

***GTA 41-01-003**



AUGUST 2009

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*This publication supersedes GTA 41-01-003, March 2005.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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INTRODUCTION

This guide is intended to assist Civil Affairs (CA) Soldiers and civil-military operations (CMO) staffs as they plan and conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) in support of the military commander, and interagency and multinational forces throughout the scope of operations. It should be used in conjunction with the recently published Joint Publication (JP) 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, which has superseded JP 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*; Field Manual (FM) 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*, which has superseded FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*; FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*; Graphic Training Aid (GTA) 41-01-001, *Civil Affairs Planning and Execution Guide*; GTA 41-01-004, *Joint Civil Affairs Operations and Joint Civil-Military Operations Planning Guide*; GTA 41-01-006, *Working with the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance*; and applicable operation plans (OPLANs).

JP 3-29 defines FHA as consisting of Department of Defense (DOD) activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or Department of State (DOS), conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by United States (U.S.) forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation (HN) civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA.

Although U.S. military forces are primarily designed and structured to defend and protect U.S. national interests, they may be readily adapted to FHA requirements. Military organization, structure, and readiness

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enable commanders to rapidly and effectively respond when time is of the essence. In addition to, or sometimes in lieu of, HN humanitarian assistance (HA) efforts, literally hundreds of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from around the world respond to disasters to provide HA in various forms and for varied durations. However, U.S. military forces are not the primary United States Government (USG) means of providing FHA. They normally supplement the activities of U.S. and foreign government authorities, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). The USAID is the principal agency for U.S. bilateral development and HA to foreign countries. The National Security Council (NSC) coordinates foreign assistance policies and programs among all USG agencies.

Often, FHA operations are conducted simultaneously with other types of operations, such as peace operations, nation assistance (NA), or noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Funding and legal authority for FHA will, in most cases, be a major concern for CA personnel, along with the conditions and standards of the end state, and transition and termination of the operations. Caution in avoiding overcommitment to programs of a long duration, such as NA, with these shorter-term FHA efforts is necessary. The environment of operations may be permissive, uncertain, or hostile, thus requiring attention to the principles of war, as well as stability operations and support operations. Regardless of the environment, Soldiers at all levels will institute protection measures that ensure the safety and security of all personnel.

A good example of the problems facing the planner in FHA is summarized below:

The joint task force (JTF) faced many significant challenges from the very beginning. The total joint operations area (JOA) spanned 100,357 square miles. The destruction in the region included 2,860 dead, over a thousand missing, and 1.04 million displaced people, as well as 172 damaged bridges. Since the

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United States had almost no military presence in any of the three countries in the JOA, the new JTF had to overcome problems in medical, logistical, engineering, aviation, and humanitarian assistance operations that the preexisting JTF did not face. The JTF also planned and coordinated for each of the ports, medical, base operations, airfield, and other support facilities that it occupied. Additionally, most of the personnel and units assigned to assist in the JOA came from the continental United States (CONUS) and had little expertise or knowledge in the region. The JTF staff was organized around a CONUS Corps Support Group headquarters, which had to quickly deploy, establish its base of operations, and begin support of arriving units. In addition to the many challenges the JTF faced, it also had some unique opportunities, such as improving U.S.-Nicaraguan relations through humanitarian assistance operations in Nicaragua, where no American troops have operated in decades.

Hurricane Mitch, 1998
Center for Army Lessons Learned

FHA operations are inherently complex operations that require a significant amount of interagency coordination. FHA is directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level. FHA operations require centralized coordination and control.

The proponent of this GTA is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Reviewers and users of this GTA should submit comments and recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-CA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610, or e-mail them to AOJK-DTD-CA@soc.mil.

Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.


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TYPES OF FHA OPERATIONS



FHA missions conducted by U.S. military forces span the entire range of military operations but are most often crisis response and limited contingency operations. The following missions are common in FHA operations, as defined in JP 3-29 (a single FHA operation may well contain more than one of these missions).

Disaster Relief Missions. These missions are provided for under Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*. These missions include prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims. Distribution of relief supplies has traditionally been the domain of NGOs and IGOs because of their charters, expertise, and experience. However, if the relief community is

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overwhelmed, or the security situation precludes it, U.S. military forces may be tasked to distribute these supplies. Potential relief roles for U.S. forces include immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, construction of basic sanitation facilities and shelters, and provision of food and medical care. The DOD is a supporting agency to the USAID, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), and IGOs.


Dislocated Civilian (DC) Support Missions. DC support missions are specific humanitarian missions designed to support the assistance and protection for DCs. Dislocated civilian is a broad term primarily used by DOD that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. These persons may be victims of conflict or natural or man-made disasters. Typically, the United Nations (UN) or other IGOs and NGOs will build and administer camps, if needed, and provide basic assistance and services to the population. However, when the U.S. military is requested to provide support, DC support missions may include camp organization, basic construction, and administration; provision of care (food, supplies, medical attention, and protection); and placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations). An important priority for the management of DCs should be to use the services and facilities of non-DOD agencies when coordination can be accomplished as DC operations are often long-term and require enormous resourcing normally not immediately available through DOD sources.

Security Missions. These include establishing and maintaining conditions for the provision of FHA by organizations of the world relief community. These missions often call upon military forces to secure areas needed for the storage of relief supplies until they can be distributed. Other tasks may involve providing protection and armed escorts for convoys and personnel delivering emergency aid, protection of shelters for DCs, and providing security for multinational forces,

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NGOs, and IGOs. During security missions, the CA unit's role is one of support and is not to provide sustained security.

Technical Assistance and Support Functions. These short-term tasks generally include communication restoration, relief supply management, provision of emergency medical care, humanitarian demining, and high-priority relief supply delivery. Based upon geographic combatant commander (GCC) guidance, the FHA force commander should establish policy regarding technical advice and assistance to the affected country, UN, NGOs, and IGOs as soon as possible. *Note:* In FM 3-05.40, this term is defined as "technical assistance operations." CA functional specialists may have the ability to provide technical assistance. The CA generalist should solicit the information from an expert rather than attempt to provide technical advice.



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Consequence Management (Foreign/Domestic) Operations. These operations mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attack or event and to restore essential government services. These operations involve those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes. Primary responsibility rests with the HN, if not otherwise stipulated under relevant international agreements or arrangements. The response may include a number of agencies with specialized capabilities, in addition to forces provided by DOD.

There are varying degrees in which the term “consequence management” is used in doctrinal concepts and real-world operations. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, and JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, define consequence management (CM) as actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, man-made, or terrorist incidents. It is usually associated with CBRN (see FM 3-11.21, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations*). JP 3-29 adds “foreign” to the term and makes a distinction for planning and collaboration of FHA that relate to disasters in a CBRN environment.


CA and other units can conduct CM in support of local, state, and federal government agencies within the borders of the United States. This is known as civil support operations. In a major disaster or emergency as defined in the Stafford Act, the President may direct any federal agency, with or without reimbursement, to use its authorities and the resources granted to it under federal law (including personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities, and managerial, technical, and advisory services) in support of state and local assistance efforts. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) primarily coordinates federal emergency preparedness, planning, management, and disaster

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assistance functions. In 2005, in response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, disaster relief included significant DOD resources, including manpower, equipment, and supplies (FM 3-05.401, Chapter 5: Civil Support Operations).

CA and other units conduct CM nested in CAO/CMO in support of military operations. FM 3-05.40 and FM 3-05.401 provide doctrinal and TTP in support of CM. It is important to note that the CA Soldier who will conduct either CM or foreign consequence management (FCM) is providing the same fundamental mission “to mitigate the effects and restore essential services.”

RELATED OPERATIONS




Although FHA operations may be executed simultaneously with other types of operations, each type has unique characteristics. For example, FHA operations may be simultaneously conducted with peace operations, but each has its own strategic end state. Military commanders must be cautious not to commit their forces to projects and tasks that go beyond the FHA mission. Military commanders conducting FHA simultaneously with other operations must develop end state, transition, and termination objectives, as well as measures of effectiveness (MOEs) complementary to simultaneous military operations.

Stability Operations. Some military operations normally will continue after the conclusion of combat operations. An extended U.S. presence will be required to conduct stability operations to enable legitimate civil authority and attain the national strategic end state. These missions, tasks, and activities seek to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, or humanitarian relief. To reach the national strategic end state and conclude the operation or campaign successfully, joint force commanders (JFCs) must integrate and synchronize stability operations with other operations (offense and defense) within each major operation or campaign phase. Stability operations that support USG plans for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations primarily support HN authorities, OGAs, NGOs, and IGOs. Stability operations may be required during FHA operations to help rebuild HN capacity.

Nation Assistance Operations. These are often connected with FHA operations, but there are very distinct differences. NA refers to civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. NA programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance; foreign

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internal defense (FID); other Title 10, United States Code (USC) programs, to include humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) and military civic action (MCA); and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or IGOs. NA generally refers to a long-term commitment to promote sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. Most often, NA will be an important part of rebuilding after the completion of a disaster relief FHA mission.



- *Security assistance.* Security assistance refers to a group of programs by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services to foreign nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of U.S. national policies and objectives (for example, foreign military sales).
- *Foreign internal defense.* FID involves participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

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- *Humanitarian and civic assistance.* HCA is assistance to the local populace provided in conjunction with authorized military operations. This assistance is specifically authorized by Section 401, Title 10, United States Code (10 USC 401), and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions must promote the security interests of both the United States and the host country and the specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities. Assistance is limited to—
 - Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.
 - Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
 - Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
 - Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
 - Detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war.
- *Military civic action.* MCA programs offer the JFC an opportunity to improve the HN infrastructure and the living conditions of the local populace, while enhancing the legitimacy of the HN government. These programs use predominantly indigenous military forces at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and other areas that contribute to the economic and social development of

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the nation. These programs can have excellent long-term benefits for the HN by enhancing the effectiveness of the host government, developing needed skills, and enhancing the legitimacy of the host government by showing the people that their government is capable of meeting the population's basic needs. MCA may involve U.S. military supervision and advice, but the visible effort should be conducted by the HN or foreign nation military.

