THE BATTALION AND BRIGADE
BATTLE STAFF


TABLE OF CONTENTS
 COMBINED ARMS COMMAND
Deputy Commanding General
for Training
Historical Perspective
 Brigadier General William L. Nash
Introduction
I.
MISSION RECEIVED
CENTER FOR
II.
 INFORMATION TO COMMANDER AND
 ARMY LESSONS LEARNED
STAFF
III.
 MISSION ANALYSIS, RESTATED
Director
MISSION AND COMMANDER'S
Colonel Roger K. Spickelmier
GUIDANCE
Mission Analysis and Restated Mission
 Managing Editor
Commander's Planning Guidance
 Dr. Lon R Seglie
Time Management
IV.
 COURSE-OF-ACTION DEVELOPMENT
 Editor plus Layout and Design
AND ANALYSIS
Miss Mary Sue Winneke
Course-of-Action Development
Course-of-Action Analysis
 Author
Course-of-Action Comparison
 Major Tony Garcia
V.
 PREPARE PLAN/ORDER/FRAGO
Preformatted Orders
 Photos and Graphics
Organizing Reproduction
 Major Tony Garcia
Methods of Reproduction
VI.
 APPROVE PLAN/ORDER/FRAGO
 Contributors
VII.
 ISSUE PLAN/ORDER/FRAGO
 Colonel Joseph Molinari, Major
VIII.
 MISSION RECEIVED BY
Randy Schroeder, NTC Cobra,
SUBORDINATE HQ
 Scorpion, Bronco and Dragon Teams,
Confirmation Brief
 and JTRC Observer Controllers
Backbrief
Rehearsals
 Distribution
Conclusion
 Sergeant First Class Michael Noone
Ms Lisa Matthews

Information in this newsletter is the result of a year-long study conducted by the
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Many of the techniques and procedures
have been collected from observer controllers at the National Training Center (NTC),
and Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). The remainder were developed by the
Command and General Staff College, Infantry School, Center for Army Lessons
Learned, Tactical Commanders' Development Course, 1st Cavalry Division, 1st, 4th
and 6th Infantry Divisions. CALL appreciates the efforts of all contributors, especially
those of COL Joseph Molinari, LTC Clyde Long and MAJ Randy Schroeder from the
Command and General Staff College for their assistance in the publication of this
newsletter.


The Secretary of the Army has determined that the
publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction
of the public business as required by law of the Depart-
ment. Use of funds for printing this publication has been
approved by Commander, U.S Army Training and
Doctrine Command, 1985, IAW AR 25-30.


Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or
feminine gender is used, both are intended.

NOTE: Any publications referenced in
this newsletter (other than the CALL
newsletters), such as ARs, FMs, TMs, must
be obtained through your pinpoint
distribution system.

Local reproduction of
this publication is
authorized and
encouraged.



HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE*

The men of the 31st Regimental CombatTeam, 7th Infantry Division, on the
east side of the Chosin Reservoir, had been under attack for virtually 80 straight
hours by waves of Chinese. The men were staggering with mental and physical
fatigue, the results of constant attacks, sub-zero weather and a shortage of
supplies. At dawn on 1 December 1950, the commander, LTC Don Faith, and
staff decided on a desperate breakout attempt to the south and the relative safety
of the headquarters of the 1st Marine Division at Hagaru-ri. As a result of
fatigue and the continuous combat, the breakout plans were poorly prepared,
coordinated and disseminated. Many officers and men were not even informed
that a breakout was being attempted until they saw the trucks forming up at
1100. The arrival of Marine close air support initially helped suppress enemy
fire, but that "lift" to friendly morale disappeared when one aircraft accidentally
dropped napalm on the front of the breakout column. As several officers
admitted later, command and control was virtually lost from the start. Poor staff
coordination and the lack of synchronizing all available firepower and maneuver
forces led to a terrible situation. "The plan did not work and the mission failed
because control was lost at the outset--and, in fact--the rifle elements failed to
provide flank and rear security."

