureau (CIB)**

a. A CIB is similar to the JIB in organization and functions except that staffing includes the full integration of allied or coalition personnel in the organizational structure. Oftentimes, when the contributions of two nations are relatively equal, co-CIB directors will be established. Depending on the ability of other nations to furnish staff for the CIB, some nations may be represented only by staff members in the liaison cell.

b. With increased multi-national operations, Army public affairs personnel may be assigned tasks in a multi-national headquarters to respond to international media. For example, in NATO, public affairs staff may attend the NATO Information Officers' Course in Mons, Belgium and receive training in operating in an environment where the national authorities control media access and information dissemination.

### **22-31. Pentagon correspondents**

There have been media representatives at the Pentagon since the establishment of the Department of Defense in 1947. Some 20-25 journalists keep rent-free offices in the Pentagon, courtesy of the Department of Defense, paying only for their own furniture, telephones and office supplies. These 20-25 resident journalists as well as 75 others representing major wire services, newspapers, weekly news magazines, trade journals and radio and television networks are issued regular DOD Pentagon building passes that allow unescorted access to unrestricted areas inside the Pentagon. The practice benefits both the media and the military in that information about DOD of interest to the public can be readily disseminated to correspondents who are already familiar with and reasonably well educated regarding DOD's mission, operations and structure. These correspondents are regular attendees at the ASD(PA) media conferences conducted on Tuesdays and Thursdays at the Pentagon.

### **22-32. DOD media pool**

DOD established a standing media pool in 1985 following the Grenada operation to balance the legitimate needs of the media in covering a military operation with the military's ability to support a reasonable number of media in the initial phases of a combat operation. Up to 16 journalists and three escort officers are on standby at all times and can be deployed on an exercise or an actual contingency mission. The journalists in the pool are rotated on a quarterly basis and typically represent several major newspapers, one or more wire services, a news magazine, one radio service, one television network and one or more still photographers. Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume IV of the Joint Operational Planning Guidance requires commanders to plan for the deployment of the pool as part of all contingency plans to include transportation, messing and billeting on a reimbursable basis, the issuance of appropriate

equipment for an operation (e.g., helmets, flak vests, etc.), medical support as required and access to communications facilities to file stories on an expedited basis.

### **22-33. Combat camera**

Combat camera provides the combatant command or joint task force with the capability to acquire, process and deliver still and video imagery to communicate the force's mission to both internal and external publics, to enhance situational awareness for the National Command Authority and to document the mission for planning, legal, training or public affairs requirements. All Services have combat camera units. A typical combat camera unit includes a headquarters, an electronic imagery section and up to three image acquisition teams. The J-3 establishes imagery collection priorities, and the images are transmitted electronically via the combat camera international maritime satellite (INMARSAT) systems or other communications assets to the combatant command and the Joint Combat Camera Center in the Pentagon. After initial distribution by the center, the imagery becomes a long-term information resource that is electronically available across DOD in support of ongoing or future mission requirements. Although doctrinally aligned with the J-3 staff, combat camera products, after clearance, can be used to support the commander's communications plan.

## **SECTION VII INFORMATION MEDIUMS**

### **22-34. News media**

The specific medium, through which the news media present their work, creates different needs and expectations on the part of media representatives in their dealings with the military. As in just about any military operation, timing is everything, and a basic analysis of media deadlines, requirements and abilities to reach the American public with the command's story can assist the commander's public affairs program as well as serve to better satisfy the media. Advances in communications technology today enable virtually simultaneous reporting from anywhere in a satellite footprint anywhere in the world. To cope with this new ability of the media, the military must be prepared to provide credible information in a format the media can use, the more so if the military expects the media to accept basic ground rules for access and support. Without this mutual coordination and understanding, the media will report what they see without the military's input, the end result of which will not likely be what the command intended to transmit as its message.

### **22-35. Television**

Television news broadcasts are typically pegged to specific times of the day. While a television station can interrupt programming for special announcements, such reporting is more akin to radio than television in that the voice is most likely the primary medium. Television thrives on video pictures, a script written to what the camera has seen and some carefully chosen 5-8 second "soundbites" from interviews conducted on camera with witnesses to the event, experts or participants whose words fit the video the cameraman has taken of the event. Long answers from commanders and staff officers rarely make it to the screen, so PAOs will recommend the use of copy points to assist

commanders and interviewees in getting the command's message out in a format television will be most likely to use. Television is also a linear medium in that it broadcasts from a lineup of stories. This makes deviation during a live news broadcast difficult, although not impossible when "breaking news" warrants interruption of regularly scheduled programming. While the Cable News Network (CNN) is more immediate and can and will likely be first on the scene, it too is hampered by the requirements of the television medium. CNN has more flexible deadlines in reporting news of immediate national interest, although it too must make the decision when to interrupt its regularly scheduled programming like the other networks.

### **22-36. Radio**

Radio is the most immediate of all news media and the easiest to use. If the command has a story it wants to get out fast, radio is best suited for the mission. Live radio news broadcasts are easily changed even in progress. "Hot" stories can easily be inserted into normal programming. The voice is the only medium, and details from commanders or their spokespersons will get more airtime than on television because the voice must paint the picture for the audience. A radio news desk is only as far away as a telephone line, and the story can be on the air within minutes.

### **22-37. Print**

Newspapers tend to follow strict deadlines to get their product to American breakfast or dinner tables. Reporters may be able to spend hours, even days with a unit before having to file their stories. The unit will likely garner more "space" in the articles by virtue of the attention the print journalist can give the story. The longer a reporter stays with the unit, the more attached he or she becomes to the unit, which results in more favorable coverage as a result of the reporter's increased understanding and appreciation for the unit's mission. Daily newspapers differ from weekly publications in terms of immediacy and pictorial requirements. Weeklies tend to want lots of colored pictures and will focus on more analytical, more timeless aspects of the mission, whereas daily newspapers focus on what has happened since their last deadline and will settle for a good black and white photograph transmitted electronically. A reporter for a specific newspaper gives the commander access to one newspaper, whereas wire services such as Associated Press offer the commander and his or her PAO multiple access to the American public because many newspapers subscribe to the services.

### **22-38. Television "news magazines"**

In recent years there has been a steady growth in the number of television and radio news programs that entertain as much or more than they inform. The print media has always had some notorious examples of such journalism, and it is likely that commanders will see such print media on the battlefield as well as the newer radio and television media. It is likely that such media will be credentialed in theater, so the commander and his or her PAO need to be prepared to deal with them. The command's messages can be transmitted through a variety of media, and dealing with the entertainment media will require some imaginative work. While the commander should not deny access (thereby creating a story in and of itself), he or she should be prepared to prioritize his or her effort in supporting the media and has every right to pursue getting his or her command message out through

media that reach the American public in a format that is credible and reflects favorably on the military and its operation.

### **22-39. Motion picture industry support**

The Office of the Chief of Army Public Affairs maintains branch offices in Los Angeles and New York primarily to interface with the entertainment industry and networks headquartered in those areas. The offices assist radio, television and film professionals in all matters relating to the U.S. Army. They serve as a local, authoritative source of information about the Army and provide authentication, verification and limited research for producers, writers, property masters, wardrobe supervisors, film editors, etc. They also provide assistance and advice to script writers, including reviewing rough drafts and suggestions for changes prior to script finalization. Army's support of a project is contingent on scripts realistically portraying the Army and its personnel. These offices can also arrange for and coordinate use of Army equipment and supplies not commercially available, coordinate requests for Army's stock footage, arrange for and coordinate with Army installations or properties for location filming and arrange for soldier volunteers to participate in the project if requested.

## **SECTION VIII SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

### **22-40. Summary**

**a.** Advances in communications technology have made possible virtually simultaneous transmission of breaking news into the American living room. Technology has made news organizations such as CNN possible, which has decreased the dominance of traditional news organizations and increased competition for news and the attention of the American public. The elements of what makes news, however, have remained constant-and the American public is, as it always has been, interested in what happens to its sons and daughters in uniform, especially when they are executing an operational mission. The increasing number, variety and complexity of real-world operations in which the U.S. Army has been involved since the end of the Cold War have attracted considerable public and media interest and will likely continue to do so in future. The Army has grown smaller, and budgets have grown even smaller. The Army's need to communicate its successes and future requirements has never been greater, and the Army's ability to win on future battlefields will be hampered if the full spectrum of information operations-including public affairs-is not adequately addressed.

**b.** The need for operational security will always be of concern to the military; however, it should not prevent the Army from communicating in real time with the American public. With media able to transmit words, voice or pictures via satellites in future conflicts, the most viable solution to assure operational security will include the practice of security at the source, a clear set of ground rules accepted and understood by the media and honest interaction between the military and the media covering the operation. Maintaining OPSEC in this environment also implies that soldiers and their leaders are trained to deal with the media before the next conflict. The concept of security review has become a moot issue. It has not been practiced since Desert Storm, and the

few conflicts between the military and the media during Desert Storm as a result of the security review process were resolved in favor of the media.

c. Gone also are the days when the commander could expect to provide information separately to his or her troops, the American public and the enemy. Information operations involve civil affairs, psychological operations and public affairs messages that by definition overlap and that are picked up simultaneously by soldiers, the media and the enemy. The importance of consistency and truth in the message has never been more paramount, and the danger of miscommunication and the subsequent loss of credibility in a deception plan intended for the enemy's ears or in communications with a civilian populace equipped with pocket-sized, short-wave transistor radios that does not account for this overlap has never been greater.

d. Gone too are the days when the commander could expect his or her PAO to represent him or her with the media and stick to operational matters. The media and the American public who watch television, listen to radio and read the newspapers expect more, and public affairs has become an operational matter. It is conceivable that a commander could win the battle and lose the information war by excluding or attempting to exclude the media from his or her operations. What is worse is that excluding the media from an operation or creating ill will with the media during the operation means the Army's story goes untold or misrepresented, and the American public is allowed or even encouraged to lose sight of why they have an Army in the first place. So long as the U.S. Army believes it has a role to play in the National Military Strategy of the United States, it owes the American public a look at how it is accomplishing the missions assigned it in the pursuit of that strategy's objectives.

## **22-41. References**

- a. DOD Directive 5122.5, *Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)*.
- b. DOD Directive 5122.10, *American Forces Information Service*.
- c. DOD Directive 5122.11, *Stars and Stripes Newspapers and Business Operations*.
- d. DOD Directive 5200.1, *DOD Information Security Program*.
- e. DOD Directive 5230.9, *Clearance of DOD Information for Public Release*.
- f. DOD Directive 5400.4, *Provision of Information to Congress*.
- g. DOD Directive 5400.7, *DOD Freedom of Information Act Program*.
- h. DOD Directive 5410.18, *Community Relations*.
- i. DOD Directive 8910.1, *Management and Control of Information Requirements*.
- j. DOD Instruction 5405.3, *Development of Proposed Public Affairs Guidance (PPAG)*.
- k. DOD Instruction 5410.16, *DOD Assistance to Non-Government-Oriented Motion Picture, Television, and Video Productions*.
- l. DOD Instruction 5410.19, *Armed Forces Community Relations*.
- m. Joint Publication 1-07, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations*.

- n.** Army Regulation 25-55, *The Department of the Army Freedom of Information Act Program.*
- o.** Army Regulation 340-21, *The Army Privacy Program.*
- p.** Army Regulation 360-1, *Army Public Affairs Programs.*
- q.** Field Manual 46-1, *Public Affairs.*
- s.** Field Manual 100-6, *Information Operations.*



# CHAPTER 23

## MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

*Military operations are the sole responsibility of the operational chain of command, which does not include the Military Departments. While removing “operations” from the responsibility of the Secretary of the Army for this important purpose, the Committee agrees that each Secretary of a Military Department would retain authority to use military equipment and forces for activities such as disaster relief, response to domestic disturbances, public affairs, the operations of non-combatant forces, and many training activities.*

Public Law 99-433, 14 April 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986)

### SECTION I INTRODUCTION

#### **23-1. Constitutional and policy basis for military assistance to civil authorities**

**a.** The basis for the use of military forces to assist civil authorities stems from our core national values. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states “Congress shall have power ... to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.” Article IV, Section 4 expands this authority—“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them ... against domestic violence.”

**b.** The Army serves to support and defend the Nation; this responsibility extends to military responses to domestic disasters. From our Nation's inception, the Army has provided support to civilian authorities to assist in times of crisis and need. Floods, riots, hurricanes, earthquakes, unknown substances, and forest fires are examples of situations that have required states to call upon the National Guard or request support from Federal Armed Forces.

**c.** The National security strategy incorporates the aforementioned national values and sets forth three key national interests—protect the lives and safety of Americans, maintain the sovereignty of the United States, and provide for the prosperity of the nation and its people. Military assistance to civil authorities in times of need contributes significantly to satisfying these national security concerns. The National Military Strategy recognizes that America's military may respond to a variety of national needs other than waging war. It specifies that: “Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, illegal drug trafficking, and other threats at home or abroad may exceed the capacity of other agencies and require the use of military forces.”

## **23-2. Overview**

**a.** Military assistance to civil authorities is a complex yet critically important mission for the armed forces. Within existing processes and procedures, the armed forces have a well-defined basis for participation, perform specific and appropriate roles and are postured for expansion of their roles and missions in response to the evolving threats and future technologically related domestic emergencies.

**b.** The U.S. military primarily organizes, trains and equips forces to conduct combat operations. However, it also has the capability to rapidly respond to domestic emergencies and provide assistance to civil authorities for certain unique and restricted missions. Such assistance usually occurs after a presidential declaration of a major disaster or an emergency, and supplements the efforts and resources of State and local governments and voluntary organizations. The U.S. military normally responds to domestic emergencies in support of another Federal agency.

## **23-3. Military assistance definitions**

The terminology for military assistance in response to civil emergencies is evolving. This adds to the complexity of an already intricate system of systems. The broad term of military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) includes military support to civil authorities (MSCA) and military assistance for civil disturbance (MACDIS).

**a. MACA.** DOD activities and measures in response to domestic, natural and manmade disasters (MSCA), plus DOD assistance in response to civil disturbances (MACDIS), and in counterdrug operations, sensitive support, counterterrorism, and law enforcement.

**b. MSCA.** DOD activities and measures to assist and support any civil government agency in planning or preparing for, or responding to the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies.

**c. MACDIS.** DOD activities and measures to assist Federal, State, and local government and law enforcement agencies in the United States, its territories, and possessions to prepare for or respond to civil disturbances, including response to terrorist incidents.

## **23-4. Component of homeland security**

**a.** Military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) is a key component of homeland security. Natural disasters, major accidents, and terrorist threats present a complex and potentially catastrophic impact on the American Homeland. An overriding consideration of all emergency response operations is insuring the continuity of government (COG). The COG component of homeland security includes providing for the stability and restoration of all levels of government—Federal, State, and local:

- At the Federal level, COG ensures the integrity of constitutional authority.
- At the State and local level, COG operations can facilitate the quick restoration of civilian authority and essential government functions and services. COG reassures citizens and helps affirm that military support for consequence management activities is not an imposition of undue military involvement or control.

**b.** MACA cuts across the spectrum of military operations. While a Department of Defense (DOD) concept for homeland security (HLS) is still evolving, the Army has begun drafting HLS Strategic Planning Guidance. The guidance includes a working definition of HLS:

*Active and passive measures taken to protect the area, population, and infrastructure of the United States, its possessions, and territories by: (1) Deterring, defending against and mitigating the effects of threats, disasters and attacks; (2) Supporting civil authorities in crisis and consequence management; and (3) Helping to ensure the availability, integrity, survivability and adequacy of critical national assets.*

**c.** The military's rapid, effective, and often extensive response in support of civil authorities facilitates homeland security. The military also benefits from its participation in these operations. MACA usually exercises the military's force projection capability, employs soldiers in duties related to their military occupational specialties and involves units and equipment in complex real-world missions.

### **23-5. Historic role of domestic military support**

**a.** When the framers met to draft the U.S. Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787, Shay's Rebellion of 1786-1787 was a recent memory, and insurrection a major concern. To protect the viability of the Government they created mechanisms to suppress rebellions or insurrections and enforce law.

**b.** Later, the response to the 1794 Whiskey Rebellion set the stage for establishing the fundamental precepts codified in our current laws. As a result of the excise tax on whiskey, the taxpayers revolted against the Federal Government. Violence against tax collectors grew to such a level that it prompted a presidential response. During August to November 1794, Federal troops were deployed to Western Pennsylvania as a show of force. Throughout this threat to federal governance, President Washington's guidance was that the military was to support the local civil authorities, not preempt them. This underlying principle remains imbedded in our laws, systems and processes to this day.

**c.** Executive Orders (EO) 12148 and 12656 established the current interagency responsibilities and organizations. EO 12148 established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and delegated most of the President's authority under the Stafford Act to the Director, FEMA. Similarly, EO 12656 identified agency responsibilities for COG. However, the current organizations, systems and processes for conducting MACA operations evolved from the civil defense mission of the Continental Army Command (CONARC) and, in large measure, reflect how CONARC organized the various agencies to perform the civil defense mission. Subsequently, EO 12148 transferred many of the missions formerly performed by CONARC from the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) to FEMA.

**d.** Historically, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has also played a central role in MACA due to their unique resources and on-going domestic missions (see Chapter 21, paragraph 21-5e). One of the USACE existing missions is to provide assistance, within its authorities, when natural disasters or other emergencies occur and when the nature of the disaster exceeds local and State capabilities.

## SECTION II DOMESTIC EMERGENCIES AND RESPONSE.

### 23-6. Domestic emergencies

Understanding categories and definitions is key to understanding the roles of the military and its relationships to other Federal, State, and local agencies in MACA.

**a. Major disasters.** Included in this category are hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, and other man-made or natural disasters that result in suffering and damage of a severity or magnitude that overwhelm the capabilities of the Federal, State and local authorities. For such cases, military resources can supplement Federal response efforts.

**b. Civil emergencies.** Include in this category are civil disturbances, postal strikes, mass immigration, environmental incidents, and other emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt normal governmental functions to the extent that Federal, State, and local authorities require military support.




Figure 23-1. Crisis and Consequence Management

**c. Crisis management.** Crisis management includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. Crisis management is predominantly a civilian law enforcement response, with the Department of Justice (DOJ) serving as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA). As shown in Figure 23-1, DOJ has assigned the lead operational response mission to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

**d. Consequence management.** Consequence management includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to local governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the adverse consequences of a serious incident. Primary response authority resides with State and local governments, with the Federal Government assisting as required. At the Federal level, the LFA for consequence management is FEMA. Through the Federal Response Plan (FRP), FEMA assigns Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) to the appropriate Federal agencies.

**e. Technical assistance.** Technical assistance includes actions to identify, assess, or decontaminate personnel and/or property potentially exposed to hazardous materials; and to dismantle, transfer, and/or dispose of contaminated/contaminating materials, equipment, or property. Technical assistance operations may occur during crisis or consequence management.

### **23-7. Federal crisis management response**

**a.** The FBI continually assesses intelligence and reports of terrorist activity. When there is an actual incident or a credible threat of one, the FBI takes action to prevent casualties and consequences by combating the terrorists. The FBI also provides additional support to the special agent in charge (SAIC) at the incident scene. The SAIC supervises law enforcement actions and coordinates other agencies' activities at the incident scene. FBI actions can include employing special FBI teams, requesting DOD support with a joint special operations task force (JSOTF), deploying a domestic emergency support team (DEST) and establishing a joint operations center (JOC).

**b.** The DEST is a rapidly deployable special interagency team. It provides advice to the FBI on-scene coordinator. The FBI will normally follow DEST deployment with the establishment of a JOC. The JOC becomes the nerve center for interagency coordination for on-scene crisis management.

**c.** When the situation dictates, the FBI may request specialized DOD support. The FBI on-scene coordinator notifies the Attorney General, through the FBI Director, of the need. The FBI also informs the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) of the pending request and provides details of the incident. ASD(SO/LIC) provides advice to the SecDef on crisis management and combating terrorism activities. The Attorney General confers with the SecDef on the deployment request. They in turn confer with the President. The National Command Authority (NCA) must approve all requests that may potentially lead to DOD use of lethal force in support of law enforcement support.

**d.** After Presidential approval of DOD support, SecDef personally approves deployment orders prepared by the Joint Staff for the appropriate forces. Normally DOD provides a JSOTF and Special Mission Units with unique capabilities, such as those to render safe weapons of mass destruction. The JSOTF deploys to the site and coordinates proposed actions with the FBI agent in charge. At the appropriate time, the FBI employs the JSOTF to execute those operations approved by the NCA. DOD assets normally deployed in support of crisis management operations do not remain to support consequence management operations.

### **23-8. Federal domestic disaster response is a tiered, escalating process**

**a. Three tiers of support.** Domestic consequence management response includes three tiers of support - local, State, and Federal (see Figure 23-2). Primary responsibility for responding to

domestic disasters and emergencies rests with the lowest level of government able to deal effectively with the incident. If the situation exceeds local capability, State authorities are next involved. If the State capability proves insufficient, Federal support is requested. Military forces and assets provide assistance when the circumstances warrant and there is an appropriate request by proper civilian authority. Military support can be provided at the State level (National Guard assets under State control) and at the Federal level (Active Army and U.S. Army Reserve forces).

**b. Local response.** In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the local responders arrive first on the scene. First responders normally include law enforcement, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), and hazardous materials (HAZMAT) teams. At the incident site, local authorities organize the various responders under the Incident Command System.


