Appendix D

LESSONS LEARNED

The lessons learned in this appendix come from a U.S. Marine Corps light armored vehicle (LAV) unit serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Stryker operators and leaders can benefit because of LAV and Stryker similarity, and LAV lessons learned in urban environments.

ATTACK AND MOVEMENT

D-1.      Despite current SOP, vehicle commanders (VCs) fought out of the hatch "popped up" 99 percent of the time. They did this for three reasons: all-around visibility; safety; and target acquisition. The LAV used by the USMC is a high center of gravity vehicle.

D-2.      Though the vehicle can maneuver straight up a 60 percent slope, it can only traverse a 30 percent slope. Fighting holes, dips, and steep road shoulder drops proved to be major problems. While drivers drove buttoned up 90 percent of the time, and always during movement to contact, the field of view was so narrow that VCs were required to give detailed commands with regard to obstacles and hazards. As for target acquisition, there are no independent thermal or optical sights for the VCs. Therefore, VCs were limited to what the gunner saw, or what they saw through periscopes arrayed around the hatch. Periscopes reduce visibility and reaction times to a threat by 50-60 percent. Therefore, unless indirect fire was impacting directly on the LAV's position, they did not button up.

D-3.      In Tikrit, the Lessons Learned commander's platoons (four vehicles apiece with approximately three to four scouts each) were faced with clearing several city blocks that often left individual vehicles isolated. They were not digitized at the vehicle level. The vehicles crept forward as the scouts moved, never letting the scouts get out of sight for the sake of protecting both the scouts and the vehicles. The scouts cleared every corner and intersection before their vehicle crossed. While the gunner scanned between the first and second floors of buildings, the VCs covered the rooftops. Before scouts dismounted the vehicles, all scout hatches were closed to keep grenades out.

D-4.      Observation alternated between the vehicle's thermal sight and night vision goggles because action in Afghanistan proved that continuous use of the "thermals" burned up sensor units quickly. We were fortunate when we attacked into Tikrit, because the resistance was very light. "The times have changed now, and if we did it over again against the threat in place now, we'd be more deliberate in movement."

MOVING WITHIN URBAN AREAS

D-5.      The Division zone stretched from An Nasireyah in the south, to Al Hillah in the north. This comprised a distance of approximately 300 miles with only one improved highway (MSR Tampa – Route 1) running through the middle of it. Many other roads were two lane and unimproved dirt roads where the LAV's speed (and to some degree mobility) advantage was drastically hampered.

D-6.      When trying to win "hearts and minds" on Iraq's crowded and narrow urban streets, driving an LAV through the middle of downtown was ineffective at best, and could lead to a "flashpoint" at worst. While the company did experience some minor traffic accidents with Iraqi civilians (they are notoriously aggressive and dangerous drivers), there were no casualties. There were several children killed by high speed U.S. military vehicles during the same time frame…a situation that could have boiled out of control if Marine forces did not have the relationship it did with the local population. The commander made it a point to ensure Bravo Company took great pains to avoid congested civilian traffic areas, especially if the mission or commander's intent allowed for this flexibility. While remaining as unpredictable as possible, the company also avoided morning and afternoon "rush hour" in built up urban environments.

TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS: STATIONARY, ROVING, and HASTY

D-7.      The company was often assigned the task of rapidly moving to and controlling access through, along, or near major avenues of approach, egress, or heavily traveled main supply routes. This was largely an effort to deter or deny former regime loyalist (FRL) forces the use of these routes or to monitor traffic activity along them. The great benefit of light armored reconnaissance (LAR) was the manner in which it could quickly own a space with point or route security. Its limitation was not having enough dismounted Marines to effectively man traffic control points over a long period of time. This problem was solved by task organizing elements from Lima Company 3/5 with Bravo Company. This combined team gave Battalion Task Force 3/5 a good deal of flexibility when handling a myriad of security challenges along the many improved, unimproved, and dirt roads that crisscrossed its zone. The battalion established numerous stationary and defined checkpoints throughout its zone that Bravo Company and other battalion elements manned on a regular basis.

D-8.      Bravo Company also conducted a process of roving and hasty checkpoints. The hasty checkpoints were particularly effective when a suspected vehicle was spotted and a section or platoon of LAVs lying in wait descended upon and searched the vehicle and its occupants. Another effective variation of this technique is called the "squeeze-play". One LAV would set itself overtly at a tactical control point (in a hull down position preferably) on an avenue of approach—with another LAV lying covertly in defilade approximately 200-300 meters from its wingman vehicle. As an Iraqi vehicle approached, a dismounted scout team would position themselves to pull the vehicle over for a search. Most vehicles would comply with the search. However, if they didn't, the nearby LAV could pull forward, and if the Iraqi's vehicle made an abrupt u-turn in an attempted get away, the "squeeze play" vehicle was given a quick radio brevity code to cut off the vehicle attempting to egress. This was especially effective when Bravo Company conducted its force protection mission with BTF 3/5 while conducting stipend payments for former Iraqi Soldiers. Several suspected FRL members were caught along with numerous weapons, ammunition, and bundles of Iraqi and U.S. currency.

THREAT

D-9.      An LAV presents a high value and tempting target if a creative dismounted enemy (often using getaway civilian vehicles) can canalize and ambush with a combination of small arms, IEDs, RPGs, and other massed surprised fires in a built up area. Several IEDs were employed against Bravo Company in similar fashion, fortunately without any significant personnel or vehicle damage. In these situations the alertness of the Marines and dispersion of our vehicles was the key to preventing the enemy's success. Following are some driving tips Bravo Company found effective:

l        Vary the distance between vehicles and do not create patterns. This helps defeat the enemy's timing when detonating IEDs or leading with RPGs and small arms.

l        Employ liberal use of scouts to conduct security sweeps along the flanks of heavily traveled routes prior to moving any vehicles on them. This sounds like a simple concept, but was an incredibly unfamiliar concept with certain units.

D-10.   While the congestion, tight spaces, and 360 degree nature of a built-up area may negate the full effectiveness of an LAVs optical and firepower advantages, scouts or attached Infantry should be employed. This will provide maximum standoff and security, and is especially important in a civil disturbance or riot control situation. Creating a buffer between an LAV and an unruly, potentially dangerous crowd is critical. There are not many attractive options for an LAV if it is about to be overrun, even if by a mob of "innocent" civilians. Getting too close to a crowd also affords the enemy the opportunity to engage an LAV from within or nearby those civilians, hoping to draw fire back. LAV intimidation through its imposing presence, faking a charge (lifting the trim-vane has definite shock value), ramming vehicles, or firing warning shots are the only measures an LAV crew can take before employing deadly force.

D-11.   Civil unrest operations in An Nasiriyah and Al Hillah provided several lessons learned:

l        Create maximum standoff and "buffers" with organic scouts or integrated Infantry to preserve and exploit the LAVs imposing presence.

l        Achieve effective coordination between dismounted scouts/Infantry to work as a combined team that maximizes the capabilities of both.

l        Have a thorough understanding of the urban ground your unit is working on. A simple map reconnaissance will not do justice to the myriad of streets and alleys present in neighborhoods that are old, dense, and complicated.

l        Finally, we must have the ability to quickly maneuver or egress along multiple avenues as the situation and time of day dictate. This is every leader's responsibility. Remember Mogadishu!