With the loss of control of the flank and rear guards, the unit began to break
apart under relentless enemy attacks. Communications were nonexistent and
only a carefully established, well-disseminated operational plan could have
rescued the situation. As the trucks full of wounded were halted by enemy fire
and roadblocks, it became a situation of every man for himself. Despite many
instances of individual heroism, most men who broke through the surrounding
enemy forces kept going to the south without a thought for the wounded left
behind. A unit had turned into a collection of individuals without direction or
control. In the space of four days and five nights of continuous combat, 1,000
men, almost 30 percent of unit strength, were killed or captured. Many of these
casualties occurred during the breakout attempt and were direct results of poor
staff operations. Individual courage could not replace the failure of the
commander and his staff to plan, coordinate and synchronize a complex
maneuver in the face of a relentless foe.

*Roy Appleman, East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950.







The need for efficient staff action exists today
as it did on December 1, 1950. The near destruction
of the 31st Regimental Combat Team (RCT) was not
entirely due to the poor planning by the commander
and staff; however, it was a dominant factor. Had
the commander and staff made a greater effort to
develop and coordinate a better plan, their unit may
not have suffered such a great loss.
INTRODUCTION

The tenets of Army Operations doctrine demand that commanders seize and retain
initiative in battle. Taking the initiative requires commanders to act independently, consistent
within their higher commander's intent, and to never allow the enemy to recover from
offensive actions. To accomplish this, commanders must act quickly and decisively.


Observations from the Combat Training Centers
(CTCs) indicate that commanders and staffs do not
follow the military decisionmaking process (MDMP).
Although it is often necessary to abbreviate the
MDMP to make quick decisions, current doctrine does
not provide an effective abbreviated method. As a
result of the lack of specific techniques and
procedures, commanders and staffs often eliminate
steps in the MDMP rather than reduce the time for
each step. This leads to plans which are not complete,
lack detail and are not synchronized during execution.


Emerging doctrine, to be published in FM 101-5, Command and Control for Command-
ers and Staffs, will provide guidance on how to abbreviate the MDMP. However, there are
techniques and procedures that have been employed that are useful. This newsletter provides
techniques and procedures that speed the MDMP while maintaining effectiveness. The
techniques and procedures contained in this newsletter were used by brigade and battalion
commanders and staffs to quickly conduct the MDMP.






"Your staff won't win the war for you, but it can prevent
you from winning." BG John E. Miller
I. MISSION RECEIVED

OBSERVATION: Commanders and staffs must
optimize available time by providing subordinates
information to begin planning and preparing for
the mission.

DISCUSSION: During the MDMP the commander
and staff receive and develop information that is
useful to subordinates. To aid subordinates in
planning, the commander and staff provide
information as frequently as possible, maximizing the
subordinate's planning and preparation time.
The commander and staff send warning orders at
key times during the MDMP to provide subordinates
planning information. Send the first
warning order once the mission is
received from the higher unit.
Provide subordinates the type, time and location of operation. This allows subordinates to
begin planning and managing available time, prepare necessary equipment, and begin
conducting rehearsals and battle drills.

Send the second warning order after the commander and
staff have analyzed the mission. Provide as much new information as possible
(restated mission and tasks); include any specific instructions that subordinates need to aid
them in organizing their planning and preparation time.

Send the third warning order after the commander has
decided the course of action and has developed a concept of
operation. With a course of action selected, tell subordinates the task organization and
their specified tasks By providing the task organization, units can begin cross-attaching and
coordinating changes in support. Provide subordinates copies of draft operational graphics and
a brief explanation of the concept of operation if time is available. This allows them to begin
parallel planning, while the battalion or brigade operations order is developed.




Parallel planning is a technique similar to multiple warning orders. Parallel planning allows
subordinate commanders and staffs to plan and prepare while the higher staff produces their
plan. This would prevent planning sequentially, with the subordinate commander receiving the
higher commander's order before beginning to plan. By parallel planning, subordinate units
have more available time because they receive information earlier than they would during
sequential planning. During parallel planning, the higher commander provides subordinate
commanders his concept of the operation and details of the plan as soon as they are
developed. This is done best by the commander meeting and quickly briefing his subordinates.


HELP SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS PLAN QUICKLY BY GIVING
THEM A DETAILED WARNING ORDER PRIOR TO THE OPERATIONS
ORDER BRIEFING.