**(1) Incident Command System (ICS).**

**(a)** The Incident Command System has the flexibility for one or more agencies to coordinate and combine independent efforts in an effective and efficient response. It provides a action oriented system with one commander with reasonable span of control, common terminology, and is supportable by other emergency operation centers (EOC). The incident commander is normally the senior responder of the organization with the preponderance of responsibility for the event (for example, fire chief, police chief, or emergency medical services). Effective local response depends on the coordinated efforts of various departments and agencies, and may involve assets from surrounding communities. ICS provides for unity of command. There is only one incident commander for each incident.

**(b)** The incident commander will establish an incident command post to direct operations. An additional emergency operations center (EOC) may support and complement the incident command post. Within the Incident Command System there are four major functional areas: Operations; Logistics; Planning; and Finance.

**(c)** Should the situation dictate, the ICS will likely transition to a unified command. The Unified Command structure used at the incident will expand as mutual-aid partners, State, and Federal response elements arrive to assist with response operations.

**(2) Mutual aid agreements.** To supplement local capabilities, local governments establish mutual aid agreements with surrounding communities. Mutual aid agreements allow the provision of additional assets to the incident and provide for the expeditious flow of support to the incident site.



**Figure 23-2. Tiered Disaster/Emergency Response**

**c. State support.** If requirements exceed local capabilities, the local emergency services request additional support from county and State agencies.

**(1) Organizations.**

**(a) State office of emergency services (OES).** All States have a specific agency that coordinates emergency preparedness planning, conducts emergency preparedness training and exercises, and serves as the coordinating agency for the Governor in an emergency. The titles of these offices vary from State to State; for example, Division of Emergency Government, Emergency Management Agency, Department of Public Safety, or Office of Emergency Preparedness. Generally, the OES is either organized as a standalone office under the Governor or aligned under the adjutant general (TAG) of the State or the State police. The OES operates the State emergency operations center during a disaster or emergency, coordinates with Federal officials for support if required, and designates the State coordinating officer (SCO) for specific incidents.

**(b) The senior official in charge of OES varies by State.** In some States the adjutant general (TAG) is dual-hatted as the senior official, while in others the director of Emergency Services is the senior official. Some States make the TAG and OES equals. In Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, U.S. Virgin Islands, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming, the TAG and director of OES are the same person.

(c) *Governors.* State Governors are empowered by the U.S. Constitution and their State constitutions to execute the laws of the State and command the State National Guard when serving in State status. Similar authorities are given to the Governors of U.S. territories and possessions. Governors also issue executive orders declaring "states of emergency" and ensuring that State agencies plan for actions in the event of a disaster. Once a disaster occurs, the Governor determines whether to honor a local government request for assistance. If appropriate, the Governor declares a state of emergency, activates the State response plan, and may call up the National Guard. The Governor gives the National Guard its mission and determines when to withdraw Guard forces. The Governor informs the FEMA regional director of his actions.

(d) *National Guard.*

**1** Plans, operations, and military support officer (POMSO). The POMSO plans for disaster response and recovery for all support missions. Within each State and territory, the POMSO coordinates plans and exercises between the State National Guard and Federal, State, and local emergency management agencies. The POMSO serves as the National Guard point of contact with DOD officials during a Federal emergency or disaster.

**2** Air National Guard executive support staff officer (ESSO). The ESSO serves as the POMSO equivalent in the Air National Guard (ANG) for managing requests for assistance and activation of ANG forces, and serves in a chief of staff role to the assistant adjutant for air. The ESSO handles legislative matters, statewide ANG recruiting, Congressional inquiries, position classifications, liaison to the ANG Operations Center, and management of current issues impacting on ANG mission. The ESSO is the ANG MSCA and National Security Emergency Preparedness Program point of contact in each State.

(2) *Emergency assistance compacts.*

(a) Similar to local mutual aid agreements, States may be able to call upon other States for help through the use of interstate compacts. These compacts are legal agreements between two or more States, and may be general or limited in nature. They expedite the employment of interstate emergency response assets. State assets that are shared across state lines may involve all types of emergency support, to include National Guard assets. Assets provided by another State are under control of the Governor of the assisted State while they are providing assistance. Benefits of interstate compacts include:

- Pre-coordination to resolve fiscal and legal issues associated with crossing state lines.
- Predetermined command and control arrangements to insure unity of effort.
- Encouraging deliberate planning and coordination between States in advance of large disasters.
- Maximizing use and availability of scarce assets, personnel, and equipment among States.
- FEMA recognition of cross-state support as reimbursable.

(b) *Several compacts exist (see Table 23-1).* Under terms set by Congress, other States may join the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) without prior Federal Government approval.

(c) State assets deploy to support the city or county incident commander. If the State assets, including the National Guard, are not sufficient the Governor may request Federal support.

<b>Table 23-1. Emergency assistance compacts</b>	
Mutual Aide Compact (1952)	Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey
Southern Region Emergency Management Assistance Compact (1993)	Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, U.S. Virgin Islands, Virginia, and West Virginia
Southwest Governors Compact (Amended)	California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, and Utah
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)	Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia

**SECTION III  
FEDERAL RESPONSE PROCESS**

**23-9. Key authorities**

The authorities and constraints on Federal support efforts are codified in a wide range of laws, executive orders, Presidential Decision Directives and National Plans. Most are listed in Table 23-2. The noted authorities are not all-inclusive, but provide the basis for FEMA, the interagency community, and DOD to provide support to local and State entities.

Federal Laws	Public Law 100-707; The Stafford Act (with revisions) Public Law 104-201; Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (Nunn-Lugar-Domenici) Public Law 106-65; National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2000, Section 1023 Public Law 84-99 10 USC 331-335, Insurrection 10 USC 372-380, Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies 10 USC 2554, Provision of Support to Certain Sporting Events 10 USC 12304, Reserve and IRR Order to Active Duty Other Than During War or a National Emergency 18 USC 1385 Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus
Executive Orders	12148, FEMA, July 20, 1979 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, November 18, 1988
Presidential Decision Directives	PDD #39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, June 21, 1995 PDD #62, Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas, May 22, 1998 PDD #63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 22, 1998 PDD #67, Continuity of Government and Continuity of Operations, October 1998
National Plans	Federal Response Plan with Terrorism Annex (FEMA) Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FEMA) National Oil and Hazardous Substances (EPA) National Contingency Plan (NCP) (EPA) Health and Medical Services Support Plan for the Federal Response to Acts of Chemical/Biological Terrorism (DHHS/PHS) National Plan for Telecommunications Support in Non-Wartime Emergencies (National Communications System (NCS) Chemical/Biological Incident Contingency Plan (DOJ/FBI) Mass Immigration Emergency Plan "DISTANT SHORE" (DOJ/INS)

**23-10. Federal Response Plan**

**a.** The Federal Response Plan (FRP) provides the framework for Federal assistance to State and local governments for consequence management. The Stafford Act provided FEMA with the authority for coordinating Federal responses to emergencies. Working with other Federal agencies, FEMA developed and published the Federal Response Plan (Figure 23-3) with 29 department/agency signatories. The FRP organizes emergency response into twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). The FRP describes how the Federal Government will mobilize resources and conduct activities to assist States in coping with significant disasters. The FRP outlines Federal (including DOD) responsibilities and civil-military coordination requirements. The plan may be fully or partially activated, depending on the scope of the disaster, and the

needs of the supported State and local governments. Along with DOD, 27 other Federal departments and agencies, plus the American Red Cross provide support under full implementation of this plan.

**(1) FEMA Organizations.**

**(a) FEMA regional operations center (ROC).** FEMA and representatives from the primary ESF departments and agencies, and other supporting agencies as needed staff the ROC. The ROC serves as the point of contact for the State, the national Emergency Support Team, and Federal agencies until establishment of the disaster field office (DFO) near the incident location. The DOD regional emergency preparedness liaison officer (EPLO) teams will usually be the first DOD representation at the ROC. The ROC performs these functions:

- Gathers information regarding the affected area.
- Establishes communications links and serves as a point of contact for affected State(s), national emergency support team (EST), and Federal agencies.
- Supports deployment of emergency response teams to field locations.
- Serves as an initial coordination office for Federal activity until the DFO is established in the disaster area.
- Implements information and planning activities (ESF #5).
- Supports coordination of resources for multi-state and multi-regional disaster response and recovery operations, as needed. Serves as higher headquarters for multi-state, multi-region Disaster Field Offices.

**(b) Emergency response team-advance element (ERT-A).** The FEMA ERT-A element initially responds to an incident location. It forms the nucleus of the full ERT, which operates from an established DFO. FEMA regional program and support staff and selected representatives from the ESFs compose the ERT-A. The ERT-A organizes with administration and logistics, information and planning, and operations groups, and includes staff for public information, congressional and community liaison activities as required. The ERT-A team leader and selected staff may initially deploy to the State EOC, or to another designated State operating facility, to work directly with the State to obtain information on the impact of the event and begin identifying specific State requirement for Federal response assistance. Needs assessment begins with accurate and timely reporting from those in authority at the disaster site through State area coordinators to a State EOC. State EOC operating procedures allow for collection of on-scene information as to the exact nature of the situation. Needs assessment begins to unfold as this reporting takes place. In emergencies where the magnitude of an event requires collation of reports over a wide area, State EOCs have procedures to monitor the total situation and assess the magnitude of requirements from all reporting elements. Requirements for human needs and support to public infrastructure are determined as quickly as possible. Selected members of the ERT-A (leasing, communication and procurement representatives, logistical and other support staff from FEMA, the General Services Administration (GSA), and other agencies) may deploy directly to the disaster site to conduct on-scene damage assessment. They may also verify the location for a DFO, establish communications, and set up operations. In many instances the ERT-A team leader is appointed to serve as the Federal coordinating officer (FCO) after the Presidential disaster declaration.

(c) *Emergency response team (ERT)*. The ERT is the interagency group that provides administrative, logistical, and operational support to the regional response activities in the field. The ERT includes staff from FEMA and other agencies. The ERT also provides support for the dissemination of information to the media, Congress, and the public. Each FEMA regional office is responsible for maintaining an ERT, and developing appropriate procedures for its notification and deployment.

(d) *Disaster field office (DFO)*.

**1** The ERT-A selects a site for the DFO. The DFO serves as the disaster information clearing house, operations center, and command post

**2** The DFO is a coordinating center for the FCO and SCO and their primary support staffs. All of the ESFs are represented in the DFO.

(2) *Federal coordinating officer*. The FCO is head of the DFO and is supported in the field by staff carrying out public information, congressional liaison, community relations, outreach, and donation coordination activities. The FCO:

- Represents the President
- Coordinates overall Federal response and recovery activities with the affected State
- Works with the SCO to determine State support requirements including unfilled needs and evolving support, and to coordinate these requirements with the agencies/departments responsible for those ESFs
- Tasks any Federal agency to perform additional missions not specifically addressed in the FRP

(3) *National level organizations*:

(a) *Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG)*. The CDRG is the national-level coordinating group which addresses policy issues and support requirements. It is chaired by the FEMA Associate Director for Response and Recovery and includes representatives from the Federal departments and agencies that have responsibilities under the FRP. The CDRG addresses response issues and problems that require national level decisions or policy direction. Officials from other organizations not listed in the FRP, which have resources, capabilities, or expertise needed for the response effort, may augment the CDRG. The CDRG meets at the request of the CDRG Chair. Meetings are generally held at the Emergency Information and Coordination Center (EICC), located in FEMA National Headquarters, Washington, DC. The Director of Military Support (DOMS) represents DOD on the CDRG.

(b) *Emergency Support Team (EST)*. The EST is a group of representatives from each of the primary agencies, selected support agencies, and FEMA National Headquarters Staff. It operates from the FEMA EICC. The EST serves as the central source of information at the national level regarding the status of Federal response activities and helps disseminate information to the media, Congress, and the general public. The EST supports the CDRG. The EST also provides interagency resource coordination support to the FCO and regional response operations. In this capacity, the EST provides coordination support with the FCO, ERT, and ESF activities in the field. ESF representatives from the primary agencies provide liaison between field operations, their respective emergency operations center, and headquarters

activities. The EST also coordinates offers of donations, including unsolicited resources offered by various individuals and groups, for use in response operations. The EST coordinates for additional resources to support operations which an ESF department or agency is unable to obtain under its own authorities. The EST advises the CDRG on resource conflicts between ESF departments or agencies, which cannot be resolved in the affected region. The EST also provides overall coordination of resources for multi-state and multi-regional disaster response and recovery activities. A member of the DOMS staff serves on the EST.

**(4) Military.**

**(a) DOMS as action Agent.** DOMS will generally serve as the single interagency POC for military support requests and interface with national-level agencies. The Office of the SecDef Executive Secretary can also serve as an entry point for military support requests from the interagency process.

**(b) Emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLO).** Each State, territory, and FEMA Federal region has assigned Reserve officers from the Air Force, Army, and Navy, specifically trained in disaster preparedness and military support matters. These officers report to an active duty program manager or regional planning agent from their service, and are required to have a comprehensive knowledge of their service facilities and capabilities within the assigned area. As a service liaison to the Governor or Federal regional director, EPLOs assist in determining what DOD resources exist within the State, territory, or region. When a Defense coordinating officer (DCO) is appointed, the EPLOs serve as service representatives and advisors to the DCO.

**(c) State area command (STARC).** The STARC organizes, trains, plans, and coordinates the mobilization of National Guard units and elements for State and Federal missions. Deployment and employment of State National Guard units and elements are directed through the STARC.

**(d) DCO.** The DCO represents DOD as the DOD single point of contact in the DFO.

**(e) Joint task force (JTF).** Based on the level of DOD military support, the supported CINC may establish a JTF to provide command and control of DOD assets. In such cases, the DCO will generally report to the JTF commander.




Figure 23-3. The Federal Response Plan

b. The FRP groups disaster assistance into 12 functional areas called Emergency Support Functions (ESF), and assigns primary and support responsibilities for those ESF activities (see Table 23-3). During an emergency, some or all of the emergency support functions may be activated. Activation of the ESFs is based on the nature and scope of the event and the level of Federal resources required. The emergency support functions are outlined below, along with a list of the responsible primary departments and agencies.

<b>Table 23-3. Federal Response Plan Emergency Support Functions</b>		
ESF 1: Transportation	Responsibility: Provide civilian and military transportation support	Primary Agency: Department of Transportation
ESF 2: Communications	Responsibility: Provide telecommunications support	Primary Agency: National Communications System
ESF 3: Public Works and Engineering	Responsibility: Restore essential public services and facilities	Primary Agency: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Department of Defense
ESF 4: Fire Fighting	Responsibility: Detect and suppress wildland, rural and urban fires.	Primary Agency: U.S. Forest service, Department of Agriculture

ESF 5: Information and Planning	Responsibility: Collect, analyze and disseminate critical information to facilitate the overall Federal response and recovery operations.	Primary Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency
ESF 6: Mass Care	Responsibility: Manage and coordinate food, shelter and first aid for victims; provide bulk distribution of relief supplies; operate a system to assist family reunification.	Primary Agency: American Red Cross
ESF 7: Resource Support	Responsibility: Provide equipment, materials, supplies and personnel to Federal entities during response operations.	Primary Agency: General Services Administration
ESF 8: Health and Medical Services	Responsibility: Provide assistance for public health and medical care needs	Primary Agency: U.S. Public Health Service, Department of Health and Human Services
ESF 9: Urban Search and Rescue	Responsibility: Locate, extricate and provide initial medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures.	Primary Agency: Federal Emergency Management Agency
ESF 10: Hazardous Materials	Responsibility: Support Federal response to actual or potential releases of oil and hazardous materials.	Primary Agency: Environmental Protection Agency
ESF 11: Food	Responsibility: Identify food needs; ensure that food gets to areas affected by disaster.	Primary Agency: Food and Nutrition Service, Department of Agriculture
ESF 12: Energy	Responsibility: Restore power systems and fuel supplies.	Primary Agency: Department of Energy

c. DOD is responsible for ESF #3 (Public Works and Engineering), with the USACE as the DOD lead agency. Additionally, the DOMS is the DOD point of contact for military support related to ESF #5 (Info and Planning) and ESF #9 (Urban Search and Rescue).

### **23-11. Emergency Support Function #3 (Public Works and Engineering)**

The USACE executes a broad range of continuing domestic missions associated with civil works and is the logical Federal organization to respond to the FRP emergency support function for public works and engineering. USACE has a long history of providing civil support for flood control, water quality and hazard mitigation under Public Law 84-99, Support to State and Local Governments, and has organized and postured itself for civil support.

a. By law, the USACE assistance is limited to the preservation of life and protection of residential and commercial developments, to include public and private facilities that provide public services. Exclusive assistance to individual homeowners and businesses, including agricultural businesses, is not authorized. However, during periods of extreme drought, such assistance may be provided to farmers and ranchers under certain circumstances. Rehabilitation assistance may also be available for eligible flood control structures with public sponsors.

**b.** The geographically diverse location of USACE offices facilitates timely response to disasters in almost any area. Generally, the USACE is divided by watershed drainage basins into regional divisions. The divisions are subdivided by smaller drainage basins into districts. Personnel are also assigned to various field offices throughout each district. During disasters, personnel quickly mobilize to assist in response and recovery work.

**c.** Each USACE division and district has an emergency operations manager to carry out emergency actions. Each emergency operations manager is responsible for maintaining an emergency organization of trained specialists and is the established single point of contact for all emergency activities within the division or district.

**d.** Each USACE office develops plans based on hazards unique to its area, coordinates with appropriate agencies, and identifies response teams to support the assigned missions in the FRP. Training and exercises are conducted frequently to ensure the readiness of emergency team members when the FRP is activated.

**e.** Types of assistance provided by USACE under ESF #3 include—

- Technical advice and evaluations.
- Engineering services.
- Construction management and inspection.
- Emergency contracting.
- Emergency repair of wastewater and solid waste facilities.
- Real estate support.

**f.** Some of the activities within the scope of ESF #3 include emergency clearance of debris; restoration of critical public services and facilities, including supply of adequate amounts of potable water; temporary restoration of water supply systems; technical assistance; structural evaluation of buildings; and damage assessment.

## **SECTION IV**

### **DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MACA STRUCTURE**

#### **23-12. Civilian control**

A fundamental responsibility of government at all levels is the protection of its citizens. Primary responsibility appropriately rests with the civilian agencies of our Federal, State, and local governments. In a supporting role, military forces stand ready to provide these governmental authorities assistance when requested and approved by DOD civilian officials. As with all military operations, decision authority rests with the civilian leadership. When and how best to provide military support is a critical issue for the civilian leadership of DOD. Besides the SecDef, Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef), or SECARMY as decision-makers, civilian policy offices also perform key roles. These include:

**a.** Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) develops DOD policy and provides oversight for emergency planning and preparedness, crisis management, and defense mobilization in emergency situations.

**b.** Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness develops DOD policy and provides oversight for support to international sporting competitions.

**c.** Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) is principal staff advisor to the SecDef and USD(P) on special operations and crisis management support to the FBI matters. Responsibility includes overall civilian oversight of all DOD activities in combating terrorism and domestic chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear and high yield explosives (CBRNE) consequence management.

**d.** Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs develops DOD policy and provides oversight for medical support issues.

**e.** Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs develops DOD policy and provides oversight for reserve component involvement with domestic emergency situations.

**f.** Special Assistant to SECARMY for Military Support (SASA-MS) serves as Secretariat's principal assistant for policy oversight of the DOMS operations.

### **23-13. Policy principles**

The following principles serve as the foundation for civilian decisions on requests for military support:

**a.** Absolute and public accountability of officials involved in the oversight of the process while maintaining the constitutional principles and civil liberties of our system.

**b.** DOD must remain in a supporting role to the lead civilian agencies (domestic crisis management—FBI, domestic consequence management—FEMA; overseas—Department of State).

**c.** DOD support should emphasize its appropriate role among participating agencies, and its unique skills and structures such as ability to rapidly mobilize large numbers of personnel and equipment and provide a broad range of logistical support.

**d.** DOD should not acquire or maintain resources for disaster response that do not directly support the primary warfighting mission.

**e.** Existing legislative authorities governing DOD support to civilian agencies are generally adequate; DOD is not seeking “new missions” or greater authority.

### **23-14. DOD Executive Agent**

**a.** The SECARMY is the DOD Executive Agent for providing DOD resources to civil authorities. As the Executive Agent, the SECARMY oversees planning guidance and tasks DOD components (combatant command commanders in chiefs (CINCs), Services, and Defense agencies) to plan for and commit DOD resources in response to requests from civil authorities.

**b.** As Executive Agent, the SECARMY can approve most requests for DOD support. In cases of terrorism or civil disturbance, the SecDef must approve requests for use of CINC-assigned forces or when use of lethal force by military personnel in support to law enforcement is anticipated.

c. SASA-MS has been delegated as the Secretariat's principal assistant for policy oversight of MSCA operations.

### **23-15. Executive Agent missions**

**a. Standing missions.** As the Executive Agent for MACA, the SECARMY is responsible for a wide range of standing missions, including the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). These standing missions include wildland fire fighting; civil disturbances; military assistance to civilian law enforcement agencies; immigration emergencies; postal disruptions; animal disease eradication; DOD support for special events; military assistance to safety and traffic (MAST); military assistance to the District of Columbia in combating crime; and continuity of operations program. This executive agency does not include CBRNE events if OSD directs special management by the Joint Staff.