It is important to understand the differences among HCA, MCA, and FHA. FHA focuses on the use of DOD support as necessary to alleviate urgent needs in an HN caused by some type of disaster or catastrophe. By contrast, HCA and MCA programs are typically preplanned military exercises designed to provide assistance to the HN.


To avoid possible overlap or duplication and ensure sustainability, HCA and MCA projects must be coordinated with the Country Team (especially USAID) and the HN. For example, school construction should not be undertaken if there is not a sustainable plan by partners to provide teachers and administration, salaries, equipment, and books.

Peace Operations. Peace operations encompass multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations. NEOs are conducted to assist the DOS in evacuating U.S. citizens, DOD civilian personnel, and designated HN and third-country nationals whose lives are in danger


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from locations in a foreign nation to an appropriate safe haven. Although normally considered in connection with hostile action, evacuation may also be conducted in anticipation of, or in response to, any natural or man-made disaster.



CIVIL AFFAIRS ROLE IN FHA


The CA role in FHA is one of support to the commander's operational function and to the administration of certain aspects of the FHA operation. FHA operations are inherently complex and require a significant amount of interagency coordination. FHA is normally directed from the strategic level, coordinated and managed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level. On all levels, CA Soldiers perform the tasks discussed in the following figure. (JP 3-29 contains additional details for the civil-military operations center [CMOC].)



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At the strategic level, the CA Soldier must understand the following:


- DOS is the lead federal agency for FHA.
- Approval authority for commitment of DOD component resources or services for foreign disaster relief operations rests with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance.
- DOD supplies and services are provided for disaster and humanitarian purposes only after approval by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs). DOD provides supplies and services from the most expedient source, which is normally the GCC from whose theater the FHA requests emanate.



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At the operational level, the CA Soldier must understand the following:


- DODD 5100.46 establishes the relationship between DOD, USAID, and OFDA. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs) (DASD[H&RA]) is the primary point of contact (POC).
- OFDA and USAID often have existing operational links and grants relationships with many NGOs and international organizations that have relief programs outside the United States.




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At the tactical level, CA Soldiers must understand the following:

- Even in permissive environments, nonthreatening means—such as demonstrations—may be used to impair credibility or reduce the effectiveness of U.S. military activities.
- HN authorities or combatants may use FHA and disaster relief as a tool for political gain.
- Military commanders at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster are authorized to conduct prompt relief operations when time is of the essence.
- Measures to ensure continuity of operations, troop survival, and the rehabilitation of essential military bases take precedence over military support of local communities.



INTRODUCTION TO PLANNING FACTORS FOR FHA OPERATIONS



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This section is designed to assist the CA Soldier assigned to support FHA missions across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. When participating in an FHA operation, it is very likely that CA Soldiers will deploy as part of a JTF. Therefore, it is essential for successful mission implementation to understand the structure of USG interagency coordination and collaboration. The following pages describe many of these agencies.

As stated earlier, U.S. military forces are not the primary USG means of providing FHA. They normally supplement the activities of U.S. and foreign government authorities, NGOs, and IGOs. USAID is the principal agency for U.S. bilateral development and humanitarian assistance to foreign countries. Within USAID, the Office of Military Affairs provides the focal point for USAID interaction with U.S. and foreign militaries, and OFDA is the primary office within USAID that facilitates and coordinates all non-food emergency assistance overseas. FHA missions conducted by U.S. military forces span the entire range of military operations but are most often crisis response and limited contingency operations that are unilaterally or multinational coordinated. Multinational responses may or may not involve the UN. **Note:** GTA 41-01-006, *Working with the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance*, has additional details.

A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. A limited contingency operation in response to a crisis includes all of those operations for which the joint operation planning process (JOPP) is required and a contingency or crisis action plan is developed. The level of complexity, duration, and resources is situational dependent. Included are operations to maintain and improve U.S. ability to operate with multinational partners to deter the hostile ambitions of potential aggressors (for example, JTF Shining Hope in the spring of 1999 to support refugee humanitarian relief for hundreds of thousands of

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Albanians fleeing their homes in Kosovo). Many such operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs. The ability of the United States to respond rapidly with appropriate options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. Thus, joint operations may often be planned and executed as a crisis response or limited contingency. Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically limited in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific objective in an AO. They may be conducted as stand-alone operations in response to a crisis or executed as an element of a larger, more complex joint campaign or operation.

Key Military Elements

The GCCs direct military operations, including FHA, within their areas of responsibility (AORs). Ideally, this should be done with the concurrence of the chief of mission (COM), also known as the ambassador. GCCs develop and maintain commander's estimates, base plans, concept plans (CONPLANS), or OPLANS for FHA, disaster relief, and FCM. In response to a disaster, the supported GCC structures the force necessary to conduct and sustain the FHA operation, typically forming a JTF. Advisors on the GCC's staff will be in close communications with various advisors and counterparts on the JTF staff. Additionally, supporting combatant commanders (CCDRs) may provide necessary support, including transportation, forces, special operations forces (SOF), and communications capabilities, as required.

- *Crisis action team.* Each CCDR has an organization designed to respond to immediate requirements, often called a crisis action or rapid deployment team. The initially deployed team serves as the immediate responder/assessor for the CCDR. The exact composition of this team and the subsequent follow-on assets will vary depending on the type and severity of the incident and, in some cases, restrictions placed on the COM by

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the HN (through a status-of-forces agreement [SOFA], treaties, or informal agreements) in limiting the number of foreign military permitted in-country. When an FHA operation has been or will likely be directed, the crisis action team can recommend to the CCDR priority issues (water, food, equipment, and so on) as well as how to organize for the most effective response. The crisis action team may form the nucleus of the FHA force HQ or the JTF command element.

- *Humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST)*. The supported CCDR may also organize and deploy a HAST to acquire information required for planning. This information may include an assessment of existing conditions and requirements for FHA force structure. Before deploying, the HAST should be provided the current threat assessment; current relevant intelligence; geospatial information and services support; and embassy, DOS, and USAID points of contact. Due to the possibly dangerous nature of the environment at the site of a disaster, the HAST should include medical personnel who can conduct both a predeployment vulnerability assessment and an occupational and environmental health site assessment, documenting conditions in the AO. The DART and USAID mission can provide a great deal of this information to the HAST. Once deployed, the HAST can assess the relationship with and authority of the government of the affected country, identify primary points of contact for coordination and collaboration, determine the threat environment and survey facilities that may be used for protection purposes, and coordinate specific support arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies. The HAST works closely with the DART to prevent duplication of effort.
- *Humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC)*. The supported CCDR may establish a HACC to assist with

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
coordination and planning. The HACC provides the critical link between the CCDR and OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs that may participate in the FHA operation at the theater strategic level. Normally, the HACC is a temporary organization that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or humanitarian operations center (HOC) has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the CCDR's staff and crisis action organization. Staffing for the HACC should include a director appointed by the supported GCC, a CMO planner, an OFDA advisor or liaison if available, a public affairs officer (PAO), an NGO advisor, and other augmentation (for example, a political advisor [POLAD] or a preventive medicine physician) when required. Liaisons from OGAs, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, key NGOs, IGOs, and HN agencies also may be members of the HACC in large-scale FHA operations.

- *Joint interagency coordination group (JIACG)*. The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. The primary role of the JIACG is to enhance interagency coordination. The JIACG complements the interagency coordination that takes place at the national level through DOD and the NSC. JIACG members participate in contingency, crisis action, security cooperation, and other operational planning. They provide a conduit back to their parent organizations to help synchronize joint operations with the efforts of OGAs. The JIACG may play an important role in

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contingency planning for FHA and in initial interagency coordination prior to establishment of a HACC or other coordination body.


Note: More information on the JIACG is contained in JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I*, and the *Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group*.



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- *Consequence management advisory team and a joint technical advisory CBRN element.* During a crisis involving CBRN materials, the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), at the request of a CCDR, and in coordination with the joint staff, may direct the immediate deployment of a supporting consequence management advisory team (CMAT).
 - The CMAT provides task-organized, deployable, doctrinal, and technical consequence management expertise; support; advice; and hazard prediction modeling assistance for the DOD and other federal agencies during all phases of CBRN accidents or incidents.
 - When requested by combatant commands and directed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), U.S. Strategic Command can deploy a CBRN consequence management (CM) technical advice and assistance element (known as a joint technical advisory CBRN element [JTACE]) to augment a CMAT with specialists in public affairs, legal counsel, radiobiology, and other fields pertinent to the mission. The JTACE will leverage DTRA's reachback capability across DOD, the federal government, and academia to provide mission critical information to the supported organization.

Key Non-U.S. Government Participants and Organizations



Host Nation. The HN is a nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or an IGO such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. The HN will coordinate all relief efforts within its territory. U.S. forces conducting FHA do so with the permission of the HN under the guidance of formal and informal agreements. JFCs should become knowledgeable of all bilateral agreements for mutual support, and exercise these agreements to the maximum extent possible. If the necessary agreements are not in place, commanders must obtain authority to negotiate (through the joint staff) and then actively seek bilateral agreements to support the joint reception, staging, and onward movement of forces, equipment, and supplies. The Country Team will be critical to this effort. The embassy is the primary liaison with the HN government.

Multinational Forces. Other nations may deploy military forces to support the FHA effort. These forces may provide liaison officers to the combatant command, the JTF, and the CMOC.

United Nations. The purposes of the UN, as set forth in the charter, are to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in solving international

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economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems and in promoting respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining these ends.

The UN coordinates its response to humanitarian crises through a committee of all the key humanitarian bodies, chaired by the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator. The UN has been relied on by the international community to respond to natural and man-made disasters that are beyond the capacity of national authorities alone. Today, the UN is a major provider of emergency relief and longer-term assistance, a catalyst for action by governments and relief agencies, and an advocate on behalf of people struck by emergencies.

During HA operations in which the UN is involved, the UN will form a United Nations disaster assessment and coordination (UNDAC) team, an on-site operations coordination center (OSOCC), or a humanitarian operations coordination center (HOCC). These operations centers assist the local emergency management authority of the HN to coordinate international relief efforts. The UN humanitarian coordinator is responsible for establishing and maintaining comprehensive coordination mechanisms based on facilitation and consensus building among actors involved at the country level in the provision of HA and protection, including cluster leads.