Parallel planning conserves time for all echelons, but demands close coordination between
commanders and staffs. Even after the commander has met with subordinate commanders, the
brigade and battalion must maintain close contact during planning. If not, the brigade may
change the concept, and the battalion will produce an erroneous order.





LESSONS:
* Commander and staff: Send multiple warning orders to maximize subordinate
planning and preparation time.
* Commander and staff: Conduct parallel planning by providing subordinate
commanders the concept of the operation and specified tasks when they are
developed.


II. INFORMATION TO COMMANDER
AND STAFF

OBSERVATION: Staffs must collect and organize
information to provide the commander with
necessary details he needs to analyze the situation.

DISCUSSION: Once the mission is received, the staff
collects and organizes information and provides it to
the commander to assist him in his Mission, Enemy,
Troops, Terrain, and Time (METT-T) analysis.
Although most staffs provide the commander with
information, they do not organize the key pieces of
information to give it quickly to the commander.
To provide the commander with information prior
to mission analysis, the staff must give him a quick
situation update. Frequently the situation update
consists of changes from an earlier update, since new

missions are branches or sequels of previous missions. In this case the staff provides
information that has changed and is likely to affect mission accomplishment. The situation
update ensures that the commander and staff are aware of current friendly and enemy activity,
and the current and future available assets (units, equipment, supplies and time) to identify
constraints. The commander and staff develop the format for their situation update through
training and incorporate it into the unit's tactical Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs). The
situation update serves as a checklist to ensure that the staff does not forget an item of
information.







LESSONS:
* Commander and staff: Determine the necessary information required to complete
the commander's METT-T analysis.
* Commander and staff: Develop a situation update format for all staff officers.

EXAMPLE OF SITUATION UPDATE FORMATS




S-1
S-2

A) CURRENT PERSONNEL STATUS
INITIAL IPB
1. STATUS OF ALL ORGANIC UNITS
A) BATTLEFIELD AREA EVALUATION
2. STATUS OF ATTACHMENTS
B) TERRAIN ANALYSIS
B) ACTIVITY OF UNITS: STATUS OF
C) WEATHER ANALYSIS
PERSONNEL RECONSTITUTION
D) THREAT EVALUATION
1. REPLACEMENTS
E) INITIAL THREAT INTEGRATION
2. RETURN TO DUTY
 SITUATION TEMPLATE
C) FORECASTED PERSONNEL
STATUS
1. ORGANIC UNIT STATUS
AT MISSION TIME
2. ATTACHMENT STATUS AT
MISSION TIME
S-3
S-4

CURRENT WEAPON STATUS OF
A) CURRENT VEHICLE STATUS
AVAILABLE
B) FORECASTED VEHICLE STATUS
A) TANKS
C) FORECASTED WEAPON STATUS
B) TOWS
D) SUPPLY STATUS
C) BRADLEYS
1. CL I
D) INFANTRY SQUADS
2. CL III
E) DRAGONS
3. CL IV
F) MORTARS
E) TRANSPORTATION ASSETS
G) STINGERS
H) AVIATION ASSETS


III. MISSION ANALYSIS, RESTATED MISSION
AND COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE




MISSION ANALYSIS AND RESTATED MISSION




OBSERVATION: Commanders must analyze the mission completely.

DISCUSSION: Commanders must completely analyze their mission or the result will be a
poorly restated mission, an incomplete commander's intent, and a vague appreciation of
available time. To help the commander analyze and restate the mission quickly, the staff
begins analysis as soon as the order is received. When the operations order arrives, the
executive officer (XO) distributes the portion of the order that applies to each staff officer's
functional area. The staff assists the commander by identifying constraints, restrictions and
specified and implied tasks contained in their portion of the order.
The XO assembles the staff and lists all the constraints, restrictions, and specified and
implied tasks, once the staff has completed its analysis. While the staff compiles the list, they
discuss their individual analysis to identify information from one staff officer's functional area
of responsibility that will impact on another staff officer's functional area of responsibility.







The commander analyzes the commanders' intent two echelons higher and then reviews the
staffs list to confirm his own appreciation of the order. The commander reviews the list and
identifies the essential tasks, which define mission success, and includes them in the restated
mission. The restated mission contains the elements of what, when, where, and why the unit
will execute.