**b. Directed missions.** Supplementing the standing missions, the SECARMY frequently is designated the Executive Agent for selected missions (those that do not occur on a routine basis). Examples include Presidential Inaugurations, National Boy Scout Jamborees (assigned by separate legislation), and the NATO 50th Anniversary Summit.

**c. Other Army leading roles.** The SECARMY's role as Executive Agent for a number of these missions also reflects the Army's broad leading roles in support of DOD missions. Examples include: Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP); chemical-biological expertise; anthrax vaccination program; veterinary services; and population control (for example, civil unrest). Additional, as previously outlined, there is the separate Army role with the USACE public works and engineering mission.

### **23-16. Director of Military Support (DOMS)**

**a.** DOMS serves as Action Agent for the DOD Executive Agent (SECARMY) and ensures the performance of all planning and execution responsibilities for MACA. Organizationally, DOMS is located within the staff of the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans.

**b.** DOMS has responsibility for communicating and coordinating policy guidance and for the execution of standing and directed missions. DOMS conducts planning and prepares warning and execution orders that task DOD resources in response to specific requests from civil authorities.

**c.** DOMS is a joint organization that includes flag officers from all Services, including the U.S. Marine Corps and Coast Guard, which serve as Deputy DOMS. Deputy DOMS responsibilities include:

- Maintain service staff knowledgeable on MACA
- Provide service related advice and recommendations to DOMS
- Advocate appropriate service MACA mission assignment within the Service staff
- Provide assessment of DOD and service-specific MACA issues and work to and resolve service-related MACA issues
- Maintain active mission execution coordination with DOMS; provide information to DOMS of service MACA on-going activities

- Assist DOMS manning of crisis action team (CAT) or crisis response center (CRC) staffs
  - Support the EPLO and the Individual Mobilization Augmentation Program
- d.** Since DOD provides support to a LFA, a key to success is maintaining an informed relationship with Federal partners consistent with the FRP. DOMS competencies in support of DOD and the SECARMY Executive Agent mission are:
- Proven historical success
  - Extensive mission area knowledge base
  - Efficiency in timely responses, effective planning, and multi-component/Service engagement
  - Inherent organizational situational awareness (since the preponderance of military response is generally land-based forces)
  - Established infrastructure and linkage with Federal partners
  - Meeting legislative intent for Service Secretaries to manage non-combatant operations

### **23-17. Combatant command CINCs**

**a.** Generally, CINCs serve as the DOD principal planning agents and supported organizations for various geographic areas outside the U.S. and its territories, as designated in the Unified Command Plan. They validate all requests for military assistance in their areas of responsibility (AOR).

**b.** DOD support for domestic emergency situations is provided through Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM).

**(1)** JFCOM is responsible for coordinating and scheduling joint exercises for assigned forces, as well as de-conflicting the participation of forces in worldwide exercises, training events, and operational missions supporting one or more unified commands. Within CONUS, JFCOM provides domestic support operations to assist civil government agencies, including MACA (including CBRNE consequence management response), MSCA, and MACDIS subject to SecDef or SECARMY approval. Because of the residual MACA expertise within the Army components, the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), U.S. Army Southern Command (USARSO), and U.S. Army Pacific Command (USARPAC) were designated as the respective lead operational authority (LOA) for their respective CINCs.

**(2)** FORSCOM is JFCOM's LOA for MSCA and executes support to domestic emergencies through the Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs) and regional planning agents. First United States Army is located at Fort Gillem, GA, and is responsible for the States East of the Mississippi River, and Minnesota. Fifth United States Army is located at Fort Sam Houston, TX, and is responsible for the States west of the Mississippi River (except Minnesota). CONUSAs establish and maintain disaster relief liaison with appropriate Federal, State, and local authorities, agencies, and organizations; and plan for and conduct disaster relief operations within respective their AORs. To facilitate identification of DOD assets that might be applied to an emergency situation, FORSCOM maintains and updates the DOD Resource Data Base listing military equipment and facility support assets.

(3) USSOUTHCOM and USPACOM provide MACA (including CBRNE consequence management response), MSCA, and MACDIS subject to SecDef or SECARMY approval for areas of the U.S. and its territories and possessions in its assigned AOR.

## **SECTION V MILITARY SUPPORT PROCESS**

### **23-18. Principles of MACA**

The President and the SecDef establish priorities and determine what DOD resources will be made available for domestic support. Commanders ensure that DOD resources are used judiciously by adhering to the following principles:

- a. Civil resources are applied first in meeting requirements of civil authorities.
- b. DOD resources are provided only when response or recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of civil authorities (as determined by FEMA or another LFA for emergency response).
- c. DOD specialized capabilities (e.g. airlift and reconnaissance) are used efficiently.

Military forces shall remain under military command and control under the authority of the DOD Executive Agent at all times.

- d. DOD components shall not perform any function of civil government unless absolutely necessary and then only on a temporary basis under conditions of immediate response.
- e. Unless otherwise directed by the SecDef, military missions will have priority over MACA missions.

### **23-19. Leadership reviews**

Before acting on a request for DOD support, consideration is given to the operational, legal, and policy aspects of the response. Operational review ensures that providing support will not unduly impact operational readiness; legal review ensures DOD support is consistent with regulatory guidance and approved by the appropriate authorities; and policy review ensures that such support is in the best interests of DOD. To assist decision makers, DOD Directive 3025.15 establishes six criteria against which each request for support is assessed: legality (compliance with laws); lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces); risk (safety of DOD forces); cost; appropriateness; and readiness.

### **23-20. Planning parameters**

- a. National Guard forces, serving on State Active Duty, have primary responsibility for providing military assistance to State and local authorities in emergencies.
- b. DOD components and commanders ensure compliance with legal and regulatory requirements for the loan of equipment or provision of military assets in support of an emergency.
- c. Military support will ordinarily be provided on a full cost-reimbursable basis.

- d. DOD components will not procure, store, or maintain stocks or materiel exclusively for providing support in civil emergencies, unless otherwise directed by the SecDef.
- e. Military support will be provided in support of a LFA; military forces will always remain under military chain of command.
- f. Military support will generally be of short-duration to assist civil agencies with establishing essential safety and security; MACA missions generally do not exceed 30 days per incident.




Figure 23-4. Sequence for Disaster Support (MSCA)

**23-21. MSCA request and response process**

Figure 23-4 illustrates a typical DOD response to a disaster.

- a. When a disaster occurs, local authorities (for example, city and county fire fighters, HAZMAT teams, ambulances and police) respond to the event. Under the Incident Command System, the designated local official establishes an incident command post to coordinate efforts of all first responders. Local governments activate their operations centers.
- b. If the magnitude of the disaster exceeds the capabilities of the local authorities, they request support from other local communities under mutual aid agreements. If these assets cannot meet requirements, the local commander contacts the State EOC for additional support. The Governor assesses the situation, decides upon the level of response and whether to declare a State emergency. A portion of the State’s response may come from the National Guard operating under the Governor’s control. National Guard units have enormous capabilities to respond to disasters. The majority of disasters and emergencies in this country are handled by the State in which the disaster occurs, without Federal assistance.

c. If the magnitude of the disaster exceeds its capability the State will request additional aid under existing interstate compacts. When a disaster exhausts State and compact resources, the Governor may petition the President for Federal assistance and declaration of a Federal disaster area. At the same time, the State EOC will inform the regional FEMA director to begin Federal response coordination. The FEMA regional director activates the ROC and FEMA dispatches an ERT-A to the affected State. FEMA assesses the situation and advises the President on the appropriate Federal response. The ERT-A forms the nucleus of the developing FEMA DFO. FEMA designates a FCO to coordinate the all on-scene Federal efforts.

d. DOD involvement in disaster relief begins with a presidential declaration based on a request from the Governor. After Presidential declaration FEMA activates the FRP and DOD prepares to provide support through its executive agent (SECARMY). At the direction of the SECARMY, DOMS dispatches an Execute Order designating the supported CINC (usually JFCOM), establishing necessary supporting DOD agencies for the CINC's mission, and requires the CINC to appoint a DCO. If the situation warrants, a JTF will also be established. The DCO team sets up in or near the DFO to coordinate all DOD support for the disaster. The State and regional EPLOs serves as advisors to the DFO staff. The designated Federal forces respond to taskings for support validated by the DCO. Military forces establish on-scene command posts and operations centers appropriate to the level of response. The supported CINC will designate a Base Support Installation.

e. There will generally be at least one base support installation (BSI) for each disaster.

(1) A BSI is a military installation of any Service or Defense Agency close to an actual or projected domestic emergency contingency operational area that is designated to provide interservice (joint) administrative and logistical support to DOD forces deployed in the area. Federal military and civil assets may be positioned at or near the BSI.

(2) FORSCOM, as JFCOM's LOA for developing and executing domestic emergency contingency plans to support other Federal Agencies, will designate BSIs. Selection is based on geographic proximity to an operation, functional capability, and coordination with service regional planning agents (per DOD Directives 3025.1, 3025.12, and 3025.15 and DOD Manual 30251.1M).

(3) The DCO will task the BSI for specific support requirements for responding military forces (to include mission tasking numbers and cost estimates). FORSCOM will coordinate augmentation of BSI capabilities to overcome shortages and/or the unavailability of any of these services in the event of emergency operations.

(4) While specifics vary widely depending upon the nature and scope of the domestic emergency, personnel deployed to conduct MACA operations may number approximately 2,000 troops in a worst-case scenario; 600-1,200 is a more common figure. BSIs may typically be tasked to provide or coordinate for the following support to a brigade (-) sized light infantry unit:

- Transportation (personnel and supply) to/from and in/around the operational area (buses and trucks).
- Supply and distribution (food, water, ammunition, fuel, oil, repair parts, etc.).
- Communications for command and control operations.

- Large open areas to serve as bivouac sites, with food, laundry and basic subsistence services (latrines and showers).
  - Emergency medical services.
  - Airfield operations to receive and service military aircraft (helicopters and transport).
  - Contracting and purchasing of supplies and services.
  - Support maintenance of common type equipment.
  - Airfield control group and/or airlift control element.
  - Administrative, logistical and transportation support to FEMA civilian urban search and rescue teams (about 60 people each with 60,000 pounds of equipment and 4 working dogs).
  - Forward assembly areas in or near the area of operations.
- f. Military plans generally set out five phases of operations for providing disaster support.
- Phase I: Predeployment.
  - Phase II: Deployment.
  - Phase III: Support to civil authorities.
  - Phase IV: Transition to other Federal agencies.
  - Phase V: Redeployment.

### **23-22. Immediate response**

- a. Unique circumstances allow commanders to respond immediately, prior to any declaration, to imminently serious conditions that are beyond the capability of the local authorities.
- b. Local commanders can respond immediately to requests for assistance to save lives, prevent human suffering, and to mitigate great property damage.
- c. Once initiated, the installation commander must inform the DOD Executive Agent (DOMS) through command channels as soon as possible. The installation commander should also record all incremental costs associated with this activity for potential reimbursement later.
- d. Immediate response is normally of short duration (not longer than 72-hours).


### **23-23. National special security event**

To ascertain the full scope of DOD support to a potential terrorist situation (crisis and consequence management), DOD uses the Crisis Coordination Group (CCG). Through the CCG, DOD identifies known and likely DOD support for a potential or actual terrorist situation and then assesses the ability to meet the requirements.

**SECTION VI  
SPECIAL MACA SITUATIONS**

**23-24. Consequence management for chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear and high yield explosives (CBRNE)**

a. While the interagency community, in accordance with the FRP, views consequence management from an “all hazards” approach, DOD has further delineated consequence management for a subset of CBRNE. The interagency community refers to CBRNE as weapons of mass destruction (WMD).



**Figure 23-5. CBRNE (Consequence Management & Technical Operations Support)**

b. SecDef memorandum of 9 May 2001, Civilian Oversight of DOD Combating Terrorism and Consequence Management Activities, stipulates that the SecDef or DepSecDef personally approve deployment orders for combating terrorism and domestic CBRNE consequence management activities (see Figure 23-5). If an incident involving the deliberate, inadvertent, or potential release of CBRNE warrants special management procedures for the DOD response effort, the Joint Staff issues the necessary support orders. If special management procedures are not warranted, the SECARMY issues orders through DOMS.

c. DOD has designated elements to command and control the response to a CBRNE event.

(1) USCINJFCOM has established the Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS). The mission of JTF-CS is: “When directed, conduct consequence management operations in support of the designated LFA in response to a CBRNE incident or accident in CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. Territories and Possessions. The JTF-CS will establish command and control of designated DOD forces and provide military assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary critical life support.”

(2) The CONUSAs have formed response task forces (RTF) that can serve as command and control headquarters for additional military crisis management and consequence management support operations. The supported CINC deploys the RTF to support Federal crisis and consequence management operations in support of the LFA. The RTF Establishes communications and liaison with supported agencies, exercises operational control of committed DOD consequence management response forces, plans, coordinates, and executes military support to Federal, State, and local consequence management operations, and plans for and transitions to follow on missions or disengagement and redeployment.

d. States and local governments are responsible for consequence management. The State uses assets, to include the National Guard, to deal with the consequences of a CBRNE attack. The Governor can use all elements of the National Guard in his State. Unfortunately, many States do not have chemical or other special capability units in the State, or even in neighboring States. To enhance the national capability to deal with CBRNE attack consequence management, Congress has directed DOD to create National Guard Civil Support Teams

e. Civil support teams (CST) are made up of highly trained, full-time National Guard experts in a cross-discipline of functional areas. Their mission is to deploy and assess the situation, advise the local, State and Federal response elements, define requirements, and expedite employment of State and Federal military support. The CST is organized as an element under the peacetime control of the State adjutant general. During wartime, the CSTs provide force protection support within the State during mobilization. As with the other elements of the DOD response, these teams can also be used as part of a Federal (Title 10) response to support civil authorities.


### **23-25. Special event sporting competitions**

a. The DOD special event mission to support international sporting competitions was transferred to the Department of the Army in January 1997. This coincided with the enactment of 10 U.S.C. §2554, which authorizes DOD to provide support to such events, if the Attorney General certifies that the support is essential to the safety and security of the event.

b. DOMS plans, coordinates, and monitors execution of approved DOD support to international sporting competitions (SISC) and other special events. It focuses on categories of support in areas related to public safety and security. These areas include, but are not limited to, physical security, aviation, logistics, communications, joint operations and command centers, and explosive ordnance disposal support. DOD support for events may be reimbursable or non-reimbursable, depending on the type of support provided and the nature of the event. DOD supports non-sporting events on a reimbursable basis.

c. Congress has established a revolving fund to cover SISC operational expenditures. The legislation requires DOD to provide to Congress 45-day notification of planned SISC expenditures and an annual report of SISC expenditures for the preceding year.

**SECTION VII  
MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL DISTURBANCES (MACDIS)**



**Figure 23-6. Civil Disturbance Support Command and Control**

**23-26. MACDIS**

**a. Responsibilities.** The Department of Justice (DOJ) coordinates the Federal response to domestic civil disturbances. A Presidential Executive order must authorize military support. DOD supports DOJ in these efforts when requested and IAW rules of engagement approved by the General Counsel of DOD and the Attorney General.

**b. Planning.** Operations Plan GARDEN PLOT is the DOD plan for supporting State and local authorities during civil disturbances. This plan serves as the foundation for any MACDIS operation and standardizes most activities and command relationships.

**c. Concept of operations (see Figure 23-6).** The first use of military forces in support of local government would most likely be the State’s National Guard, under State active duty. The authority to call out the National Guard resides with the Governor. Using the Guard in State militia status avoids the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S. Code 1385) on aiding civil authorities with law enforcement. The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of Army or Air Force personnel to execute or enforce the laws, except as authorized by the Constitution or act of Congress. As a matter of DoD policy, this prohibition is also applicable to Navy and Marine Corps personnel.

(1) MACDIS requires a request from the Attorney General for military support, approval by the SecDef, and a decision by the President. The President is authorized by the Constitution and the Insurrection Act (10 U.S. Code 331-334) to suppress insurrections, rebellions and domestic violence under various conditions and circumstances. The President issues an Executive order that directs the Attorney General and the SecDef to take appropriate steps to disperse insurgents and restore law and order. DOD evaluates requests by civil authorities for Federal military assistance in civil disturbance operations against the following criteria:

- Legality: Compliance with laws.
- Lethality: Potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces.
- Risk: Safety of DOD forces.
- Cost: Impact on DOD budget.
- Appropriateness: Whether the requested mission is in the interest of DOD to conduct.
- Readiness: Impact on DOD's ability to perform its primary mission.

(2) Normally, DOD will stand up a JTF headquarters near where the Attorney General's local representative is based. The JTF commander, a general officer, coordinates all DOD support to the Justice Department with the Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG).

(3) After a Presidential Executive order has been issued and the execute order approved by the SecDef and directed by the SECARMY, JFCOM normally would deploy a quick reaction force (up to a brigade) for this mission. USCINCFJCOM has designated CDRFORSCOM as the coordinating authority for MACDIS planning within the USCINCFJCOM area of interest. The last time DOD forces were employed in a MACDIS operation was in May 1992, in Los Angeles, CA.

(4) Tasks performed by military forces committed to MACDIS include joint patrolling with law enforcement officers; securing key buildings, memorials, intersections and bridges; and acting as a quick reaction force. OPLAN GARDEN PLOT directs that all FORSCOM units receive periodic civil disturbance mission training and refresher training prior to employment in civil disturbance operations.

**d.** Civil disturbance conditions (CIDCONs). There are five conditions of increasing preparedness of military forces to prepare for deployment to an area operation in response to an actual or threatened civil disturbance.

- CIDCON 5 - Situational awareness; normal training and preparedness for units identified
- CIDCON 4 - Initiation of detailed planning and reconnaissance requirement; 12 hour response time and airlift prepared
- CIDCON 3 - Pre-positioning of forces and airlift at the airfields
- CIDCON 2 - Aircraft and vehicle loading
- CIDCON 1 - Deploy within one hour

## **SECTION VIII MACA CONSIDERATIONS**

### **23-27. Role of Reserve Component forces (see chapter 7, paragraph 7-50)**

The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) is capable of extensive support to domestic emergencies. Besides individuals serving as EPLOs, USAR assistance and support may include the use of individuals, units, equipment, and other resources. USAR personnel may be employed for civil emergencies in a volunteer status, be ordered to active duty for annual training, or be called to active duty after the President has declared a national emergency.

### **23-28. Media relations**

**a.** Any public safety event can become newsworthy, especially if it involves a possible CBRNE or WMD incident. Consequently, attention and scrutiny by the news media can be intense. During MACA operations, the news media provide invaluable service that can be used for the benefit of both the responding organizations and the public. However, the need to get accurate and timely information to the public, the sensitivity of the information, the possibility of causing public panic, the telling of good news stories to build confidence and hope within the affected communities, and the correction of false information caused by rumors and distorted reporting all must be weighed when deciding what can and should be released. The intent should be to insure that the media get as complete and accurate a story as possible, while ensuring that their activities do not adversely affect public safety or compromise the response activities.

**b.** From the DOD perspective, the military's role is clear—it is in support. In response to the common question that surfaces whenever an incident occurs—“Who’s in charge?”—the DOD answer is simple, “the military is in support”. Normally, the LFA establishes a joint information center (JIC) to deal with the media. Senior DOD representatives usually participate in JIC events. For major incidents, DOD will publish public affairs guidelines applicable to all participating DOD organizations. The guidance will outline any constraints and the policies for media interaction. Two common themes will usually be addressed—a civilian LFA is in charge, and military forces are providing support to the Nation in time of need.

## **SECTION IX SUMMARY AND REFERENCES**

### **23-29. Summary**

**a.** Our Nation has a time-tested tradition of civilian control over the military and of limiting military activity within the U.S. Balancing that valued tradition with the need for military support in response to disaster and acts or threats of terrorism within the U.S. requires approval by the most senior civilian officials within our Government.

**b.** The military has available a unique blend of skilled personnel and equipment capable of rapid and effective responses in support of the lead Federal, State, and local agencies. By policy, requests for military resources are only approved when other Federal, State and local agencies have exhausted their resources and the crisis remains unresolved.

**c.** While MACA normally involves military units performing tasks related to their wartime missions, the commitment of those units detracts from their ability to respond to possible combat

missions and usually adversely affects readiness. DOD leaders must be very judicious in determining when and how to provide support to civil authorities; must scrupulously adhere to approval and employment rules; and must be mindful that DOD resources are always in a support role.

d. Moving into the 21st century, the topic of Federal response to domestic terrorism will continue to be dynamic. Numerous issues may influence the future of DOD involvement:

- Is a national strategy needed to address the issues of domestic preparedness and response to terrorist incidents involving CBRNE materials?
- What is the optimal organizational structure within the Federal Government to combat terrorism?
- How might legislation produce more effective and efficient Federal organizations to counter terrorism?
- What is the appropriate role for the military in counter-terrorism and CBRNE incidents?

e. Given the nature of the potential threats and likely military missions, it is unlikely that preparation can cover all possible scenarios. Thus, tailored responses must be formulated, coordinated and, when required, implemented to minimize casualties and unnecessary damage to property. Responsible government organizations at all levels must continue to develop and refine programs and processes that will provide effective responses. Existing local, State, and national response systems provide a solid framework upon which DOD can provide support.

f. The military continues to provide reliable and responsive MACA. Moreover, the Army's extensive experience in supporting civil authorities during peacetime disasters, national security emergencies, and special events enhances homeland security, and has kept the U.S. Army in the forefront of domestic disaster response. The military's force projection capability, designed to respond quickly and decisively to global requirements, also allows its rapid response to domestic incidents that occur within the United States and its possessions. The judicious use of military forces in support of civil requirements complements the military's warfighting and force projection capabilities while insuring the American people get maximum return from their investment in the military.