Nongovernmental Organizations. An NGO is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the U.S. military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They may have a long-term established presence in the crisis area. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. Because of their

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capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Working alone, alongside the U.S. military, or with other U.S. agencies, NGOs assist in all the world's trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. Whereas the military's initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces, NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state, which they had no part in determining. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably.

Private Sector. Increasingly, the resources of the international business community are being used to mitigate human suffering associated with disasters. Businesses donate talent or in-kind goods and services to disaster relief and recovery operations in developing countries and try to ensure that their help is delivered in a coordinated and effective manner.


Private Contractors. Although U.S. military contractors are addressed in other sections, commanders should be aware that private contractors are employed by a wide range of actors, inside and out of the USG. They are often employed to provide security, training, technical expertise, and logistical support. Commanders should be cognizant that contractors are often viewed by the local population as USG representatives and any negative behavior or interaction with the local population on the part of contractors can have an adverse impact on U.S. efforts. Commanders should consider developing guidance for the contractors in the humanitarian zone, and should consider the need to develop public affairs guidance that takes into account potential issues with private contractors, should they arise.

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Intergovernmental Organizations. An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement (for example, a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. It is formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the UN, NATO, and the African Union. NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are regional security organizations, while the African Union and the Organization of American States are general regional organizations. A new trend toward subregional organizations is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination and collaboration. The United States maintains formal or informal ties with some of the largest of these IGOs.

Note: JP 3-29, Chapter II, Pages II-15 through II-17, contains additional information.

Civil Affairs Planning Factors for FHA Operations



FHA is a core task for all CA Soldiers. Therefore, it is important for each CA Soldier to know and understand operations at each level. In most FHA operations, a predeployment site survey (PDSS) would be hasty at best, but, knowing the important roles for CA Soldiers at each

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
level are keys to success in mission planning, execution, and transition. This section of the GTA will attempt to highlight the roles of a CA Soldier at each level of operation using the six steps in the CA methodology as a guide. The CA methodology is applied equally by CA Soldiers at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. At each level, it supports the commander's ability to visualize, describe, direct, and lead operations in his AO. Elements of the common problem-solving and decision-making processes used at various levels of command are embedded within the steps of the CA methodology. FM 3-05.401 includes additional details regarding the CA methodology and how it assists the CA Soldier during the execution of the mission. GTA 41-01-004 provides a more detailed understanding of joint planning.

During an FHA operation, joint planners may use the crisis action planning (CAP) process of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) because of the time-sensitive nature of deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources.


Note: The JOPES is being phased out and replaced with the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system. The APEX system will provide a single planning process encompassing both contingency and crisis action planning through execution. Additional information regarding APEX is contained in SecDef Memo, Subject: Implementation of Adaptive Planning (AP) Roadmap II, March 5, 2008. In addition, JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, describes the implementation process.

In addition, research from lessons learned, after action reviews (AARs), and trip reports during previous FHA operations can provide valuable insight for commanders and staffs preparing for a similar operation.

Planning Factors: Assess



The assessment begins at receipt of mission and continues through the mission analysis process focusing on defining the civil components of the supported commander's AO. This step looks at the nonmilitary factors that shape the operational environment. (ASCOPE is the acronym used by CA to describe the nonmilitary factors in an AO. It stands for areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.) This step is conducted for each of the 14 CA functional specialties as well as the general aspect of the AO. The product of this step is an initial estimate and restated mission statement.



Planning Factors: Assess at the Strategic Level. Planning at the GCC and higher levels (DOD and Joint Chiefs of Staff) is based on national policy directives and strategies. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and the Contingency Planning Guidance, prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), task the GCCs to develop plans for potential operational contingencies and deterrence. The JSCP tasks the development of GCC-prepared OPLANs, selected CONPLANs (with or without time-phased force deployment data [TPFDD]), and FUNCPLANs. The JOPES formalizes the planning process and provides for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision making in two related but distinct categories—contingency planning and CAP—which differ primarily in the amount of available planning time.

CAPT of the regionally aligned Civil Affairs commands (CACOMs) support the strategic CMO planning at the theater level. These teams develop complete CA plans, policies, and programs that support the GCC's strategic plan. Individual CA functional specialists from the CACOM's organic functional specialty cells support the CAPTs. To transition to CAP, CMO planners must examine contingency planning assumptions and the plans adjusted accordingly to account for any differences between assumptions and the actual circumstances at the time of the crisis. Additionally, if there is a CMO planner working with the Country Team, they can provide more specific details to the overall plan.

Planning Factors: Assess at the Operational Level. Operational-level planning concentrates on developing plans for campaigns, subordinate campaigns, and major operations that accomplish multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives. The CA brigade CAPT supports CAO and CMO G-9 planning staff at the corps or the division HQ (acting as a JTF). In crisis situations requiring rapidly deployable CA forces, the Active Army CA brigade CAPT normally provides this

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support until transition to follow-on United States Army Reserve (USAR) forces is accomplished. CAO and CMO operational planning concentrates on the civil components of the supported commander's AO at the regional and provincial level. National-level CAO and CMO analysis data developed at the theater level is refined and validated as it pertains to the assigned corps and JTF AO.

The G-9 (designated as the J-9 or CJ-9 during joint and coalition operations) staff directorate has the primary responsibility for the planning and integration of CAO and CMO at the operational level. During the operational-level military decision-making process (MDMP), the G-9 staff is proactive. The staff integrates CAO and CMO planning considerations with the other staff elements according to the development of the CMO estimate.

Planning Factors: Assess at the Tactical Level. At the tactical level, CAO and CMO planners concentrate their analysis and planning efforts on the unit AO described in the higher HQ OPLAN and the supported commander's areas of interest. Tactical planning will encompass guidance and information developed during systems analysis at corps and JTF levels, and operational-level CMO objectives described in the OPLAN received from higher HQ. In addition, they will receive prioritized CA tasks, measures of performance (MOPs), and MOEs.

Note: Additional MOPs and MOEs can be developed at this time to better support the specific mission guidance.


Tactical-level CAO and CMO planning requires the application of the mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations (METT-TC) factors, concentrating on the civil considerations aspect of the AO during the conduct of MDMP. Using the ASCOPE model will assist in the analysis of civil considerations. FM 3-05.401 provides a detailed explanation of how to use this tool. At this phase, an initial estimate and a restated mission statement is completed.

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During FHA operations, CA Soldiers at the tactical level should become aware of other organizations operating in their AO. During the beginning of a crisis situation where the international response is high, a coordinated response may not be fully developed. CA Soldiers should always make contact with these organizations during the initial ground assessments and locate the civilian coordination center. In many cases, this may be the UN HOCC (or Humanitarian Information Center [HIC]). The World Health Organization (WHO) may be operating in tandem with the UN but based elsewhere. Valuable information can be acquired through coordination and collaboration.

In addition to the planning of operations, each tactical-level unit (CAT, CMOC, CLT, or individual) must prepare to operate independently. Factors such as survivability, sustainability, communication (with supported units, interpreters, and cultural knowledge), monetary information, and mobility can critically affect the CA mission. Preparing for missions at the tactical level requires a detailed understanding of these factors.

Planning Factors: Decide



Decide who, what, when, where, why, and how to focus CA assets and actions that support the commander's intent, planning guidance, and concept of operations (CONOPS). This step encompasses integrating CAO into unit COAs, and analyzing and providing recommendations to the commander for a COA decision from a CA perspective. Updating

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the CMO estimate is a continuous process. Upon the commander's COA decision, CA leaders refine the CAO/CMO CONOPS and the CAO/CMO plan. The plan directs task-organized CA elements and non-CA forces to create or observe those conditions or events that would either mitigate or trigger a specific CAO/CMO response. It also addresses all CAO/CMO from initial response through transition to other authorities, whether they are military or civilian. The products of this step include the commander's concept for CMO, CAO priorities, and the CMO annex. In addition, MOPs and MOEs for the various related objectives and tasks are identified.

Planning Factors: Decide at the Strategic Level. The CMO planning staff at the strategic level provides the operational-level staffs the proper guidance in accordance with (IAW) the GCC-prepared OPLANS, CONOPS, CONPLANS, and the commander's intent.


Planning Factors: Decide at the Operational Level. As the G-9 staff integrates CAO and CMO planning considerations with the other staff elements, COAs are evaluated and recommended to the JFC. This will result in formulating the commander's CMO objectives supporting the attainment of strategic goals, prioritized CA tasks required to meet CMO objectives, MOPs that are focused on task accomplishment, and MOEs focused on effects attainment. Approval authority for validating and approving effects must be decided during this phase. Approval authority may be a commander, HN authorities, organized representatives of the international community, or some other entity.

Planning Factors: Decide at the Tactical Level. In conjunction with the supported commander's guidance, tactical planning will analyze and validate a COA as it applies to specific named areas of interest (NAIs), identify and recommend other CAO/CMO responses, and facilitate the integration of CAO/CMO into the unit COA. During this phase, planning at the higher levels can be a lengthy process that may hinder the deployment of tactical CA forces. It is important for planners

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to know that CA integration with the supported units at the earliest possible moment is essential for conducting successful CAO/CMO. The amount of integration with the supported units will vary based on threat levels and time constraints. Some CATs will be allowed to operate independently, while others may require security escort. However, CA Soldiers must convey a high level of patience and flexibility during the integration period.

Planning Factors: Develop and Detect



Develop rapport and relationships with the nonmilitary participants of the operation (including indigenous populations and institutions [IPI]) and detect those conditions or events that would call for a specific CAO/CMO response. CA accomplishes this step through numerous actions and operations such as facilitating the interagency process in the CMOC, host meetings, participating in selected DC operations, conducting civil reconnaissance in support of civil information management (CIM), and monitoring public information programs and CAO/CMO-related reports from the field. The products of this step include continuous assessments, revised or updated plans, formalized CMOC terms of reference, and fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs).