In the absence of the
commander, the XO leads the staff
by analyzing the higher command-
ers' intent and collecting the
constraints, restrictions, and
specified and implied tasks as he
would with the commander. The
XO, together with the staff, drafts a
restated mission and presents it to
the commander when he arrives.
The commander then accepts or
changes the mission statement
which becomes paragraph 2 in the
operations order.


MISSION ANALYSIS CHARTS HELP THE COMMANDER
AND STAFF ANALYZE AND RESTATE THE MISSION


LESSONS:
* Staff: Assist the commander by identifying and listing constraints, restrictions,
and specified and implied tasks.
* Commander: Analyze the mission completely by accomplishing the following:
* Review the commanders' intent of the two higher echelons.
* Identify the unit's constraints and restrictions.
* Identify the unit's specified and implied tasks.
* Derive the essential tasks from the specified and implied tasks.






COMMANDER'S PLANNING GUIDANCE

OBSERVATION: Commanders must provide sufficient planning guidance for their staffs
to develop estimates and feasible courses of action.

"Poor execution can render the most brilliant

concept null and void, but the most magnificent

execution can rarely offset the deadweight of a

flawed concept." GEN W. E. DEPUY, USA, RETIRED


DISCUSSION: To correctly provide planning guidance, the commander must give the staff
his vision of the operation. The commander develops his guidance using his experience and
the information available on the mission. By training his staff, the commander learns how
explicit his guidance must be. He determines the detail of guidance by evaluating the staffs
abilities and the time available to plan the mission. The commander does not want to make his
guidance so explicit that he suppresses the staffs ideas but focuses their efforts to quickly
develop planning options.
However specific the commander's planning guidance is, he must provide his staff these
nine elements.
1. Enemy courses of action.
2. Restated mission.
3. Commander's intent.
4. The concept of the operation, using the elements of the battlefield framework
(area of operation, battle space and organizing the battlefield).
5. The deception objective.
6. Priorities.
7. The time plan, produced from the commander's and staffs analysis of available
time.
8. The type of order to issue.
9. The type of rehearsal to conduct.




Through training, the commander determines how explicit he must make his planning
guidance. Regardless of the amount of commander's guidance, the staff must be prepared to
receive and retain all the details. A technique for the commander to help his staff retain all his
guidance is to sketch the initial concept of the operation graphics. The commander uses the
sketch to explain his guidance on the scheme of maneuver, deception objective, and to
designate the sustainment priorities. Additionally, a member of the staff takes notes and lists
each guideline the commander gives the staff Whether the commander remains or leaves after
he gives his planning guidance, the sketch and list will assist the staff during the estimate
process.
A common mistake of commanders is believing that the staff understands his planning
guidance, when, in fact, they do not. Even if the commander provides a sketch, a supplemental
technique is to have the staff back-brief him on his planning guidance. Similar to having
subordinate commanders back-brief him on the operations order, the commander has the staff
repeat his guidance as it pertains to them. This additional technique may not always be
necessary, but during the fatigue of continuous operations, it helps the commander confirm his
guidance is understood. Time spent here will improve the probability that the commander will
accept the staffs work later.




SKETCH THE INITIAL CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION
WHEN GIVING PLANNING GUIDANCE.




LESSONS:
* Commander: Determine the amount of planning guidance the staff requires to
develop the plan.
* Commander: Do not suppress the staff's ability to plan by providing excessive
planning guidance.

* Commander: Sketch the initial concept of the operation for the staff.
* Staff: Take notes on the commander's guidance.
* Commander: Have the staff back-brief you on your guidance.


TIME MANAGEMENT


"You can ask me for anything you like, except time." NAPOLEON

OBSERVATION: Commanders and staffs must analyze and plan the use of available
time in detail and not waste planning and preparation time.