### **23-30. References**

#### **a. Executive Orders (EOs):**

- (1) EO 12148, Establishment of FEMA, July 20, 1979.
- (2) EO 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, November 18, 1988.

#### **b. DOD Directives (DODDs):**

- DODD 1215.6, Uniform Reserve Training.
- DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program.
- DODD 2000.15, Support to Special Events
- DODD 3020.26, Continuity of Operations (COOP).
- DODD 3020.36, National Security Emergency Preparedness (NSEP).

- DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).
  - DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance to Civil Disturbances (MACDIS).
  - DODD 3025.13, United States Secret Service Support.
  - DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA).
  - DODD 3025.16, Military Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer Program
  - DODD 3150.5, Response to Improvised Nuclear Devices.
  - DODD 3150.8, Response to Radiological Accident.
  - DODD 4500.9, Transportation and Traffic Management.
  - DODD 5025.5, Military Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.
  - DODD 5030.41, Oil and Hazardous Substances.
  - DODD 5030.46, Assistance to District of Columbia in Combating Crime.
  - DODD 5030.50, Employment of Department of Defense Resources in Support of the United States Postal Service.
  - DODD 5160.54, Critical Asset Assurance Program.
  - DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.
  - DODD 6010.17, National Disaster Medical System.
- c. DOD Manual 3025.1, Manual for Civil Emergencies.
- d. Plans:
- (1) Federal Response Plan.
  - (2) DOD Civil Disturbance Plan - "GARDEN PLOT".
  - (3) DOD Postal Augmentation Plan - "GRAPHIC HAND".
  - (4) Joint Staff CONPLANS 0400 and 0500.
  - (5) Unified Command Plan.
  - (6) OPLAN Garden Plot, 15 Feb 91.
  - (7) JFCOM Functional Plans (FUNCPLANS):
    - (a) 2501-97, Domestic Disaster Relief.
    - (b) 2502-98, Civil Disturbance Plan.
    - (c) 2503-97, Mass Immigration Plan.
    - (d) 2504-99, Radiological Emergency Response.
    - (e) 2508-96, Medical Mobilization.
  - (8) USPACOM Functional Plan 5210-95, Domestic Disaster Response.
  - (9) USSOUTHCOM Functional Plan 6175-98, Domestic Disaster Operations – Puerto Rico/U.S. Virgin Islands.

**e. World Wide Web resources:**

- (1) FEMA: [www.fema.gov](http://www.fema.gov).
- (2) DOMS: [www.doms.pentagon.mil/](http://www.doms.pentagon.mil/) (restricted to .MIL or .GOV domains).
- (3) FORSCOM: [www.freddie.forscom.army.mil/maca/default.htm](http://www.freddie.forscom.army.mil/maca/default.htm) (for official use only and restricted to .MIL, .GOV, or authorized .US domains).
- (4) NGB:
  - (a) [www-ngb5.ngb.army.mil/](http://www-ngb5.ngb.army.mil/).
  - (b) [www.ngb.dtic.mil/](http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/).
- (5) USACE: [www.usace.army.mil/](http://www.usace.army.mil/).
- (6) NDMS: [www.oep.dhhs.gov/NDMS/ndms.html](http://www.oep.dhhs.gov/NDMS/ndms.html).
- (7) DHHS:
  - (a) [www.oep.dhhs.gov/CT\\_Program/ct\\_program.html](http://www.oep.dhhs.gov/CT_Program/ct_program.html).
  - (b) [www.cdc.gov/](http://www.cdc.gov/).
- (8) DOJ:
  - (a) [www.ndpo.gov/](http://www.ndpo.gov/).
  - (b) [www.ojp.usdoj.gov/terrorism/whats\\_new.htm](http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/terrorism/whats_new.htm).
- (9) NOAA: <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/mission.shtml>.
- (10) SBCCOM: [www.natick.army.mil/soldier/npc/index.htm](http://www.natick.army.mil/soldier/npc/index.htm) (National Protection Center).
- (11) Homeland Defense: [www.homelanddefense.org](http://www.homelanddefense.org).



# GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

The following alphabetical listings identify acronyms and abbreviations used throughout this text, their meanings, and the paragraphs, tables, or figures where they are first cited.

## A

<b>A2SF</b>	Active Army Strength Forecaster	13-10j
<b>AA</b>	Active Army	7-1
<b>AAC</b>	Army Acquisition Corps	11-12a
<b>AACMO</b>	Army Acquisition Corps Management Office	13-43d
<b>AAE</b>	Army Acquisition Executive	3-8b(2)
<b>AAESA</b>	Army Acquisition Executive Support Agency	9-55c
<b>AAFES</b>	Army and Air Force Exchange Service	12-4g
<b>AAMMP</b>	Active Army Military Manpower Program	13-10f
<b>AAO</b>	Army Acquisition Objective	5-33e
<b>AAR</b>	after-action review	Figure 15-7
<b>AASA</b>	Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army	9-30e(1)
<b>AAW</b>	Army acquisition workforce	11-16b
<b>ABC-C</b>	Army Benefits Center-Civilian	14-13b(7)
<b>ABCS</b>	Army Battle Command System	11-18e(3)
<b>ABO</b>	Army Budget Office	5-30h
<b>ACA</b>	airlift clearance authority	12-5c(7)(e)
<b>ACA</b>	Assimilative Crimes Act	20-8c
<b>ACAP</b>	Army Career and Alumni Program	13-56
<b>ACAT</b>	acquisition category	2-5c(1)
<b>ACC</b>	Active Competitive Category	13-35b(1)

## How the Army Runs

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<b>ACC</b>	Army component command	12-4c(4)(e)
<b>ACERT</b>	Army Computer Emergency Team	16-34c
<b>ACES</b>	Army Center of Excellence (Subsistence)	12-41
<b>ACES</b>	Army Continuing Education System	13-52
<b>ACF</b>	Acquisition Career Field	11-10
<b>ACIPS</b>	Army Casualty Information Processing System	13-54b
<b>ACM</b>	advanced concept manager	11-87b(5)
<b>ACO</b>	area claims office	20-12c
<b>ACOE</b>	Army Community of Excellence	17-41
<b>ACP</b>	Army cost position	11-17c(6)
<b>ACR</b>	armored cavalry regiment	5-31d
<b>ACS</b>	advanced civilian schooling	11-16b(2)
<b>ACSIM</b>	Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management	9-29c(2)
<b>ACSP</b>	ATAV client server prototype	12-8h(2)
<b>ACT II</b>	Advanced Concepts and Technology II	11-12c(7)
<b>ACTD</b>	advanced concept technology demonstration	11-7d
<b>ACTEDS</b>	Army Civilian Training, Education and Development System	13-43j
<b>ADA</b>	Anti-deficiency Act	10-17
<b>ADCATT</b>	Air Defense Combined Arms Tactical Trainer	15-40b(3)
<b>ADCSOPS-FD</b>	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff Operations and Plans-Force Development	2-5b(1)
<b>ADCSPRO-FD</b>	Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs-Force Development	11-17f(1)(b)
<b>ADD</b>	Authorizations Documentation Directorate	5-17
<b>ADL</b>	active duty list	13-31a
<b>ADM</b>	acquisition decision memorandum	11-34
<b>ADR</b>	alternative dispute resolution	14-22b(3)
<b>ADR</b>	annual Defense report	10-30h
<b>ADRS</b>	Army National Guard Division Redesign Study	7-59

<b>ADSO</b>	active duty service obligation	13-32a
<b>ADSW</b>	active duty for special work	7-21a(1)
<b>ADT</b>	active duty for training	7-21a(1)
<b>ADTDL</b>	Army Doctrinal Training Digital Library	15-13
<b>AE</b>	Army Enterprise	16-6
<b>AEA</b>	Army Enterprise Architecture	Table 9-2
<b>AEAGD</b>	AEA Guidance Document	16-13a
<b>AECA</b>	Arms Export Control Act	12-13
<b>AEF</b>	Army Expeditionary Force	7-5
<b>AEO</b>	Army Energy Office	12-5c(9)(a)
<b>AEP</b>	Affirmative Employment Program	14-22e
<b>AER</b>	academic evaluation report	13-45a
<b>AES</b>	Army Enterprise Strategy	16-7
<b>AFAMC</b>	Air Force Air Mobility Command	6-13a(7)(a)
<b>AFARS</b>	Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement	11-12c(12)
<b>AFHC</b>	Army Family Housing (Construction)	9-64b(1)(b)
<b>AFHO</b>	Army Family Housing (Operations)	9-64b(1)(a)
<b>AFM</b>	Army Flow Model	2-4b(1)(b)
<b>AFMIS</b>	Army Food Management Information System	12-5c(11)(c)2
<b>AFMS</b>	Army Force Management School	5-35
<b>AFS</b>	active Federal service	13-33a(5)
<b>AGR</b>	Active Guard Reserve	7-21a(1)
<b>AI</b>	artificial intelligence	15-40b(7)
<b>AIMP</b>	Army Intelligence Master Plan	18-8a(2)
<b>AIMS-R</b>	Automated Instructional Management System-Redesign	15-13
<b>AIS</b>	automated information systems	11-3b
<b>AISSP</b>	Army Information System Security Program	16-34c
<b>AIT</b>	advanced individual training	7-31b

## How the Army Runs

---

<b>AIT</b>	automatic identification technologies	12-8h(3)
<b>AKO</b>	Army Knowledge Online	16-34b(2)
<b>ALO</b>	authorized level of organization	5-22c(1)
<b>ALOC</b>	air line of communication	12-5c(7)(e)
<b>ALRPG</b>	Army Long Range Planning Guidance	4-11a
<b>AMC</b>	Army Materiel Command	3-4b
<b>AMCOM</b>	Aviation and Missile Command	11-13d
<b>AMCSS</b>	Army military clothing sales stores	12-5c(11)(d)
<b>AMEDD</b>	Army Medical Department	13-16
<b>AMEDDC&amp;S</b>	Army Medical Department Center and School	5-11a
<b>AMFP</b>	Army modernization fielding plan	11-57d(1)
<b>AMHA</b>	Army Management Headquarters Activities	5-30i
<b>AMOPES</b>	Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System	4-5b
<b>AMP</b>	Army Mobilization Plan	6-11d
<b>AMP</b>	Army modernization plan	5-8a
<b>AMS</b>	Army management structure	9-6a(12)(a)
<b>AMSAA</b>	Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity	12-5b(2)
<b>AMSCO</b>	Army management structure code	2-11b(6)(a)
<b>AMSO</b>	Army Modeling and Simulation Office	11-17g(1)(d)
<b>AMSP</b>	Advanced Military Studies Program	15-22a
<b>AMSS</b>	Army Materiel Status System	12-6b(12)(b)
<b>AMT</b>	Army modernization training	15-36
<b>AN</b>	Army Nurse Corps	19-6b
<b>ANC</b>	Arlington National Cemetery	21-9
<b>ANCO</b>	Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course	15-18c
<b>ANG</b>	Air National Guard	23-7c(1)(d) <u>2</u>
<b>ANGLICO</b>	air, naval gunfire liaison company	15-34c

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<b>ANNPRO</b>	annual program	13-14a
<b>ANSOC</b>	Army Network and Systems Operation Center	16-26
<b>AoA</b>	analysis of alternatives	5-9e
<b>AOA</b>	Army Operational Architecture	16-14
<b>AOC</b>	area of concentration	5-14e
<b>AOI</b>	area-of-interest	5-16b
<b>AOLCM</b>	Army Organizational Life Cycle Model	2-6
<b>AOP</b>	Army order of precedence	11-57b
<b>AOR</b>	area of responsibility	23-17a
<b>APB</b>	acquisition program baseline	5-9e
<b>APF</b>	appropriated fund	14-2a
<b>APFT</b>	Army physical fitness test	7-34
<b>APG</b>	Army Planning Guidance	9-41b(2)
<b>APGM</b>	Army Program Guidance Memorandum	4-14b(10)
<b>APIC</b>	Army performance improvement criteria	17-41f
<b>APMC</b>	Advance Program Management Course	11-10
<b>APO</b>	Army procurement objective	12-8a(2)
<b>APP</b>	affirmative program plans	14-22d
<b>APS</b>	Army pre-positioned stocks	12-4c(1)(e)
<b>APSES</b>	Army prepositioned stocks equipment sets	5-27a
<b>AR</b>	Army regulation	2-5c(2)
<b>ARB</b>	Army Resources Board	9-6a(14)
<b>ARBUCS</b>	Army RDA Budget Update Computer System	9-27
<b>ARCOM</b>	Army Reserve Command	7-31a(3)
<b>ARFPC</b>	Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee	7-28c
<b>ARFOR</b>	Army forces	12-4c(4)(e)
<b>ARI</b>	Army Research Institute	9-47e
<b>ARL</b>	Army Research Laboratory	11-21e

## How the Army Runs

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<b>ARMS</b>	Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support Program	10-33d
<b>ARNG</b>	Army National Guard	5-22a
<b>ARNG-TSP</b>	Army National Guard Troop Structure Program	5-30f
<b>ARO</b>	Army Research Office	11-21i
<b>AROC</b>	Army Requirements Oversight Council	2-5c(1)
<b>AR-PERSCOM</b>	Army Reserve Personnel Command	6-12e(5)
<b>ARPRINT</b>	Army Program for Individual Training	9-22f(2)
<b>ARSEC</b>	Army Secretariat	3-8b
<b>ARSTAF</b>	Army Staff	2-4b(1)(b)
<b>ARSTRUC</b>	Army structure	5-20b
<b>ARTEP</b>	Army Training and Evaluation Program	2-6a(7)
<b>AS</b>	acquisition strategy	11-3a
<b>ASA</b>	Army Systems Architecture	16-15
<b>ASA(ALT)</b>	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology)	9-5a(12)
<b>ASA(CW)</b>	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works)	21-4a
<b>ASA(FM&amp;C)</b>	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	5-30h
<b>ASA(M&amp;RA)</b>	Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)	5-30h
<b>ASARC</b>	Army Systems Acquisition Review Council	9-8a(4)
<b>ASAS</b>	All Source Analysis System	18-3a
<b>ASAT</b>	Automated Systems Approach to Training	15-13
<b>ASB</b>	Army Science Board	11-22b
<b>ASCC</b>	Army service component command	9-5a(9)
<b>ASD</b>	Assistant Secretary of Defense	6-16b
<b>ASD(C3I)</b>	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)	11-62i
<b>ASD(ES)</b>	ASD (Economic Security)	6-16b
<b>ASD(HA)</b>	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health Affairs)	19-4b(3)

<b>ASD(PA)</b>	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)	22-28
<b>ASD(RA)</b>	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)	7-26a
<b>ASD(SO/LIC)</b>	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict	23-7c
<b>ASG</b>	area support groups	15-34c
<b>ASI</b>	additional skill identifier	2-6a(3)
<b>ASIOE</b>	associated support items of equipment	11-57c(2)
<b>ASIOEP</b>	associated support items of equipment and personnel	2-6a(2)
<b>ASL</b>	authorized stockage list	2-6a(6)
<b>ASMP</b>	Army Strategic Mobility Program	12-5c(7)(c)2
<b>ASP</b>	ammunition supply point	12-8h(3)(a)1
<b>ASPG</b>	Army Strategic Planning Guidance	4-14b(7)
<b>ASPP</b>	Army Strategic Planning Process	9-42b
<b>ASTAG</b>	Army Science and Technology Advisory Group	11-18e(1)(e)
<b>ASTMP</b>	Army's Science and Technology Master Plan	5-3a
<b>ASTWG</b>	Army Science and Technology Working Group	11-21g
<b>ASVAB</b>	Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery	13-14b(1)
<b>AT</b>	annual training	7-4
<b>AT/FP</b>	Antiterrorism/Force Protection Program	20-24i
<b>ATA</b>	Army Technical Architecture	16-15
<b>ATAV</b>	Army Total Asset Visibility	12-8h
<b>ATCP</b>	Army Transformation Campaign Plan	11-57a(2)
<b>ATD</b>	advanced technology demonstration	11-7d
<b>ATDP</b>	Army TOE development plan	5-16a
<b>A TEC</b>	Army Test and Evaluation Command	3-6a
<b>ATMG</b>	Army Transfer Management Group	20-25a(3)
<b>ATRRS</b>	Army Training Requirements and Resources System	9-22f(2)
<b>ATSC</b>	Army Training Support Center	15-11d
<b>ATSD-IO</b>	Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight	18-5e

## How the Army Runs

---

<b>AUB</b>	Army Uniform Board	12-5c(11)(d)
<b>AUGTDA</b>	augmentation table of distribution and allowances	5-31
<b>AUTS</b>	Automatic Update Transaction System	5-30h
<b>AVCATT</b>	Aviation Combined Arms Tactical Trainer	15-40b(3)
<b>AVIM</b>	aviation intermediate maintenance	12-5c(6)(b)
<b>AVUM</b>	aviation unit maintenance	12-5c(6)(b)
<b>AW</b>	Articles of War	20-14b
<b>AWCF</b>	Army Working Capital Fund	9-60d
<b>AWCF-SMA</b>	Army Working Capital Fund, Supply Management Army	12-4c(4)(f)
<b>AWE</b>	advanced warfighting experiment	5-8a(1)

### **B**

<b>BA</b>	budget activity	9-7d
<b>BA</b>	budget authority	9-64b(2)
<b>BAA</b>	broad agency announcement	11-21i
<b>BAG</b>	budget activity group	9-7d
<b>BAH</b>	basic allowance for housing	13-17c
<b>BASOPS</b>	base operations	17-10
<b>BCD</b>	bad conduct discharge	20-19d(3)
<b>BCIS</b>	Battlefield Combat Identification System	11-88b
<b>BCT</b>	basic combat training	15-15
<b>BCT</b>	brigade combat team	1-8b
<b>BCTP</b>	Battle Command Training Program	15-34
<b>BDA</b>	battle damage assessment	12-5c(6)(b)2
<b>BDS</b>	Battlefield Distribution System	12-10c
<b>BEF</b>	Base Engagement Force	5-22b(2)
<b>BES</b>	budget estimate submission	5-30h
<b>BFVS</b>	Bradley Fighting Vehicle System	2-3a

<b>BGF</b>	Base Generating Force	5-22b(2)
<b>BIT/BITE</b>	built-in-test/built-in-test equipment	12-5c(6)(d)
<b>BLIN</b>	budget line item number	9-7d
<b>BLTM</b>	Battalion Level Training Model	5-30h
<b>BMDO</b>	Ballistic Missile Defense Organization	11-18g
<b>BNCOC</b>	Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course	15-18b
<b>BOD</b>	board of directors	12-4g(1)
<b>BOD</b>	broadcast operations detachment	22-26
<b>BOIP</b>	basis-of-issue plan	2-4b(1)(b)
<b>BOIPFD</b>	basis-of-issue plan feeder data	5-18b
<b>BOS</b>	battlefield operating systems	15-34b
<b>BOS</b>	budget operating systems	11-81b
<b>BPR</b>	business process reengineering	11-17e(3)
<b>BRAC</b>	base realignment and closure	12-6b(12)
<b>BRP</b>	basic research plan	11-7
<b>BRS</b>	Budget Review System	9-21d(3)(d)
<b>BSA</b>	budget subactivity	9-7d
<b>BSB</b>	base support battalion	17-9
<b>BSI</b>	base support installation	23-21e
<b>BSNCOC</b>	Battle Staff Noncommissioned Officer Course	15-18g
<b>BT</b>	basic training	7-31b
<b>BTOE</b>	base table of organization and equipment	5-14c
<b>BY</b>	budget fiscal year	9-12a(1)(c)

**C**

<b>C3I</b>	command, control, communications, and intelligence	9-15b(1)
<b>C4I</b>	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence	11-7e(4)
<b>C4I/IT</b>	command, control, communications, computers and intelligence/information technology	16-2

<b>C4ISR</b>	command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance	16-3
<b>CA</b>	civil affairs	4-22b(6)
<b>CAA</b>	U.S. Army Center for Army Analysis	5-22a(1)(c)
<b>CAC</b>	Combined Arms Center	11-18e(2)
<b>CAC</b>	common access card	16-25e
<b>CAE</b>	Component Acquisition Executive	11-12
<b>CAIG</b>	Cost Analysis Improvement Group, OSD	11-67d
<b>CAIV</b>	cost as an independent variable	5-4a(4)
<b>CALS</b>	Committee for Ammunition Logistic Support	12-8g(2)
<b>CAP</b>	crisis action (time sensitive) planning	6-3i(3)
<b>CAP</b>	critical acquisition position	11-9
<b>CAR</b>	Chief, Army Reserve	7-30a
<b>CARDS</b>	catalog of approved requirements documents	11-17g(2)
<b>CAS<sup>3</sup></b>	Combined Arms and Services Staff School	15-21
<b>CASCOM</b>	U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command	5-22a(1)(b)1
<b>CAT</b>	crisis action team	23-16c
<b>CATS</b>	combined arms training strategy	5-9b
<b>CATT</b>	Combined Arms Tactical Trainer	15-40b(2)
<b>CATT</b>	Computer Automated Transportation Tool	12-8h(3)(e)
<b>CBDCOM</b>	Chemical and Biological Defense Command	12-6b(11)
<b>CBL</b>	commercial bills of lading	12-5c(7)(c)3
<b>CBRNE</b>	chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear and high yield explosives	23-12c
<b>CBS</b>	Corps Battle Simulation	15-34a(2)
<b>CBS-X</b>	Continuing Balance System, Expanded	12-8a(2)
<b>CBT</b>	combat	5-19d
<b>CBTDEV</b>	combat developer	11-13b
<b>CCA</b>	Clinger-Cohen Act	16-4a