Planning Factors: Develop and Detect at the GCC Strategic Level. The CMO staff at the GCC strategic level (usually the J-9 or J-3/5) can assist in the mission planning at the operational level by facilitating higher-level coordination and collaboration efforts. In times of disaster,

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once the ambassador requests federal assistance from DOD and a federal disaster is declared by the President, support goes immediately from planning to execution in the way of a running assessment (situational dependent). Ambassadors will refer to their staff to identify force and equipment requirements and apply HN restrictions. A CA planner working for the Country Team may be at an advantage during this decision-making process. CA planners working for the Country Team should prioritize their time to (1) provide planning support to the COM and (2) collaborate with USAID DARTs that may have already gone to the affected areas to build situational awareness. CA planners should utilize available resources before taking it upon themselves to conduct the on-the-ground CAO. Follow-on forces will depend on their guidance upon entry into country. At this point, most of the directed task-organized CA forces are beginning to move into the Deliver phase of the crisis (for example, food, water, transportation assets, and medical assistance support). The CMO staff or element must prepare to deploy if directed and it will task a CACOM element to provide CMO tracking. Incoming reports and progress from the operators in-country continue to provide visibility of the civil considerations to a rapidly changing operational environment in support of the GCC's JOPP and execution thereof. Depending on the magnitude of the crisis, this action may require the establishment of an in-country CMOC and/or a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF). (*Note:* DOS is in the lead when the ambassador [COM] is the decision maker in-country.)

Planning Factors: Develop and Detect at the Operational Level. CA units at the operational level must form CMOCs to support the G-9. The CMOC (CLTs) will develop rapport with the various nonmilitary participants of the operation to facilitate coordination and collaboration. Additional CMOCs should be established if the AO is more than one country. CMOCs will also provide a clearinghouse for tactical CA units. CMO staffs will designate the criteria to measure CAO/CMO effectiveness and performances (who, when, where, what, and how).


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Using this information, the G-9 staff and the CMOC (CIM cell) can confirm or deny the conditions, standards of care, and attitudes, which serve to either cancel or trigger planned and on-call CAO and CMO branches and sequels to the operation plan.

Planning Factors: Develop and Detect at the Tactical Level. Rapport-building skills at the tactical level can ensure smooth transition with the NGOs, IPI, HN, or OGAs operating within the AO. In addition, these organizations will be a large resource in providing accurate and current information to update the common operational picture (COP) and assist in detecting any key events that may trigger a specific CAO/CMO response.

Developing rapport does not end with the civilian populace and organizations, but continues with the supported unit. In many FHA cases, CA forces deploy to support U.S. forces from a different Service. Understanding the needs and requirements to interact with different services may increase the level of success obtained in accomplishing the directed missions.

Planning Factors: Deliver




Engage the civil component with planned or on-call CAO as appropriate. This step is executed according to synchronized plans by CA Soldiers, non-CA Soldiers, IGOs, NGOs, and HN assets. The product of this step is an executed mission.

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Planning Factors: Deliver at the Strategic Level. Mission execution at the strategic level involves the facilitation and synchronization of plans with the higher-level counterparts of the IGOs, NGOs, and HN involved in the FHA mission in order to assist operational-level CA/CMO staffs. During this time, the strategic-level CMO staff is consolidating reports from the operational level through a possible CMOC structure.

Planning Factors: Deliver at the Operational Level. The ability of the CMO staff/CMOC to accurately track MOEs and MOPs is essential during the deliver phase. As tactical CAO produce relationships and civil reconnaissance products, the CIM cell must keep a detailed record and conduct a 360-degree information exchange (strategic levels, the JTF, NGOs, IGOs, HN, other CMOCs, and subordinate CA units). The JTF may require current input to the COP; CLTs may need to share information to assist NGOs, IGOs, and the HN; and the CMO staff will rely on the data to perform evaluations to the MOPs and MOEs.

Planning Factors: Deliver at the Tactical Level. The tactical-level CA Soldiers will execute CAO IAW guidance from higher HQ. During this phase, all raw data and observations should be consolidated accurately and then sent to the CMOCs supporting the tactical operations. Information pulled from the raw data and observations is essential for the CMO staff to evaluate the MOEs and MOPs. It is at this point that CAO at the tactical level becomes indispensable. The CAT or CMOC is the executor of CAO and will provide the first indicators of the effectiveness of the planned mission.

Planning Factors: Evaluate

Evaluate the results of the executed mission. This step validates the CAO/CMO CONOPS and supports the management of MOPs and MOEs to assess task accomplishment and attainment of objectives. As the evaluation phase progresses and satisfaction of MOEs indicates an operation is nearing completion, CAO and CMO planners on all levels will finalize transition plans and begin executing termination or transition timelines.

Planning Factors: Evaluate at the Strategic Level. As the reports begin flowing in from the operational levels, the CMO staff (augmented as necessary with a CMOC) can begin evaluating mission execution and validating the CAO/CMO CONOPS.

Evaluators analyze the effects of the operation (both desirable and undesirable) based on each of the 14 CA functional specialties, determine the sustainability of any projects or programs initiated during the execution phase, and recommend follow-on action. At this point, the CMO staff should also reinforce the working relationships with their high-level counterparts in select organizations in preparation for transition.


Planning Factors: Evaluate at the Operational Level. Measuring effects will enhance the unity of effort between joint, multinational, and interagency organizations via the CIM process. Utilizing the data collected through the CIM cell from the CATs or CLTs, CMO staffs

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and CMOCs will be able to determine how well or poorly an operation is proceeding in achieving CMO objectives according to the commander’s mission statement and intent. During this phase, CMO staffs and CMOCs will also evaluate the capacities of the HN, NGOs, IGOs, and IPI to sustain any projects or programs initiated, and recommend follow-on action.

Planning Factors: Evaluate at the Tactical Level. Input from the tactical level in the evaluation phase is crucial as it will be the priority intelligence requirement at its rawest form. During this phase, tactical CA forces will continue to conduct CAO and support CMO. They will also have the advantage of seeing firsthand the effects of each COA and make educated recommendations to mitigate undesirable effects. CA forces will have the visibility to evaluate the capacities of the HN, NGOs, IGOs, and IPI to sustain any projects or programs initiated.

Planning Factors: Transition



Transition CAO or CMO to follow-on agencies (CA units, other military units, HN assets, UN organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and other civilian agencies). This step is CA forces’ direct contribution to a sustainable solution, and the commander’s ability to secure the victory. This step is executed according to synchronized transition plans. The outcome of this step includes successful transition of authority or relief-in-place, and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on forces or organizations.

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Based on the supported GCC's intent, the JFC determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to create desired effects and accomplish the assigned mission. This arrangement is broken into phases. The need to move into another phase is normally identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the situation has evolved in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the design of the AO. This challenge demands an agile shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks, and coordination and collaboration with a wider range of other organizations. OGAs, multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs provide those capabilities necessary to address the mission-specific factors.

Termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning and should be a coordinated OGA, IGO, NGO, and multinational effort. Properly conceived termination criteria are key to ensuring that achieved military objectives endure. Further, development of a military end state is complementary to and supports attaining the specified termination criteria and national strategic end state. Commanders are cautioned that the end state conditions could change during the operations and that the end state envisioned by other participating organizations may differ.

Because FHA is largely a civilian endeavor, with the military in a supporting role, the termination of U.S. or multinational military FHA operations will not necessarily coincide with the termination of international efforts. Normally, military forces operate in the initial stages of disaster relief to fill immediate gaps in assistance; military objectives will be to enable civilian control of disaster relief efforts (HN, international, or USG agency).

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The transition of humanitarian efforts to HN authorities will not occur by default. Planning of FHA must involve extensive international and interagency coordination from the very beginning in order to ensure a successful transition. FHA efforts by the joint force should focus on the capacity of the HN, as well as OGAs and IGOs; the goal is to transition all efforts to HN, OGA, IGO, or NGO ownership to allow rapid redeployment of the joint force. MOEs, end state, transition, and termination planning should all reflect this goal.

Planning Factors: Transition at the Strategic Level. As stated above, termination of operations must be considered from the outset of planning and should be a coordinated OGA, IGO, NGO, and multinational effort. Having analyzed and validated various COAs throughout the FHA mission, the strategic-level CMO staff can assist in providing consolidated information that is critical to successful transition of authority or relief-in-place, and programs that are durable and sustainable by the follow-on forces or organizations. Information flow should be well established between subordinate units and high-level leaders in each organization involved in the transition.

Planning Factors: Transition at the Operational Level. As stated above, FHA efforts by the joint force should focus on the capacity of the HN, as well as OGAs and IGOs. At the operational level, the goal of transitioning all efforts to HN, OGA, IGO, or NGO ownership to allow rapid redeployment of the joint force is most tangible and therefore planners should be closely involved. Based on information gathered through evaluation, the CMO staff and the CMOC can provide accurate advice to the transition organization in order to assist them in conducting sustainable projects or programs.

Planning Factors: Transition at the Tactical Level. Building on the Assess, Develop and Detect, and Deliver phases, the tactical-level transition should become the most time intensive, yet the most tangible. CATs, CMOCs, and individual CA Soldiers at the tactical level will

ensure that transition operations are seamless with the designated organizations.

Civil Affairs Coordination in the Host Nation

This section is designed to assist the CA Soldier or team when deployed and working in foreign countries for missions, such as FHA, or related missions—HMA, CM, counter-narcoterrorism (CNT), and emerging operations. It addresses activities that may take place during predeployment, mission execution, or redeployment.

Introduction. Some missions conducted by CA are done in conjunction with other SOF elements. In some cases, another element is in command of the mission and will provide interface between the unit and the U.S. Embassy. However, it is wise to be prepared to coordinate with both the Embassy and the HN personnel.

Predeployment Site Survey. Before any deployment, a PDSS should be conducted. This PDSS is the opportunity for the mission commander or his designated representative to interface with U.S. Embassy personnel, the theater special operations command (TSOC), and the HN personnel. The PDSS checklist is a tool the mission commander uses to answer all mission-related questions.