DISCUSSION: A significant problem commanders and staffs face during the MDMP is time
management. Though time is very valuable, it is often wasted by poor management leaving
little time for effective preparation. To have time to accomplish all the tasks during
preparation, commanders and staffs must organize, plan and manage their available time.
Identified as part of the commander's planning guidance, the analysis of time begins as the
mission is received. Once the commander receives his mission, he begins a METT-T analysis
including an analysis of time.
Problems begin when the commander's, or commander's and staffs, analysis consists only
of determining their planning time (one-third available time). This is only a partial analysis
and does not enable the commander to determine how much time he has to conduct each step
of the MDMP or prepare for mission execution. Using the "one-third or one-fifth" rules to
manage time only serves to determine the impact on subordinate commanders' time, which is
necessary, because only the commander can preserve subordinate commanders' time.
A technique to efficiently analyze and manage time is to develop a planning and
preparation timeline which becomes part of the time plan. The timeline identifies the time for
planning and preparation tasks, beginning when the unit receives the mission and ending when
the unit executes the mission. During planning, the commander and staff develop and refine
the timeline by listing the tasks they will conduct or must track.







EXAMPLE OF DETAILED TIMELINE
PLANNING/PREPARATION TIMELINE (TASK FORCE DEFENSE)

TIME
 EVENT
 RESPONSIBILITY/POC
091030
 Received Mission
091045
 Situation UpdateBrief
Staff
091050
 Initial Warning Order Sent
S-3
091100
 Mission Analysis
Staff
091130
 Receive CDR's Planning
Commander
Guidance
Send 2d Warning Order
S-3
091200
 Develop Courses of Action
Staff'
091300
 Course of Action Analysis
Staff
War Game and Comparison
091330
 Course of Action Decision
CDR and Staff
Brief
Detailed War Game with CDR
CDR and Staff
Develop Decision Support
CDR and Staff
Template
091350
 3d Warning Order Sent
S-3
091400
 Begin Prepositioning of CL V
S-4 Company COs
Order Preparation
Staff
091530
 Reproduction Begins
Operations NCO
091630
 Operation Order Brief
CDR and Staff
091800
 Confirmation Brief to Commander
Company COs
092100
 One third Available Time
100700
 Emplace Task Force Target
S-3
Reference Points (TRP)
100800
 Backbrief to Commander
Company COs
100900
 Rehearsal
 CDR/S-3
101100
 Status of Obstacle Plan to
Engineer LO
Commander
101400
 Status of Survivability
Engineer LO
Positions
102000
 Heat all TRP's
S-3
102030
 Sundown
102115
 End Evening Nautical
Twilight (EENT)
102330
 NET Call
 TOC
(All Leaders on Command NET)
NLT110001
DEFEND IN SECTOR
110430
 Intelligence Update
S-2
110515
 Before Morning Nautical
Twilight (BMNT)
110545
 Sunup

By developing the timeline, the commander has an appreciation of the amount of time
available for him and his subordinate commanders. The timeline shows the commander
and staff using 10 1/2 hours (from mission receipt to end of order plus briefback and
rehearsal time) of the available 37 1/2 hours, providing the majority of available time to
subordinates for planning and preparation.

Beginning with receipt of the mission, the staff develops an initial timeline, identifying on
a chart the times for known events using the reverse planning sequence. At this point, all that
can be listed is mission receipt time, mission execution time, the one-third time point
(planning time), and light data.
The XO continues to develop the timeline by identifying the estimated time the staff will
assemble to prepare their situation updates, analyze the mission, and brief the commander. To
develop the timeline further, the commander and staff need to know how long it takes to
conduct each planning task. This information is obtained only by training on the MDMP. The
commander determines the amount of time the staff will spend on course of action analysis,
wargaming and the time of the decision brief. These events are added to the timeline so the
staff can plan their own time while developing their estimates.
The commander and staff identify tasks to be accomplished during preparation, while they
develop the plan. These tasks are added to the timeline with the responsible person or
organization. The TOC then tracks the status of the task for the commander. By adding
preparation tasks to the timeline, the commander and staff can synchronize the preparation
effort.





LESSONS:
* Commander: Preserve subordinate commanders' time.
* Commander and staff: Develop a planning and preparation timeline.
* Commander and staff: Refine the timeline by listing tasks to be accomplished
during planning and preparation and the person responsible to complete the task.
* Commander and staff: Use the timeline to track the progression of preparation.