<b>CCA</b>	component cost analysis	11-17c(5)
<b>CCC</b>	captains career course	15-21
<b>CCG</b>	Crisis Coordination Group	23-23
<b>CCP</b>	Consolidated Cryptologic Intelligence Program	18-5a
<b>CCP</b>	consolidation/containerization point	12-10a(2)
<b>CCSS</b>	Commodity Command Standard System	12-10
<b>CCTT</b>	Close Combat Tactical Trainer	15-40b(3)
<b>CDC</b>	Combat Development Command	3-3
<b>CDPL</b>	command designated positional list	13-42
<b>CDRG</b>	Catastrophic Disaster Response Group	23-10a(3)(a)
<b>CD-ROM</b>	compact disk read only memory	12-6b(12)(b)
<b>CE</b>	continuous evaluation	11-71c
<b>CEAC</b>	U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center	10-4e(4)
<b>CECOM</b>	Communications-Electronics Command	11-13d
<b>CEG-A</b>	Combat Equipment Group-Afloat	12-6b(2)(a)
<b>CEG-E</b>	Combat Equipment Group-Europe	12-6b(2)(a)
<b>CEHNC</b>	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Huntsville Center Engineering Support	17-30d
<b>CELP</b>	civilian employment level plan	9-9a(4)(b)
<b>CEM</b>	Concepts Evaluation Model	5-22a(3)
<b>CENDOC</b>	centralized documentation	5-30d
<b>CENTCOM</b>	Central Command	15-27c
<b>CEP</b>	concept experimentation program	11-19a(3)
<b>CERB</b>	Civilian Executive Resources Board	14-24d
<b>CERBOC</b>	Civilian Executive Resources Board Operations Committee	14-24d
<b>CERL</b>	Construction Engineering Research Laboratory	21-6b
<b>CERLA</b>	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act	17-31a
<b>CFDB</b>	Career Field Designation Board	13-38c

<b>CFJO</b>	concept for future joint operations	5-6b
<b>CFM</b>	CONUS Freight Management	12-4e(5)(a)
<b>CFO</b>	chief financial officer	10-28
<b>CFR</b>	Code of Federal Regulations	6-17a
<b>CFSC</b>	Community and Family Support Center	14-10b
<b>CG</b>	commanding general	5-3a
<b>CG</b>	Chairman's Guidance	4-7b(1)
<b>CG CAP</b>	Coast Guard Capabilities Plan	6-3
<b>CG LSCP</b>	Coast Guard Logistic Support and Capabilities Plan	6-3
<b>CGSOC</b>	Command and General Staff Officers Course	7-31a(5)
<b>CHAMPUS</b>	Civilian Health and Medical Program Uniformed Services	19-4 b(3)
<b>CHR</b>	civilian human resource	Chapter 14 quote
<b>CHS</b>	combat health support	19-17b
<b>CI</b>	counterintelligence	18-3d(7)
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency	6-7k
<b>CIB</b>	combined information bureau	22-30
<b>CIC</b>	critical intelligence category	11-62a
<b>CIDC</b>	U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command	20-20a(1)
<b>CIDCONS</b>	civil disturbance conditions	23-26d
<b>CIDSS</b>	Combat Identification Dismounted Soldier System	11-88b
<b>CIE</b>	clothing and individual equipment	12-5c(11)
<b>CIF</b>	central issue facility	12-10d(9)
<b>CINC</b>	commander in chief	1-7
<b>CINCPAC</b>	CINC Pacific Command	6-12e(3)
<b>CIO</b>	Central Imagery Office	6-7k
<b>CIO</b>	chief information officer	11-12b
<b>CIP</b>	contract in process	10-25b
<b>CIPPS</b>	Civilian Integration into the Personnel Proponent System	13-5c(1)(e)

<b>CIV</b>	civilian	5-30h
<b>CJA</b>	command judge advocate	20-1
<b>CJCS</b>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	4-2
<b>CJCSI</b>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction	4-6a
<b>CJCSM</b>	Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum	6-3i
<b>CLAMO</b>	Center for Law and Military Operations	20-22c
<b>CLRP</b>	Command Logistics Review Program	12-5c(2)
<b>CM</b>	calendar month	13-19d(2)
<b>CM(FS)</b>	command manager (force structure)	2-11b(3)
<b>CM(PBG)</b>	command manager (program budget guidance)	2-11b(6)
<b>CMF</b>	career management field	7-52c
<b>CMICS</b>	Civilian Manpower Integrated Costing System	5-30h
<b>CMO</b>	civil-military operations	22-2e
<b>CMS</b>	community management staff	18-4d
<b>CMTC</b>	Combat Maneuver Training Center	15-34
<b>CND</b>	computer network defense	16-34c(1)
<b>CNGB</b>	Chief, National Guard Bureau	7-29a
<b>COA</b>	course of action	6-3c(6)
<b>COB</b>	Commissary Operating Board	12-4k(2)
<b>COC</b>	council of colonels	5-22a(2)(a)
<b>COE</b>	Chief of Engineers	11-17i
<b>COE</b>	U.S Army Corps of Engineers	3-3
<b>COG</b>	continuity of government	23-4a
<b>COHORT</b>	Cohesion, Operational Readiness, and Training System	2-3c
<b>COIC</b>	critical operational issues and criteria	11-19a(2)
<b>COMMZ</b>	communications zone	12-4f(2)
<b>COMPO</b>	component	5-22c(4)(b)
<b>CONARC</b>	Continental Army Command	3-4a(1)

## How the Army Runs

---

<b>CONOPS</b>	concept of operations	6-3j(3)
<b>CONOPS</b>	contingency operations	17-8a
<b>CONPLAN</b>	concept plan	2-11b(7)(e)
<b>CONUS</b>	continental United States	3-3
<b>CONUSA</b>	Continental U.S. Army	7-49b(5)
<b>CORM</b>	Commission on Roles and Missions	17-22c
<b>CORTRAIN</b>	Corps and Division Training Coordination Program	7-41b
<b>COSCOM</b>	corps support command	12-4f(3)
<b>COTS</b>	commercial-off-the-shelf	11-19b(7)
<b>CPA</b>	Chairman's Program Assessment	4-9b(1)
<b>CPA</b>	Chief of Public Affairs	22-17a
<b>CPAC</b>	civilian personnel advisory center	14-4
<b>CPG</b>	Contingency Planning Guidance	9-40
<b>CPIPT</b>	cost performance integrated product team	11-13f(8)
<b>CPO</b>	claims processing office	20-12c
<b>CPOC</b>	Civilian Personnel Operations Center	14-4
<b>CPOCMA</b>	Civilian Personnel Operations Center Management Agency	14-11c
<b>CPOL</b>	Civilian Personnel Online Library	14-13b(2)
<b>CPR</b>	Chairman's Program Recommendation	4-9b(1)
<b>CRA</b>	continuing resolution authority	9-62c
<b>CRB</b>	cost review board	11-17c(6)
<b>CRC</b>	CONUS replacement center	6-12d(3)
<b>CRC</b>	crisis response center	23-16c
<b>CRD</b>	capstone requirements document	2-5c(1)
<b>CRESTS</b>	Contingency Real Estate Support Teams	21-18
<b>CRITIC</b>	critical intelligence communications	6-8a(1)
<b>CRREL</b>	Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory	21-6b
<b>CS</b>	combat support	5-19d

<b>CS/CSS</b>	combat support/combat service support	15-22a(1)(c)
<b>CSA</b>	Chief of Staff, U.S. Army	1-3b
<b>CSEPP</b>	Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program	23-15c
<b>CSG</b>	corps support groups	15-34c
<b>CSL</b>	command selection list	13-42
<b>CSMC</b>	Command Sergeants Major Course	15-18e
<b>CSS</b>	combat service support	5-19d
<b>CTA</b>	common table of allowance	12-5c(11)(d)
<b>CTC</b>	combat training center	2-6a(7)
<b>CTT</b>	collective task list	2-6a(7)
<b>CTU</b>	consolidated TOE update	5-16b
<b>CUITN</b>	Common User Installation Transport Network	16-22
<b>CY</b>	calendar year	17-26
<b>CY</b>	current fiscal year	9-23b

**D**

<b>DA</b>	Department of the Army	2-7e
<b>DAADB</b>	Department of the Army Active Duty Board	13-47b
<b>DAAS</b>	Defense Automatic Addressing System	12-10a(1)
<b>DAB</b>	Defense Acquisition Board	9-8a(2)
<b>DACIL</b>	DA critical items list	6-20b
<b>DACM</b>	Director of Acquisition Career Management	11-12a
<b>DAE</b>	Defense Acquisition Executive	9-13e
<b>DAES</b>	Defense Acquisition Executive summary	11-63g
<b>DAIG</b>	Department of the Army Inspector General	2-4a
<b>DALSO</b>	DA logistics support officer	11-17h(1)
<b>DAMMS-R</b>	Department of the Army Movement Management System-Redesign	12-10d(6)

## How the Army Runs

---

<b>DAMPL</b>	Department of the Army Master Priority List	2-6a(6)
<b>DANTES</b>	Defense Activity for Non-Traditional Education Support	13-52a(6)
<b>DAO</b>	Defense Accounting Office	10-20
<b>DARNG</b>	Director, Army National Guard	7-29f
<b>DARPA</b>	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	1-3a
<b>DASA(B)</b>	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Budget	9-6b
<b>DASA(CPP)</b>	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civilian Personnel Policy)	14-10a
<b>DASA(FO)</b>	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Operations)	10-4e(2)
<b>DASA(L)</b>	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Logistics)	12-5c(9)(a)
<b>DASA(RB)</b>	Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Resource Analysis & Business Practices)	10-4e(3)
<b>DASC</b>	DA system coordinator	11-12d
<b>DAU</b>	Defense Acquisition University	11-9
<b>DAWIA</b>	Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act	11-9
<b>DC</b>	Dental Corps	19-6b
<b>DCD</b>	Directorate of Combat Developments	11-18e(2)
<b>DCG, IET</b>	Deputy Commanding General for Initial Entry Training	15-16
<b>DCI</b>	Director, Central Intelligence	11-18c(3)
<b>DCINT/SEC</b>	Directorate of Counterintelligence and Security	17-16b
<b>DCIPS</b>	Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System	14-10c
<b>DCLM</b>	Department of Command, Leadership, and Management	1-9b
<b>DCMA</b>	Defense Contract Management Agency	12-4j
<b>DCO</b>	Defense coordinating officer	23-10a(4)(b)
<b>DCPDS</b>	Defense Civilian Personnel Data System	14-13a
<b>DCSBOS</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Base Operations Support	15-11b
<b>DCSCD</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments	15-11b
<b>DCSDOC</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine	15-11b
<b>DCSIM</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Information Management	15-11b

<b>DCSINT</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence	4-14a(5)
<b>DCSIntel</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence (USARC)	16-32b
<b>DCSLOG</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics	8-16c
<b>DCSOPS</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans	2-5a
<b>DCSPER</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel	5-3a
<b>DCSPIM</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Installation Management	17-4a
<b>DCSPRO</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs	2-5a
<b>DCSRM</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management	15-11b
<b>DCST</b>	Deputy Chief of Staff for Training	15-11b
<b>DD</b>	dishonorable discharge	20-19d(4)(a)
<b>DDACM</b>	Deputy Director of Acquisition Career Management	11-16a
<b>DDCI</b>	Deputy Director for Central Intelligence	18-2a
<b>DDN</b>	Defense Data Network	6-3c(7)
<b>DDS</b>	Director of Dental Services	17-16d
<b>DeCA</b>	Defense Commissary Agency	12-4k
<b>DENTAC</b>	dental activity	19-18b
<b>DEOMI</b>	Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute	13-53b
<b>DEP</b>	Delayed Entry Program	20-6b(2)
<b>DepSecDef</b>	Deputy Secretary of Defense	9-2d
<b>DERA</b>	Defense Environmental Restoration Account	17-31b
<b>DEROS</b>	date eligible to return from overseas	13-19e(2)(b)
<b>DESC</b>	Defense Energy Support Center	17-30d
<b>DET</b>	displaced equipment training	15-36
<b>DFARS</b>	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement	11-12c(12)
<b>DFAS</b>	Defense Finance and Accounting Service	9-7e
<b>DFAS-IN</b>	Defense Finance and Accounting Service-Indiana	9-26b
<b>DFO</b>	dining facility operations	12-10d(7)
<b>DFO</b>	disaster field office	23-10a(1)(a)

## How the Army Runs

---

<b>DHP</b>	Defense Health Program	19-6d
<b>DHS</b>	director of health services	17-16d
<b>DI</b>	document integrator	2-11
<b>DIA</b>	Defense Intelligence Agency	6-7k
<b>DII</b>	Defense Information Infrastructure	16-34c(1)
<b>DIS</b>	Directorate of Installation Support	17-16k
<b>DIS</b>	distributed interactive simulation	11-23c
<b>DISA</b>	Defense Information Systems Agency	6-7k
<b>DISC4</b>	Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers	9-29c(1)
<b>DISCOM</b>	division support command	12-4f(4)
<b>DISL</b>	Defense Intelligence Senior Leader	14-29c
<b>DISN</b>	Defense Information System Network	16-22
<b>DIV(IT)</b>	division (institutional training)	7-52b
<b>DIVARTY</b>	division artillery	5-28b
<b>DL</b>	distance learning	11-13f(4)
<b>DLA</b>	Defense Logistics Agency	6-7k
<b>DLEA</b>	drug law enforcement agencies	7-49b(4)
<b>DLMP</b>	Doctrine and Literature Master Plan	5-9a
<b>DLMSO</b>	Defense Logistics Management Standards Office	12-9
<b>DMA</b>	Defense Mapping Agency	6-7k
<b>DMC</b>	Defense Management Council	12-4k(2)
<b>DMO</b>	directed military overstrength	5-30e
<b>DMRD</b>	defense management review decision	12-6b(12)
<b>DMSSC</b>	Defense Medical Support Center	19-7c(3)(h)
<b>DOC</b>	Department of Commerce	6-17a
<b>DOC</b>	Directorate of Contracting	17-16m
<b>DOD</b>	Department of Defense	2-6a(2)

<b>DODD</b>	Department of Defense Directive	11-4b
<b>DODI</b>	Department of Defense Instruction	11-4b
<b>DOE/FEMP</b>	Department of Energy/ Federal Energy Management Program	17-30d
<b>DOIM</b>	Director of Information Management	16-32c
<b>DOJ</b>	Department of Justice	20-13c(4)(b)
<b>DOL</b>	Directorate of Logistics	17-16
<b>DOMS</b>	Director of Military Support	23-10a(3)(a)
<b>DOPMA</b>	Defense Officer Personnel Management Act	13-31
<b>DOS</b>	Department of State	6-7k
<b>DOT&amp;E</b>	Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOD)	11-32
<b>DPAE</b>	Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation	9-4
<b>DPAS</b>	Defense Priorities and Allocations System	6-17
<b>DPCA</b>	Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities	17-16g
<b>DPD</b>	Defense Programming Database	9-12f
<b>DPG</b>	Defense Planning Guidance	2-6a(2)
<b>DPP</b>	dedicated procurement program	7-37
<b>DPTM</b>	Directorate of Plans, Training and Mobilization	17-16a
<b>DPW</b>	Directorate of Public Works	17-16j
<b>DRB</b>	Defense Resources Board	4-4
<b>DRC</b>	direct reporting commands	7-15
<b>DRID</b>	Defense Reform Initiative Directive	17-34d
<b>DRM</b>	DAB readiness meeting	11-67b
<b>DRM</b>	Directorate of Resource Management	17-16h
<b>DRMO</b>	Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office	2-6a(8)
<b>DS</b>	direct support	5-22b(1)(c)
<b>DSA</b>	Deputy for Systems Acquisition (AMC)	11-13d
<b>DSAA</b>	Defense Security Assistance Agency	12-13a(1)
<b>DSB</b>	Defense Science Board	11-22b

<b>DSCA</b>	Defense Security Cooperation Agency	20-25a(5)
<b>DSFA</b>	direct support field artillery	5-28b
<b>DSI</b>	Defense Simulations Internet	11-23c
<b>DSMC</b>	Defense Systems Management College	11-9
<b>DSMIS</b>	Defense Subsistence Management Information System	12-10d(7)
<b>DSS</b>	Direct Support System	12-5c(7)(d)
<b>DSU</b>	direct support unit	12-10a(1)
<b>DT</b>	developmental test	11-35b
<b>DTAP</b>	DOD Technology Area Plan	11-7c
<b>DTLOMS</b>	doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, materiel, and soldier	2-2a
<b>DTLOS</b>	doctrine, training, leader development, organizations, and soldier	11-18e(3)
<b>DTO</b>	defense technology objective	11-7
<b>DTOE</b>	draft table of organization and equipment	5-16b
<b>DTP</b>	Delayed Training Program	20-6b(2)
<b>DTS</b>	Defense Transportation System	12-5c(7)(e)
<b>DTT</b>	doctrine and tactics training	15-36
<b>DUSA(IA)</b>	Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs)	9-8d
<b>DUSA(OR)</b>	Deputy Undersecretary of the Army (Operations Research)	11-17b
<b>DUSD(AS&amp;C)</b>	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Systems and Concepts)	11-22c
<b>DUSD(S&amp;T)</b>	Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Science and Technology)	11-41b
<b>DVE</b>	driver's vision enhancement	11-88b
<b>DWCF</b>	Defense Working Capital Fund	12-12

## E

<b>EA</b>	economic analysis	11-17c(3)
<b>EAC</b>	echelons above corps	5-19d
<b>EB/EC</b>	electronic business/electronic commerce	16-25b

<b>EC</b>	electronic commerce	12-4e(5)(a)
<b>ECAS</b>	Environmental Compliance Assessment System	21-5d(6)
<b>ECUR</b>	end of current service agreement	13-32
<b>EDAS</b>	Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System	13-19e(2)(a)
<b>EDATE</b>	effective date	2-7e
<b>EDI</b>	electronic data interchange	12-4e(5)(a)
<b>EDRB</b>	Expanded Defense Resources Board	9-14d
<b>EDRE</b>	emergency deployment readiness exercise	2-6a(7)
<b>EDTM</b>	Enlisted Distribution Target Model	13-19d
<b>E-E</b>	emergency-essential	14-26b(2)
<b>EE PEG</b>	equipping program evaluation group	11-81f
<b>EEO</b>	equal employment opportunity	14-8d
<b>EEOC</b>	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission	14-8d
<b>EEOCCRA</b>	Equal Employment Opportunity Compliance and Complaints Review Agency	14-22b
<b>EES</b>	Enlisted Evaluation System	13-23
<b>EGOSC</b>	Enterprise General Officer Steering Committee	16-8b
<b>EIP</b>	Enterprise Implementation Plan	16-8
<b>ELIM-COMPLIP</b>	Enlisted Loss Inventory Model-Computation of Manpower Program by Linear Programming	13-10f
<b>EMAC</b>	emergency management assistance compact	23-7c(2)(a)
<b>EMD</b>	engineering/ manufacturing design	15-40b(3)
<b>EMS</b>	emergency medical services	23-8b
<b>EN</b>	enlisted	5-30h
<b>ENCATT</b>	Engineer Combined Arms Tactical Trainer	15-40b(3)
<b>EO</b>	equal opportunity	13-53b
<b>EO</b>	Executive order	14-9
<b>EOA</b>	equal opportunity advisor	13-53b

## How the Army Runs

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<b>EOC</b>	emergency operation center	23-7b(1)(a)
<b>EOH</b>	equipment on hand	8-15c
<b>EOQ</b>	economic order quantity	12-8c
<b>EOR</b>	element of resource	9-7d
<b>EOR</b>	equal opportunity representative	13-53b
<b>EPA</b>	Environmental Protection Agency	17-26
<b>EPLO</b>	emergency preparedness liaison officer	23-10a(1)(a)
<b>EPMD</b>	Enlisted Personnel Directorate, PERSCOM	13-19d(2)
<b>EPMS</b>	Enlisted Personnel Management System	13-5c(1)(e)
<b>EPMS-USAR</b>	Enlisted Personnel Management System--USAR	7-21b(1)
<b>EPP</b>	extended planning period	9-5b(1)(b)
<b>EPW</b>	enemy prisoner of war	6-4g(3)(b)
<b>ERC</b>	equipment readiness code	2-7e
<b>ERDC</b>	U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center	21-6a
<b>ERGO</b>	Environmental Review Guide for Operations	21-5d(5)
<b>ERPS</b>	Equipment Release Priority System	12-8d
<b>ERT</b>	emergency response team	23-10a(1)(c)
<b>ERT-A</b>	emergency response team - advance element	23-10a(1)(b)
<b>ES</b>	end strength	7-21a(4)
<b>ES</b>	equipment serviceability	8-15d
<b>ESA</b>	Endangered Species Act	20-9d(2)
<b>eSB</b>	enhanced separate brigade	7-10
<b>ESCO</b>	Energy Services Company	17-30c
<b>ESF</b>	Economic Support Fund	20-25c(6)
<b>ESF</b>	Emergency Support Function	23-6d
<b>ESPC</b>	energy savings performance contracts	17-30
<b>ESSO</b>	executive support staff officer	23-7c(1)(d) <u>2</u>
<b>EST</b>	emergency support team	23-10a(1)(a)