U.S. Embassy Coordination. The CA element should coordinate with the U.S. Embassy as soon as appropriate guidance has been given. The element should not wait until arrival in-country to begin coordination. Some members in the Embassy to coordinate with include the following:

- *Defense attaché (DATT) officer.* At a minimum, brief the team composition and mission to the DATT officer and, if required, the Deputy Chief of Mission or even the ambassador. Confirm the SOFA and any memorandums of agreement (MOAs), and/or memorandums of understanding (MOUs). Explain or

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confirm the training plans, schedules, and locations, all of which will require approval prior to implementation.

- *Regional security officer (RSO)*. Receive threat brief from the RSO. Confirm the emergency action plan (EAP). This plan details the evacuation of U.S. personnel out-of-country if the situation so dictates. Personnel should know assembly locations closest to their lodging and work areas, especially if the locations are different. Ensure good contact information is provided to the RSO for protection updates.
- *Financial management officer (FMO)*. Meet the FMO. Confirm what specific requirements the FMO has directed for the team's intended purchases or contracts. Establishing a good working relationship with the FMO is the key for mission success.
- *Political officer (PO)*. Meet with the PO. Ask for an informal briefing of the latest developments in-country.
- *Governmental supply officer (GSO)*. Meet with the GSO. Ask him to assist in purchases, vehicle rentals, and other contracts.
- *Team members and all other collocated personnel*. Brief all the team members and all other collocated personnel. Confirm the internal communications notification plan, friendly assembly areas, and actions upon the notification of the EAP. Ensure all members are aware of the potential threats and emergency procedures advised by the RSO or PO. Advise members of the addresses and contact numbers of key personnel and medical facilities.

Host Nation Coordination. CAT personnel should coordinate with the following:

- Key HN leaders involved in the mission (military and nonmilitary).
- Local contractors.

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- Pertinent local and international NGOs.
- Authorized private organizations.

Note: This list is not all-inclusive.

Redeployment. At the completion of each mission, CAT personnel should—

- Outbrief HN senior leaders.
- Outbrief DATT/ambassador.
- Meet with FMO.
- Coordinate with USAID. (They may assist in funding.)

Note: This list is not all-inclusive.

CONDUCTING ASSESSMENTS

CA Soldiers conduct assessments as part of any mission. During FHA operations, assessments from the ground level will serve to confirm or deny any assumptions early on in the planning stage. The unique requirements of an FHA operation may entail a level of flexibility and understanding of reporting formats as published by different agencies collaborating in the AO. The U.S. military will almost always play a supporting role to the DOS during an FHA operation, in addition to or in lieu of the HN, NGOs, and/or world response to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions. Although the CA unit's primary reporting responsibility is to the supported commander, an effort should be made to assist follow-on forces or agencies that will become the transition element by providing accurate data in formats ideal for them and appropriately packaged to meet necessary military restrictions.

Assessment Recommendation and Impact on Recovery

The recommendations made by the assessment team should not have a detrimental effect on the long-term recovery efforts of an affected country. Relief programs can set the stage for rapid recovery or prolong the length of the recovery period. Every action in an emergency response will have a direct effect on the manner and cost of reconstruction.


Many common relief programs can create dependencies and severely reduce the survivors' ability to cope with the next disaster. For example, food commodities brought into a disaster area without consideration for the local agricultural system can be detrimental to the local market system and cause future food shortages where self-sufficiency had been the norm.

Sustainable recovery depends on restoring the affected populations' own capacity to meet their basic food, shelter, water, and sanitation requirements. Understanding the priorities and providing assistance that supports the affected population's efforts to restore viable socioeconomic systems is critical to achieving a long-lasting, sustainable recovery.

Recommendations should be simple and support the use of local materials, food and water sources, distribution systems, and locations of health or medical priority. The recommender should always be considerate of the affected country and its way of life. He should not discount alternative interventions that may be against "conventional wisdom," or collide with bureaucratic obstacles. Some recommendations may require an increased relief agency capacity. In the end, this may be more cost effective and sustainable.

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When ordered to do an assessment, there are some main points that a CA Soldier must understand, as shown in the following figure.



Once critical factors have been assessed, a matrix of needs can be created that generates an assessment of the proposed military contribution in each area. The following are recommended formats that may assist in the assessment process. Format requirements may vary with each operation and no two operations will be exactly the same. The important matter is that the CA assessment provides accurate and timely civil data that assists the supported commander in successfully identifying the immediate needs of the affected populace.

The format on the following pages is compatible with the OFDA Disaster Assessment Handbook, which makes it compatible with the majority of the relief community.

Reporting Format

From:

To:

Info:

Subject: _____ Unit Assessment Report # _____

References: If applicable.

1. *Summary:* Summarize the findings of the initial disaster and what are its causes from a short-term and historical perspective? Update with further reports.

2. *Description of Disaster:* What, when, where, and how? An estimate of the scope of the disaster in the area you are investigating.

- a. What type of disaster or conflict? How did it occur?
- b. When did the disaster occur? Is it ongoing?

3. *General Situation:*

- a. Describe the assessment effort (military).
- b. Identify any other agencies, private or governmental, involved in the assessment.

4. *Health/Nutrition Situation:*

- a. How many were killed, and where?
- b. How many human remains need to be disposed of? Cultural perspective: What types of assistance do people need to be able to bury deceased relatives properly?
- c. How many people are in need of assistance from the government and/or other agencies?

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- d. What type of health care system exists to meet health care needs?
- e. What is being done in the health area, and by what agencies?
- f. How many people are in need of health care?
- g. What are the immediate health risks?
- h. What are the problems that are preventing those health care needs from being met?
- i. If there is a food shortage, describe what it is, where it is, and in what volume.
- j. What are the nutrition needs of the population? (Culturally appropriate?)
- k. Are there signs of malnutrition among the population?
- l. Is the total amount of food being delivered equal to total needs in terms of calories per day?
- m. What is obstructing the delivery of food?
- n. Are the most vulnerable people (infants, elderly, and infirmed) obtaining adequate food?
- o. Do people have the appropriate utensils, cooking fuels, and so on, to prepare foods?
- p. What actions are being taken to ensure that people have sufficient food? By whom?
- q. Is there any assistance that only the U.S. military can provide? If so, how long will it be required?

5. *Shelter:*

- a. Describe the damage to buildings.

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- b. Describe estimated number of people and estimated family units needing shelter.
- c. Are shelters sufficient in quantity and quality?
- d. What is being done to provide shelter? By whom?
- e. How urgent is the need for shelter given the environment?
- f. Is there any assistance that only the U.S. military can provide? If so, for how long will it be required?

6. Water/Sanitation:

- a. Describe water problems. Note the color and smell of the water.
- b. What is being done and who is doing it?
- c. Describe sanitation problems.
- d. How many people lack a sufficient quantity of appropriately potable water?
- e. How is sanitation being handled? Who is doing it?
- f. Are sanitation facilities (toilets and defecation fields) adequate in size, location, and cleanliness?
- g. Is there anything that only the U.S. military can do? If so, for how long will it be required?

7. Infrastructure/Logistics:

- a. What problems with infrastructure and facilities are impeding relief efforts?
- b. Are ports and airfields damaged? Is equipment damaged?
- c. What is the availability of electricity?

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- d. Are there problems in management? How much of the infrastructure workforce is available or has reported in?
- e. Where are the bottlenecks that prevent delivery of relief supplies?
- f. Are there sufficient transportation assets for delivery of relief aid?
- g. Do transportation assets for delivery require security?
- h. Where is additional aid needed most critically and how much is needed?
- i. What actions are being taken to ensure that facilities and infrastructure are in sufficient working order to facilitate the relief effort?
- j. Are there things only the U.S. military can restore (especially transportation)? If so, in what volume and for how long?
- k. What are the population's communication needs that must be met?
- l. What communication media is currently available, functioning, or in need of repair?
 - 1) Television?
 - 2) Radio AM/FM?
 - 3) Cell phone towers?
 - 4) Telephone lines?
 - 5) Print?
- m. What communication assets and actions can the military provide to stabilize the infrastructure, commerce, and the population?

8. *Coordination:*

- a. How is the relief effort being coordinated? (Is the U.S. military response integrated?)
- b. Is the HN government (or local U.S. government in domestic disasters) in charge?
- c. What private and/or nongovernmental agencies are involved?
- d. What key coordination issues are not being addressed, either due to lack of personnel or lack of subject-matter expertise?
- e. What actions are being taken to improve coordination efforts?
- f. Is the assessment team attending meetings?
- g. Do you need augmentation to get the assessment completed?

9. *Capability:*

- a. Recap those things that only the U.S. military is capable of doing, noting those things that the other services can bring.
- b. Estimate how long services will be provided, and who will replace the military capability (if applicable).
- c. Use the Rapid Assessment format provided on page 62.

10. *Recommendations:* List the recommended priority of U.S. relief asset arrival in your area according to the immediacy of need.

Preparation for Exit (Transition Operations)

Following are some specific questions linked to essential tasks that will help identify exit criteria:

- Who will take over the function, and how long will it take to do so?

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- How will the transfer of responsibility and authority occur between the outgoing and incoming parties?
- Have efforts been coordinated in such a way as to ensure that everyone involved has a clear understanding of who is in charge at all times?
- When will temporary functions no longer be necessary, and how will we measure it?
- What is the agreed-upon MOE that indicates when the desired end state is achieved?
- What are the activities that should not be conducted by U.S. forces?

Dos and Don'ts of Assessments

DO	DON'T
Try to Quickly Plug Into Existing Disaster Relief Mechanisms	Sign up to any Binding Missions Before Your Assessment Has Been Approved by Higher
Attempt to Learn Predisaster Norms in AO	Monopolize Meetings With Your Views
Attempt to Coordinate Some Relief	
Be an Effective Listener	

Focused Questions:

- What is the security situation? Is anyone threatening you?
- How many people died per day before the disaster? How many per day are dying now?
- What is your source of water? Has it been polluted by the disaster?
- How many people are without food?
- How many families are without shelter?
- What relief agencies are in place?
- Who are they?