<b>EST</b>	Emergency Support Team	23-10a(3)(b)
<b>ETM/IETM</b>	electronic technical manuals/interactive electronic technical manuals	12-6b(12)(b)
<b>ETS</b>	expiration of term of service	13-19k
<b>EUSA</b>	Eighth United States Army	3-6a
<b>EW</b>	electronic warfare	11-18c
<b>EXDIR/ICA</b>	Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs	18-4d

## F

<b>4GL</b>	4 <sup>th</sup> generation language	12-8h(3)(e)
<b>FAA</b>	Foreign Assistance Act	12-13
<b>FAA</b>	functional area assessment	13-13
<b>FAD</b>	force activity designator	12-9b
<b>FAD</b>	fund authorization document	10-9
<b>FAR</b>	Federal Acquisition Regulation	11-12c(12)
<b>FASA</b>	Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994	11-1
<b>FASCAM</b>	Family of Scatterable Mines	20-24h(2)
<b>FASTALS</b>	Force Analysis Simulation of Theater Administrative and Logistics Support	5-22a(2)(b)3
<b>FBCB2</b>	Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below System	11-88b
<b>FBDSS</b>	Force Builder Decision Support System	5-33a
<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigations	18-2a
<b>FCCE</b>	flood control and coastal emergencies	21-5e(2)
<b>FCIP</b>	Foreign Counterintelligence Program	18-5a
<b>FCO</b>	Federal coordinating officer	23-10a(1)(b)
<b>FCS</b>	future combat system	1-7a(2)
<b>FDC</b>	first digitized corps	16-21b
<b>FDD</b>	first digitized division	16-21b
<b>FDD</b>	Force Design Directorate	5-12a

<b>FDP</b>	funded delivery period	12-8a(3)
<b>FDU</b>	force design update	5-3b
<b>FEMA</b>	Federal Emergency Management Agency	6-7k
<b>FFCA</b>	Federal Facility Compliance Act	20-9c(1)
<b>FFMIA</b>	Federal Financial Management Improvement Act	10-31
<b>FFR</b>	force feasibility review	5-12b
<b>FGS</b>	final governing standards	17-24
<b>FHMP</b>	Family Housing Master Plan	17-35a
<b>FI</b>	force integrator	2-10b
<b>FISO</b>	force integration staff officer	2-10b
<b>FLIR</b>	forward looking infrared	11-88b
<b>FLOT</b>	forward line of own troops	5-22b(1)(b)
<b>FLRA</b>	Federal Labor Relations Authority	14-8c
<b>FM</b>	financial management	9-61b(3)
<b>FMC</b>	fully mission capable	8-15d
<b>FMCS</b>	Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service	14-21d
<b>FMF</b>	Foreign Military Financing	12-13
<b>FMFIA</b>	Federal Manager's Financial Integrity Act	10-27
<b>FMFP</b>	Foreign Military Financing Program	20-25c(2)
<b>FMS</b>	Force Management System	2-4b(1)(b)
<b>FMS</b>	foreign military sales	2-6a(8)
<b>FMS-R</b>	Force Management System – Requirements	5-13b
<b>FOA</b>	field operating agency	2-11b(5)
<b>FOC</b>	future operational capability	5-3a
<b>FOIA</b>	Freedom of Information Act	22-6
<b>FORMDEPS</b>	FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System	6-12d(1)
<b>FORSCOM</b>	U.S. Forces Command	3-4e
<b>FoS</b>	family of systems	11-59c

<b>FOT</b>	follow-on operational test	11-40a
<b>FPC</b>	force package code	5-28a
<b>FPPM</b>	Functional Proponent for Preventive Medicine	19-13b
<b>FPR</b>	force program review	5-23b
<b>FR</b>	functional review	13-13
<b>FRP</b>	Facility Reduction Program	17-34b
<b>FRP</b>	Federal Response Plan	21-5e(3)
<b>FRP</b>	full rate production	11-25
<b>FS-2000</b>	Food Service 2000	12-5c(11)(c)2
<b>FSA</b>	force structure allowance	7-21a(4)
<b>FSC</b>	federal supply class	12-8b(2)
<b>FSC</b>	Field Support Command	12-6b(2)
<b>FSC</b>	First Sergeant Course	15-18f
<b>FSCATT</b>	Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer	15-40b(3)
<b>FSIP</b>	Federal Service Impasses Panel	14-21d
<b>FSP</b>	force support package	7-46
<b>FSSE</b>	Fire Support Software Engineering	12-6b(4)
<b>FTS</b>	full time support	7-51
<b>FTX</b>	field training exercises	15-33
<b>FUED</b>	first unit equipped date	11-17f(4)(b)
<b>FUSRAP</b>	Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program	21-5b
<b>FWS</b>	Federal Wage System	14-17a(2)
<b>FY</b>	fiscal year	1-7a(2)
<b>FYDP</b>	Future Years Defense Programs	4-1

## G

<b>GAO</b>	General Accounting Office	9-21c
<b>GBL</b>	government bill of lading	12-4c(5)(a)

<b>GC</b>	The General Counsel	11-17m
<b>GCCS</b>	Global Command and Control System	4-21c
<b>GCCS-A</b>	Global Command and Control System-Army	16-28
<b>GCCT</b>	Global Climate Change Treaty	12-5c(9)(b)
<b>GCM</b>	general court-martial	20-19d(4)
<b>GCMCA</b>	general court martial convening authority	7-56
<b>GCSS-A</b>	Global Combat Service Support System Army	12-5c(4)
<b>GDAS</b>	Global Deployment Analysis System	5-22a(3)
<b>GDIP</b>	General Defense Intelligence Program	18-5a
<b>GIWW</b>	Gulf Intracoastal Waterway	21-5c(2)
<b>GMRA</b>	Government Management Reform Act	10-29
<b>GO/SES</b>	general officer/Senior Executive Service	5-35
<b>GOICC</b>	General Officer Installation Commander's Course	17-13
<b>GOSAG</b>	general officer study advisory group	5-22a(2)(a)
<b>GOSC</b>	general officer steering committee	9-48c
<b>GOWG</b>	general officer working group	11-88d
<b>GPCC</b>	Garrison Pre-Command Course	17-12
<b>GPRA</b>	Government Performance and Results Act	9-40a(2)
<b>GRD</b>	grade	5-30j
<b>GS</b>	general schedule	14-171(2)
<b>GS</b>	general support	5-22b(1)(c)
<b>GSA</b>	General Services Administration	12-2d(1)
<b>GSGMC</b>	Garrison Sergeant Major Course	17-14
<b>GSORTS</b>	Global Status of Resources and Training System	8-8a(2)
<b>GSU</b>	garrison support unit	7-31a(4)
<b>GUI</b>	graphical user interface	12-6b(12)(a)

## H

<b>HAAP</b>	Homebase/Advanced Assignment Program	13-19i(3)
<b>HASC</b>	House Armed Services Committee	9-62a(3)
<b>HAZMAT</b>	hazardous material	23-7b
<b>HCA</b>	head of contracting activity	20-29b
<b>HCA</b>	humanitarian and civic assistance	20-26e
<b>HFEA</b>	human factors engineering analysis	11-19b(5)
<b>HHA</b>	health hazard assessment	11-18b
<b>HHB</b>	headquarters and headquarters battery	5-28b
<b>HLS</b>	homeland security	23-4b
<b>HMMWV</b>	high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle	22-24
<b>HMO</b>	health maintenance organization	19-4b(4)(a)
<b>HN</b>	host nation	12-2a(5)
<b>HNS</b>	host nation support	5-22a(2)(b)3
<b>HPSCI</b>	House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence	18-5
<b>HQDA</b>	Headquarters, Department of the Army	1-13
<b>HR</b>	human resource	13-1
<b>HRI</b>	horizontal requirements integration	11-18e(1)
<b>HRM</b>	human resource management	13-1
<b>HSI</b>	Human Systems Integration	11-17i(1)
<b>HTI</b>	horizontal technology integration	11-12c(11)
<b>HUMINT</b>	human intelligence	18-3d(2)

**I**

<b>I&amp;S</b>	interchangeability and substitutability	12-6b(12)(a)
<b>I3A I3A</b>	Installation Information Infrastructure Architecture	16-29
<b>I3MP</b>	Installation Information Infrastructure Modernization Program	16-22
<b>IADT</b>	initial active duty for training	7-31b
<b>IAV</b>	interim armored vehicle	1-7c

<b>IBCT</b>	interim brigade combat team	1-7c
<b>IC</b>	intelligence community	18-4
<b>IC/EXCOM</b>	Intelligence Community Executive Committee	18-4g
<b>ICAF</b>	Industrial College of the Armed Forces	11-9
<b>ICP</b>	incremental change package	5-14c
<b>ICT</b>	integrated concept team	5-3a
<b>ID</b>	infantry division	7-60
<b>IDT</b>	inactive duty training	7-21a(1)
<b>IET</b>	initial entry training	13-14b(2)
<b>IET/IADT</b>	initial entry/initial active duty training	15-15
<b>IEW</b>	intelligence and electronic warfare	18-8a(2)
<b>IFA</b>	installation food advisor	12-10d(7)
<b>IG</b>	inspector general	17-15a
<b>IIPT</b>	integrating integrated product team	11-66
<b>IIQ</b>	initial issue quantity	5-33e
<b>ILS</b>	integrated logistic support	11-11b
<b>ILSC</b>	Industrial Logistics Systems Center	12-6b(4)
<b>ILSM</b>	integrated logistic support manager	11-74b
<b>ILSMT</b>	integrated logistic support management team	11-73
<b>ILSP</b>	integrated logistic support plan	11-74c(2)
<b>IMA</b>	Individual Mobilization Augmentee	6-13a(1)
<b>IMET</b>	International Military Education and Training	12-13
<b>IMINT</b>	imagery intelligence	18-3d(3)
<b>IMMC</b>	integrated material management center	12-2d(1)
<b>INFOSEC</b>	information security	11-18c(1)
<b>ING</b>	Inactive National Guard	6-13a(1)(a)
<b>INMARSAT</b>	international maritime satellite	22-33
<b>INR</b>	intelligence and research	18-3a(2)

---

<b>INSCOM</b>	U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command	3-6a
<b>IO</b>	Information Operations (Career Field)	13-37b
<b>IOB</b>	Intelligence Oversight Board	18-4b(2)
<b>IOC</b>	initial operational capability	11-17f(4)(b)
<b>IOT</b>	initial operational test	11-40a
<b>IPA</b>	integrated program assessment	11-64b
<b>IPB</b>	intelligence preparation of the battlespace	18-9d
<b>IPDM</b>	Intelligence Program Decision Memorandum	9-14e
<b>IPDS</b>	Inland Petroleum Distribution System	12-5c(10)
<b>IPL</b>	integrated priority list	9-2e
<b>IPMO</b>	Intelligence Personnel Management Office	14-10c
<b>IPM</b>	industrial preparedness measure	6-20e
<b>IPP</b>	industrial preparedness planning	6-20a
<b>IPPD</b>	integrated product and process development	11-66
<b>IPPL</b>	industrial preparedness planning list	6-20c
<b>IPR</b>	in-process review	11-66a(1)
<b>IPRG</b>	Intelligence Program Review Group	9-16a
<b>IPS</b>	illustrative planning scenario	5-19c
<b>IPT</b>	integrated product team	11-20b(5)
<b>IR&amp;D</b>	independent research and development	11-21h
<b>IRAC</b>	internal review and audit compliance	17-15c
<b>IRP</b>	Installation Restoration Program	17-31
<b>IRR</b>	individual ready reserve	6-12d(3)
<b>IRRD</b>	Issue Release/Receipt Documents	12-8h(3)(e)1
<b>IS</b>	Institutional Support (Career Field)	13-37c
<b>ISB</b>	intermediate staging base	15-34c
<b>ISEW</b>	intelligence, security and electronic warfare	11-18c(2)
<b>ISM</b>	integrated sustainment maintenance	12-5c(6)(c)

<b>ISR</b>	installation status report	17-36
<b>ISSP</b>	Information Systems Security Program	16-23
<b>IT</b>	information technology	6-3c(7)
<b>ITAM</b>	Integrated Training Area Management	21-5d(6)
<b>ITAR</b>	International Traffic in Arms Regulation	12-13a(3)(c)
<b>ITD</b>	Individual Training Directorate	15-11c
<b>ITMRA</b>	Information Technology Management Reform Act of 1996	11-12b
<b>ITOE</b>	intermediate table of organization and equipment	5-15
<b>ITOIPT</b>	Information Technology Overarching Integrated Product Team	11-17e(10)
<b>ITV/TAV</b>	in-transit visibility/total asset visibility	12-8h(3)(a) <u>2</u>

**J**

<b>JA</b>	judge advocate	20-1
<b>JAG</b>	Judge Advocate General	12-13a(3)
<b>JAGC</b>	Judge Advocate General's Corps	20-1
<b>JCLL</b>	Joint Center For Lessons Learned	6-4g(1)(c)
<b>JCS</b>	Joint Chiefs of Staff	2-7a
<b>JCSE</b>	Joint Communications Support Element	6-8b(1)
<b>JDISS</b>	Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System	18-3a
<b>JDOC</b>	joint desired operational capability	5-6b
<b>JER</b>	Joint Ethics Regulation	20-7b
<b>JFCOM</b>	U.S. Joint Forces Command	5-6b
<b>JFOC</b>	joint future operational capability	5-6b
<b>JIB</b>	joint information bureau	22-29
<b>JIC</b>	joint information center	23-28b
<b>JMIP</b>	Joint Military Intelligence Program	18-5b
<b>JMPAB</b>	Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board	6-9b(3)
<b>JMRR</b>	Joint Monthly Readiness Review	8-2

---

<b>JNA</b>	Joint Net Assessment	4-10a
<b>JOC</b>	joint operations center	23-7a
<b>JOPES</b>	Joint Operations Planning and Execution System	4-2
<b>JOPESRE</b>	JOPES Reporting Structure	6-3i(4)
<b>JPD</b>	joint planning document	4-7b(3)
<b>JPEC</b>	Joint Planning and Execution Community	6-3f
<b>JPME</b>	joint professional military education	15-22b
<b>JRB</b>	JROC Review Board	4-11c
<b>JROC</b>	Joint Requirements Oversight Council	2-5b(1)
<b>JRP</b>	Joint Requirements Panel	4-11d
<b>JRTC</b>	Joint Readiness Training Center	15-34
<b>JRU</b>	joint reserve unit	7-47
<b>JS</b>	Joint Staff	5-6
<b>JSCP</b>	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan	4-7b(3)
<b>JSMB</b>	Joint Surface Movements Board	12-5c(7)(c)2
<b>JSO</b>	joint specialty officer	13-50a
<b>JSOTF</b>	joint special operations task force	23-7a
<b>JSPS</b>	Joint Strategic Planning System	4-2
<b>JSR</b>	Joint Strategy Review	4-7b(1)
<b>JTA</b>	joint table of authorizations	2-11b(5)(b)
<b>JTA-A</b>	Joint Technical Architecture-Army	11-17e(2)
<b>JTAV</b>	Joint Total Asset Visibility	12-8h
<b>JTB</b>	Joint Transportation Board	6-8f(9)
<b>JTF</b>	joint task force	6-8c(4)
<b>JTF-CS</b>	Joint Task Force-Civil Support	23-24c(1)
<b>JULLS</b>	Joint Utilization Lesson Learned System	6-4g(1)(c)
<b>JWCA</b>	Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments	4-3
<b>JWCO</b>	Joint Warfighting Capability Objective	11-7b

<b>JWE</b>	joint warfighting experiment	5-8a(1)
<b>JWICS</b>	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System	18-3a
<b>JWRMAG</b>	Joint Water Resources Management action Group	12-5c(8)
<b>JWSTP</b>	Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan	11-7

**K**

<b>KFL</b>	key facilities list	6-19
<b>KM</b>	knowledge management	16-34b(1)
<b>KPP</b>	key performance parameter	11-20b(12)
<b>KSA</b>	knowledge, skills, abilities	14-13b(1)

**L**

<b>LAN</b>	local area network	12-8h(3)(e)
<b>LCSEC</b>	Life Cycle Software Engineering Center	11-73
<b>LCSSC</b>	Life Cycle Software Support Center	12-6b(4)
<b>LEA</b>	law enforcement agencies	7-49b(4)
<b>LFA</b>	Lead Federal Agency	23-6c
<b>LFT</b>	live fire test	11-35b
<b>LFT&amp;E</b>	live fire test and evaluation	11-42b
<b>LIA</b>	Logistics Integration Agency	12-5b(1)
<b>LIC</b>	language identifier code	15-15
<b>LIDB</b>	Logistics Integrated Databases	12-6b(12)
<b>LIF</b>	Logistics Intelligence File	12-10c
<b>LIN</b>	line item number	2-7e
<b>LIWA</b>	Land Information Warfare Activity	18-9d(3)
<b>LOA</b>	letter of offer and acceptance	12-6b(9)
<b>LOA</b>	lead operational authority	23-17b(1)
<b>LOE</b>	limited objective experiment	5-8a(1)
<b>LOGCAP</b>	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program	12-4c(1)(f)

<b>LOGSA</b>	Logistics Support Activity	12-5c(7)(e)
<b>LOGSACS</b>	Logistics Structure and Composition System	2-7e
<b>LOI</b>	letter of instruction	6-4g(3)(c)
<b>LOTS</b>	logistics over-the-shore	21-18
<b>LRIP</b>	low rate initial production	11-25
<b>LSE</b>	logistics support element	12-4c(4)(e)
<b>LSSC</b>	Logistics Systems Support Center	12-6b(4)

**M**

<b>M&amp;R</b>	maintenance and repair	20-30b(6)
<b>M&amp;S</b>	modeling and simulation	11-20b(11)
<b>M2PR</b>	monthly military personnel review	13-13
<b>MAAG</b>	military assistance advisory group	20-25a(9)
<b>MAC</b>	maintenance allocation chart	12-5c(6)(d)
<b>MACA</b>	military assistance to civil authorities	23-3
<b>MACOM</b>	major Army command	2-11
<b>MACDIS</b>	military assistance for civil disturbance	23-3
<b>MAE</b>	mission accomplishment estimate	8-15f
<b>MAIS</b>	major automated information system	11-37
<b>MANPRINT</b>	manpower and personnel integration	11-11b
<b>MAP</b>	military assistance programs	12-13a(3)
<b>MARC</b>	manpower requirements criteria	2-11b(2)(e)
<b>MASINT</b>	measurement and signature intelligence	18-3d(5)
<b>MAST</b>	military assistance to safety and traffic	23-15a
<b>MATDEV</b>	materiel developer	5-18a
<b>MBI</b>	major budget issue	9-61b(4)
<b>MC</b>	Medical Corps	19-6b
<b>MCA</b>	Military Construction, Army	10-3c

## How the Army Runs

---

<b>MCAR</b>	Military Construction, Army Reserve	10-15b
<b>MCARNG</b>	Military Construction, Army National Guard	10-15b
<b>MCC</b>	movement control center	12-4f(3)
<b>MCM</b>	Manual for Courts-Martial	20-14b
<b>MCP</b>	Marine Corps Capabilities Plan	6-3
<b>MCS</b>	managed care support	19-7b
<b>MCSS</b>	military clothing sales stores	12-4g(2)(a)
<b>MCT</b>	movement control team	12-10d(6)
<b>MDA</b>	milestone decision authority	11-12c(13)
<b>MDAP</b>	major defense acquisition program	4-11b
<b>MDEP</b>	management decision package	2-11b(1)(b)
<b>MDR</b>	milestone decision review	11-17c(3)
<b>MDW</b>	Military District of Washington	3-6a
<b>MEDCEN</b>	medical center	19-18b
<b>MEDCOM</b>	U.S. Army Medical Command	3-4d
<b>MEDDAC</b>	medical department activity	19-18b
<b>MEL</b>	military education level	13-30
<b>MEO</b>	most effective organization	17-23b
<b>MEPCOM</b>	Military Entrance Processing Command	6-13a(4)(a)
<b>MEPS</b>	military entrance processing station	6-13a(4)(a)
<b>MER</b>	manpower estimate report	11-62j
<b>METL</b>	mission essential task list	7-34
<b>METT-T</b>	mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time	12-2a(5)
<b>MEWR</b>	mission-essential wartime requirement	5-15a
<b>MFA</b>	materiel fielding agreement	11-56b
<b>MFORCE</b>	Master force	5-22c(4)
<b>MFP</b>	materiel fielding plan	2-11b(7)(b)
<b>MHE</b>	material handling equipment	12-6b(5)