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- How can we contact them?
- Who is in charge of local relief efforts?
- Have any unusual diseases been noted, particularly among children?
- How many health care professionals do you have? Are they adequate?
- What is our normal source of power? Has it been disrupted?
- What was the crude mortality rate before the disaster? What is it now?
- What is the situation in terms of—
 - Water?
 - Food?
 - Shelter?
 - Medical support?
 - Power and/or lines of communication?

Note: Reference Field Operations Guide (FOG) v.3 for additional information. The assessments provided on pages 58 through 61 come from various sources.

The Rapid Assessment, page 62, is a good structured baseline assessment that also takes into consideration some key factors that may affect the U.S. military relief effort (see items 4-7). These factors should influence how much cultural research a CA Soldier must do in order to successfully engage the population.

The Comparison of Sphere and UNHCR Standards and Indicators, pages 64 through 66, highlights an important matter when attempting to accurately report an assessment. It is important for a CA Soldier to

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identify and verify the appropriate standards and indicators. Although reporting requirements from higher may require a specific standard or indicator, it is up to the CA Soldier on the ground to be able to verify and recommend the appropriate standard.

Example: UNHCR standard for WATER: SYSTEM/DELIVERY = At least one tap per 80 to 100 DCs and no more than 200 DCs per hand pump or well with one rope and bucket.

This standard is appropriate for urban areas with pipe systems or areas where the water table is sufficient to drill a well. However, in rural areas at sea level where the local population draws water from streams or freshwater springs, it would be inappropriate.

Sample UNHCR Assessment Format *

Municipality	Village		MGRS Grid Ref	
Agency	Name of Assessor		Date	
Source of information (give as much detail as possible - give the telephone number of someone in the village if possible)				
ROAD ACCESS IN SUMMER	Car Y/N	4WD Y/N	Light Truck Y/N	Heavy Truck Y/N
CURRENT POPULATION	Persons	Albanian	Serb	Other
ROAD ACCESS IN WINTER	Car Y/N	4WD Y/N	Light Truck Y/N	Heavy Truck Y/N
BREAKDOWN	Locals	Returnees	IDPs	Refugees
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs) - one record per village of former residence				
Number of IDPs	from MUNICIPALITY (NAME)	from Village (NAME)	WHAT'S PREVENTING THEIR RETURN HOME? (See CONSTRAINTS TO RETURN box below for possible issues)	
COMMUNITY LEADERS PRESENT	MTS ACTIVIST Name	TEACHER	HEALTH WORKER	IMAM/PRIEST
	Tel			OTHER

* Items need to be adjusted for missions in different regions.

Sample UNHCR Assessment Format (Continued) *

ASSISTANCE DISTRIBUTION		Who is responsible for distribution? (circle or specify)			Local warehouse/storage facilities?				
		MTS	UCK	Mayor's Office	Mosque/Church	NGO (specify)	Other (specify)		
SECONDARY DISTRIBUTION		Is this village used for secondary distribution?			Y/N	If so, which villages receive assistance from this village?			
		Total Houses in Village		Category 1 (undamaged/unfinished)		Category 2	Category 3	Category 4	Category 5
DAMAGE TO HOUSES (see category guide below)		Was there any new war damage to buildings since JANUARY 1999?			Y/N	Was there any new war damage to buildings since NATO arrived?		Y/N	
		Was there any new war damage to buildings since NATO arrived?			Y/N			Y/N	
DAMAGE TO COMMUNITY BUILDINGS		MTS WAREHOUSE		SCHOOL	MOSQUE/CHURCH		SHOPS	BAKERY	HEALTH/FAC
		None/Category	None/Category	None/Category	None/Category	None/Category	None/Category	None/Category	None/Category



! Broken windows, door locks and hinges, roof tiles water
 ! Cut off from electricity, water
 ! Can be repaired

! Up to 30% roof damage
 ! Light shelling or bullet impact on walls
 ! Partial fire damage
 ! Can be repaired

! Over 30% roof damage
 ! Severe fire damage
 ! Need for replacement of floors
 ! Doors and windows destroyed
 ! All piping, wiring destroyed
 ! Can be repaired

! Destroyed
 ! Needs reconstruction
 ! Cannot be repaired

* Items need to be adjusted for missions in different regions.

Sample UNHCR Assessment Format (Continued) *

Electricity	Working?	Yes/No/Intermittent	If intermittent, approximate hours working per day				
Education	School functioning?	Yes/No	Number of classrooms				
WATER & SANITATION	% of Households Using	CURRENT STATUS*		PERCEIVED WATER QUANTITY	REMARKS		
		Preconflict	Current			QUALITY	
Wells				Adequate/Inadequate			
Springs				Adequate/Inadequate			
Piped Distribution				Adequate/Inadequate			
Electric Pumps				Adequate/Inadequate			
* STATUS (more than one if necessary): (W)orking/(D)amaged/(C)ontaminated/(D)estroyed							
HEALTH (for Type, if Ambulanta circle one: MTS = Mother Teresa; S = State; P = Private; for Personnel; (D)octor, (N)urse, (M)ed. Tech. for Drugs and Equipment: (A)dequate, (I)nadequate)							
TYPE (see above)	Daily Consultations	Working	Personnel (number)	Drugs	Equipment	Water	Sanitation
Hospital	Number:	Y/N	D _ N _ M	A/I	A/I	Y/N	Y/N
Shetepia e Shendetit (DZ)	Number:	Y/N	D _ N _ M				
Ambulanta: MTS/SP	Number:	Y/N	D _ N _ M				
FOOD AND COOKING							
% of dairy cattle remaining				% of farms expecting to harvest this summer			
% of families with cooking facilities:				Is there a bakery?		Is it operational?	
				Y/N		Y/N	

* Items need to be adjusted for missions in different regions.

Sample UNHCR Assessment Format (Continued) *

SOURCE OF FOOD AVAILABLE IN VILLAGE		Y / N	FOOD ITEM	AVAILABLE	PRICE
Humanitarian Distribution		Y / N	Wheat Flour	Y / N	DM / Din Kg
Household Garden/Farm		Y / N	Oil	Y / N	DM / Din Liter
Household Stores		Y / N	Sugar	Y / N	DM / Din Kg
Shops or Market		Y / N	Meat	Y / N	DM / Din Kg
Nearest Village With Market			Fruit & Vegetables	Y / N	DM / Din Kg
			Coffee	Y / N	DM / Din Kg

ACTION TAKEN

REMARKS

Please return to UNHCR Pristina, attn: Inter Agency Coordination Unit
 * Items need to be adjusted for missions in different regions.

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RAPID ASSESSMENT	
CURRENT AS OF (MM/DD/YY):	
1. GENERAL	
a. Village Name:	
b. Grid:	
c. Sector:	
d. Language:	
2. POPULATION	
a. Total Pop:	
b. Families:	
c. Male:	
d. Female:	
e. Children:	
f. Refugees:	
g. Refugee Origin:	
h. Abroad:	
3. STANDARD OF LIVING (General Description or Percentage)	
a. Food:	
b. Water:	
c. Shelter:	
d. Power:	
e. TV:	
f. Radio:	
g. Transportation:	
4. ETHNIC COMPOSITION BY PERCENT	
5. POLITICS	
a. Parties:	
b. Representatives:	
6. EMERGENCY SERVICES	
a. Police:	
b. Fire:	
c. Rescue:	
d. Militia:	
7. KEY PERSONS	
a. Mayor:	
b. Police Chief:	
c. Military Commander:	
d. Representative:	
8. ECONOMICS	
a. Unemployed:	
b. Self-Employed:	
c. Nature of Self-Employment:	
d. Employed:	
e. Nature of Employment:	
f. Agriculture:	
g. Industry:	
9. LINES OF COMMUNICATION/UTILITIES	
a. Communications:	
b. Water Supply:	
c. Electrical Supply:	
d. Road System:	
e. Rail System:	
f. Medical Facilities:	
g. Education Facilities:	
10. OBSERVATIONS	

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KEY EMERGENCY INDICATORS

Crude Mortality Rate (CMR)	Normal rate among a settled population Emergency program under control Emergency program in serious trouble Emergency out of control	0.3 to 0.5/10,000/day <1/10,000/day >1/10,000/day >2/10,000/day >5/10,000/day
Mortality Rate Among Children Under 5 Years Old	Normal rate among a settled population Emergency program under control Emergency program in serious trouble	1/10,000/day <2/10,000/day >2/10,000/day >4/10,000/day
Clean Water	Minimum survival allocation Minimum maintenance allocation	7 liters/person/day 15–20 liters/person/day
Food	Minimum food requirement for a population totally dependent on food aid	2,100 kilocalories/person/day
Nutrition	Emergency level	>15% of the population under 5 years old below 80% weight for height Or >10% of the population under 5 years old below 80% weight for height together with aggravating factors; for example, epidemic of measles, crude mortality rate>1/10,000/day
Measles	Any reported cases 10% or more not immunized among ages 6 months to 5 years	
Respiratory Infections	Any pattern of severe cases	
Diarrhea	Protection from wind, rain, freezing temperatures, and direct sunlight are minimum requirements	
Appropriate Shelter	Minimum shelter area Minimum total site area	3.5 square meters/person 30.0 square meters/person
Sanitation	Lack of organized excreta and waste disposal. Less than 1 latrine cubicle per 100 persons	
<p>Calculating the Mortality Rate The chief indicator of an actual emergency is an accelerated mortality. In all cases, deaths should be reported as total number and as a rate since population sizes will vary considerably depending on the nature of the emergency. The presentation of the number of deaths as rate will make comparison to existing norms possible regardless of the number of people considered in the group. An example of how to calculate the death rate follows:</p> $\frac{\text{Number of Deaths} \times 10,000}{\text{Days Counted} \times \text{Total Population}} = \text{Deaths}/10,000$ <p>For example, if 21 people have died in one week in a total population of 5,000, then the death rate for that situation would be:</p> $\frac{21 \text{ (Deaths)} \times 10,000}{7 \text{ Days} \times 5,000 \text{ (Total Population)}} = 6/10,000/\text{Day}$		