<b>MHRM</b>	military human resource management	13-2b
<b>MI</b>	military intelligence	18-2b
<b>MIB</b>	Military Intelligence Board	18-7c(2)
<b>MILCON</b>	military construction	9-64b(1)(b)
<b>MILDEP</b>	military deputy	11-12
<b>MILPERS</b>	military personnel	9-64b(1)(a)
<b>MILSPEC/STD</b>	military performance specifications and standards	11-28b
<b>MILSTAMP</b>	military standard transportation and movement procedures	12-5c(7)(c)3
<b>MILSTEP</b>	military supply and transportation evaluation procedures	12-9d
<b>MILSTRIP</b>	military standard requisitioning and issue procedures	12-9a
<b>MIPS</b>	modified integrated program summary	11-62a
<b>MIRV</b>	Major Item Requisition Validation	12-8g(1)
<b>MJCS</b>	Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum	20-24g(1)
<b>MLRS</b>	Multiple Launch Rocket System	2-3a
<b>MMC</b>	materiel management center	12-4f
<b>MMP</b>	Master Mobilization Plan	6-10a
<b>MNS</b>	mission need statement	2-5c(1)
<b>MOB-ARPRINT</b>	Mobilization Army Program for Individual Training	15-10h
<b>MOBMAN</b>	Mobilization Manpower Planning System	15-10h
<b>MOBTDA</b>	mobilization table of distribution and allowances	5-31
<b>MOCS</b>	Military Occupational and Classification System	13-6
<b>MODPATH</b>	modernization path	5-15c
<b>MOE</b>	measurements of effectiveness	11-20a
<b>MOI</b>	memorandum of instruction	6-4g(3)(b)
<b>MON</b>	memorandum of notification	11-56b
<b>MOS</b>	military occupational specialty	2-6a(3)
<b>MOSLS</b>	MOS Level System	13-10f
<b>MOSQ</b>	military occupational specialty qualification	15-15

<b>MPA</b>	Military Personnel, Army	10-3c
<b>MPAD</b>	mobile public affairs detachment	22-20
<b>MPD</b>	military personnel divisions	13-10h(2)
<b>MPS</b>	Mobilization Planning System	15-10h
<b>MPT</b>	manpower, personnel, training	11-17i
<b>MRD</b>	material requirements document	5-3a
<b>MRI</b>	Medical Reengineering Initiative	12-8f
<b>MRL</b>	materiel requirements list	11-56b
<b>MRMC</b>	Medical Research and Materiel Command	9-47e
<b>MRS</b>	Mobility Requirements Study	12-5c(7)(c)2
<b>MS</b>	Medical Service Corps	19-6b
<b>MS</b>	milestone	11-3b
<b>MSC</b>	major subordinate command	11-13d
<b>MSC</b>	Military Sealift Command	4-22b(8)
<b>MSCA</b>	military support to civil authorities	7-29f(2)
<b>MSF</b>	million square feet	17-34b
<b>MSL</b>	Military Shipment Labels	12-8h(3)(e)1
<b>MSP</b>	mission support plan	11-56b
<b>MSPB</b>	Merit Systems Protection Board	14-8a
<b>MTF</b>	medical treatment facility	19-16b(3)
<b>MTMC</b>	Military Traffic Management Command	3-6a
<b>MTOE</b>	modification table of organization and equipment	2-3b
<b>MTOF</b>	mission task organized force	5-22a(1)(a)
<b>MTP</b>	mission training plan	15-33
<b>MTS</b>	movement tracking system	12-10e(5)
<b>MTT</b>	mobile training team	20-25a(9)
<b>MTW</b>	major theater war	5-19c
<b>MUL</b>	master urgency list	6-16c

---

<b>MUTA</b>	multiple unit training assemblies	7-21a(1)
<b>MUTA-4</b>	four consecutive multiple unit training assemblies	7-21a(1)
<b>MWR</b>	morale, welfare, and recreation	9-69
<b>N</b>		
<b>NAF</b>	non-appropriated funds	10-4e(3)
<b>NAFI</b>	non-appropriated fund instrumentality	10-34b
<b>NAMI</b>	non-Army managed item	12-4a(4)(f)
<b>NAP</b>	not authorized prepositioning	6-12e(3)
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	11-59a(2)
<b>NBC</b>	nuclear, biological, and chemical	19-6c
<b>NCA</b>	National Command Authorities	4-2
<b>NCMP</b>	Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan	6-3
<b>NCO</b>	noncommissioned officer	13-14b(3)
<b>NCOA</b>	noncommissioned officer academy	7-52b
<b>NCOER</b>	NCO evaluation report	13-23b
<b>NCOES</b>	Noncommissioned Officer Education System	7-52b
<b>NDA</b>	National Defense Act	7-4
<b>NDAA</b>	National Defense Authorization Act	13-62
<b>NDI</b>	nondevelopmental item	11-19b(7)
<b>NDMS</b>	National Disaster Medical System	23-15a
<b>NEATS</b>	Northeast Asia troop strength	13-19c
<b>NEO</b>	noncombatant evacuation order	6-4g(3)(b)
<b>NEO</b>	non-combatant evacuations operations	20-27
<b>NEPA</b>	National Environment Policy Act of 1969	11-29
<b>NET</b>	new equipment training	11-13f(4)
<b>NETP</b>	new equipment training plan	2-11b(7)(b)
<b>NETT</b>	new equipment training team	15-36a

## How the Army Runs

---

<b>NFIP</b>	National Foreign Intelligence Program	9-8e(1)
<b>NGA</b>	NATO Guideline Areas	13-19c
<b>NGB</b>	National Guard Bureau	5-30b
<b>NGO</b>	nongovernmental organization	15-34c
<b>NGPA</b>	National Guard Personnel, Army	10-8b
<b>NGR</b>	National Guard Regulation	15-8l
<b>NGREA</b>	National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation	7-37
<b>NGS</b>	non-government standards	11-28b
<b>NIC</b>	National Intelligence Council	18-4e
<b>NICP</b>	national inventory control point	12-6b(3)
<b>NIIN</b>	national item identification number	12-8b(2)
<b>NIMA</b>	National Imagery and Mapping Agency	18-3a(2)
<b>NIMAP</b>	National Imagery and Mapping Agency Program	18-5a
<b>NIST</b>	National Intelligence Support Team	18-7c(1)
<b>NJP</b>	nonjudicial punishment	20-14b
<b>NMCC</b>	National Military Command Center	6-8a
<b>NMIB</b>	new materiel introductory briefing	11-57d(1)
<b>NMJIC</b>	National Military Joint Intelligence Center	18-7c(3)
<b>NMM</b>	National Maintenance Management	12-5c(6)(f)
<b>NMP</b>	national maintenance point	12-6b(3)
<b>NMS</b>	National Military Strategy	1-3c
<b>NOF</b>	notional force	13-9
<b>NPS</b>	non-prior service	13-14b(1)
<b>NRO</b>	National Reconnaissance Office	18-3a(2)
<b>NRP</b>	National Reconnaissance Program	18-5a
<b>NSA</b>	National Security Agency	6-7k
<b>NSC</b>	National Security Council	6-3d
<b>NSCS</b>	National Security Command System	6-3d

<b>NSDD</b>	National Security Decision Directive	6-3a
<b>NSF</b>	net square feet	17-35b(1)(b)
<b>NSIP</b>	Network Security Improvement Program	16-23
<b>NSN</b>	national stock number	11-60
<b>NSS</b>	national security strategy	1-3c
<b>NTC</b>	National Training Center	5-31d
<b>NULO</b>	negative un-liquidated obligations	10-25a

## O

<b>O&amp;M</b>	operations and maintenance	9-64b(1)(a)
<b>O/M</b>	operator and maintainer	5-18c
<b>OA</b>	obligation authority	9-64c(2)
<b>OA</b>	officer aggregate	13-10f
<b>OA</b>	operational architecture	11-17g
<b>OADCSOPS-FM</b>	Office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans for Force Management	5-18d
<b>OASA(M&amp;RA)</b>	Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)	15-8a
<b>OASA(FM&amp;C)</b>	Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller)	10-4e(5)
<b>OASD(PA)</b>	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs	22-28
<b>OAVCSA</b>	Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Army	2-5b
<b>OBC</b>	officer basic course	13-16b
<b>OC</b>	observer-controller	15-34b
<b>OCA</b>	operating cost authority	12-12a
<b>OCAR</b>	Office of the Chief, Army Reserve	6-12e(5)
<b>OCI</b>	Office of Complaint Investigation	14-9b
<b>OCIE</b>	organizational clothing and individual equipment	12-5c(11)(d)
<b>OCLL</b>	Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison	11-85
<b>OCONUS</b>	outside of the continental United States	5-30b

## How the Army Runs

---

<b>OCPA</b>	Office of the Chief of Public Affairs	22-17a
<b>OCS</b>	Officer Candidate School	2-6a(3)
<b>ODCSCD</b>	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments	5-12a
<b>ODCSINT</b>	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence	14-10c
<b>ODCSOPS</b>	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans	2-11b(2)(e)
<b>ODISC4</b>	Office of the Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers	16-17c
<b>ODP</b>	officer distribution plan	2-6a(6)
<b>ODS</b>	officer development system	13-35b(3)(a)
<b>ODSCLOG</b>	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics	5-22a(1)(b)1
<b>ODT</b>	overseas deployment training	7-48
<b>ODU</b>	Officer Development Update	13-39a
<b>ODUSD/TSP</b>	Office of the Deputy under Secretary of Defense for Trade Security Policy	12-13a(3)(c)
<b>OER</b>	officer evaluation report	13-38a
<b>OES</b>	officer education system	7-52b
<b>OES</b>	office of emergency services	23-7c(1)(a)
<b>OFC</b>	objective force capability	5-3a
<b>OFF</b>	officer	5-30h
<b>OGE</b>	Office of Government Ethics	20-7b
<b>OGLA</b>	Office Grade Limitation Act	13-49
<b>OI</b>	organization integration	2-10a
<b>OI</b>	organization integrator	2-10b
<b>OIPT</b>	overarching integrated product team	11-4b
<b>OJCS</b>	Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	18-7c
<b>OJE</b>	Operation Joint Endeavor	12-8h
<b>OJG</b>	Operation Joint Guard	12-8h
<b>OMA</b>	Office of Military Affairs	18-4h(5)
<b>OMA</b>	Operation and Maintenance, Army	9-64f

<b>OMAR</b>	Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve	10-8b
<b>OMARNG</b>	Operations and Maintenance, Army National Guard	10-8b
<b>OMB</b>	Office of Management and Budget	3-7a
<b>OMNG</b>	Operations and Maintenance, National Guard	13-17b
<b>ONS</b>	operational needs statement	11-17e(1)
<b>OOTW</b>	operations other than war	12-6b(2)(b)
<b>OP</b>	Operations (Career Field)	13-37a
<b>OPA</b>	Officer Personnel Act	13-49
<b>OPA</b>	Other Procurement, Army	10-15b
<b>OPFOR</b>	opposing forces	5-31d
<b>OPLAN</b>	operation plan	4-8b
<b>OPLAW</b>	Operational Law	20-22
<b>OPLOC</b>	operating location	10-18b
<b>OPM</b>	Office of Personnel Management	13-11c
<b>OPMD</b>	Officer Personnel Management Directorate, PERSCOM	13-20c(1)(f)
<b>OPMS</b>	Officer Personnel Management System	13-5c(1)(e)
<b>OPMS XXI</b>	Officer Personnel Management System – XXI	13-35
<b>OPMS-USAR</b>	Officer Personnel Management System	7-21b(1)
<b>OPORD</b>	operation order	4-21a
<b>OPREP</b>	operations report	6-8a(2)
<b>OPREP-3PCA</b>	Operation Report - 3 PINNACLE Command Assessment	6-8a(2)
<b>OpSD</b>	operating strength deviation	13-12a
<b>OPSEC</b>	operational security	6-4g(3)(c)
<b>OPTEMPO</b>	operating tempo	5-30h
<b>ORB</b>	officer record brief	13-20c(1)(e)
<b>ORCEN</b>	Operations Research Center	17-36a
<b>ORD</b>	operational requirements document	2-5c(1)
<b>ORF</b>	operational readiness float	5-33e

<b>ORG DB</b>	Organization Component of TAPDB	13-19e(1)
<b>ORS</b>	operational requirement statement	11-87c
<b>ORT</b>	operational readiness test	2-6a(7)
<b>OS</b>	operating strength	13-10d
<b>OS</b>	Operations Support (Career Field)	13-37d
<b>OS/UM</b>	overstructure/undermanning	5-30e
<b>OSA</b>	Office of the Secretary of the Army	9-3b
<b>OSC</b>	Operations Support Command	12-6b
<b>OSD</b>	Office of the Secretary of Defense	3-5
<b>OSINT</b>	open source intelligence	18-3d(8)
<b>OSJA</b>	Office of the Staff Judge Advocate	20-2
<b>OSUT</b>	one station unit training	7-31b
<b>OT</b>	operational test	11-18e
<b>OTOE</b>	objective TOE	2-7e
<b>OTP</b>	outline test plan	11-50b
<b>OTRA</b>	Other than Regular Army	13-16c
<b>OTSG</b>	Office of The Surgeon General	15-8k

### **P**

<b>P&amp;I</b>	Administrative and Technical Privileges and Immunities	20-25c(10)
<b>P3I</b>	preplanned product improvement	11-22d(2)
<b>PA</b>	public affairs	18-9d(2)
<b>PA&amp;E</b>	Program Analysis and Evaluation	5-29
<b>PACOM</b>	Pacific Command	23-17b
<b>PAD</b>	public affairs detachment	22-25
<b>PAE</b>	program analysis and evaluation	9-27b(1)(a)
<b>PAED</b>	Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate	2-5b(3)
<b>PAG</b>	Petroleum Advisory Group	12-5c(10)

---

<b>PAM</b>	Personnel Authorizations Module	13-9a
<b>PANCO</b>	public affairs noncommissioned officer	22-1d
<b>PAO</b>	public affairs officer	17-15e
<b>PAOC</b>	public affairs operations center	22-21
<b>PAT</b>	process action team	11-1
<b>PBAS</b>	Program Budget Accounting System	9-64a(2)
<b>PBD</b>	program budget decision	5-12b
<b>PBG</b>	program budget guidance	2-11b(3)(c)
<b>PC</b>	personal computer	12-8h(3)(e)
<b>PCC</b>	Pre-Command Course	15-22
<b>PCS</b>	permanent change of station	13-11c
<b>PDD</b>	Presidential Decision Directive	18-2a
<b>PDM</b>	Program Decision Memorandum	9-14e
<b>PE</b>	program element	9-7d
<b>PEDS</b>	PERSCOM Edit System	13-19(e)(4)
<b>PEG</b>	program evaluation group	9-6a(2)
<b>PEO</b>	program executive officer	5-18a
<b>PEPDUS</b>	PERSCOM Enlisted Personnel Data Update System	13-19e(2)
<b>PER DB</b>	Personnel Component of TAPDB	13-19e(1)
<b>PERMISS</b>	Personnel Management Information and Support System	14-13b(2)
<b>PERMS</b>	Personnel Electronic Records System	7-30c(1)
<b>PERNET</b>	Personnel Network	13-19d(2)
<b>PERSACS</b>	Personnel Structure and Composition System	2-7e
<b>PERSCOM</b>	personnel command	15-8d
<b>PERSCOM</b>	U.S. Army Total Personal Command	3-4e
<b>PERSSO</b>	personnel system staff officer	2-11
<b>PFA</b>	personnel functional review	13-13
<b>PFIAB</b>	President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board	18-4b

<b>PFP</b>	Partnership for Peace	15-34c
<b>PI</b>	product improvement	11-25
<b>PIM</b>	pre-trained individual manpower	6-13a(1)(a)
<b>PIP</b>	product improvement program	11-79g
<b>PKIPKI</b>	Public Key Infrastructure	16-25e
<b>PKO</b>	Peacekeeping Operations	20-25c(7)
<b>PL</b>	Public Law	21-4a
<b>PLDC</b>	Primary Leadership Development Course	15-18a
<b>PLL</b>	prescribed load list	2-6a(6)
<b>PM</b>	program manager	5-18a
<b>PM</b>	project manager; product manager	11-12c
<b>PM</b>	Provost Marshal	17-16
<b>PMAD</b>	Personnel Management Authorizations Document	5-30h
<b>PMCS</b>	preventive maintenance checks and services	12-5c(6)(b)1
<b>PMD</b>	Program Management Directorate	15-11c
<b>PMO</b>	program manager, or project manager, or product manager office	11-12c(14)
<b>POC</b>	point of contact	11-12d
<b>POE</b>	program office estimate	11-17c
<b>POM</b>	Program Objective Memorandum	2-7e
<b>POPM</b>	Proponency Office for Preventive Medicine	19-13b
<b>POMSO</b>	plans, operations, and military support officer	23-7c(1)(d) <u>1</u>
<b>POR</b>	Preparation of Replacements for Overseas Movement	6-13a(1)(d)
<b>POSC-Edit</b>	Personnel Occupational Specialty Code Edit	13-6b
<b>PPBC</b>	Planning Program Budget Committee	9-6a(14)
<b>PPBES</b>	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System	2-11b(6)(d)
<b>PPBS</b>	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System	4-1
<b>PPG</b>	personnel priority group	2-6a(6)

<b>PPI</b>	POM preparation instructions	9-54g
<b>PPM</b>	Personnel Priority Model	13-20b
<b>PPP</b>	power projection platforms	6-11b
<b>PPP</b>	public private partnership	10-33d
<b>PPSO</b>	personal property shipment office	12-10d(8)
<b>PRB</b>	Project Review Board	9-30d
<b>PRC</b>	Presidential Reserve Call-up	6-13b(2)
<b>PRD</b>	personnel requirements document	14-6a
<b>PRD</b>	Presidential Review Directive	9-36
<b>PREPO</b>	pre-positioned	6-12e(3)
<b>PRG</b>	program review group	9-2i
<b>Probe</b>	PPBES Data Management System	9-6a(12)(c)
<b>PROFIS</b>	Professional Officer Filler Information System	19-17b
<b>PROSE</b>	partnership for reduced O&S costs, engine	12-8h(3)(d)
<b>PRP</b>	personnel reliability program	13-19k
<b>PSA</b>	principal staff assistant	11-66a
<b>PSIO</b>	Personnel Systems Information Operations	16-32c
<b>PSP</b>	power support platforms	6-11b
<b>PSYOPS</b>	psychological operations	4-22b(6)
<b>PURE</b>	PREPO Unit Residual (left behind) Equipment	6-13a(2)(a)
<b>PWD</b>	procurement work directive	12-8c
<b>PX</b>	post exchange	7-54
<b>PY</b>	prior fiscal year	9-12a(1)(a)

**Q**

<b>QAPR</b>	Quarterly Army Performance Review	9-7f
<b>QDR</b>	Quadrennial Defense Review	4-16a
<b>QMP</b>	Qualitative Management Program	13-28

<b>QRP</b>	qualifying recycling program	17-28
<b>QRRC</b>	Quarterly Readiness Report to Congress	8-8c
<b>QTY</b>	quantity	5-30j

### **R**

<b>R&amp;D</b>	research and development	1-7
<b>RA</b>	Regular Army	13-31
<b>RAM</b>	reliability, availability, and maintainability	11-11b
<b>RAP</b>	revised approved program	9-65
<b>RAP-C</b>	requisition allocation plan – CONUS	13-19h(1)
<b>RC</b>	Reserve Component	4-8c
<b>RCAS</b>	Reserve Component Automation System	15-35d
<b>RCCC</b>	Reserve Component Coordination Council	7-28b
<b>RCERT</b>	regional computer emergency response team	16-34c(3)
<b>RCF</b>	repair cycle float	5-33e
<b>RCI</b>	Residential Communities Initiative	17-22c(1)
<b>RCP</b>	retention control point	13-28b
<b>RCRA</b>	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act	20-9c(1)
<b>RCSOF</b>	Reserve Component Special Operations Forces	6-12d(2)
<b>RDA</b>	research, development, and acquisition	5-3a
<b>RDAP</b>	research, development, and acquisition plan	5-8c
<b>RDBMS</b>	relational database management system	12-8h(3)(e)
<b>RDD</b>	Requirements Documentation Directorate	5-3c
<b>RDEC</b>	research, development, and engineering center	11-21d
<b>RDL</b>	Reimer Digital Library	15-6a
<b>RDS</b>	Requirements Documentation System	5-13b
<b>RDT&amp;E,A</b>	Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Army	10-3c
<b>RDTE</b>	research, development, test, and evaluation	9-8a(6)

<b>REDTRAIN</b>	Readiness Training Program	18-8b(2)
<b>REP-63</b>	Reserve Enlistment Program Of 1963	7-31b
<b>REQ DB</b>	Requisition Component of TAPDB	13-19e(1)
<b>REQUEST</b>	Recruiting and Training Reservation System	13-14a
<b>REQVAL</b>	Requisition Validation	12-8d
<b>RETAIN</b>	Reenlistment, Reclassification and Assignment System	13-14a
<b>RF</b>	radio frequency	12-8h(3)
<b>RFG</b>	resource formulation guide	9-54f
<b>RFP</b>	request for proposal	11-13f(9)
<b>RFPB</b>	Reserve Forces Policy Board	7-26b
<b>RFS</b>	Resource Formulation System	9-27
<b>RHI</b>	residential housing initiative	10-33d
<b>RI</b>	resource integrator	2-11
<b>RIF</b>	reduction in force	13-48
<b>RITV</b>	regional in-transit visibility	12-8h(3)(e)2
<b>RLAS</b>	Regional Level Application Software	16-32c
<b>RMC</b>	regional medical command	19-16
<b>ROC</b>	regional operations center	23-10a(1)(a)
<b>ROC</b>	resource operating command	5-28a
<b>ROE</b>	rules of engagement	6-7e
<b>ROPMA</b>	Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act	7-21b(1)
<b>ROTC</b>	Reserve Officers Training Corps	2-6a(3)
<b>RPA</b>	Reserve Personnel, Army	10-8b
<b>RPLANS</b>	Real Property Planning and Analysis System	17-34b
<b>RPM</b>	real property maintenance	17-34a
<b>RRC</b>	Requirements Review Council	2-5c(1)
<b>RSC</b>	regional support command	7-15
<b>RSG</b>	regional support group	7-31a(3)