**COMPARISON OF SPHERE AND UNHCR
STANDARDS AND INDICATORS
(February 2001)**

TOPIC AREA/ISSUE	SPHERE	UNHCR
WATER		
Quantity	15 liters per person per day collected	15 liters per person per day; absolute minimum for short-term survival is 7 liters per person per day
System/Delivery	Taps provide flow rate of at least 0.125 liters per second	
	At least one water point per 250 people	At least one tap per 80–100 refugees and no more than 200 refugees per handpump or per well with one rope and bucket
Quality	No more than 10 faecal coliforms per 100 milliliters at point of delivery	1–10 faecal coliforms per 100 milliliters is reasonable quantity
	For piped systems, residual-free chlorine at tap is 0.2–0.5 milligrams per liter and turbidity is less than 5 nephelometric turbidity units (NTUs)	Residual-free chlorine at tap is 0.2–0.5 milligrams per liter at distribution point
	Dissolved solids no more than 1,000 milligrams per liter	
HYGIENE - SANITATION		
Soap	250 grams of soap per person per month	
Laundry	1 washing basin per 100 people	
Toilets/Latrines	Maximum 20 people per toilet	1 latrine per family; second option, 1 per 20 persons; or third option, 1 per 100 persons or defecation field
Refuse Bins	100 containers at 1 per 10 families	100 containers at 1 per 50 families
Refuse Pits	No shelter farther than 15 meters from container or 100 meters from communal refuse pits	1 pit 2 meters x 5 meters x 2 meters deep per 500 persons
CAMP SITE PLANNING		
Gross Area	45 square meters per person (inclusive of all uses except agriculture or garden)	30 square meters per person (inclusive of all uses except agriculture or garden space)
Dimensions/Distances	Maximum distance between shelter and toilets is 50 meters	Maximum distance between shelter and toilets is 50 meters
Firebreaks	2 meters between shelters, 6 meters between clusters of shelters, 15 meters between blocks of clusters	30 meters per every 300 meters of built-up area
Distance Between Wells/Springs and Latrines	Latrines farther than 30 meters from ground water sources and 1.5 meters above water table	Latrines farther than 30 meters of built-up area
	Maximum distance from shelter to water supply is 500 meters	No dwelling should be farther than 100 meters or a few minutes' walk from distribution points

**COMPARISON OF SPHERE AND UNHCR
STANDARDS AND INDICATORS (CONTINUED)**

TOPIC AREA/ISSUE	SPHERE	UNHCR
CAMP SITE PLANNING (Continued)		
Elevation/Drainage	3 meters above high water table	
	2–4% gradient (ideal) and not more than 7% without extensive site engineering	
SHELTER		
Shelter Area	3.5–4.5 square meters covered area per person	3.5 square meters covered area per person in tropical climates. 4.5–5.5 square meters covered area per person in cold or urban situations
Plastic Sheeting for Temporary Shelter	4 meters x 6 meters sheet per household of 5 people (to meet UNHCR material specifications)	4 meters x 5 meters reinforced plastic tarpaulins in sheets with aluminum eyelets all four sides
FOOD/NUTRITION		
Calories	2,100 kilocalories per day initial planning figure to be modified based on through demographic analysis of population.	2,100 kilocalories per day (initial planning figure)
Makeup	10–12% total energy from protein 17% total energy from fat	10–12% total energy from protein 17% total energy from fat
HEALTH		
Excessive Mortality	1 per 10,000 per day CMR	Normal rate among a settled population Emergency program under control
CMR	1 per 10,000 per day CMR	>1/10,000/day >2/10,000/day >5/10,000/day
U5MR	2 per 10,000 per day under 5 CMR	Normal rate among a settled population Emergency program under control Emergency program in serious trouble Emergency out of control
Measles Vaccination Coverage	95% of all children 6 months–12 years	UNHCR advocates the immunization of all children from 6 months up to 12 or even 15 years (rather than the more usual 5 years) because of the increased risk from the living conditions in refugee emergencies. As an emergency indicator, any reported cases of 10% or more unimmunized among ages 6 months to 5 years.

**COMPARISON OF SPHERE AND UNHCR
STANDARDS AND INDICATORS (CONTINUED)**

TOPIC AREA/ISSUE	SPHERE	UNHCR
HEALTH (Continued)		
Measles Vaccination Coverage	Measles vaccine needs = 140% of target group (15% waste, 25% stockpile)	
Medical Staff	1 home visitor for each 500–1,000 population 1 traditional birth attendant for each 2,000 1 supervisor for each 10 home visitors 1 senior supervisor 1 peripheral health facility for each 10,000 population 1 central health facility for each 10,000 population	Approximate staffing levels for refugee health and sanitation services for a population of 10–20,000: ! Community health workers: 10–20 ! Traditional birth attendant: 6–10 ! Public health nurse: 1 ! Clinic nurse/midwives: 3–4 ! Doctor/medical assistants: 1–3 ! Pharmacy attendant: 1 ! Laboratory technician: 1 ! Dressers/assistants: 10 ! Sanitarians: 2–4 ! Sanitation assistants: 20
NONFOOD ITEMS (Domestic needs)		
Water Containers	2 vessels 10–20 liters for collecting, plus 1 20-liter vessel for water storage, narrow necks and covers	Ability to transport 10 liters and ability to store 20 liters per 5-person household.
Eating Utensils	1 cooking pot with lid 1 basin 1 kitchen knife 2 wooden spoons 1 plate per person 1 spoon per person 1 mug per person	
PROTECTION AND SECURITY		
Location	50 kilometers from threat (border?)	A reasonable distance

Summary

Assessments play a major role in all CAO. During FHA operations, ground-level assessments should be accurate and timely as they will serve to confirm or deny any assumptions early on in the planning stage. The assessment team should be mindful that its recommendations should not have a detrimental effect on the long-term recovery efforts of an affected country. In FHA, the U.S. military's role will almost always be of support to the DOS in addition to or in lieu of the HN, NGOs, and/or world response. The CA units should be prepared to provide 360-degree reporting. The civil information available from the CA unit should be made available not only to the commander of whom that unit supports, but also to agencies above,

below, and adjacent. This information can assist follow-on forces or agencies that will become the transition element. The CA unit should be mindful to provide accurate data in formats ideal for other agencies, appropriately packaged, and complies with necessary military information restrictions.

FUNDING IN SUPPORT OF FHA OPERATIONS

Every FHA operation is unique. The goal of this section is to familiarize the CA Soldiers with the funding options that are available to them for an FHA or related operation. Because FHA can be conducted inside the full spectrum of operations, either as a part of a larger operation or as the sole mission, CA Soldiers need to know how to utilize or apply these sources to support the commander's CMO objectives. For a detailed explanation of funding sources for all types of CMO, refer to FM 3-05.401, Appendix G, and JP 3-29, Appendix B.


Funding for HA may originate from within the DOD, DOS, or OGAs as appropriated by Congress through the enactment of public law. The DOD must satisfy criteria as laid out in the USC Appropriations. Although Title 10 of the USC is the common source of funding for many DOD operations in support of FHA and related operations, Title 22 is the primary source of funds. The DOD has limited authority to engage disaster assistance. The President may direct DOD through the SecDef to respond to man-made or natural disasters with concurrence from DOS. (Executive Order 12966, 60 Federal Regulation 36949, *Foreign Disaster Assistance*, has more information.)

A military commander at the immediate scene of a foreign disaster may undertake prompt relief operations when time is of the essence and when humanitarian considerations make it advisable to do so. The commander should report at once the action taken and request guidance. Reimbursement of funds expended under these circumstances is not assured. Responding elements must track costs

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incurred by maintaining detailed records of expenditures and provide detailed billing information to support their reimbursement efforts. DODD 5100.46 contains guidelines for DOD elements to bill for cost reimbursement for supplies and/or services provided in support of foreign disaster relief.

The next figure illustrates the approval authority for DOD funding for foreign disaster relief (except in cases of emergencies where the on-site commander determines immediate response is required). DOD components will participate in foreign disaster relief operations only after the affected country requests assistance and DOS or USAID determines that assistance will be provided. The Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Global Security Affairs is the normal approval authority for DOD resource and services commitment to foreign disaster relief. The DOD lead for management of budget allocations in this area is the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The main point of contact for the joint staff is the J-4 (JP 3-29, Appendix B). The J-4 provides coordination among combatant command, Service, and defense agency response cells or teams, as appropriate.




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The following paragraphs discuss the sections of the USC that are appropriate for FHA and related operations.

Title 10, United States Code

Section 401 establishes the HCA program. As stated in the first section of this GTA, HCA programs are related to FHA. HCA is generally a long-term commitment to promote sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. Most often, HCA will be an important part of rebuilding after the completion of a disaster relief FHA mission or part of the HN's internal defense and development program.



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The HCA program is administered by the GCC directly, with coordination and approval authority vested in the Office of ASD for Global Security Affairs and DSCA. The goal of this program is to promote regional security objectives by providing basic HCA. Army operation and maintenance (O&M) accounts fund the building materials and other incremental costs incurred for projects performed under Section 401 Authority. In contrast to other HA programs discussed, HCA activities are authorized by 10 USC 401 in conjunction with authorized military operations of the Armed Forces if they promote—

- The security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out.
- The specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.

Deploying units normally use “generic” O&M funds to support their operations. Although the term is not restricted to mission funding under Section 401, it has explicit authorized uses. O & M appropriations pay for the day-to-day expenses of training, exercises, contingency missions, and other deployments. Section 401(c)(4) describes funds appropriated to the DOD for O&M that may be obligated for HCA under this section only for incidental costs of carrying out such assistance. Also known as de minimis HCA, O&M funds can be used when unplanned HCA activities or projects occur. The DOD has an inherent authority to undertake HCA activities that, by chance, create HN benefits and are carried out to fulfill the training requirements of the unit involved. The term de minimis HCA can apply to the following examples:

- A unit doctor’s or medic’s examination of villagers for a few hours or giving inoculations and issuing some medicines. However, this term would not include the dispatch of a medical team for mass inoculations.

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- The opening of an access road through trees and underbrush for several hundred yards, but not the asphaltting of a roadway.

HCA is defined in 10 USC 401(e) as—

- Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in areas of a country that are rural or are underserved by medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary professionals, respectively, including education, training, and technical assistance related to the care provided.
- Construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.
- Detection and clearance of land mines, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines.