<b>RSO</b>	retirement services officer	13-57a
<b>RTF</b>	response task force	23-24c(2)
<b>RUDIST</b>	REQUEST Unit Distribution Program	13-14b(3)(b)
<b>RX</b>	reparable exchange	12-4c(4)(g)

### S

<b>S&amp;T</b>	science and technology	1-7a(2)
<b>SA</b>	Secretary of Army	1-3a
<b>SA</b>	security assistance	12-5c
<b>SA</b>	supportability analysis	11-73
<b>SAAS</b>	Standard Army Ammunition System	12-10d(1)
<b>SACS</b>	Structure and Composition System	2-7e
<b>SAE</b>	Service acquisition executive	11-67a
<b>SAFOR</b>	Semi-Automated Forces	15-40b(3)
<b>SAG</b>	study advisory group	5-22a(1)(c)3
<b>SAIC</b>	special agent in charge	23-7a
<b>SALS</b>	Standard Army Logistics Systems	12-10
<b>SAMAS</b>	Structure and Manpower Allocation System	2-4b(1)(b)
<b>SAMS</b>	Standard Army Maintenance System	12-8h(3)(d)
<b>SAR</b>	selected acquisition report	11-63h
<b>SARSS-O</b>	Standard Army Retail Supply System – Objective	12-10d(3)
<b>SASA-MS</b>	Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army for Military Support	23-12f
<b>SASC</b>	Senate Armed Services Committee	9-62a(3)
<b>SASO</b>	stability and support operations	15-34c
<b>SAT</b>	Systems Approach to Training	15-12
<b>SATFA</b>	Security Assistance Field Activity	15-11c
<b>SATP</b>	Security Assistance Training Program	15-37
<b>SATS</b>	Standard Army Training System	15-13

---

<b>SB</b>	supply bulletin	12-8a(2)
<b>SBCCOM</b>	Soldier and Biological Chemical Command	12-6b(11)
<b>SBIR</b>	Small Business Innovation Research Program	9-65
<b>SBP</b>	Survivor Benefit Plan	13-57b
<b>SBR</b>	Standby Reserve	6-13a(1)(a)
<b>SCM</b>	summary court-martial	20-19d(1)
<b>SCO</b>	State coordinating officer	23-7c(1)(a)
<b>SDC-L</b>	Software Development Center - Lee	12-6b(4)
<b>SDC-W</b>	Software Development Center - Washington	12-6b(4)
<b>SDS</b>	Standard Depot System	12-10
<b>SDWA</b>	Safe Drinking Water Act	20-9c(1)
<b>SEAL</b>	sea, air, land (Navy)	4-22b(6)
<b>SECARMY</b>	Secretary of the Army	9-5a(8)
<b>SecDef</b>	Secretary of Defense	5-6c
<b>SERB</b>	selective early retirement board	13-48
<b>SES</b>	Senior Executive Service	11-14b
<b>SFP</b>	strategic force package	8-16c
<b>SG</b>	standards of grade	5-14e
<b>SGI</b>	small group instruction	15-18b
<b>SHAPE</b>	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe	18-7c
<b>SHRM</b>	strategic human resource management	13-35b(3)(b)
<b>SI</b>	skill identifier	5-14e
<b>SI</b>	system integrator	2-10b
<b>SIDPERS</b>	Standard Installation/Division Personnel System	13-10h
<b>SIGINT</b>	signals intelligence	11-18c
<b>SIMLM</b>	single integrated medical logistics manager	19-19b
<b>SIMOS</b>	space imbalanced MOS	13-19b(1)
<b>SIO</b>	standard installation organization	9-22b(3)

<b>SIOP</b>	Single Integrated Operation Plan	6-4a
<b>SIPT</b>	supportability integrated process team	11-73
<b>SIRDAP</b>	Science and Infrastructure RDAP	9-47f
<b>SISC</b>	support to international sporting competitions	23-25b
<b>SJA</b>	Staff Judge Advocate	17-15
<b>SKA</b>	skills, knowledge and aptitudes	13-24b
<b>SKA</b>	skills, knowledge, and attitudes	15-17
<b>SLAMIS</b>	SSN-LIN Automated Management and Integrating System	9-27b(2)
<b>SLEP</b>	service life extension program	11-22d(2)
<b>SM</b>	soldier's manual	15-29a
<b>SMA</b>	Supply Management, Army	12-12a
<b>SMART</b>	Simulation & Modeling for Acquisition, Requirements, and Training	11-89
<b>SMC</b>	Sergeants Major Course	15-18d
<b>SMCA</b>	Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition	12-6b(3)
<b>SMCT</b>	Soldier's Manuals of Common Tasks	15-29a
<b>SMDR</b>	structure manning decision review	13-13
<b>SME</b>	subject matter expert	5-30d
<b>SMM</b>	shipment management module	12-10d(6)
<b>SOCOM</b>	Special Operations Command	7-10
<b>SOFA</b>	status of forces agreement	14-2c
<b>SOP</b>	standing operating procedure	20-24h(2)
<b>SOR</b>	source of repair	12-4c(4)(g)
<b>SORTS</b>	Status of Resource and Training System	2-11b(7)(f)
<b>SOS</b>	source of supply	12-10d(3)
<b>SoS</b>	systems of systems	11-57
<b>SOSM</b>	systems of systems manager	11-57d(1)
<b>SOUTHCOM</b>	Southern Command	23-17b

<b>SOW</b>	statement of work	11-13f(9)
<b>SP</b>	Army Medical Specialist Corps	19-6b
<b>SPBS-R</b>	Standard Property Book System-Redesign	12-10d(5)
<b>SPCM</b>	special court-martial	20-19d(2)
<b>SQI</b>	special qualification identifier	5-14e
<b>SRA</b>	separate reporting activity	12-6b
<b>SRB</b>	selective retirement board	13-33a(4)
<b>SRC</b>	standard requirements code	5-23a(1)(b)
<b>SRG</b>	Senior Review Group	9-6a(14)
<b>SRO</b>	strategic research objective	11-7a
<b>SRO</b>	system readiness objective	11-74c(6)
<b>SROC</b>	Senior Readiness Oversight Council	8-2
<b>SRP</b>	soldier readiness program	20-11b
<b>SS</b>	supportability strategy	11-73
<b>SSA</b>	source selection authority	11-12c
<b>SSA</b>	special staff agency	6-12b
<b>SSA</b>	system safety assessment	11-19b(5)
<b>SSC</b>	senior service college	15-22
<b>SSC</b>	small scale contingency	5-19c
<b>SSCI</b>	Senate Select Committee on Intelligence	18-5
<b>SSCOM</b>	Soldier Systems Command	12-6b(11)
<b>SSF</b>	single stock fund	12-4c(4)(f)
<b>SSN</b>	standard study number	5-18c
<b>ST</b>	sustainment training	15-36
<b>STA</b>	system threat assessment	11-42a
<b>STAMIS</b>	Standard Information Management System	13-10h(1)
<b>STANFINS</b>	Standard Finance System	10-18c
<b>STAR</b>	system threat assessment report	11-62a

<b>STARC</b>	State area command	7-32b
<b>STARFIARS</b>	Standard Army Financial Inventory and Accounting Reporting System	12-10d(7)
<b>STO</b>	science and technology objectives	11-21g
<b>STO</b>	split training option	15-16d
<b>STORES</b>	Subsistence Total Order and Receipt Electronics System	12-10d(7)
<b>STOW</b>	synthetic theater of war	11-23c
<b>STP</b>	short term project	9-22b(6)
<b>STP</b>	soldier training publications	15-29
<b>STRADS</b>	Strategic Deployment System	12-4e(5)(a)
<b>STRAMS-E</b>	Student/Trainee Management System-Enlisted	13-19e(5)
<b>STRAP</b>	system training plan	11-13f(4)
<b>STRICOM</b>	Simulations, Training, and Instrumentation Command	12-6b(10)
<b>STTR</b>	Small Business Technology Transfer Pilot Program	9-65
<b>STX</b>	situational training exercises	15-33
<b>SVP</b>	special visibility program	9-22b(5)
<b>SWAR</b>	Solid Waste Annual Reporting System	17-28

**T**

<b>T&amp;E</b>	test and evaluation	11-17b
<b>T&amp;EO</b>	training and evaluation outline	15-35c(5)
<b>TAA</b>	total Army analysis	2-11b(7)(e)
<b>TAACOM</b>	theater army area command	22-21
<b>TAADS</b>	The Army Authorization Document System	2-7e
<b>TACITS</b>	Total Army Centralized Individual Training Solicitations	15-10c
<b>TACOM</b>	Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command	11-13d
<b>TADSS</b>	training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators	11-13f(1)
<b>TAEDP</b>	The Army Equipment Distribution Program	5-30k
<b>TAG</b>	the adjutant general	7-29b

<b>TAMMS</b>	The Army Maintenance Management System	12-10d(4)
<b>TAP</b>	The Army Plan	4-14b
<b>TAPDB</b>	Total Army Personnel Databases	13-10g
<b>TAPDB-AE</b>	Total Army Personnel Databases-Active Enlisted	13-10g
<b>TAPDB-AO</b>	Total Army Personnel Databases-Active Officer	13-10g
<b>TAPDB-MOB</b>	TAPDB Mobilization Databases	13-19e(2)(a)
<b>TAPES</b>	Total Army Personnel Evaluation System	14-29b
<b>TAS</b>	transportation addressing subsystem	12-10d(6)
<b>TASS</b>	The Army School System	7-52
<b>TAT</b>	technical assistance team	20-25a(9)
<b>TATS</b>	Total Army Training System	15-15
<b>TAV</b>	total asset visibility	5-18d
<b>TC AIMS</b>	Transportation Coordinator's Automated Information for Movements System	12-10d(6)
<b>TC-ACCIS</b>	Transportation Coordinator-Automated Command and Control Information System	12-4e(5)(a)
<b>TCMD</b>	Transportation Control and Movement Documents	12-8h(3)(e)1
<b>TD</b>	technology demonstration	11-21a
<b>TD</b>	training development	Figure 15-7
<b>TDA</b>	table of distribution and allowances	2-4b(1)(b)
<b>TDAD</b>	Training Development and Analysis Directorate	15-11c
<b>TDS</b>	Trial Defense Service	20-15c
<b>TDY</b>	temporary duty	13-41
<b>TEC</b>	Topographic Engineering Center	21-6b
<b>TECHINT</b>	technical intelligence	18-3d(6)
<b>TECOM</b>	Test and Evaluation Command	12-6b(8)
<b>TEM</b>	training execution matrices	15-35c(5)
<b>TEMP</b>	test and evaluation master plan	11-17b

## How the Army Runs

---

<b>TEP</b>	theater engagement plans	4-8b
<b>TERA</b>	temporary retirement authority	13-62
<b>TEWIPT</b>	test and evaluation working-level integrated product team	11-40a
<b>TFE</b>	tactical field exchange	12-4g(2)(b)
<b>TFE/TFF</b>	Task Force Eagle/Falcon	12-8h
<b>TFM</b>	Training Feedback Module	15-35c(5)
<b>TG</b>	Training Guide	15-29b
<b>TGM</b>	technical guidance memorandum	9-54c
<b>TIARA</b>	tactical intelligence and related activities	18-5c(3)
<b>TIG</b>	time in grade	13-33a(3)
<b>TIS</b>	time in service	13-46
<b>TISA</b>	troop issue subsistence activity	12-10d(7)
<b>TISO</b>	threat integration staff officer	11-17j(2)
<b>TJAG</b>	The Judge Advocate General	20-12c
<b>TJAGSA</b>	The Judge Advocate General's School	20-22c
<b>TM</b>	technical manual	12-6b(12)(b)
<b>TMA</b>	TRICARE Management Activity	19-6d
<b>TMCA</b>	transportation movement control agency	12-4f(1)
<b>TMD</b>	theater missile defense	11-18g
<b>TMDE</b>	test, measurement, and diagnostic equipment	12-5c(6)(e)2
<b>TMOPEs</b>	TRADOC Mobilization Operational Planning and Execution System	6-12d(3)
<b>TNGDEV</b>	training developer	11-13b
<b>TOA</b>	total obligation authority	9-6b(9)
<b>TOE</b>	table of organization and equipment	2-3b
<b>TOMA</b>	Training Operations Management Activity	15-11c
<b>TOPMIS</b>	Total Officer Personnel Management System	13-20c(1)
<b>TOPS</b>	Transportation Operational Personal Property Standard System	12-4e(5)(a)

<b>TPF</b>	total package fielding	11-56
<b>TPFDD</b>	time -phased force and deployment data	4-21c
<b>TPFDL</b>	time-phased force deployment list	12-5c(3)(a)
<b>TPIO</b>	TRADOC program integration office	11-18e(3)
<b>TPSN</b>	troop program sequence number	5-28a
<b>TPU</b>	troop program unit	7-21a(3)
<b>TRADOC</b>	U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command	2-5c(1)
<b>TRAP</b>	training requirements arbitration panel	13-13
<b>TRI</b>	toxic release inventory	17-26
<b>TRICARE</b>	not an acronym	6-13a(6)
<b>TRM</b>	Training Resource Model (TRM)	5-30h
<b>TSARC</b>	test schedule and review committee	11-19a
<b>TSC</b>	theater support command	12-4f(2)
<b>TSG</b>	The Surgeon General	11-17k
<b>TSM</b>	TRADOC systems manager	11-18e(3)
<b>TSP</b>	training support package	15-35c(6)
<b>TSR</b>	training support requirements	11-13f(5)
<b>TTHS</b>	trainees, transients, holdees and students	13-10e
<b>TTP</b>	tactics, techniques, and procedures	1-8c
<b>TWOS</b>	Total Warrant Officer System	13-5c(1)(e)
<b>TWS</b>	Thermal Weapons Sight	11-88b
<b>TYPCO</b>	type code	13-9a

**U**

<b>UAD</b>	updated authorizations document	13-8
<b>UAS</b>	unit activation schedule	6-12e(6)
<b>UCMJ</b>	Uniform Code of Military Justice	7-56
<b>UCP</b>	Unified Command Plan	4-22a

<b>UIC</b>	unit identification code	2-7e
<b>UIT</b>	unique item tracking	12-8e
<b>UJTL</b>	universal joint task list	5-22a(1)(a)
<b>ULLS</b>	Unit Level Logistics System	12-6b(12)(b)
<b>ULLS-A</b>	Unit Level Logistics System-Aviation	12-6b(12)(b)
<b>ULLS-G</b>	Unit Level Logistics System-Ground	12-6b(12)(b)
<b>ULP</b>	unfair labor practice	14-21f
<b>ULTP</b>	USAREUR Leaders Training Program	15-34b
<b>UMD</b>	unmatched disbursements	10-25a
<b>UMFP</b>	unit materiel fielding points	11-56c
<b>UMMIPS</b>	Uniform Movement and Materiel Issue Priority System	12-9b
<b>UMV</b>	Unit Movement Visibility	12-10c
<b>UNAAF</b>	Unified Action Armed Forces	6-4g(1)(a)
<b>URS</b>	unit reference sheet	5-3b
<b>USA</b>	Under Secretary of the Army	9-29a
<b>USACAPOC</b>	U.S. Army Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Command	Figure 7-6
<b>USACE</b>	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	3-6a
<b>USACHPPM</b>	U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine	19-13
<b>USACIDC</b>	U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command	3-4d
<b>USACPEA</b>	US Army Civilian Personnel Evaluation Agency	14-10a
<b>USAFMSA</b>	U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency	2-11b(5)
<b>USAMEDCOM</b>	U.S. Army Medical Command	15-27e
<b>USAMRMC</b>	U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command	11-19b
<b>USANETA</b>	U.S. Army Signal Command Networks, Engineering, and Telecommunications Activity	16-26
<b>USAPA</b>	U.S. Army Publishing Agency	13-6a
<b>USAR</b>	U.S. Army Reserve	5-23a(1)(c)
<b>USARC</b>	U.S. Army Reserve Command	5-30f

<b>USARCS</b>	U.S. Army Claims Service	20-12c
<b>USAREC</b>	U.S. Army Recruiting Command	3-2b(1)(a)
<b>USAREUR</b>	U.S. Army, Europe	3-2b(1)(a)
<b>USARF</b>	United States Army Reserve Forces	6-13a(4)(c)
<b>USARPAC</b>	U.S. Army, Pacific	3-6a
<b>USARSO</b>	U.S. Army, South	3-6a
<b>USARSOC</b>	U.S. Army Special Operations Command	15-27c
<b>USASAC</b>	U.S. Army Security Assistance Command	12-6b(9)
<b>USASMC</b>	U.S. Army Sergeants Major Course	15-18d
<b>USASMDC</b>	U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command	3-6a
<b>USASOC</b>	U.S. Army Special Operations Command	3-6a
<b>USASSI</b>	U.S. Army Soldier Support Institute	13-7a(4)
<b>USATC</b>	U.S. Army Training Center	15-16
<b>USAWC</b>	U.S. Army War College	1-9b
<b>USC</b>	United States Code	1-1
<b>USCENTCOM</b>	U.S. Central Command	4-22b(2)
<b>USCG</b>	United States Coast Guard	6-7k
<b>USD (Policy)</b>	Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)	9-13f
<b>USD(AT&amp;L)</b>	Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics)	9-13e
<b>USD(C)</b>	Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)	9-13g
<b>USD(P&amp;R)</b>	Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness)	9-13h
<b>USERRA</b>	Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act	7-25a
<b>USEUCOM</b>	U.S. European Command	4-22b(3)
<b>USF</b>	unit set fielding	11-57
<b>USJFCOM</b>	U.S. Joint Forces Command	4-20b(1)
<b>USMA</b>	United States Military Academy	2-6a(3)
<b>USMC</b>	U.S. Marine Corps	15-34c

<b>USPACOM</b>	U.S. Pacific Command	4-22b(4)
<b>USPFO</b>	U.S. Property and Fiscal Officer	7-32c
<b>USR</b>	unit status report	8-12
<b>USR</b>	unit status reporting	2-11b(7)(f)
<b>USSOCOM</b>	U.S. Special Operations Command	4-22b(6)
<b>USSOUTHCOM</b>	U.S. Southern Command	4-22b(7)
<b>USSPACECOM</b>	U.S. Space Command	4-22b(5)
<b>USSTRATCOM</b>	U.S. Strategic Command	4-22b(9)
<b>UST</b>	underground storage tanks	17-24
<b>USTRANSCOM</b>	U.S. Transportation Command	4-22b(8)
<b>UTA</b>	unit training assembly	7-21a(1)

### V

<b>VC</b>	Veterinary Corps	19-6b
<b>VCJCS</b>	Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	4-11a
<b>VCSA</b>	Vice Chief of Staff, Army	2-5a
<b>VDISC4</b>	Vice Director of Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications & Computers	11-12d
<b>VEOA</b>	Veterans Employment Opportunity Act	14-18a
<b>VERRP</b>	Voluntary Early Release and Retirement Program	13-61b
<b>VI</b>	voluntary indefinite	13-32
<b>VI/TSC</b>	visual information/training support centers	15-8j
<b>VISMOD</b>	visually modified	5-31d
<b>VOLAR</b>	Volunteer Army	17-35b(1)

### W

<b>WARS</b>	Worldwide Ammunition Reporting System	12-8e
<b>WBRP</b>	Whole Barracks Renewal Program	17-35b(1)
<b>WES</b>	Waterways Experiment Station	21-6d

<b>WFLA</b>	warfighting lens analysis	9-47c
<b>WHNS</b>	wartime host nation support	12-5c(3)(b)
<b>WIN</b>	Warfighter Information Network	16-30
<b>WIP</b>	work in process	10-25b
<b>WIPT</b>	working-level integrated product team	11-66
<b>WLMP</b>	Wholesale Logistics Modernization Program	12-5c(4)
<b>WMD</b>	weapons of mass destruction	23-24a
<b>WMP</b>	Air Force War and Mobilization Plan	6-3
<b>WO</b>	warrant officer	5-30h
<b>WOAC</b>	Warrant Officer Advanced Course	13-30
<b>WOBC</b>	warrant officer basic course	13-15b
<b>WOCC</b>	Warrant Officer Career Center	13-30e
<b>WOCS</b>	Warrant Officer Candidate School	13-15b
<b>WOES</b>	Warrant Officer Education System	13-29a
<b>WOLDAP</b>	Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan	13-29a
<b>WOMA</b>	Warrant Officer Management Act	13-29a
<b>WOS</b>	warrant officer service	13-29e
<b>WOSC</b>	Warrant Officer Staff Course	13-30
<b>WOSSC</b>	Warrant Officer Senior Staff Course	13-30
<b>WPR</b>	War Powers Resolution	20-24f
<b>WPS</b>	Worldwide Ports System	12-4c(5)(a)
<b>WRAP</b>	warfighting rapid acquisition program	11-17e
<b>WRMR</b>	war reserve materiel requirement	6-13a(2)(b)
<b>WRMS</b>	war reserve materiel stock	6-13a(2)(b)
<b>WRSA</b>	war reserve stocks for allies	12-8a(1)(d)
<b>WTCV</b>	weapons and tracked combat vehicles	10-15b
<b>WWW</b>	World Wide Web	16-25b

**X**

There are no X entries in this glossary

**Y**

There are no Y entries in this glossary

**Z**

<b>ZBR</b>	Zero Base Review	7-47
<b>ZLIN</b>	developmental line item number	5-18c