Any assistance provided under this program should first undergo legal review. CA Soldiers should consult with the Staff Judge Advocate's Fund Proponent DOD/DA Annual Budget for Legal Authority.

Section 166a is the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund. The CJCS may provide funds to the commander of a combatant command, upon the request of the commander, or with respect to a geographic area or areas not within the AOR of a commander of a combatant command. This section provides the CCDRs with a great deal of legal flexibility to conduct activities that include—

- Force training.
- Contingencies.
- Selected operations.
- Command and control.

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- Joint exercises.
- HCA, to include urgent and unanticipated humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance.
- Military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries (including transportation, translation, and administrative expenses).
- Personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs.
- Protection.
- Joint warfighting capabilities.

Section 166a is significant to FHA and related operations because in relationship to other funding (such as Section 401 which restricts duplicate funding for an operation), any amount provided by the CJCS during any fiscal year out of the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund for an activity shall be in addition to amounts otherwise available for that activity for that fiscal year.

Section 402 is the Transportation of Humanitarian Relief Supplies to Foreign Countries (commonly known as the Denton Amendment). This section authorizes the transportation of nongovernmental, privately donated relief supplies. The DOS and DSCA administer this. The relief supplies are transported on a space-available basis under certain conditions:

- The transportation of such supplies is consistent with the foreign policy of the United States.
- The supplies to be transported are suitable for humanitarian purposes and are in usable condition.
- There is a legitimate humanitarian need for such supplies by the people or entity for whom they are intended.
- The supplies will in fact be used for humanitarian purposes.

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- Adequate arrangements have been made for the distribution or use of such supplies in the destination country.

Priority for Disaster Relief Assistance. In processing applications for the transportation of HA abroad under 10 USC 402, the USAID administrator shall afford a priority to applications for the transportation of disaster relief assistance. In reality, this is sometimes a slow process from start to materials on the ground.

Modification of Applications. The USAID administrator shall take all possible actions to assist applicants for the transportation of HA abroad under 10 USC 402 in modifying or completing applications submitted under such section in order to meet applicable requirements under such section. The actions shall include efforts to contact applicants for purposes of the modification or completion of these applications.

Section 404 addresses Foreign Disaster Assistance. In consultation with the Secretary of State, USAID is the lead agency for foreign disaster relief. The President may direct the SecDef to provide disaster assistance outside the United States to respond to man-made or natural disasters when necessary to prevent loss of lives or serious harm to the environment. Assistance may be provided in the form of transportation, supplies, services, and equipment. Assistance should take the form of support to the overall civilian effort. Amounts appropriated to the DOD for any fiscal year for Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) programs shall be available for organizing general policies and programs for disaster relief programs.

10 USC 404 is rarely used because there is no implementing guidance. As a result, the DOD relies on the broad authority of 10 USC 2561 to conduct the foreign disaster assistance contemplated under 10 USC 404.

Section 407 outlines the specific use of funds for humanitarian demining assistance. Regardless of how it is defined in relation to

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FHA, Section 407 is the authority and outlines limitations for members of the Armed Forces. The assistance must promote either—

- The security interests of both the United States and the country in which the activities are to be carried out, or
- The specific operational readiness skills of the members of the armed forces who participate in the activities.

Although humanitarian demining assistance can be supported as an FHA operation under technical assistance and support functions, it can also be conducted under nation assistance (NA) operations (related to FHA but not FHA) as an HCA project. It is important to distinguish that under the FHA umbrella, it must be a short-term project and under NA/HCA, it is designed to increase the long-term capacity of the HN to provide for the health and well-being of its populace. The definition of humanitarian demining assistance IAW Section 407 as it relates to training and support, means detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war, including activities related to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines and other explosive remnants of war.

Section 2557 provides the authority to make available for humanitarian relief purposes, through the State Department, any nonlethal excess supplies of the DOD. The identified excess property inventory normally transfers to USAID, as agent for the DOS, for distribution to the target nation.

Section 2561, Humanitarian Assistance, authorizes use of funds for transportation of humanitarian relief and for other humanitarian purposes worldwide. The statute does not define “other” humanitarian purposes worldwide. This allows the DOD to carry out broader, more extensive HA projects. Projects that use contractors, to include the purchase of end items other than those used in connection with 10 USC 401 HCA activities, or involve the provision of training or technical

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assistance for humanitarian purposes, are carried out under this authority. It also allows more flexibility in emergencies, to include natural or man-made disasters. CA units may provide and coordinate FHA. Section 2561 does not require the promotion of operational readiness skills of the U.S. military participants and allows contracting for goods and services if necessary for mission execution. In addition, unlike HCA, which must be conducted in conjunction with an exercise or ongoing military operation, FHA can be conducted as a stand-alone project. The transport of USG-donated goods to a country in need often falls under this authority. 10 USC 402 applies when relief supplies are supplied by NGOs. 10 USC 2561 has been amended to allow the SecDef to use this authority to transport supplies intended for use to respond to or mitigate the effects of an event or condition that seriously threatens the environment (such as an oil spill) if other sources of transportation are not readily available.


OHDACA is a DOD account to which Congress appropriates funds. OHDACA funds are generally used to pay for operations and activities that are authorized by 10 USC 2561, HA, and demining under 10 USC 401. Even though the law specifically lists HCA and disaster relief as appropriate uses for the fund, the actual practice is that OHDACA funds are used to pay for activities authorized by 10 USC 2561.

Title 22, United States Code

Section 2292 through 2292k is the International Disaster Assistance Funds. The President may direct the DOD through the SecDef to respond to man-made or natural disasters. The President delegated disaster relief authority to the SecDef with concurrence of the DOS (except in emergencies). The DOD has limited authority to engage in disaster assistance. Through Section 2292, Congress and the President provide the authorization for the United States to provide assistance to certain countries. Generally, each section after 2292(b) will indicate particular countries that will be the intended recipient of this aid and

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additional countries will undoubtedly be added to the list as time goes on. In addition to funds mentioned in Title 10, the bulk of FHA operations may be funded IAW Section 2292.



Section 2151 is the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). The FAA is designed to focus on developing countries and provides economic, agricultural, medical, disaster relief, and other forms of assistance. The FAA also assists foreign countries in fighting internal and external aggression by providing various forms of military assistance upon request (and subject to Congressional approval). Despite a large DOD role in providing defense-related articles and services, the DOS controls the FAA. The FAA mandates close coordination and cooperation between the DOD and U.S. civilian agencies at all levels of the security assistance process.

Fiscal Law. A central legal consideration for commanders conducting FID operations is using the proper funding authorizations for the type of mission. The two major types of funding are FAA funds (see Title 22 discussion above) and O&M funds (see Title 10 discussion above).

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In most instances, commanders encounter problems in this area when they use O&M funds for projects that require FAA funding. The following fiscal principles should be observed when conducting FID operations to ensure that all activities are conducted within the limits of U.S. law:

- Commanders must be aware of fiscal law principles to avoid possible violation of Anti-Deficiency Act (Section 1341[a], Title 31, United States Code, and Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amounts). The Anti-Deficiency Act violations are reportable to Congress and carry both civil and criminal penalties. Commanders cannot make expenditures in advance or in excess of available appropriations.
- Commanders must ensure expenditures reasonably relate to the purpose of the appropriation.
- Commanders must not allow expenditures prohibited by law.
- Commanders must make sure the expenditure does not fall specifically within the scope of some other category of appropriation.
- Commanders must know that if two appropriations permit the expenditure, either may be used, but not in combination or interchangeably.

CA personnel assigned at all levels in an FHA operation will support the commander's CMO objectives by becoming familiar with the intricacies of these funding sources.

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ACRONYMS

AO	area of operation
AOR	area of responsibility
APEX	Adaptive Planning and Execution
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
CA	Civil Affairs
CACOM	Civil Affairs command
CAP	crisis action planning
CAPT	Civil Affairs planning team
CAT	Civil Affairs team
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR	combatant commander
CIM	civil information management
CJ-9	combined civil-military operations staff officer
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CLT	civil liaison team
CM	consequence management
CMAT	consequence management advisory team
CMO	civil-military operations

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CMOC	civil-military operations center
CNT	counter-narcoterrorism
COM	chief of mission
CONPLAN	concept plan
CONUS	continental United States
DART	disaster assistance response team
DATT	defense attaché
DC	dislocated civilian
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
DOS	Department of State
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EAP	emergency action plan
FAA	Foreign Assistance Act
FCM	foreign consequence management
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
FMO	financial management officer
FUNCPPLAN	functional plan
G-9	civil-military operations staff officer
GCC	geographic combatant commander

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GSO	governmental supply officer
GTA	graphic training aid
HA	humanitarian assistance
HACC	humanitarian assistance coordination center
HAST	humanitarian assistance survey team
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HMA	humanitarian mine action
HN	host nation
HOCC	humanitarian operations coordination center
HQ	headquarters
IAW	in accordance with
IGO	intergovernmental organization
IPI	indigenous populations and institutions
J-3	operations staff section
J-4	logistics staff section
J-5	plans staff section
J-9	civil-military operations staff section
JFC	joint force commander

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JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
JOA	joint operations area
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOPP	joint operation planning process
JP	joint publication
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTACE	joint technical advisory CBRN element
JTF	joint task force
MDMP	military decision-making process
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
NA	nation assistance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSC	National Security Council
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

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OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
O&M	operation and maintenance
OPLAN	operation plan
PDSS	predeployment site survey
PO	political officer
POC	point of contact
RSO	regional security officer
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
TSCP	theater security cooperation plan
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government

Terms

civil-military operations center (CMOC)

The civil-military operations center provides command and control and interagency coordination from the Civil Affairs Command through company level. (JP 3-57)

consequence management (CM)

Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. (JP 3-0)

foreign disaster relief

Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Normally, it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (JP 3-29)

foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA)

Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of

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the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and its possessions. (JP 3-29)

humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA)

Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly U.S. forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities; and (5) detection and clearance of land mines, including activities relating to the furnishing of education, training, and technical assistance with respect to the detection and clearance of land mines. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.

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UN-Sponsored Electronic Mine Information Network:

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